Hegel versus Aristotle and the Law of Identity
[This exchange is extracted from another thread. It is impractical to extract every section, so we begin here]:
[This is an informal exchange between Metaphysician Undercover and myself, so it is unlikely I will reply to anyone else on this thread. Metaphysician Undercover will do as he pleases.]
JERSEY FLIGHT:
This exchange started when you made the following claim:
"Actually Plato provides a much more useful dialect than Hegel. After reading Plato and Aristotle, you'll be able to see where Hegel goes wrong in his dialectics, leading people like dialectical materialists into a violation of the law of non-contradiction." — Metaphysician Undercover
This assertion has not been sustained throughout the course of this exchange.
Hegel's position on being, as you seem to use the term, is that it is not only inconsequential, but dangerous insofar as it serves to distort essence: "For here we are not concerned with the object in its immediate form, but want to know it as mediated. And our usual view of the task or purpose of philosophy is that it consists in the cognition of the essence of things. By this we understand no more than that things are not to be left in their immediate state, but are rather to be exhibited as mediated or grounded by something else. The immediate being of things is here represented as a sort of rind or curtain behind which the essence is concealed. Now, when we say further that all things have an essence, what we mean is that they are not truly what they immediately show themselves to be. A mere rushing about from one quality to another, and a mere advance from the qualitative to the quantitative and back again, is not the last word; on the contrary, there is something that abides in things, and this is, in the first instance, their essence."
You are free to insist that you are talking about the law of identity. You are also free to insist that your external imposition of negation doesn't imply a violation of the law, but the law of identity is an entirely positive formation. As soon as you bring in the negative you have gone beyond identity. You are free to pretend that Aristotelian logic deals with actual being, but it does not, it deals with abstract being, with dead images. Dialectic is thought suited to essence, Aristotle's axioms are principles suited to the creation of abstract categories, not the comprehension of reality.
Hegel commenting on Aristotle's logic: "Now if, according to this point of view, thought is considered on its own account, it does not make its appearance implicitly as knowledge, nor is it without content in and for itself; for it is a formal activity which certainly is exercised, but whose content is one given to it. Thought in this sense becomes something subjective; these judgments and conclusions are in and for themselves quite true, or rather correct – this no one ever doubted; but because content is lacking to them, these judgments and conclusions do not suffice for the knowledge of the truth."
"So long as I maintain the separation between what is said about the object's identity, and the object's real identity, there is no problem." — Metaphysician Undercover
The object's identity and the object's real identity? Then what is the non-real-identity of the object that you are maintaining against the object's real identity? How is this not an exercise in abstraction? It proves that what you are talking about is nothing more than an idea, a stale and lifeless category.
Just because the abstract formation I put forward, describing the identity of the object, is not the object itself, does not mean that there is not an object, with its own identity. — Metaphysician Undercover
My position is not that the abstraction is not the object, but that it distorts our comprehension of the object, the actual being of being is its movement not its fragment. I am saying exactly what Hegel says, take your categories from the phenomena, do not impose them on the phenomena. I suppose you could assign multiple abstractions to an object if you so desired, but the danger is always the same: distortion of the comprehension of reality itself.
Yes, you continue to assert that Hegel demonstrated "identity" to be faulty, or contradictory, but you have yet to produce the argument. The argument you have here does nothing. — Metaphysician Undercover
In concise form, you will have to connect the dots through careful contemplation:
"Thus the principle of identity reads: "Everything is identical with itself, A = A'; and negatively: "A cannot be both A and non-A at the same time." -Instead of being a true law of thinking, this principle is nothing but the law of the abstract understanding. The propositional form itself already contradicts it, since a proposition promises a distinction between subject and predicate as well as identity; and the identity-proposition does not furnish what its form demands." Hegel
METAPHYSICIAN UNDERCOVER:
"For here we are not concerned with the object in its immediate form, but want to know it as mediated. And our usual view of the task or purpose of philosophy is that it consists in the cognition of the essence of things. By this we understand no more than that things are not to be left in their immediate state, but are rather to be exhibited as mediated or grounded by something else. The immediate being of things is here represented as a sort of rind or curtain behind which the essence is concealed. Now, when we say further that all things have an essence, what we mean is that they are not truly what they immediately show themselves to be. A mere rushing about from one quality to another, and a mere advance from the qualitative to the quantitative and back again, is not the last word; on the contrary, there is something that abides in things, and this is, in the first instance, their essence." Hegel
This passage demonstrates how this so-called distortion of essence is a feature of Hegel's misunderstanding of the Aristotelian concept, "essence" and nothing else. As I explained to you already, Aristotle defined two senses of "form". The one is the human abstraction, and this is how we come to know the essence of things. The other is the form of the material thing itself. Each material thing is a particular, an individual with a form proper to itself. This form is distinct from the essence of the thing, which is the form which human beings know in abstraction, because it consists of accidentals, whereas the essence does not. Do you apprehend that difference? The essence does not contain the accidentals which inhere within the form of the material object. Both are "forms", yet "forms" in two distinct senses of the word.
So the following statement reveals Hegel's misunderstanding "The immediate being of things is here represented as a sort of rind or curtain behind which the essence is concealed...there is something that abides in things, and this is, in the first instance, their essence." The essence of a thing is not concealed at all, nor does it abide in the thing, it is the form which exists within the human abstraction, what the human mind apprehends and determines as the essential properties of the thing. What is concealed is the independent "form" of the thing, complete with the accidentals which the human being does not necessarily perceive. And this independent form constitutes the identity of the thing. That this is the proper interpretation is evident from the writings of Thomas Aquinas, who did much work expounding on the difference between the forms of human abstraction (essences), and the independent "Forms".
Hegel, with this use of "essence" puts us right back into the confusion of Plato's Timaeus. "Form" as "essence", is a universal. The problem which confronted Plato was the question of how a particular could come into existence from a universal form. He thought it necessary to assume this, because things, like human beings for instance, come into existence as a determinate type. So the human form, as a universal, must be prior to the particular, the individual human being. He was stumped because the medium between the universal and the particular was seen as matter, but the universal form could not account for the existence of the particulars of the material individual. Aristotle got beyond this problem by assigning all such universal forms (essences) as the product of human abstraction, therefore posterior to the things themselves, while also positing a new type of form, the form of the individual. which substantiates a thing's "identity". Hegel, in not upholding this distinction confuses identity with essence.
You are free to pretend that Aristotelian logic deals with actual being, but it does not, it deals with abstract being, with dead images. Dialectic is thought suited to essence, Aristotle's axioms are principles suited to the creation of abstract categories, not the comprehension of reality. — JerseyFlight
That's right, formal logic deals with essences, not with actual things. But dialectics is not formal logic. How do you suppose that a person might create useful abstract categories without an appropriate understanding of reality? Creation of suitable abstract categories can only follow from a comprehension of reality.
The object's identity and the object's real identity? Then what is the non-real-identity of the object that you are maintaining against the object's real identity? How is this not an exercise in abstraction? It proves that what you are talking about is nothing more than an idea, a stale and lifeless category. — JerseyFlight
Right, there is a distinction to be upheld, between the form of the thing, within the human mind, the abstraction, and the form of the thing in reality. The "non-real identity" is the identity given to the thing by the human mind, the abstraction, the essence. It is "non-real", because it is lacking in the accidentals which are a part of the identity of the individual thing.
My position is not that the abstraction is not the object, but that it distorts our comprehension of the object, the actual being of being is its movement not its fragment. I am saying exactly what Hegel says, take your categories from the phenomena, do not impose them on the phenomena. — JerseyFlight
This is not what Hegel says. The "movement" you refer to here is called by Hegel "becoming". It is not called "the actual being" in Hegel's dialectics. That is the point I'm trying to impress on you, "Being" is subsumed within the category of becoming, "movement". That's how Hegel can argue against Aristotle's concept of identity. There is no such thing as beings in the real, actual world, only becoming, because Hegel has done away with any independent Forms. All forms are dependent on the human mind, as essences, and there is no true form or being concealed behind how the thing appears to us, only movement, becoming. A thing only has being through human apprehension. Other than this it is just a becoming.
Thus the principle of identity reads: "Everything is identical with itself, A = A'; and negatively: "A cannot be both A and non-A at the same time." -Instead of being a true law of thinking, this principle is nothing but the law of the abstract understanding. — Hegel
See, this is Hegel's misrepresentation, a straw man. The law of identity says that a thing has an identity unto itself. It says nothing about abstract understanding. It is a law against the abuse of abstraction reasoning. It says nothing about what abstract understanding is, or how it ought proceed, only what it is not, i.e. a thing's identity. It was created by Aristotle as a tool against sophists who claimed that the human abstraction (essence) of a thing is the thing's identity. This sophistic claim denies the possibility of human mistake as to identity. That is why we must uphold a distinction between a thing's true identity, its own particular and unique form, and the identity which we assign to it in abstraction (essence). Without this distinction there can be no such thing as human knowledge being mistaken, because what we say about the thing is what is true about it.
Instead of being a true law of thinking, this principle is nothing but the law of the abstract understanding. — Hegel
Let's say that the law of identity is an ideal. As such, it is proposed as a limitation, or rule for abstraction. As a proposal, or proposition, it might be judged for truth or falsity and rejected or accepted accordingly. What I am arguing is that Hegel's rejection is unjustified, being based in a faulty dialectic, consisting of a misunderstanding of the Aristotelian conceptions of "form" and "essence", evidenced by Jersey Flight's quotes.
Furthermore, if we reject the law of identity there are consequences which need to be respected. Initially, the assumption that there are particular, determinate individuals, beings or objects, in the real, or actual world, is unsubstantiated, unsupported and unjustified. So it makes no sense, as hypocrisy or self-contradiction, to both deny the law of identity and also talk about "actual being". Without the law of identity, or an adequate replacement, the claim of "actual being" is completely invalid.
The propositional form itself already contradicts it, since a proposition promises a distinction between subject and predicate as well as identity; and the identity-proposition does not furnish what its form demands. — Hegel
This is another example of Hegel's misrepresentation of Aristotelian principles. A thing, for Aristotle consists of both matter and form. A thing's identity is form alone. Therefore we have the required distinction between subject (the thing as matter and form), and what is predicated of the thing, identity (its form). It is this separation of a thing's true, real form ("identity" rather than human abstraction), from the material thing, which allows Christian theologians to conceive of immaterial Forms, which are prior to, and necessary for, as the cause of existence, of material things. Aristotelian principles disallow matter without form, but not form without matter.
Jersey Flight has the next response:
[This is an informal exchange between Metaphysician Undercover and myself, so it is unlikely I will reply to anyone else on this thread. Metaphysician Undercover will do as he pleases.]
JERSEY FLIGHT:
This exchange started when you made the following claim:
"Actually Plato provides a much more useful dialect than Hegel. After reading Plato and Aristotle, you'll be able to see where Hegel goes wrong in his dialectics, leading people like dialectical materialists into a violation of the law of non-contradiction." — Metaphysician Undercover
This assertion has not been sustained throughout the course of this exchange.
