The man who desires bad, but does good
Greetings,
I have recently found a flaw in my own philosophical views, a bugging inconsistency.
Good is largely defined as what should be.
And a good thing is a thing that helps said good exist, as it should.
But then it would mean that a good person is someone who helps good exist, therefore someone that does good.
If that is the case, then a person that desires evil and does good would be a good person, and a person that desires good and does evil would be a bad person (we assume that a person can wish for evil).
That result seems incredibly unacceptable though. How can a man that wishes for evil and does good, therefore doing good by error, be a good man?
I have the feeling that my logic fails somewhere, but I cannot put my finger on it. Can anyone help?
I have recently found a flaw in my own philosophical views, a bugging inconsistency.
Good is largely defined as what should be.
And a good thing is a thing that helps said good exist, as it should.
But then it would mean that a good person is someone who helps good exist, therefore someone that does good.
If that is the case, then a person that desires evil and does good would be a good person, and a person that desires good and does evil would be a bad person (we assume that a person can wish for evil).
That result seems incredibly unacceptable though. How can a man that wishes for evil and does good, therefore doing good by error, be a good man?
I have the feeling that my logic fails somewhere, but I cannot put my finger on it. Can anyone help?
Comments (64)
Generally, or in western culture at least, we would say that intentions matter for determining what is a good action or not. So by that logic it would be impossible to desire evil and do good by accident.
In some other cultures intentions seem to matter less, and there it is perfectly possible to desire evil and do good by accident... because good or bad are evaluated purely based on actions.
If the good is accidental, there is no need to consider a moral agent at all. A tree is a good tree if it shelters me or bears fruit. But this is not 'good' in ethical terms. It would be illogical to instruct the surrounding trees to follow the example of the first.
This is why I find it illogical to construct an ethics of outcomes. One does not act according to outcomes; one acts according to intentions.
Quoting Matei
Logic can't help this scenario due to the absurd nature of human beings, morality, and human experience. There are many things that are illogical that exist.
But, to get to my point on your question, it depends on how we are judging the person. What code of morals are we judging this person by? And are these morals widely accepted or not? I say this because some people judge people good or bad by action, intention, or both.
Every human, if we remain in our lines of desiring good and bad and doing good and bad, is inconsistent or morals can't be widely accepted or judged on people. I have yet to meet or hear of a person who hasn't done good and bad and hasn't desired good and evil at some point in their lives. Do these things make that person wholly good or wholly bad? The fact that inconsistencies do exist--because of the absurd/illogical nature of human beings and their actions--illustrates that this isn't possible nor exists.
For example, let's take a hypothetical scenario.
A man is swimming in the water. His enemy is trying to shoot him. He misses and shoots a shark that was swimming under the water ready to eat the swimming man, and so saves the man swimming.
The intentions of the enemy were evil, but his actions saved a human being, therefore naming them evil too would be against common sense, but, by what you have said, they would, indeed, be evil.
I agree, but nonetheless some cultures apparently don't see agency as a central concept in morality. It's a descriptive claim, not necessarily rational or normative. Just picked that up from Sean Carroll's last podcast on W.E.I.R.D.- biases. The rough outline is that we westerners, and our conceptions, are in some respects not representative at all for whole of humanity. Individuality and notions of free will and agency are more typical for cultures that grew out of Christianity.
I think people, in Europe, generally would think that that action was evil... if they knew his intentions at least, which often isn't the case. But to be clear, intentions are not the only thing that matters. My point was just that they do, to some extend at least.
The whole idea that an intention should correspond to its results tacitly assumes there is a rational connection between the two. If you intend to "do good" and help an old woman across the street this is certainly more rational than embezzling a large amount of money in order to acquire the funds to start a company to end global hunger. So if someone either does good or evil "by accident" I'd say it usually indicates a very inferior kind of rational thought. And/or an accomplished degree of self-deception.
"Good is largely defined as what should be."
What do you mean "should be"?
Oh absolutely. The Iliad is chock full of people talking about evil arrows and evil spears and evil chariots. But then they don't mean what we mean by evil now.
What I meant was that any culture that holds a person to be evil for an accidental outcome of their benign actions but does not hold the tree to be evil for falling on granddad seems objectively inconsistent.
The definition of good is what should be. If something should be then it is good, and if something should not be then it is bad.
