Descartes Hyperjumping To Conclusions
Descartes says: Cogito, ergo, sum. I think. Therefore, I am.
The basic idea behind Descartes' argument, in a linguistic sense, is that the verb (act of thinking) entails a subject (that which is doing the thinking)
Hyperdrive (noun): An engine that allows spaceships to travel faster than light
Hyperjump (verb): To travel faster than light using a hyperdrive.
Anti-Descartes says: The spaceship D-105A is now hyperjumping to sector T23 in the Andromeda galaxy.
There's a verb, hyperjump but, because we know faster than light travel is impossible, it follows that the subject, the hyperjumper (D-105A) doesn't exist.
In other words, that there's a valid verb denoting an action doesn't imply the existence of a subject capable of that action.
A major point of difference between Descartes and Anti-Descartes is that thinking is real - we all think and that's proof - but hyperjumps and hyperdrives, unfortunately, aren't real and that's a Sunday punch for where, you might've already guessed by now, I want to take this thread. After all, there's a difference between real and not real and my argument makes the case of an action (verb) not necessarily implying an actor (subject) only in the latter. In the real world, an action necessarily implies an actor; a verb, assuredly, a subject for that verb.
However, take a moment to consider the last sentence in the paragraph above viz. "in the real world, an action necessarily implies an actor; a verb, assuredly, a subject for that verb". How do we know this? Well, if I'm anywhere near the truth, this principle (action implying an actor; verb implying a subject for that verb) is derived from the "real" world. I put real in quotes because, according to Descartes, the "real" world could, well, be not real and that throws a giant spanner in the works for nothing true could be/can be gleaned from the not real and that includes the foundational premise in Descartes' argument viz. actions (verb) imply an actor (subject). It's a premise derived from what is quite possibly an illusory world, a world that's not real and being so it loses its potency to such an extent I must add that Descartes' cogito ergo sum argument is blown clean out of the water.
In summary, the first step in my argument was to show that there's no necessary connection between actions and actors, between verb and subject. This was demonstrated in terms of a world that is not real [hyperjump (verb/action) and hyperjumper (subject/actor)]. The expected response is that in the "real" world there's a necessary connection between action and actor, between verb and subject. This, however, was shown to be a case of inferring from a world which according to Descartes' himself could be an illusion or not real and therefore unreliable or simply useless to make an inference about the real.
The cogito ergo sum is an unsound argument. It can't prove that thinkers exist just because thinking takes place.
The basic idea behind Descartes' argument, in a linguistic sense, is that the verb (act of thinking) entails a subject (that which is doing the thinking)
Hyperdrive (noun): An engine that allows spaceships to travel faster than light
Hyperjump (verb): To travel faster than light using a hyperdrive.
Anti-Descartes says: The spaceship D-105A is now hyperjumping to sector T23 in the Andromeda galaxy.
There's a verb, hyperjump but, because we know faster than light travel is impossible, it follows that the subject, the hyperjumper (D-105A) doesn't exist.
In other words, that there's a valid verb denoting an action doesn't imply the existence of a subject capable of that action.
A major point of difference between Descartes and Anti-Descartes is that thinking is real - we all think and that's proof - but hyperjumps and hyperdrives, unfortunately, aren't real and that's a Sunday punch for where, you might've already guessed by now, I want to take this thread. After all, there's a difference between real and not real and my argument makes the case of an action (verb) not necessarily implying an actor (subject) only in the latter. In the real world, an action necessarily implies an actor; a verb, assuredly, a subject for that verb.
However, take a moment to consider the last sentence in the paragraph above viz. "in the real world, an action necessarily implies an actor; a verb, assuredly, a subject for that verb". How do we know this? Well, if I'm anywhere near the truth, this principle (action implying an actor; verb implying a subject for that verb) is derived from the "real" world. I put real in quotes because, according to Descartes, the "real" world could, well, be not real and that throws a giant spanner in the works for nothing true could be/can be gleaned from the not real and that includes the foundational premise in Descartes' argument viz. actions (verb) imply an actor (subject). It's a premise derived from what is quite possibly an illusory world, a world that's not real and being so it loses its potency to such an extent I must add that Descartes' cogito ergo sum argument is blown clean out of the water.
