Coherentism
The issue to address here is the question of why natural reason (meaning the innate ability of human beings to engage in reasoning) demands coherency. If propositions are inconsistent, contradictory, or otherwise incoherent, there is an inability for human reason to understand what is being stated, so some or all of these propositions need to be rejected, for the purpose of reasoning and understanding.
However, we tend to believe that there is a reality, beyond the propositions, which is represented by them, and we will judge propositions as "true" according to some assumed ideal of correspondence. The propositions serve as descriptions of this assumed reality, produced from observation.
If such observations produce judgements of correspondence, and true propositions, but the propositions display incoherency amongst each other, then why does natural reason demand that we reject them? The nature of reality might be that there is inconsistency inherent within it, so that one person's observation might naturally contradict another's, for example. So why does natural reason direct us toward rejection of such contradictory propositions, as if it were impossible that reality is like this, demanding that we produce coherency between the propositions, as a condition for acceptance, reasoning, and understanding? The truth might be that there is incoherency inherent within reality, and this demand for coherency which natural reason forces on us, might actually be directing us toward misunderstanding, disguised and presented to us by the innate capacity to reason, as what is required for understanding. Why ought we trust natural reason as superior to observation whenever observation gives us incoherency?
However, we tend to believe that there is a reality, beyond the propositions, which is represented by them, and we will judge propositions as "true" according to some assumed ideal of correspondence. The propositions serve as descriptions of this assumed reality, produced from observation.
If such observations produce judgements of correspondence, and true propositions, but the propositions display incoherency amongst each other, then why does natural reason demand that we reject them? The nature of reality might be that there is inconsistency inherent within it, so that one person's observation might naturally contradict another's, for example. So why does natural reason direct us toward rejection of such contradictory propositions, as if it were impossible that reality is like this, demanding that we produce coherency between the propositions, as a condition for acceptance, reasoning, and understanding? The truth might be that there is incoherency inherent within reality, and this demand for coherency which natural reason forces on us, might actually be directing us toward misunderstanding, disguised and presented to us by the innate capacity to reason, as what is required for understanding. Why ought we trust natural reason as superior to observation whenever observation gives us incoherency?
Comments (84)
At that point you're missing out the real reason you had a lucky result. Maybe it was your confidence to try new things you liked. Maybe it was the fact that your natural charm got you to get the waiter to switch your seat out for a view outside of a window. If you're missing out the real reason why good results happened to you, then you're leaving it up to chance.
The second is to avoid negative results. Lets say that I want to go paragliding but don't finish the training course because "My lucky rabbits foot will make it all work out." Perhaps it does. But you and I know that the rabbit foot had nothing to do with it, and his belief in the foot made him make a decision that could have been deadly. And of course, perhaps it doesn't work out at all.
It is a decision to be rational however, and if someone does not experience negative consequences from being irrational, or does not ascribe their negative experiences to being irrational, many people will choose the easier path of being emotional. In this case, they will reject reason for their "superior state" of emotional opinions and biases.
I think there's a bit of equivocation going on with the term "coherency" here. I take logical coherence as distinct from scientific coherence. If an argument is logically incoherent, it's truly incomprehensible. Logical statements that draw random conclusions and self contradictory statements would be examples.
Scientific coherency demands consistent use of underlying principles for the explanation of results, but the lack of such coherency doesn't result in incomprehensiblility. For example, if Newtonian physics accurately explains much phenomena, but ad hoc explanations must be used to explain others, we don't stumble into confusion, but we just note our underlying principle must be wrong.
Our demand for logical consistency is based upon what we take logic to be because if we're logically inconsistent, we are, by definition, not logical. It's what logic is.
Our demand for scientific coherence is based upon our prior observation of the existence of consistent laws of physics, but some are willing to allow for the paranormal, which might be stupid, but it's not incomprehensible.
The principle 'it happened like this before, therefore it will happen like that again', is not logical, nor reasonable in any way. It might appear like induction is built on this, but it isn't really. Induction is based in numerous repetitions.
So I don't quite understand the relationship between coherency and repeatability which you are trying to get at. Is coherency produced from repeatability, or does it, as you say allow repeatability? Repeatability, we can understand as being the necessary condition for a general principle, produced by induction.
Quoting Philosophim
Now you are talking about repeatability, but I don't understand your assumed relationship between repeatability and coherency.
Quoting Hanover
I don't see the distinction you're trying to make. A logically incoherent statement, or argument, does not render it incomprehensible. The parts of the statement or argument, when it is analyzed, must be themselves comprehensible in order to designate the statement as incoherent. The designation of "incoherent" requires that the parts be comprehensible. So we cannot assign "incomprehensible" in any absolute sense to the incoherent statement or argument.
For example, "the square circle" is not truly incomprehensible because "square" and "circle" are each comprehensible terms. In understanding them together though, the reality of one excludes the possibility of the other, such that a person's natural reason demanding for coherency produces the appearance of incomprehensibility. Without this demand for coherency, or perceived necessity of coherency, we might talk about square circles quite naturally, as if it is completely reasonable that an object would appear as a square from one perspective and as a circle from another perspective, like the well known duckrabbit.
The issue might be "perspective". Can one perspective, such as an individual's single mind, apprehend the same thing as both a square and a circle? Why does a mind demand that the reality of one excludes the possibility of the other? And if we say that it is potentially both, then we seem to replace "reality" with multiple possible worlds. But since the multiple worlds are just "possible", that reality is actually allowed to lurk in background, as simply undetermined.
But the propositions are part of this reality that is represented. They are composed of visual scribbles and sounds that we observe, just like the the things that the propositions represent. I don't understand this inclination to set words, or language-use, and observers, up on this special pedestal separate from the world that they represent. What makes one scribble or sound a proposition and some other scribble or sound not a proposition?
If we didn't observe (see and hear) propositions consistently between ourselves, how could we ever communicate?
Being part of the world, observers have an effect on what they observe. The inconsistency lies in the mind of observers in the form of their different experiences with propositions and what they refer to. The world isn't inconsistent outside of our minds. Being that our minds are separate, then there are bound to be differences in our minds, and each one has a different relation with the world from it's own position. The confusion arises out of trying to understand what we are talking about - the world or our experience of the world.
Propositions are merely a formality of dictionary words bundled through a simple manageable logic. They are a useful tool for the practice of formal philosophy. In and of themselves propositions represent nothing whatsoever just as mathematical symbols represent nothing beyond their own formalism.
To also add that philosophical formalisms correspond to a matching real, even material world is quite a stretch, when you think about it. It could be so, maybe or maybe not. But philosophy is in no position to then circularly derive its own primitive premises.
To justify such theories and many more speculations of its own is what science is for. Science has over the past millennium shown that nature is quite different than what the naive imagination suggests. If it wasn't so, there would be no need for science at all -- we could just ask each other how the world is and get true answers.
It's called "human understanding", and it's separated off from the rest of the world, as a particular thing to try to understand in itself. The reason for separating it off, is not to put it on a pedestal, but to try and understand it. Since this is philosophy, human understanding is a common subject to separate off.
I have made a further distinction, to address the role of natural reason, in comparison to observation, within human understanding.
Quoting Harry Hindu
From participation in this forum, it appears to me like there is not necessarily consistency between the way that different people interpret propositions. So I believe that communication is based in something other than consistency or coherency. I've seen people try to argue that communication requires coherency, and if you truly believe this you might present me with such an argument, but such arguments always seem to fail, so I believe that this is just an unsupported assumption.
I think, that as described above, coherency is something demanded by an individual's mind, for the sake of that thinking person's own thoughts, not something demanded by the person for the sake of communication.
Quoting Harry Hindu
I don't see how you can say this, and respect your earlier premise that propositions, which are products of minds, are part of the world. If our minds are part of the world, then the inconsistencies within our minds are inconsistencies in the world.
Quoting tim wood
It's not reasonable because a further premise is required. The conclusion that it will rain an hour after sunrise today, because it rained an hour after sunrise yesterday is not reasonable in any way, because a further premise is required to draw that conclusion logically. That's what I meant, 'it happened like this before, therefore it will happen like that again' is not reasonable in any way, because the further premise which states the necessity of similarity must be accounted for.
Quoting magritte
Well, needless to say, I strongly disagree with this. A "symbol", by what it means to be a symbol, necessarily represents something. To say that there is a symbol which represents nothing is contradiction plain and simple. If it represents nothing it can't be called a symbol. So your assumption is not worth considering as contrary to natural reason, to begin with.
How do you conclude this? Now some instances of predicting the future based on the past are illogical. But will you say that predictions on physics and math are illogical? All predictions are illogical? My desire to eat an apple because I liked the taste in the past is illogical?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Yes, the claim that the future will be a certain way is always an induction. But we can have logically based inductions, and irrationally based inductions. For example, I can claim the probability of an evenly balanced coin flip will be 50% over time. This is based on the knowledge we've gleaned from the past that we assume still stands. Knowing this information, it would be irrational to predict that it is 10/90% probability for heads/tails.
And that is the point I am trying to make. A rational assessment of the situation can allow you to avoid making a mistake. Note I was not intending to imply a guarantee. You can still make a rational choice about something, and it turns out to be wrong. But making a choice based on logic and previous knowledge gets you in a better ballpark on average than a guess that ignores or does not consider these things. Have I communicated this better? Feel free to point out if I need to clarify.
I just explained it in the last post. Another principle, which states the necessity of similarity is required.
But that's the problem - trying to separate it from the world. We typically understand things based on their effects on the rest of the world or the rest of the world's effect on it. Understanding understanding entails knowing how understanding has a causal relationship with the rest of world - like how observations affect our understanding, or how humans behave as a result of their understandings.
And understanding is about, or of, things, so trying to separate what some understanding is, from what it is about, or of, would be a misunderstanding of understanding.
