Memory Vs Imagination
The received wisdom regarding the two notions - memory & imagination - is that they're not the same. In the simplest of terms memory is about things that have happened and imagination is about things that didn't or even things that will never happen with the caveat that the framework knowledge that makes things imagined impossible.
So far so good.
At this point, let's take a closer look at memory and imagination. Note how they were differentiated - in terms of having occured (memory) and not having occured (imagination). Nothing amiss (or so it seems).
Another fact, the critical fact as far as this discussion is concerned, is that in terms of quality meant as those purely mental characteristics that go into forming the images that both memory and imagination evoke, those images themselves constituting the phenomena of memory and imagination as experienced by the mind. Consider quality as herein relevant to be those features of the mental image, be it a memory or pure imagination, that define its status as a mental phenomena.
As an analogy, if one takes two pictures with the same camera, these pictures will have a quality that give it a certain character that help us infer their sameness, their sameness in being photographs and perhaps even identify the particular camera which was used.
Returning to the matter of memory and imagination, both images of memory and imagination have the same quality i.e. insofar as the images evoked themselves are concerned, we can't distinguish between memory and imagination. As mentioned above, the two (memory and imagination) are distinguished in terms of whether the mental image in question has actually happened (memory) or not (imagination).
Here's where things get interesting. The only evidence that something has happened is our memory of it and that implies there's a circularity in our argument for distinguishing memory from imagination. I present the following conversation between two imaginary friends, John and Jane
Jane: I have a memory of x. I have an image of x in my mind.
John: How do you know that the image x in your mind is a memory and not your imagination? [because there's no difference in quality between the images that are classified as memory and the images that are classified as imagination]
Jane: I know it's a memory because x happened
John: How do you know x happened?
Jane: I know x happened because I have a memory of x.
John: How do you know that the image x in your mind is a memory and not your imagination? [circling back to the first question he asked Jane]
To counter this one might refer to the practice of corroboration - using other people to confirm that an image in our mind is a memory rather than an imagination - but the same argument can be made for any number of people.
In essence, as a purely mental effort, we can't distinguish between imagination and memory. Does this mean that our imaginations could actually be memories or, what for me is the more implausible alternative, that memories are imaginations?
:chin:
So far so good.
At this point, let's take a closer look at memory and imagination. Note how they were differentiated - in terms of having occured (memory) and not having occured (imagination). Nothing amiss (or so it seems).
Another fact, the critical fact as far as this discussion is concerned, is that in terms of quality meant as those purely mental characteristics that go into forming the images that both memory and imagination evoke, those images themselves constituting the phenomena of memory and imagination as experienced by the mind. Consider quality as herein relevant to be those features of the mental image, be it a memory or pure imagination, that define its status as a mental phenomena.
As an analogy, if one takes two pictures with the same camera, these pictures will have a quality that give it a certain character that help us infer their sameness, their sameness in being photographs and perhaps even identify the particular camera which was used.
Returning to the matter of memory and imagination, both images of memory and imagination have the same quality i.e. insofar as the images evoked themselves are concerned, we can't distinguish between memory and imagination. As mentioned above, the two (memory and imagination) are distinguished in terms of whether the mental image in question has actually happened (memory) or not (imagination).
Here's where things get interesting. The only evidence that something has happened is our memory of it and that implies there's a circularity in our argument for distinguishing memory from imagination. I present the following conversation between two imaginary friends, John and Jane
Jane: I have a memory of x. I have an image of x in my mind.
John: How do you know that the image x in your mind is a memory and not your imagination? [because there's no difference in quality between the images that are classified as memory and the images that are classified as imagination]
Jane: I know it's a memory because x happened
John: How do you know x happened?
Jane: I know x happened because I have a memory of x.
John: How do you know that the image x in your mind is a memory and not your imagination? [circling back to the first question he asked Jane]
To counter this one might refer to the practice of corroboration - using other people to confirm that an image in our mind is a memory rather than an imagination - but the same argument can be made for any number of people.