Hegel's position on being, as you seem to use the term, is that it is not only inconsequential, but dangerous insofar as it serves to distort essence: "For here we are not concerned with the object in its immediate form, but want to know it as mediated. And our usual view of the task or purpose of philosophy is that it consists in the cognition of the essence of things. By this we understand no more than that things are not to be left in their immediate state, but are rather to be exhibited as mediated or grounded by something else. The immediate being of things is here represented as a sort of rind or curtain behind which the essence is concealed. Now, when we say further that all things have an essence, what we mean is that they are not truly what they immediately show themselves to be. A mere rushing about from one quality to another, and a mere advance from the qualitative to the quantitative and back again, is not the last word; on the contrary, there is something that abides in things, and this is, in the first instance, their essence."
You are free to insist that you are talking about the law of identity. You are also free to insist that your external imposition of negation doesn't imply a violation of the law, but the law of identity is an entirely positive formation. As soon as you bring in the negative you have gone beyond identity. You are free to pretend that Aristotelian logic deals with actual being, but it does not, it deals with abstract being, with dead images. Dialectic is thought suited to essence, Aristotle's axioms are principles suited to the creation of abstract categories, not the comprehension of reality.
Hegel commenting on Aristotle's logic: "Now if, according to this point of view, thought is considered on its own account, it does not make its appearance implicitly as knowledge, nor is it without content in and for itself; for it is a formal activity which certainly is exercised, but whose content is one given to it. Thought in this sense becomes something subjective; these judgments and conclusions are in and for themselves quite true, or rather correct – this no one ever doubted; but because content is lacking to them, these judgments and conclusions do not suffice for the knowledge of the truth."
"So long as I maintain the separation between what is said about the object's identity, and the object's real identity, there is no problem." — Metaphysician Undercover
The object's identity and the object's real identity? Then what is the non-real-identity of the object that you are maintaining against the object's real identity? How is this not an exercise in abstraction? It proves that what you are talking about is nothing more than an idea, a stale and lifeless category.
Just because the abstract formation I put forward, describing the identity of the object, is not the object itself, does not mean that there is not an object, with its own identity. — Metaphysician Undercover
My position is not that the abstraction is not the object, but that it distorts our comprehension of the object, the actual being of being is its movement not its fragment. I am saying exactly what Hegel says, take your categories from the phenomena, do not impose them on the phenomena. I suppose you could assign multiple abstractions to an object if you so desired, but the danger is always the same: distortion of the comprehension of reality itself.
Yes, you continue to assert that Hegel demonstrated "identity" to be faulty, or contradictory, but you have yet to produce the argument. The argument you have here does nothing. — Metaphysician Undercover
In concise form, you will have to connect the dots through careful contemplation:
"Thus the principle of identity reads: "Everything is identical with itself, A = A'; and negatively: "A cannot be both A and non-A at the same time." -Instead of being a true law of thinking, this principle is nothing but the law of the abstract understanding. The propositional form itself already contradicts it, since a proposition promises a distinction between subject and predicate as well as identity; and the identity-proposition does not furnish what its form demands." Hegel
METAPHYSICIAN UNDERCOVER:
"For here we are not concerned with the object in its immediate form, but want to know it as mediated. And our usual view of the task or purpose of philosophy is that it consists in the cognition of the essence of things. By this we understand no more than that things are not to be left in their immediate state, but are rather to be exhibited as mediated or grounded by something else. The immediate being of things is here represented as a sort of rind or curtain behind which the essence is concealed. Now, when we say further that all things have an essence, what we mean is that they are not truly what they immediately show themselves to be. A mere rushing about from one quality to another, and a mere advance from the qualitative to the quantitative and back again, is not the last word; on the contrary, there is something that abides in things, and this is, in the first instance, their essence." Hegel
This passage demonstrates how this so-called distortion of essence is a feature of Hegel's misunderstanding of the Aristotelian concept, "essence" and nothing else. As I explained to you already, Aristotle defined two senses of "form". The one is the human abstraction, and this is how we come to know the essence of things. The other is the form of the material thing itself. Each material thing is a particular, an individual with a form proper to itself. This form is distinct from the essence of the thing, which is the form which human beings know in abstraction, because it consists of accidentals, whereas the essence does not. Do you apprehend that difference? The essence does not contain the accidentals which inhere within the form of the material object. Both are "forms", yet "forms" in two distinct senses of the word.
So the following statement reveals Hegel's misunderstanding "The immediate being of things is here represented as a sort of rind or curtain behind which the essence is concealed...there is something that abides in things, and this is, in the first instance, their essence." The essence of a thing is not concealed at all, nor does it abide in the thing, it is the form which exists within the human abstraction, what the human mind apprehends and determines as the essential properties of the thing. What is concealed is the independent "form" of the thing, complete with the accidentals which the human being does not necessarily perceive. And this independent form constitutes the identity of the thing. That this is the proper interpretation is evident from the writings of Thomas Aquinas, who did much work expounding on the difference between the forms of human abstraction (essences), and the independent "Forms".
Hegel, with this use of "essence" puts us right back into the confusion of Plato's Timaeus. "Form" as "essence", is a universal. The problem which confronted Plato was the question of how a particular could come into existence from a universal form. He thought it necessary to assume this, because things, like human beings for instance, come into existence as a determinate type. So the human form, as a universal, must be prior to the particular, the individual human being. He was stumped because the medium between the universal and the particular was seen as matter, but the universal form could not account for the existence of the particulars of the material individual. Aristotle got beyond this problem by assigning all such universal forms (essences) as the product of human abstraction, therefore posterior to the things themselves, while also positing a new type of form, the form of the individual. which substantiates a thing's "identity". Hegel, in not upholding this distinction confuses identity with essence.
You are free to pretend that Aristotelian logic deals with actual being, but it does not, it deals with abstract being, with dead images. Dialectic is thought suited to essence, Aristotle's axioms are principles suited to the creation of abstract categories, not the comprehension of reality. — JerseyFlight
That's right, formal logic deals with essences, not with actual things. But dialectics is not formal logic. How do you suppose that a person might create useful abstract categories without an appropriate understanding of reality? Creation of suitable abstract categories can only follow from a comprehension of reality.
The object's identity and the object's real identity? Then what is the non-real-identity of the object that you are maintaining against the object's real identity? How is this not an exercise in abstraction? It proves that what you are talking about is nothing more than an idea, a stale and lifeless category. — JerseyFlight
Right, there is a distinction to be upheld, between the form of the thing, within the human mind, the abstraction, and the form of the thing in reality. The "non-real identity" is the identity given to the thing by the human mind, the abstraction, the essence. It is "non-real", because it is lacking in the accidentals which are a part of the identity of the individual thing.
My position is not that the abstraction is not the object, but that it distorts our comprehension of the object, the actual being of being is its movement not its fragment. I am saying exactly what Hegel says, take your categories from the phenomena, do not impose them on the phenomena. — JerseyFlight
This is not what Hegel says. The "movement" you refer to here is called by Hegel "becoming". It is not called "the actual being" in Hegel's dialectics. That is the point I'm trying to impress on you, "Being" is subsumed within the category of becoming, "movement". That's how Hegel can argue against Aristotle's concept of identity. There is no such thing as beings in the real, actual world, only becoming, because Hegel has done away with any independent Forms. All forms are dependent on the human mind, as essences, and there is no true form or being concealed behind how the thing appears to us, only movement, becoming. A thing only has being through human apprehension. Other than this it is just a becoming.
Thus the principle of identity reads: "Everything is identical with itself, A = A'; and negatively: "A cannot be both A and non-A at the same time." -Instead of being a true law of thinking, this principle is nothing but the law of the abstract understanding. — Hegel
See, this is Hegel's misrepresentation, a straw man. The law of identity says that a thing has an identity unto itself. It says nothing about abstract understanding. It is a law against the abuse of abstraction reasoning. It says nothing about what abstract understanding is, or how it ought proceed, only what it is not, i.e. a thing's identity. It was created by Aristotle as a tool against sophists who claimed that the human abstraction (essence) of a thing is the thing's identity. This sophistic claim denies the possibility of human mistake as to identity. That is why we must uphold a distinction between a thing's true identity, its own particular and unique form, and the identity which we assign to it in abstraction (essence). Without this distinction there can be no such thing as human knowledge being mistaken, because what we say about the thing is what is true about it.
Instead of being a true law of thinking, this principle is nothing but the law of the abstract understanding. — Hegel
Let's say that the law of identity is an ideal. As such, it is proposed as a limitation, or rule for abstraction. As a proposal, or proposition, it might be judged for truth or falsity and rejected or accepted accordingly. What I am arguing is that Hegel's rejection is unjustified, being based in a faulty dialectic, consisting of a misunderstanding of the Aristotelian conceptions of "form" and "essence", evidenced by Jersey Flight's quotes.
Furthermore, if we reject the law of identity there are consequences which need to be respected. Initially, the assumption that there are particular, determinate individuals, beings or objects, in the real, or actual world, is unsubstantiated, unsupported and unjustified. So it makes no sense, as hypocrisy or self-contradiction, to both deny the law of identity and also talk about "actual being". Without the law of identity, or an adequate replacement, the claim of "actual being" is completely invalid.
The propositional form itself already contradicts it, since a proposition promises a distinction between subject and predicate as well as identity; and the identity-proposition does not furnish what its form demands. — Hegel
This is another example of Hegel's misrepresentation of Aristotelian principles. A thing, for Aristotle consists of both matter and form. A thing's identity is form alone. Therefore we have the required distinction between subject (the thing as matter and form), and what is predicated of the thing, identity (its form). It is this separation of a thing's true, real form ("identity" rather than human abstraction), from the material thing, which allows Christian theologians to conceive of immaterial Forms, which are prior to, and necessary for, as the cause of existence, of material things. Aristotelian principles disallow matter without form, but not form without matter.
Jersey Flight has the next response:
Comments (57)
In this context the 'esse' means literally the 'is-ness' of a particular - what it is that gives a particular identity. (to ti ên einai, literally “the what it was to be” for a thing - SEP.) Socrates is an instance of the 'substance' (or 'type of subject') 'man', whose features (accidents) include a flat nose and blue eyes. (Note the Aristotelian 'substance' was the Latin translation of the Greek ouisia, which is nearer in meaning to our 'being' than to our 'substance'.)
But overall, I think the basic intuition of hylomorphism is still quite sound.
From Thomistic Psychology: A Philosophical Analysis of the Nature of Man, by Robert E. Brennan, O.P.; Macmillan Co., 1941.
So, the idea here is that the rational mind recognises the form (essence, what-is-ness) of a particular, which is a purely intelligible act. The senses 'receive' the impression i.e. the physical signals of sight, sound, smell, etc, through physical means.
These are combined to form the knowledge of particular beings that the rational mind has.
Most likely, moderns will be inclined to reject the 'immaterial' nature of 'the intellect'. This actually is central to the whole scheme, however. According to Lloyd Gerson's reading, Aristotle's basic contention is that reason is inherently universalising, i.e. it operates by recognising the type or universal of particulars. This is what enables reason to compare like with like or contrast like with unlike. Reason is inherently universalising - which is a point that became lost with the advent of nominalism in the late middle ages. WIthout some concept of universals, then reason becomes progressively internal or subjectivised. (This is the subject of a lot of literature).
When it is said that A = A, this is an abstraction. It is nevertheless applicable to real particulars but only because particulars are instances of forms or types. So birds are birds, not bats, because they are of the form 'bird'. Of course this doesn't address the question of what all birds are, or what it is to be a bird. It simply states that, given that we can identify a thing by type, then such principles as 'the principle of identity' can be applied to that type. In that sense, reason is always operating according to universals or generalisations, although again that is nowadays contested because of the influence of nominalism on modern thinking. [sup] 1[/sup]
But, again, in matter-form dualism, there is at least a coherent way to account for the relation of form and matter and the sense in which 'intelligible' forms and 'mindless' matter can be understood as parts of a unified whole.