And does understanding necessarily entail the use of propositions? Does a mother deer in the woods understand the odors and sounds that it smells and hears? Based on it's behavior, it obviously understands the distinction between the smell and sounds of its offspring and the smell and sounds of a wolf. It runs from wolves, and not from its offspring.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Communication requires a consistent understanding between two or more minds of what some scribble or sounds refers to. If your intention is to communicate with me, then your assumption is that I will interpret the scribbles on this screen in the same way that you do, so that I might catch a glimpse of your mind and its contents. Definitions in dictionaries are the consistent use of some scribble or sound. If you want to use them in a way that is inconsistent with their definition, then communicating would be difficult unless the other person has some prior experience with you using the scribble/sound in that way to know/understand/interpret in the same way that you are. In other words, communication entails the consistent understanding of what some scribble or sound points to in two or more minds. Without that, communication doesn't occur.
Communication between two or more computers requires the consist use of protocols - the rules by which the computers communicate. If one isn't following the same set of rules communication doesn't happen.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Like I said, "The world isn't inconsistent outside of our minds", which means that the only place the inconsistencies exist in the world is in minds. Inconsistencies occur because propositions and understanding are about, or of things, and not the things themselves, and our belief that every instance in time can be the same as some prior instance. All instances are unique and any understanding of some present or future event can only be based on prior similar instances, never the same instance.
The world is consistent (deterministic), in that if ever the universe was re-started, it would evolve in exactly the same was as before, but each instance in time of the evolving universe is separate and distinct, however similar it may appear based on our present intention and experiences.
Sorry tim, I just can't understand what your saying. You asked me why I think it is unreasonable to think that because it happened in the past, the same thing will happen again in the future, and I gave you my answer. I don't see how infinite regress is relevant.
Quoting tim wood
That is close to what I meant, but it doesn't quite get there. What i said is that it is not reasonable in any way, to think that what happened in the past guarantees that the same thing will happen in the future. You ought to quit trying to read some hidden agenda into what I write, then disagreeing with me based on that assumed hidden agenda.
Quoting Harry Hindu
Sure, but we also typically separate one from the other, in the attempt to understand the mix, like separating the sugar from the water to understand the solution. It's often called analysis. So for example, we'd separate the cause from the effect, in an attempt to understand the event, which consists of both. I don't see how you characterize understanding through analysis as "the problem".
Quoting Harry Hindu
I think this is nonsense. It makes complete sense to talk about "understanding" in a general sense, and determine characteristics which are proper to it, regardless of the particulars involved in an instance of understanding a particular thing.
Quoting Harry Hindu
I don't see how any of this is relevant to the op.
Quoting Harry Hindu
I think that if you took a serious look at the way words are actually used, you'd see that meaning is provided by the context of usage, not dictionaries.
Quoting Harry Hindu
You are removing yourself further and further from the subject of the op. The op concerned the use of words in human understanding. You took one step away from this to talk about the use of words in human communication. Now you've taken a step even further away, to talk about communication between computers.
Quoting Harry Hindu
That's some assertion, but I don't believe it. And since you speak as if it's the absolute truth, we probably don't have much to discuss.
Then what use is a dictionary? Is not a dictionary a use of words within a certain context, like defining the meaning of words?
Quoting Metaphysician UndercoverAnd I already showed that words are just scribbles and sounds. What makes some scribble or sound useful for understanding, and others not useful for understanding? If we can use sounds to understand things that arent sounds, then why cant we use any sound, like sounds that arent spoken words, to understand something. For instance, hearing and seeing someone say "it's going to rain" vs hearing thunder and seeing lightning, both sounds and visuals provide you with the same understanding - that it is going to rain. Propositions are just a particular type of visual and sounds.
We trust reason over observation because reason is conditioned by itself, whereas observation is conditioned by Nature.
Observation, being a strictly passive, unconscious mental activity, is not responsible for incoherency, such being the domain of judgement.
It follows that even if judgement, a product of reason, occasionally leads the thinking subject astray, it is rarely the case, and even if there is a case, it is reason alone that has the ability to rectify its own mistakes.
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Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Absolutely. Although, treating understanding as a fundamental human cognitive faculty, doesn’t really warrant scare quotes, Nietzsche’s “inverted goat’s feet”. No reason to be scared of it, or doubt its reality.
Worthy subject matter, anyway.
That's not how we start it.
We don't assume inherent inconsistency in nature. We don't make sense of nature with inconsistencies.
If we observe something that seems to us inherently inconsistent, we simply make the conclusion that we don't know what happens. That it's a mystery to us at least for now and we hope an answer is found later.
Hence, if quantum mechanics seems inconsistent with classical mechanics, we simply cherish it as we do now: that it's consistent that it looks at first inconsistent.
It is a use of words, but the dictionary does not define the meaning of words. It gives guidance, in the form of a general representation of how words are commonly used. So the dictionary definitions are similar to inductive conclusions, descriptions of how words are commonly used. But if we look at them as inductive conclusions, they are very faulty, not acceptable induction at all, by scientific standards.
Quoting Harry Hindu
The so-called sounds and scribbles are used with intent, as symbols, and that means that they are associated with something else. We do use other things, like in your example. I didn't say that understanding is limited to the use of words. I was talking about a specific type of understanding, which I called "natural reason".
Quoting Mww
I don't quite understand the distinction here, perhaps you could expound. What do you mean with "conditioned by itself"? There is a reason why I used "natural reason", to establish reason as something natural rather than an illusionary concept of reason as something self-created.
Quoting Mww
This seems sort of contradictory, a strictly passive activity. Don't you think that there is judgement inherent within observation? Observation consists of noticing some things as important or significant, but also disregarding others as insignificant or unimportant.
Quoting Mww
So I would say that there is judgement which is not a product of reason. Such judgements might or might not appear to be reasonable judgements, in a different sense of "reason", like a reasoned judgement might still appear to be unreasonable in that other sense, when the reasoning is judged as unsound.
Quoting Mww
I'm not familiar with "scare quotes", I use the quotes to emphasize the word as referring to a thing, a concept, such as "reason" above. Another tradition might be to capitalize the word, Reason.
The idea of coherency only exists if there are prior observations of the phenomena being observed currently. If you observe a completely novel experience, then you won’t know if your observation is coherent or not, as there is no baseline to judge it by.
If you have prior observations/experiences, then the default assumption is coherency (which also implicitly assumes determinism). The reason for this, I would assume, is because more often than not this assumption is correct. It’s an effective assumption to make while navigating the world and trying to understand it.
If we observe something that contradicts our assumed coherency, then the logical thing to do is to try to develop a theory that explains both the incoherent and coherent observations. If that cannot be accomplished, then the only options left are to discard the observation as some illusion, determine that the novel observation plays by a different set of rules for some reason (which you would then go in to try and explain), or to repeat the observations if possible and hope you can gain some better insight into what exactly is going on.
The bottom line is that observations drive, or determine, reason. When the two clash, it is reason that must become flexible or malleable in order to accommodate our observations.
In science or in philosophy?
Both. In all areas of life.
Inherent in? No. Consequential to, certainly, with respect to time. Judgement presupposes that which is to be judged, either a posteriori perception on the one hand, or a priori thought on the other. We can think and arrive at a judgement without perceiving, but we cannot perceive and arrive at a judgement without thinking.
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Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Reason is a prime human asset, along with the moral constitution. Reason conditioned by itself just means there is nothing else required for reason to function as that asset, other than the compendium of cognitive faculties incorporated within it. Things are required to reason about, of course, but not to function.
Reason doesn’t create itself, but it does create its own objects. Consciousness, the ego, the self....a myriad of representations that are nothing but objects of reason.
But it’s all speculative metaphysics, so......grain of salt here, dump truck full there.
I don't agree with this. I think that each experience is novel. I've never had two experiences the same before, though I've experienced deja vu, but I really can't even imagine the possibility of living through the same thing twice. I recognize deja vu as just a feeling, and not really having the same experience twice. With the nature of time and spatial existence being as it is, it seems completely impossible to have the same experience more than once. So quite clearly, coherency must be based in something other than prior observations of the same thing.
The idea of coherency might be derived from observations though. Maybe after many observations we start to derive a notion of what is and isn't possible, and coherency is based in this sort of inductive conclusion concerning possibilities.
Quoting Pinprick
The problem I see here is that you do not seem to be differentiating between experience, and observation. Observation is to take note of what has been experienced, so it requires a task of memorizing. Imagine that something has just happened, you've experienced it. You think it's significant so you want to remember it, therefore you take mental notes, observations. It's very difficult to imagine the whole scenario of what occurred, and memorize this, so I tend to put things into words, and this helps me to remember. The strategy I use is to maintain coherency in my description, otherwise when i try to remember at a future time, I will be confused as to what really happened, because my own description won't make sense to me. Sometimes though, it might be difficult to be coherent, especially if the event was fast and it's difficult for me to follow exactly what happened. However, I will feel a need to remember what happened with a coherent description, and this might incline me toward making up some things, just to produce coherency, and help me understand the event which I am trying to remember, so that I can remember it. But then I'm not actually remembering what I experienced, because my observations are tainted by the make believe which I had to add, in order to understand what I saw.
Quoting Pinprick
Why do you contradict yourself here? First you say that if consistency cannot be produced, the only thing to do is to discard the observation as illusion. Then you say when observation and reason clash, "it is reason that must become flexible" to accomodate observations.
Quoting tim wood
Just as I said, to reasonably draw that conclusion we need another principle, a principle which supports the idea that what happened yesterday will happen today. This principle is not drawn from experience because we experience each day as different from every other day. And there is no implied infinite regress, just a need for that principle which would support the conclusion as a reasonable conclusion.
Quoting Mww
I suppose we may be using "observation" in different ways. To me, observation implies judgement having been past on the acts of sensation, such that a decision as to what will be remembered out of all that has been sensed, has been made. The content of sensation is much more expansive than the content of observation, so something intermediate between sensation and observation must narrow the field. The complete magnitude of all that is sensed is not contained in observation. If this is not a form of judgement, which narrows sensation to observation, then what is it?
Quoting Mww
Let's assume that what you say about reason here is true. Your claim that reason ought to be trusted over sensation was supported by this principle. But how does that make sense? Reason, being conditioned only by itself, would have the capacity to produce any sort of fantasy, any imaginary thing. But sensation is condition by nature, and is therefore grounded in some sort of reality. If this is a true portrayal of reason, why on earth should reason be more trustworthy than sensation?
