Contradictions!
My experience of logic can be summed up as brief contacts with introductory textbooks, wikipedia, and discussions on this forum. I know that doesn't amount to much but I feel it'll do the job regarding a very basic idea I want to discuss in this thread viz. the logical entity everyone knows as contradiction
A contradiction is simply to assert a proposition and then to deny it. It's formulaic description is p & ~p where p is a propositional variable.
Let's begin by understanding what a contradiction is. Imagine I say, "God exists". Mind you, the choice of the proposition doesn't mean this post has a religious agenda. Suppose E = "God exists". Now, if I say "God doesn't exist" that gets translated in logic as ~E. If I say E and ~E, it's a classic instance of a contradiction.
I like to view a contradiction in terms of a blank space on a piece of paper on which you write down propositions. Imagine the blank space; (..........). I say, "God exists" and this space gets filled and becomes: (God exists). If I now say "God doesn't exist, this happens:([s]God exists[/s]) - basically you're, if you had an eraser at hand, erasing the words "God exists" from the blank space and we return to:(..........), the blank space we started with.
In essence then a contradiction is to say nothing at all (returning to the blank space after having written down a proposition and then erasing it).
Now, contradictions in classical logic (categorical, sentential and predicate logic) are prohibited - they're a big no-no - but, to my utter surprise, not for the reasons I outlined above but, as I've been led to believe, because allowing them makes it possible to prove every conceivable statement true: Principle Of Explosion/Ex Falso Quodlibet.
If you're with me so far, what's the issue here?
Contradictions, as they appear to me and as I've delineated above, seem to be simply the act of both affirming and denying a proposition - it basically returns the logical cursor back to its starting point and understanding it as such seems sufficient to make the point that contradictions are illogical.
Why is the official (logical) explanation for why contradictions are prohibited (ex falso quodlibet) different?
A penny for your thoughts...
A contradiction is simply to assert a proposition and then to deny it. It's formulaic description is p & ~p where p is a propositional variable.
Let's begin by understanding what a contradiction is. Imagine I say, "God exists". Mind you, the choice of the proposition doesn't mean this post has a religious agenda. Suppose E = "God exists". Now, if I say "God doesn't exist" that gets translated in logic as ~E. If I say E and ~E, it's a classic instance of a contradiction.
I like to view a contradiction in terms of a blank space on a piece of paper on which you write down propositions. Imagine the blank space; (..........). I say, "God exists" and this space gets filled and becomes: (God exists). If I now say "God doesn't exist, this happens:([s]God exists[/s]) - basically you're, if you had an eraser at hand, erasing the words "God exists" from the blank space and we return to:(..........), the blank space we started with.
In essence then a contradiction is to say nothing at all (returning to the blank space after having written down a proposition and then erasing it).
Now, contradictions in classical logic (categorical, sentential and predicate logic) are prohibited - they're a big no-no - but, to my utter surprise, not for the reasons I outlined above but, as I've been led to believe, because allowing them makes it possible to prove every conceivable statement true: Principle Of Explosion/Ex Falso Quodlibet.
If you're with me so far, what's the issue here?
Contradictions, as they appear to me and as I've delineated above, seem to be simply the act of both affirming and denying a proposition - it basically returns the logical cursor back to its starting point and understanding it as such seems sufficient to make the point that contradictions are illogical.
Why is the official (logical) explanation for why contradictions are prohibited (ex falso quodlibet) different?
A penny for your thoughts...
Comments (46)
Far from being like saying nothing, saying a contradiction is making the strongest statement of all. Yes, contradictions are the strongest of all propositions, because the first part of a proposition lets one set of propositions follow, and the second part implies all the rest. This is the explosion which makes contradictions useless.
But far more than just leading to explosion, a contradiction is false by the very wist (nature and essence) of negation. The “domain” of the negation NOT(A) of a proposition A is by definition everything that lies outside the “domain” of A, so to speak, so by definition, there is no overlap between the two. Stating a contradiction is basically asserting that something lies in the overlap, which, as we’ve said, is empty by definition. Hence, all contradictions are false.