In summary, the first step in my argument was to show that there's no necessary connection between actions and actors, between verb and subject. This was demonstrated in terms of a world that is not real [hyperjump (verb/action) and hyperjumper (subject/actor)]. The expected response is that in the "real" world there's a necessary connection between action and actor, between verb and subject. This, however, was shown to be a case of inferring from a world which according to Descartes' himself could be an illusion or not real and therefore unreliable or simply useless to make an inference about the real.
The cogito ergo sum is an unsound argument. It can't prove that thinkers exist just because thinking takes place.
Comments (72)
Yup. As the cogito is most commonly understood - to regard thought but not awareness per se - it doesn't validate the thinker of the thought; it only validates that thought occurs. As wiser folk than I have mentioned along with you:
Quoting https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cogito,_ergo_sum
That established, there's a follow up question: How does one know that thinking takes place to begin with? In other words, what entitles Descartes to say "thinking is occurring"?
What bothers me is that, to reiterate in fewer words than the OP, the inference from action to actor - doing, doer [reading, reader; loving, lover; talking, talker, being, beer ( :joke: ) ] - is abstracted from a world that, Descartes himself acknowledges, could be not real. That, as far as I can see, invalidates the action, actor/doing, doer reasoning.
Quoting javra
It's taking place alright. I'm thinking right now, so are you and everybody else too but as crazy as this sounds, we may not exist in the sense there may not be a thing doing the thinking.
If you can't say, "this is thought now" then there is no thinking. It's an assertion of awareness. Thought is aware of its own authorship. It is fundamental to the nature of thought.
Yea, but I'm not addressing this from that vantage of language realism, or some such.
Quoting TheMadFool
Right, but - again - how do we conclude that thought is taking place?
I'll offer a suggestion: we are aware of our own thought, ergo we conclude that thought takes place. Now, one could play linguistic games with being an "aware-er" or else keep things in tune with commonsense expressions and just stipulate that we are aware beings. Here, epistemologically, our awareness of our thoughts takes precedence as a known over the thoughts in question of which we are aware.
Hmm. Can't one be aware while devoid of thoughts? As one example, while zoning-out? But this gets into the murky issue of what one interprets by the abstraction of thought. In short, is not awareness and thought two distinct - though intimately entwined - givens?
While I [s]gave[/s] attempted to give a linguistic twist to Descartes reasoning it seems only incidental to the tale I'm weaving. The crux of the issue is, in my humble opinion, the hidden premise - doing ergo, doer - which, as I've learned, is derived from the world we're in, a world whose reality is in question. In short, whatever premise we construct out of our experiences in this world (reality questionable) is of dubious value for reasoning about the real.
Quoting javra
Quoting javra
Well, I'm "...aware..." that "...thought is taking place..." but to infer that there's an aware-er we need the premise that says doing implies a doer in all cases of doing but this premise is, like it or not, derived from a pattern in the world we're in which Descartes admitted could be an illusion or not real and that casts a long shadow of doubt on the crucial doing implies a doer premise.
Are you intending to infer a homonculus to first-person awareness? I'd strongly disagree with that. We don't infer that we are aware so as to conclude that we are aware; instead, we as first-person points of view are aware of any such inference, and are thereby, QED, aware beings. And this regardless of us being entities, processes, both, or neither .... an ontological issue that can only be resolved (if at all possible to resolve) by inference and, hence, thoughts of which we are aware. No? (I'll check back in tomorrow.)
You've made an inference from "...are aware..." to "...aware beings." For this to work you need the premise 1. All doings are things that have doers to be true. If this premise is false the statement 2. Some doings are not things that have doers will be true and that means it's possible that just because we "...are aware" [doing] it doesn't follow that there are "...aware beings [doers]".
