A Heuristic for Seeking The Truth

I don't want to be overly dismissive of the project, but I think you are on the wrong track in several ways.

Logic is not the measure of truth, logic only preserves the truth-value of statements. What determines the truth-value of a statement in the first place is experience, sense-data, unless it's merely an analytic truth.

And more fundamentally, the idea that we need and have to look for criteria or heuristics for seeking truth starts from the misguided assumption that truth needs to be determined in an active conscious way predominately. I think our brain has heuristics or algorithms imbedded that for most of our purposes do a far better job than any set of clumsy criteria we might try to come up with.

Before you start your project, it's probably not a bad question to ask yourself if the we even have a need for it in the first place. You might think, but how can we know that we know if we are not even aware, or cannot even make explicit the criteria by which we would know?

Think about this for a second, the self-learning algorithm AlphaZero has surpassed any human by orders of magnitude in the poster-child thinking-mans game of chess a while ago already. But it has no idea, nor does anyone else, what criteria it uses to make the right moves... because it's not conscious (and so can't even have ideas). It's just a neural net, a bunch of levers, that has been fine-tuned by playing games to itself. This only to show that knowledge or awareness of criteria by which one knows something is not needed to know something.... which is why most epistemology is useless ultimately.

HI TVCL! You remind me a ton of myself when I finished up grad school years ago. Seems you're big on Epistemology like I was, and also wanted to continue to pursue your search outside of Academia.

I wish I had someone examine my work back then, so the least I can do is give you that. I will attempt to be fair to your logic and viewpoint, and remove ego from the equation. The search for truth is all that matters, and so to that end I will keep in my criticism and our discussion.

I read your site thesis, and your first post. I will try to sum up how you are labeling goals, please correct me or affirm if I have the matter.

Goals: We have goals, and they are the endpoints of our inquiry. A starting point would be, "I wish to discover the nature of truth", and endpoint would be, "I have obtained this goal when X is reached".
The parameters of how we go about that do not alter our goal. For example, if I desire to pursue truth through philosophy, or pursue truth per science, these parameters do not affect the goal themselves.

I'm a little lost at 4. Therefore, we measure our understanding of the truth in relation to our goals. I think you're stating that the "truth" of obtaining this goal must be within the confines of how we have designed this goal?

5 and 6 seem to imply that what we consider useful is often a guide for when we know we have achieved our goal.

This seems good to start that we have goals, and our answers within those goals are often times our truth (but not necessarily an objective truth, as you continue)

You note well that if what fits our goals is truth, then we fall into the danger of subjectivity and opinion. So how do we avoid this? You state that answers to our goals need to make sense.

It is here where I'm going to pause. What is "make sense"? Is this when we hear a conclusion to our goal that satisfies our minds? Or is this conclusion satisfactory to larger society? Because many things can "make sense" to us, but not truly reach our goals or assess the truth.

Also, "making sense" seems to be our own subjective judgement again on what satisfies our goals. I can construct my goals in such a way as to avoid contradiction, or I can accept contradiction and be satisfied. People accept contradictions all the time without question, and believe this makes sense, sometimes even when others point it out.

If something makes sense to me, then it is useful correct? In which case, what is useful is arbitrary to what makes sense to myself at the time. We also then rule out the need for logic. I can throw it out if I personally feel it makes sense to me.

I think this contradicts point 18. Information or truth-claims that are illogical are meaningless and make no sense.

I think you need to demonstrate this. There are people who believe that is makes sense, and is true, that space aliens seeded our planet with life. They ignore contradictory facts. They use their own parameters of logic, and simply discard that which does not fit. They feel they have obtained their goal, and that the rest of us simply do not make any sense.

So to sum, I think things are off to a great start, but the hang up is in what you mean by "makes sense". I look forward to your take!

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Reply to ChatteringMonkey

Thank you for your criticisms. I don't take them as overly critical. Instead, it is an opportunity to clarify my aims and intentions with the project.

First, allow me to speak to your point about logic. I would agree with you that logic without content is meaningless and, as you say, merely analytic. However, I would contend that a source of information such as experience cannot provide us with an understanding of what is true directly and that we must use our logical faculty (paired with our concern for "use") to sort our experience into that which is indicative of the truth and that which is not; what experience tells us may or may not be true, but experience is that which is being judged for its truth-value. Before we continue with this point, may I point you towards my discussion on logic?

It can be heard here:
www.youtube.com/watch?v=TO2rWEkT3VQ&t=347s
And read here:
https://tvclowe.wixsite.com/tvcl/post/logic-and-its-limits

It feels a bit rude to not provide you with a summary but this is probably as clear and concise as I can make my approach to logic. Would you mind giving it a look before we continue because it would be good discuss with you how logic might/might not relate to experience?

As for the value of the project itself,
I agree that our understanding of the truth need not be determined actively and consciously. It's for this reason that the heuristic is not aimed at or designed as a necessary tool for finding the truth but it is designed as necessary for those who wish to actively seek the truth. The necessity of the active search will not be argued for and, as such, is the initial contingency for the entire argument. Instead, the argument is that if truth is actively sought, the rest of the argument must follow and we must measure truth in relation to what is logical and what we can regard as useful (at the very least). Which [hopefully] will allow all else to be built up to from. Therefore, my hope is that this argument/heuristic will eventually be relevant to all who actively seek but, of course, I must be a ways off for now and even if the work is of a level that it only offers something of interest to a handful of people it feels justified. Finally, the point about a lot of epistemology being useless is exactly right and that's why the relevance to our goals is so important - I'm attempting to ground what we know in how we live - in what is relevant to our life and aims without hitting all of the pitfalls of pragmatism. I genuinely believe that this can be done, but there are a lot of questions to overcome before that can be demonstrated.

Anyway, I look forward to your response.

Reply to Philosophim

This was a very generous response - thank you.

Hopefully, I can do justice to your questions.

The summary of my approach to goals is not quite right (unless I am mis-reading it which I apologise for if so). The parameters are inseparable from our goals; they are one and the same in the sense that a parameter is what determines when a given goal is achieved. For example, the goal "to pursue the truth via science" will include parameters such as "this enquiry must involve empirical data" and "I will accept that an understanding of the truth has been reached once a reproducible test has verified a theory 1000+ times" or the like. Therefore, the understanding of the truth will be determined by the parameters of the approach, but unless that approach is taken, the parameters are never in place and that understanding is never reached. Therefore, our understanding of the truth is always "measured" in relation to our aims, without which no approach to truth is taken, nor are any parameters/criteria for our understanding set. As an aside, this could be either implicit or explicit but, of course, the point of the argument is to treat this as explicit.

I hope this helps. If you would like a fuller explanation of the role that goals play in the argument, may I point you towards my discussion on it?
This can be heard here:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L6AdOtKBUFk&t=200s
And read here:
https://tvclowe.wixsite.com/tvcl/post/use-goals-and-decisions

Also, I hope this clears up the approach to points 4, 5 and 6.

The issue about subjectivity... the idea is that, although our understanding of the truth might be relative to our goals, it cannot be merely relative to our goals because it cannot be that anything is a goal. We know this by grounding the approach in logic; logic determines that some goals simply cannot be pursued. For example: "to travel north yet not travel north at all at the same time" - this is a senseless goal and cannot be pursued. Therefore, if our goals are constrained and goals serve as a measure of the truth, truth cannot, in fact, be relative.

Hopefully this illuminates the approach to "making sense" - this is an invocation of logic (or adherence to logic). Namely, that if we actually break the laws of thought that logic is based upon, things become nonsense. For example: the law of non-contradiction which holds that a thing cannot be itself and not itself at the same time and in the same respect. Trying to claim that this is so (such as claiming that "truth is not truth") becomes meaningless and nonsensical. Therefore, for something to "make sense" it has to be not nonsense (I apologise if this is clunky and perhaps this is an indication that I need to clean up my terminology). In any case, "making sense" isn't subjective - it requires adherence to the objective laws of logic. This is also why it makes no sense to rule out logic if it is "useless" - the idea is that we can't even posit an aim, let alone pursue it, without adherence to the laws of thought. Again, if we turn to the example of contradiction, the goal to "throw out logic" requires that you assume that logic is,in fact, logic and not something completely different in order to throw it out. I hope this helps - please let me know if not. And if you want a more fleshed-out explanation, may I point you to my full take on logic:

It can be heard here:
www.youtube.com/watch?v=TO2rWEkT3VQ&t=347s
And read here:
https://tvclowe.wixsite.com/tvcl/post/logic-and-its-limits

Again, very thankful for the approach you've taken with your question. I look forward to discussing this further with you.

Reply to tim wood

In all fairness, I never define truth and am not altogether sure whether I should at this point. I suppose that at this point I would define truth as "that which is the case" but I know that this leaves much to be desired. Indeed, the whole idea is to create an approach that would allow us to figure just what the truth is.

I must respectfully disagree that the approach is not comprehensive (although it is doubtless faulted) and ask you to justify this claim. The approach has been to begin from the axiom that we do not yet know what the truth is but to ask, if we are to actively search for an understanding of it, what we would use as a measure for our understanding and whether these measures would be necessary. The argument that I have proposed is that we must treat adherence to logic and relevance to our goals (or usefulness) of potential truths as the measures of our understanding of the truth from the outset, whatever the truth turns out to be. Moreover, this approach can (and it appears must) be applied to the very question "how do we define truth and how do we know?"

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Ok TVCL. I think I was viewing parameters as specifics you would feed to the goal. You're basically saying the goal and its results are set. Kind of like F(x) = y. X is the parameter, and Y is defined in terms of that parameter. If you changed the parameters to F(x, z) = y, we are also changing the goal, which is the entire equation.

If I'm understanding this correctly, then truth is merely the outcome of whatever we place into our goal. As long as X is plugged in, we'll get y. If we plug in X and Z, we get a different type of y. You are not speaking about a universal truth, but the result in regards to the goal, or the equation we have made.

The one barrier we are putting up is that the goal and truth must not be contradictory. It can't conclude up is down for example. That is fair, and good. I think, in writing this, that you should forgo the phrase "makes sense", as it is a loose term that will be up to the reader to define. Trust me, I know how easy it is to make a phrase or use that sounds like one particular thing in my head, then its read 40 different ways by others.

Perhaps to keep within your vein of speaking, simply state that logic is useful, and contradictions in logic are not. Myself concluding that up is down helps me in no way if I am to try to use up or down as useful directions. We may not know exactly how to define truth, but contradictions we know are the negation of truth. I don't think you'll find many people who will disagree with that.

So we have personal goals (We'll ignore society for now), when we meet those goals with the parameters we have, we feel it is true. To eliminate one aspect of this being an opinion, we state that the fulfillment of the goal must not be a contradiction.

Goals -> fullfillment -> cannot have contradiction = personal truth.

At this point you state that logic cannot be the sole measure of truth. But it can be the sole measure for what is not true correct? At this point I think you can safely say, "Any pursuit of truth must use logic, for logic is the one thing we can ascertain that can show something that is not true." That is, as long as you define logic as that which identifies a contradiction.

For example: 7 = 7. If we were to claim that 7 = 8, we would be in a contradiction. We can realize at this point that if I tried any other number to be equal to 7, besides 7, there would be a contradiction.
Thus, I could make a goal saying, "My goal is to see if another number can equal seven, besides 7 itself." If I concluded, "8 is the other number", then I am wrong because logic shows me that 7 equally 8 is a contradiction.

Do I have this correct? All of these assumptions are made as the start to a personal "truth", and do not involve other people coming in and mucking with the equation. =) If I have a correct understanding, feel free to continue from here. I see nothing wrong with this as a springboard into further points.

Quoting TVCL

Would you mind giving it a look before we continue because it would be good discuss with you how logic might/might not relate to experience?

It doesn't relate to experience directly, logic pertains to what we say about what we experience, to language.

Language enables us to abstract from what we experience, from particulars, and say something more general about it, with categories we make up, universals... although strictly speaking no universals exist. X is only truly identical to itself the exact same moment. But for our purposes that doesn't matter all that much, because things have enough similarities so that we can give them the same designations and communicate things to each other. We apply logic to the language we use to keep it coherent, intelligible, etc... in short to keep it usefull to us. That is the justification for logic and it's value.... it's utility to us. And not necessarily because it's inherent or fundamental to the world we experience, although the world appears to be such that logic is useful... which could have been otherwise.

Quoting TVCL

However, I would contend that a source of information such as experience cannot provide us with an understanding of what is true directly and that we must use our logical faculty (paired with our concern for "use") to sort our experience into that which is indicative of the truth and that which is not; what experience tells us may or may not be true, but experience is that which is being judged for its truth-value.

I think truth-value applies to statements only, to the things we say about what we experience, not to experience itself. To know whether a statement is true or not, we generally verify it by looking or using any of our other senses. So I'd say we do not judge experience for it's truth-value, I think it's the other way around, we judge statements on their truth-value by looking to experience. Logic then enables us to make coherent statements and deduce ramifications from those statements... by virtue of the analytic connections in our language. But ss I said, it doesn't determine the truth-value, it only preserves it. If a statement is false, logic on it's own can't tell you that's it's false, and anything correctly logically deduced from that false statement will remain false.

Quoting TVCL

Therefore, my hope is that this argument/heuristic will eventually be relevant to all who actively seek but, of course, I must be a ways off for now and even if the work is of a level that it only offers something of interest to a handful of people it feels justified. Finally, the point about a lot of epistemology being useless is exactly right and that's why the relevance to our goals is so important - I'm attempting to ground what we know in how we live - in what is relevant to our life and aims without hitting all of the pitfalls of pragmatism. I genuinely believe that this can be done, but there are a lot of questions to overcome before that can be demonstrated.

Ok fine, I guess I'd just advise you then to be aware of the fact that you are attempting to (re)create a heuristic that is competing with an organ that has evolved for millions of years and serves a similar purpose (among other things).

deafinoneeye.com

Reply to tim wood

Quoting tim wood

But that is just "that which is the case." And it may well be a duck. But here's a problem: how are you going to know it's a duck? (That not quite as simple as it sounds.)

Something that I've swiftly learnt from this forum and others is that I've made the mistake of framing my argument as if the criteria that I outline determine the Truth whereas they simply determine our understanding of it or, you could say, determine how the search for the "truth" (whatever that turns out to be) must progress. Likewise, I am ready to accept that truth as-such may be elusive (however, it is yet to be demonstrated that it will be entirely elusive).

And so, when you claim that Quoting tim wood

you appear to be looking for something without a model for what it is.

I may have made a mistake in framing the argument as such. Instead, the aim of the argument is akin to saying "we are not yet entirely sure what it is, but if we are to posit the search at all, there seem to be some necessary starting points - especially if we are to posit an explicit search...

This is also why, when you say:
Quoting tim wood

You do have some criteria that seem relevant to you...

I would contend by arguing that the criteria appear to be more than merely relevant to me alone. I contend this on the grounds that I cannot conceive of an explicit search for an understanding that makes any sense without a dual reference to the criteria of our goals and adherence to logic for the reasons stated above.

What are your thoughts on these remarks, or have I misunderstood your criticism? Your comments are highly critical but I read a tone of respect in them which I have respect for in return and for which you have my gratitude.

Reply to Philosophim

Yes. Yes you have everything correct. I would not criticise your summary of my argument so much as clarify and build upon it...

To begin with (and as I mentioned in another response above) it is not so much that Quoting Philosophim

truth is merely the outcome of whatever we place into our goal.

but instead it is that our understanding of the truth will be determined by whatever we place into our goals. You're right to say that I am not speaking about a universal truth (directly) but here is - I think - the interesting bit... if universal truth is such that it only allows for the existence of particular goals to be pursued, then we can backtrack from the selection of our available goals to decipher what universal "Truth" or "reality" might be, by recognising what this "Truth" does or does not allow. For example, if we cannot go north and south at once, our understanding of this truth is relative to our goals, but it may also reveal that "reality" is such that it does not allow one to go north and south at once.

Now, one may contend that our goals can be selected at the whim of our preference, but I believe that this is demonstrably false, especially if we consider how goals exclude one-another. Returning to the example, one might - by preference - aim to head north, but when they find that they cannot also go south, they find that the two goals are incompatible and that there is a "Truth" beyond their preference that constrains their goals (and therefore their criteria): "you can travel north, but you cannot travel north if you wish to travel south at the same time." What we could play with is the idea that this model of truth at once allows for objectivity but grounds a potential definition of truth directly in relation to life and how it can or cannot be lived (potentially).

And, as you've recognised, one such constraint that limits our goals is the necessity of logic because "reality" appears to be such that it limits the pursuit of contradictory goals.

The distinction that I am trying to clarify is between our understanding of what may or may not be "true" and what is, in fact, true. My argument is that our understanding or "personal truth" is necessarily built upon the criteria that I have outlined (at the least) but that universal truth may be nonetheless present at the periphery. Now, as I have discussed with @tim wood, it might be that the truth might ultimately be elusive, but it remains the case that the implementation of the criteria of the heuristic appear to reveal something beyond the criteria itself (whether we have the right to call that "Truth" or not - after all, how would we know?)

In any case, does that all make sense? Do you have questions about this at this juncture? And if not and you would like to continue, how would you like to proceed? Is there a particular direction that you would like the discussion to go in?

P.S. I like your recommendation of re-phrasing my approach to logic. I will consider this thread again when I come to re-write my work.

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Reply to TVCL

Great! I think we both understand. Having read both your reply to myself and tim wood, I think I know what you're trying to describe. The understanding of what may be true, versus what is true, is the question of knowledge.

I believe if you replace "truth" with knowledge, your steps will make more sense. What you're doing at this point is the initial conclusion that many theories of knowledge have started with. Namely, that knowledge must start with elimination of what is contradictory. You ask where you should go from here? That is what every philosopher asks at this point. There have been many roads, but they usually end poorly. That doesn't mean we don't try though!

I have some writing of my own that I will share with you. Part one is basic, and generally concludes a similar line of thought as yourself. Part 2 is where I go from there. Part 3 I introduce societal context. Part 4 I introduce rational inductions. They aren't too long, and you might enjoy them, at least for a spring board of ideas. I do suggest at first if you don't understand a point, keep reading. I generally keep referencing back a bit, so it may become clearer as you go.

Part 1 The basics of knowledge
https://docs.google.com/document/d/17cHCI-_BY5k0tmpWXSoHCniGWW8hzpbVDDptLp5mIgg/edit?usp=sharing

Part 2 How to apply knowledge within personal contexts
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1Crx8zMpD9cdZ47Zw4RDhsS7VUzyb4xCdhIbEfcV10oA/edit?usp=sharing

Part 3 Knowledge within societal contexts
https://docs.google.com/document/d/14_KGMPbO2e_z8icrjuTmxVwGLxxUA0B_CqNT-lF6SXo/edit?usp=sharing

Part 4 Rational Induction
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1Q84NCGIcwkjytFZaLBIv9JmRGzhKHDjlV7j_dDPTDAY/edit?usp=sharing

I'm sharing this because you're the real deal, a person who genuinely wishes to consider epistemology, knowledge, and truth. Some of it may overlap with what you've considered, some may be a spring board to further thought, and some might be flat out wrong. =) I welcome the discussion.

Reply to ChatteringMonkey

I think I'd like to respond by addressing experience as well as a semantic issue/mistake that I may have made with logic...

Let's start with experience.

Quoting ChatteringMonkey

I guess I'd just advise you then to be aware of the fact that you are attempting to (re)create a heuristic that is competing with an organ that has evolved for millions of years and serves a similar purpose (among other things).

I have to respectfully disagree because although our experience is an organ that does inform us, it is not the same as a tool that does the work of an explicit search for an understanding of the truth. The explicit search appears to require the heuristic in addition to experience, even if experience does provide us with direct truth. Allow me to explain...