Mark, however, that while the boundary between the two domains always cuts everyone in two who tries to stand with one leg in one domain and the second leg in the other domain, so to speak, it need not be fixed at a certain location. Rather, it can bounce around, so to speak – its location can be undetermined. The Law of Not-Contradiction LNC and the Law of the Excluded Middle (LEM) together are weaker than the Principle of Bivalence (PB).
To use your metaphor, stating a contradiction isn’t like first writing “God exists” in the space and then erasing it, but rather like first writing “God exists” in the space and then writing “God doesn’t exist” over it, which makes a mess.
So do you now believe in God or don’t you? (just joking :wink:)
That’s at least how I see the matter.
The way I see it, logic is based on propositions, which are themselves expressions of a ‘logical’ position in relation to ‘reality’. Without such a proposition, there is no position. It isn’t a blank space, per se, but rather all possible reality. Logic doesn’t create something - all it does is propose a position among all possible reality. It’s a top-down reductionist methodology.
So a contradiction is a bit like an interaction of matter and anti-matter, or the use of imaginary numbers in mathematics. It doesn’t create anything except an imaginary perspective with infinite potentiality, from which we can relate to another position which might have appeared illogical from our own position.
Quoting Tristan L
I don't recall making the claim that conjunction is like mathematical addition but I remember some Boolean logic from high school which makes that claim.
As for negation being a sign-flipping operation, I admit that's how I read it. Why would you say that's wrong? A few paragraphs below in your post you say this (very insightful I must add):
Quoting Tristan L
You're basically talking about complements of sets, right? Your reasoning is flawless insofar as categorical logic, with its categories and their respective complements, are concerned, but E = "God exists" and ~E = "God doesn't exist" are not categorical statements.
The rest of your post is no longer relevant. However, I mean this only against the backdrop of sentential logic. If you want to discuss categorical logic, no problem but I fear it'd be going off on a tangent as, I now realize, I seem to have been talking about sentential logic. Perhaps there's a right way to extend the discussion into categorical logic. Any ideas?
Actually, conjunction is a bit like multiplication, whereas it is exclusive disjunction (EITHER-OR, XOR) which is a bit like addition. And like multiplication, conjunction isn’t reversible; if you multiply by zero, you always get zero, and if you AND with a false proposition, you always get a false proposition.
Quoting TheMadFool
And you’re right.
But since conjunction isn’t like addition (see above), you can’t conjoin with the negation of a proposition to undo conjoining that proposition. The logical operations that work together like addition and sign-flipping are XOR and NOT, not AND and NOT.
Quoting TheMadFool
Well, I’m using the language of sets to metaphorically talk about propositions. Of course, sets are extensions of properties, so set-language is actually better suited to talking about properties than about propositions.
Quoting TheMadFool
Right, and in sentential logic (witcraft) as in logic broadly, LNC follows directly from the definition of negation, or perhaps we could regard it as part of the definition of negation. If a proposition A isn’t the case, then well, it isn’t the case; if we have NOT(A), we can’t have A.
Quoting TheMadFool
But they are propositions about categories, or rather, universals (broadthings) more generally. Specifically, they are propositions about Godhood: E is the proposition that there is an x with Godhood, that is, the proposition that Godhood has instantiatedness, and ~E is the proposition that there is no x with Godhood, that is, the proposition that Godhood doesn’t have instantiatedness.
I think that maybe you're confusing the law of non-contradiction with the principle of explosion.
The LNC, as stated in Aristotle’s own words: “It is impossible for the same property to belong and not to belong at the same time to the same thing and in the same respect” (Metaphysics, IV). To Aristotle, the law of non-contradiction was not only self-evident, it was the foundation of all other self-evident truths, since without it we wouldn’t be able to demarcate one idea from another, or in fact positively assert anything about anything – making rational discourse impossible.