You'll need to prove each doing that you come across has a doer individually and your inference "...are aware..." to "...aware beings" is one such case. How are you going to build your case? You can't use premise 1. All doings are things that have doers because it's no longer reliable, drawn as it is from the world, a world that could be not real.
a The only option left for you is to construct the required premise from your own experience of yourself and the truth of that key premise of your argument viz. if "...are aware..." then "...aware beings" has to turn on the only truth you know viz. "...are aware..." and that isn't sufficient to build the key premise because I've demonstrated the truth of statement 2. some doings are not thing that have doers and that means if "...are aware..." then "...aware beings" doesn't have to be true. Basically, you can't prove your key premise.
You may ignore what I've written below and even above if it suits you. It's for my own clarity that I've fleshed out the argument. There's a certain part in my refutation that's troubling me.
Your argument:
1. If "...are aware..." then "...aware beings"
2. "...are aware..."
Ergo
3. "...aware beings"
First things first, from the fact that the world we exist in could be an illusion/not real, it follows that the inferences drawn from it may not be valid in the real world. Ergo, one such inference, the proposition all doings (actions) have doers (actors) could be false. If this is the case then premise 1. If "...are aware..." then "...aware beings" could be false (not false but could be false).
So, we need to prove/support premise 1. The only reliable source that could help you in proving premise 1 is your own knowledge of "...are aware..." You experience it and so you can't deny it. However, since it's possible that 1. If "...are aware..." then "...aware beings" could be false, that you know "...are aware..." is not adequate grounds to assert premise 1. That's the end of the road for your argument.
If you think we should get into the mechanics of thought, then I'd dive right into things like "passive volition", which is an advanced yogic concept. Willing without willing. Thought can be amazingly complex, easily housing contradictions, aporias, paradoxes. But are the actual "mechanics" of thought relevant to the conditions of its possibility? Emergence is a funny thing.
Quoting TheMadFool
First, "aware" is an adjective, not a verb. As such, it's a state of being; not a doing.
Secondly - and this is harder to address impersonally rather than from an experiential vantage, but I'll try - for "X to be aware" is for X to be in a state of being of awareness ... which entails that X is, i.e. holds the property of [s]isness[/s] being, i.e. is a being (here, is a given that is).
I don't aware; I am aware.
Contrast this with the cogito. Here, the affirmation of "I think" is questioned due to lack of evidence that that which is done (the thought in question) pertains to a particular doer ("I"). Differently expressed, that that which is (the thought in question) is a product of some agency (the "I"); here, then, there can be the implicit issue of causality, as in X causes Y. It might have been Descartes demon that was doing (else causing) all the doubting that Descartes ascribed to his own agency, for one example.
However, (and correct me if I'm wrong about this) you've granted that "I am aware" is a sound experiential fact whenever the given "I" is aware. At this junction, X's awareness cannot logically occur in the absence of X; X must be in order for X to be aware. If Descartes was aware of all the given doubts he talked about - even if we get into weird doubts about telepathy on the part of the demon being the cause of this awareness, or some such - it remains the fact that a first-person awareness which addressed itself as Descartes was aware. Since this first-person awareness was aware, this first-person awareness was.
To sum up the aforementioned, regardless of the status of the world, BIVs, and the like, if I am aware, I as a first-person awareness am.
... Interesting to see where this goes.
No. Philosophy of mind is a vastly complex issue, I agree. I was only interested in whether you interpret "thought" and "awareness" to be identical.
Well, they are both just words whose extension is debatable. In my experience, those words mutually entail.
I would. But then I'm a strong subscriber to a systems theoretic interpretation of reality. From a systems theoretic perspective, even inanimate things can be said to participate in thought "in a way". It lends itself to a brand of panpsychism.
Well, you threw me off with the statement:
Quoting javra
Come to think of it, even if "aware" is an adjective - a state of being - you still must rely on the premise that asserts that being (verb) in that state implies something that can be (verb) in that state.
Quoting javra
Definition of aware (courtesy Google): having knowledge or perception of a situation or fact. In other words awareness consists of the actions knowing (verb) and perceiving (verb).