Well, it depends on how general you want to be. I had in mind things like causation, or gravity. You have certainly observed one object cause another object to move on more than one occasion. My point being that due to this consistency in experience (or observation if you prefer) we come to have certain expectations of how the world works. We then experience incoherency when these expectations are not met.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I’m not, but it’s because whatever difference there is between them seems to not make a difference. Also, I didn’t have in mind anything complex. I was thinking more along the lines of natural physical laws. In which case, the memorization seems to be done unconsciously, or is arrived at intuitively in some way. I remember an experiment that showed that very young children (infants?) were capable of experiencing surprise/shock. This was to show that we are able to form expectations at a very young age, which implies the ability to learn about the environment presumably through “memorizing” observations.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I listed two other options as well (try to explain the observation using different rules, or try to replicate the experience).
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This is meant to refer to those other two options. My point is just that if we are going to make an attempt at understanding something that seems to contradict our preconceived notions (natural reason), then we must alter those notions because we cannot change the actual phenomenon.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I don't think natural reason demands the rejection of incoherent propositions. Incoherent propositions are rejected when proven incoherent. Therefore, it is the action of observing which forms the basis for the rejection of incoherent propositions.
If I say there is only one star in the universe, it is not natural reason which leads me to believe that there is more than one star in the universe; it is the act of experiencing and observing that there is more than one star in the universe which rejects the incoherent proposition.
The rejection of incoherent propositions is only possible by experiencing a phenomenon which after being observed renders them incoherent.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I don't think that two different, observations about the same thing can be completely contradictory; they might disagree in certain aspects but never contradict each other (they are about the same thing). If they are observations about different things, then they cannot be contradictory, at all.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I'd say that if our minds are part of the world, then the inconsistencies in the world are inconsistencies within the mind (if there are any true inconsistencies in the world), and not the other way around as you stated it (your mind is not the only thing there is).
Coherence is found in what we say, not in how things are.
Things just are the way they are. If what we say about them is inconsistent, then we've said it wrong. There will be another way of talking that will remove the inconsistency.
Please don't take offense, but this is too beautiful not to rip ungraciously from its context.
Here here, "Knowledge unconditionally presupposes that the reality known exists independently of the knowledge of it, and that we know it as it exists in this independence." Prichard
Perhaps. For me, everything in its place: sound sensation is hearing, tactile sensation is feeling, olfactory sensation is smelling.....sight sensation is seeing, and that which is seen is observed. We do not observe the smell of frying bacon, we do not taste B-flat, and we do not hear the sight of fast-moving clouds.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
From the above, it is clear any sensation has its possible judgement, but their respective sources, hence the conceptions under which they are subsumed, will be completely different. Observation directly requires extension of matter in space, for instance, but the sensation of sound only directly requires changes in air pressure, which is not required by extension.
Judgement passed on sensation, rather than being mere observation, is empirical knowledge. Sensation upon which a judgement is not forthcoming, insofar as we must admit to an “I don’t know” about it, still manifests as an experience. Aesthetic judgements, on the other hand, those having to do with non-cognitive feelings, or the sublime, are just the opposite, insofar as, while possibly motivated by experience, are not themselves judgements of experience, thus knowledge with respect to them is given immediately.
Obviously, empirical judgements are susceptible to change with sufficient subsequent experience, but aesthetic judgements are not so susceptible, being grounded in the subject’s innate sense of quality, re: Hume’s “missing shade of blue” gedankenexperiment.
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Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Yep. Self-control is not intrinsic to reason. We can certainly imagine anything we like, except the logically impossible. Which is ironic, because only reason gives the laws of logic, which reason then uses to control itself. So perhaps we trust reason over sensation because reason belongs to us, is present constantly, and if we didn’t trust it, we couldn’t claim to know anything whatsoever, including the very same laws of logic, the principles of mathematics, and even our own selves, which is absurd.
Nevertheless, if one chooses to trust sensation over reason, he will be at a complete loss as to explaining what the sensation actually represents, unless he reasons about it, which puts him right back to trusting reason over sensation.
This type of generalization seems to be the common response here. But no one has told me, and I can't figure out, how it relates to coherency. I was defining coherency as consistency within logical structures, lack of contradiction between propositions, etc.. You seem to be saying that incoherency is when something isn't the way that you expect it to be, referring to inductive generalizations to support your expectations. So you are assigning "incoherency" to situations when things are inconsistent with the way you expect them to be. But this is really a lack of correspondence, it's not a lack of coherency, in the sense of "coherency" that I meant.
I think that this is a different issue. The notion that things ought to correspond with our expectations, the expectations having been produced from inductive generalizations, is somewhat different from the notion that such generalizations ought to be consistent with themselves. The latter is what I am talking about as "coherency". The difference becomes more evident if we replace "generalizations" with principles of procedure, application, or principles for moral conduct in the latter case. Then it becomes very clear how we can have incoherent, contradictory principles of procedure.
Quoting Pinprick
Of course it makes a difference. If you scan the horizon with your eyes for a few seconds, and there are hundreds of different things out there, and you turn around, then I ask you what did you see, you could list off a view items. Whether you list off these items, or those items, is a big difference, because it indicates that what you have noticed, or "observed", is different from what you have "sensed". The only reason why you would say that it doesn't make a difference, is if you were trying to support the false premise that sensation and observation are the same thing.
Quoting Pinprick
OK, maybe there is a correlation between "expectations", which refers to an assumption of correspondence, as described above, and "coherency", defined as logical consistency. I really don't see it though, and the problem is this. Coherency might be at the base of expectation. Expectation, as a motivator for action might be naturally shaped, or conformed by coherency, in order to prevent us human beings from being inclined toward many different inconsistent actions. However, such coherency is pragmatic only, it prevents the human being from trying to do contrary or inconsistent things, things which would interfere with, or hinder each other. Now, what supports this need for coherency? What validates the assumption of interference? You'd say that it is those generalizations, and correspondence with them, but such generalizations are known to be faulty and unreliable. That's why a child must be educated, to dispel the expectations that the child has, at a very young age, replacing them with more true expectations.
Quoting Pinprick
Sure, but "phenomenon", as referring to how the world appears to a person, through sensation, might not be a very good representation of how the world actually is. This problem is indicated by the difference between sensation and observation, and the example above. The aspects of the world which are noticed, or observed by us, are only a very small portion of what is sensed, and this small portion constitutes the phenomena. So if we want to learn about how the world actually is, we must apply some principles derived from something other than the phenomena.
Quoting Daniel
I don't agree with this. Propositions are proven to be incoherent by demonstrating inconsistency like contradiction. This is done through appeal to definition. There is no need to refer to observation for this proof, only a rule of non-contradiction is required. Proof that such a rule ought to be applied might require empirical demonstration, but that's a different issue.
Quoting Daniel
Incoherency, as I meant to define in the op, is a relationship between propositions, or the terms within a proposition. So there would be incoherency between these two propositions "there is one star in the universe", and "there is more than one star in the universe", but neither one is itself incoherent. Likewise, a self-contradicting proposition would demonstrate incoherency within itself. The act of observing numerous stars leads to the rejection of "there is one star in the universe", on the basis of a failure to correspond, not on the basis of incoherency.
Quoting Daniel
Of course two observations of the same thing might contradict. One person might say, that object is small, and another might say that it is big.
Quoting Banno
Right, now the question is what validates the desire, or need for coherency in what we say about the world. Unless there is something in the world, which corresponds with "coherency", the world ought to be represented as incoherent, in order for us to have a true, corresponding representation of the world. Why would we demand coherency within our descriptions and representations of the world, when these are meant to correspond with the world, and there is no such thing as coherency in the world? What does "coherency" represent, which makes it so valuable, if it doesn't correspond with anything in the world?
Quoting Banno
What makes it wrong, to say something inconsistent about the world, if "consistent" doesn't correspond with anything in the world?
To my understanding, only truths matter - there's no sense in knowing falsehoods; after all, falsehoods are a liability rather than an asset unless, of course, you're a politician, in which case, falsehoods have huge payoffs
Anyway, consider the situation where you have a belief system, T, that consists of the propositions, say X, Y, and Z. Suppose then that these 3 propositions are inconsistent in the sense that it's impossible for all three of them to be true at the same time. In other words the conjunction X & Y & Z evaluates to false i.e. the belief system T, as a whole, is false.
Too, note that a false belief system like T above is useless for further inference because in a sound argument all premises must be true but because X, Y and Z form a set that is inconsistent, that can never be the case. No sound arguments can follow from inconsistent premises - no sound arguments, no knowledge.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
The usual suspect when someone makes such comments is quantum physics and the most common law reported as being violated is the law of non-contradiction but, as far as I can tell, the difference between the quantum world and the world at our scale is as great as that between the world of inanimate matter and the living world. In other words, thinking an electron is like, say, a pebble or a chair -something that can't be in two places at the same time - is probably a monumental mistake, as much of a mistake as thinking biochemistry applies to rocks.
There's another type of coherence and it, more or less, falls under the rubric of abductive reasoning - argument to the best explanation. As a concrete example, suppose you were a detective and you've been called to a crime scene at a house. You have a hypothesis - you think the crime is an "inside job" i.e. the criminal is one of the occupants. If your hypothesis is correct then, the doors and windows of the house should show no sign of forced entry and if, in fact, this is the case, facts and hypothesis then form a coherent picture of what transpired.
and,
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Well, (p & ~p) ?q
A contradiction implies anything. Indeed, it implies everything.
But if you wish to work from contradictions, go right ahead. If you don't mind, I'll not be joining you.
I don't believe that seeing something necessitates the conclusion that it has been observed. Observation requires that the person understands and remembers what has been seen. Did you see the example I provided above? Could you address this example, I'll reproduce it below, and explain to me how you maintain your principle of whatever has been seen has been observed?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Quoting Mww
My argument is that some form of judgement (unconscious judgement) must be passed on sensation prior to observation. This accounts for the fact that so much sense information is received, and only a portion of this is remembered as observation. Consider another example. You are assigned the task of observing something specific. Suppose someone wants to know when a certain thing changes, or something like that, which could happen at any moment. So you observe this particular thing, focus on it, and it alone, such that you are not paying any attention to the other things in your field of vision, even though you still see them. Other things could be happening in your field of vision, you see them, but you ignore them, because you are focused on observing something specific. What I think, is that when we look around in the world, certain things attract one's attention for some reason or another, and so those things are observed by the person, but the vast majority of things going on around the person do not get observed at all, despite being present to the senses.