In the centuries that followed Aristotle, medieval logicians noticed something interesting: if they allowed themselves just one contradiction, they seemed to be able to arrive at any conclusion whatever. Logicians refer to this as ‘anything follows from a falsehood’, which is the principle of explosion as you mentioned, but rarely explain why this is the case.
A non sequitur is a logical fallacy where the conclusion does not follow from the premises, so anything does not follow from a falsehood if you apply all applicable logical rules to some proposition. The conclusion is not about, or related in any way to the premise, so even if the premise were true, there is no guarantee that the conclusion will be true or false. Essentially the premise and conclusion would be talking past each other.
So, I got mixed up! Thanks for the clarification.
Quoting Tristan L
I feel I'm getting closer to seeing your point of view on the matter. If I understand you correctly, you're under the impression that my understanding of contradictions (p & ~p) is one that considers the conjunction of the negation of proposition with the original proposition to be an undo operation, which you think is wrong.
This makes sense to me but here's the catch - there's got to be a sense in which ~p is the opposite of p otherwise, to continue with my analogy of blank spaces E = "god exists" and ~E = "god doesn't exist" would simply occupy two different blank spaces and it would be completely ok to do so. For instance, take E = "god exists" and T = "2 is an even number". I could easily write them down in two different blank spaces as (E & T). Nothing's amiss in doing that - they're not making "opposite" claims. When it comes to E & ~E, there's this oppositeness we have to countenance. At they very least to state ~E = "god doesn't exist" requires one to erase E = "god exists" like so: ([s]god exists[/s]) and then write (god doesn't exist).
By the way I like the way you described contradictions within the context of my analogy:
Quoting Tristan L
:up:
I suppose, in my blank space analogy, it boils down to:
1. Propositions about a single entity (god, water, balls, whathaveyou) that are in the same sense are restricted to a single blank space
2. A proposition and its contradiction will, according to 1 above, have to be written in the same blank space but that's impossible - one has to go i.e. one of them will have to give up its seat in a manner of speaking for the other.
In fact, the whole idea of contradictions is basically that (above). Two contradictory propositions are mutually annihilating i.e. they can't coexist.
As an attempt to find a common ground between us, I'd like to point out that while I accept that a contradiction is like overwriting a proposition with its negation ("makes a mess"), we should note that this is because the proposition concerned had/has to be erased before the negation could be written down. :chin:
Quoting Harry Hindu
If you want to know
1. P & ~P (assume contradictions allowed)
2. P..................................1 Simp
3. P v A..........................2 Add (this is the important step because A can be any proposition at all)
4. ~P...............................1 Simp
5. A................................3, 4, DS
QED!?
We can prove anything once we allow contradictions.
If you're going to take things that way then there's no such thing as individualness, everything becomes a category...something doesn't add up.
No it can't. It has to logically follow, or be causally related with, the prior statement or its a non sequitur. I did mention this the post you replied to but apparently did not read.
"As for the obstinate, he must be plunged into fire, since fire and non-fire are identical. Let him be beaten, since suffering and not suffering are the same. Let him be deprived of food and drink, since eating and drinking are identical to abstaining.”
-The philosopher and polymath Avicenna
I guess everyone has an opinion on the matter but what's your beef with the principle of explosion? Any flaws? You don't mention any.
Quoting Harry Hindu
I love this quote but, on analysis, it, nowhere in its poetic fervor, states a contradiction. All it does, in my humble opinion, is swing back and forth between a proposition and its negation, never really getting there, never really making a point, the point in fact. It seems to be more about negation if anything. That's, of course, just my opinion. Perhaps you can edify me. Thanks.
Yes. I did. Search for the phrase, "non sequitur" on this page. The principle of explosion IS a non sequitur error.
Quoting TheMadFool
Then how are you defining, "contradiction"?