By should be I mean that it should exist. Justice is good, so it should exist. Slavery is bad, so it should not exist.
I think the intuitive answer is: he cannot.
Thus, it seems a good action requires both a just intention and the intended result.
We can attribute an unjust intention to malice, and an unintended result to ignorance.
And aren't they both great sources of what is traditionally regarded as evil?
No, wait, this doesn't make any sense. So, your definition of good is "what it should exist". So if a thing should exist, then is good. If not, is bad.
Then you make the example of Justice. You say that "Justice is good", so Justice should exist. That is correct, but why Justice is good? According to your definition Justice is good because it should exist. But Justice should exist because Justice is good.
Basically it seems that saying that something is good or saying that something should exist is exactly the same thing. Then you didn't provide an informative definition of what good is.
The question would be to what extent can good and evil be understood as objective categories? Even if you see good and evil as objective, who is able to judge and spell out their exact nature in applications for human affairs. I see the word 'bad' as a value judgement.
On a wider and deeper level, I would go on to ask: is there anything which is absolutely wrong? This specific question was once given to me as an essay title and it got me thinking, but I won't go on to share the conclusions I came to. I think that it is more useful to just pose the question, for you to reflect upon, in relation to the area of debate which you have raised.
I find this interesting...
One reason why could be that intentions themselves have no effect on others. I can intend to do harm all day, but no one will actually be harmed until I act, and even then only if I am successful. If no one is harmed, then what is there to justify any moral judgments made on intentions? Also, our intentions are, at least sometimes, caused by whatever outcomes we desire, or don’t desire. So I’m not sure it’s entirely accurate to say we don’t act on outcomes. If I had no desired outcome, I don’t think I would act at all. Why would I?
Sure, if we evaluate it in our moral frame it would be inconsistent.
Nothing to worry about too much, they'll be many more assuredly.
Quoting Matei
Yeah but that's just subjective. If aliens happen to exist, perhaps numbering in the trillions, and discover our history, where we are and that we're trying to colonize the universe, we'd probably just get blown up to be honest. And they would this call this good. And logic would agree. But would we? Etc, etc.
I thought he meant that we judge something on what the intended or desired outcome was, not on the actual outcome. And while that seems to be the case for the most part, it isn't that cut and dry. In certain cases we do think intent to harm isn't necessary for something to be immoral, like say in case of doing harm because of drunk driving or negligence.
If we do not act on our intentions, are they intentions? I think intentions do have effects on others, mediated by our actions (the things we intended to do).
Quoting Kenosha Kid
I think it would be impossible to justify commending someone who intends for something malevolent but inadvertently does good but I don't think it is impossible to condemn someone who intends good or does not intend harm but inadvertently does harm. Whether by negligence, incompetence, recklessness, carelessness or impulsiveness. Not necessarily so but I think we could come up with examples where people with good intentions acted thoughtlessly and caused harm and could be rightfully condemned for it.
There's also a list of actions which are considered immoral regardless of intention. Sometimes, we need to weigh up why someone did something as a mitigating feature, like a drug dealer who is just trying to survive or support a family but often that isn't enough. When their actions are causing harm or violating moral precepts, intent may not be accepted as excusing their immoral behaviour. Perhaps a drug dealer is too much, my intent isn't necessarily to give a cut and dry example because this area can be contentious in ethics. The point is that we cannot and do not simply excuse any or all behaviour based on intent and sometimes intent doesn't even excuse a person.
There's no logical inconsistency here, we hold humans to standards which we don't expect of trees or animals.
I do good, not because I wish to do good, but because the few I care about would suffer were I to do the evils I desire, therefore, due to self imposed restrictions of not wanting to cause my loved ones suffering, I restrain my true desires and continue to follow "Socially acceptable actions", despite knowing I am, in truth, living an exceedingly long winded lie.
The fundamental difference is that I am not doing good through error, I am doing good by choice, not because I prefer good, but because I am aware of the results my true desires would have on my few valued people, were I to indulge in these desires. Were these factors to be suddenly and irrevocably removed from my life, my choices would be very different. No longer would I choose to play nice.
Does that make me a good man thinking he is evil, or an evil man playing at being good?