If experience gave us a direct feed of truth, we would simply passively receive the truth through our experience. However, if we were to search for the truth, we could not and would not be in a state of passive reception, but in an active state of seeking. Once we are in this active state, the reference to our goals becomes a necessary element for the reasons stated above but, in brief, we can recognise that the search is a goal itself and that the activity of the search is carried out in relation to the goal's end. Now, one may point out that we can choose what we experience, yet we are still drawing on experience to inform us. This may be so, but if active choosing is entailed, experience alone cannot do the work of a truth-seeking heuristic because it is the choosing that makes it an active endeavour, whereas the experience alone will simply make it passive. Merely experiencing is passive, but once we seek the truth, the endeavour is rendered active. If the endeavour is active, it appears that concern for our goals and adherence to logic/consistency is necessary, whereas I am unsure whether experience is necessary in the same way.

Moreover, what has been said of experience and its relevance to the heuristic has been assuming that experience is a direct feed to truth, which we can contend with. Now, on the one hand, experience is a direct proof of the certainty of experience itself. For example, the experience of a blue ball is certain proof that there is an experience of a blue ball. In this sense, we cannot doubt that there is the experience as-such, but what we can doubt (and what we need to discern for its truth-value) is whether the experience is giving us information of any significance beyond this. For example, you see a pink elephant in a room...

If we translate this experience into words you have at least two ways that you can interpret it:
1. "There is a pink elephant in the room" and
2. "I am having an experience of a pink elephant in the room"

Now, experience alone can only affirm the second interpretation (and indeed, it cannot be doubted). However, experience alone cannot tell you whether there is, in fact, a pink elephant in the room. To figure this out, a number of other criteria would have to be invoked to determine whether this is so. Indeed, we may even need to figure out which criteria we could use. What I would posit is that, at the very least, we require logic to make sense of the question because without logic we could suppose that "There is a pink elephant in the room and also not a pink elephant in the room at the same time and in the same sense" which is nonsensical. And so, if the question is: "is there, or isn't there?" logic must be invoked. Secondly, relevance to our goals is necessary because the goals frame the enquiry and, aside from this I would also posit that we use our goals to test whether particular interpretations can be lived by... can you live as if there is a pink elephant in the room? This criteria may help you discern whether you are hallucinating or not (or, perhaps even to determine how "real" a hallucination is).

As for your points about logic directly, I agree and think that they show that I've made a semantic mistake. I have been using logic to refer to the faculty that adheres to the Laws of Thought which allows us to track things such as identity and consistency when, in fact, this faculty is reason; its just that reason is the faculty that does logic. However, this use of reason is distinct from formal "logic" which is more commonly understood as the system of testing claims for their validity. This form of logic, as you say, does apply to language, whereas as I am unsure whether the faculty of reason must solely apply to language and our claims. I would therefore consider replacing "logic" with "reason" or its use in my work. Does this seem fair?

Quoting TVCL

If experience gave us a direct feed of truth, we would simply passively receive the truth through our experience

Perhaps we do. There are myriad cognitive mechanisms which cause us literally to misperceive the truth in a variety of ways. List of Cognitive Biases

In light of this, I always formulated the goal of this kind of project as "learning to think correctly". Hence, coming to understand the psycho-social mechanisms responsible for biased thought.

Reply to tim wood

It's probably worth me noting from the outset that I am probably less well educated than you might presume, considering how your arguments are framed. I'm flattered for example that you assumed that I am readily familiar with Godel's discoveries (I know of his work in fairness) but this is not so. Nor am very familiar with talking philosopher in "numerical" terms such as

Quoting tim wood

~T is defined as the compliment of T in E. Given any subset of false propositions in ~T, called F, he showed you can construct a proposition that is false but not in F, therefore in ~T.

etc.

In light of which I apologise if I haven't understood your argument fully and I also humbly ask that you simplify some of you arguments as we proceed. In any case, I will try my best to offer a response...

To begin with, it's probably worth re-framing the heuristic as "A Heuristic for Seeking Knowledge" instead of "A Heuristic for Seeking The Truth"

And then, let's wind things back for a moment...

First of all, we can recognise that Godel et al or Emil Post, have to assume logic for their arguments to be sensible in the first instance. Now, the problem appears to be that if the logic is taken far enough down particular avenues, logic can cancel-out its own truth-value on its own terms.

Okay, so could we make a distinction between saying that adherence to logic [being adherence to the Laws of Thought] is necessary for seeking an understanding of knowledge that makes any sense, and saying that if such an understanding is to be sought, logic must be carried through to its final conclusion? This is a reason why goals could act as another "tether" for logic in the pursuit of knowledge because they determine the point at which the enquiry itself will or will not end and what methods of enquiry are compatible with one-another. Given this, I will still posit the the methods of enquiry: relevance to goals and adherence to logic remain constant.

Allow me to justify...

Let's suppose that Godel or Emil Post have the aim within mathematics:
"To use logic to demonstrate that a proposition can at once be true and not true"

Now, this requires adherence to logic because logic is required for this very demonstration. Moreover, this is relevant to their goals in so far as they find that "reality" is such that it allows us to posit propositions that are true and not true within mathematics - that is, this goal can be pursued; Godel/Emil Post can live as if this is so/true. Moreover, I might ask that once this is done, and logic demonstrates that these propositions that are at once true and not, can they be taken any further and be put to any potential use or is this simply a demonstration of the point at which logic implodes/hits its own limits?

In any case, adherence to logic and relevance to goals are part of this narrow branch of enquiry, but I might ask whether, when we zoom out, we can treat propositions as at once true or false when we pursue any of our others goals ("I need a cup of tea, but tea is at once tea and not tea" or "I need to head north, but north is not north in any sense at all..."). Again, we might not be able to pursue logic to its limits in pursuit of these aims, but we also cannot do away with logic (which would have the same effect). As such, it is interesting to note what this reveals about the world in which we live. I hope this demonstrates the point.

Finally, I liked your analogy... "Underwear at least" indeed. But let's be clear... I'm not saying that people must wear anything at all - they can choose to remain undressed and remain exposed to the weather - and that weather is that of raw nonsense/ignorance. I'm not going to - indeed, I'm not sure if one can - dictate or demonstrate that one must get dressed. Instead, the purpose of the argument is for those who say "I want to get dressed..." to which the reply appears to be "okay, if you want to get dressed you must wear underwear at least" and, as we try on our clothes, we find that if we want to keep out of the storm, we cannot simply wear anything

P.S. I respect the analogy of the bullet-hole now that you've explained it. Admittedly I initially took it as a slight as if you were accusing me of merely, lazily defining my own way into "Truth" but I see it differently now.

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Reply to tim wood Fair enough. My intention was to reply to @Philosophim next, but just before I do so, allow me to make one more point. You say:

"Quoting tim wood

Another point! it all seems to point back the the trueness of the true, Which path, traveled enough, becomes dizzying.

At risk of sounding like a broken record, I think that this problem can once again be addressed by an appeal to the constraints that goals put on our enquiry. Indeed, an enquiry can become dizzying without bounds, but what is to say that the enquiry is determined to be boundless? Allow me to copy in an example that I wrote in one of my essays which might speak to the issue and clarify exactly what I think goals do to our enquiry(s):

"Let’s say that a man is hungry. He is no philosopher, nor a scientist, nor does he have any explicit concern for finding the truth. Nonetheless, he wants to get some food: that is his goal. As a result, he goes on his way to find food.

He starts to put a meal together and checks the ingredients: do they smell unpleasant? Do they show any strange colouration? And the like. Upon finding no issue with the ingredients he cooks and enjoys his meal, marking the end of this enquiry.

Now, it may not even seem as if there was an enquiry but the man still had to discern whether it was true or not that he could cook his meal; even if they were implicit, he was judging ideas such as “this ingredient is edible and safe to eat” to be either true or false. Ultimately, the meal is cooked and the question that was framed by the goal: “is this meal edible?” was answered “yes” by the time that the man sat down to eat it.

There are at least two considerations to take from this example.

The first is that when the man regards the meal to be edible, he is regarding the claim that the idea is true enough to satisfy his goal. Why is this the case instead of the claim that the meal is edible in some absolute sense? The answer is that we can ask what would make something absolutely edible: is it a question of our being able to eat it? We can eat sand at a push and so why is that not on the radar? Is it a question of serving one’s good health? Then we could ask what exactly we mean by “health” and whether the ingredients are or are not healthy. Yet, these considerations were not in the man’s purview. Instead, his goal was to satisfy his hunger.

However, despite the fact that the enquiry did not include a concern for the true definition of “edible” or “health”, it did include some other enquiries: the food may not be absolutely “healthy” but it at least had to not be rotten, which is why the man checked for colour and smell. This brings us to the second consideration that we can take from this example which is that a given enquiry into the truth is not only parameterised by a main goal, but also by a number of sub-goals. If we break down the man’s enquiry, we find that yes, the goal was to “eat edible food to satisfy hunger” but this goal also included sub-goals such as:

· The ingredients cannot smell foul and

· The ingredients cannot show strange colouration

And there may be a number of other implicit goals which set the criteria for when the man will regard that it is “true enough” that his meal is good to eat and he can achieve his goal.

The key point is that what the example demonstrates is that a given goal sets and constrains our truth-seeking by determining what we will or will not be willing to accept as “true” and the lengths that we go to in this search will depend on what we are trying to achieve."

No problem if you have nothing left to add, and thanks for what you have added so far. Of course, if you have any more thoughts that occur to you, they will be good to here.

Finally, I don't expect this to be read, but if you do happen to want a fuller version of my argument you can read the progression of it here (the argument progresses from the bottom post to the top):

tvclowe.wixsite.com/tvcl/blog/categories/the-philosophy-project

All of which can be listened to here:
www.youtube.com/channel/UCdea60D2yKm4FFAFr5IbpuA

Thank you

This user has been deleted and all their posts removed.

Reply to Philosophim Great stuff. This is clear an well-structured thinking. Admittedly - of course - I cannot comment on all of it and I'm unsure which parts to comment on.

And so, let's pause for a second... we both seem to be in agreement that the issue at hand is the question of understanding what may be true, which is the question of what we know. And then, it appears to be that we are both concerned with how we know what we know...

My basic argument has been that if we are actively pursuing knowledge we have two basic criteria for judging what we know that are necessary from the outset and that these criteria are:
1. Judging knowledge by its usefulness (as it relates to our goals) and
2. Judging knowledge by its consistency (as it adheres to logic/reason).

Now, in addition to this we seem to share a similar take on the negative approach to knowledge. We've only mentioned this in relation to logic (if something is inconsistent it is definitely not true), but this can be extended to usefulness (if something cannot be put to use it is also not true). Yet, this approach does not ensure what must be true, but at least determines what must not be true.

I posit that this is the best we can hope for as a starting point of epistemology, or it may even be considered a heuristic for proto-epistemology because I believe that this is the point that we must start from the moment the enquiry commences, prior even to any formal epistemology.

For this reason, I think I can now give some comments to your work as it branches off from this point. For example, I agree with everything that you say about beliefs but I wonder if "Any discussion of knowledge must begin with beliefs." and why this must be the case. Moreover, is it the discussion of knowledge that must begin like so, or our understanding of it?

And so, perhaps to start us off, I could begin by asking whether you would agree with my basic argument as it has been summarised here or whether you have any questions, and then ask if you may respond to the initial comments about your stance on the knowledge and the beginnings of discussing it?

If we are trying to establish what we can or cannot know, it would be good to determine whether we already agree on the groundwork to be built up from or whether the groundwork requires further discussion. Moreover, I believe that if my argument is correct, there are implications for our understanding of knowledge that one can build up to from it and it could be interesting to compare these implications with your own work, which may either be another potential groundwork or could contain arguments that can be built up from and/or compliment the heuristic.

I look forward to your response.

Aw shucks tim wood, that's a helluva compliment! Hopefully I can keep it clear as we discuss here as well.

Reply to TVCL Quoting TVCL

I posit that this is the best we can hope for as a starting point of epistemology, or it may even be considered a heuristic for proto-epistemology because I believe that this is the point that we must start from the moment the enquiry commences, prior even to any formal epistemology.

I agree TVCL. In my reading I see argument expressed in different ways within Descartes, Locke, Popper, etc. If you construct a theory of knowledge, it must be able to be applied to itself. So to start, you must come up with a conclusion that cannot be contradicted. From there, you can build upon it. How one words its is important, and how one builds upon it can lead to different places that can end up very wrong.

For my point, I avoid the idea of "truth" in the formation of knowledge. If you do not know what knowledge is, how can you know the truth? Earlier in your posts you stated, "In all fairness, I never define truth and am not altogether sure whether I should at this point." You knew that something bugged you about it right?

If you use the word truth in your initial premise without quite knowing what it is, your foundation is based on an induction, and not a deduction. A deduction as defined here will be, "A conclusion that cannot be contradicted from the premises, and any further information we introduce." So we don't get too confused on that point either, if you read the link you'll note that definitions are based upon the contexts of two people. Since its you and I at this point, a deduction for both of us will be a conclusion that neither of us can contradict with the information at hand. In including more people, we make it more difficult to deduce, but can be more hopeful that it is exposed to more "potential contradictions" then you or I alone could throw at it.

An induction is by our definition, "A conclusion that does not necessarily follow from the premises and information on hand. Again, this will be within the context of both of us. I note in link four that an induction is less valid, which I'm sure most will agree on. This leads us to your use of truth without a clear definition.

We first need a clear definition that we can then attempt to deductively apply to reality. Since your use of truth is not clear, it can only be inductively applied to reality. We can induce many things against reality, but this is where knowledge theories fail. If we are to claim, "I know what knowledge is," there must be as little induction as possible.

But I feel we can remove the word "truth" in your writing and replace it with "knowledge". Truth is generally seen as an objective reality apart from the subjective. You are talking about truth as a subjective, and used as a tool. To me, that is what knowledge is. It is a tool human being use to understand their world as correctly as possible to obtain their goals.

You are also currently examining the self-subjective viewpoint, and have not yet expanded it into contexts like societies. Once you start doing that, you'll see your use of truth runs into some problems. People generally think of truth like an objective, but you'll run into a situation in which your "truth" and another "truth" will come into conflict.

For example, lets say you decide your goal is to get to the North Pole using only a compass as a directional guide. You let everyone know, then shut off communication for a month as you make your way North, and finally arrive at the North Pole! You did it! You reached your goal! Except unknown to you, a prankster flipped your compass signals, you you're actually at the South Pole. Did you travel both North and South? No, as you mentioned, that is a contradiction. But your "truth", and the "truth" of the GPS signal that tells the world where you are are in contradiction. At that point you have contradictory truths, and your base starts to crumble as you try to reconcile them without quite knowing what truth means. Make it knowledge instead of truth, and we can view these conflicts as a puzzle to be worked through.

And finally, changing you "truth" to "knowledge" helps solve the circularity issue of truth measuring truth. You are talking about two separate identities. An objective reality that you have a difficult time defining, and a methodological attempt to create conclusions about the world that fit within that objective reality. I postulate the objective reality, which is something that cannot be contradicted, is truth, while our methodology to grasp this is knowledge. What do you think?

Regardless, I believe we can both agree that knowledge is a tool, and like any good tool:

1. Knowledge must be useful to us
2. Knowledge must be consistent
3. And one way we can establish knowledge is consistent, is if its methodology is built on a foundation of deductions, not inductions. This is because inductions are beliefs that can potentially be contradicted with the information we have.

The first deduction you realized was, "To claim knowledge of something, it must be free of contradictions".

As for my statement, "Any discussion of knowledge must begin with beliefs", that's just because I suck at introductions. =) A better sentence would probably have been, "All discussions of knowledge eventually must address beliefs, so that is where I will begin." You can begin anywhere in the discussion of knowledge, but I believe it has to inevitably address a few issues, beliefs being one of them.

Regardless, feel free to continue to use your heuristic in the manner you understand in our discussion. Since I think I know where you are coming from, I think we both have a context that we can understand. If the heuristic runs into potential problems, I'll point them out. Please do the same with mine. Maybe we'll get somewhere with knowledge, and if not, I think we'll both have a good time.

Reply to Philosophim Sorry for the slow reply, it's been a busy couple of days.

Excellent. You've made the case for replacing "knowledge" with "truth" very well. Indeed, it has been demonstrated on this discussion and elsewhere that framing the heuristic as a tool for finding "truth" has been the greatest mistake for many of the reasons that you've outlined; "truth" has that static, objective, definitive connotation to it which I'm not trying to determine. Instead, the goal is to draw a line around our understanding or what we can "know" - as you say. Therefore, I agree with your argument and will proceed to replace "truth" with "knowledge" as I revise my work.

The first point that I might contend is that the approach that I've suggested only regards the self-subjective viewpoint. The reason for this is that, if the approach was merely subjective, it would follow that the subject can determine their knowledge, but this appears to not be the case because what the subject can or cannot know is bounded and those bounds do not appear to be set by the subject, but by something beyond them (otherwise, another subject might be able to exceed them). These bounds are of course what we have been discussing: that the subject cannot know anything (sensibly) that is contradictory, nor can they know anything that is not in some way parameterised by their goals. Therefore, we might conclude that the individual knowledge is unique to the subject, but that these parameters apply across subjects, such that they are objective.This is why we might wonder whether, although the actual set of knowledge would be unique to each person, the limits or bounds on what these possible sets can be tells us something about the objective nature of things or reveal something about "truth" as such... what are your thoughts on this?

Also, I will extend from this a note of scepticism about whether one's "truth" can truly come into conflict with another's if they are bounded by the same criteria. It might be that combinations of "truth"/knowledge are compatible, but if they are in fact at odds, being bounded by the same criteria, one's knowledge must be more indicative of the truth than the other's.

Another question about your definition of knowledge... why is it the methodology that you define as knowledge? I'm not sure that I disagree yet, but would like to clarify.

---

Also, can you clarify what you mean by:

"A deduction as defined here will be "A conclusion that cannot be contradicted from the premises, and any further information we introduce.""?

My go-to rebuttal was to point out that new information can change the outcome such as
"all swans are black" therefore,
"the next swan that I will see will be black"

[contradicted by the sight of a white swan],

but if the fact that the deduction is "open" to new information what renders it an induction? I.e. the deduction must lead to the conclusion if the premises are fixed?

---

Your point about the communal nature of definitions is very interesting (and useful) - I think that I am inclined to agree. Moreover, it may allow us to extend the heuristic to social contexts and see if it applies...

What we could posit is that the same principles of the heuristic apply directly over to a social context. The question is the extent to which there is common enterprise. To being with, if a group of 3 are trying to learn anything new, they must adhere to logic (exclude contradiction) for reasons that we have established. If the 3rd member of the group does not adhere to logic, they can only offer nonsense and no new knowledge and therefore must be excluded from the enterprise if members 1 and 2 are seeking knowledge. Hopefully, you can see why this exclusion must happen, practically by default; the goal to pursue logic (and sense) of the first two and the rejection of it by the 3rd makes the two sets of goals mutually exclusive and they cannot possibly be pursued at once. Hence, just as one man cannot pursue contradictory goals, neither can they exist within a group without a break. In so far as goals that are apparently contradictory can be pursued at once this demonstrates that they are not, in fact, contradictory.

Now, once adherence to logic is in place, when we ask what the members of the group will know or understand, the question is of what they are trying to achieve - this will dictate what models of knowledge they can or cannot employ. We can use your argument about definitions here:

Quoting Philosophim

Since its you and I at this point, a [definition of] deduction for both of us will be a conclusion that neither of us can contradict with the information at hand. In including more people, we make it more difficult to deduce, but can be more hopeful that it is exposed to more "potential contradictions" then you or I alone could throw at it.

...

Deduction can mean "A conclusion that cannot be contradicted from the premises, and any further information we introduce." if you and I agree that it is a useful definition for our current purpose of allowing us to do philosophy. Now, this definition is currently under discussion because there is a question as to whether it will serve this purpose. Moreover, there is a further question as to whether we do share exactly the same goal and this will change our approach to it too, but assuming that our aims are the same, this will move us to agree on a definition that helps us serve our mutual purpose. Now, suppose a third person came in and had a completely different goal; say, the two of us were doing philosophy and this man is doing accounting. Now, he may contend that "deduction" has nothing to do with conclusions, but to do with how some figures on the accounts are taken away from others. In so far as his goal is separate from ours, the knowledge of what the word "deduction" means does not overlap. However, once the man shares our enterprise, the definition can be mutually understood by all three of us.