Quoting TheMadFool
Quoting Harry Hindu
Is the principle of explosion self-evident in the way the principle of non-contradiction is self-evident?
Explain it to me with the argument I made:
1. P & ~P.......assume contradictions allowed
2. P............1 Simp
3. P v A......2 Add [A being any proposition under the sun]
4. ~ P.........1 Simp
5. A..........3, 4 DS
Three important facets to the logic above:
1. The propositions themselves
2. The logical connectives (&, v)
3. Natural deduction rules
Have I missed anything?
Explain the non sequitur using one or more of the above.
Quoting Harry Hindu
p & ~p = Something is something & Something is not that something
Quoting Harry Hindu
It wasn't and thus this thread. By the way, how, in what sense is the law of noncontradiction self-evident?
You express your right feeling for the truth of LNC in the words emboldened by me above. In order not to be wrong, you first have to disjoin E with the trivially true proposition (e.g. 0=0; for our goals, we can speak of the trivially true proposition) to get (E OR 0=0), and only then conjoin the resulting proposition (E OR 0=0) with ¬E to get (E OR 0=0) AND ¬E, which is equivalent to ¬E. The neutral element of conjuction is the trivially true proposition, so I think that not saying anything is equivalent to saying something trivially true, and erasing is equivalent to disjoining with the trivially true proposition, which yields the latter.
Quoting TheMadFool
And indeed there is: (EITHER-OR)ing p with ~p yields the trivially false proposition, which is the neutral element of EITHER-OR.
Quoting TheMadFool
Right, and so, we have what the previous paragraph says.
Quoting TheMadFool
Yes, I think so, or to put it in other words, conjoining a proposition with its negation is of course possible, but yields a necessarily false proposition, namely a contradiction.
Quoting TheMadFool
Yes, exactly, see the first paragraph.
I can’t help but realize that this is of great relevance to my very first thread on this forum, Is negation the same as affirmation?.
Why do you keep moving the goal posts? I explained it using the way you expressed it in your OP. I already pointed out that A cannot be any proposition under the sun because it has to logically follow. A has to be logically connected to P, and it isn't. You say it is, but how? Do you even know what a non sequitur is? It is defined as a deductive argument that is invalid, therefore you are not adequately applying all the 3. Natural deduction rules to the principle of explosion. Basically, the principle of explosion is a lazy attempt to be logical.
Quoting TheMadFool
Then I don't understand how you can say that the quote I provided doesn't have any contradictions in it. :roll:
Quoting TheMadFool
Try thinking of something and it's contradiction in the same moment. That is different than trying to say a contradiction in the same moment, which is impossible. To say a contradiction means that you have to say one sentence and then another that contradicts it in the same moment. It is in saying it that you get the sense of time passing where something is added and then taken away. That isn't what a contradiction is. That is utterly different than thinking of a contradiction, which is done in the same moment with the same thing.
Try thinking of a god that both exists and doesn't exist. Now, use your logical symbols to say the same thing. It takes time to write them out, and the symbols appear in different places than the symbols that they are contradicting. When thinking of a contradiction, you think of the existing and non-existing property in the same moment and in the same visual space - meaning the existing/non-existing god must appear in the same space at the same moment. Remember this quote of Aristotle's:
Quoting Harry Hindu
Your symbolism is not adequate at representing how the LNC is self-evident, because the symbols appear in different areas of space, not the same area of space, as explained by Aristotle. In order to observe the self-evidence of the LNC, you have to [try to] think of a contradiction, not say or write it.
What does it mean, "...it has to logically follow."? Are you saying the natural deduction rules that appear in my argument are flawed? Which ones? Where?
Sorry but I didn't move the goal post. I erected it in the first place (recall it was me who provided you the argument). You're unwilling to accept the argument - an instance of ex falso quodlibet - and then proceeded to call it a non sequitur but didn't, obviously because you had better things to do, back it up with an argument of your own.