Neither. It makes you a child. Nothing more, nothing less. Though the window of proper upbringing has come and gone, perhaps you could find solace in society ie. "socially acceptable actions" upon the realization the laws, systems, and orders in place are what allows you to have been raised as you were in the first place. You would not be you, as you are, alive, without the society that you claim to "choose to play nice" in. Show a little respect for what made you and continues to sustain you day after day, at the very least.
Exactly, I am a product of society. Apparently that causes you distress. Tell me again about this society that I am to find solace in, the one that created me.
I mean it's logically inconsistent in itself.
Yes, it depends. If the person didn't think because they didn't care, they are morally culpable. As for incompetence, it depends. An idiot is generally considered to have diminished responsibility.
I kinda figured you wouldn't let it go that easily :-).
I think I disagree, but i'm not entirely sure which is why I tried to avoid it. Logic pertains to language. The world cannot be logically inconsistent in itself, only statements we make about that world can.
So I think, concerning this specific point, if you have a totally different moral vocabulary, that doesn't include individuality, agency, free will, personal blame and the like, because they just don't exist yet, you presumably cannot really say it is logically inconsistent. It's logically inconsistent in those terms, but I wouldn't know if it was in their terms.
An example giving in the podcast was bloodfeuds of old, and how if one member of a clan did something wrong to a member of another clan, you could take compensation from any member of that clan, not just from the one that did wrong. And yes, if individuality isn't a thing yet, but their whole way of looking revolves around tribes and clans or any social unit, it isn't clear how intentions would play a role there.
I agree that both have to be considered, but neither are good/bad on their own. You can’t solely look at outcomes or intentions and derive a moral judgment based only on that. For example, is it wrong for me to shove pins in a Trump voodoo doll because I’m intending to do him harm? I don’t think it is since no harm is actually caused. It’s the same thing with outcomes. Is it wrong if a football player tackles another player and unintentionally injures him? Again, I would answer no.
I always thought so, but maybe we’re thinking of the term differently. I think of intentions as whatever it is you want to do, regardless of whether or not you have the means to do them, or are capable of doing them, etc.
Yes, I think it also depends on the circumstances what will be considered and what not, which is not saying much, I know... but it is complex and probably not reducible to simple uniform principles.
Shooting at someone with a gun but missing, would be considered morally wrong, but shoving pins in a voodoo doll is not... both have the same intention and and the same outcome, but they are judged differently. So aside from outcomes and intentions, what kind of action also seems to matter.
The football example is actually an interesting one, because in football (and I'm talking about soccer here) they have very clear rules about what kind of tackles are allowed and which are not. Intentions usually are not considered in determining whether the player has made a fault. Either way such a tackle usually isn't considered morally wrong, even if it was a fault. But if you were to tackle someone outside of a football-field then it would be considered morally wrong. Intention to harm is assumed because why would you be tackling someone otherwise. So here we have basically the same actions that are judged completely differently because context matters.
Agreed. I suppose whether or not the act actually has the potential to cause harm is the determining factor when evaluating intentions? Using a voodoo doll hasn’t been shown to have the potential to cause harm, whereas being shot obviously has.
Quoting ChatteringMonkey
I was referring to American football, but either one illustrates the point, I think. The context being that all parties involved in the game have consented to play it with the full knowledge that certain physical contact is allowed and could cause injury (I’m referring to legal tackles here, which could still lead to injury).
However, I wonder if there have been any cases, in any sport, where legal charges were filed due to excessive or malicious use of force (think fights in hockey where actual weapons (hockey sticks) have been used)? I know in American football, some illegal hits carry the additional burden of being judged as immoral as well. These are hits that are obviously done to intentionally injure a player.
One example:
There definitely have been in soccer, and in other sports like cycling too I think. Consent typically doesn't overrule criminal law if lack of consent isn't part of what constitutes the crime (whereas it does overrule civil law) because it isn't deemed a matter between the parties only, but also a matter of the state... which is why you have a public prosecutor.
Ah. "I cannot swim so will not swim but intend to swim." To me that's erroneous. An intention to me is an intent to act. I think that's typical.
I'd consider drunk driving a case of negligence. And what makes negligence what it is is your failure to act according to your duties before the outcome is unavoidable.
Using the drunk driving example: if there is a chance you'll end up drunk driving, don't drink in the first place.
Quoting Pinprick
But if you're certain that this cannot work, you're not actually intending harm - you're just pretending to. And if you think there's a chance it might work, it seems to me that it would be wrong.