Also, what's the proof for the premise If in a state (awareness) then exists something that is in that state (the entity that's aware)?
This leads us to the following puzzle...
What's really getting me worked up is that it was relatively easy to invalidate the reliability of the world (possibly not real) as a good source from which to build a set of premises to be used in, transferred to, the real world. When that happened a critical premise for cogito ergo sum viz. all doings have a doer which would've proved the Cartesian premise "if thinking then thinker" goes out the window.
The only reliable source to build premises from is one's own experience but that consists of only thinking or, if you prefer, awareness. To make the case that there's a thinker or a thing that is in a state of awareness, we need the following premises:
1. Thinking implies thinker
2. Awareness implies something that is aware
Since both propositions 1 and 2 require the support of the statement "doing implies doer" which we know could be false we're unable to prove these premises. There's only one last option for us - turn to our own experiences to build a proof for statements 1 and 2 is our own actual experiences but these involve only thinking and awareness and if I claim that these actions (verbs) implies the existence of a thinker and something that is aware I'm assuming precisely what needs to be proved. Circulus in probando.
If you don't mind indulging me further, what of the distinction I alluded to in my reply to TMF?:
Thought is caused by X, whereas awareness isn't caused by X but, instead, is a state of X's being ... thereby making thought and awareness ontologically distinct givens.
Don't mean to badger. Only want to flesh out whether or not they are the same thing in you view.
It sounds like you are drawing lines similar to those of Locke, between passive and active thought. Personally, I would describe all types of thought as being unified under something like a transcendental ego. So I would still view thought and awareness as united at some level.
OK, but here ordinary language clashes with ontology: "be" is classified as a verb, yes, but then does it make any sense to affirm that X causes - or else is an agency for - its own being (let's avoid the God's causa sui issues, please). For example, does the phrase "I am" entail that the "I" addressed causes - is an agency for - its own being?
Quoting TheMadFool
To know and to perceive are both ambiguous terms in ordinary language. We can get into this if you'd like. Knowledge by acquaintance, or else by experience - such as in knowing oneself to be happy/sad or certain/uncertain in manners devoid of inference - for example. Or seeing that apple one imagines to be: the perception of imaginary givens. I'm thinking so doing might deviate too much from the topic, though.
Quoting TheMadFool
In a state, like Texas? Or in a state of being then exists some given that is in that state of being. And who on Earth is describing this given that is as an entity?! Concepts matter here.
Quoting TheMadFool
If this conversation is getting you worked up, I'll stop partaking. Best not to get into even more worked up modes.
It lands on, I am consciousness, and from there it can not go any further.
It can go to: therefore I exist, and therefore the world exists.
But where did the ego get introduced? Where is the step from "There is something." to "I am aware of something."
The nature of being could be self-fulfilling, self-sufficient.
I think we exist as consciousness, and the world is a product of this, but I will start a new thread so as not to derail this one.
Were this to be true, it would signify that solipsism is logically impeccable. I've disagreed with this on logical grounds in this recent thread.
So I disagree with your conclusion, instead agreeing with @Olivier5.
Consciousness by definition is always the consciousness of something (the world). So the world does not spring of consciousness, it is a logical requirement for any consciousness.
That is true, but the world is our interpretation of this information, rather than an accurate integration of the facts of the world as they might exist.
I agree however, both must exist. One cannot exist without the other - chicken and egg situation.
Not quite. Idealism would prevail. As @Olivier5 states , integration requires something to be integrated.
I have started a thread on this and would be grateful for your contribution.
I've seen no evidence that the world cannot exist without consciousness in it. In fact, it must have started as a totally stupid universe.
Well, as I see it, the English translation of cogito ergo sum viz. I think. Therefore, I am, is slightly inaccurate. My research, for what it's worth, shows that cogito ergo sum actually means: Thinking. Therefore I am.
Descartes' argument in syllogistic form (there are 2 arguments actuallly) would look like below:
1. If there's thinking then there's a thinker that exists [Argument 1]
2. There's thinking (cogito)
Ergo
3. There's a thinker that exists [Argument 2]
4. I am that thinker that exists
Ergo
5. I exist (sum)
Cogito ergo sum!