Quoting Harry Hindu
Avicenna probably intended it as such - to do an exposé on the absurdity of denying a contradiction - but, if it's not too much trouble, can you point out the exact location in the quote where a contradiction makes its, what I expect is a grand, entrance.
Quoting Harry Hindu
You speak as if thought is different to speech. It is, quite obviously, but it can be said and it is true that speech is nothing but vocalized thought and thought is simply unvocalized speech. I'm curious though because, if what you say makes sense to you, your brain must work in a radically different manner than mine. Care to share.
:ok: Tell me one thing...what is the meaning of trivially true? By the way (E v 0=0) & ~E isn't equivalent to ~E. Do a DeMorgan on it and you have (E & ~E) v (~E v 0=0) and you know the rest.
Quoting Tristan L
Saying is not the same as not saying and nothing is not the same as true, trivial or otherwise. Do I have to go Avicenna on you? :smile:
Do you understand what Aristotle is saying? Take in what Aristotle is saying and then roll it around in your head and then get back to me with how you would paraphrase it.:
To represent a contradiction with words, you can only represent the opposing ideas separately on a screen or on paper with symbols stretched across space and time. Contradictions are opposing qualities in the same space at the same time. Try to say, "exists" and "not-exists" at the same moment. Do you see the problem now?
While you can say a contradiction, you can't think a contradiction. A contradiction is illogical because it doesn't represent how one thinks. It is impossible to think of opposing qualities in the same space at the same moment. If you can do that, then your brain must work in a radically different manner than mine. Care to share.
I understand what Aristotle is saying but imagine I don't. How would you explain it to me? Please do.
Quoting Harry Hindu
Of course, I just gave it a go a moment ago but with a different kind of a contradiction. I tried imagining a square-circle. All that happened was the image in my mind flipped between a square or a circle bit never really getting to a square-circle. So? What's the point?
Oh! Now it makes sense. Thanks. You mean to say I can speak/write, for instance, the contradiction "god exists" and "god doesn't exist" - I just did ( :grin: ) - but I can't think it. And...your point is?
It means being true by the laws of logic and thereby true in a very strong, very necessary way.
Quoting TheMadFool
Actually, the two are equivalent, and I think that you mean the Distributive Law rather than de Morgan (please correct me if I’m wrong):
(E ? 0=0) ? ¬E ? (E ? ¬E) ? (0=0 ? ¬E) ? (0=0 ? ¬E) ? ¬E
I belive that your second intance of the OR-operator should be an instance of the AND-operator.
Quoting TheMadFool
Please don’t :fear:! Of course saying something isn’t the same as saying nothing, and I even have an original and I believe new solution of an important problem based on an idea which is in a way similar to this one. However, for our purposes, saying nothing can indeed be seen as equivalent to saying the trivial truth. That’s because in a way, saying several propositions is like saying their conjunction, and the empty conjunction is vacuously true.
Try to say “5 is odd” and “six is even” at the same moment.
Quoting Harry Hindu
Well, when I was little, I thought to myself that almight includes the ability to make something be the case and not the case at the same time. This thought gave me a feeling of awe and wonder. Today, it’s still the same.
And that's the reason why you refer to it as "trivially" true? Something's off.
Quoting Tristan L
Yes! Sorry, my brain was probably out on a break that day. :grin:
:up: It seems you've serendipitously discovered a law of thought viz. One moment, one thought!
Of course it isn’t necessarily trivial for us, but for logic (witcraft), any two logically equivalent propositions are basically the same, and since any logically true proposition is logically equivalent to a truly trivial proposition like 0=0 (one whose truth is obvious at once), the logically true proposition is also trivially true from the perspective of logic, isn’t it?
Quoting TheMadFool
Exactly. This observation has led me to the conclusion that that a genuine proof cannot consist of a chain of thoughts, for in that case, it would need the memory to be infallible. I also thought about this when writing mathematical proofs by asking: How do I know that the theorems which I proved on an earlier page and on which I now draw haven’t been tampered with by a hacker or a random glitch in my harddrive and thus rendered false? But that’s likely something for the knowledgelore (epistemology) underforum.