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1. Compare Jacques Maritain:'For Empiricism there is no essential difference between the intellect and the senses. The fact which obliges a correct theory of knowledge to recognize this essential difference is simply disregarded. What fact? The fact that the human intellect grasps, first in a most indeterminate manner, then more and more distinctly, certain sets of intelligible features -- that is, natures, say, the human nature -- which exist in the real as identical with individuals, with Peter or John for instance, but which are universal in the mind and presented to it as universal objects, positively one (within the mind) and common to an infinity of singular things (in the real).'
Maritain, The Cultural Impact of Empiricism
That is not to say that the form exists separately or apart from matter in some 'ethereal realm'.
In Aristotle's metaphysics, matter without form is an impossibility demonstrated by his cosmological argument. He also explains why the form of a thing is necessarily prior to its material existence. This is why Aristotelian principles are consistent with Christian theology which posits immaterial Forms in the act of creation.
Furthermore, he argues that if the form of the thing was not prior to the material existence of the thing, then the thing, when it comes into existence, could come into existence as something other than it is. But it's impossible that a thing is something other than the thing that it is. So by this argument, what a thing will be (its form) is necessarily prior in time to the material existence of the thing, in order that the thing is the thing that it is, and not something else.
And by the cosmological argument it is impossible that there ever was matter without form. To posit the reality of matter without form, is to posit something real which is unintelligible, as form is what is intelligible. To assume that there is something which in its very nature is unintelligible, is self-defeating to the philosophical mind, which is the desire to know. So regardless of the cosmological argument, there is no benefit to the assumption of formless matter. This would only postulate something which is impossible to comprehend. Therefore we ought to assume that all matter has form, and so it has identity, and formless matter is a nonsense proposition.
Followers of Duns Scotus thought that prime matter can exist on it's own.
Also, when it comes to arguments for God, Aristotelians try arguments. They try arguments, but they all fail. But at least they have arguments. The bizarre thing is that when it comes to "forms" followers of Aquinas and Aristotle will talk endlessly about it without providing a single argument. Yet in their minds they are "proving" their position . It's weird.
Please provide a real argument that a tree is composed of two principles instead of one. Why not just the treeness principle instantiated?
There are some from my own school of thought who could call this exchange "a fruitless endeavor," but I do not agree with this, and this is why: it is insufficient to prejudice the accuracy of one's position merely because one has convictions as to the nature of its truth. I reject this, I believe philosophy is best served as honest and diligent minds come into collision with each other. Further, those who say this, not putting forth the effort to defend their own views, are in danger of forfeiting truth to the victory of error. (Of course, this assumes their views are true). It is clear to me that what is required of serious thinkers is not merely to validate the cravings of their own egos, or to bask in their convictions, but to search out the nature of truth, even if its comprehension causes them the greatest psychological distress. It is hard for me to respect thinkers that are not willing to subject their ideas to coarse criticism. This does not mean one should apply themselves to every contrarian under the sun, but that qualitative objections should be discerned, sought out, and engaged. It greatly saddens me that so many dialectical thinkers have retreated to the Ivory Tower of theory. These thinkers do not fail to write books proclaiming the formation of their ideas, but when it comes to defending them, they fly off and hide away or dismiss the seriousness of their opponent's objections through the sheer arrogance of their convictions. Not I dear reader, I will do my best to apply thought where it deserves to be applied. I believe there are few things so valuable to the thinker than the resistance of other minds.
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The first distinction I should like to make is that being is an actual, concrete thing, not a mere concept or word. Words are objects that we create in order to make sense of being. We do not discover them, unless by "discover" one is talking about cultural integration.
"Each material thing is a particular, an individual with a form proper to itself. This form is distinct from the essence of the thing, which is the form which human beings know in abstraction, because it consists of accidentals, whereas the essence does not." - Metaphysician Undercover
Isn't it actually the case that no material thing is a particular? You are in fact the one assigning this abstract identity to the object. Even the concept "particular" is not itself particular. Diversity and movement is found everywhere in being.
"Hegel argues that these three concepts [particular, individual, universal], though they seem quite distinct, are intimately bound up with each other. The understanding, however, does not see this and holds the three strictly separated. The understanding sees universals as externally related to particulars. In its extreme form, this may issue in an ontological separation between them, as in Plato’s philosophy, where universals or ‘forms’ are held to exist in a different reality altogether separate from their particular exemplars. Hegel rejects any such approach, and shows how in a real sense it is quite impossible to think the universal, particular, and individual apart from each other. For instance, if the universal is thought to be absolutely separate from individuals, and unique in its own right, then isn’t the universal an individual? Further, if an individual is understood as absolutely separate from universals, doesn’t it become an empty abstraction (i.e., a kind of universal) without specific quality? Hegel argues that the concepts of universal, particular and individual mutually determine one another." The Hegel Dictionary, Glenn Alexander Magee, Continuum International Publishing Group p.255
"The essence of a thing is not concealed at all, nor does it abide in the thing, it is the form which exists within the human abstraction, what the human mind apprehends and determines as the essential properties of the thing." -- Metaphysician Undercover
It seems to me this is the crux of everything you are saying. How can you say the essence of a thing "does not abide in the thing," and then claim to "apprehend" and "determine" it from the thing? Further, it seems the way you make use of these determinations, extracted images, I will not yet call them "properties," is to wield them as totalities and finalities against the movement and diversity of being. This seems exceedingly problematic to me, but there is more... what the mind apprehends is precisely the immediacy of an object, unless one goes beyond this mere apprehension (which takes one beyond bare identity) one cannot inform essence with totality from the narrow category of identity. Here you are trying to smuggle in content that cannot be furnished by bare identity alone. The fact that you are doing this, and that you must do this, only stands to demonstrate the accuracy of Hegel's critique of Aristotle.
"What is concealed is the independent "form" of the thing, complete with the accidentals which the human being does not necessarily perceive." --Metaphysician Undercover
This seems to contradict your previous premise, when you said "the essence of a thing is not concealed," and while I note the use of a new term to overcome the limitations of your identity position ("accidentals"), I would also note that the actual concretion of what you are doing here seems to contradict your description. I think this is the part that really matters, I think it's the part that exposes the technique of your idealism, which appears to me as a form of sophistry. It seems you are trying to walk two roads at once in an attempt to retain the appearance of consistency for your formal position on identity, but when we actually examine the concrete process of your determination and formation, we find that it negates your description of identity. What you are actually doing, which is to say, what you must do, in order to furnish being with adequate content, forces you to go beyond the so-called law of identity.
"... formal logic deals with essences, not with actual things. But dialectics is not formal logic. How do you suppose that a person might create useful abstract categories without an appropriate understanding of reality? Creation of suitable abstract categories can only follow from a comprehension of reality." --Metaphysician Undercover
The point of dialectics is that you cannot arrive at an accurate essence (understanding of reality) through identity, but must make use of unity and difference, these not only negate the narrow Aristotelian formation of identity, but go beyond it. Just because one produces a formalism, through the method which you are here defending, doesn't make it accurate or comprehensive. One could in fact understand reality in such a way that they extract error from it, thus leading to an erroneous formalism. That is to say, a comprehension of reality can only follow from a dialectical process.
"...if we reject the law of identity there are consequences which need to be respected. Initially, the assumption that there are particular, determinate individuals, beings or objects, in the real, or actual world, is unsubstantiated, unsupported and unjustified." --Metaphysician Undercover
Here your idealism shines through with vibrant colors. It is not a matter of "rejecting," I think this might be the problem in your characterization, it is a matter of incompletion, a lack of totality, Hegel demonstrates that the principle, as Aristotle forms it, is neither conscious nor consistent with itself.
Perhaps the clearest formation of the refutation of the principle of identity presented by Hegel, is when he notes that A=A requires three different symbols linked in unity to even form the syllogism. Merely within the symbolic logic you have the diversity of Unity, Difference and Identity, which are all required and presupposed in order to make sense of identity. There is no identity without them, where there is identity, there you already have the negation of Unity and Difference.
You claim that if the Aristotelian formation is rejected that we cannot make sense of objects in reality, but this presupposes that we actually form our concepts through the narrow prism of identity, but we don't, this is the naive idealistic assumption, it is akin to the idealist drinking his own Kool-Aid. Hegel proved that every occurrence of identity is making use of other principles, namely, unity and difference.
I am well aware of the fact that you will likely claim I am attacking a strawman of your position. If this is actually the case then my argument has not made contact with your discourse. However, I think the reason you claim this, is because the thing you are claiming is not the same as what you are doing. You are saying that I am not making contact with your position because I am not validating your description of the process, but like Hegel, I am claiming that your actual process of identity is in tension with your formal description.
As I explained, there is no good reason to take this position. It contravenes the conclusion of the cosmological argument, and, designating a part of reality as unintelligible in such an absolute sense is contrary to the philosophical will to know.
Quoting Gregory
The two principles, matter and form, are required to understand the reality of change, as explained in Aristotle's physics. If a tree was just form, then with every passing moment that the form of the tree changed, it would be a hew object. We could not refer to it as one continuous, existing "tree" because every new moment it becomes something different, with change. So Aristotle posited "matter" as the underlying thing which stays the same, as the form changes, grounding the identity of a changing thing, allowing us to say that the tree continues to be "the same tree" despite changes to its form. If a thing's identity is associated only with its form, then at each moment when it has a new form, due to change, then it must also be identified as a totally distinct object. .
Will to know? You just happen to like Aquinas and don't recognize that other people feel just of must truth from other thinkers. He made you dogmatic.
Two principles are not required to explain change. A tree is instantiated treeness. The treeness can change in different ways but remain the same tree. No problem there. This is oh too easy!
So it's a new form every time a color dims on an object? That's what you are saying. Aristotle got the idea of Plato that any change whatsoever would change the whole object. Plato was scrupulous about change, even thinking it weird to say 6 is big compared to 4 but small compared to 8. Everything had to be exact for him, the Da Vinci of philosophy. Realize that it was this weak system of Plato that Aristotle tried to remedy. Most of us have no problem seeing something as the same even though parts change, without positing an underlying principle under another one that changes. Aquinas argued "One universe, so one God", therefore I say "One tree, so one principle". It's just as valid.
Ideas on this subject are speculation from all sides. We're here to share what we think is cool
You need to explain your use of "being", because it makes no sense to me. You are not using it as a noun, to talk about "a being", or individual "beings", so I assume that it is used either as a verb, or as an adjective like "existence" is used as an adjective when we say that a thing has existence or being. Either way, you'd be talking about the concept of "being", not a concrete thing which would be a being. If "being" refers to an activity which many things are engaged in, then this is a concept. If "being" refers to a property, like existence, which things have, then again this is a concept. So it really makes no sense for you to use "being" in the way that you do, and insist that you are referring to an actual concrete thing, this would be "a being". And if "being" refers to some activity which things are involved in, then clearly this is conceptual, because each activity of each individual thing is distinct from the activity of every other thing, so to generalize and say that all these distinct activities have something in common which you call "being", is to conceptualize.
Quoting JerseyFlight
Yes, you have not really made contact with my discourse. I have stressed that Aristotle distinguishes two types of "form", one being the abstracted essence of a thing, and the other being the form which a material object has inherent within itself. Until you recognize this distinction, understand it, and either proceed from this, or refute it and offer something better, then you will just be attacking the straw man.