Quoting Mww
This would only be the case, if what you say about sensing and observation is true. But if it is true that there is a difference between sensation and observation, as I describe, then we have to account for that type of "judgement" or whatever it is, which induces us to observe only specific aspects of what we sense. This is not a conscious judgement, so it cannot be a judgement of reason. We could call it a sense of intuition, in the traditional sense of intuition, and one might trust this intuition over reason. Then the inclination to trust the laws of logic, and consequently trust reason, would be derived from a similar type of intuition.
Quoting TheMadFool
If X&Y&Z are inconsistent with each other, this does not justify the claim that the belief system is false, unless falsity is determined as inconsistency, rather than as correspondence. That is the point of the op. Each proposition might state something true (corresponding) about the world, yet logic might tell us that those statements are inconsistent. The laws of consistency are not based in correspondence, so inconsistent does not mean false, in the sense of correspondence.
You conclude that X, Y, and Z, cannot all be true if inconsistent, but on what basis do you claim this? Perhaps your idea of what is consistent, and what is not consistent, does not provide a true representation of the world. Then being inconsistent does not necessarily mean false, because your rules of logic may not correspond with the reality of the world.
The idea behind consistency appears to be simple. Consistency ensures that, there exists a possible world in which all propositions for a given belief system, say X, are true. If no such world exists, it's called inconsistency. The basic idea behind inconsistency is simple - it indicates that, in all possible worlds, at least one of the propositions in X is false. In other words, inconsistency is an indication that if you subscribe to belief system X, and the propositions that constitute X are inconsistent, you're actually admitting that you believe something false (the one or more false propositions that lead to the inconsistency).
Suppose the inconsistent belief system X is made up of propositions P, Q, R, and S. X's inconsistency can be made more evident by the conjunction operation performed on P, Q, R, and S as so; P & Q & R & S which will always evaluate to false. In other words, there is no possible world in which P, Q, R, and S can all be true. To reiterate, an inconsistent set of propositions implies one or more of them is/are false.
The idea that there's a possibility that the universe could itself be inconsistent doesn't make sense for the reason that inconsistency implies the presence of a falsehood and unless you want to construct a belief system that includes falsehoods, no inconsistent set of proposition is acceptable. Do you want there to be falsehoods in your belief system about the universe?
X is Y of Q, but only if X is conditioned by P.
X is the derivative of P as P itself derives from S...
"What the fuck is this shit!," the astronaut yelled?
"It's a very important syllogism I've been working on," he replied.
Moments later the shuttle crashed to the earth.
Isn't that what "defining the meaning of words" means? If not, then what is a "definition"?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I'm not sure I get what you mean here. My point was that there has to be a common understanding of what some words mean if they are to be used for communicating. That common understanding could be a dictionary, or experience with a person using certain words in a certain way. Either way, it requires experience with a dictionary or a person using words, to understand their use of them.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
That's the thing - I don't see a distinction. Don't you have to first understand that what you are looking at or hearing is words, and not just some scribbles or sounds? Only after that can you then try to understand what those scribbles or sounds refer to. At each point, there is no difference in the type of understanding required to understand the difference between scribbles and words and to understand how those words are used. In the case of lightning and thunder, you have to understand that it is lightning and thunder that you see and hear, and then understand from that what the presence of lightning and thunder mean.
Understanding is simply having a set of rules for interpreting sensory data based on experience, and that goes for scribbles/voices and lightning/thunder.
If you intended to communicate, then you would have to use words in a way that you know I would understand. If you didn't care about me understanding your use of words, then you really didn't use anything, just as you didn't use a screwdriver if you failed to turn the screw. You simply made scribbles or noises, or stripped the screw. Those scribbles and noises may mean something to you, but if your intent is to communicate, then that isn't enough. You have to understand you readers and listeners as well - like what languages that they understand and their level of competency. If not, then all you have done is make scribbles or noises.
So you say, which is fine. I would say cognition requires one to understand, and experience is that which he remembers as having been observed in particular, perceived in general.
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Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I suppose imagination, the unconscious faculty that transforms sensations into phenomena, could be thought as a form of judgement. But such transformation is still a consequence of perception rather than prior to it.
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Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Whichever items are mentioned in a list merely indicates a relative impression those objects made, whether from familiarity, some arbitrary characteristic...shiny, odd-shaped, whatever. The list of cognized items will always be fewer than the list of sensed items, because the mind doesn’t bother registering those in the periphery, or those with relatively minor impression. In effect, there is always a possible list just as you’ve hypothesized, in everyday life.....when I look at the tv, the walls of the room are right there, but I don’t sense or observe them.
On the other hand, the lists of related items could very well be different for different people, and there are people who can relate many more items on the list than others. In addition, the more time spend on sensing or observing, the more likely the list of items increases proportionally. Because of these variables, it must be the case that something other than sense or observation is responsible for relating the items on the list.
I grant there will be a difference between the totality of the items and the items that make the list, but I don’t grant it as relating to a difference in sense vs. observation.
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Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You 1: what you have noticed, or "observed", is different from what you have "sensed"
You 2: there is a difference between sensation and observation, as I describe
There is a difference between sensation and observation, but this is not as you described, that being the difference between what is sensed and observation. Sensation is the affect the objects we have sensed have on us...a tickle, a sound, a taste, etc. These are all sensations which merely represent objects that physiologically affect our sense organs.
I don’t know what to do with this, now, because I’m not sure what it is you’re arguing.
This is incorrect. Consistency says nothing about the truth of the beliefs. One could write fictitious propositions which are completely false, but consistent, about some "possible world". Consistency does not ensure that the belief system is true. What ensures truth is that the propositions correspond with the actual world. The issue is whether or not the true propositions, ones which describe the actual world, are consistent with each other, and capable of producing one consistent "possible world". Perhaps the actual world is composed of a multitude of possible worlds which are inconsistent with each other.
Quoting TheMadFool
If "true" is defined according to correspondence with the reality of the world, then another premise is required to produce this conclusion. That premise would be the proposition that the reality of the world cannot be described with inconsistent premises. How can we know whether this proposition is true or not.
Quoting TheMadFool
This is only the case if you remove correspondence as a defining feature of truth and falsity. If you do this, then any imaginary possible world which is consistent is a true world. Otherwise you equivocate with your use of "falsehood".
Quoting Harry Hindu
Defining a word is to give a definition which will be adhered to within a logical argument or a similar use. This is a prescriptive venture. It prescribes how the word will be used and interpreted. What the dictionary gives us is a description of how words are generally used.
Quoting Harry Hindu
Your use of "common understanding" doesn't make any sense to me. Individual people understand, and have an understanding. But the way I understand things is different from the way that you understand things. Yet we can communicate. So I think your proposition, that a "common understanding" (which appears incoherent to me) is required for communication, is false.
Quoting Harry Hindu
I believe that this is intuitive. Everything we sense and observe, lightening, thunder, the ground, buildings, sky, words, is intuitively received as having significance or meaning. This is why I have requested a difference between sensation and observation. When we sense things, there is a huge magnitude of events happening all at the same time, and we instinctually prioritize the significance of the various things, and observe those assumed to have importance.
Quoting Harry Hindu
I think there is a big difference between conscious understanding, reasoning, and the unconscious, intuitive, assigning of importance to sensations.
Quoting Mww
OK, so I would place observation in the same category as cognition. There seems to be a grey area, a division lacking demarcation, which we often refer to habitually, between conscious reasoned thought (cognition), and unconscious brain activity. I'd say that this is derived from our habit of separating human beings from other animals, as equipped with a special type of mental capacity which the other animals do not have. Since we have established this division "man is a rational animal", we talk about mental capacities as if there is a divide between this and that type of activity. We wouldn't say that other animals engage in reasoning, cognition, or even observation. But to argue that other animals do, is to obscure that proposed division.
However, I believe that this way of dividing the different mental activities is not representative of reality. In reality, each of these activities crosses back and forth between that proposed divide, consisting of aspects of each, reasoned thought, and animalistic instinct, and this habit of dividing mental activities as if some are distinctly reasoned thought, and others are distinctly brute instincts is an incorrect representation. So if we look at a divide between conscious (chosen) and unconscious (instinctually driven) activities, (perhaps the biological division of voluntary and involuntary actions), we would see that human beings and other animals engage in both. And if we were to take just the conscious (voluntary) actions, we would see that a large part of the inclination toward such actions is based in the involuntary. so it's not a proper division. This would mean, that as much as we want to separate "reason" out, and place it as conditioned by itself only, there is a fundamental part of it which is firmly planted in natural instinct.
Quoting Mww
Based on what I wrote above, I have reason to question our understanding of judgement. We categorize judgement as a feature of conscious, reasoned decision, a product of cognition. However, it is quite clear from the example of seeing the multitude of things, that some type of decision, choice, or selection, is being made at the unconscious, involuntary level. How do we describe, or refer to this type of selection, or judgement, if the common use of all these words is conditioned by that traditional separation, to refer to the product of human reasoning alone? If it is actually the case that this type of activity, decision, choice, selection, or judgement, extends throughout all living activities to the most basic life forms, then we need to reassess the traditional division between a reasonable judgement and a non-reasonable judgement, to determine what constitutes a reasonable judgement.
Quoting Mww
Right, so can we say that the impression which the objects make is relative to some type of "judgement" (using quotes to signify an idiosyncratic use of the word referring to an instinctual, unconscious form of decision) of importance or some other type of significance? That different people will notice different things is indicative of a fundamental individuality in such "judgements". Perhaps, this individuality, this difference, is a fundamental feature of such instinctual "judgement", and we only learn through conditioning, to make judgements which are consistent with what others would make in the same situation. So we, as human beings, produce an artificial ideal, "a judgement which is consistent with what others would choose", and call this "reason", despite the fact that it is reasonable, do to the underlying individuality, to make a judgement which is different from others.