The point is that our goals are still driving our knowledge and setting its parameters, but the overlap of our knowledge will depend on the degree to which our goals are shared and, therefore, the extent to which our parameters are shared. Yet, again, whatever we agree that a definition means it is not merely relative, because if it is the case that we cannot simply have any goal, we also cannot have any common enterprise. "Bridge" might mean any number of things, but if we are all coming together to build across water, it cannot mean "a bird with two wings". Likewise, even if we are all trying to get rich, we cannot simply define money into existence as "that which we have tons of" - if our shared goals is to "define gold into existence" - we find that the goals that we are able to pursue is bounded.

Perhaps we could build upon the heuristic and consider whether the ways in which sets of societal goals can or cannot overlap (setting the bounds to its knowledge) might give us an indication of what objective truth is?

---

At this juncture, there are a number of places we could move into. Of course, I would like to get your response and thoughts on what has been said but there are also a number of places that we can take the heuristic. As of now, I have laid the rationale for its foundation but there are further implications of the model that I would like to discuss, such as "how goals form networks and how goals exclude one another (what does this tell us?)". Let me know what you think.

P.S. if you are this investing into the discussion and my approach to this extent, may I point you to the rest of my work? I have written out the full rationale for my argument and have also recorded it to be listened to if that is a preferable medium. I neither demand nor expect you to look at it, but if it would be of interest it can be listened to here:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TEjS6qZoTZY&list=PLbDtyFJTYCEQikJoTqYycbae8LfqY1Efp

and read here:
https://tvclowe.wixsite.com/tvcl/blog/categories/the-philosophy-project
(posts progress from bottom to top)

Reply to TVCL
Not a worry on the reply speed TVCL, we all have lives. =) Also, I have read quite a bit of your work as well. I have mainly read it to make sure I understood the points you were addressing. A very valuable link, and a great resource.

Quoting TVCL

The first point that I might contend is that the approach that I've suggested only regards the self-subjective viewpoint.

Quoting TVCL

What we could posit is that the same principles of the heuristic apply directly over to a social context.

Fantastic. I think these two quotes together help me understand where you are coming from. If I understand correctly, what you are looking for is that the steps, or methodology of obtaining knowledge, should be the same whether your goals are from a self-subjective view, or a group-subjective view.

While our process for obtaining knowledge can be defined by logic and avoiding contradictions, this does not necessitate that our knowledge is actual truth. Lets go back to the example of our person who traveled to the South pole while thinking that they were going to the North Pole. Recall the GPS knows they are actually at the South pole. Does the person who has traveled to the North pole know that they are at the South pole?

This is why I consider knowledge a methodology (or the result of a methodology to be more accurate). If the person in question had used the correct methodology of knowledge, and arrived at the conclusion that they were in the North pole without any contradictions or deviations from this methodology, they would by application, know that they were in the North pole, even though they were in truth, at the South pole.

Lets contrast that with a person who ignores their compass entirely, and just travels in a direction until it gets really cold. They then declare, "I know I'm at the North pole!" Whether they are actually at the North or South pole is irrelevant. The methodology they followed was an induction. A guess at best. They do not have knowledge, but a guess that either happens to align with the truth, or against the truth.

This is what I believe you are trying to put into words as well. This conclusion does not come easily to many, and I am again impressed by your thought process. As for your point of applying your heuristic to a group, I agree.

I'm going to repost a section from Chapter 3 here. I think you'll find its very similar to your statement.

"If other people exist as other “I’s” like myself, then they too can have deductive beliefs. I will call another I a “subject” and their ability to deduce is their “subjective deduction”. How do we handle that two of us can have different distinctive knowledge? The sensible way is to realize we must come to agreement on two things. First, there needs to be agreement about our distinctive knowledge. To agree, there must be an agreement of enough essential properties that we would conclude the same deductive result when applying this new distinctive agreement.. What properties are agreed to be essential between two people is called “distinctive context”.
To demonstrate a resolution of conflicting distinctive context, imagine I walk by a field and spy what I distinctively and applicably know to be a sheep. It has curly fur, hooves, and lacks a beard. A rancher is in the field tending the sheep. I call to him saying, “Nice sheep!” The rancher turns to me puzzled and states, “Actually, that’s a goat.”
I assume it is a difference in distinctive knowledge within the definition, so I politely ask the rancher what it is that makes that a goat.. Smiling the rancher explains not all goats have beards, but one distinction between sheep and goats is their tails. He shows me the short upright tail of the creature and explains that this property is essential to define a goat.
I reply, “I didn’t know that, thanks!” If I do so, I am expanding my distinctive knowledge to equal the rancher’s. However, context adds another layer of choice and complication. My agreement might amend my personal definition, or, it could be my definition is only within the context of speaking with ranchers, while keeping my old sheep definition the same for non-rancher contexts.
Alternatively, I could reject the distinctive knowledge of the rancher. Instead, I could state “The tail is unimportant. Its just a sheep with a short upright tail! Its silly to call it a goat when the defining feature of a goat is its beard.” There is nothing innate to reality which requires I accept the distinctive context of the rancher, just as there is nothing innate to reality that requires the rancher to accept my personal distinctive context. Distinctive contexts are choices of “I”s, and not laws of reality."

Note that I establish there is the knowledge of discrete experiences, or what one identifies in the mind, and then applicable knowledge, or how one takes that identity of the mind, and applies it to reality. I can define, and accept as a definition from others in my mind by my choice. There is nothing in reality that necessitates I do otherwise. However, the methodology of how I apply that distinction to reality, determines whether I have knowledge of that application, or if it is an induction. It does not matter if the context of the distinctions I hold is within the self-subjective, or the multisubjective, the steps of applicable knowledge are the same. To your point, we cannot have a relative methodology of applying our distinctions to reality, but we can have relative distinctions, or definitions.

What we have to be careful about in our assessment of contradictions, is whether these are contradictions in applying our definitions to reality, or contradictions within our definitions within ourselves, or against other people's definitions.

I can hold a definition that contradicts another's definition. And then I can use the methodology of knowledge to ensure that within the bounds of my definitions, I am not contradicted by reality. This may result in two people having knowledge within their own definitions, but then arrive at a logical conflict when these definitions and applications come together. I will leave it at this point to make sure you follow what I am saying, and if this matches with the intuition of your heuristic.

Quoting TVCL

"A deduction as defined here will be "A conclusion that cannot be contradicted from the premises, and any further information we introduce.""?

I knew I was going to get in trouble on this one! I needed to break this down, I will do so now. Lets say I deduce that when something is burned, it loses mass. Everything I have ever burned has lost mass, there is no contradiction. I then conclude, "Part of the definition of something being burned means that it will lose mass." Fair enough. One day I burn a new metal, and I discover (this is real btw), that it GAINS mass. I have to decide what to do with this information. Do I include it within the category of "burning", or it is something else new? If I decide that this does count as burning, then I can no longer deduce, "All things that burn lose mass".

I once knew that things that burned lost mass, but now I know that things that burn can also gain mass. So if knew information comes into our context while we discuss a deduction, if that new information invalidates that deduction, it once was a deduction, but now it is no longer.

If this sounds like we are somewhat on the same page, feel free to introduce where you would like to take it. I am enjoying the conversation, and will gladly go where it takes us.

Reply to Philosophim

Quoting Philosophim

While our process for obtaining knowledge can be defined by logic and avoiding contradictions, this does not necessitate that our knowledge is actual truth.

Yes, precisely so. Which now makes me wonder how we use our methodologies and to what end. Likewise, it makes me wonder exactly what the heuristic does...

There are at least two things that I would like to address in turn:

1. We have a set bound (we are certain of what we cannot know) and this tells us what must not be true or, at least, what we must be unable to know. Yet, once this bound is set, the question of absolute certainty/objectivity remains open.

2. The type of knowledge that we will find will depend on what we are trying to achieve. Therefore, we should be cognisant of our aims.

Let's start with the first point. What the heuristic does is it [hopefully] creates a bedrock that the search for knowledge must be based on. We cannot seek to know a contradiction, nor can we know beyond the parameters of our aims - both positions are senseless and so, in effect, they set the boundary of our pursuit. However, this boundary alone does not determine that what we will come to know within these bounds will ever be certain or "objective" knowledge that aligns fully with the truth. Now, as you say, our beliefs or proposed knowledge may or may not align with the truth once we work within these bounds, but the question of how we would know whether this is the case appears to be the question at hand... we have the bedrock. Now, how would we build up to alignment with "truth" from that bedrock? Which requires a methodology or technique of building. I'm wondering whether the heuristic can lay the foundation and build...

I think that's saying too much, strictly speaking. The heuristic contains a set of mutually-supporting axioms. The way that we would "build" knowledge with the heuristic alone would be by re-relating these axioms and drawing the relevant conclusions/deductions (which I may demonstrate with the "implications" of the heuristic). Otherwise, it does not so much "build" but sort and support our knowledge by showing us what the shape of our thinking is and what must be rejected. And so, let's consider your example:

Quoting Philosophim

Lets go back to the example of our person who traveled to the South pole while thinking that they were going to the North Pole. Recall the GPS knows they are actually at the South pole. Does the person who has traveled to the North pole know that they are at the South pole?

What's the relevance?

With nothing else to go on but the heuristic, all that we can know about the traveller's knowledge of his destination cannot be contradictory (he cannot know that he is at both poles at once) and that his criteria for knowing that it is true that he is at one pole or the other will determine his criteria for achieving that understanding. "Does the person who has traveled to the North pole know that they are at the South pole?" well, if he were the only man on earth, but what standard could he differentiate "North" from "South"? If his goal was simply "to take me where the GPS leads" the distinction would be arbitrary. Yet, if he had seen a globe, pointed to the top and thought "I wanted to go there" that changes things. And then the man needs to ask himself "how will I know that I will get there?" of course, he chooses to use the GPS. Therefore, his goal and criteria: "I will travel North and judge that I have done so with the GPS"
And then, the GPS takes him South, lying that it is taking him North. Once he reaches the South Pole his belief is "I have used the GPS and this has taken me to the North Pole" - does he know this? Well, technically, whilst awaiting confirmation he only knows that he has followed his GPS and if to follow his GPS were his only criteria he would know that he had followed it and that this were the end of the matter. However, once he employed a second source of information and found that the information of his GPS contradicted that of a map or a globe, he would conclude that he did not know "I have used the GPS and this has taken me to the North Pole" and that this belief was wrong: it did not fulfil his criteria; he could not put this belief into action for the end of achieving his goal. Now, if his goal was simply "To reach a place that I have decided is North..." that would be a different matter.

I'm not sure if this is making sense - I'm thinking through this as I go. Yet, I suppose the point is that, the heuristic is effective but its application pushes us to fully examine exactly what goals we have and what they entail:
"Is my destination defined externally or individually?" etc. Or, if we were to unpack the traveller's goals, there might be two potential variations:
a) "To travel North, being a location seen on a map and agreed upon by my peers (that a GPS may or may not lead me to, but I will use as my indicator)", OR

b) "To travel North, being the location defined by my GPS"

Therefore, two goals that seem the same have different criteria and different standards by which one would know that they have fulfilled it.

Therefore, in answer to your question: "Does the person who has traveled to the North pole know that they are at the South pole?" The answer is: yes if the goal is

"To travel North, being the location defined by my GPS"

but if the goal is "To travel North, being a location seen on a map and agreed upon by my peers (that a GPS may or may not lead me to, but I will use as my indicator)" - the man does not know using his GPS alone.

Great example to use - really interesting. I may return to this later.

---

Anyway, let's get on to the second point; which is an extension of the first...

2. The type of knowledge that we will find will depend on what we are trying to achieve. Therefore, we should be cognisant of our aims...

Hopefully I've demonstrated how this applies in a practical case, but I wanted to loop it back on our general enquiry into epistemology. After all, we're asking questions such as "what is truth?" and "how do we know?" and it is worth considering: "by what point is our enquiry satisfied?"

I raise this point because I often see it as a mistake in philosophy to presume that the quest for "truth" is for "absolute certainty" or knowledge that cannot be doubted and this often seems to be an axiom that is tucked-into discussions of epistemology.

Consider this:
The heuristic holds that we measure knowledge in relation to our aims. But also note that it holds that we cannot simply have any aim. As such, our limited aims appear to reveal what reality does or does not allow in the way of what our aims can be or what can or cannot be pursued.

Now, consider this...
What makes us presume that "absolute certainty" is something that can be pursued? That is, to nail-down what knowledge must be beyond doubt or to get our beliefs in perfect alignment with reality? @Tim Wood and I touched on this topic above in relation to Godel et al. There is reason to believe that truth is like a bar of soap that, when we grip our hardest, slips right through our fingers. What I'm trying to get at is that it might be the case that reality as-such does not allow the goal of being "absolutely certain" to be fulfilled. Or, perhaps we could re-frame the issue... we need to define truth, but we can ask whether this definition is the "true" definition... how certain does reality allow us to be about our definitions? Indeed, how certain does it allow us to be about our knowledge and that it mirrors "the Truth"? If we presume that reality allows us to be completely certain, we might be functioning under a false-goal in the pursuit of truth and, therefore, would be no more be able to find the truth than we would be able to travel North and not-North at the same time.

And so, to tie the two points together, the question for you to consider would be:
You are trying to find knowledge, but what exactly are your parameters for this?
What model or approach to epistemology can we actually pursue and actually live by?
I think we've already found some agreement here.

---

Finally, sorry to give a short response to your extended discussion on definitions, but simply put: I agree.

Quoting Philosophim

To your point, we cannot have a relative methodology of applying our distinctions to reality, but we can have relative distinctions, or definitions.

Exactly. My only contention would be when you say:

Quoting Philosophim

I can define, and accept as a definition from others in my mind by my choice. There is nothing in reality that necessitates I do otherwise.

This is contingent. Reality appears to determine that you must unite your definitions with others if you are to enter mutual understanding and dialogue with them.

---

There's a lot more to say, but let's touch-base first. I'll jump into more of the implications once there's a bit more room to. It was a bit of a ramble tonight but hopefully there's a decent thread running through which is of some interest or value. Looking forward to hearing your thoughts.

Quoting TVCL

I'm not sure if this is making sense - I'm thinking through this as I go.

Please continue! The pages I linked you at one time numbered past one hundred, filled with my own thoughts as I went. Sometimes it is the best way to think.

I think we are both in agreement that knowledge is based on something that we determine. Of course, what do we use? The compass? The GPS? Both?

Quoting TVCL

My only contention would be when you say:

I can define, and accept as a definition from others in my mind by my choice. There is nothing in reality that necessitates I do otherwise.
— Philosophim

This is contingent. Reality appears to determine that you must unite your definitions with others if you are to enter mutual understanding and dialogue with them.

Let me rephrase your sentence to show you what I was trying to say.
Yes, you must unite your definitions with others if you are to enter mutual understanding and dialog with them. But reality does not necessitate that I desire to enter mutual understanding and dialog with them.

Let me give you an example. Imagine you and some friends are walking through a forest you pass by a bizarre looking tree. "Look at that tree!" one of them shouts. Every week you walk by and call it, "The bizarre tree". One day, you invite a friend who happens to be a botanist with you on your walks. As someone shouts out, "Hello Bizzarre tree, how are you today?" the botanist speaks up and states, "Oh, that's actually a bush."

The botanist then goes into detail about what defines it as a bush, and sure enough, applying that definition fits. One of your friends agrees, but another of your friends doesn't believe the person is a botanist, and thinks the botanist is pulling their leg. "Sure, whatever. Sorry, but its too tall to be a bush, its still the Bizarre tree to me."

One of your friends now knows it as a bush and the Bizarre tree. Your other friend only knows it as the Bizarre tree, because they have refused to accept the botanists contextual definition. Now you might think this friend dimwitted, but lets imagine the scenario another way. Lets say the "botanist" actually wasn't a botanist, but a convincing liar. Now your ignorant friend appears to be wise in who they trust, while the believer in the "bush" identification now comes across as a dupe.

Another way to consider it (going back to the real botanist this time) is your friend who doesn't believe the tree is a bush, simply doesn't care about botany, and likes the fun of calling it "The Bizarre tree". Calling it a "bush" demystifies it, and they don't want to lose that.

So here we have two separate contexts that each has applied to safely say each person knows within the context they accepted. The friend who accepted the botanist's context can still speak with the one who refused to accept it. When those two are together, they might both call it "The Bizarre tree" for comradery. And when the "academic" friend meets another botanist, that friend won't call it "The Bizarre tree", but instead the botanist's context of bush. Or maybe the academic of the group will think the other friend is a lunk head, causing a fight every time they pass the tree next in the future. There are several outcomes, and no requirement within reality that any one context be accepted within the group.

Thus I do claim there is no necessity in what context a person must accept, but I do agree that if you want to be in harmony with other people, it is important to. Of course, does deciding to be in harmony with a group mean you have useful applicable knowledge? Think on this when applied to politics or religion.

This circles back to your idea that our idea of knowledge is formed by our goals. If our goal is to have harmony and peace within a group, we may decide to throw out certain contexts that might better match reality, but help us preserve harmony. In fact, our context may actually fly in the face of what most other contexts would think of reality, but not in the face of preserving peace and harmony.

Still, if we have a common methdology of knowledge within those contexts, we can differentiate who believes in their context, versus who actually applicably knows their context.

And there is MY ramble. Feel free to continue on where you left off!

Reply to Philosophim

Quoting Philosophim

Yes, you must unite your definitions with others if you are to enter mutual understanding and dialog with them. But reality does not necessitate that I desire to enter mutual understanding and dialog with them.

Good. I agree with your arguments in this post and think that this is an ideal place to follow onto one of the implications that I wanted to talk about: namely, the way in which our aims do or do not overlap will shape what we can or cannot know. Moreover, that our goals form into "networks" and that these networks can exclude other networks. This may reveal even more of the "big picture".

Let's see if we can make this a progression of the heuristic...
[adherence to consistency as a measure of knowledge is constant]
We also measure our knowledge by use/relation to our goals. This is done in a number of ways:
a) Our goals set the criteria for our enquiry and therefore act as proto-epistemological standards,
b i) The goals available for us to pursue is limited which is another limiting factor on our potential knowledge
b ii) We may posit a goal, presuming that it can be pursued, but in the process of pursuing it, find that this cannot be so.

Simple example:
You posit the goal of flying; therefore, your enquiry is to learn how to fly and you will consider this knowledge to be acquired once you can - say - fly with a sheer force of will (after attempting for 10 days). Hence, positing a goal sets the bounds of the enquiry, but does not guarantee its results. In fact, if you keep your criteria constant, you find that you cannot fly with sheer will of the mind within 10 days.

Result: you know that the claim "I can fly by sheer will of mind" is false. This belief is a poor candidate for knowledge because it is not applicable to reality - the test of which is your implementation of the belief vis-a-vis your decisions.

Therefore, to learn what reality does allow you might change your criteria. For example, you might change the criteria from "with sheer will of mind" to "with the assistance of helicopters" and you find that you can in fact get on a helicopter and fly within 10 days. The claim "I can fly by use of helicopters within 10 days" is affirmed.

---

Now, let's extend this by bringing the goal out of isolation...
Goal A: "To fly by use of helicopter"
Goal B: "To regard helicopters as four-legged mammals"

Here we have exclusionary goals because you might be able to pursue either one of these goals, but you cannot pursue both goals at once. As such we find that we know that we can fly by use of helicopters (and use this as knowledge) or that we can regard helicopters as four-legged mammals (and use this as knowledge) but we cannot know both things at once.

Here's where I'm trying to go with this...
Consider how, if you were the only being in the world and you only had one goal and only ever one goal at a time, you could claim all kinds of things as knowledge because you would have relatively few constraints on what you set as your criteria. For example: cannot fly by force of will? Then why not re-define "flying" as walking on the ground? True enough, you would still find that reality does not allow your mind to put you in the air, but you could still come away from this thinking that "I know that I can fly" because of this criteria. Therefore, does this not allow for easy abuse of the heuristic and make it messy when it comes to epistemology?