Quoting JerseyFlight
This is not the case at all. We do not produce concepts through "identity" as defined by the law of identity. We produce concepts in the mind, through abstractions, essences, logic, and other mental processes. The law of identity just serves to remind us that what we say about things, in conceptualization, may not be the truth about the thing. And if we think that the identity we like to give to the thing is the thing's true identity, then we are making such a mistake. So "identity" is not a principle by which we would construct concepts, rather we would deconstruct, by acknowledging that the so-called reality which we describe in words and meaning, concepts, is just an illusion, grounded in a false identity which recognizes the similarity between things rather than the differences between things.
Quoting JerseyFlight
As I just explained, the law of identity is not a principle by which we arrive at essences. It was formulated as a tool against the mistaken arguments of the sophists. It is a principle by which we demonstrate mistaken conceptualizations, not a principle to be used for the production of concepts. So your reference to unity and difference are not relevant in this context.
Quoting JerseyFlight
This really does not make sense to me. "Difference and identity... [are required to make sense of]... identity"? If your wish is to put this forward as an argument against the law of identity, you need to formulate it in a coherent way. The law of identity states that a thing is the same as itself. One might represent this as A=A, but you need to bear in mind that this is what A=A represents in this instance. So I have no idea how you infer "diversity", "unity", and "difference" from "a thing is the same as itself".
Quoting JerseyFlight
I don't see how a principle could be conscious, and I'm still waiting for you to produce the demonstration you've told me Hegel made. So far you've only shown me how Hegel misunderstood the law of identity, and attacked a straw man.
Quoting JerseyFlight
I don't know what you could possibly mean here. We know material things as particulars, individuals. That chair is a particular, so is the table, and my computer. How could there possibly be a material thing which is something other than a particular thing? Care to explain?
Quoting JerseyFlight
Sure, the concept of particular is related to the concepts of individual, and also universal. But still, we understand material things as particulars, or individuals, and we understand universals as concepts. So this passage does nothing to refute the distinction between particular and universal. Just because we have a concept of what a particular is, and a concept of what a universal is, and these concepts are related as concepts are, doesn't mean that there is not a difference between what is understood by "particular", and what is understood by "universal". One is understood to be a material thing, while the other is understood to be a concept.
Quoting JerseyFlight
Do you understand the duality of "form" which I described above? Here's an example. When I see a chair in front of me, there is an image in my mind, we can call this the form of the chair. But the form of the chair, which exists within my mind, is not the same as the form which the material object I am seeing has. The material object I am seeing has molecules, atoms, etc., which are not evident in the image in my mind. So the form of the chair, which exists within my mind, is not the same as the form of the material object which I am calling a chair. These are two distinct "forms" of the very same thing. One is the abstraction, from which we might produce, concepts, and essences, the other is the form which is proper to the chair, constituting its identity.
So the essence of a thing is present to a human mind, as the concept of that thing, or type of thing, and is therefore not concealed. What is concealed, is the thing's true form, or identity, due to the deficiencies of our capacities of sense. Nevertheless, through sensation we do determine "a form" of the thing, and we may proceed to produce an essence, we just do not apprehend "the form", in the sense of the thing's true identity.
Quoting JerseyFlight
As I said, we do not use identity to produce concepts and essences, we use the appearance of the thing to us, how the thing appears to us, its image etc., to produce such conceptualizations, and this is not "identity". So you are really attacking a straw man here. In no way am I arguing that identity provides the content for conceptualization. I am arguing the exact opposite, an unbridged gap between identity and conceptualization, such that "identity" in the sense defined by the law of identity, does not even enter into conceptualization..
Quoting JerseyFlight
It only seems like contradiction because you are not recognizing the duality of "form" which I've been talking about, and trying to get you to apprehend.
Quoting JerseyFlight
There are two roads, two distinct types of "form". When you come to apprehend what I am saying, what Aristotle was saying, then make your point. But don't just keep hitting the straw man.
Quoting JerseyFlight
Of course, being is conceptual, while identity is within the thing itself. So identity doesn't even enter into the content of being, or any such conceptualization. The thing itself cannot get into the content of our minds. But your straw man is to claim that I pretend to use identity as some sort of content or foundation for conceptualization. That's not the case, and that's why it's a straw man.
Quoting Gregory
Of course, it requires a different description, therefore it's a different form.
Quoting Gregory
I know, that's why two principles are required, to account for how we can see that the thing is the same despite having changed, and understand that this is true. One aspect of the thing changes while another stays the same. Without this separation making two distinct aspects, we'd have to say that the thing is the same, despite having changed, which is contradictory.
Big post, no proofs
So alteration causes half of the object to completely change? New forms every second since QM says everything is changing? You can't see that your stuck in Plato's world and that Aristotle was medicine for that, not objective truth
I don't like Thomistic Aristoteleans because they don't say "here's a neat alternative way of thinking" . Instead they say "I can unfailingly prove this" and they never ever can
There is too much sophistry in your reply. You did not answer my question: 'How can you say the essence of a thing "does not abide in the thing," and then claim to "apprehend" and "determine" it from the thing?'
He is using the word "essence" to describe thoughts because he thinks the world is literally in his head thru the forms
I didn't say "from the thing". That is just your materialist interpretation,, like saying that the image of the chair in my mind when I see a chair "comes from the chair". It does not. It is created by, and therefore caused by, my mind. You interpret from a perspective completely different from mine, then instead of trying to understand what I am saying, you create a straw man from your faulty interpretation, to knock down. You are not in this discussion to understand, but to discredit names like "idealism". So you represent me with your straw man named "idealist" and knock it down, pretending that you are knocking me down.
You just cannot get out of your determinist/materialist way of seeing things, to be able to understand what I am saying. Do you recognize two distinct types of forms, the form which the object called "chair" has, within itself, and the form of it which exists in my mind when I see it?
If the form in my mind came from the chair, it could not be mistaken. It would be taken necessarily from the chair, and therefore could not be anything but a correct representation of the chair. However, this is not the case, mistakes abound, because the form in the mind is created by my mind, not taken from the chair. And that is why the form in my mind must be understood as distinct from the form in the material object
Do you understand the nature of representation? One thing, like a symbol for example, represents something else. The symbol is not taken from the other thing, nor is it necessarily a facsimile or even a likeness of the thing which is represented.
Quoting Gregory
I am trying to be consistent with Aristotle in my use of "essence", regardless of how others use it. Jersey is neither consistent with Aristotle, nor Hegel, but is clinging to some idiosyncratic notions which are disabling any proper understanding of either.
You speak as if the form in the mind is the same in essence as the outside forms. This is strange.
Also, why don't we turn into different people (a new form) with changes in a human (internal or external)? You'll say the human soul is a unique form, but maybe treeness is like this and therefore there is one principle per object
It seems your reading skills are not so good Gregory. I have, for days now been trying to get Jersey to recognize the distinction between the form in the mind, and the form of the material object. "Identity" in the sense of the law of identity, refers to the latter. In Aristotle, "essence" refers to a form in the mind. Therefore essence is not identity.
You've been ambiguous about identity and said that essence is the form in the mind. But you can continue to ignore the fact that I've refuted your position many times, that's up to you. I don't like Thomist so I don't like you
So as to remove my own errors from this exchange and promote a healthy environment of discourse. When I said, "there is too much sophistry in your reply." Even if this is true it is not the way to approach the topic. I should not have said this. I will do my best from this point on to respond accordingly.
"You interpret from a perspective completely different from mine, then instead of trying to understand what I am saying, you create a straw man from your faulty interpretation, to knock down." -- Metaphysician Undercover
I am trying to think in terms of your own premises, I am just trying to do it critically as opposed to affirmatively. I am not trying to invent premises to attack.
You said, "The essence of a thing is not concealed at all, nor does it abide in the thing, it is the form which exists within the human abstraction, what the human mind apprehends and determines as the essential properties of the thing." -- Metaphysician Undercover
I asked you, 'How can you say the essence of a thing "does not abide in the thing," and then claim to "apprehend" and "determine" it from the thing?'
You then said, "I didn't say "from the thing"."
This is correct, you said, "of the thing."
The question still remains, from what then are you apprehending and determining properties? If the mind constructs the form of a Snark would this mean a Snark has existence? Further, where does the mind even get the properties to construct the idea of a Snark?
"...the image of the chair in my mind when I see a chair "comes from the chair". It does not. It is created by, and therefore caused by, my mind." -- Metaphysician Undercover
Do you then say that the chair has no existence beyond your mind?
(And I should like to make it clear, this is exactly the position of idealism, of which you are indeed proving yourself to be most consistent. Idealism states that there is no reality beyond the mind, which is to say, even though it tries to posture away from this and violates it repeatedly in the course of action, it is the actual conclusion and solipsism of the position).
Now this seems like a direct contradiction of what is stated above, an example of the posturing I alluded to:
"Do you recognize two distinct types of forms, the form which the object called "chair" has, within itself, and the form of it which exists in my mind when I see it?" -- Metaphysician Undercover
I recognize that objects exist outside my mind. Chairs exist regardless of whether or not I call them chairs. A chair has a form that exists independent of my mind. My mind interacts with my environment in order to comprehend it. Without a concrete, objective world, my mind would not be able to form concepts. If I were to say, "stones have no existence outside my mind," and Socrates decides to pelt me in the head with one, this would be an immediate refutation of my idealism.
"If the form in my mind came from the chair, it could not be mistaken." -- Metaphysician Undercover
I do not understand how you arrived at this conclusion?
"It would be taken necessarily from the chair, and therefore could not be anything but a correct representation of the chair." -- Metaphysician Undercover
Why do you here assume that your act of "taking" would be (and must be) one of perfection?
(It is clear to me that this demonstrates the superiority of Hegel's approach over that of Aristotle, because Hegel did not see this process as an automatic transference of perfection, but that it is mediated by thought, hence, the logic by which thought mediates must be more comprehensive than the narrow categories provided by Aristotle. Further, Hegel saw that an unmediated understanding leads to a distortion of reality).
"However, this is not the case, mistakes abound, because the form in the mind is created by my mind, not taken from the chair. And that is why the form in my mind must be understood as distinct from the form in the material object." -- Metaphysician Undercover
I see a serious dilemma here. If the form of the mind is created by the mind then what is the chair? How can the mind create the form of a chair without the concrete existence of a chair to "apprehend" and "determine" its content? How do you know that it (the chair) doesn't play a role in this process?
Your argument seems to be that the existence of "mistakes" is proof that your idealism is true? This seems very much like a non-sequitur. How can you even determine when something is a "mistake" if there is no difference between your mind's idea of a chair and an actual chair?
It seems to me that by speaking this way you are going beyond your idealist position: "I have, for days now been trying to get Jersey to recognize the distinction between the form in the mind, and the form of the material object."
I do not see how there can be "material objects" from the basis of your position? If you are referring to "forms" your mind produces, then you are neither referring to "material" or "objects" but mental abstractions. You then have no right to use the term, material objects.
It seems very much like you are just asserting these sweeping metaphysical premises into being without a way to substantiate them, like you are constructing your own imaginary world out of abstract premises. If everything is reduced to your mind and objects have no independent being, then wouldn't that leave you trapped in your own mind? If you can't make a distinction between what your "mind creates" and what actually exists, then it seems to me you cannot escape the conclusion that this entire discourse is just a "creation" of your mind.