You're right that intentions and outcomes cannot be looked at separately though, because intention, in the moral sense, is selecting an action based on a desired outcome and given ability to bring it about.
Quoting ChatteringMonkey
But is this a sign of different moral approaches or merely of different factual information? We always have to infer the intentions of others from outcomes.
Football players also agree to a specific game with specific written and unwritten rules. Which is why things that would otherwise be considered assault aren't if they can still be considered part of the game.
Quoting Echarmion
This was an example to illustrate that intention doesn't always matter. Maybe you intent to drive while drunk, but you don't intent to harm somebody. The harm done is an accident, made more probable because you are drunk but still an accident. Unless you are going to say that it is driving drunk itself that is immoral, regardless of whether you hit someone or not. But I don't think that's how we typically look at it, it does seem to matter that you hit someone or not.
Quoting Echarmion
Yes I agree, maybe it wasn't a good example for the point being discussed. I though it interesting because it illustrates the complexity of judging a certain situation in todays world. You have the rules of the game, you have the law,... and then you also have morality? Makes you wonder where morality actually comes into play.
It is best illustrated by the events that unfolded earlier today in the U.S. Capitol. One person, unfortunately, was killed. I would compare these to hypothetical (some not) numbers of fatalities that would arise if others in another country decided to encroach their government buildings, numbers amounting to human lives lost that will never be heard of.
In most modern societies, you have a right to insult and make just short of literal death threats toward elected leaders. You can oppose the government openly, vehemently, and on occasion, successfully. Your ancestors, whether you know or accept it or not, were more than likely highly dependent and faithful toward religion, or their idea of a god or supreme being. They considered all their successes, gains, etc. as solely from said entity. So much so they allowed "the reigns to be loosened" so that us modern folk can live as we more or less please, provided basic decencies or at least egregious crimes
are recognized as they are.
Perhaps they were wrong, god did not exist and all successes and contingent rewards or gains were and are based solely on human endeavor, be it moral or otherwise. Perhaps not. You seem to have made your choice. Let others make theirs.
Look at it in terms of probabilities. A good man is trying to do good. While sometimes they may do evil, it is unintentional and therefore less likely. Further, if they realize they've done evil, a good man will correct it.
Take the opposite view with an evil man. An evil person will attempt to do evil. While sometimes they may do good, it is unintentional and therefore less likely. Further, if they realize they've done good, an evil man will correct it.
I'd most definetly say that driving drunk is immoral regardless of whether or not you have an accident. It's also illegal in most countries, I'd wager. The immoral intention here is not to cause harm, but rather to intentionally ignore a rule that ensures everyone's safety for your own benefit. A case might be made for a situation where you didn't expect to get drunk but honestly miscalculated the effect the drinks would have, but that's a rather fringe case.
Quoting ChatteringMonkey
I'd say on all levels, more or less. The rules of the game could itself be immoral, and so might the law. But the law might also be based on morality, but be less exacting.
I consider morality the principle according to which we individually choose our actions in accordance with reason. Rules we make - for games or in the form of laws, should conform to morality insofar as they do make provisions, but they do not need to (and arguably shouldn't) require fully moral actions. I.e. not everything that's immoral should be illegal, but by and large everything that is moral should also be legal.
Ok, I think I agree with most of your points.
Just to clarify though, you say
Quoting Echarmion
I take it that you mean that, even though we choose individually, the principle according to which we choose is the same for everybody, universal?
Where caution should be heeded is acknowledging the circumstance or trials in which the failure occurred. Not everyone goes through the exact same things under the exact same circumstances.
So you mean if you’re incapable of performing the act, for whatever reason, then you cannot intend to do it? I’m just not quite understanding how you differentiate between desiring to do something, and intending to, unless you’re just saying intention is a specific type of desire to act; one where the agent is actually capable of doing so.
If so, that seems odd to me, because I can start off simply desiring to, let’s say, swim, which is something I currently cannot do. Then, once I learn how to swim, the same internal feeling of desiring to swim becomes an intention, simply because I now know how to.
But what is there to make it wrong? There’s essentially no outcome, and no one is harmed, so why call it wrong?
If you know you are incapable of the act, then it is logically impossible to intend to do it, yes. Intent is teleological.