I would posit that this is not so if we recognise that if goals were ever isolated they would be trivial and irrelevant, but they are never isolated. Moreover, once they network, notice how quickly that constrain what we can or cannot regard as knowledge. If you wanted to know whether helicopters were four-legged animals or not, what standard of knowledge would you use to correct this if this was truly your only goal? However, once you need to use a helicopter to fly, or need to form military strategy or need to talk to an average person about helicopters, these goals limit what we can know about helicopters.

Indeed, consider how the goal of "making things comprehensible" immediately brings in logic and rules out all contradictions and even all goals that require us to accept contradictions for these exact reasons.

And so, I think that this might be a way to demonstrate how the heuristic - this way or measuring knowledge by use and logic - can be a correction to nonsense and relativism when put to full application.

For example: a man says "I am a woman" and he may in fact "know" that he is a woman if making the claim was all that there was to it. Yet, we proceed to consider: how does this man actually know that he is a woman? He knows that he can make the claim, and perhaps even that he can believe it, but can he believe this and lactate at the same time? Or can he live by this and become pregnant at the same time? In the course of this, we might find that the man can label himself as one "type" of woman (in appearance perhaps) but find that he cannot be another type of woman - i.e. a biological one. Therefore, the man is left to consider exactly what he knows about what women can or cannot be. Indeed, all of us are left to consider what we can or cannot claim to know if some of our aims exclude others from being applicable and thereby, when we discover what we can or cannot claim to know as we trying to pursue multiple goals at once.

It appears that when we apply the heuristic and measure our knowledge by logic and use, we discover that "reality" which stands beyond the heuristic has a "stripping-down" effect, by means of which, as we continue to live life and think about it in more detail, we progressively discover what reality does or does not allow which reveals more and more of what we know about it; the network of peoples aims as it is limited by reality progressively sculpts their knowledge (IF they are actively seeking knowledge)

What are your thoughts on this?

I think we are largely in agreement. Yes, the greater number of people you test your own personal knowledge claims against, the more challenges arrive that possibly show it to be false. Further, I also agree on a scaffolding of knowledge. Knowing algebra relies on knowing a lot of other fundamentals. Sometimes when our current perceptions of what we know are challenged, it is the underlying fundamentals which are brought back into question again.

I think your statements are great fundamentals to start tackling more complex questions. Please continue on as you build on this! Once you are done, I may throw a few questions your way to see how your theory handles it, but so far, this seems great.

Reply to Philosophim

Right - Good - and so,

It appears that using logic and use as the measures of knowledge achieve a number of things:

1. It directly tethers the use of reason (which is adherence to logic) to our attempts to seek knowledge. Of course, this alone does not demonstrate that reason is a necessary factor in all possible knowledge, but it does necessitate that reason be adhered to in the search for any knowledge that is comprehensible because this is what ensures that we disavow contradictions.

2. It creates the question: "can we live as if X is true?" (especially in relation to Y and Z). this is to say, treating the heuristic as the foundation forces us to regard our potential beliefs about what we know by the extent to which they can be lived by - which is a simple way of testing our claims or even systems of knowledge.
For example:
"Can we live as if science provides us with knowledge?" if not, what aims does this limit, and if so, what does this allow?
"Can we live as if science and this particular religion are true?" if not, why not? Moreover, if treating science as the provider of knowledge allows us to pursue Y set of goals, and if treating religion as a provider of knowledge allows us to pursue Z set of goals, which one takes priority and why? OR is there a way of conceptualising both science and religion and their relation to each other that allows for the pursuit of both Z and Y goals?
Using the heuristic, we can determine that of the three options (science, religion or both) the one that allows for the maximal set of goals is the most likely to provide us with knowledge of reality because the one that can allow for the maximal set of goals to be pursued is the most applicable to reality.

Another way to phrase this is that the conception of our knowledge which is the most accurate is that which is the most applicable; being that which allows for the largest network of aims to be pursued at once.

2 [extra]. The network of goals that relativism allows to be pursued appears to be extremely small which we can use as a contrast. The network of goals that genuine relativism allows one to pursue is relegated to the ability to define or re-frame things in any way. However, the practising relativist will find that these goals are constrained solipsistically to their own psyche and reasoning abilities alone, and that this "network" does not extend beyond this, instead being contained by external factors - known or unknown. (one may redefine "water" however they like, but this will not allow sand to satiate their thirst).

3. The heuristic might serve to create a direct unity between our search for knowledge and the living of life itself (I'd be tempted to say that it unites epistemology with ethics). Philosophy is often disregarded as ethereal , merely academic and not practical. Yet, once we recognise the necessity of the heuristic as the starting point we have a direct way of relating what we know to how we live. Therefore, not only does philosophy become practical, but the practical becomes philosophical. Nor would this be a mere fancy. The fact of this is necessary if we understand the necessary relationship between these two things - which is a relationship demonstrated in the rationale for the heuristic itself because it unites reason (being philosophical) to decisions (being practical).

It also creates the possibility for us to demonstrate that, if two people are seeking the truth and therefore adhere to reason as their initial goal, it must follow that they will necessarily reach the same conclusions, provided that they are exposed to the same information. I believe that this relates to point 2. However, I need a bit more time to think through this intuition before presenting a case for it.

And so, I know that I'm making a reach with some pretty grand claims here which makes this a good point to stop if you have any questions to ask about any of this. In fact, it may be a good place to call on @tim wood again to get a few hammer blows in. There are surely some large leaks in this hull, so let's get them boarded up.

Looking forward to hearing your thoughts.

All the best.

Thanks for another great post TVCL.

Quoting TVCL

It directly tethers the use of reason (which is adherence to logic) to our attempts to seek knowledge. Of course, this alone does not demonstrate that reason is a necessary factor in all possible knowledge,

I think a little clarification is needed here. If reason is not a necessary factor in knowledge, how do we separate knowledge from mere belief? We are crafting the definition of knowledge as we go, do you think there is a way to know without reason?

Quoting TVCL

Using the heuristic, we can determine that of the three options (science, religion or both) the one that allows for the maximal set of goals is the most likely to provide us with knowledge of reality because the one that can allow for the maximal set of goals to be pursued is the most applicable to reality.

Can you also clarify what you mean by "maximal set of goals"? What if I have a very simple goal in science, but a very complex set of goals in my religion? Further, what about the importance of goals to myself? "What could be a more important goal than serving God?" for example? Finally, what about a person who has many complex goals versus thousands of people who have simple goals, but gain complexity in how they work among themselves? For example, one man wants to discover the truth of the cosmos, but that will make an entire group of people incredibly uncomfortable. Is it a greater maximal set of goals from one man, or the goal among the hundreds of people that each person in the group remain comfortable?

Quoting TVCL

The network of goals that relativism allows to be pursued appears to be extremely small which we can use as a contrast. The network of goals that genuine relativism allows one to pursue is relegated to the ability to define or re-frame things in any way. However, the practising relativist will find that these goals are constrained solipsistically to their own psyche and reasoning abilities alone, and that this "network" does not extend beyond this, instead being contained by external factors - known or unknown. (one may redefine "water" however they like, but this will not allow sand to satiate their thirst).

What do you mean by relativism in this case? Do you mean the ability to relatively define one's context, or relatively apply this context to reality? Recall the previous example between "The Bizarre tree" and a "bush". I see the ability to redefine one's definitions as either increasing, or decreasing the complexity in its application to reality. Should we always strive to use definitions that have the most complicated way of applying them to reality? I can still define water in many different ways and still quench my thirst.

Quoting TVCL

Therefore, not only does philosophy become practical, but the practical becomes philosophical.

I understand where you are coming from. I have always believed philosophy's goal is to destroy itself. Epistemology is still philosophy because no one has accepted an epistemology that can be quantified, qualified, and used in a useful manner. Once that happens, it will no longer be a part of philosophy, but science.

And I agree with you. I entered philosophy to find the practical, and quickly threw away anything which was "Gandolfian" philosophy. (We can debate how Gandolf would react in a particular situation, but we forget or ignore the fact that Gandolf is fiction).

Quoting TVCL

It also creates the possibility for us to demonstrate that, if two people are seeking the truth and therefore adhere to reason as their initial goal, it must follow that they will necessarily reach the same conclusions, provided that they are exposed to the same information.

This is a nice thought, but people do not work this way. If both people have different definitions and goals in the beginning, not to mention different sensing capabilities (blind versus sight) they can both use reason within these definitions and goals, and obtain different conclusions. I think if you can establish a way of obtaining knowledge that is logically sound, then we can determine in the group who has knowledge, and who does not. Knowledge is a tool, and a tool is not something you can't force anyone to use. But, if a tool is useful, sound, and agreed upon by enough people, it can be used to build some wonderful things.

I think you have a fantastic start, and a good overview. When talking about knowledge from the self-subjective viewpoint, I think your ideas have merit. It is when you start bringing other people into the picture, that it starts to become a little muddled, and some inconsistencies and questions start to form. I do not mean this as a slight, this is an incredibly complex and difficult topic, yet I feel this is on a good path.

Reply to Philosophim

Thanks again for your consistent feedback too - it's highly appreciated.

Okay, so it might be a good idea to answer your questions and then pull back a bit; I've over-reached and so it's a good point to receded.

Let's begin with the questions:

Quoting Philosophim

I think a little clarification is needed here. If reason is not a necessary factor in knowledge, how do we separate knowledge from mere belief? We are crafting the definition of knowledge as we go, do you think there is a way to know without reason?

It appears that we have demonstrated that reason is a common factor in all knowledge that is sought, but I'm not sure if the application of reason is required for all knowledge. The main thing that I have in mind is experience. You may refer to my discussion with "Chattering Monkey" above but the idea is that we can know the direct contents of experience merely by experiencing it (if there is an experience of pain I know that there is an experience of pain). What we can then doubt and require our reason to discern (actively) is whether that pain is connected to anything beyond the experience itself and is "real" or not, etc. It might be that reason is required for us to have experience as-such (with a Kantian epistemology for example) but that isn't demonstrated at this juncture. And so, it seems plausible that we can have some passive knowledge without the use of reason.

Quoting Philosophim

Can you also clarify what you mean by "maximal set of goals"? What if I have a very simple goal in science, but a very complex set of goals in my religion? Further, what about the importance of goals to myself? "What could be a more important goal than serving God?" for example? Finally, what about a person who has many complex goals versus thousands of people who have simple goals, but gain complexity in how they work among themselves?

There is a difference between one's belief about what is true/ their knowledge allowing a set of goals and demanding it. Perhaps the answer would be that whether a Muslim farmer and a Christian farmer were both living their simple lives with few questions, it would be the one who's beliefs that allows the more complex life to be lived that would be the most indicative of the truth. This is so because this would be the belief system which is more applicable to reality and allows the most goals to be realised (as opposed to merely posited or pursued). We might contend that if both Christians and Muslims are having their goals served by their beliefs, this demonstrates that they both possess knowledge of the truth - and this is the case, to a point. However, if the question that you, and I and the farmers could pose is: which one is actually/ultimately true? We might reflect that the farmers do not have knowledge of the answer to this question, but simply have faith in it.

In addition, consider how complex an apparently "simple" goal might be...
"to serve God" seems simple. Yet, if we consider all that this entails, this might require nothing less than trying to understand Him to the best of our ability (the most complex thing of all) and live in accordance with His will as well as His world.

Quoting Philosophim

What do you mean by relativism in this case? Do you mean the ability to relatively define one's context, or relatively apply this context to reality?

No, I think definitions can be "relative" (although, recall how they are bounded). It's the relativism that holds that truth is non-absolute; being merely relative to the subjective perspective or even relative to culture. Now, of course we can account for the differences in conclusions that appear to be indicative of this non-absolute truth, especially when we judge our knowledge against our goals but, of course, the "bounding" effect that we have been discussing makes all of the difference. In this sense, our individual enquiries appear to reveal different and unique areas on the same absolute map (although, being unique we might take this different areas to prove relativism). Whereas, relativism would posit that there is a truly unique map for each person - this does not appear to be so.

Quoting Philosophim

This is a nice thought, but people do not work this way. If both people have different definitions and goals in the beginning, not to mention different sensing capabilities (blind versus sight) they can both use reason within these definitions and goals, and obtain different conclusions...

I'm going to hold-off on my claims about this for a bit.

---

Now for the pull-back...

You appear convinced of my case for the search of knowledge from a "self-subjective" viewpoint which is a good start, but I must contend with it because it appears that we can demonstrate that if the foundation is correct, there must be a bridge beyond this.

Therefore, consider this progression:
1. If one seeks knowledge they must use their reason and their goals as the basic measure for this knowledge (if it is to be a search and is to be comprehensible, this must be so. This is what the foundation of the heuristic demonstrates).

2. If another seeks knowledge the same must, by necessity, apply to them.

3. Therefore, if two come to seek knowledge and hold this basic goal in common, their methodology must overlap.

My aim at this point is to double-check whether you think that all stages of this argument are necessary and if not, why not... from there, perhaps we can attempt to build up.

Also, I'm re-considering the idea of making the argument about a search for "Truth" as opposed to "Knowledge". I'm beginning to find "Knowledge" just as confusing as "Truth" because the latter appears to entail the former. For example, "Knowledge" may be defined as "Understanding what is True" - we imply it with that quality of being "right" which entails truthfulness. And "Truth" may be defined as "That which is the case"; "That which is so" or, at least, "That which is not-false"...

The earlier confusion might have come from the notion that my argument or the tools of reason and goals dictate what the truth is, instead of simply being those tools that allow us to discover what we can of it if we search for it - with the idea of the search being vital to the role of the defition of Truth within the overall argument.

What are your thoughts?

Quoting TVCL

It appears that we have demonstrated that reason is a common factor in all knowledge that is sought, but I'm not sure if the application of reason is required for all knowledge.

I think for this section, we'll need a good definition between knowledge, and belief. If I have a belief that happens to align with the truth, is it knowledge in your heuristic? And if we are talking about knowledge, we must be very careful to avoid, "maybe's". That way lies the death of all epistemological theories. Once you enter into the realm of not being sure about something, we should try to be find sureness in it, or table it for now.

I think you're close with the idea that "experience" is something we can know. But can you explain why? Can it be explained without reason?

Quoting TVCL

There is a difference between one's belief about what is true/ their knowledge allowing a set of goals and demanding it.

Quoting TVCL

Whereas, relativism would posit that there is a truly unique map for each person - this does not appear to be so

What if my goal is to find the best color in the world? I find it is red. Another person has that same goal, and finds that it is blue. This seems like a unique map. This also seems to confuse belief and knowledge. Can yo puzzle this out? Again, I think a clear definition of a belief versus knowledge would be helpful here.

These are fairly advanced topics btw. For lack of a better term, the analytic/synthetic distinction has tripped a lot of philosophers up. Further, untangling relativism with knowledge is also another mess. So there is no need to answer my questions just now if you want to come back later. They are just things to think about.

Quoting TVCL

Also, I'm re-considering the idea of making the argument about a search for "Truth" as opposed to "Knowledge". I'm beginning to find "Knowledge" just as confusing as "Truth" because the latter appears to entail the former.

I definitely understand that you are transitioning out of a previous mindset, and that makes it difficult. Science is the act of taking definitions of reality, combining them, and hoping to find something new. Philosophy is about taking what we innately suspect about reality, and finding words that are logical, and can then be applied to reality. And its not easy. =) I don't want to tell you "not" to use truth (thought I really do), because you need to understand why you will not be able to. I don't want to stymie your thinking, or lead you down a path I think is correct, but perhaps is not.

But what I feel comfortable in saying is to take some time and rethink your definitions. Think about what truth, knowledge, and belief entail. Then see if you can come up with some clearer definitions to start again with. Epistemology must have a strong foundation, and if we don't have those three terms strongly defined, it is difficult to build a stable theory on them.

Reply to Philosophim

These are all important questions to consider and so, please, don't take my not answering them as a dismissal. Instead, please, understand that I would like to take a moment to reign things right back and "catch my breath" so to speak... I've probably over-reached myself with the implications.

Firstly, let me just take a detour to mention some of the other conclusions that I'm working with. One thing worth mentioning is that I don't actually think that epistemology can be a matter of certainties or sureness. I agree that we should take great care, but that even with the greatest care knowledge or "truth" is [almost] never a question of sureness and certainties but a question of likelihoods and best guesses; I regard faith as a philosophical constant (as is doubt). Another thing worth mentioning is that I'm a Witggenstinian when it comes to definitions and regard them as Pragmatic and so I'm cautious about the idea of nailing them down. The relevance of that isn't entirely clear yet but it seems worth mentioning.

Anyway, let's table that just for a moment... What I would like to do just for now is is ask for your patience and re-state the progression above in order to get yours exact views on it:

Working definition: Truth = "That which is the case"

1. If one seeks to find truth must use their reason and their goals as the basic measure for this knowledge (if it is to be a search and is to be comprehensible, this must be so. This is what the foundation of the heuristic demonstrates).

2. If another seeks to find truth it follows that the same must, by necessity, apply to them.

3. Therefore, if two come to seek truth and hold this basic goal in common, their methodology must overlap.

What do you think?

No worry TVCL, I understand completely. When I start my own explorations into ideas, I quickly branch out into the end. You have a similar thought process as myself, where I think you can see the big picture, and how it all links together. I often see that first, then build my way there, so I understand fully.

Lets start with your definition of truth, as every solid structure needs a stable foundation. Quoting TVCL

Truth = "That which is the case"

What is the case? This is not meant as a nitpick or an attempt to be clever. What is "that"? Let me explain.

Is that which is the case my view of reality? Is it another person's view of reality? Is it my beliefs? Is it an objective reality apart from my beliefs?

One problem I see if you don't have this down, is it undermines your first rule. If "that which is the case" is my beliefs, then my goals and "reason" are my beliefs. Which means my beliefs are just as good as anyone elses. This will be a problem come step 3. If truth is an objective reality, how did we come to this conclusion? Now of course you stated that reason is at minimum, "What is not a contradiction". But how do we know that is true? Is it because we believe it to be true? You have to find some foundation that is incontrovertible and build from there, otherwise it won't hold. Not that we can't start with some stabs in the dark by the way!

My advice is to take every single word of step 1, and define it:
Truth, reason, goal, comprehensible, knowledge, and measure of that knowledge. After you define them, see if you can combine them into a step one which leaves no questions within the statement itself. Also try to define them as separate identities that don't bleed or cross into one another. We've been talking at a high level so far, but now its time to go low level and really make sure all the parts of your heuristic are pristine!

Reply to Philosophim

See, it's so tricky because on the one hand we can recognise how important your questions are and on the other, despair of answering them. I'm sceptical of whether your approach to epistemology should be taken. Allow me to explain why...

You advise that all parts of the foundational argument be 'pristine'; incontrovertible and that we get our definitions nice and secure before we proceed, but we might wonder whether this can be done...

If the definition of any word is given, that definition can be challenged. Even if the definition appeals to its component parts, those parts can be challenged too. For example, we might try to clarify that truth is "accordance with reality" But! what do "accordance" and "reality" mean? (and, indeed how do we know?). If the game of definitions is a game of words supporting other words we hit a meandering regress. As some point, when you or I or any combination of people are in discussion, we simply have to trust or assume that we know what we are talking about, aware that misunderstanding, as much as doubt, is potentially constant.

What's more, the questions raised present a particularly interesting challenge in the definition game because when we ask:

"If truth is that which is that case, what is the case?" the question that follows is: "Isn't that what we are trying to discover?"

Maybe we can still work with this...
"Truth is that which is the case..."

"Is that which is the case my view of reality?"

"It might be the case that you have your view of reality, but is this the same as saying that the contents of your view of reality reflects that which is the case?; it might be the case that you have your view, but it might not be the case that the contents of that view are indicative of that which is the case."

"What is the case?"

"Good question."

And so, that might be a way to do it, Other alternatives for the definition of truth are "accordance with reality" or "that which is not false." Maybe a better one is "The reality that is the case independently of belief, which a belief may or may not align with" naturally, these aren't perfect.