BACK TO THE ACTUAL TOPIC: THE LAW OF IDENTITY:
I said, 'Perhaps the clearest formation of the refutation of the principle of identity presented by Hegel, is when he notes that A=A requires three different symbols linked in unity to even form the syllogism. Merely within the symbolic logic you have the diversity of Unity, Difference and Identity, which are all required and presupposed in order to make sense of identity. There is no identity without them, where there is identity, there you already have the negation of Unity and Difference.'
You replied,
"This really does not make sense to me. "Difference and identity... [are required to make sense of]... identity"? If your wish is to put this forward as an argument against the law of identity, you need to formulate it in a coherent way. The law of identity states that a thing is the same as itself. One might represent this as A=A, but you need to bear in mind that this is what A=A represents in this instance. So I have no idea how you infer "diversity", "unity", and "difference" from "a thing is the same as itself"."
The symbolic form is, as a matter of fact, made up of three different symbols. The A to the left is not the same as the A to the right and the = is required to form the concept of the "tautology." Hegel's point is not that the law of identity specifically states these attributes (unity and difference) but that the law not only presupposes them, but makes use of them within the movement of its own being. What Hegel is pointing out in the law of identity is "the lack of awareness of the negative movement..." When you say this "doesn't make sense to you," that is correct, because you're not considering the law of identity as it is in the actual movement of its being, hence you are oblivious to its negation. Dialectic comprehends contradiction as it emerges from the object, it does not try to bring it from the outside, and neither does it see it as coming from the outside. This is how Hegel was able to comprehend the contradictory nature of the law of identity.
What's most interesting is that you have actually validated Hegel's position throughout this exchange because you have admitted that the law is too narrow to deduce content. Hegel says, "This proposition in its positive expression A = A is, in the first instance, nothing more than the expression of an empty tautology. It has therefore been rightly remarked that this law of thought has no content and leads no further."
I never said anything about identity to him. He just got mad that I refuted his arguments. The part he "responded" to was just me clarifying that Aristotle and Aquinas believe the "form" in an object has many locations: with the prime matter, and in the heads of humans who abstract it. This is the "idealism" you object to, and I agree it's strange and there is no proof for it. Thomists are so prideful they always, every time to a fault, get mad and make things personal when I refute their arguments. They are a unique breed of people
I've been very clear about identity, "a thing is the same as itself". Therefore, unless the form in the mind is the very same as the thing itself, it is not the identity of the thing. Where is this claimed ambiguity?
Quoting Gregory
That's strange, I don't recall your refutation. Perhaps you could refresh my memory.
Quoting JerseyFlight
OK, so I'll repeat the principal premise. Aristotle distinguishes two types of "form", one being the abstracted essence of a thing, an idea, formula, or definition, and the other being the form which a material object has inherent within itself. Whenever you go astray of this premise, I will point it out to you.
Quoting JerseyFlight
I don't see how "existence" is relevant, we haven't defined that term in this discussion, so it appears like you want a digression. I'm sure you are aware that the mind creates things, some imaginary, perhaps like a "Snark". Some might pass from being imaginary, to be material, like when an architect plans and then has a building constructed. I really don't know where a mind gets its creative ideas, but I don't see how the fact that I don't know how a mind can be creative could be used as evidence that a mind is not creative. Obviously minds are creative, whether or not we know how the creative activity works.
Quoting JerseyFlight
No, this would be contrary to the principal premise stated above.
Quoting JerseyFlight
Again, contrary to the principal premise stated above, and so nothing but a straw man.
Quoting JerseyFlight
Correction, it's a direct contradiction of your straw man interpretation.
Quoting JerseyFlight
So do I recognize that objects exist outside my mind,, as is stated in my principal premise, and also is supported by the law of identity, "a thing is the same as itself".
Quoting JerseyFlight
Let me explain. If the form of the chair comes from the chair and goes into my mind, then what exists in my mind is the same form as what came from the chair. Since the form is the same form, then there can be no mistake. If the form in my mind is different than the form in the chair, then it cannot be true that the form in my mind came from the chair because it is a different form. If there is a form which comes from the chair, and it is mediated, or altered in any way, then this different form comes to be in my mind, and it is not the same form as what came from the chair, so we cannot say that the form in the mind came from the chair, because the mediated form is a different form. This is the nature of "form". Any change in form, constitutes a distinct and different form.
Quoting JerseyFlight
For the reason stated above. Any difference of form constitutes a different form. If the form of that chair in my mind is not exactly as the form within the material object (chair in this case), I cannot say that the form comes from the object. It is a different form, therefore this particular form must originate from a different source.
Quoting JerseyFlight
Actually Hegel's position is consistent with Aristotle on this point. It is your idiosyncratic perspective (straw man) which creates the difference. If there was a transferal of form from the object to the mind, as you suggest, then perfection would be necessary. Since there is not perfection Hegel sees this perspective or proposition, i.e. unmediated understanding, as a distortion of reality. That there is mediation of thought, indicates that the form in the mind is different from the form in the object, and therefore not the same form. Therefore what I've argued above, that the form does not come from the object, is consistent with Hegel. Neither Hegel's nor Aristotle's approach is superior on this matter, because they both say the same thing in different ways.
Quoting JerseyFlight
I guess you do not recognize that minds create things. Would you think that it's a serious dilemma that an architect can design a building without ever seeing the building? This is one area where Aristotle is far superior to Hegel, his exposition of final cause, which is derived from Plato's dialectics concerning "the good".
Quoting JerseyFlight
I didn't say that the chair doesn't play a role, I said that the form in the mind doesn't come from the chair, it is created by the mind. This is consistent with Hegel's "mediated" by thought. And, when you recognize that a difference in form implies that the two different forms are not the same form, you will conclude that the form in the mind did not come from the chair, but was created by the mind.
Quoting JerseyFlight
Another failure to respect the principal premise for the sake of a straw man.
Quoting JerseyFlight
I have no idea what you're trying to say here but it appears like another failure to respect the principal premise. That premise states that a material object has a form, and the form which the material object has is distinct from the forms which are in my mind. Material objects are taken for granted by the premise, so if you perceive my perspective as denying the possibility of material objects, you need to demonstrate this, not just appeal to your straw man named "idealism", and knock it down as if you were hitting me.
Quoting JerseyFlight
Failure to respect the principal premise.
Quoting JerseyFlight
I think I've addressed this for you already, in the other thread. A material "thing" is changing as each moment of time passes. Nevertheless, we say that it remains the same thing. This changing activity is what you call "the actual movement of its being". The material thing has a new form at each passing moment, yet it maintains its identity as the same thing. What is negated is certain attributes, not the identity of the material being. Negation, as a dialectic of attributes, what a thing has and has not, does not suffice to refute the law of identity.
Quoting JerseyFlight
So this is Hegel's faulty representation of the law of identity; the one which can be struck down with negation, but it's just a straw man. Identity does not presuppose any attributes. The only presuppositions are "a thing", and "same", neither of which is an attribute.. If Hegel introduces "the movement of its own being" here, then he is talking about attributes which are negated, not the thing nor its identity.
Quoting JerseyFlight
That's right, the law of identity is not at all intended to produce conceptual content. It is applied as an aid to judging truth and falsity of conceptual content. So it would be better described as a principle of skepticism. The problem though is when people like you, and perhaps Hegel, represent it as if it is supposed to produce conceptual content, then denounce it as inadequate for that endeavour. All this demonstrates is a misunderstanding of it, on your part.
Discoursing on the Law of Identity:
Quoting you: "Any difference of form constitutes a different form."
"The material thing has a new form at each passing moment, yet it maintains its identity as the same thing." -- Metaphysician Undercover
If its form has changed, then according to your logic, how can you say "it maintains its identity as the same?" For you have said that any difference constitutes a new form. "New" is not the same as "same."
"I recognize that objects exist outside my mind..." This premise serves as the absolute negation of your idealism, insofar as it must give way to the authority of the material form. This is why consistent idealists must deny the existence of the material world, the admission of the premise ends up nullifying the authority of their abstraction. After this admission abstraction is sublated to the concretion of the object. As soon as one posits a world beyond the mind, one has deferred to an authority beyond the mind.
Is identity different from itself? Identity is saying that it is not different from itself, this is the negative side of the determination of identity. The positive side says that everything is identical to itself. One cannot posit identity without equally positing difference (because one cannot make a determination without negation) there is no such thing as identity without difference, and this is because identity is saying that it is not difference, unless you claim that identity is different from itself? Here it will not work merely to reassert the positive side of identity, because you are already, in the same instance as you posit identity, saying that it is not different from itself, you just don't realize it.
This is why Hegel says, "a determinateness of being is essentially a transition into its opposite..." What you are trying to do is retain a determination, while rejecting the inescapable transition which casts identity into its negation. You have exactly manifested and proven Hegel's point.
"Identity does not presuppose any attributes. The only presuppositions are "a thing", and "same", neither of which is an attribute." -- Metaphysician Undercover
A thing is itself, this is the positive side. A thing is not different from itself, this is the negative side. You do not have identity with only one side of the determination. Both sides taken together, equal unity; identity contains itself as well as unity and difference. The mere positive formation is simply ignorant of itself.
"If Hegel introduces "the movement of its own being" here, then he is talking about attributes which are negated, not the thing nor its identity." -- Metaphysician Undercover
Hegel does not show that identity has contradiction outside itself, but that this contradiction is contained within the nature of identity itself. All of the determinations brought forth by Hegel are instances of the same identity. This thinking is exceedingly difficult for Aristotelians to grasp, precisely because their comprehension has been deluded by idealistic premises which artificially divide and distort the objects of being. Instead of allowing the object to dictate and unfold its properties and attributes, the Aristotelian logic dictates axiomatically how the object should be viewed and divided. This leads to a narrow distortion of reality. "…identificational thinking itself is a tremendous abstraction. We have recently begun to become painfully aware of the artificial world man has constructed and imposed on the natural immediacy of the planet earth by force of identificational thinking in its abstractness and its nihilism— for everything built by reflection is built on negation." "Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, A Propaedeutic,” pg.251, Thomas Hoffmann, translated by David Healan, Brill 2015
"Any difference of form constitutes a different form. If the form of that chair in my mind is not exactly as the form within the material object (chair in this case), I cannot say that the form comes from the object." -- Metaphysician Undercover
It seems to me, and I could be wrong, that there is a kind of strawman posited here. You say, "if the form of the chair is not exact..." this seems problematic, why the criteria of exactitude? The answer you give is because of the first part of the syllogism. "Any difference, new form." What I don't understand is why the movement and transition of an object should preclude its influence on our comprehension of it? It is merely your authoritarian and idealistic assumption that perceptual information taken from the chair must equal exactitude. I do not believe you can sustain this, but I am open to your defense.
Isn't the actual conclusion simply that you could not say your ideas of the chair were exact, and not that the information you assess from the physical object, has no bearing on your formation of it?
I confess that the question of subject and object is one of the most difficult areas in all of philosophy. I do not believe you have conquered it with this simple, idealistic syllogism. The latest discoveries in neuroscience are actually informing us that our perception is the result of our social interaction, it is both mind and the world, what amounts to a most astounding discovery, "action comes before perception." But this is not a dualism, to posit such would be to reduce the plurality of mind and world to idealistic categories.