My issue is with premise 1 and I've already said what I wanted to say. Your point concerns argument 2. Descartes identifies with the thinker (supposing he manages to get past the hurdle that this thread is about viz. that actions don't necessarily imply an actor or that doing doesn't mean there has to be a doer). I don't see a line in Descartes' argument where he claims that "...is an agency for - its own being". The being/existence is inferred from an action/the doing of something - the thinker, according to Descartes, follows logically from thinking.
Quoting javra
Let's look at the issue of awareness from a different angle. In my humble opinion, if one is aware, necessary that one doing something with one's mind e.g. thinking, perceiving, etc. If you disagree, you'll need to describe awareness in terms on non-action i.e. you'll have to show that awareness doesn't involve an mental activity but that, as I mentioned in the post preceding this one, is the definition of non-awareness. This puts you in the position where, if you stick to your guns, you'll have to admit that awareness is the same as non-awareness. That's a contradiction, no?
Quoting javra
Read above.
Quoting Heiko
That "could be" is the key phrase. It brings into question the soundness of Descartes' argument.
"Cogito" is the first person singular form of "cogitare".
What I actually wanted to say is that you cannot easily exchange thought for awareness as it might change the argument. I did not read much of Descartes however.
I think we all know instinctively that the world can disagree with us, that it can very well contradict our interpretations of it. The facts of the world impose themselves on us.
:up: :ok:
Quoting Heiko
The crux of Descartes' argument is that if an action is being performed then, for him, necessarily the existence of a thing performing that action - thinking, ergo, thinker.
Come to think of it, there's something else wrong with Descartes' cogito ergo sum. It's backwards. What comes first in an existential sense? An action or an actor, a doing or a doer?
Consider first the matter of a not-real or hypothetical world. There are actions like (switch off your religious side and forget your encyclopedic knowledge of superhero lore for the moment) levitating, resurrecting from the dead, becoming invisible, shrinking to ant-size, etc. are actions that, well, precede the existence of anything that can actually, in real-life, do them.
However, in real-life, in the real world, an actor (a doer) exists before actions (doing). In other words, in the real world, you wouldn't and you couldn't speak of an action without there being an actor capable of that action. In other words, every action in the real world comes prepackaged, so to speak, with the implicit acceptance of the existence of an actor.
In other words, Descartes can't claim the action thinking if he hasn't already assumed the existence of a thinker. If this isn't the case then Descartes' would have to admit that thinking doesn't necessarily mean that there's a thinker but if he does that his argument doesn't work. To conclude, Descartes' has assumed the very thing he's trying to prove. I think this error in Descartes' logic is exposed in the English translation of cogito ergo sum viz. I think. Therefore, I am. The I seems to be inseparable from, is part of, is presupposed in, thinking. I'm not completely sure about this. Thanks to Descartes and his radical skepticism. Mind if you take a look at it and get back to me.
Quoting 180 Proof
(emphasis is mine)
Quoting 180 Proof
Quoting 180 Proof
Indeed there is and thank you for pointing that out but what's its relevance to the topic? What about ear plugs and closing one's eyes or blindfolds?
Yes, one can direct one's thoughts to a degree, or at least it feels this way, and this is a big reason why we identify with 'our' thoughts. We have some control over them, while we have no control over quite a few other things 'out there', things which, as a result, we don't identify with.
Or just shooting the tweeting bird. Sounds like an idea!
A macabre choice to make but it'll do the trick...I guess.
Question then would be how to get it back singing on demand.
The problem then would be if it's changed its tune. :lol:
Must be a different bird then.
Quoting TheMadFool
A disingenuous answer to the issue at hand. My point is that in the phrase "it is" the being (verb) addressed is not a doing: the specified "it" doesn't do the specified "is".
Your retort is to tell me the obvious about what the cogito translates into.
Quoting TheMadFool
No it is not. I agree that argument 2 is faulty.