What are your thoughts? and
Do you have any suggestions for a definition of truth?

Certainly, its is a very difficult endeavor. But consider this, the study of epistemology has been going on for thousands of years with no conclusive determination. In my study, a common thread is always that their foundation of knowledge has a hole. It cannot "know its own theory". And the reason is because induction and assumptions often enter into their theories that later bite them down the road.

If you do not wish to solidify your definitions, it is understandable. It is difficult and can practically twist your brain into knots. But I would be certain that if you do not do that work for your own definitions, anything you build upon it it too will meet the same fate as all the other epistemological theories out there.

My answer to truth is close to as you claimed, "The reality that is the case independently of belief, which a belief may or may not align with". Basically reality is what happens despite what we will. If you wish, go back to my first link on the knowledge theory. It is not to say I am correct, but this time read with a mind to examine how I construct my definitions. I attempt to start with the most basic premise, then slowly build on top of each. I'll admit I could do a better job in parts, especially part 2, but those definitions carry onward throughout the entire argument. Scour them for weaknesses, and then wonder whether your respect of the argument increases or decreases.

A => B is much more stable then A => (B v C). Even if you cannot get a A => B, it helps immensely if you can at least narrow it down.

Reply to Philosophim

Quoting Philosophim

Scour them for weaknesses, and then wonder whether your respect of the argument increases or decreases.

Yes, I will do. Now that we have reached this point it is a good time to get a handle on your arguments. However, I won't be able to do so tonight and so before I turn in for this evening, let me share some thoughts about this last post...

I think you're right about the "hole" and perhaps we should have addressed it sooner (although, now may even be the perfect time) - it appears that you and I have both discovered something similar about epistemology which we are wrestling with. Epistemology has been attempted for (at least) thousands of years and it is true that none of the approaches are "airtight"; even if we just examine their foundations. In fact, this common error in philosophy ripples out to all philosophical systems and, as I'm sure that you've found... there's always a hole.

[note: the closest I've ever come to something "airtight" is an appeal to logic/consistency, but even this is not beyond question]

It's in light of this that I would like to present a couple of considerations...
First; we seem to agree that knowledge is a tool. Perhaps we agree that theories of knowledge are tools too. Perhaps, is there a distinction between a "perfect" tool that is never prone to failure and a tool that is as good as it can be but that we must accept will eventually break down?

Secondly; if epistemology has had an open wound after thousands of years after some of the greatest minds in history, is it worth attempting to tackle it in the same way or to achieve the same results, or to try a different approach?

Thirdly; can the very fact that attempts at foundational epistemology continues to fail, and perhaps will always fail, tell us something about the character or makeup of epistemology? Another way of framing this question is that: if we consider the problems of doing epistemology, and blast away a number of our options, are there some parts that we are left with that something can be built out of?

I have my own answers to these questions but it would be good to get yours too and then perhaps we can compare notes. As mentioned, I will try to give your pieces to but can't promise that I will have the time or attention give them a proper reading for a day or two - just so that you're aware of any apparent delay.

As a final question - how far are you happy to carry this conversation on for? I understand that we appear to have been orbiting the centre for some time and haven't done as much "travelling" as we might have liked yet, but there appears to be a LOT more to say. Personally, I'm having a blast with this discussion but it may be a slow burn and so do let me know your thoughts.

Reply to TVCL Quoting TVCL

First; we seem to agree that knowledge is a tool. Perhaps we agree that theories of knowledge are tools too. Perhaps, is there a distinction between a "perfect" tool that is never prone to failure and a tool that is as good as it can be but that we must accept will eventually break down?

I agree entirely with this. No person has ever built a tool that cannot be improved upon over time. Science is considered one of the best methodologies of understanding the world, and even it is still debated and tweaked with improvements to this day. One thing that usually repeats in historic use of tools, is that the next tool offers something the previous one's did not. If a new theory of epistemology is to offer something new to the world, it must differentiate itself from its competitors. To me, that is to make a foundation of epistemology so strong, that it is taken seriously as a branch of study, and less as philosophy.

This also bleeds into your second and third points. Innovator's take two options. Refinement, or advancement. Refinement is a polish or improvement on the old ways to produce something better. This works in many ways. Advancement is much more difficult, because it requires a new approach, and is riskier to pull off.

In either case, I think using the lessons of the tools before us as information to think about is invaluable. But this information must not be enshrined. Polishing keeps the fundamentals while advancement understands that the fundamentals have reached their limit, and it is time for something new. I believe a little of both is in order.

I am of the opinion that epistemology suffers from a few flawed fundamentals, one being its assumptions and allowance of uncertainty within its fundamentals. Yet they are also built upon a few fundamentals that are nearly timeless in epistemological history. To me, these shaky errors manifest after the spring board from the "I think therefore I am" type conclusion that I believe all epistemology reaches as an agreed upon start. I believe there is also some merit in the analytic/synthetic type of arguments as well. When i say "type", I mean the fundamental core of the argument. It is their specifics that I find may not quite nail the issue, and lead to failure down the road. But perhaps I am wrong there as well, which is why I think we both understand we have to present and listen to each other's viewpoints. If two people are looking for the truth, then as you have stated, I believe our viewpoints should point out contradictions or show alignment.

Please take all the time that you need. I have visited a number of philosophy boards over the years, and all of them have been dissapointments. I'm not sure what made this one work, but it seems to be full of people who genuinely like to think on philosophy. I do not mind continuing the discussion for as long as it takes, and I have also been having a blast!. Philosophy and epistemology have long been a passion of mine; it won't burn out any time soon.

Reply to Philosophim

Right, so, I've got a jumble of things to present to you today...

First of all, your work is a treat to read - especially now that we've had a bit of a discussion. High quality thinking - very well done.

There are some bumps in it and so, as you requested, I thought I'd bring them to your attention.
The first one was your definition of Reality as "What results independently of a belief" - I'm inclined to agree but the counter occurred: "This presumes that belief cannot dictate reality. Why not?" It seems that you can answer this within your framework but it may be worth pressing you to do so explicitly.

And then, there was a question about what you mean by a "Will" or "Sureness" when you define Belief. This can be nit picky, but as it goes, I get your drift anyway.

Other than that, the whole foundation that you lay and connections you draw between Belief, Reality and Knowledge were tight and cogent.
One note: if knowledge is belief in something which is co-existent with reality and requires that the belief is not contradicted, it would appear that knowledge is provisional. That is, we have knowledge up to the point that the knowledge we have is contradicted.

Now, admittedly, by the end of your first piece I got off of the boat. You began to make a number of appeals to the subjective function of one's psyche. These were lucid in places, but it began to drift over into psychology enough for it to feel as if the tread and relevance of our more direct concerns were being lost. Moreover, it begins to raise far more questions far too quickly to keep pace with.

And so, that being said, the work is great. What I'd like to do is take it away from a week (or two) and think it over, in an attempt to try and splice it with my own. it appears that we're drawing two halves of the same foundation and so it would be good to draw them together and see what that allows us to stand on. How does that sound to you?

---

Switching gears now,

It occurred to me that in light of what we have discussed; the attempts that we can make in epistemology and our limits, we may have a number of puzzle pieces that might allude to what we can or will eventually achieve. Here are some of these puzzle pieces:

1. Contradictions are nonsensical.

2. Our goals shape our enquiries.

3. Attempts at epistemology always leave a "hole" in the theory.

4. Definitions cannot be incontrovertible.

5a. The attempt to make epistemology "airtight" is potentially endless/unattainable.

5b. Likewise, the attempt to define epistemological terms and make them "airtight" is potentially endless/unattainable

Conclusion (a): we cannot create a foundation for epistemology that is so solid that it is beyond doubt or misunderstanding.

Conclusion (b): we cannot conclude that "anything goes" when it comes to our enquires. For example, we cannot make contradictory claims if we want them to make sense.

And so, I wanted to get your thoughts on these pieces - do you agree or not? Otherwise, are there any that you would like to add?

Looking forward to reading your thoughts.

Reply to TVCL Quoting TVCL

There are some bumps in it and so, as you requested, I thought I'd bring them to your attention.
The first one was your definition of Reality as "What results independently of a belief" - I'm inclined to agree but the counter occurred: "This presumes that belief cannot dictate reality. Why not?" It seems that you can answer this within your framework but it may be worth pressing you to do so explicitly.

First, thank you for the compliment! And absolutely, question even the slightest issue you find. It is the only way to the truth, and I never take offense or slight to it.

First, when I wrote this theory I thought to myself, "A knowledge theory must be able to know itself". The way I have written the work is as a newborn discovering things for the first time. I take what I can glean at the moment, and build upon it from there. However, that does not mean I cannot return to it after. Indeed, at this moment of claim it could be drawn that belief cannot dictate reality, but I also make no claim one way or the other.

The key comes after I demonstrate what "discrete experiences" are. Once you realize that a belief is a discrete experience, you also realize that belief is concurrent with reality, because a discrete experience cannot be contradicted. To streamline the theory for first time readers, I have removed a lot of going back to the beginning. But feel free to take any future conclusions I make, go back to the beginning, and see if a contradiction is found, or a question you had now answered.

And to clarify, the belief itself is reality. A belief's claim, such as, "I believe Tim is waiting just around the corner" is not necessarily confirmed by reality. A belief's claim is an application of our discrete experiences to reality, which is covered in part 2.

Quoting TVCL

And then, there was a question about what you mean by a "Will" or "Sureness" when you define Belief.

In essence belief is a desire. A claim that you are sure reality is X, even if it might be Y. I use belief as a precursor to action in its introduction, but it can also be a claim about reality without any action. "The sun is made of hydrogen" for example. Whether I believed this, or that it was made out of helium has no recourse in the actions I will take as a random belief simply appearing in my mind, then quickly disappearing. This is where the "Sureness" comes from.

But an excellent point on noting that it is not well explained. I had to cut quite a bit to get it down to a manageable read, and explaining belief in further detail seemed like something I could let slide a bit. It seems I may need to cover it again.

Quoting TVCL

One note: if knowledge is belief in something which is co-existent with reality and requires that the belief is not contradicted, it would appear that knowledge is provisional. That is, we have knowledge up to the point that the knowledge we have is contradicted.

This is correct. Part two covers how we can handle these contradictions. Sometimes, what might appear to be a contradiction, may not be at all depending on our definitions.

Quoting TVCL

Now, admittedly, by the end of your first piece I got off of the boat. Moreover, it begins to raise far more questions far too quickly to keep pace with.

A very fair assessment. As I mentioned earlier, once a foundation type of, "I think therefore I am" has been established, the true complexity starts. Originally, this was a MUCH larger read. I covered so many branches and different considerations. The problem in doing so is that ultimately loses the reader. What I tried to do was cut it down to the necessary fundamentals that allow the building blocks to answer all of the branching questions within section 2. But I feel it may be good to table section 2 for now. I am more interested in how you will construct your fundamentals, and where you will build from independently of mine. Without your own strong conclusion on the "I think therefore I am" section of epistemology, going further would not be productive.

Quoting TVCL

5a. The attempt to make epistemology "airtight" is potentially endless/unattainable.

5b. Likewise, the attempt to define epistemological terms and make them "airtight" is potentially endless/unattainable

That is only half the story! The attempt to make epistemology "airtight" is potentially obtainable. The attempt to define epistemological terms and make them "airtight" is potentially obtainable.

Let us combine this with, "A common thread of all epistemological theories is their lack of "airtightness".
Therefore perhaps creating an airtight epistemology would lead to a success.

Also one other thing, we are assuming "knowledge" before knowledge has been figured out. What is "airtight"? What is "unobtainable/obtainable" in regards to knowledge? What is potential? If the questions themselves have questions, that tells me there is something underlying we still do not understand yet, and we should work on that first.

Take as long as you want to think, I'll be here when you're ready.

Reply to Philosophim

Right Sarge, reporting from the front.

Still working on processing the arguments but his a milestone and thought I would share some of the findings...

---

We begin with posting a search for knowledge - this sets our aim. In relation to this goal, we find that we must define our terms, not least the term "knowledge". This prompts the three definitions of belief, reality and knowledge as you have addressed them. What's more, the logic for why these three definitions are required can be justified in relation to the goal, as follows:

To posit a search for knowledge, one must distinguish between three things:
a) a position that has the potential to be knowledge (here called "belief");
b) a standard that provides the measure for knowledge, independent of a position that may or may not accord with with this standard (here called "reality); and
c) the status of the potential position when it is in accordance with the independent standard (here called "knowledge")

The distinction between all three definitions is required (and, therefore, all three definitions are required) because if we only had the first two; if we only had "belief" and "reality" there would be no need to search for knowledge. One's position would have no potential to be in line with the independent standard that measures it, one's position would be in accordance with that standard by default. In plain speaking, one's belief could never be wrong or right - it would only even be right if one's beliefs always reflected reality. In this sense, one would only ever possess knowledge and, in effect, all three definitions would blur into one; there would be no difference between the position one takes and between what is the case and, therefore, belief, reality and knowledge would be one and the same.

To assume such a position requires an assumption of omniscience which a search for knowledge denies. This is because if belief and reality are one and the same, one's belief is never potentially false, it is always right (knowledge). This presumes omniscience because one must assume that there can never be anything that demonstrates that their belief is false. To know that nothing could ever falsify one's belief, one would have to know all things because only then could they be sure that nothing could or would contradict their current belief.

Therefore a match between belief and reality requires omniscience.
Therefore, if one does not presume that they are omniscient, they must make a distinction between belief that matches reality and belief that might not.
Therefore, to separate them for the purpose of the enquiry, we call the latter 'belief' and the former 'knowledge'
All three terms must be distinguished if the search for knowledge is to occur, because omniscience nullifies the search for knowledge.

Moreover, to stress the point, reality must be posited if there is to be a search because the lack on omniscience requires us to posit a standard external to mere belief by which its potential for knowledge can be judged.

---

On Definitions...
The previous discussion justified the three distinctions, but it did not justify the given definitions. For example, it did not justify why "reality" is the term that we know means "the independent standard" or such like.

[in response] we do not, in fact, strictly know the definition of "reality" at this point (for example). All that we know is that we have a need for the three definitions in order to pursue our task and have opted for "reality" in order to serve this purpose. However, it might turn out that there is a better/('truer'?) definition that serves the purpose. The hope is that, whilst a perfect term is lacking, "reality" associates closely enough with the understanding of the common reader well enough to convey the augmented definition in order to convey the argument that it may be repurposed such (assuming that a word is ever really "repurposed" or taken away from a truer position).

---

At this juncture, we have established that we must presume a lack of omniscience and posit three things:
a) a position that has the potential to be knowledge (here called "belief");
b) a standard that provides the measure for knowledge, independent of a position that may or may not accord with with this standard (here called "reality); and
c) the status of the potential position when it is in accordance with the independent standard (here called "knowledge")

Therefore, in order to pursue the aim, we must determine the standards by which we judge whether a given belief accords with reality and is therefore knowledge.

Of course, this brings us back to the heuristic.
The basic standards that we use to determine knowledge are consistency (being how far beliefs adhere to knowledge) and applicability (being how far beliefs allow the pursuit of goals).

Note: we should not assume "perfect" accord between belief and reality at this point.

---

Final note...
It occurred to me that if this work was fully-fashioned, it could be split into 4 main sections, each of which inter-relate to one-another and either one of which could be taken as the starting point as it may not in fact be the case that any one of these were "primary". My thoughts on this are not set, but taken from a leap of intuition. These four sections would be:

"Knowledge"

"Definitions"

"Logic"

"Goals"

Here is an example of how a given section is inter-related:
"Logic" relates to...
"Definitions" because contradictory definitions are useless; we assume logic when we use definitions.
"Knowledge" because non-contradiction becomes a requisite of knowledge
"Goals" because our goals are a necessary requirement for the adoption of logic AND because contradictory goals cannot be pursued.

This is a fantastic start! With regards to defining reality, it is fine to start with a loose but accurate definition. You make an interesting point about showing the difference between belief and omniscience. I've never seen it before, well done.

Reply to Philosophim

Right, now I've hit a bit of a speed-bump and would like to get your thoughts/assistance on it.
Allow me to back-track the line of thought first...

[This does not follow on directly from the discussion above but comes shortly after]

Note: 'Reality' need only be 'external' to the belief

Q: is there a way that we can determine whether a belief accords with a standard that is external to that belief?

An external standard is a constraint because if no constraint existed, a belief could be anything.

Yet, a belief can be anything. In the respect that can believe anything. The question is whether any belief can be knowledge...

But we cannot believe anything, can we?
For example, can we believe that food is poison?
Answer:
a) if one simply wants to hold this belief as an idea in their head (possibly); but
b) not if one seeks to put this belief into effect - to act upon this belief and satisfy their hunger without dying.

Therefore one's aims constrain what beliefs one can or cannot hold.

However, this discussion above established the need to determine whether a held belief does or does not accord with reality and is therefore knowledge, not that we need to determine whether a belief can be "held" or not in the first place. Otherwise, we may conclude that "all beliefs that can be held are knowledge."

To try an pull this back...
We know that a belief is not in accord with an external standard (reality) if that belief cannot be put into effect because it reveals that something beyond the belief itself constrains the belief such that the effect of the belief is limited.

However, consider the question: "What if I believe that my beliefs are limitless?"

The problem here is that the discussion thus far holds the effect of the belief as being limited (only that the effects are), not that the belief itself is limited. To extend this argument to beliefs, we would have to conclude that beliefs are their effects.

Do you see the issue?
We can determine that the effects of a belief hit an external standard but not that the belief is subject to an external standard, but positing that a belief hits an external standard is required to bridge the gap between belief and knowledge because the argument above requires that we recognise when a belief is either confirmed or constrained. How do we bridge this gap whilst keeping the logical flow of the argument?

What are your thoughts?

This is the issue that all theories of knowledge struggle with. This is the analytic/synthetic section of the problem. Some might argue this is THE problem of epistemology.

For a general strategy, you need to find a basic and solid answer, and build from there. I think most philosophers conclude that beliefs can be anything, but how they arrive at that sets up the next step.

It may be time to analyze what I wrote in part two now. The strategy I took was to use the same methodology that I used to determine discrete experiences are knowledge, in applying those discrete experiences to reality. Thus there should be no gap, at least in logical consistency.
But maybe you will see a flaw and that will spark a better solution.

Hi TVCL, I know you are busy. I've had time to think if I answered you question adequately last time, and I feel I did not.

Quoting TVCL

The problem here is that the discussion thus far holds the effect of the belief as being limited (only that the effects are), not that the belief itself is limited. To extend this argument to beliefs, we would have to conclude that beliefs are their effects.

Lets first clarify what "effects" means. You stated a belief can or cannot be put into effect. To me that means you are applying your belief to reality. As an example, I believe that there is a red ball in front of me. Somehow we need a standard to confirm that it is a red ball. If we figure that out, we figure out the synthetic part of knowledge.

But what about the belief itself? Do I know that I believe there is a red ball in front of me? Yes. If we can figure out how we know that we are experiencing the belief of a red ball in front of us, then perhaps we could apply the same trick in applying that belief we do know, to the reality we don't yet know. In other words, we are creating an external standard to our knowledge that we have beliefs. For your purposes, you have started with the law of non-contradiction. For my purposes, I did the same. I concluded that we absolutely must have discrete experiences, as to not have discrete experiences, is a contradiction. I then build into basic beliefs.

While we can be unlimited in our beliefs, we are limited in our application of those beliefs to reality. So for yourself, I would questing if you can know that you hold beliefs. How can you conclude this? And if you can create this, try applying it to the "synthetic" (used as a broad term, not any one defined interpretation) aspect of beliefs.

Reply to Philosophim

Good timing. I just got the last part of my argument down last night with the view of writing it up today. It took some revision but I'll copy my final thought progression up verbatim. Some points are not explained in their entirety but this omission is made under the assumption that the underlying arguments are already understood. Please tell me if this is not the case...