In essence, as a purely mental effort, we can't distinguish between imagination and memory. Does this mean that our imaginations could actually be memories or, what for me is the more implausible alternative, that memories are imaginations?
:chin:
Comments (23)
Yeah it's fairly fundamental, the distinction between fact and fiction, and unfortunately, as a matter of psychological fact, it is quite easy to implant false memories.
The moral of this is twofold; stay away from psychologists, and make a habit of telling the truth, lest you come to believe your own bullshit (see also confabulation).
The weird thing is the visual impression with that memory has changed over time. It still feels just as strong a memory. It used to be in first person, now it's in third person. The bathroom I have the memory in changed from one house I lived in as a kid to another, judging by the detail in the visual impression. How I remember it doesn't line up with the facts that I can independently verify.
I don't think memory is like a photograph of the past, it's more like a caricature.
I have the same thing with dreams, and it's my impression that during the dream, I flip between first and third person often.
I have had the thought that you can almost see the construction of self in this phenomenon, as if something is inferring there "needs to be" a subject for the experience and then making one.
Quoting TheMadFool
Highly unlikely, you know it really happened, compared to your imagination.
My take is that it is the same principle with souvenirs vs memory, it's not about one being more real or reliable than the other, but about memory being more shelled and less prone to modification/diformation, older evolutionarily.
I know this is not true. Age 4-5, my family went to Scotland where we lived for almost a year. I have very many vivid memories of this trip - places, animals, events - seeing a hedgehog on the grounds of Edinburgh Castle, seeing a beehive with my father shining a torch on it, many scenes from the ship going over there, where the piano was in the house we lived in, my mother playing that piano. I certainly accept that my current recollection of those events is enhanced by imagination, but they are events that occured and I recall them.
The bulbous center of the wheel cover on a ‘52 Chrysler is bigger than the entire hand of a 3yo.
Souvenir fabrication, my ass.
Quoting TheMadFool
Since I haven’t read anybody mention it yet, imaginations are willed at the time experienced, memories (be they false memories or not) are not willed at the time experienced. At most one wills to recall a memory, rather than having the memory enter one’s awareness on its own. But one never will’s the memory’s contents into psychological existence, else one knows oneself to be willfully imagining things.
[Un-willed imaginings that occur during awakened states, on the other hand, are often enough ascribed to various mental disorders - be these mild, transitive, and generally normal (like a brief hallucination of seeing an animal in a dark corner when it was just wind-blown leaves, which is still a hallucination) or, else, psychological conditions that can be more debilitating.]
In case one asks “how does one know what one wills and what one does not”: One knows this via immediate awareness of oneself as a first-person awareness that engages in volitions.
In the end I think It is incorrect to completely separate these two aspects which partly form the amazing energy known as thought, for lack of looking at the bigger picture which constitutes the whole.
It may help to add in the distinction between the whole and its parts. The relationship between the whole and its parts has been discussed since at least Plato, and GE Moore wrote that “ a thing becomes intelligible first when it is analysed into its constituent concepts”.
IE, I would suggest that we can only imagine a whole object if we already have a memory of the parts of the object. This whole object may or not exist in the world. For example, I can only imagine the whole object "unicorn" because I have the memory of its parts - the tusk of a narwhal and the body of a horse. I cannot think of an example at the moment whereby I can imagine a whole object without having a memory of its real parts, in that I am not able to imagine a part for which I don't have a pre-existing memory.
As regards the question "is our imagination memories", I would say that our imagination of a whole object is our memory of its parts.
To have categories like false memories and confabulation suggests that there are true memories and my aim in this thread is to demonstrate that there can be no such thing at all - memory is indistinguishable from imagination insofar as (an attempt to) distinguishing the two is a purely mental exercise.
What I mean is if a group of people were to gather in a room and discuss their "memories" with no recourse to any other means of confirming them, they wouldn't be able to tell apart memory from imagination - no mental features help to make that distinction.
If so, some other means of confirming that a particular image in a person's mind is actually a memory becomes necessary. Suppose, for the sake of argument, someone claims that fae has a device that'll help determine whether a particular image in a person's mind is a memory and not an imagination - call this method Memory Confirmation Device (MCD). The MCD itself has to be a memory device for the simple reason that the issue at hand is the past and the only way to access the past is with memories, memories stored on an appropriate medium.