You and i believe we see the world. MU thinks he abstracts the world into his soul. He is so convinced he has the correct psychology and that we really abstract without knowing it that he can't see that he created this feeling of abstraction is his mind through lust for a devourment of scholastic books. "Reason is a whore" said Luther (about Aristotle btw)
In Aristotelian physics, temporal continuity is provided for by matter. Matter is the underlying thing which persists through change, as the form of the thing changes. Because the identity of the thing persists, despite changes to its form, we must associate identity with matter, not with form.
Quoting JerseyFlight
When did I say I was idealist? That is your straw man. And since I accept the existence of the material world, which is contrary to your notion of idealism, you now ought to see that it is a straw man. Or, perhaps I really am idealist, and your notion of idealism is a straw man. Choose your poison.
Quoting JerseyFlight
We went through this already, perhaps in the other thread. "Same" and "different" are not proper opposites when "same" is used as it is in the law of identity. Difference is included within same, because the same thing has a changing form, and therefore is different from one moment to the next, despite maintaining its identity as the same thing. This is represented as the difference between subject and predicate which I described earlier. The subject may persist as the same subject, despite having predications negated at different times. So the subject remains the same, as in same subject, despite difference being a part of it, due to changing predications, when the subject represents an object.
Therefore "different" is not applicable when referring to the subject itself, because difference is a feature of what is predicated. To represent the law of identity as saying that "a thing is not different from itself" is a mistaken representation, because it is to oppose different with same, and that is to give "same" a formal definition, but the law of identity associates "same" with matter.
Quoting JerseyFlight
Negation and transition are formal, identity is material. Do you recognize this distinction between form and matter in Aristotle?
Quoting JerseyFlight
This very clearly demonstrates a misunderstanding of the law of identity. Identity is given to the object itself, and the object is represented in logic as the subject. All contraries are related to what is predicated of the subject, so it makes no sense to say that contradiction is within identity itself. Contradiction is in what is said about the object, but identity is within the object.
If the law of identity were itself contradictory, then you might demonstrate this. But it's not. So it makes no sense to say that contradiction is within identity, because the law of identity puts identity into the object itself, and contradiction is always within what is said about the object.
Quoting JerseyFlight
The need for "exactitude" is quite clear. Any difference is a difference, hence two distinct forms. Two similar forms are different forms, not one form.
Quoting JerseyFlight
I did not preclude influence, that is your straw man. What I insist, is that perceptual information received from, or taken from, the chair, does not mean that the form of the chair in my mind, as an image, is even similar to, let alone the same form, as what inheres within the material chair.
That is the argument. There is a form in the material chair itself, directly related to the chair's identity, and there is a form "of" the chair in my mind, as an image. These two forms, though they might both be called "the form of the chair", are completely distinct. And only the form which inheres within the material chair is directly related to the identity of that object, because the form in my mind "of the chair", is what you called mediated.
Quoting JerseyFlight
The point is that these are two distinct forms, the form which inheres within the material chair, and the form of the chair which is in my mind.. We could only call them the same form, and thereby claim that the form in my mind is directly related to the identity of the chair, if there was such exactitude. There is not such exactitude, therefore the identity of the chair remains within the chair, and not in my mind.
Quoting JerseyFlight
There is though, a duality of form. How else can you account for the form of the chair in your mind, as an image, and the fact that the material chair has a form itself, which makes it the particular thing that it is? For the reasons explained, we cannot say that these two forms are the same form. Therefore we ought to conclude that each perceived object has a duality of form, the form which is proper to the identity of the object, and the form that is proper to the mind which perceives it which we often call the "form of the object" .
If it is true that I "created" this, then my argument is proven.
That's a wonky statement
Have you never hogged the good chair? It's a wonderful fact that humanity is the only creature to go about the world with it's own padding upon which to sit. What does this say of form? Doesn't it make the identity of the form the bottom atop it?
It's just a material object. How it is understood is How is used, depending on culture
But how do you weave a coherent pathway between iconography and iconoclasm? Nothing is eternal, nothing is sacred. Any imagined form is bound to tear upon us between shackles of the past and over-zealous expectations for the future. Coherent change is the language of our kindness to both. But it is the substance of which the chair is made that teaches us that kindness that keeps us coherent between enslaving icon and savage iconoclasm. Idealism of the Christian Era imposes a divine design upon the world that through obedience to it we are meant to translate that design into the remaking of the world. But this view proscribes our learning from the matter. The divine plan means to impose heavenly order upon the world through the human mind dedicated to that plan upon a world under the believers hand. As if the carpenter teaches the wood what it can be. That dogma has prevented us from letting the matter teach the mind, through the hand handling it, rather than the other way around. Touch the world and it teaches kindness, beat it into shape and the gods only teach us cruelty.
Best to begin at the beginning. As a matter of fact, if you had no eyes, no ears, no hands to feel, only your mind to think, you could not arrive at an understanding or form of a chair. But chairs are real things, they exist independent of the human mind, this premise is the swift destruction of your position. This is true because all that you say about the chair and its form hinges on the actual existence of a chair, coupled with your sensory ability to detect it. If you remove this premise, if you subtract the concretion of the chair and your senses, and leave only your mind, you would not arrive at an understanding of a chair. Matter is the substance of mind, remove this and there is nothing left.
"To represent the law of identity as saying that "a thing is not different from itself" is a mistaken representation, because it is to oppose different with same, and that is to give "same" a formal definition, but the law of identity associates "same" with matter." -- Metaphysician Undercover
The easy way to refute this is simply to re-ask the question, is identity different from itself? You obviously have to say no. We could try to say that identity is not saying this, but that would merely amount to a denial of its actual being. When I thought of this objection by Hegel, it crossed my mind that perhaps he was just engaging in sophistry, trying to artificially attach difference to identity. But the thing is, identity is actually saying this! Hegel is not making it up. To prove it, look what happens if you deny it, surely you will not say that identity is different from itself? This would destroy identity.
Hegel is correct, identity contains unity and difference. Back to the symbolic form: A = A is an instance of three different symbols. Taken together (unity) they are said to form the law of identity. Everything you need to prove that Hegel's dialectical clarification is correct is contained right in the symbolic form. When I brought this up before your reply was as follows:
"This really does not make sense to me. "Difference and identity... [are required to make sense of]... identity"? If your wish is to put this forward as an argument against the law of identity, you need to formulate it in a coherent way. The law of identity states that a thing is the same as itself. One might represent this as A=A, but you need to bear in mind that this is what A=A represents in this instance. So I have no idea how you infer "diversity", "unity", and "difference" from "a thing is the same as itself"." -- Metaphysician Undercover
The answer is that you have three different symbols combined together in order to construct the law of identity. This is not my opinion. This was not Hegel's opinion, this is an empirical fact regarding the symbolic structure of identity. Why this structure, why not another?
One can deduce the same properties from the informal articulation: a thing is the same as itself. Here you have multiple different words combined together to construct the law, and here's the vital point, you cannot construct this law without making use of these different terms combined in unity.
When you try to bring in the predicate to rescue this law all you are doing is going beyond what is actually contained in the identity premise. You must admit that the predicate introduces negation. Well friend, this is not contained in Aristotle's formulation of the law. Once again, your predicate attempt would imply A = -A.
At every turn you are going beyond the premise of this law in order to rescue it from itself, the only difference is that you are claiming that all your actions are still contained within the premise of the law.
""Same" and "different" are not proper opposites when "same" is used as it is in the law of identity." -- Metaphysician Undercover
The point is not that they are opposites. Same is saying that it is not different from itself, it is also never an isolated word but requires the unity of difference to distinguish itself.
"Difference is included within same, because the same thing has a changing form, and therefore is different from one moment to the next, despite maintaining its identity as the same thing." -- Metaphysician Undercover
It does not actually maintain its identity, this is an ideal we project. But that is a different point. We are here discussing the law of identity. Difference is posited in the same instance as you posit "same." It is already contained within the concept, within the very being of sameness. This is Hegel's point. In dialectics contradiction always emerges from being.
"This is represented as the difference between subject and predicate which I described earlier. The subject may persist as the same subject, despite having predications negated at different times. So the subject remains the same, as in same subject, despite difference being a part of it, due to changing predications, when the subject represents an object." -- Metaphysician Undercover
This is just an idealistic formulation of reality. In reality the subject is changing, but more importantly, the subject itself is not separated from difference or unity. If it was, it could not distinguish itself, could not determine itself.
"Therefore "different" is not applicable when referring to the subject itself, because difference is a feature of what is predicated." -- Metaphysician Undercover
This is false, as proven above through the symbolic form, it is already part of the subject's being.
"To represent the law of identity as saying that "a thing is not different from itself" is a mistaken representation, because it is to oppose different with same, and that is to give "same" a formal definition, but the law of identity associates "same" with matter." -- Metaphysician Undercover
It is not to oppose "different" with "same," as from the outside, it is merely to draw out what the premise already contains.
It doesn't matter what you try to say the law is doing or does, what matters is what it actually contains; what matters is whether you have to go beyond it in order to derive the value you need from it.
As On-Mi says, in the movie Cloud Atlas, "I am not genomed to alter reality!" But then she goes on to do just that. You're thinking statically. States of being have no identity. They are quantified, but never qualifying. Only what is qualifying can be itself. And that act of qualifying is neither same nor different. Such static categories are vapid. By the way, analogy, arguably the source of all rational terms, is sameness in difference. That is, it is a comparison of two sets of differences that reveal a sameness in that difference. But identity goes well beyond this. It is differing. It is the act of being itself that alters reality, and all its terms. What is static and unchanging has no identity, because no differing of reality can come through it. This is why there can be no divine creator, because it would be itself unchanging. Whereas change, changing all the terms of reality, is what person is. It does this in the act of not being the one any static form is. And reality becomes real as a response in recognition of the worth of that omission of itself from the count. Of course, since all terms emerge analogically, as a static sameness a static difference reveals, there can never be any one that sameness is, because it is only difference. The worth of time is no 'one'. God, of course, is the universal quantifier, and so quite unreal. But something of its unity must be taken as axiomatic to the count of what would span the ends of time, if time were "one". However, since that founding oneness or unity number would be, if time were one, is contradictory to that count, then the count of time is unreal in relation to that presumed unity. God and science cannot exist in the same universe. And yet, each needs something of the other as axiomatic to its destruction or neglect of identity. Of that identity, that is, that the act of being, and identity, the differing of reality is. Identity is the act of being no one any quantifier is.
I do hope no one here is suggesting that the form of the chair is eternal! Bums on seats tells it all!
I'm going to apologize right now, in case it offends you, because I'm going to be curt with my reply on most the things you said. It seems like most your points are either repeating a question I've already addressed, or trending toward absurdity. There is however one point where we might have some agreement, so I'll start with that and see if we can find a way to advance.
Quoting JerseyFlight
Yes, it is an ideal we project, but that's exactly what the law of identity is, an ideal. It is very similar, and closely related to the concept of matter, an ideal. We notice that despite the fact that the world is continually changing, there is consistency. The changes are not random, there is continuity of existence from one moment to the next, so Aristotle posited "matter" to account for this continuity. If the forms of things in the world are changing from one moment to the next, there must be something which dictates the possibility of change, this potential is attributed to matter. Why do some aspects of the world appear to persist while others do not? Whatever it is which answers the reason for this, it must be something substantial, and in modern terms it is expressed as mass or inertia. This concept is employed to answer the question of why do some forms change from one moment to the next, while others persist in time. You can see how "matter" is an ideal.