Negation can be a positive statement, not just a blank. If I say X is an integer and X is not even I am not saying nothing about X, I am saying it must be odd. Let E = even and O = odd.
[math]\neg E = O[/math] which is saying X is odd, a positive statement.
The starting point of a proof or of an argument is never a contradiction. And a contradicion is never a starting point.
I have never seen an argument to start, "Peter is not Peter." Or with "Given the time allotted to finish the project, we can finish the project if and only if we can't finish the project."
Contradictions in classical logic are allowed as conclusions. They are used to prove a proposition false. It's called recuctio ad absurdum... if you can show that a proposition is contradictory to itself, then it is absurd, and therefore the proposotion is not valid, it is false.
They are different because you made several mistakes in the structuring of your original post. I pointed the mistakes out in my immediately preceding series of posts before this one.
If you want a visual analogy like that, you can take your blank page, and write all propositions that are true in green ink, and all propositions that are false in red ink. Since every proposition has a negation, for anything you write in green you'd also have to write its negation in red, and vice versa everything you write in red you'd have to write its negation in green. Erasing a green proposition isn't the same thing as writing a red one.
This is not a trivial truth. It's an instance of a law of thought viz. The Law Of Identity [A = A]. It's basic, I agree, but that doesn't make it trivial. In fact, Aristotle made it a point to state it explicitly lest we forget it.
Quoting Tristan L
This is where The Law Of Identity, I mentioned above, comes into play. The words/concepts you employ must remain the same throughout a proof, A = A, a perfect example of which is 0 = 0. It appears that when you make an argument, time is supposed to stop at a single instant, a single moment, this moment being occupied by all the propositions in that argument. This issue of the temporal aspect of argumentation has been at the back of my mind for quite some time now. Thanks for reminding me of it. I recall having come to the conclusion that since a contradiction is defined in temporal terms:
Quoting Harry Hindu
arguments do have a temporal dimension and one of the ways of offsetting this is The Law of Identity [A = A] which you think is trivial.
Quoting EnPassant
Yes, you're correct. Tristan L showed me the error of my ways. When you're dealing with a proposition and its contradiction, it's more like two propositions swapping places rather than cancelling each other out.
I think I finally understand what I was trying to get at. If you have the time, this is my take:
A proposition may be thought of as occupying "space", in my analogy blank spaces. Suppose there is one like this: (..........). I now assert that E = god exists. Proposition E now occupies the blank space like so: (God exists). If I now claim that ~E = god doesn't exist, necessarily that E can no longer be claimed for the simple reason that ~E means, literally, NOT E. Therefore, I must erase E from the blank space which then transitions from (God exists) to (..........). Back to square one. This is what I was getting at but it appears that the process doesn't end there - my mistake was thinking it does. What happens next is ~E = God doesn't exist, occupies the blank space and (..........) transforms into (God doesn't exist). If I had asserted ~E first and then E, the same process is involved, only the propositions are now switched.
Quoting god must be atheist
I'm not talking about contradictions in the context of arguments. I'm investigating the import of propositions and their negations, specifically that to state a propositions P, then to deny it, ~P, amounts to not stating P [return to the starting point].
Quoting god must be atheist
:ok: :up:
:ok:
Yes. See also Reductio Absurdum as a (dis)proof.
I don't quite get you there...Mind elaborating a bit?
Reductio Absurdum makes a conjecture and follows that conjecture through until a contradiction is reached. The negation of the conjecture can then make a positive statement.