Suppose now that you, on 20/11/2020 (today), have an image in your mind that has the date stamp 2/3/2020 and (necessarily that) you don't know if it's a memory or an imagination. You pull out the latest hand-held MCD and check - it has a record, dated 2/3/2020, that matches the image in your mind. You conclude, with much glee, that the image in your mind is a memory and not an imagination.
You forget what now seems to be a minor issue and spend your day having a blast with your friends. As night falls you're exhausted, return home, change into your pyjamas and call it a day. At the stroke of midnight you suddenly get up, all confused now, with a question in your mind, "how the hell do I know that the MCD is correct?"
You realize, deeply distressed at this point, that the fancy hand-held MCD you possess itself needs some other device to confirm the events recorded actually took place. There's no difference between the hand-held MCD you have and your brain insofar as credibility of the events recorded on them are concerned.
The event on 2/3/2020 occurred, the MCD would report because it has a memory of it (the matching record) but then the question, how certain are we that that particular MCD memory (the record) isn't a malfunction artifiact? [In human terms, how do we know that the memory isn't imagination?] The answer will be, has to be, that the event dated 2/3/2020 did occur unlike a malfunction artificact which didn't. But then the only evidence we have that the 2/3/2020 event occured is the MCD memory (record) itself and we don't know if the MCD has malfunctioned or not. We're now caught in a vicious circle.
You (to me): I know the image I have in my mind of an event dated 2/3/2020 actually happened because my cute little hand-held MCD has a record of it.
Question 1. Me: How do you know the MCD record on the event dated 2/3/2020 is a correct (in the sense is a true record of an actual past event?
You: Because the event dated 2/3/2020 occurred
Question 2. Me: How do you know that the event dated 2/3/2020 occurred?
You: Because there's a record on the MCD.
Me: Go to Question 1
:chin:
Ok. But since I cannot tell that you said that or presented any argument for it, it's not worth responding.
Quoting TheMadFool
Is this not an argument?
To answer question 1 in your (our) favor means confirmation that the MCD record is correct (in the sense is a true record of an actual past event)
To answer question 2 in your (our) favor is to know for certain that a given event did occur in the past.
To answer question 1 in your favor you need an answer to question 2 in your favor but to answer question 2 in your favor you need an answer to question 1 in your favor. Vicious circle?! The memory is the evidence for a past event having occurred but the past event having occurred is the evidence for the memory. You can't know if it's a memory unless it's an actual past event but you can't know if it's an actual past event unless it's a memory. Something is a memory only if it's an actual past event but something is an actual past event only if it's a memory. You can't know one without knowing the other. Reminds me of yin-yang and the problem of the criterion.
I don't know. Do you remember making an argument, or did you imagine making one?
That proves my point, doesn't it? :lol:
No, it presumes your point, and concludes that nothing can at all be known because knowledge can only be of the past. Accordingly it ceases to engage in the discussion. It constitutes a reductio ad mad folly argument.
Oh, wait, a faulty imagination: I got it backwards. It was a remembrance of the Houyhnhnms that gave me pause.
Yea, doesn't quite work.
Can memory be distinguished from imagination ?
John Locke (1632-1704) and David Hume (1711-1776) have made the argument that the basic building blocks of all thought are simple ideas, or more precisely, in Hume’s terminology, simple impressions – single colours, single shapes, single smells and so on.
When we have a memory of an object or we imagine an object, we have to make the distinction as to whether the object we are thinking about is a complex thought or a simple impression, in that a complex whole is built from a set of simple parts.
Complex thoughts such as unicorns, government, justice, buildings, ie, the whole object. Simple impressions such as red, square, bitter, loud, ie, the parts of the object.
Therefore, we have two types of memories - memories of complex thoughts and memories of simple impressions.