Quoting Mww
The use of terminology here is extremely vague, so I won't fuss over the proposed division between sense and observation. The point was to show that there must be some mechanism of choice or selection at this level. Consequently, there is "judgement", at the unconscious level. And any form of judgement must be grounded in some sense of importance or significance, so there must be a reason why some people would observe or notice some items, out of the vast multitude, and other people would notice other items.
Quoting Mww
The problem here, is that we cannot proceed through the conscious mind, to determine the effect which sensation has on the unconscious part of our being. With the conscious mind, we get to the point of the affect which sensations have on the conscious mind. But much of the interaction between the objects sensed, and the sensing being is carried out at the unconscious level. so we cannot access that interaction through the conscious mind. Therefore we cannot make any conscious judgements concerning the unconscious "judgements" which are carried out at that level through this procedure. To limit "the affect the objects have" to the consciously apprehended affect, is a mistake. .
Which is to say what the word generally means, and how it is commonly understood, or interpreted. All of these terms are compatible with each other, so we seem to be understanding each other and agreeing as we are using different words that have similar meanings to reiterate what the other is saying.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Exactly, YET we communicate. So how do you explain communication without a common understanding, or way of interpreting scribbles and sounds?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It seems to me that you can't sever the interpretation from the sensation - as if sensations just occur without the addition of its interpretation. The brain subconsciously interprets the sensory data and filters it before you even become aware of it in your conscious mind. The conscious part of the mind seems to be an extra layer of fault-tolerance - interpreting sensory data and interpreting it in a social context, like for communication.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Well, that begs the question: What is consciousness?
Communication is a very complex subject and I'm not ready to try to explain how it works.
Quoting Harry Hindu
Right we're in agreement here. That subconscious interpretation, which you say that the brain does, requires some sort of "judgement" is what I've been arguing. We cannot call it reasoning because reasoning is limited to conscious judgements. So i wonder what kind of principles are being applied in this subconscious interpretation.
Your description of consistency is correct. All that's essential is that some possible world exist where all propositions being considered are true.
You mention works of fiction and that the propositions contained therein are necessarily false and yet consistent. This is also correct for the same reason - there need only be one possible world in which all propositions in a fictional work are true to satisfy the condition of consistency.
That "consistency does not ensure that the belief system is true" is, again, right on the money. All that the test of consistency can do is to show us that there's at least one possible world in which all propositions in a given belief system are true. It doesn't mean that that possible world in which all propositions in a belief system are true is this, our, world
Sorry for the multiple posts but my last reply to this comment was inadequate.
First, you agree that if a given set of propositions, cal it S, is inconsistent implies that there is no possible world where all of them are true.
Second, if you agree to the above, you have to agree that if S is an inconsistent set of propositions, one or more of the propositions in S are false.
Third, if you think all of the above are true then, any set of propositions, call it R, that describes reality and is inconsistent will contain at least one false proposition. Too, that the set R is inconsistent implies that there's no possible world in which all the constituent propositions of R are true. Doesn't this mean that even in this world, not all the propositions of R will be true i.e. you'll have at least one proposition in R that's false. Do you want to belief system which has falsehoods? No! If so, you simply can't accept a description of reality that's inconsistent.
Again, my previous reply was not up to mark.
There are two things to consider:
1. The definition of truth as a correspondence between reality and the words that are used to decribe reality.
So far so good.
2. Then there's the notion of consistency/inconsistency.
The correspondence theory of truth defines what truth is. That's that.
The notion of consistency informs us whether a given belief system is acceptable in the sense it's possible that all propositions in it can be true at the same time. If this is impossible then we know that given belief system is inconsistent and in every possible world at least one of the propositions of that belief system is going to be false.
The two, the correspondence theory of truth and the concept of consistency/inconsistency are independent of each other. The correspondence theory is an agreed upon meaning of truth and consistency/inconsistency is a description of the relationship between given propositions.
Coming to your statement: "if we remove correspondence as a defining feature of truth and falsity...any imaginary world which is consistent is a true world". I get what you mean. You mean to say that the correspondence criterion decides whether something is true/not and if that were not the case, every world in all possible worlds would be identical in all respects, including truth.
However, consistency/inconsistency doesn't depend on the actual truth of propositions. In fact this is why we use truth tables to identify them - every possibility is taken into account. Ergo, no theory or definition of truth is relevant to consistency/inconsistency.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
The second is fine; whatever reason there may be to fuss over the division between sense and observation is semantic, and doesn’t interfere too seriously with the technicalities. But if observation is suggested as having similar characteristics....being in the same category.....as cognition, we are met with an insurmountable technical inconsistency, for cognition makes explicit an understanding, but observation holds no such requirement, insofar as it is common enough to sense that for which there is no immediate recognition. In other words, cognition implies knowledge, mere observation does not.
But I think I understand your groundwork: if there is an “unconscious” form of judgement at the one end of the cognitive sequence, which has been mentioned as imagination, and a “conscious” form of judgement at the other, which has been mentioned as judgement proper, then it follows that the outputs of these forms of judgement will have something in common between them. This may very well work, except for the realization that nothing in the unconscious mode can be anything but purely theoretical, from which follows necessarily that our observation, if categorized as proceeding from “unconscious” judgements, can also be nothing more than theoretical. But they are not, nor can they be, and still keep with the hope of empirical knowledge, as humans indulge themselves in it. One doesn’t theorize hearing a siren; he actually, truly, and with apodeictic certainty, hears a siren.
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Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It’s not supposed to represent reality; it only represents the compendium of faculties contained in a possible methodology used by humans in particular, to understand the reality in which they find themselves.
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Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No need for such derivation. It is quite obvious there is an unconscious aspect of human mental activity, right? I mean.....we are never aware of the output of sensation and the input to the brain, yet when we stub our left toe we never jerk our right foot. Might this be your “unconscious” judgement?
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Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Correct, which is why we theorize scientifically, and speculate metaphysically, on what is going on unconsciously. Everything between sensation and understanding is speculative, re:, unconscious, including appearance, intuition, space, time, imagination, phenomena, ending with conception. While one guy’s guess is as good as another’s, it helps to have as few explanatory gaps as possible.
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Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Perhaps. But we both accept that we know things. If nothing else, the best we could say is we both sometimes make exactly the same mistake. And if everybody makes exactly the same mistake, we might as well call such mistakes, knowledge.
This is an unwarranted assertion. What is it about consciousness that makes reasoning limited to it? To answer this we need a proper definition of consciousness.
If this is the case, then why do we give consistency any esteem? According to the op, many would give greater esteem to consistency than to correspondence. This may be due to the fact that it is usually much more difficult to determine correspondence than it is to determine correspondence.
Quoting Mww
Again, if we follow this route of investigation we might just fall into a pit of deceptive definitions, defining a term in such a way so as to support an already adopted epistemology. So we now have an issue with the definition of "understanding". For me, there is no problem defining "understanding" such that "observation" requires understanding. How could one remember, and observe, what has occurred without some sort of understanding of what has occurred. Animals understand, perhaps insects understand, but I don't think plants have any understanding. But plants don't even sense. So we might link sensation as necessarily correlated with understanding. But if we ask which is prior to other other, as a necessary condition for the other, I would say that some sort of understanding is required for sensation.
As I described in my last post, I think this comes down to an issue of "judgement" as the defining feature of these terms. Understanding requires some sort of "judgement". And sensation requires "judgement", as the judgement is used to filter the vast array of information available, such that the organism recognizes only the information which is "judged" as important or significant to it. If we ask, do plants make "judgements", I'd have to answer yes. Consider a seed. It will lie dormant for an extended period of time. Then, with the correct combination of environmental conditions, temperature, moisture, and light, it will germinate. Isn't this a case of "judgement"? We could almost say that it is a case of sensing without sense organs. Bear in mind, that a physicalist might argue that a thermostat senses the temperature. In philosophy, there is a tradition of shaping one's definitions to be consistent with one's metaphysics.
Quoting Mww
It's not that the observations themselves (as basic sensations) are theoretical, (because theory is only produced by a rational conscious mind), but what we say about the observations is theoretical. This is because we only have access to our observations through our rational mind, so as i described earlier, when we go to memorize something, we put it into words.
This displays the need to distinguish between the prior and the posterior in our definitions. Observation is prior to theory, because theory is built upon rational thinking employing human language, and observation is more primitive to that. However, within observation we can assume that there is something employed which is similar to theory, but we probably ought not call it "theory", because theory is posterior to observation, if we adhere to a strict definition of theory. Likewise, in my use of the term "judgement", we really ought not say that a seed makes a judgement. It provides more clarity to restrict that term to reasoned judgement of a conscious mind. But then we need a term to refer to what the seed is doing when it decides to germinate. if we do not create these terms, we have the ambiguity which allows the determinist to say that what the seed is doing, is the exact same thing as what the thermostat is doing.
Quoting Mww
But this isn't really true, is it? The person might hear a sound, interpreted as a siren, like a recoding perhaps, and assume that it is an actual siren. It really does not make sense to say that hearing the siren is a real and actual hearing a siren, and not a theorized hearing a siren, because there is theory within the concept of "siren", and also the concept of "hearing". So how could hearing a siren possibly be anything other than a theorized hearing a siren?
Quoting Mww
This doesn't make a good epistemology though. it's nothing more than mob mentality. If everyone seems to be doing it, then it must be correct, "knowledge".
Quoting Harry Hindu
Well, I don't think so really. All we need is a proper definition of "reason". The more specific term is defined in relation to the more general, but a definition of the more general defining feature is usually not necessary. So for example, we might define "human being" through reference to the more general, "mammal". A definition of "mammal" may or may not be called for. We define "mammal" in reference to "animal", and a definition of "animal" may or may not be called for. Likewise, if we define "reason" in reference to consciousness, a definition of consciousness may or may not be required.
Consistency is important for the reason that if an inconsistency is detected then, there's a hidden contradiction and that's bad, right.