Likewise, you can see how the law of identity is an ideal. Suppose one were to describe the world (its form) at each moment in time. Each moment it would be a different form. However, we can name a particular aspect, and say that this aspect is not changing. So we might say that this aspect has identity, as a temporally extended thing. But this is just a projected ideal, because parts of this thing (accidentals) are changing, and we must overlook these changing parts in order to say that this thing is not changing. The point is, that we observe consistency, and see very clearly that some aspects of the world are not changing as time passes, but when we try to formalize this, state the form that is not changing, we cannot accurately represent this because there is always aspects of that thing, which the formalized statement refers to, which are changing. So these are said to be accidentals, but we still haven't accurately isolated the thing which is not changing, because we just disregard the accidentals. So Aristotle posited matter, and matter as an ideal, is supposed to account for those temporally extended, unchanging aspects of the world, which we give identity to as existing things.
Having said that, let me proceed to the rest of your points.
Quoting JerseyFlight
This claim is unsupported, and actually sort of absurd. You have no way of saying what type of form a mind with no senses could come up with. So if such a mind created a form, and called it a chair, then just because it's not the same form of a chair that your mind would come up with, does not mean that it's not the form of a chair. What validates your understanding of "a chair" as better than this mind's understanding of "a chair". All you are doing is denying Descartes' "brain in a vat", as incapable of creating forms without sensing, but you have no principles to support such a denial.
Quoting JerseyFlight
This is an absurdity as well. We are not talking about whether identity is the same as itself, we are talking about whether a thing is the same as itself. So you just go off on an unintelligible tangent here, assuming that identity is a thing. But identity is not a thing, it is something that we say a thing has, a thing has identity. And, the law of identity states that the thing is the same as itself. We are not saying that the thing's identity is the same as the thing's identity, that would be redundant. We are saying that the thing's identity is such that the thing is the same as itself. The law of identity is something (a law) which is applied to things by human beings. To ask whether identity is the same as itself is to reify identity, making identity the thing rather than something the thing has.
Quoting JerseyFlight
There is another structure. It's the proposition "A thing is the same as itself". There's more than three different symbols here. The fact that Hegel can represent this as A=A does not mean that A=A is the only way that the law of identity can be represented. I'm sure that other people can think of other ways to represent it. Suppose I say Z represents "a thing is the same as itself. Then I've represented the law of identity with one symbol, no different symbols with unity. Hegel's decision to represent the law of identity with three symbols is simply arbitrary. So this argument of Hegel's is against a straw man. And all that babble about difference and unity is just an irrelevant distraction. What needs to be done is to address the meaning of the law, not the symbolization of it. What the law talks about is identity, and it defines identity as a thing being the same as itself. This talk about unity and difference is irrelevant, having no real bearing on the issue.
Quoting JerseyFlight
Actually, it's you and Hegel who went beyond the premise of the law, by bringing in negation. I only pointed out that negation is relative to predication, not to the subject itself. So I pointed out how Hegel has gone beyond the premise, just like he does in talking about the three symbols, difference and unity. He brings in all sorts of irrelevancies, to cloud the issue, in a ploy of sophistry, instead of addressing the meaning of the proposition itself.
Quoting JerseyFlight
Here you go, beyond the stated proposition. There is nothing within the law of identity which indicates that "different" is opposite to "same". And, as I already explained to you more than once, as "same" is used in the law of identity, "different" is necessarily included within same, and therefore cannot be opposite. A thing is different from how it was, from one minute to the next, therefore it is different from itself. Yet it maintains its identity as being the same as itself. Therefore being different from itself is included within being the same as itself, such that a thing is both different from itself, and the same as itself. It is very clear that different is not opposed to same, as "same" is used in the law of identity.
Quoting JerseyFlight
Yes, for sure, it is an idealistic formulation of reality, as explained at the beginning of the post. The problem though, is that we have no other way to account for the consistency and temporal continuity of existence, so we posit ideals such as "matter", and "identity", to fill that void in our understanding of reality.
Quoting JerseyFlight
That's absurd. The premise says nothing about difference. I "draw out" the premise in the way that it was meant to be drawn out, to show that difference is included within the identity of the changing thing. You "draw out" the premise by defining different as opposed to same, with the intent of rejecting the premise. Obviously it is you who draws out the premise in the wrong direction, because opposing same and different is unnecessary. Clearly observation shows us how one thing can be both the same as itself and different from itself, due to the nature of change and temporal extension.
Quoting JerseyFlight
Right, and this law contains nothing about difference or unity. Therefore your attempt to relate these concepts to that law, in a way which is inconsistent with the law, is nothing but an attempt to reject the law through the use of semantics. But we can define words in such a way so as to make any law or proposition appear as if it ought to be rejected. However, what is at issue here is the law itself, and the meaning of it. And we need to understand its meaning before determining whether we ought or ought not reject it, and then we may proceed to define words consistent with it, to uphold it, or inconsistent with it to uphold the intent to reject it. Defining words with the intent of proving a proposition wrong is a pointless exercise. Understanding the proposition so that you can decide whether it ought or ought not be proven wrong is something more meaningful.
You're whole thesis assumes that stability real. Hegel took Heraclitus seriously but you are not. If your premise is "something must remain stable and we call that matter" , I take the whole premise and nail it from the nearest tree
Is being the case? Is there a case of being? Is there a case for being? Only what is most real not being the case, a case of something, can have identity. John Searle, I think it is, likes to talk about what it is 'like' to be conscious. That phrasing perverts the issue. There is absolutely nothing it is like to be a person, with identity. I am not identical. Not to you, not to a chair, not to dead matter, not to anything at all. That is the whole point. When a person departs this life only the whole history of humanity working as a totality can possibly encompass that loss. But certainly not in the clamor of a world or evolving styles or 'geist'. Something far more personal and intimate.
Why do I feel like I'm trying to release all the mice at a mousetrap symposium? The reason you want to catch the mouse is that you are afraid that time is real, and worth more than we can endure. But duration is not what is real to time, it is the attenuation of it, dehumanizing and devaluing it into something we are more able to endure. Time is the mouse you perennially try, but never can trap. It is unendurably of worth because it is not enduring at all. It is just change. The rest the attenuation of its worth
Tim,
No, I am saying that if you think time is stable duration you want forms to be eternal so as not to suffer the unendurable worth of it. I did take it for granted that others would see the folly that eternal forms impose upon our perceptions, and discussions, of what does exist and of what existing means.
"Yes, it is an ideal we project, but that's exactly what the law of identity is, an ideal." -- Metaphysician Undercover
Even as an ideal the concept is not merely made up of a one-sided determination. In order to make sense of a 'part' one must make use of the concept 'whole.' What, after all, would the 'inner' be without the 'outer'? This is Hegel's reasoning when it comes to identity.
I said: 'if you subtract the concretion of the chair and your senses, and leave only your mind, you would not arrive at an understanding of a chair.'
You said: "This claim is unsupported, and actually sort of absurd. You have no way of saying what type of form a mind with no senses could come up with." -- Metaphysician Undercover
My claim is that your concept of a chair presupposes, not only the existence of a chair independent of your mind, but also your senses. I would go even further and claim that this is self-evident, if you went deaf and blind tomorrow your ability to form concepts would immediately be restricted because it would be much harder to take in information.
I said: 'The easy way to refute this is simply to re-ask the question, is identity different from itself? You obviously have to say no. We could try to say that identity is not saying this, but that would merely amount to a denial of its actual being.'
You replied: "We are not talking about whether identity is the same as itself, we are talking about whether a thing is the same as itself. So you just go off on an unintelligible tangent here, assuming that identity is a thing. But identity is not a thing, it is something that we say a thing has, a thing has identity. And, the law of identity states that the thing is the same as itself. We are not saying that the thing's identity is the same as the thing's identity, that would be redundant. We are saying that the thing's identity is such that the thing is the same as itself. The law of identity is something (a law) which is applied to things by human beings. To ask whether identity is the same as itself is to reify identity, making identity the thing rather than something the thing has." -- Metaphysician Undercover
In the first instance identity is a formal claim. It is a statement about an object. The problem with this statement is that it is very specific and very narrow; the problem is that it negates itself. You are claiming that a thing is not different from itself, which is just the negative side of the identity position. Hegel puts it this way: "It is thus the empty identity that is rigidly adhered to by those who take it, as such, to be something true and are given to saying that identity is not difference, but that identity and difference are different. They do not see that in this very assertion they are themselves saying that identity is different; for they are saying that identity is different from difference; since this must at the same time be admitted to be the nature of identity, their assertion implies that identity, not externally, but in its own self, in its very nature, is this, to be different."
He is correct, the identity position is, and must say this, in order to protect itself from the difference it is saying it is not. When you say a thing is itself you are at the same time saying that it is not different from itself, this is Hegel's masterful point, the contradiction emerges from identity itself.
I said: 'The answer is that you have three different symbols combined together in order to construct the law of identity. This is not my opinion. This was not Hegel's opinion, this is an empirical fact regarding the symbolic structure of identity. Why this structure, why not another?'
You replied: "There is another structure. It's the proposition "A thing is the same as itself". There's more than three different symbols here. The fact that Hegel can represent this as A=A does not mean that A=A is the only way that the law of identity can be represented. I'm sure that other people can think of other ways to represent it. Suppose I say Z represents "a thing is the same as itself. Then I've represented the law of identity with one symbol, no different symbols with unity." -- Metaphysician Undercover
This is where our exchange finally begins to narrow. Here you failed to comprehend the literalness of Hegel's argument. You, as a matter of fact, cannot bring the law of identity into being with the symbol of Z, this solitary symbol articulates nothing. In order to bring the law of identity into conceptual being you must make use of identity, difference and unity. In every occurrence of identity you must make use of... must identify... different symbols that are taken together in unity. This is a material fact regarding the existence of the concept of identity. Try to articulate the law of identity without making use of unity and difference, you will not be able to do it. I hope you will not kick against this my friend but join me in celebrating the genius of Hegel's discovery. What mind could go up against Aristotle in this sense? No one! He held his ground for two thousand years. But Hegel, how did he do it (!), comes along and breaks down Aristotle's thoughts into their finer dialectical components, not fallaciously, but on Aristotle's own terms. This is truly astounding and it marks a turning point in philosophical history!
"What needs to be done is to address the meaning of the law, not the symbolization of it." -- Metaphysician Undercover
Of course, but its meaning is derived from its formation. The premise is not supposed to violate itself. Hegel proves that its determination inevitably casts it into negation.
"Actually, it's you and Hegel who went beyond the premise of the law, by bringing in negation." -- Metaphysician Undercover
Hegel is not bringing negation from the outside; he is demonstrating that it is already contained in the law. This is proven by the fact that the Aristotelian formation states that identity and difference are different, that is, a thing is not different from itself.
" Clearly observation shows us how one thing can be both the same as itself and different from itself, due to the nature of change and temporal extension." -- Metaphysician Undercover
As Hegel says: "...the truth is rather that a consideration of everything that is, shows that in its own self everything is in its self-sameness different from itself and self-contradictory, and that in its difference, in its contradiction, it is self-identical, and is in its own self this movement of transition of one of these categories into the other, and for this reason, that each is in its own self the opposite of itself."