It may be difficult to distinguish whether our memories of complex thoughts, such as unicorns and mountains, are real or fictive. However, our memories of simple impressions, such as the colour red, must be real. IE, all our memories of simple impressions must have been experienced through our senses, in that it is not possible for the mind to invent simple impressions. For example, someone who is colour blind and unable to experience through their senses the simple impression of the colour red will not be able to invent the experience of redness in their minds. Therefore, all our memories of simple impressions, such as the colour red, must be based on real experiences.
A memory of a complex thought may be real or fictive. However, when having a memory of a simple impression I know that I cannot have imagined it, and the remembered experience must have been real.
Therefore, it is possible to distinguish some memories from imagination.
Do you have a refutation for my argument? By the way thanks for reminding me of false memories and confabulation. It fits perfectly in with my argument.
Well, let's look at it from the perspective of two people, one with normal vision (X) and the other color-blind to red ( Y ). Imagine now that both are walking together down a busy street and they both see a woman in red. They walk past, nothing remarkable happens, and they stop at their favorite café. They order the usual and begin to discuss the woman in red. X has an mental image of the woman in red in in vivid colors and Y has a mental image of the woman in red missing the color red.
Is it possible for X to determine that the woman in red is a memory or an imagination? No, as per my argument. Is it possible for Y to come to any definite conclusion that the woman in red is a memory and not an imagination. Again, no. The color red as a relevant factor in making the distinction between memory and imagination is, hence, null and void. After all, the Y can't tell the difference between imagination and memory and likewise for X. It doesn't make sense to draw any conclusions about reality, specifically the reality of the past, by comparing two mental images both of which could be the work of our imagination. It's somewhat like comparing unicorns to dragons, both imaginary, and inferring from that comparison a proposition about reality itself.
Did you make an argument?
1. Neo: I have a mental image of Trinity. It's a memory.
2. Agent Smith: How do you know it's a memory and not an imagination.
3. Neo: It's a memory because it happened
4. Agent Smith: How do you know it happened.
5. Neo: It happened because I have a memory.
6. Agent Smith: Go to line 2
Neo's claim that the image of Trinity in his mind is a memory is based on it having happened but it having happened is based on the image of Trinity in his mind being a memory. Ergo, my argument, a circularity in Neo's logic.
To further clarify:
1. If it's a memory then it happened
2. If it happened then it's a memory
To establish if it happened, I need to prove it's a memory but to demonstrate it's a memory, I need to prove it happened. I can't do one without the other which means I can do neither.
There are two different situations. First, having a complex thought such as "woman in red" and second, having a simple impression such as "colour red", where a complex thought is a set of simple impressions.
As regards the complex thought "woman in red", I agree that person X may not be able to directly distinguish between memory and imagination (though they may be able to distinguish using indirect means such as reason and logic)
However, as regards the simple impression "colour red", person X can distinguish memory from imagination as they know that their memory of the colour red must have come from a real experience, and therefore they cannot have imagined it. It is true that person X may not be able to accurately remember the circumstance in which they experienced the colour red, but this doesn't affect the fact that they know their memory of the experience of the colour red was not imagined.
IE, is it possible to give one example of a memory of a simple impression - a particular sight (eg, red) , sound (eg, loud) , smell (eg, acrid), taste (eg, bitter) or touch (eg, hot) - that has never been experienced through the senses but invented in the mind. If not, then, in this situation, memory can be distinguished from imagination as none of these memories can have been imagined.
What we can express more concretely, are memories which are backed up with evidence beyond a reasonable doubt and aren't just circumstantial imaginations disguised as memories.
for example, i have a memory of the Chicago Bulls beating The Lakers; immediately after the game i am able to recall who scored at various points in the game with my friends who also agree on the sequence of events which took place. We then go home and rewatch the game on television and various spectators recordings on YouTube - this public record of history reinforces the memories i recalled immediately after the game before rewatching them.
Despite this, my memories immediately after the game contained some imaginary elements due to the fact i could not recall the event on a timestamped granular level, however my broad memories of the game were correct as they actually happened.
Could we have a robust legal system whereby witnesses were required if memories were indistiguinshable from imaginations? possibly not, but indubitable evidence would possibly plug the difference...