Let me give you an example. Imagine I subscribe to theism (T) and materialism (M). As part of theism, god is considered immaterial (I)
1. M.........premise (part of my belief)
2. T...........premise (also part of my belief)
3. T > I.....premise (if theism then god is immaterial)
4. I > ~M...premise (if god immaterial then materialism false)
5. T > ~M....3, 4 HS
6. ~M...........2, 5 MP
7. M & ~M....CONTRADICTION
8. Either ~M Or ~T
Statement 7 reveals the inconsistency, a contradiction, and implied theism and materialism are incompatible in the sense both can't be true. If you believe one, the other must be false. All in all, inconsistency checking ensures that there are no contradictions or falsehoods in your beliefs.
It does not.
All sorts of people engage in reasoning despite having self-contradictory(incoherent )beliefs. Some refuse to even consider the self-contradiction even when the incompatible beliefs are picked out and compared/analyzed side by side.
That is the point, to determine whether contradiction truly is bad. If reality is such, that contradiction is required to accurately describe it, then how can we say that contradiction is bad?
Quoting TheMadFool
Again, this is to define "falsehood" as inconsistency. But if reality is such that inconsistencies are the result of true descriptions of our natural world, how can you say that inconsistency represents falsehood?
Quoting creativesoul
Sure, but we label these people as unreasonable. This is the two different uses of "reason" I referred to already. There is "reason" which refers to when a person uses some thinking capacity to work out a problem, working from some sort of premises to a conclusion. Then there is "reason" which refers to conventional rules of logic, by which we would judge an individual's use of reason, as valid or not. On a judgement of not valid, we would say that the person's reason is unreasonable.
You appear to be saying that within an individual's own tendency to reason (and this is what I called natural reason), a person would allow the existence of contradiction. I disagree. I think that if the person recognizes the contradiction as such, the reasoning would not be accepted by the person. But I agree that such self-contradiction and incoherency does exist, though it is not recognized as such by the person who holds those beliefs. What appears to others as incoherency is actually rationalized within the mind of the person who holds those beliefs such that it does not appear as incoherent to that person.
I think it is an intuitive, innate tendency, to reject contradiction and incoherency, when recognized as such, as unintelligible. It may be the case, that if it is deemed necessary in order to understand the reality of our world, we might be educated, or habitualized, to allow such incoherency, as part of our training in formal logic, but I would not accept the proposal that the reverse is the case. That is, I would not accept that the natural tendency of a human being is to accept contradiction and incoherency, and it is only through training and education that we learn to reject this.
A contradiction is "bad" because, to give an analogy, it's like writing down a proposition on a blank piece of paper and then erasing it. If I say P and then follow it up by saying ~P and P = "God exists" then it amounts to this: [s]God exists[/s]. It's as good as not saying anything at all.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Inconsistency has nothing to do with the definition of falsehood. Allow me to explain (as best as I can). Imagine there are two definitions of truth and falsity: 1. Correspondence, 2. Pragmatic. Whether I use definition 1 or definition 2 doesn't matter for inconsistency is simply the situation in which you say something and then take back what you said. Refer to what I said about contradictions.
A proposition without context is meaningless. So the terms in your example, "God", and "exists" need to be defined. Otherwise saying "God exists" says nothing at all in the first place, so negating it changes nothing.
Quoting TheMadFool
Then inconsistency has nothing to do with falsehood, and your statement:Quoting TheMadFool
is a misunderstanding.
Well, put it in whatever context you wish but the fact that you're cutting off the very branch you're sitting on remains unchanged.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
:chin: The concept of inconsistency has nothing to do with the definition of truth/falsity. All it reveals is that you're, in logical terms, taking one step forward (affirming a proposition) and taking one step backward (denying the proposition you just affirmed), essentially you're just standing at one spot without making any progress.
Actually I see your descriptions as cutting off the branch your sitting on. You want to define truth in relation to correspondence, yet you keep insisting that falsehood can be demonstrated by inconsistency. This divorces falsehood from a lack of truth, associating it with inconsistency.
Quoting TheMadFool
Then why do you keep saying that falsehood can be determined by inconsistency? That is inconsistency within your argument. You claim that inconsistency has nothing to do with truth or falsity, then you proceed to argue that inconsistency demonstrates falsehood. So it is you who makes a step forward, by recognizing that truth and falsity have nothing to do with inconsistency, then you'll make a step backward right to the point of where you entered this discussion, and claim that inconsistency demonstrates falsehood.
Perhaps we need to separate "true" from "false" such that they are not the opposite or negation of each other. We could say that true is corresponding, and false is inconsistent. Then lack of, or deficiency, in correspondence does not mean false, even though corresponding means true, and consistency does not necessitate true, even though inconsistent necessitates false.
I am saying that people hold contradictory beliefs.
Well yeah, but there's a difference between holding beliefs that someone else recognizes as contradictory, and holding beliefs which you yourself recognize as contradictory. Only the latter would be an instance of accepting incoherency. I think we might be able to train ourselves to accept incoherency, but it's contrary to natural reason, so we'd probably need some very strong arguments to persuade us into doing this.
Sorry, I don't see the relevance.
para-consistent logic
I agree, that's basically what I said, natural reason delivers us toward an either this or that sort of belief. So I don't really see your point.
But suppose that someone convinces Smith that the reality of "the job" is such that he might be sharing it with someone else. Then we must revise this statement, to allow that Smith might believe he will get the job, and someone else will also get the job.
There were a couple different points being made...
My basic point(the reason I first posted) was that natural reason does not demand coherency. If that were true, it would not be possible for a normal average everyday layperson to hold contradictory beliefs.
But they do.
The bit about Gettier was in agreement with your other point about someone being convinced that contradiction is acceptable. Except, with Gettier, that contradiction is not admitted...
You're conflating two things. The definition of truth/falsehood and the falsity implied by an inconsistency. These are two different things. The former is about what we mean by truth/falsehood and the latter is about the truth/falsehood relationship among a given set of propositions. When I say that an inconsistency in a group of propositions implies a falsehood, I don't mean that in the sense the inconsistency provides us with a definition of falsehood, as you seem to be thinking, and that that definition aids us in deciding there's a falsehood among the propositions.
What's actually going on is that, an inconsistent set of propositions, call this set X, entails a contradiction (p & ~p). How did we arrive at that contradiction? By assuming all propositions in the set X to be true? Ergo, reductio ad absurdum, at least one of the propositions in X must be false. The detection of a falsehood in X isn't based on some kind of definition of falsehood inconsistency provides us but is actually a reductio ad absurdum inference.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
By that I meant the definition of truth and falsity has nothing to do with inconsistency which is what you're all about. By way of an explanation for what I mean, allow me an analogy. You must've played the game of chance, LUDO, as a young child. Suppose you and I are playing this game one-on-one. There are four colors to choose from and we're free to choose any one of them. However, once the colors are chosen, they're antagonistic in the sense, whatever color we choose, both can't occupy the same square. Definitions of truth and faleshood are like the colors we choose and inconsistency is the rule in the game where, whatever color we've chosen, they both can't occupy the same square. If I were now to inform a third party that a situation where two pieces were on the same square occurred but that it resulted in one of the pieces being returned to the starting position (inconsistency), the third party can come to the correct conclusion that the pieces involved were not of the same color (falsehood detected). As you can see, the third party's realization that the colors are not of the same color (inconsistency i.e. one is true and the other is a falsehood) doesn't depend on knowing which colors the two of us were playing with (which definition of true and false the two of us were employing).
This is nonsense. If part of the definition of a mammal is that it is part of the group that we call animals, then animals needs to be defined in order to properly define mammals. The same goes for consciousness if you are going to say that reason is limited only to it.
So what is it about reason that makes it limited to consciousness?
This is not true, as I explained. Contradictory beliefs can be held by a person, so long as the contradiction is not evident to the person who holds the contradictory believes, This is due to the way that a person understands one's own beliefs, and relates them to each other.. A person may come to believe one thing at one time, and hold that belief, then come to believe a contradictory thing at a later time, and hold that belief as well. Unless the person uses reason to analyze and compare the two beliefs they will not recognize the contradiction. The person might continue through life applying the one principle in one type of situation, and the contradicting principle in another type of situation without even realizing that one's own behaviour is inconsistent.
Quoting TheMadFool
Sure they are different things, but it amounts to equivocation, to use falsity in the two different ways in the same argument. So it's not that I am conflating two different things, you are equivocating.
Quoting TheMadFool
You do not seem to understand the problem. You cannot say that inconsistency implies falsehood, while maintaining consistency with our definition of "falsehood". It's not that you're redefining falsehood, but you're using it in a way which is unsupported by our definition. Therefore I reject that use as unacceptable, because what you are doing is known as equivocation.
Quoting TheMadFool
OK, so this is what is at issue here. When we learn how to reason formally, with mathematics, deductive logic, etc., we learn that it is not necessary that the proposition be true. The natural tendency for a human being might be to only proceed from premises believed to be true, but we are trained to suppress that natural tendency, and proceed from premises regardless of the truth or falsity of the premises, we suspend judgement on that. This gives many advantages to the logical process. However, the detection of logical inconsistency cannot be claimed to be a detection of falsity, as you insist, because we have divorced the logical proceeding from the judgement of truth and falsity.
Quoting TheMadFool
You are describing the logical process as if we must make a judgement as to truth or falsity before applying the logic. But this is not the case, as described above. We are actually trained to proceed without making any such judgement. That's why logicians use symbols which do not refer to anything, to learn the procedures, so that we can proceed with pure logic without the bias which judgements of true and false present to us, impeding our progress.
Quoting Harry Hindu
That's your opinion, but I think it is very clear that it is incorrect. If we need each term defined as you say, there'd be an infinite regress of definitions, and no one would understand anything. In reality, at some point we get to a broad, vague term, and we do not request any further definition. So, for example, human being is defined as a mammal, and some might accept this, others might ask to define mammal. Mammal is defined as animal, and most would accept this as going far enough. But if we go further, we say it's a living being, and further, a living being is an existing thing. And what does it mean to exist? Ad infinitum.
Quoting Harry Hindu
As I said, it's defined that way, the more general term being used to define the more specific. Reason (the more specific) is defined as a feature of consciousness (the more general).
What I did would qualify as an equivocation if and only if I used different definitions of falsehood. I didn't. The actual definition is important for sure but inconsistency is relationship in which propositions differ in truth value. If so, surely one of them has to be a falsehood; otherwise how would the differ in truth value?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Read above.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Consistency/inconsistency is about logic and not about the definition of true and false.