:ok: :up:
This is not the way contradictions are viewed in classical logic, but this is precisely how Aristotle and many philosophers until the rise of classical logic viewed them. The technical name for this view is "negation as cancellation", and the types of logics that use this sort of negation are known as "connexive logics". More info here
You may also be pleased to know that connexive logics are paraconsistent, meaning that EFQ is not valid in these logics. Indeed, Aristotle's syllogistic logic (one of many connexive logics) is paraconsistent, although this fact is not widely known. To convince yourself of this fact, consider the following syllogism:
1. All birds can fly.
2. Some birds cannot fly.
3. Therefore, the moon is made of green cheese.
This is not a valid syllogistic argument, since it violates all the rules of syllogistic reasoning. Now, in the sentential realm, the connexive logician avoids EFQ due to the fact that Simplification is not a valid rule of inference in connexive logic.
When you put it like that, it rings a bell. P, a proposition can be viewed as the denial of ~P on the basis that double negation returns the original proposition [P = ~(~P)]. And, ~P is the denial of P. The two do cancel each other because asserting the contradiction P & ~P means that P cancels ~P by denying ~P and ~P cancels P by denying P. It's like integer math with positive and negative numbers: +9 and -9 = (+9) + (-9) = 0.
The starting point of WHAT? It has to be a starting point of something or other, which you haven't named. I can't put words in your mouth. Please state the starting point and state also this is a starting point of what. Thanks.
1.Start. Nothing as in no propositions have been stated
2. P stated
3. ~P stated.
4. P & ~P stated. P cancels ~P and ~P cancels P. Result = No proposition left. Back to 1.
Now that I realize it, P & ~P, because they cancel each other doesn't amount to a proposition. A contradiction essentially means the person who utters/writes it isn't saying anything at all. If so, any other proposition wouldn't be constrained by the necessity of consistency as there's no proposition in the first place to be consistent with. This is why anything follows from a contradiction keeping in mind that what doesn't follow from a certain proposition is predicated on a resulting inconsistency.
[math]P_{1}:[/math] all odd numbers greater than 1 are prime.
3 x 5 = 15 which is composite.
[math]\neg P_{1}:[/math] At least one odd number is composite.
[math]P_{2}:[/math] Not all odd numbers are prime.
[math]\neg P_{1}[/math] forces the positive statement [math]P_{2}[/math]
thank you.
I think it came to focus here: Quoting TheMadFool
I still have questions that need to be clarified.
(1) I state a proposition P.
(2) Then I state ~P.
(3) which amounts to denying P.
(4) this necessarily concludes in not having stated P.
Questions:
A. Is (2) equivalent to (3)?
B. Is P true, or not true?
C. By denying P, do you mean to say that you can prove that P is false?
D. What precisely do you mean by saying "I deny P"?
E. Your stating P, then later denying it: is it a chronological order of your chaning opinion of P, which is independent of the actual truth or falsehood of P, or
F. is it a logical order of progression, in which you give validation why ~P should be held as truth, and not P should be held as true?
You see, I am having problems. Also, you say you go back to the starting point... then you say the starting point is nothing, but your starting point is P.
This is all unclear, and untouchable because it's basically senseless. Sorry, not an opinion on you or on your abilities, but a judgment made only on this... erm... on this... I don't even know what to call it. Series of related thoughts?
NEW ADDITION:
Did you add this to your previous post with a bit of a delay? Because it states precisely what I stated (almost), it is similar enough in meaning so that I would not have made my argument here if I had seen it and read it.
Quoting TheMadFool
That means, that you already preemptively answered my objections, and you and I came to an agreement. No further answer is required from you in this matter. Thanks.
What, then, is an example of a trivial truth?
Quoting TheMadFool
True, but when you say
Quoting TheMadFool
I have to counter: The Identity Law isn’t a law about the meanings of terms, is it? The proposition (0=0), which is indeed an instance of the Identity Law, is not the same as the not at all trivial proposition that for all time-points t1, t2 and every x, if I mean x and nothing else by ‘0’ at t1, then I also mean x and nothing else by ‘0’ at t2. The latter is an instance of what I call “the Constancy of Meaning Assumption”, which states that for every name N, all time-points t1, t2, and every x, if I mean x and nothing else by N at t1, then I also mean x and nothing else at t2 by N. It is this Meaning Constancy Assumption (MCA) that we need in a key way when arguing, not the Law of Identity, right?