Well we assume it is. We cannot really know, since we only have access to our own reasoning. So the principle would have to be something universal according to our own reasoning.
Quoting Pinprick
This requires answering the question why we call anything "wrong". I'd argue that, insofar as "right" and "wrong" have a unique purpose, that purpose is to tell us how we should act. And since we're neither omniscient nor omnipotent, it follows that what is wrong can only be an intention - something aimed at an outcome for a given reason - not the outcome itself.
Ok, I expected you to make a stronger claim to universality because of the next sentences you wrote :
Quoting Echarmion
The idea that the rules we make and laws we vote should to be in accordance with morality, only really makes sense if there is one universal morality, right?
I mostly wanted to distance myself from the idea of a "divine logos" or similar. I only have access to my own reasoning. The best I can do is vet my reasoning by having other look for flaws. But even if all humans agreed to a principle, we could not technically be sure that it's universal in the ontological sense.
Some alien might come along with entirely alien reasoning. Our principles wouldn't be universal to them.
Quoting ChatteringMonkey
Universal among the moral subjects, yes. But since it's unlikely we'll ever all agree on just what that universal morality is, we'll always have to hope we're not mistaken.
You derive the universality from a shared biology then? While I would agree that we have many more similarities than differences because of our shared biology, there are differences too... so it seems to me that could only make for a tentative universalism at best.
Quoting Echarmion
Quoting Echarmion
So you think differences in moral evaluation can only be a matter of flawed reasoning? To me it does seem like there are also differences in moral evaluations not because of flawed reasoning, but because of genuine different values.
Yes, you could say that. Though my metaphysics skew constructivist, so I'd say shared mental faculties.
Quoting ChatteringMonkey
I think our shared reasoning is pretty fundamental. Pretty much everyone agrees with the scientific method, for example, even those who completely disagree with some of it's commonly accepted findings. The concepts we represent by basic propositional logic or algebra are accessible to anyone who we ordinarily consider sane.
Quoting ChatteringMonkey
Yes. Though I would qualify this by saying that no-one has flawless reasoning all the time, so I'd nevertheless expect there to always be different moral evaluations.
Quoting ChatteringMonkey
People have genuinely different values, but I consider the aim of a moral philosophy to moderate the expression of these values so that they can coexist.
A bit one dimensional. It makes you nothing other than you were before said endeavor, with the exception it can be said you indeed "failed" in the scope of that one specific endeavor. If I experience an injury it doesn't make me "an injury", now does it? Granted, some words used today are useful for grounding a person in the spirit of improvement and betterment of one's self as well as encouraging them to gain more knowledge and better understanding of said failed endeavor before attempting it again. We've all lost or otherwise failed in something or another. We've also all won or otherwise succeeded in other things. Why should one or even many failures or successes be internalized as a defining characteristic of one's true self? What if I lose a game of chess, yet win two. Or even lose five and win five. Is it a matter of numbers of occurrences or simply the most recent outcome you believe, technically, defines a person.
Besides, there are instances of non-completed endeavors (with the exception of time-sensitive, numerically measurable goals ie. losing 20 pounds before Christmas or being able to add 50 pounds to one's weightlifting max before the end of Summer) that are far from failure. For example, perhaps I inspired others who will accomplish said goals in a way better than I could or would be comfortable risking at the time. Perhaps I discovered said goals were not as useful in the long term as was first believed or that they were even detrimental.
Perhaps, the only true failure in life is failing to learn from one's failures. And perhaps the only true success in life is learning to take one's inevitable losses gracefully when they do occur, and one's successes with a sense of gratitude absent of all pride. Not everybody can do it, you know. For does all success in this life not come with a poisoned chalice of complacency, dooming all would partake from it to an even greater and insidious failure? One that disguises and manifests itself as the opposite? Perhaps these are just mere words of encouragement for all who may benefit from them- the afflicted, the downtrodden, those without hope. Perhaps not. Who's to say.
I'd call myself a moral constructivist, and I'd say the 'local universalism' comes from shared culture and shared values, more than any shared attributes we may have, although those are probably a prerequisite for having a shared culture to begin with, sure.
Quoting Echarmion
Yeah I'm not so sure about that, I think history would beg to differ. I came to this thread having just listened to a podcast about WEIRD-biases. And if we put some belief in that research, it seems like a lot of our reliance on reason and our moral way of looking at things is historically contingent. Myth and tradition were for the largest part of history what determined morality, not reason... although reason played a role there too, no doubt.