By the way, there are systems of logic (paraconsistent logic, dialetheism, and perhaps others) that tolerate, even encourage I suppose, inconsistencies and contradictions. Perhaps you should have a look at them.
I just can't wrap my head around someone saying P and ~P and being true on both counts. [s]Proposition X[/s] is something that I can't make heads or tails of: Ne caput nec pedes!
To not stall this discussion, I'd like to suggest something. Please describe what the meaning of the most obvious inconsistency, the contradiction (p & ~p), would be in a system that tolerates inconsistencies, the kind you're suggesting here?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
There's a bit of irony here...
Here's what Wikipedia says:
"In logic, equivocation ('calling two different things by the same name') is an informal fallacy resulting from the use of a particular word/expression in multiple senses within an argument."
There is no requirement for definitions. All that is required is to use the word in "multiple senses", which you already admitted that you did. Now you ought to admit that what you did was a fallacy called equivocation.
Quoting TheMadFool
No, I just went through, this. We do not need to judge propositions for truth value in order to determine that one is inconsistent with another, we can look for contradiction.
Quoting TheMadFool
I know, that's what I've been talking about, it's the point of the thread. Some people believe that the nature of the physical world is such that contradiction, and other inconsistencies are required to accurately describe it. The question though, is if it is the right thing to do, to reject natural reason for this artificial form of reason, which has been manipulated to allow contradiction and incoherency, for the sake of corresponding with observations.
Quoting TheMadFool
I agree, I find this very difficult. What I tend to believe, is that the observations, which lead people toward these artificial forms of logic, are themselves faulty. So instead of reshaping logical principles, to correspond with observations, we ought to revisit these observations to determine the faults within them, and see what makes them inconsistent with natural reason.
Quoting TheMadFool
The issue, as I see it, is that in some instances we cannot determine whether P, or not-P is what is the case (true). Natural reason tells us that it cannot be both (contradiction), nor can it be neither (excluded middle). If, after much examination, this continues to be the situation, we will be inclined to produce a principle to account for this situation, by violating either the law of non-contradiction, or the law of excluded middle.
Quoting creativesoul
If there's irony there, it goes way over my head. Oh well, I've always had difficulty discussing anything with you anyway. Who cares?
Here's the irony...
You claimed both, that natural reason demands coherency, and that laypeople can indeed hold contradictory beliefs. So, either lay people do not use natural reason(which is contradictory to what you've already claimed) or natural reason does not demand coherency(which is also contradictory to what you've already claimed).
...you hold contradictory beliefs.
Only if there were an infinite number of words. There isnt, so your argument is invalid.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
And yet you can't define reason without using the word consciousness. So either define consciousness or define reason without using the word. Does not reason entail using information to achieve some goal? Does a computer reason? If you're going to say no because the computer isn't conscious, then you'd be using circular reasoning. You'd need to define consciousness and why you think brains are conscious but not computers.
You demonstrate the point very clearly. Whether something appears to be contradictory or not depends on how you look at it, i.e. how you interpret, understand, explain, or describe that situation.
That was the point I made with your example "Smith cannot believe both, that he will get the job, and that someone else will get the job." The situation appears to be contradictory, therefore impossible. But if Smith looks at "the job" in a different way, there is no contradiction.
Likewise, the way you interpret what I've said leads you to think that I believe contradiction. That's good evidence that you've misinterpreted what was said, indicating that you ought to go back and reread what the person actually said
Quoting Harry Hindu
You seem to have forgotten about circularity. There is no need for an infinite amount of words, because an infinite regress can be supported by vicious circle. Any way, these things just demonstrate that your claim, that any word used in a definition, must itself be defined, is a false claim.
Quoting Harry Hindu
I really don't see your point Harry. Using my guide, the dictionary, I can define reason without using the word consciousness. "The intellectual faculty by which conclusions are drawn from premises", for example. The problem is that "intellectual faculty" tends to imply a conscious thinking being.
Is it your point to argue that a computer has an intellectual faculty, and therefore artificial reason is the same thing as natural reason? If so, you still don't get beyond the point I'm making, and that is that artificial reason is derived from natural reason, such that natural reason is prior to artificial reason. And therefore, to understand "reason" we need to understand natural reason as being the foundation for artificial reason.
Well, give us an instance of equivocation then. A tangible and concrete example would go a long way in clearing up matters.
P.S. Please don't use anything I said because that would be begging the question.
Note, this is a minor issue; you may choose to ignore it.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
:ok:
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
My two cents:
First, there are empirical statements, statements about our world. These, for sure, need to correspond with observations i.e. their truths are not determined by the application of logic; to the contrary, the need to be tested against observation.
Second, beginning with a set of empirical statements and some theoretical framework, other empirical statements are implied. Nonetheless, entailed empirical statements too need to correspond with observation.
The above is basically a sketch of the scientific method.
Where does inconsitency enter into all of this?
The most well-documented scientific culprit involved in violation of logical principles, specifically the law of noncontradiction - the most glaring inconsistency of all - is quantum mechanics. One common instance of a quantum contradiction is Schrodinger's cat - it's said that before the box containing the cat and a probabilistic quantum system, the cat is both dead and alive.
Schrodinger's cat being both dead and alive is a logical impossibility in first-order logic for, in the world at our scale, if a cat's alive then it can't be dead and vice versa. No empirical evidence at our scale supports Schrodinger's cat's state of being both dead and alive. According to you then, we have to accept that the claim about Schrodinger's cat amounts to an inconsistency and this was possible not because we did something fancy with logic but because we failed to make an observation corresponding to that statement.
Are we on the same page?
Now suppose that it were possible to peek at Schrodinger's cat inside the box without breaking the experiment. You look inside, essentially making an observation, and find the poor cat is both dead and alive. As far as first-order logic is concerned this is frank inconsistency but the situation in this case is entirely different to the one we considered previously - we have, in this case, an observation that corresponds to Schrodinger's cat being both dead and alive. The question that then arises is this: are you going to put your faith in first-order logic and treat your observation (cat both dead and alive) as null and void or are you going to believe what you saw and make plans to modify first-order logic to accommodate your observations?
Remember we're dealing with empirical statements.
You seem to have forgotten that words are merely scribbles and sounds. So to say that words are defined by other words is saying that scribbles and sounds are defined by other scribbles and sounds. But then those scribbles and sounds point to things that are not scribbles and sounds and this is the step that avoids the infinite regress. What we are doing with words is pointing to things that are not words. I don't have to define "rain" by using other words. I can point to it raining outside. But if it's not raining outside, how do I communicate the idea of rain? I have to use words and I have to keep using words until I can simply show you what the words mean. We aren't telepathic, hence we rely on scribbles and sounds to communicate the other sensations that we experience.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Which seems to indicate that consciousness isn't a requirement for reasoning.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Computers can draw conclusions (output) from premises (input).
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
The point that I am making is that there is no difference between natural and artificial reasoning. Brains are physical objects, like computers, yet you attribute natural reasoning to brains and artificial reasoning to computers. Why?
I'm inclined to ignore, but since you don't seem to understand equivocation, maybe I can help. Here's an exaggerated example so it will be easy for you to follow. Say we come to a fork in the road, one road goes right and one goes left. I ask you which is the correct road to take. You say the right road is the correct road, because "right" means correct, therefore it's an obvious choice, the logical conclusion is to go right. That's an exaggerated example. Your equivocation with "falsehood" is much more subtle.
Quoting TheMadFool
This is not such a simple issue. To judge whether a statement corresponds requires determining the meaning of the statement. And we cannot determine what the statement means without some sort of application of logic. Otherwise, the meaning of the statement is determined by its use, and if this statement is being used to refer to this thing, then it necessarily corresponds.
Quoting TheMadFool
No, I don't think we're on the same page. I can't quite figure out what you're trying to say with this example. You're saying there's an inconsistent state of affairs described by "Schodinger's cat". And, you think that some fancy logic produced this description. You contrast this with a failure to make a corresponding observation, and you imply that you believe one of these, and I believe the other.
I think what I would actually argue, is that we make observations which we cannot understand. They are not necessarily inconsistent observations, but unintelligible, for some reasons or others. So we create the fancy logic, which hides the fact that we are not understanding, and therefore do not have an adequate or meaningful description of what is being observed. (Consider what I said about corresponding statements above. Making a statement which corresponds with what is observed is not always a straight forward and simple task.) The inconsistency results from a failure to understand, and properly describe what is being observed. Then the fancy logic is applied to try and make the unintelligible appear to be intelligible.
Quoting TheMadFool
From the point of view which I just described, looking inside the box amounts to getting an adequate description of what is being observed, based in an understanding of the situation. At this point, the "fancy logic" which produces the cat scenario can no longer be applied. So the question about the cat is no longer meaningful, if you could get that required understanding.
Quoting TheMadFool
The problem with this example, is that the cat scenario is just a fictional scenario. It is produced by the fancy logic. You cannot expect to look and see the cat, because the scenario is not based in any true observations, it's a fiction. So your example is really nonsensical. You are taking a scenario which is completely fictional, and asking, what would we see, if looked at this part of the fictional story. I might just as well ask you, if I throw a box out the window with something in it, and it was falling, and you could peak inside it, what is in it? It's just a nonsensical question.
Quoting Harry Hindu
If you read my posts, I attribute both, natural and artificial reason to human minds. Natural is the innate, intuitive sense which we are born with, while artificial is the learned type of reasoning, like mathematics and formal logic. Computers use different types of formal (artificial) logic, just like minds do, this is an extension of the human mind's use of artificial reasoning. Smith cannot believe both, that he will get the job, and that someone else will get the job. But I'm differentiating this, artificial reason, and natural natural reason.
The argument, for the difference between these is this. Natural reason does not allow inconsistency, like contradiction. Artificial reasoning may allow contradiction and inconsistency, like in TheMadFool's example above. Therefore there is a difference between the two.
Contradictions can only manifest as a use of language - an improper use of language.