I said: 'It doesn't matter what you try to say the law is doing or does, what matters is what it actually contains; what matters is whether you have to go beyond it in order to derive the value you need from it.'
You said: "Right, and this law contains nothing about difference or unity. Therefore your attempt to relate these concepts to that law, in a way which is inconsistent with the law, is nothing but an attempt to reject the law through the use of semantics."
The point I'm about to make is exceedingly important. It was my hunch that Aristotelians would reply to Hegel's position by claiming that it was 'just semantics.' But this doesn't work because the law of identity is itself semantical! There is no way around this, logic is perhaps the most vital part of semantics. One cannot state a semantical law and then complain when it is refuted by semantics. Hegel's genius on essence has yet to be discovered by our species, it's a beautiful, untapped area of philosophy that carries philosophy into the future.
As Hegel said about those who hold to the Aristotelian position on identity: "Thinking that keeps to external reflection and knows of no other thinking but external reflection, fails to attain to a grasp of identity in the form just expounded, or of essence, which is the same thing. Such thinking always has before it only abstract identity, and apart from and alongside it, difference. In its opinion, reason is nothing more than a loom on which it externally combines and interweaves the warp, of say, identity, and then the woof of difference; or, also, again proceeding analytically, it now extracts especially identity and then also again obtains difference alongside it, is now a positing of likeness and then also again a positing of unlikeness — likeness when abstraction is made from difference, and unlikeness when abstraction is made from the positing of likeness. These assertions and opinions about what reason does must be completely set aside, since they are in a certain measure merely historical; the truth is rather that a consideration of everything that is, shows that in its own self everything is in its self-sameness different from itself and self-contradictory, and that in its difference, in its contradiction, it is self-identical, and is in its own self this movement of transition of one of these categories into the other, and for this reason, that each is in its own self the opposite of itself. The Notion of identity, that it is simple self-related negativity, is not a product of external reflection but has come from being itself. Whereas, on the contrary, that identity that is aloof from difference, and difference that is aloof from identity, are products of external reflection and abstraction, which arbitrarily clings to this point of indifferent difference."
This is a false assumption you make. You could explain what a chair is, to a person who has never sensed a chair, and that person could have a concept of a chair without sensing a chair.. Furthermore, the fact that architects, designers, and creators, produce conceptions prior to the material existence of the thing conceived, indicates that what appears to you as "self-evident", is actually a falsity.
Quoting JerseyFlight
Again, this is a falsity. The law of identity is a universal statement, a generality. It states that a thing is the same as itself. This applies to all things. It is not a statement about an object, it is a statement about all objects.
Quoting JerseyFlight
I've already dealt with this objection. A thing is the same as itself, but it is also different from itself. It changes with the passage of time, therefore it is different from how it was. Your proposal, to oppose or negate, "same" with "different" is unjustified in this context. The thrust of your argument seems to be to say that "different" is the opposite of "same", but this is not true in the context of the law of identity. Clearly a thing is both the same as itself, and different from itself, so we have no premise to allow us to say that "same as itself" means "not different from itself". You are just adding this premise, that different is the opposite of same, to create a straw man.
Quoting JerseyFlight
See, Hegel demonstrates in this passage, that he sort of grasps what you are missing. Difference inheres within identity. To be the same is also to be different. Therefore it is a misrepresentation to represent difference as the negation of same, difference is a part of being the same.
Let me try another approach for you. I'm sure you are aware of the concept of "similar" What does it mean to you, if two things are said to be similar? To me, it means that some aspects of the things are the same, and some aspects are different. We cannot say that the two things are different, in an unqualified or absolute sense, because we need to account for why we are calling them "similar". So in some way, they appear to have aspects which are the same, yet also aspects which are different. This is why difference cannot be used to negate sameness, they are both distinct aspects of the same concept, "similar". They are not the opposites of each other though because the aspects which are same cannot be the aspect which are different. Therefore "same" and "different" represent two distinct categories within the concept "similar".
Quoting JerseyFlight
As I've explained, many times now, this is a false assumption. When someone says that a thing is the same as itself, they are not saying that it is not different from itself. I am a thing, and I am the same as myself. But clearly I am different from the way I was last year, despite being the same person last year and this year. So when I say that I am the same person that I was last year, I am not saying that I am not different from how I was last year. Clearly I am different, yet the same. So it is just your unwarranted, and unjustified straw man, which represents being the same as being not different, this is not consistent with the law of identity.
Quoting JerseyFlight
This again is false. Why can't I say Z represents "a thing is the same as itself", just like Hegel says A=A represents "a thing is the same as itself"? The symbols used to represent a proposition can be arbitrary.
Quoting JerseyFlight
This is not true at all. "A thing is the same as itself" represents one idea which can be represented with one symbol, just like the single word "square" represents "equilateral rectangle". The fact that the idea represented by the symbol is a complex idea does not necessitate that the idea requires more than one symbol to represent it. This is not a matter of me trying to wiggle out of Hegel's criticism, it is simply the way that symbols and ideas relate to each other. One symbol may represent a vast complexity of ideas, structured and existing as one idea represented by that symbol. Take a word (one symbol) which is an acronym, like radar, for example. The one word stands for a whole complexity of ideas, represented as one idea, by that one word. So this whole talk about "different symbols which are taken together in unity" is irrelevant speculation. It's like arguing that each letter within a word must stand for something on its own. Hegel's claims here have no basis in reality, and his insertion of "difference" and "unity" into the concept of identity through an analysis of those symbols which he uses to represent the law of identity, is just unsupported speculation.
Imagine if I represented the law of identity with Z. Then I proceeded to argue that because the law of identity is represented with Z, and Z is the final letter in the alphabet, then there must be finality within the concept. You cannot draw a conclusion about the meaning of the concept represented, by doing a physical analysis of the symbols used to represent it. Plato demonstrated this with an extensive analysis of the sounds of many different words, in one of his dialogues. He tried to show how the sound of the word is correlated to the idea represented by the word. But he didn't get very far, and it was demonstrated that it's very unreliable to attempt to determine anything useful about what is represented by a symbol through a physical analysis of the symbol.
Quoting JerseyFlight
This is blatantly false. "A thing is the same as itself" says nothing about difference or unity. How can you even make such a statement and try to maintain some semblance of honesty?
Quoting JerseyFlight
Sorry, but unity and difference do not enter into the law of identity, so these are Hegel's terms for identity, and clearly a straw man.
Quoting JerseyFlight
The meaning is not derived from the symbolic formation, as you've represented, it is derived from the complex formation of ideas. It is pointless to attack the symbolic structure, rather than the structure of ideas.
Quoting JerseyFlight
That two things are different doesn't mean that one is the opposite of the other, they might be different categories. Yes, identity is different from difference, but this does not mean that same is defined as "not different". Colour is different from sound, but this does not mean that colour is defined as "not sound". It is only when you define "same" as "not different", which is a definition not supported by the law of identity, that negation is produced. So, the negation is brought in from outside, with this faulty definition of "same" (as not different), a definition which is inconsistent with the way that "same" is used in the law of identity.
Quoting JerseyFlight
Nice quote, this is a fine example. Notice, "everything is in its self-sameness different from itself". That's exactly what I've been saying, difference is included within identity, so that the thing is the same as itself and also different from itself. Now, Hegel claims that this is contradiction, but it is not contradictory. It is only contradictory if you define "same" as "not different". But nothing necessitates this definition. In fact it is very clear that this definition is unacceptable, because it would create contradiction in this way. Therefore it is quite evident that Hegel introduces this definition for the purpose of creating contradiction, so that he can refer to the law of identity as "self-contradictory". It is not though, Hegel creates that contradiction by defining "same" as "not-different", when same and different are actually different categories and cannot be directly related to each other in this way.
Hegel might even recognize that same and different belong to distinct categories, as he says " this movement of transition of one of these categories into the other". So he also ought to recognize that to bring same and different into the same category, so that they become contraries, is to make a category mistake.
Quoting JerseyFlight
Hegel's argument is not semantics at all. It is a matter of analyzing the physical structure of the proposition, its symbols, and attempting to make a conclusion about the meaning from this physical analysis of the symbols. I'm sure you must recognize the fault here. One cannot take a word like "word", and analyze the constituent parts individually, "w", "o", "r", "d", and their relations to each other within that word expecting to determine something useful about the meaning. Nor can you do as Plato tried, and analyze the individual syllables within a word, expecting to determine the meaning this way. Likewise, you cannot represent a proposition with symbols, then expect to determine something meaningful about the proposition by analyzing the relations between those symbols.
Quoting JerseyFlight
See Hegel understands the Aristotelian notion of identity. The category mistake he makes though, is to allow difference to move into the category of same, making these two opposite of each other, rather than categorically distinct. This category mistake is what allows the self-sameness which is different from itself to be called self-contradictory.
Manufacturing a contradiction with an unwarranted definition is a mistake. And, contrary to your claim that creating this contradiction will "switch up your mind in order to get out of rigidness of thought" it is an attempt to force you into a rigidness of thought. A mistaken rigidness, of course.
Becoming is the sublations of nothing and being. There is no dingy dirt called prime matter hanging around. The movement leads thru Universals to the Absolute. The lesser produces the greater. Do you think this impossible? Of course, you're a Thomist. But this can happen because of Time. Check out the last section of Heidegger's Being and Time to see him rap up succinctly Hegel's view of time
That is what I described earlier as a mistake. Following Aristotle, (and this is not Thomism it is Aristotelianism pure and simple), becoming is incompatible with nothing and being. Attempting to make becoming compatible with being/nothing is a sophistic trick which can be used to make all sorts of absurdities appear as if they must be real.. It was demonstrated by Aristotle, that no activity described with the terminology of this category of being and not-being, could be consistent with becoming. This is why he recommended a violation of the law of excluded middle to account for the reality of becoming. Becoming must be described such that it is neither being nor nothing, it must be expelled from that logical category. The terms which are applicable to the description of becoming are neither terms of being, nor terms of nothing.
As I explained earlier, the Hegelian sublation, allows both being and not-being to be subsumed within the concept of becoming. So after being expelled from that category, becoming turns around and consumes the whole category. But this leads to a violation of the law of noncontradiction because being and not-being are both predicated of becoming, and "becoming" being conceptual is not a temporal being. On the surface, the two positions, Hegel's and Aristotle's, appear be very similar ways for dealing with the reality of temporal existence. But there is a deep difference. Aristotle provides a category separation between becoming, and being/nothing, by demonstrating that the two categories are incompatible and therefore need to be described by different terminology. Hegel dissolves this category separation by making becoming the sublation of being and nothing.
Everything you experience is becoming, so it is related to time. Nothing and being can do nothing without each other, but they can act in unison with nothing playing prime matter and being form. The result is a cosmos which is in total flux. Aristotle's logic laws don't apply anymore. His static world was an illusion
No, nothing and being cannot act in unison because they would negate each other, in an absolute sense, rendering this supposed act as completely unintelligible, such that it would be something we couldn't even talk about in any coherent way..
Finiteness and infinity would seem to negate each other when put "in the same regard" in unison. But that is what an object geometrically is
I would say finiteness and infinity are distinct categories, and therefore cannot be put "in the same regard", without a category mistake.
Does not a segment have an infinity of tiny points and is also finite? Have you heard of Banach-Tarski's paradox?
A line segment being composed of points is a contradiction in terms. The point has no dimension, and the line has dimension. Even an infinity of points could not make anything with dimension, a line. The line segment is what exists between two points.