[Beginning]
Once we begin the search for knowledge a number of axiomatic criteria come into being:

• The distinction between the 3 definitions,
• Goals as criteria
• Logic as criteria
• Faith that knowledge/(truth?) must exist or can be pursued
• One's lack of omniscience/the existence of doubt

a) Once we accept that we lack omniscience and search for knowledge, the 3 definitions follow.

b1) In establishing the 3 definitions and commencing the search, goals and logic as criteria for what we regard as knowledge are implied.
b2) Goals and logic are implied as criteria for determining whether a belief is in accord with a standard beyond itself such that it will or will not be regarded as knowledge. This is because the argument itself requires the use of logic to progress and progress in necessary relation to an aim (the search itself). Likewise, goals are required for logic and logic is required for goals (see the discussion vis-a-vis the heuristic). Therefore, if we do not assume logic and goals to be criteria by which we determine whether beliefs accord with reality such that they are knowledge, the entire endeavour becomes void.

c) After the 3 definitions are established, the question is: how do we determine whether a belief accords with reality such that it becomes knowledge?

d) We already have logic and goals to serve as basic criteria for determining what reality is because they reveal how beliefs are or are not limited in their capacity to relate to our aims (including their ability to relate to other beliefs, depending on the goal). This does not allow us to say what knowledge or reality are (positively), but it does allow us to exclude what we must not regard as knowledge or reality; logic and goals do not tell us what we know, only what we cannot know.

e) Applying these criteria, we are left with:
i) beliefs that cannot be regarded as knowledge.
ii) beliefs that have the potential to be knowledge.

f) We might use additional criteria to logic and goals to determine reality, but these criteria cannot contradict these two basic criteria and must build upon them (this may be the task of in-depth epistemology proper).

g) Once a belief accords with logic and one's goals, it has not been demonstrated that it does, in fact, accord with reality but it has been demonstrated that it does not contradict reality, such that reality allows it.

h) At such a point when reality contradicts a belief once a belief is either illogical or ineffective, that belief must be regarded as not knowledge. Therefore, all beliefs that have the potential to be knowledge (allowed by reality) can be regarded as provisional knowledge until they are contradicted.

i) In relation to (g) and (h):
Knowledge yet to be contradicted by reality can only be regarded as provisional because no argument has been made to state what reality is, only what it does not allow. As such, and lacking direct knowledge of reality, we cannot say that a given piece of knowledge will never be contradicted by reality. As such, what comes to be regarded as knowledge is not "That which has been demonstrated to accord with reality" but "That which has been demonstrated to not be contradicted by reality."

Extra:
- A belief is defined as a position that has the potential to be knowledge. Does this not match the description above?

- No. The description above describes knowledge (provisional) as "That which has the potential to accord with reality". This is one step forward in the progression of the argument in relation to belief.

--------------

In response to your most recent post...

Quoting Philosophim

Do I know that I believe there is a red ball in front of me?

Firstly, this introduces experience as an element which informs beliefs. That experience informs beliefs cannot be demonstrated, but if this is rejected we are to assume that we hold no beliefs (positions) that are informed by experience. Therefore, to allow for this contingency, that experience informs beliefs is adopted as an additional axiom.

What's more is that to know that I hold the belief must mean that the belief that I hold the belief itself must accord with reality. From the discussion above, we conclude that we are able to treat a belief as provisional knowledge when reality is not contradicted such that reality allows it. Therefore, if the mere holding of the belief is allowed we can know that we have the belief.
(In addition, the knowledge that I have X experience follows the same logic. If I experience pink elephants I must know that I am having the experience. What is merely belief and not knowledge at such a juncture is the belief about what the experience is indicative of; for example, I know that I experience pink elephants but merely believe that they can be interacted with in a physical manner).

And then:
Quoting Philosophim

a belief can or cannot be put into effect. To me that means you are applying your belief to reality.

[see the discussion above]: Once logic is applied, we discard all contradictory beliefs and non-knowledge. Once goals are related to, we discard all beliefs that are ineffective as non-knowledge. what remains are consistent, effective beliefs which are regarded as provisional knowledge because they have not been excluded and accord with reality such that they are allowed by it. These beliefs are only provisional knowledge because it is not demonstrated that reality will never contradict them. This is essentially the conclusion to this section of the argument.

--------------

In response to your argument...

Of course, I have not addressed your arguments about discrete experience in here and this is because they were not needed to get the argument to this point. However, if you think that they can intersect with the argument above/are required for it or can build off from it, please do say.

--------------

In any case, that's all for now. Do let me know your thoughts on anything or everything that has been addressed.

All the best.

Excellent post! I had to reread what "goals" were again to make sure I had everything right. Back then I was not criticizing word choices, because we weren't to that level yet. However, now that we're at the point that the basic definitions are so important, I think a better term instead of goals would be to separate the word goals, and your approach to solving goals as a "Hypothesis".

A repost:
Quoting TVCL

1. A goal initiates the inquiry because the search for truth is a goal.

2. Goals parameterise our enquiry because they determine the point at which a given endeavour can be deemed to be satisfactorily achieved and the criteria by which this point is to be reached.

3. Therefore, if goals set the beginning and the end of the enquiry, they set the parameters for how or when our understanding of the truth is satisfactory.

Reply to TVCL

This is due to a few factors. A goal is seen in common vernacular as "the end". Something like, "I want to find out if this apple is edible." How we approach pursuing a goal is not the same as arriving at the goal itself.

When you speak about goals, you imply that it is how we approach the goal which is just as important. If I want to fly by using my arms, then it would be silly to approach that goal without using my arms. Further, we wish to use logic, like the law of non-contradiction in our goals. That requires that our equation to discover Y must be falsifiable in some way. If we do not have this restriction, then someone could introduce a non-falsifiable belief, and state because it is not contradicted by reality, it is therefore provisional knowledge per your definition.

Quoting TVCL

This is because the argument itself requires the use of logic to progress and progress in necessary relation to an aim

Without defining our approach to obtaining goals as necessarily being falsifiable, your above claim will not hold. If we split your goal an end result, and the approach to that goal as a hypothesis, I think your approach is communicated with greater clarity, and security in its definition. If you disagree with the inclusion of a "hypothesis", this is fine. But your definition of "goal" as I understand it currently makes some assumptions that are not proven such as point 2.

Quoting TVCL

e) Applying these criteria, we are left with:
i) beliefs that cannot be regarded as knowledge.
ii) beliefs that have the potential to be knowledge

One problem here is the exclusion of knowledge itself as a viable definition. If we are to say there is a potential for knowledge, we must be able to show what knowledge is first. You even state this at the end.
Quoting TVCL

As such, what comes to be regarded as knowledge is not "That which has been demonstrated to accord with reality" but "That which has been demonstrated to not be contradicted by reality."

We cannot analyze the potential of something without first knowing what that something is. I would think that if you hold a goal, a hypothesized belief, and cannot contradict it, then you have knowledge. Now this assumes that knowledge is something which could be changed at a later time if new information arises that contradicts your claims. That is fine, but that would be knowledge itself, not provisional. What you might be doing here is thinking that knowledge needs to be truth. In doing so, you run into the problems that truth brings to epistemology. It is fine if you decide to go this route, but you'll have to address those problems as they rise up.

Quoting TVCL

Of course, I have not addressed your arguments about discrete experience in here and this is because they were not needed to get the argument to this point. However, if you think that they can intersect with the argument above/are required for it or can build off from it, please do say.

This is fine. The arguments I proposed were only used to give you a basis of how to approach the idea of knowledge from a foundational level. I am more eager to see your own approach. The only lesson to be drawn from my approach is to see how to make as few assumptions as possible in constructing an argument. Our arguments are also serving two different approaches. My argument comes from a fundamental construction of epistemology like Descartes, which admittedly is unnecessary for many people. Your epistemology is more a logical approach based on assumed precepts which few would nave need to question. We are not questioning what the "I" is, proving that thought is knowable, or other such concepts. Your goal is an applicable epistemology within our normative understanding of reality, which is useful and easy to grasp for daily use. And I think its going very well so far!

Feel free to confirm or deny any points I've made. If we are in general agreement with this base, then we can continue with the further branches from this I'm sure you're ready to get to!

Reply to Philosophim

... and a great response. Thank you, there is some helpful stuff here.

To begin my response I will start by stating that I understand where you are coming from when you suggest the distinction between the goal and its hypothesis. On the one hand, I agree that the distinction will be useful in clarifying my approach and use this when re-writing the argument. On the other, it appears that your rationale for suggesting the distinction may misunderstand the argument and so allow me to address this...

Quoting Philosophim

When you speak about goals, you imply that it is how we approach the goal which is just as important. If I want to fly by using my arms, then it would be silly to approach that goal without using my arms.

I'm not sure where this implication came from (not that it wasn't present), but in response to it, allow me to make my position on goals clear...

In the scheme of epistemology, the goal is defined as "the end" as this is primary because it lays out the criteria by which a given enquiry (including the search for knowledge itself) will be satisfied. If this were not the case we would have to posit a search for knowledge that does not reference a goal which appears to be impossible because the search itself is a goal. This would be so even if the parameters of the goal are yet to be explicit. Indeed, it appears that much of the work of the last few posts has been to say "Okay, we know that there must be a goal and that it sets parameters, but what exactly is the goal and, therefore, what are these parameters?"

The approach to the goal is secondary. The approach is a question of testing what works within the parameters. This is why I would contend with the arms example. There is nothing in my approach that determines how this goal should be approached. We presume the use of arms but the reasons for this remain un-demonstrated. Instead, once the goal is set we have multiple options for the approach. E.g. "I want to fly by using my arms..."

We [can] test what works in relation to this goal by:
a) ... by using my feet
b) ... by using my nose
c) ... by using my arms

As odd as it sounds, there is nothing in the argument itself to say that one cannot fly by using their arms by using their feet. This is absurd, but the reason that we find it to be absurd is that we find that we cannot put this approach into practice for the achievement of the goal. If we could achieve the goal by using our feet it would, in fact, not be absurd. Of course, this is a special case because the various approaches appear to present a contradiction, which reveals the place of logic in the scheme more than it does the importance of the approach... if the goal is meant exactly how it is stated with no room for contradiction, then we can exclude all approaches that are illogical because we are unable to posit them, let alone put them into effect.

Hopefully this explains why I will take your advice and use the term "hypothesis" but I will use this to refer to the approach, but not the goal itself. Goals hold a primary position in the epistemology precisely because they set "the end" of the endeavour (and all of its component parts).

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Quoting Philosophim

Now this assumes that knowledge is something which could be changed at a later time if new information arises that contradicts your claims. That is fine, but that would be knowledge itself, not provisional.

A point well made and taken. You're right - this is what the approach entails. Perhaps when I come to clarify this work I will make a point of stating that the knowledge gleaned by the point is "knowledge" but is uncertain or open to future revision or possibly not Truth etc.

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Quoting Philosophim

If we do not have this restriction, then someone could introduce a non-falsifiable belief, and state because it is not contradicted by reality, it is therefore provisional knowledge per your definition.

I'm fine with this, and this may actually speak to the difference between our approaches too. Let me explain...

One could claim that about an unfalsifiable belief, but to what extent? If a belief is divorced from its effects and the belief is unfalsifiable, it is [provisional] knowledge.
However, any belief that has an effect is falsifiable because the test for the belief the relation of the effect to an aim and we see this once the effect comes up against reality.

Sophists can pick us up on this point, but I don't mind. One thing that I would like to do with my approach is is this: instead of fighting the sophists, I would like to leave them to it. If they do not follow the argument or want to slip out of it, they can. But in so doing it would seem that they are left with islands of knowledge which are entirely within their own heads.

Consider this discussion:

Sophist: "Due to your argument, I am a Marxist; true Marxism has never been proven not to work. Therefore, I provisionally know that Marxism works."

Response: "Provisional indeed. Until such such a time that it is put into effect... so long as it remains a mere idea in your head, it remains unfalsifiable and is provisional knowledge. However, at the point when it is put into effect, or a component part can be, we will discover what reality does or does not allow and it will become falsifiable."

The takeaway is that all kinds of beliefs can be unfalsifiable if we divorce beliefs from their effects. In relation to this, there may be two kinds of philosophers: those who do philosophy with a kind of solipsism such that their ideas are always divorced from their applications and decisions, and those who do it with sophistry such that they can always find a loop-hole or clause that allows them to slip through an argument. Such people could treat the argument like so:

Me: "If we search for knowledge, all else follows..."

Sophist: "Ah! But what if we don't search?"

Me: "This word is defined like so..."

Sophist: "Ah! But how do we know that the word is so defined? Because you define it with other words? What about them?"

Me: "Beliefs not contradicted by reality are provisional knowledge."

Sophist: "Ah! And so I have removed my beliefs from their effects and made them unfalsifiable, and I have provisional knowledge."

My overall strategy in dealing with these people or approaches is not to fight them; not to guarantee, beyond doubt that such-and-such must be accepted. Instead, it is to recognise that contingencies are always left open. I make necessary deductions and arguments but hopefully this explains why I use so many contingencies in my work before moving to necessities (and, in all fairness, this is not merely a preference - this appears to be how we have to approach epistemology). Incorporating the contingencies into the structure appear to be required to give it enough "flex" to stand the storms of madness... other approaches that attempt to do away with all contingency and have only necessity appear to be more airtight and rigid, but also more brittle. Doing epistemology is like holding a bar of soap; if held with too firm a grip, it slips away... and so, perhaps it is best to make that grip firm, whilst allowing for the gaps around the edges...

This is not a criticism of a single argument that you have presented . Your observations about definitions are a case in point; the choice of words and approach to how we understand them really is important for developing an argument. The difference would be between yourself, who understands that there is a reasonable point at which the demand for definitions ceases and one who would push that demand in order to break the argument. You approach this in a spirit of constructive criticism.

Likewise, you're doing your own thing with your approach. I understand that we have our different approach to different ends, but if my discussion here would say anything to you I might use it as a word of caution against seeking knowledge structures that are perfectly "airtight". Within my own schema, this might be revealed as a "false goal" depending upon how you seek to pursue it.

Quoting TVCL

Hopefully this explains why I will take your advice and use the term "hypothesis" but I will use this to refer to the approach, but not the goal itself.

Great, I am in full agreement. I did not mean to imply they should be joined, just that you needed something to explain the process that we arrive at the goal. I'm think I fully understand now, I appreciate you re-explaining. =)

It is more than Sophists you will have to worry about. Your base theory is very close to science at this point, but science does not allow non-falsifiable claims. If you allow non-falsifiable claims into the realm of knowledge, we are also back again to what you mean by provisional knowledge. How is provisional knowledge separate from just a belief? Further, if you do not address non-falsifiable claims, how will you convince someone to use falsifiable claims? Let me give you an example.

Early on in America, there was the idea that taking an anti-malaria drug, hydroxychloriquine would be a good fight against Corona. After all, they seemed to hit what was needed, and a few people who took it had better results. There was no need to try to prove these things false for these people, and many accepted it. It turns out upon more scientific study in which falsification was applied, the medication did not have appreciable effects, and could potentially kill you.

In only preaching to reasonable people, you are only preaching to the choir. And in that case, why would reasonable people not just use science? If you are to create a new theory of epistemology you must ask yourself who is going to use, and what are the alternatives for other people to use?

This brings me back to a couple of points I made earlier. People are not always rational. If you let them escape a rational argument, they will. If you don't fight them from a place of intellectual certainty and clarity, they will think they are right. They will take that with them to the world, and knowledge becomes a thing of relativity and who is more forceful in their beliefs. On the flip side, rational people aren't going to learn or use a method of epistemology that has easily identifiable holes in it.

Your competitor with rational people is science. Your competitor for those who do not use science, is a vast variety of personal opinion, bias, and induction. What will your theory serve? Who will it save? Just something to consider.

Quoting TVCL

This is not a criticism of a single argument that you have presented

No, not a worry! And I hope my statements were not taken to be a critique of your approach either! I feel like your intention is to produce an epistemology that is rational, and can be understood by someone who is not a nit picky philosopher. This is a very good thing. To this end, I understand what you mean about not addressing the Sophists. My only concern is that you will be critiqued by a lot more than them in this particular instance. And this is what I truly meant by airtight. If you fight to make it airtight, you will likely fail, but your failure will be difficult to identify, and arguably irrelevent. If you do not make it airtight, you will assume you can let things slide, but you will misjudge on this and leave yourself open to holes you never thought of.

I would re-examine once more belief, knowledge, and potential knowledge, and see if the terms as defined are clearly different from one another, and useful to your purposes. At that point, I will accept whatever you decide, and we can move onto where you would like your theory to go from here. Again, your work and dedication to this topic are always appreciated. I know the effort it entails.

Reply to Philosophim

You raised 3 particularly interesting points/questions that I would like to answer in no particular order...

Quoting Philosophim

My only concern is that you will be critiqued by a lot more than them in this particular instance. And this is what I truly meant by airtight. If you fight to make it airtight, you will likely fail, but your failure will be difficult to identify, and arguably irrelevent. If you do not make it airtight, you will assume you can let things slide, but you will misjudge on this and leave yourself open to holes you never thought of.

Excellent, we are in agreement here - this is the point that I would like to strengthen the argument to. An interesting side-point is that we cannot technically judge nor have demonstrated the point at which we could say that a given criticism is irrelevant. This appears to be intuited and - surprise surprise! - this will be in relation to what we are implicitly trying to achieve (how far do we aim to take the enquiry?) which in fact brings me on to me next point...

Quoting Philosophim

What will your theory serve? Who will it save? Just something to consider.

Please note here that all that I stated in my previous post about my approach is not an accident of preference, but follows from the logic of the epistemology that I am describing. "What will your theory serve?" Those who seek knowledge. That aim is the cornerstone contingency from which all else follows. What I am trying to establish is that once the search is on, all else follows; this is why I build up from the axioms that this contingency brings into the argument. Once there is a search, there are a number of things that we have to accept and adhere to if the search is to be maintained (such as the presumption of doubt/lack of omniscience, relevance to goals, adherence to knowledge and the like) and it has yet to be demonstrated that these axioms are not necessary if the search is commenced. Now, these axioms and the argument that stem from them must be recognised if the argument is to be maintained as well as commenced. At any point, someone can stop searching for knowledge - they have that choice. My inference now and a place that this argument will eventually lead is that once this search is stopped, all else falls apart.

Allow me a brief example in the meantime...
I have [hopefully] established that once we search for knowledge we must regard knowledge in so far as it can be applicable to reality and not contradictory and so, the moment one searches they have to regard their beliefs in relation to their reason and goals. The moment they do away with the search, these criteria fall away; or vis-versa such that once one discards their use of reason or has no concern whatsoever for their goals and how they are achieved, they can no longer search for knowledge. Logically, this has to be the case. "What," you might ask "if someone is no longer rational?" to which I would reply: "Exactly! such people are no longer of relevance - they simply cannot be." Nor can those people who do not search or want to avoid the search to the best of their ability. I recognise that people have that option that they are free to take. In a sense the argument that I am presenting, indeed is appears that epistemology itself is binary; like a light-switch... whenever one searches for knowledge, the entire argument turns "on" and at any point the search, along with the argument, can be turned "off".

Now, one appeal that is actually contained within my argument is to the consequences of giving up the search for knowledge and all that this entails... if knowledge is always measured to some degree in relation to what we are trying to achieve and someone outright rejects the search, it follows that one would be much worse off in making decisions in their lives if they don't know anything.

Quoting Philosophim

How is provisional knowledge separate from just a belief?

Great question. There is actually a logical knot that is tangled up here. Let's pull it apart...

They are separate because belief is potential knowledge and knowledge accords with reality. Beliefs are excluded when they are inconsistent or inapplicable. All that remains is [provisional] knowledge.

If a belief is falsifiable it cannot be shown not to accord with reality. Therefore, we must conclude that it does accord with reality. Therefore, an un-falsifiable belief is knowledge.