We have a long experience now of scientific theories being falsified and replaced by what we see as better theories. We also all have first hand experience of having our personal beliefs being falsified again and again. But we are never short on new beliefs to replace them and in any case we don't know how to know the world. We just keep going regardless just because we can.
Nobody can justify that science is knowledge but there is no difficulty articulating a good justification that science is our best belief. And if that is not even true, then we may have to change our belief at some point in the future. Meanwhile, we will keep relying on science.
The solution to the Münchhausen trilemma is simple. We just have to admit that we don't know what we don't know. And I think we can all live with the fact that we still won't be able to justify that we know what we do know.
:rofl: :up: So, equivocation is about definitions, "right"?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Well, indeed it's true that "some sort of application of logic" is necessary; that's true of everything. What I mean is that logic alone doesn't help us determine that a given empirical statement is true/not.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I don't want to say this but I get the impression that you're failing to make the connection between things "we cannot understand", things "unintelligible" and inconsistencies. Inconsistencies, when they occur, are precisely things "we cannot understand", things "unintelligible" because they amount to affirmation of something followed by the negation of the thing that was affirmed: [s]Proposition P[/s], formally expressed as (p & ~p).
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You're barking up the wrong tree. The fictional nature of my example - Schrodinger's cat - is irrelevant to the point I'm making. The Schrodinger's cat hypothetical, in the way I presented it, is a simulation of a situation in which a person might make on observation that is inconsistent as per logic. It is intended as a simulation so I don't understand you making an issue about how it isn't real. Coming back to the issue, the choice then becomes one between accepting your observation as true and fault logic or stick with logic and question the validity of the observation. What would you do?
The problem is that some forms of reasoning allow for the existence of contradiction, as has been discussed on this thread. A computer can easily be programmed to produce contradictions, look at something like spell check.
Quoting TheMadFool
No, it's about how one uses words. Notice, that "right" is only defined once in the example, yet it is also used in a way other than the defined way, just like your use of falsehood. It is the act of using the word in a way which is inconsistent with the definition which is called equivocation.
Quoting TheMadFool
Yes I agree, and that is why consistency does not define truth. But there are two distinct reasons why logic does not necessitate truth. The first is obvious to most people, and that is that logic requires content, the premises. And if the premises are false, the conclusion is unsound.
The second reason, which is not so evident to most people, is that logic consists of a system of rules for procedure or application. If these rules themselves are unsound, then even true premises could turn up false conclusions. Take mathematics for example, which has at the base of its rules, "axioms". The axioms may be derived completely from the imagination without any requirement that they correspond with any real features of the world. (Refer to discussions on infinity for example). I would say that if these axioms have no evidence of correspondence they are unsound. Unsound axioms produce what you called "fancy logic".
Quoting TheMadFool
Sure there is a connection, but there is also a distinction. If we make a category of "things we cannot understand", call this "the unintelligible", then "inconsistencies" refers to one type of thing in this category. Another type of thing in this category, is what I referred to, things which we cannot adequately describe. Notice that "inconsistent" refers to the description, it requires a description. But I am talking about an observation which we haven't the capacity to describe properly, because for instance the person doesn't understand what was observed.
As I said in my earlier example, when a person does not understand what was observed, yet the person has the urge to describe it, aspects of what occurred might appear such that they can only be described with inconsistencies. The person basically has two choices. either describe what has occurred, using inconsistencies, or else manufacture aspects in the description of the event, to create consistency, but that may contain falsity. Of course a person might use a combination of these two as well.
Quoting TheMadFool
As I said, the example is an inadequate hypothetical. To make what is in the box observable is to negate the premises of the hypothetical, thereby negating the relevance of it. If we could observe what is in the box, then there would be no question of what's in the box, and no fancy logic being applied to determine what's in the box, therefore no issue of whether to doubt the logic or the observation. Otherwise we must be skeptical of both.
Thats not a problem. People can discuss imaginary and untrue things and be oblivious to the fact that what they are discussing is imaginary and untrue. The problem is that by definition, contradictions result from a lack of reason/logic.
How can you use a word properly without knowing its definition?
By the way, as far as I'm concerned, we've sailed past that port.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Just as a side note, I recall reading that logic is basically a set of rules that are truth preserving. It can't tell us which propositions are true in the sense it's a definition of truth which we can employ but it does tell us which propositions must be true in the sense of providing us candidate propositions for observational verification.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Fine but now we're getting involved with language, its limits - logic doesn't have a stake in the ineffable.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Ok, if you insist. Odd that because your post is about what people may describe as hypotheticals taken to an extreme - entertaining impossibilities (inconsistencies) to be possibld - and yet you object to the example I gave on the grounds of an inconsistency based on the ordinary, mundane.
Anyway, perhaps another example will do the job. You must know the double-slit experiment. The results of this experiment are that light is both a particle and a wave, two mutually contradictory physical states. Inconsistency as per logic but yet verifiable observationally. How do you resolve this problem? Do you think we should reexamine logical principles like inconsistency and treat our observations as real or do you think there's nothing wrong with logic and that oud observation is flawed?
That's not true, look at the examples TheMadFool gave.
Quoting TheMadFool
Quoting TheMadFool
Have you ever watched how children learn to talk? They do not learn how to use words by learning definitions.
Quoting TheMadFool
The idea that logic is "truth preserving" is what I disagree with. If the logical system is created with the intent of preserving truth, like traditional deduction for example, then it might be capable of doing a reasonable job at that. Then there are logical systems like modal logic, and even mathematics which do not aim to preserve truth. But the point of the op, I think, is that perhaps logic cannot maintain truth. Maybe the world is so strangely complex that human beings are incapable of producing a logic which is guaranteed to maintain truth.
Quoting TheMadFool
I think that this is a mistaken perspective, and where logic applies to the ineffable is where we need to proceed with the most caution. This is what I tried to describe already. A person might observe something as ineffable. This means that the occurrence is fundamentally unintelligible. However, this person wants to understand what happened, wants to remember it in words, so the person then applies some sort of natural reason to determine which words are best suited for describing the event.
So logic does have a stake in the ineffable, otherwise knowledge could not proceed from unknown to known. We must allow that knowledge evolves, and progresses, such that some things which were ineffable when human language was young, can now be described. How else can these things come into the realm of being describable if not through the application of some logic?
Quoting TheMadFool
As I said, we ought to be skeptical of both the logic and the observations. The two go hand in hand. The logical systems (what I called artificial logic) are conformed to correspond with the observations if there is a desire to preserve truth. But the observations (descriptions) are conformed by the underlying natural reason, as described above. So, the observations may be faulty, and this would lead to the production of faulty logic therefore we must be skeptical of both.
I aksed how can you use a word "properly" without knowing its definition?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
All I can say is that many different kinds inconsistency tolerant logics have spawned from the possibility that the world [s]could be[/s] is "strangely complex". Nevertheless, it must possess the attribute of being truth preserving, otherwise it loses its raison d'être, right? The very reason we need logic, whatever shape or form it may assume, is to have a system that handles propositions in such a way that, ceteris paribus, we arrive at other true propositions.
There's also multi-valued logic and fuzzy logic to consider - attempts to capture other aspects of reality like partial truths.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
To me, once something is ineffable, knowledge is impossible because the basic requirement for a thing to count as knowledge is that it should be possible to render it as a proposition, something that can't be done with the ineffable. The unknown becomes a known only if we can construct the relevant meaningful proposition.
That said, I agree with you that we're most at risk of being led away from the truth when our experiences (observations ,etc.) can't be put into words. There's this natural drive to understand, to make sense of, our encounters with reality and it has the power to force us to take a stand even when the most rational option is to withhold judgement. Misunderstanding, dangerous misunderstanding, seems almost inevitable.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I agree but this leads to Pyrrhonian Skepticism - a state of global uncertainty and extreme doubt. Are you proposing that as the only reasonable option?
So does "proper" mean in a formal way to you? Using a suitable word for the situation does not require one to learn a definition, as we see by the way children learn how to use words. Young children do not learn definitions prior to going to school, yet they know how to use words.
Where would you draw the line, what constitutes "proper" use.
Quoting TheMadFool
I do not agree with this, and my concerns are very evident in the axioms of mathematics. They are not dreamed up for the purpose of being truth preserving. They are dreamed up for the purpose of solving a particular problem. So we see that such logic is based in pragmatics rather than 'truth preserving". This is the revelation made by Plato in "The Republic" where he says "the good" is what makes intelligible objects intelligible, just like the sun is what makes visible objects visible. The good is the end, the purpose, final cause.
Quoting TheMadFool
So, I cast "logic" in a different light. The reason we use logic is to solve problems. And, logic being created by human beings, is actually shaped according to the problems it is designed to resolve. This goes beyond Plato, who says that intelligible principles are lit up by the good, to be more Aristotelian, saying that the intelligible principles are actually created, formed toward specific goals, or perceived goods. Logic is a means to an end. Clearly the means are shaped toward the end. If the end is not truth, but something else such as predictability (which has replaced truth in modern science), then we cannot say that the "raison d' etre" for logic is to preserve truth.
Quoting TheMadFool
But do you agree that language evolves? So something which could not be put into a proposition many years ago, such as the relation between protons and electrons in an atom, could at a later later time, be put into a proposition. It used to be common knowledge that there was nothing smaller than an atom, so we couldn't make a proposition concerning the parts of an atom, that would be ineffable. However, observations combined with logic produced new ideas concerning the parts of an atom, and along with that, new terms, such that this is no longer ineffable.
Quoting TheMadFool
This is why, when new theories get put into place, like theories about dark matter and dark energy for example, it takes a long period of trial before the theories can even be said to be proven.
Quoting TheMadFool
Different approaches are required depending in the state of knowledge at the particular time. It appears like at Pyrrho's time skepticism was called for. I think that we are moving into a similar time with the state of modern knowledge. Consider the examples you've provided in this thread. When things don't make sense, there's really no other approach but skepticism.
I have already given Metaphysican Undercover a compliment in private, but I believe his diligent conduct in philosophizing with people at great length warrants public praise. There are others who will go on at length, but they are few and far in between. This fella is repeatedly clarifying himself and this takes tremendous patience and effort. Further, he is always trying to reason with people. This is not something I see very often on this Forum. It is exemplary.