Quoting Echarmion
Ok but then you don't have one morality, right? Unless you think different values need not imply different moral evaluations.
Sounds interesting. Can you point me to it? I have read a bit about common cognitive biases on Eliezer Yudkowsky's blog. The fact that there are biases that pretty much everyone has points to a significant amount of shared mental machinery. Yudkowsky also argues that from an evoltionary perspective, you would expect all brains to be very much alike in terms of hard-wired logic, since it's more or less impossible that a mutation would lead to a different but viable system.
Quoting ChatteringMonkey
Well, it's true that we can never be actually sure whether or not what we think is reason is not just a rationalisation of myth or tradition. It probably often is. But this seems to be one of those dilemmas that you can only get out of by asserting a solution. And morality is a practical field. So it makes sense to me to say that, insofar as we are all capable of reason, we should try to find universal principles to base our actions on. This will have the highest likelyhood of giving us true - if no necessarily objective - results.
Quoting ChatteringMonkey
To be honest, after writing my first reply I noticed I was confused about the concept of value in the first place. What are examples of the kind of values we talk about here? Something like a specific religious creed, or something more abstract?
Sure, it was the mindscape podcast, with guess Joseph Henrich. He has written a few books on the topic I saw.
The question then presumably is how much is hard-wired and how much is left to culture? One of the interesting things about us humans is that we do have that ability to transmit idea's that are not hard-wired in our genes, which could in turn have played a role in our evolution by replacing some of the traits that were hard-wired.... making us generally more adaptable. From what I've gathered it's quite common in evolution that new developed traits can make older traits obsolete and disappear, because they are not selected for anymore if the new traits fulfills a certain function better.
Quoting Echarmion
Yes ok, I agree with this insofar reason definitely plays and should play a role, but that role is I think ultimately only instrumental and not the bases of our valuations. So if you value X, then by way of correct reasoning you would get an objective answer to the question of how to act. But that value X is not objectively derivable from the world or reason alone, but comes from our affects. I'll try to explain what I mean with value below...
Quoting Echarmion
I do tend to throw that word around semi-consciously.... but they are indeed something more general and abstract. Examples would be something like freedom, security, quality of life etc. These are general ideas that capture the things we find the most important, and we use them as standards to measure other things by... and we also weight them against eachother to order them in some kind of hierarchy. That's where people typically will have different opinions, one person will value security over freedom, and another the other way around.
Right, but intentions aren’t acts, so how can the be called right/wrong?
Intentions are what determines your actions though. You have a principle (or maxim) by which you select outcomes, and then you select a specific path for you to take from the current status quo to the outcome, and that is the intention.
So which is it that’s wrong, our actions, or their causes?
The two cannot be disentangled for the purpose of morality, but if we're talking about selecting a moral course of action, then right and wrong must already apply to the selection process.
I think I’m fine with that, but this doesn’t imply that if you intend to do harm, but aren’t successful, that you’ve still done something wrong, because that would mean that intentions, even in isolation, are wrong in and of themselves.
Are you referring to a scenario where you wish someone harm, but don't actually do anything you expect to harm them?
In that case I'd agree, such wishing is without moral relevance.
Thanks!
Quoting ChatteringMonkey
Difficult to answer, certainly, but I see no indication stuff like the scientific method requires a specific cultural background to understand. And in terms of morality, there is some significant overlap in ground rules. You'll find very similar structures of mutual assistance in band-level societies across the globe, rules of hospitality, limitations on violent conflict within groups. These seem all based on basic logic.
Quoting ChatteringMonkey
Could we say these are related to the "meaning of life"? That the values, insofar as they're not cynically used, are what you actually consider the conditions for your life's "success"?
Quoting ChatteringMonkey
I think that there is one exception to this, and that is basically the principle to respect other valuations as equal to yours. Or put in other words to treat every other subject as an end (ultimate value) in itself. That's a position you can adopt regardless of what it is you value, because we can logically recognise that everyone could simultaneously adopt it without compromising anyone's values.
I would respond that said man is an inept, but evil man. Electing to do evil, failing at it, thereby accomplishing good, is still evil, as action and intent are in step and seek the same goal: evil. That the result is not evil does not change the intent and action behind the result.