From this, we have two legs of an answer:
1) Knowledge is all such beliefs that have not been shown to be either inconsistent or inapplicable. Ergo, belief and knowledge are different.
2) All beliefs that remain un-falsified (not shown to be illogical or inapplicable) are knowledge (not Truth)

As argued in the previous post, un-falsifiable beliefs would be knowledge, not belief, only in so far as they are truly un-falsified or un-falsifiable. For example, assuming that "The revolution will eventually come" is un-falsifiable such that it only remained in one's head then yes, they could be said to know it. But the moment that this belief was applied to - say - a finite time frame, it becomes falsifiable and is [provisional] knowledge until it is contradicted (now, of course, with a complex claim like this, the point at which it is "contradicted" might depend on more than the mere assertion, or even the point at which the revolution does not come, such as the integrity of the arguments underlying the claim itself).

A final point about your mention of science...
I can see the comparison that you're drawing but have to disagree. The argument that I am progressing and the method in use are closer to mathematics than to science. Indeed, I would argue that the argument is what would/does justify science (or would even justify a religion for that matter). Which is apparently analogous with science is not the base theory but the criteria that it reveals for seeking knowledge which involves testing beliefs. One of the main differences is that I have not yet made one appeal to data/empiricism/observation to support the argument. Now, these will play a role but that will be because using empirical data works for particular goals, not because all knowledge requires empirical data.

Does that make sense? If I need to clarify any points that I have made please let me know.

An additional thought occurred to me...
Remember that goals set the criteria for knowledge but that these criteria can be more precise depending on what is trying to be achieved (including the kind of knowledge). For example, if science did in fact require falsifiable claims, there is no reason why un-falsifiable claims cannot be excluded in the search for scientific knowledge. Specific branches of enquiry can have specific criteria for specific ends.

What has been argued for in the post above is what we start out with in the non-specific search for knowledge, in light of which consistency and applicability are the criteria of criteria (if you get what I mean). So long as the more specific criteria that come after them do not contradict these two basic criteria, there is no reason that these more specific criteria cannot be put to use for various ends.

Quoting TVCL

They are separate becau[quote="TVCL;450425"]"What will your theory serve?" Those who seek knowledge.

In regards to potential knowledge versus a belief:

Quoting TVCL

They are separate because belief is potential knowledge and knowledge accords with reality. Beliefs are excluded when they are inconsistent or inapplicable. All that remains is [provisional] knowledge.

To clarify, what you are saying is that a belief that has not been contradicted is 'potential knowledge'. A belief that has been contradicted is a 'belief'. But if knowledge is what has not been contradicted, and potential knowledge is what has not been contradicted, is there a difference?

I think I see what you're trying to go for, and its a means of application to decide whether you have reached at knowledge, versus potential knowledge. If I believe that I can flap my arms and fly, but I never try it out, do we want to say that is in the same category as knowledge? I don't think that's what you're going for.

Perhaps we could say something like this. A belief which has been contradicted by reality, is a contradicted belief. A belief which has not attempted to see if reality will contradict it, is an unverified belief. I would say both of these categories are still belief, and not knowledge. And this fits within the terms you've crafted so far. You know that knowledge can only form when it cannot be contradicted, but one must try to actually contradict it for this to be. I believe this also fits in with your aims of a rational person who wishes to seek the truth.

This leads us back to falsifiability. I want to make sure we're both on the same page as to what this means. To be falsifiable means that there is a way to test if it is in accordance with reality. This is a hypothesis. It is a proposition that we can test and discover if an attempt to prove our claim as false will pass or fail. So to fit in with your example, ""The revolution will eventually come", your are correct, this is not falsifiable. It does not become falsifiable until we place restrictions on it that let us actually test it. But until it has actually been tested, it cannot be potential knowledge either. This is because we can construct a contradiction.

If I claim, "The Revolution will not eventually come", then both I and another person could have contradictory potential knowledge. If we understand however that they are both merely untested beliefs, we do not run into a contradiction. This applies whether we put a timeline to test it, or not. If we claim two contradictory beliefs are both potential knowledge, we run afoul of our core rational argument for what knowledge is: something which cannot be contradicted.

Because knowledge is something which cannot be contradicted, I do not think we cannot allow the idea of potential knowledge. The logic can be crafted as thus.

k = knowledge, p = potential knowledge

If k, then !k = false
If p, then !p = true
but p =!p is a contradiction, and knowledge cannot have a contradiction.

This is why I believe potential knowledge as you have defined it now, cannot be a fundamental part of your knowledge system, even if we do not wish to be as precise as science. Ok, I hope I didn't spend too much time on that part. Quoting TVCL

One of the main differences is that I have not yet made one appeal to data/empiricism/observation to support the argument.

I do not think that you need to. We can hold a belief in our head that we cannot contradict with our own beliefs. But then when applying those beliefs in any way, be this empirical, data, or observation, this belief cannot be contradicted by the respective empirical, data, or observation realm.

Reply to Philosophim

Quoting Philosophim

To clarify, what you are saying is that a belief that has not been contradicted is 'potential knowledge'. A belief that has been contradicted is a 'belief'. But if knowledge is what has not been contradicted, and potential knowledge is what has not been contradicted, is there a difference?

No, "knowledge" is just "potential knowledge" I'm taking this from your advice in your previous posts... we cannot go so far as to say that we have "truth". Knowledge is belief that accords with reality and at this point in the argument we only have beliefs that accord enough with reality to not be excluded on the basis of contradiction or non-applicability. If a belief is consistent and applicable it is knowledge but, technically, this is only "provisional" because we have no means of knowing whether reality will not contradict a given piece of knowledge later (as of yet). And so, we could either consider if "provisional knowledge" or say that "all knowledge that we have is technically provisional".

Can you do me a favour? I think there is an important logical point in your post that you seem to have a better grasp of that I do. Last night, I thought through what "applicability" means which is a key concept in the argument. Being clear about it might give you a clearer take on the relevance of "testing" or "fallibility" within the argument. Your points are probably still relevant but do you mind if I present this idea first and then ask you to re-frame the questions/criticisms above in light of it?

Okay, so applicability...

We say that a belief is excluded as knowledge when it is either inconsistent(contradictory/illogical) or inapplicable.

What does applicability mean?

A belief is applicable when it can be utilised in service of a given goal.

Example 1:
a) Goal: "I want to make gold."
b) Belief: "I can make things its gold by touching them."
c) Outcome: "Touching things does not make them into gold"
d) Conclusion: The belief "I can make things into gold by touching them" is not knowledge.

Example 2:
a) Goal: "I want to walk"
b) Belief: "I can do so using my feet"
c) Outcome: "Using my feet allows me to walk"
d) Conclusion: The belief "I can walk using my feet" is knowledge.

This is how the progression works (if broken down; it may often by that more than one step may happen at once):

Goal -> Belief -> Effect -> Outcome...
Belief serves goal = belief provides knowledge.
Belief does not serve goal = belief does not provide knowledge.

Example 3: (consider the progression):

Goal
To know how 2 makes 4
->
Belief
That 2+2=4
->
Effect
Adding 2 to 2 makes 4 (assuming adherence to logic and numeracy)
->
Outcome
Belief is applicable because 2+2 can make 4
->
Verdict
The belief provides knowledge

Hopefully, the way that the process applies to the abstract further helps to clarify why it is distinct from science. The idea of things constantly being "tested" is due to the fact that we are always living. It is not so much that goals or applicability determine reality (and therefore knowledge) but that the way that we "test" or attempt to determine reality will be by seeing what beliefs are or are not congruent with it, and which beliefs these will be always depends on what goals we are trying to achieve. Reality might be the overall picture behind knowledge, but goals are always the [small] frame that we see it through (and logic stops it from being too blurry).

Let me know your thoughts.

---

Finally, I wanted to leave you with a thought/question: is 2+2=4 a falsifiable belief?

Quoting TVCL

technically, this is only "provisional" because we have no means of knowing whether reality will not contradict a given piece of knowledge later (as of yet). And so, we could either consider if "provisional knowledge" or say that "all knowledge that we have is technically provisional".

Great! Truth is the only thing that is certain. Knowledge is our best rational guess at what the truth is. As such, we can imagine that something might come around that may prove our guess wrong one day.

Ok, now we get to a potentially very technical and difficult to discuss section. I will try to break down your examples and see if I can demonstrate the applicable as I have come to understand it.

1. Make gold by touching it.
This is a perfect example of the logic you have concluded. Nothing within the sentence structure necessitates any defined link between the two. You can believe you can make things into gold by touching them. You know you have this belief. What you don't know is if you apply this belief by actually touching things whether this will turn these things into gold.

So you apply it. You take you finger, touch a rock, and it does not turn to gold. Reality has contradicted the application of your belief, not the fact that you had the belief.

2. I want to walk
The problem with this example is the word "walk" is defined as using feet. You aren't confirming that using your feet allows you to walk, because that's part of the definition of walk. If we change the structure to,

a) Goal: "I want to walk"
b) Belief: "I can walk"
c) Outcome: "I am able to walk"
d) Conclusion: Therefore I can walk.

I think this works more the way you intended. You have a belief that you can walk, then you apply that belief, by trying to walk. Reality does not contradict you. The definition of walk is subsumed in the goal, as we know what walking entails. For your purposes, we have a goal, a belief, and an attempt to confirm or deny that the belief fits the goal. Yes, I know this is technical, a subtle difference, and seems like semantics, but this is an important for part 3.

3. To know how 2+2 makes 4

While in your second example, the reliance on a definition for your conclusion was subtle, here it relies on definitions almost exclusively. At this point, we've said, 2+2=4 because there are a set of definitions that tell us 2+2=4. That really doesn't prove anything except that a bunch of definitions say certain conclusions should happen. At this point we've said, I have a belief, and it is proven because I have that belief.

Lets reshape this once again to fit what I feel you are trying to do.

Goal: I want to know if 2+2 makes 4
Belief: I believe 2+2 can make 4
Effect: I make sure I understand the definitions, then I actually add 2+2 together. I find it makes 4 without contradiction.
Outcome: I know 2+2 can make 4 by application

Now I will clarify, you do not have to do math empirically. There are many beliefs and concepts we can test within our own mind, especially if they are products of the mind itself. But it is still an application of our belief to see if it is contradicted. If I stated 2 objects + 2 objects make 4 objects, you would need to apply that with objects. You could imagine objects in your mind, but they aren't actually objects. You need the real deal. What level you need to apply your belief at is determined by your definitions. Thus you could know the definition that 2+2 = 4, but you won't know if that belief is knowledge within your mind/empiricism/etc. until you apply it for yourself within the scope of the potential application.

And yes, if this is what you are going for, this is separate from science. Science rigorously tries to disprove a hypothesis, whereas we are simply trying one application, and determining whether we are contradicted. Still, every belief that is applied is falsifiable by the fact it is being applied. If it is contradicted when it is applied, then we know the belief is false. If it is not contradicted, then it is "knowledge". This should also answer your final question, that 2+2=4 is a falsifiable belief if one applies it.

Reply to Philosophim

Fantastic! Great, I think that we're making progress. I've got a few responses to make which might clarify I few points...

Quoting Philosophim

The problem with this example is the word "walk" is defined as using feet. You aren't confirming that using your feet allows you to walk, because that's part of the definition of walk.

No, in fairness this is kind of what the example was going for. Applicability is applicability. It might seem tautological to conclude that we walk using our feet but the idea is that we can discover that a definition is applicable to itself and this still provides knowledge (even if it is only trivial). If we considered the alternative and found that we could not in fact walk with our feet but must do so with our hands, this would challenge our knowledge about our definitions.

Consider this:
Goal: "I want to walk with my feet and by "walk" I mean use my feet to move"
Belief: "I can do this by using my hands"
Outcome: "I can do this by using my hands"

Now, if this were to be the case it would reveal something very strange about reality indeed and we might need to revise our beliefs and definitions, but the model would still apply. As it so happens, reality does not seem to allow this and so it's all good.

Quoting Philosophim

At this point, we've said, 2+2=4 because there are a set of definitions that tell us 2+2=4. That really doesn't prove anything except that a bunch of definitions say certain conclusions should happen

That's partly why I wanted to have this part of the discussion. So far, you appear to have presumed that applicability is always about proving something external to beliefs or definitions (which is understandable). This can be the case, but does not always have to be so. Applicability can also be "internal" to definitions. In the example that I have given, we find that "2" is, essentially, applicable to itself which, again, is tautological but it is still knowledge.

Quoting Philosophim

Thus you could know the definition that 2+2 = 4, but you won't know if that belief is knowledge within your mind/empiricism/etc. until you apply it for yourself within the scope of the potential application.

Quoting Philosophim

If it is contradicted when it is applied, then we know the belief is false. If it is not contradicted, then it is "knowledge". This should also answer your final question, that 2+2=4 is a falsifiable belief if one applies it.

Exactly!

Look, it's all about what a person's goals are, right?

If one is merely trying to determine whether arithmetic can be organised in particular ways in their mind, this will shape exactly what part of reality their applications are being applied to (namely, that of the mind) and so, their knowledge is that arithmetic applies to their goals whilst being kept in the mind. Thus, the "test" that 2+2=4 is simply that 2+2=4 (and that logic is adhered to).

However, once their goal is to marry arithmetic to something beyond itself such as physical reality or the relation of objects, the "test" for 2+2=4 is no longer the definition of terms, but whether 2 objects and 2 objects gives us 4 objects...

Internal tests for applicability might have different criteria to external ones and it always depends on what one is trying to acheive.

This is why when you say:
Quoting Philosophim

This should also answer your final question, that 2+2=4 is a falsifiable belief if one applies it.

We should have the answer to the issue about falsifiablility...
2+2=4 remains un-falsifiable whilst it remains internal (assuming that we adhere to logic) and this is not because it can never be "tested" per-se, but because the test for the claim is always based in its definitions, and because the definitions are always mirror-images of themselves they can never contradict each-other. Therefore, we're essentially concluding that it is un-falsifiable not because it can never be tested but because the test for applicability is so engineered that it can never be wrong. And so, one can know that 2+2=4. But as you noted, this is different from the knowledge that 2 objects and 2 objects gives 4 objects.

Now, when we apply this to the "revolution example", whilst it remains un-falsifiable it technically amounts to the knowledge that "So long as it is knowledge that remains solely in my head, I can know that the revolution will occur (or will not occur)" - this may seem contradictory, but reality does allow it (perhaps like it allows the knowledge that "chocolate tastes nice" and "chocolate does not taste nice" to be known by two separate individuals). However, just as the external application of 2+2=4 makes it newly falsifiable, so too does our conclusions about the revolution. Therefore, our beliefs about the revolution may be falsifiable in one sense and not in another and it depends upon what is trying to be achieved. In any case, the model still appears to hold without contradiction.

This is a great point to have reached. You seem to have summarised my previous post very well. I can't be certain whether this has answered all of your concerns from your penultimate post and so please re-frame them if you still have them. But in any case, this is looking really good.

I too am excited! I think we're whittling down the remaining issues, and this is looking good. There are just a few questions and clarifications left.

Quoting TVCL

If we considered the alternative and found that we could not in fact walk with our feet but must do so with our hands

I hesistate to address this, as I don't want this to lead into certain other questions yet. We're trying to solve the questions of applicability, so lets disregard the question which will hover, "Who determines definitions?"

Instead, what I will assume so we can resolve this portion (unless you think going into that right now would help), is that we know what definitions are. This is necessary, for then we can say we know what beliefs are. So lets define walk. https://www.dictionary.com/browse/walk?s=t
"to advance or travel on foot at a moderate speed or pace"

If you move using your hands, you can say you were able to mobilize yourself using your hands, but you (under the assumptions we are working on) could not say you would walk using your hands. That is because you are introducing something that is not the definition into the definition.

Lets use another example, the old stand by of, "A bachelor is an unmarried man." If we found an unmarried woman, then called her a "bachelor" because she fit part of the definition of being unmarried, we would be violating the portion of the definition that notes it must be an unmarried man.

This would violate what we have set up so far. We cannot have a contradiction in our belief for our belief to be knowledge. If I hold that a bachelor is an unmarried man, then conclude that an unmarried woman is a bachelor, I have a contradiction. The same applies with, "Walking with your hands," Walking uses feet. If I say I can walk with my hands, and hold the definition of walking as is, I have a contradiction.

Application as mentioned does not have to happen only in realms beyond the mind. In showing that a woman cannot be a bachelor, we have used no actual woman or man, because we have determined this logic through the definitions we hold alone. The 2+2 = 4 math equation is the same. While someone could tell us the definition of 2, 4, and addition, we can apply this within our minds in regards to other definitions such as five. Thus I can, without being told, apply 2+2 in my mind and realize that 5 would not be the answer, because it would contradict the definitions of the numbers I hold.

The application in the mind can be summed as, "Applying beliefs to other beliefs without contradiction." The belief could be a definition, or a belief that has been applied without contradiction, aka., knowledge. The application outside of the mind would be a different application, though with the same rule that it cannot be contradicted in its application, and result in a different type of knowledge. I find it helpful to call this "realm or area" in which application is occurring, context. Thus we can apply beliefs within the context of our mind, or the context of empiricism and result in different contextual knowledge.

I believe this gives you the consistency that you are looking for. Further, this will let you clarify a goal by context. Thus I could have my goal be, "To learn if a woman is a bachelor in the context of my mind," and have another goal be, "To learn if a woman is a bachelor in the context of empiricism". This compartmentalizes the goals as a person wishes, and allows a way to establish the limitations one desires in their pursuit of knowledge.

If this is amenable, I believe you have the base you need to continue. The question that I tabled, "What determines definitions?" is something you may want to ask yourself next. You may find this irrelevant to your pursuits however, and feel free to ignore it if you wish. Regardless, what you have constructed so far seems like a solid foundation. Amazing work!

Reply to Philosophim

Good stuff.

It occurred to me that the solution to this is quite easy; you can appeal to the hierarchy of one's goals and conclude that one cannot believe in a genuine contradiction.

In my last post I think that I was trying to be clever by keeping the flow of the argument, but you're right; we cannot do with genuine contradiction. We can make an argument that we can walk with our hands if walking might not require use of our feet, but if use of our feet is entailed by the criteria of the goal, walking with anything else will not be applicable: we must walk with our feet.

Here we have an instance of when certain beliefs can be demonstrated to be inapplicable the moment that the goal is posited (which is something that you essentially said in an earlier post). If the goal is to walk we can discard all beliefs that posit not using our feet in order to achieve this goal. This is because any belief like this is tantamount to the belief that "I can use my feet without using my feet" which is illogical and must be discarded as mere belief, not knowledge. We already recognise the primacy of non-contradiction, but allow me to re-justify this by arguing that the reason for why this is explicitly justified by the overall argument is because we have goals, but these are not in isolation and form into a hierarchy, with higher priority goals being implicit in lower priority ones.

Recall that earlier on in the argument I explained that adherence to logic must be a primary goal when we search for knowledge because without it, we are simply unable to do the search; anything that comes to be known can self-destruct without adherence to logic because, basically, if A is not A, Knowledge is not Knowledge and Searching is not Searching.
Therefore, in effect, being illogical is intellectual paralysis.
Therefore, if there is to be a search at all, adherence to logic is required throughout.
Therefore, whilst we are searching for knowledge, all beliefs are judged in relation to goals and goals contain the implicit goal of adherence to logic (non-contradiction).

And so, when we re-examine the goal the matter is actually quite different...
Goal: To walk, meaning movement with my feet (which adhering to logic)
Belief: "I can walk with anything except for my feet"
Effect: Cannot be done
Outcome: Cannot be done
Verdict: The Belief is not Knowledge

To hammer home the point, the only way that it could be knowledge given the criteria of the goal is if we mean something else by "walk" but if not, this argument hopefully demonstrates argument demonstrates the point.

This has been a drawn out explanation to reach a conclusion that I think we both see, but it felt useful for the sake of clarity (my own and perhaps yours too) and useful to demonstrate what I have meant the various times that I've mentioned a "false goal"...

At times I have referred to a false goal, meaning a goal which is inherently unachievable.

"To walk, meaning movement of my feet without using my feet" is a false goal.
Indeed, all such contradictory goals are false goals.
This is because the only belief that can count as knowledge in relation to it is "The means cannot achieve the goal" or simply "This cannot be done" (which translates to "reality does not allow this"). All other beliefs about how to achieve the goal must be un-applicable by default and there be merely belief, not knowledge.

