Bob Ross

Yeah, I see what you mean: I think that is the point of Job. However, I don't think we need to be able to give an account of what the perfectly good w...

Sounds good and I will listen to that video. Yes, your summary of my argument is correct. I am curious what your thoughts are on it.

Hello, friend! I've heard this rejoinder before, but the issue I take with it is that it absolves God of any moral responsibility. God is a person and...

. Aren't you a Christian?

Ah, so you are a functionalist, then? Functions point to ends; ends point to a form; and a form points to an essence. A "mind" as a mere function is a...

:up:

Ok, I think I am understanding it better now. My mistake was that I was thinking a substantial form is merely the self-actualizing principle of a bein...

The algorithm is hardcoded, but it only dictates the structure for the being to will towards its ends. We aren't talking about a being that has a prop...

I agree with you, but I do see the form of an alive being as analogous to how a form is baked into the chair. I think the robot example is going to fu...

I was thinking the material soul is baked into the matter like the form of a chair is baked into a chair; but it sounds like in your view that is not ...

But wouldn't a robot that could mechanistically grow, heal, etc. be self-unified towards certain ends? What I wondering is how would a material soul e...

To clarify, are you saying that a robot that has an inward self-actualizing principle towards specific ends (which provide its whatness) does not ther...

Aquinas, as far as I understand, did think the mind is immaterial. It is not half material and half immaterial (or something like that). In fact, he f...

Let me ask you a point of clarification: would you agree with the following? A soul is a substantial form and a substantial form is the self-actualizi...

True, but my point is that the mind is not a form and it is immaterial and it is infused with the body that is material; so the question arises: "how ...

If the mind is immaterial, then it has to be pure form because there is only form and matter. Are you suggesting an immaterial 'matter' that the intel...

But, again, then that admits that there is interaction, not in the sense of merely participation in a form, by the mind and body. No?

I guess it is metaphysically possible, but how does that work? Wouldn't there have to be some medium which supplies the imaginery to the agent intelle...

According to Aquinas, if I understand correctly, the intellect does not just witness the images: it (viz., the agent intellect) actively extracts the ...

I was using Aquinas' view that brain is capable of and does in fact produce images of things based off of the sensations; but that the agent intellect...

But triangularity is a form: the mind isn't a form. If it isn't a form then wouldn't it have to interact with things? Likewise, wouldn't that have to ...

What I am arguing is more like this: 1. Abstraction of a universal from phantasms requires interaction between the phantasm and the thing which abstra...

When you say 'man can have knowledge of all corporeal things', is this in the sense that if the a particular of any kind of given to the senses that t...

How does the concept of something not being a multiplicity entail it is a multiplicity that is one? For the point in space, assuming it is real, it wo...

In terms of distinguishing soul and mind, I agree; but that doesn't explain if Aristotle thought the mind is pure/substantial form like Aquinas; and i...

By pure form, I just meant substantial form like Aquinas thinks of. A kind of being which is not received by matter: it is just form itself subsisting...

So then we do agree that two purely ontologically simple beings are impossible, but the point if contention is that we can refer to something that is ...

Because they are ontologically absolutely simple; which means they are completely without anything which contributes to the whole but is not identical...

:up: Do you find his arguments compelling? Also, if the form of an organism extends to some other substantial, immaterial aspect (of a thinking facult...

Something being ontologically indistinguishable from another thing entails that they are the same thing because the concept of ontological (as opposed...

:up:

You continue to confuse moral facticity with inter-subjective agreement. A moral fact is not traditionally an 'imperative ought' where we ought to do ...

I partially agree. I don't think 'form' traditionally refers to some kind of transcendental idealistic 'idea' of a think attributed to it by cognition...

:up: I think I get where I was blundering: the fundamental material part would still be comprised of essence and esse, so it would not, in fact, be ab...

I agree but I don't see how this addresses the issue. E.g., circularity is not a part of a circle; but the atoms that compose the given circle are; an...

How does the idea that they have no matter but pure form not entail that matter is a kind of substrate of pure potentiality? Likewise, wouldn’t there ...

Yes, and without the form of clay the clay is just fine-grained mineral particles.

How do you define a part? Again, I defined it as something which contributes to the whole but is not identical to it. Nothing about a part in this sen...

My dearest condolences! :broken: She will be missed.

You are missing the point. Even if you accept that there can be a being of pure form, they would have immaterial parts. Parts comprise wholes; and my ...

Matter, in this sense, is still a constituent in a thing with parts; so either a composed being is composed infinitely or there is a part which is has...

I apologize: I forgot to respond. This wasn’t an analytic essay: the prose is provocative, pungent, and crude. I think provided explicated life paths ...

Again, this treats ‘matter’ as if it is a something that can be created by God to receive a form; and that, whereas, God can also create something whi...

This isn't a direct counter to my point. If you have finite divisibility, then you will end up with multiple absolutely simple beings (even if they ar...

I would say the existence (being), essence/form, and matter of a thing are all different but related aspects of it. The being is just what makes it re...

Got it. So, if I am understanding correctly, Aquinas does believe that matter is NOT merely that which is capable of receiving form but also is someth...

Yes, that is perfectly fine; and does not really deny that substance is comprised of matter and form. It’s an analogical account of God. We say God ha...

Fair enough. However, isn't he, then, implying that matter is something which something with parts, in principle, does not necessarily have? If so, th...

Yes, but then matter, albeit not pure matter in the sense of prime matter, is something separable, in principle, as its own entity. For something whic...

Thank you! That’s not your fault: I probably didn’t give you a title. I forgot about this exercise (: There’s purposefully many meanings to the narrat...