Quoting TheMadFool
Firstly, as I said above, I think that (correct me if I’m wrong) we need MCA rather than the Identity Law. Secondly, I believe that Aristotle’s additions “at the same time” and “in the same respect” are superfluous if one respects right slottedness (arity) of the relationships involved. For instance, we might say that a tree is green in summer but red in fall, so that the property of greenness belongs to the tree in summer but not in autumn. This fallacy is set right once we see that greenness is actually a binary (two-slotted) relationship, not a one-slotted one, so the tree actually has (the property of being green in summer) both in summer and in fall.
Quoting TheMadFool
:up: So I’m not the only one who has realized that time might throw a wrench into any trial at a rock-solid proof. Great!
Nothing springs to mind!
Quoting Tristan L
A rose by any other name smells as sweet. For what it's worth here's how I see it...
The Law Of Identity: A = A. In my book, A can mean anything, from letters themselves to entire theories however complex about the world. The essence of this law, what it boils down to, is that if a meaning, whatever that may be, is assigned to a particular symbol, that assignment of meaning must remain the same for the duration of an argument or narrative. Meaning Constancy Assumption seems to be logically equivalent to The Law Of Identity. I have nothing more to say.
The rest of your post went over my head. Above my paygrade for a meaningful reply. Thanks for the engaging conversation.
It seems that what you mean by “Law of Identity” is not the same as what I mean by “Law of Identity”. Why I mean by that expression is the law that each thing is the selfsame as itself. For instance, the Sun is identical to itself. This has nothing to do with the meanings of words. What you mean by “Law of Identity” is indeed basically what I mean by “Meaning Constancy Assumption”.
Quoting TheMadFool
The pleasure is all mine :smile:.
What do you mean by "the sun is identical to itself"? Is there a danger/risk that it won't be identical to itself? Surely, the reason for formulating The Law Of Identity (A = A) is to prevent the possibility that someone will make the mistake that an A is not-A (violating The Law of Identity).
This mistake, in your example of the sun, won't occur at the level of the sun itself - it's not that there's a possibility that sun will suddenly become not-sun.
Where an error can occur is at the level of, the correct word here is, terms which are essentially words that have referents, which as far as I can tell, are individual objects (sun) or entire categories (stars). The problem is a feature of language itself in that the same term, the same word, can have multiple referents (puns??) e.g. a star is a celestial object or, at other times, an actor. Here's where confusion becomes possible, confusion that's detrimental to the soundness of arguments; we're at risk of committing the equivocation fallacy. The Law Of Identity is designed to roadblock this fallacy by mandating the constancy of a term with respect to its referent in a given argument i.e. if a specific referent has been applied to a certain term, this term-referent pair must remain fixed throughout. A referent is just an object specified by the meaning of a term.
Quoting Tristan L
:chin:
By the sentence "the sun is identical to itself", I mean that the Sun is the selfsame thing as itself. This concerns only the Sun itself and has nothing to do with the word “Sun”.
Quoting TheMadFool
No.
Quoting TheMadFool
True, which is why I hold the Law of Identity to be trivial.
Quoting TheMadFool
I fully forewyrd (agree) with you.
Quoting TheMadFool
This shows that what you mean by the term “Law of Identity” is what I mean by the term “Meaning-Constancy Assumption”. Do you forewyrd?
Quoting TheMadFool
What I mean by “Law of Identity” has nothing to do with meaning. It implies, for instance, that on the level of the Sun itself, the Sun is one and the same as the Sun. The principle that you’re talking about and that is important for the soundness of arguments, which are speechly (linguistic) objects, is what I call “Meaning-Costancy Assumption”. This is the principle that each term should refer to exactly one thing in a fixed way that doesn’t change over time.