Quoting TheMadFool
You've here gone off into abstractions regarding awareness rather than sticking to concrete instantiations of its first-person occurrence - with the latter including, for example, an immediate awareness of one's own emotive states of being (e.g., being happy/sad), this in addition to perceptions, sensations, and understandings.
Mind, however, is an abstraction whose occurrence can be doubted. Some eliminative materialists do so often enough.
Quoting javra
Quoting TheMadFool
Another disingenuous answer to the issue addressed.
You want to avoid the issue of awareness and stick to the "I think therefore I am" argument, go for it. As I stated in my first post on this thread, I too find Descartes' cogito to be possible to doubt in practice.
I appreciate the paradigm you are coming from, but to what extent can something exist independent of a viewer / interpreter? And that the world develops such that inanimate matter becomes animated, and conscious, brings into question the stupidity of the universe, I believe.
I think, we have to start, as Descartes did, with; I think, therefore I am, and so the world is, and so on.
Today we can start with I am consciousness, and explore the world from its most fundamental perspective, in my opinion.
But that is an implication that does not bear any information about the nature of being. Maybe Descartes was only the hallucination of a higher entity. As far as we can tell he died at some time and hence stopped thinking and disappeared just as hallucinations do. I guess it is time to sleep now.
I have no evidence that things disappear when I don't look at them. In fact, conservation of mass and energy requires that the existence of things does not depend on them being observed or not.
Quoting Pop
Not really. It's more that everything that can happen does happen, given enough time.
Quoting Pop
Yes, that's where everybody starts.
It suggests that consciousness is the fundamental element of being from which everything else must be interpreted.
Quoting Olivier5
I think you dismiss this too easily. In my theory, consciousness = self organization. That everything that can happen dose happen, given enough time, is due entirely to self organization.
You have not said anything about what "being" shall mean in this context either. Descartes concludes
"I think => I am" which is called a material implication. So "being" must be given to "think". On the other hand "being" would be possible without thinking - as there is no equivalence relation.
It implies that being is a function of consciousness. Consciousness must decide what consciousness is, and being is a function of that. Being is not a fixed quantity, it evolves with consciousness. It is endlessly variable and open ended.
In my theory consciousness = self organization, so being will always entail self organization, but what form this self organization takes is variable.
And I told you how I think that sentence is to be interpreted. "therefor" is a formal conclusion.
Are you arguing that being is a fixed quantity? Being evolves with consciousness, in my view. It has changed throughout history, and will continue to evolve, as we aquire new information.
I am arguing that from
1. A=>B and
2. A
B can be concluded.
I have not disagreed with this. I have simply stated that B will continue to vary with A. B is not a fixed quantity, it varies with A.
Okay, you didn't take this from the text, though. In fact, in the example given above, B may apply while A does not.
It would be impossible to reach such a conclusion without consciousness, hence we start with consciousness.
Okay, and... do you make the conclusion?
I think its fairly obvious that all is ineffable without consciousness, beyond this I'm not really sure what you are asking?
Oh, that's really Descartes matter, I guess. He lands at "being", not at thinking. He did not state a tautology.
I think its a matter of interpretation. I believe he could have gone further, and landed on consciousness, but then he would have challenged the soul and the clergy, so we have what we have.
So... you do not arrive where you started? Then it was a step forward!
In the context of the times, I think it was a step forward, though ultimately it was the wrong step.
In the east they landed on consciousness, and I think this resulted in a much better understanding.
I cannot help but associate the "thinking oneself" with Heidegger's Nietzsche Lectures in Nazi-Germany. I'm sorry.
Really? I wouldn't think of his works as literature for under-aged. But I guess that doesn't matter if it was useful... As for the eastern philosophy - I'm afraid I cannot help you with that: I barely know the yin-yang principle.
If you change the definition of words, it's going to be hard to communicate... It takes a lot of time and chance to get to true consciousness. It doesn't come with just a few Lego bricks... For me, the early universe was not conscious in any way, and consciousness emerged progressively from it, through life.
I think, ultimately a philosopher has to answer how inanimate matter becomes animate, and there is no solution from the paradigm that you pose. Not even a hint of a solution, even after several hundred years of effort. However, a panpsychist solution exists.
If you accept that the universe is in a process of self organization, then you will accept that all of it's component parts are as a result in a process of self organization. That life arose from self organization is overwhelmingly supported by abiogenesis theory. What is the purpose of the Euclidian space that you see, other then self organization? Every instance of consciousness is an instance of self organization.
My claim goes beyond normal philosophical conjecture, in that it can be easily disproven by providing an instance of consciousness that is not in some way self organization, which I believe is logically impossible.
Consciousness = an evolving process of self organization.
Not to be pedant, but panpsychism doesn't actually provide a solution to this problem. It rather explains how animate matter becomes ever more animate. In doing so it trivializes the problem, it underplays the radical novelty and importance of life, in my view. Life is information bossing matter around. It radically changes the rules of the game. And the centuries of effort you mentioned were inspired by mechanics. That was the wrong track, the wrong metaphor. Seeing biology as infused with meaning is a better way to solve the hard problem and explain how consciousness emerged.
Biology agrees with self organization.
Why yes. It's where the idea comes from, in fact.
Yes, the idea comes from abiogenesis theory, and the phrase life is an expression of consciousness, which I take to be logically impeccable. Considered together I came to the conclusion that self organization leads to life, and in turn life expresses self organization. I then connected that self organization is consciousness. It works as a definition of consciousness within monism / panpsychism. Hence my objection to your stupid universe comment. I don't believe the universe is self aware, but it is involved in the same process of self organization as we are, to the best of my understanding.
The only alternative to self organization in abiogenesis theory is god. But god the creator, comes up against the question of who created god? If we are to avoid an infinite regress, we would have to say god created itself. So we are back at self organization. That consciousness is an evolving process of self organization will stick, I believe. I am not aware of it being described this way before, but @Pantagruel
has given me some related leads, so I will check them out.
According to Sartre, there is a Pre-Reflective Thinking activity (Thinking in the First Degree) which is the ontological condition for Descartes' Reflective Thinking activity (Thinking in the Second Degree).
The Pre-Reflective Thinking activity, which is oriented exclusively to that which is not thinking activity, does NOT posit a Transcendental Subject, when and while it occurs. When and while it occurs it is Ego-less and can only be defined as an occurrence without an essence. Pre-Reflective Thinking has only a non-positional self-consciousness, but no consciousness of an objective, essential self.
By contrast, Descartes' Reflective Thinking activity, which is oriented exclusively only towards itself, always does posit itself as a Transcendental Subject, when and while it occurs. When and while it occurs it posits the Ego-Subject as Object. But, in doing so, Reflective Thinking activity is constantly misrepresenting itself as an objective essential entity..
So, I suspect that Sartre would say that in one sense you are right, but in another sense you are wrong.
The Cogito ergo Sum is not, inherently, an inferential argument.
It is, instead, a performative argument. It must be executed by each person, in the first person, present tense mode, to experience it, and the full force of its indubitable certainty, correctly.
Its truth is not inferred, its truth is intuited as an immediate insight imbedded in and resulting from the performance itself.
It is not a Cogito “ergo” Sum, but simply, and immediately, a Cogito Sum.
The “When and while I am Thinking, I must be Existing” intuitive insight, is not synonymous with an “I Think, therefore I am” logical inference.”
The intuitive insight is not about “an A, therefore a B,” an inferring “I must be Existing (B)” from a “because I am Thinking (A).”
Instead, it is about my intuiting with indubitable certainty, in the first person, present tense mode, how my Existing only occurs, necessarily occurs, and always occurs simultaneously with the occurrence of my Thinking.
In fact, as Descartes so aptly put it, “For it might indeed be that if I entirely ceased to think, I should thereupon altogether cease to exist.”
Unless of course, I can experience, in the first person, present tense mode, that someone, or something, other than myself is doing the thinking while I exist???????