I find this interesting because the argument uses the axiom that we test knowledge in relation to our goals, but this extension seems to explain that what goals we can or cannot have in the first place also tells use something about what we can or cannot know.

Anyway, that should square the problem presented in your post. This hasn't felt like the most streamlined way of giving an answer but hopefully the argument has been made clearly. If not, let me know if you see any issues and we can do some tidying.

As for definitions, they function on the same principles as knowledge in general; a given definition is known based upon what a person or people are trying to achieve, with an implicit adherence to logic. As it goes, this is largely technical and we can skim over it for the moment. We can explore it later, but let's sort out one thing a time.

Looking forward to your response.

This user has been deleted and all their posts removed.

Reply to TVCL

Wonderful! I believe we are both in agreement, and yes, this conversation was as much for my clarity as yours. It is a rare event that two philosophers come together and think with a mind for the answers to life's questions without worry about ego. I believe you have taken the seed of your idea, and grown it into a strong sapling that will not break in the wind, nor yield easily to an ax. Your focus on goals is a way to make it very relatable and simple to begin with, and the process as a whole is compact, but logically sound. I look forward to seeing where we go next, and I am hopeful a person of your intellect and hard work will be able to make something of it beyond these forum posts once this is said and done.

As for the definitions, absolutely lets table it. Depending on the goal of your epistemology theory, it may not be needed. I think we are ready for your next branches.

Reply to Philosophim

Fantastic. This has been an invaluable means for testing, strengthening and clarifying the core argument. You have my sincere thanks for your commitment to philosophy as a discipline and for the attention that you have given to my work specifically. I wish you all the best as you develop your approach too. I saw that you opened it up to the forum which was good to see. You have my apologies for having received so much help from you and for not returning it in equal measure; please understand that given my alternative commitments, I have a limited amount of time to dedicate to philosophy and have the need to focus almost all of it into my own work given its subject and scope.

Looking forward, my plan is to hone and a condense the argument to the point where I can present it to academia with the view of getting further constructive criticism from there, with the eventual view of putting the work into a book or extended essay. Given the conversation we've had, along with the work that was done before this, all of the fragments of the argument seem to be there. What's needed now is to bring them together and give them some polish. There is more to say about where the argument might/does go, but clarifying the core in this way seems to be the most sensible approach.

For this reason, at this stage it appears best for me to take the argument away and write it up in a structured fashion. As of tomorrow I am starting a new career with less free time in which case, I don't know whether I can work on it every day, every week or once every month... What I might ask - if your still willing - is to double-check the "chapters" of my argument as and when I complete them with the understanding that this may be over a period of some time. How does that sound to you?

Quoting TVCL

You have my apologies for having received so much help from you and for not returning it in equal measure; please understand that given my alternative commitments, I have a limited amount of time to dedicate to philosophy and have the need to focus almost all of it into my own work given its subject and scope.

Not a worry! This was your thread, not mine. The intention was mostly to show you a different approach, and that I took the topic seriously. I had a lot of enjoyment going over your work, it was not time wasted.

Quoting TVCL

What I might ask - if your still willing - is to double-check the "chapters" of my argument as and when I complete them with the understanding that this may be over a period of some time. How does that sound to you?

Absolutely. I would like to see where you take this further. And good luck on your new career! I'm glad we were able to get this to a nice conclusion in time. I wish you well, and it will always be a pleasure to speak with you on these forums. If I am not around these forums at a later date, feel free to message me directly.

Here is the result of our discussion thus far: revised, re-formulated and condensed:

https://docs.google.com/document/d/1aF6uYKp3-Q8ee3X-8QDuBg17cc1cuMi9hdvwUengjdY/edit?usp=sharing

*Try this link instead

https://docs.google.com/document/d/1ZLiQgp2pJTbxbvMXppGuwTF8ZrkUTPHmYD6EgmLPXLY/edit?usp=sharing

I can see it now! I won't be able to get to it tonight, but hopefully tomorrow.

A happy weekend! I can finally sit down and type this out.

First, I understand this is a draft, so won't be commenting on the order of things. Just on the ideas.

To sum up, I believe you've stated we have a search for a goal. Our beliefs regarding that goal must be applicable and consistent. Applicability means it must be able to be used in regards to one's goal. Consistency means it must not be a contradiction within one's set of beliefs, and in its application.

I think applicability and consistency works. I'm still a little hesitant on what a goal entails. Like this:

"Goals are hierarchical. Criteria of lesser goals are void if fulfilling them hinders the pursuit of goals that are designated with a higher status. As such, any sub-goal that does not include the adherence to consistency cannot be pursued whilst pursuing the search for knowledge."

I think you have a germ of an idea here, but I think it needs clarification.

Goals are the journey's start, and as such, they are not a criteria for evaluating knowledge itself. If a contradiction happens within your goals, you have to decide to throw something out. But there is nothing within the goals that you've put forward at this time that clarifies which contradictions we should throw out. So all that we are seemingly left with is our own personal belief system as to which goals are more important than others.

As an example, lets say that I have it as my primary goal to prove the Earth is flat. Lets say I encounter a contradiction to this by having a lesser goal of "Going into space". So I do, and it "appears" that the Earth is curved. So I just say, "This is a contradiction to my main goal, so I'm just going to invalidate this lesser goal." Maybe you say, "Well its obvious that space bends our viewpoint of the Earth the farther away from it we are," or even "Space must just be beyond our understanding," then you don't pursue that goal anymore because it contradicts your primary one.

If you are to claim a hierarchy on goals, I believe this must be fleshed out to avoid conclusions like above.

"Provisional knowledge". A good breakdown showing that knowledge is provisional. But I wouldn't classify a "provisional knowledge" and "final knowledge". The only thing we can conclude so far is that knowledge is provisional. Since "final knowledge" does not exist, there is no separation within knowledge. I think noting that knowledge is provisional is enough.

Just a little add, when comparing knowledge versus beliefs, you can note that beliefs are also provisional, but they lack the order and structure that reinforces knowledge.

Your unicorn argument is fantastic, nice job.

The unfalsifiability section just needs a second pass to clarify the idea you're positing. It seems like you're implying what is "unfalsifiable" is based on context. Like the unicorn, it is a belief that has been constructed with a context that we cannot apply. If we could somehow create a context in which it could be applied, it would no longer be falsifiable.

In the beginning, you note how you will explain how we can know definitions once the theory is explored. You don't follow up on this at the end.

My final thoughts are this is a nice start. The only thing which I think still needs some clarity is "What a goal is". If I did not have the knowledge of our past conversations, I'm sure I would not be able to understand exactly what a goal entails from reading this paper alone. But this is a good draft. Feel free to clarify or correct my assumptions here.

Reply to Philosophim

Hello my friend, good to hear from you.

Thank you for giving my work your time. I hope that your week went well and that you've had the chance to enjoy your weekend.

What I'd like to do is tweak the draft, highlighting my changes and then run it passed you and see if it corrects for your concerns.

First, I'd like to check whether I completely understand your criticisms.

To begin with, I'm not sure whether "goal" needs to be defined because I'm not attempting to use it in an especially philosophical way; I'm using the basic dictionary definition (the result or achievement toward which effort is directed; aim; end)...

Quoting Philosophim

Goals are the journey's start, and as such, they are not a criteria for evaluating knowledge itself. If a contradiction happens within your goals, you have to decide to throw something out. But there is nothing within the goals that you've put forward at this time that clarifies which contradictions we should throw out.

I'm not sure about this. Goals are the start of the journey and the end. A goal sets the initial context for the test of applicability, but the test of applicability only passes once a goal can be pursued. Therefore, because applicability is a test for knowledge, the given goal is also a test for knowledge (or a "criteria for evaluating knowledge itself.")

As for the rest of your point regarding goals, you're right - something is amiss and it does need expansion, especially in light of your flat earth example.

Okay, so here's the idea: the model applies on a meta-level in that it not only concerns intra-goal applicability (as has been shown) but in inter-goal applicability too. What I mean is that consistency and applicability do not only tell us what beliefs we can regard as knowledge but which goals we can or cannot have (after all, how do we know that we can pursue a given goal? Answer: in the same way that we know anything else...)

And so, let's say that you're mapping a hierarchy of goals. First of all, you already have the goal-map of pursuing knowledge and so, if my argument thus far holds you adhere to applicability and consistency as standards for regarding knowledge. Now, you believe that all kinds of things can be your priorities and all kinds of things can be regarded as secondary but the question is: how do you know?

The answer is: you throw out those goals that are contradictory and inapplicable with applicability being applied to the goal itself.

It's pretty simple if we look at the example: you find that going into space (proving curvature) voids the primary goal of proving that the earth is flat. Now, we can model this:

Goal
“To prove that the earth is flat"
Belief
“That Space travel can be a sub-goal of this"
Effect
“Space travel disproves that the earth is flat"
Outcome
“I cannot pursue space travel if I want to prove that the earth is flat (the two goals cannot be mutually pursued)"

[Verdict]
The belief that "I can have space travel as a sub-goal of proving that the earth is flat" is not knowledge.

By such means we can discover which goals can be pursued, can compliment each other and can be arranged hierarchically, and which ones cannot. The idea is that the criteria of applicability and consistency follow from the initial goal of searching for knowledge and that this acts as a keystone for everything else.

Now, let's look at this issue: Quoting Philosophim

As an example, lets say that I have it as my primary goal to prove the Earth is flat. Lets say I encounter a contradiction to this by having a lesser goal of "Going into space". So I do, and it "appears" that the Earth is curved. So I just say, "This is a contradiction to my main goal, so I'm just going to invalidate this lesser goal."

Yes. You find that this is what you are forced to do by Truth/"Reality" if you are pursuing knowledge. This does not prove or disprove that the earth is flat (as of yet undecided by this argument), but reveals what you can or cannot do. If you cannot determine that the earth is flat by looking at it from space, perhaps you have to revaluate what you mean by "earth" or, hey, maybe you have a goal that cannot be pursued...

Okay, so the next point:
Quoting Philosophim

"Provisional knowledge". A good breakdown showing that knowledge is provisional. But I wouldn't classify a "provisional knowledge" and "final knowledge".

A little confused here. I never mention "final knowledge" in the draft and am not sure why it is a point of issue.

Quoting Philosophim

The unfalsifiability section just needs a second pass to clarify the idea you're positing. It seems like you're implying what is "unfalsifiable" is based on context. Like the unicorn, it is a belief that has been constructed with a context that we cannot apply. If we could somehow create a context in which it could be applied, it would no longer be falsifiable.

I was going to respond to this by saying "exactly" but I know that doesn't clarify much. As such, could you re-phrase or expand the issue with this section?

Quoting Philosophim

In the beginning, you note how you will explain how we can know definitions once the theory is explored. You don't follow up on this at the end.

Good point. Perhaps I'll do a "Definitions Part 1 & 2"

Finally,
Quoting Philosophim

I understand this is a draft, so won't be commenting on the order of things.

Out of interest (and if you have time) could you comment on the order of things? My aim is to make this as clear as possible and so your thoughts on structure could be useful.

Anyway, its great to be getting back into the swing of things. I don't want to start overplaying my thanks but understand that you have it in droves. I'll try to keep my responses regular but please understand that due to my current workload I must relegate philosophy to the weekends when I have the right amount of time and energy to dedicate to it.

Take care and I look forward to your reply.

Hello,

Couldn't we conclude that a useful true idea (based on one's logic and experience) is 'relative' to the person who was seeking it? I mean; it doesn't need to be so for all other humans.

In fact, I used noticing that while the ideas with which I have built my set of knowledge with time (for about 55 years) are real useful to me, most of them are not necessarily so to others.

By the way, in my philosophy, while there is an absolute set of truths that defines our universe and life, a human being needs to discover just a 'subset' of it to reach his 'relative perfect' knowledge; all ideas and answers that he really needs to know.

Kerim

I just came by to say I have not forgotten! I will have this answered at least by Sunday.

Reply to TVCL

Ok! Finally got some time to sit down and really analyze this again.

So there are some really good things with goals. I think they are a great way to start a search for knowledge. I just don't think they are a necessary precursor to knowledge, or work as an end. Lets keep our space example. I have a goal to discover that the world was flat. I am told before I go into space that water will float out in the open if you release it from its container. I don't believe the astronaut, or have any care or goal to learn this.

Once I am in space, I grab my water container, squeeze the straw, and sure enough, water emerges and floats there in space. I never had a goal in the beginning or the end, and yet it appears I now have applied knowledge that water floats in open space.

Perhaps this is where my issue comes from. It seems like you want to propose goals are a necessary part of knowledge, when I think it is an optional part of knowledge. Again, I really like it as an explanation for why we start seeking knowledge, but much of our day to day applied knowledge is not anticipated or sought out.

As for inter-goal applicability, while your explanation is more fleshed out, I don't think it solves the main problem. So far, I can decide whatever goals I want. Which also means I can throw out whatever goals I find contradictory, so long as there is consistency in my set of information.

What this leaves us with is a web of beliefs that are are not contradictory if we throw out evidence we don't like that fits our end goal. This is what a conspiracy theory is. Flat Earthers throw out any evidence or come up with interpretations that allow them to hold to their beliefs despite mounds of contrary evidence.

Like the unicorn case, perhaps much of this, or even all of this, can be solved by clarifying the context and applicability of the belief and separating the beliefs from the goal. I just don't think a goal is a belief, and I think you are extending to goals aspects of beliefs, when a goal is more the start of seeking out and obtaining beliefs which we may then consistently apply as knowledge.

As for the structure, all it needs is another draft review. You can tell you're thinking as you type, and you repeat a few things unnecessarily. I do it too, so I recognize it. =) As for the order, I think its mostly the introduction of doubt and definitions when you imply in your introductory paragraph that you're going to start with consistency and applicability. Again, absolutely no judgement. The paper that I wrote is 20 pages, but when I first wrote it, it was over 100. Lastly, my mention of it being a draft was to show that I was not going to word pick, but that I was looking at its overall concepts. Which, is still pretty good!

Reply to TVCL

Hi TVCL.I see you've tried to get to the bottom of this issue but I;m not sure it needs so many words. Logic cannot prove a truth about Reality, (as Aristotle points out) but it can find truths for us. I cannot see where 'usefulness' enters the picture. A thing is useful only if we use it, such that usefulness is not a property of information or things. A hammer is not useful if we only have a screw.

. . 25. Therefore, it is the goal of possessing an understanding of the truth that makes sense that justifies adherence to logic; it is the usefulness of logic for the end of achieving this goal that justifies adherence to it and makes it necessary in our search for truth.

I'd agree with this. For this reason metaphysics is a science of logic.

You make a good argument against paraconsistent logic, since we cannot understand the results it produces.

Reply to FrancisRay

Quoting FrancisRay

I cannot see where 'usefulness' enters the picture. A thing is useful only if we use it, such that usefulness is not a property of information or things. A hammer is not useful if we only have a screw.

This at the fulcrum of the argument: we need logic to do all knowledge/truth seeking, but why would we use logic if it was not useful?

Reply to Philosophim

This is looking good. Not because we appear to be in 100% agreement, but because the issues appear to be thinning out and most of the core logic appears to be stable. Most of this appears to be an issue of semantics or clarity...

Quoting Philosophim

So there are some really good things with goals. I think they are a great way to start a search for knowledge. I just don't think they are a necessary precursor to knowledge, or work as an end.

To be clear (and perhaps what I should emphasise more) is that I agree; goals are not a necessary precursor to knowledge, but they are a necessary precursor to/component of the search for knowledge - the argument that I am trying to make is not concerned with how any or all knowledge comes to be known, only that knowledge which is sought. We can discuss that further if you like but the simple idea is that it seems to be the only type of knowledge worth discussing because we cannot create a model for finding knowledge which is not sought (how does one seek knowledge passively? Isn't that a contradiction?)

Quoting Philosophim

So far, I can decide whatever goals I want. Which also means I can throw out whatever goals I find contradictory, so long as there is consistency in my set of information.

You can throw out almost any goal that you want, but if you are searching for knowledge you cannot throw out the goal of being consistent. Beyond that we really are free to choose which goals we want, but not so free that this allows us to pursue any set of goals. This is what inter-goal applicability will determine.

Quoting Philosophim

What this leaves us with is a web of beliefs that are are not contradictory if we throw out evidence we don't like that fits our end goal.

Of course. People are allowed to lock themselves off from contradictory information. Would you and I do that? Probably not. Why not? Because hopefully we want to have the optimum match between our beliefs and reality that we can manage. One can close themselves off from contradictory information but they also cut themselves off from being in accordance with large swathes of reality - these potential consequences are the prerogative of each individual thinker.

If you think this allows anyone to claim that anything is knowledge, I will once again draw your attention to the question of the exact thing that is trying to be achieved...
In the Flat Earth example, is the person's goal:
a) To prove that the earth is flat?
b) To discover whether the earth is flat or not?
c) To simply believe that the earth is flat?

What the person actually knows about the shape of the earth will depend on which one of these they are trying to achieve. I might have rushed this retort and so if you'd like me to expand upon it, by all means let me know.

Finally - some useful remarks on the structuring. I will keep them in mind.

Thank you.

All the Best!

Quoting TVCL

the argument that I am trying to make is not concerned with how any or all knowledge comes to be known, only that knowledge which is sought.

Ok, I think this clears up a significant amount of confusion and reservations on my part. You are specifically removing any consideration of knowledge which is not specifically sought out. As for the why:

Quoting TVCL

because we cannot create a model for finding knowledge which is not sought

I had to read this a couple of times, and I want to make sure I understand what you're stating. If I understand correctly, you are stating knowledge is an active process. Because we have to consider things such as applicability and consistency, this requires our active faculties. This is versus taking beliefs without question or consideration.

Now while I think goals are a fantastic way of explaining why someone searches for knowledge, they can also be precursors to simply believing something without the need for knowledge. If my goal is to learn ethics for example, I could take a web of beliefs that construct an ethical morality that satisfies an emotional goal. If my goal is to believe in Santa Claus, it can drive me, but it doesn't necessarily drive me towards knowledge in Santa Claus. Same with the flat Earth examples.

I suppose what I'm trying to say is that goals are not necessary or exclusive to the application of knowledge. Goals are the necessary precursor to seeking something, but that something can be about seeking beliefs that satisfy one's own desires. We say what separates a belief from knowledge is its applicable consistency. But I could just as easily have an inapplicable inconsistent conclusion if my goal is to have a belief without using knowledge.

So to go back to your beginning, I do believe that the precursor to knowledge is having a goal, or something a person wants. In trying to obtain that goal, a person might (not necessarily) discover that their conclusions may clash with reality. In wanting to obtain goals that are more likely to reflect reality, a person seeks a way to obtain a goal in the most rational manner. The conclusion a person can gain from this is beliefs which are applicable and consistent are the most rational conclusions one can make if they wish their beliefs to not be contradicted by reality.

I think however once knowledge is discovered, it is something one decides to integrate into future goals, but it is not a goal itself. Often times in pursuing our goals we are shown that they are impossible to reach. Either that, or we learn something we never event considered, and it opens up new possibilities for us. While the goals may change, the ever present undertaking of the process of knowledge remains with us. Do we decide to continue to apply it in every case? Sometimes yes, sometimes no. And I think this is perhaps what you are trying to imply? The question perhaps here is what is the justification for deciding to use the process of knowledge in some cases versus not others.

This question is a version of the the problem of induction, which is not a simple problem to solve. I believe your answer is that it is up to every individual to use knowledge, or not. While this does simplify the issue, I believe it is a surrender that many people will pick up on. The question is begged, "Is there a rational way of deciding when we should use knowledge, and when we shouldn't?"

But I'll let you respond here to see if I'm on the mark, or still off a bit. Great reply, I think we're almost to the point we can start taking the theory into some common epistemological problems!

Reply to Philosophim

Quoting Philosophim

because we cannot create a model for finding knowledge which is not sought
— TVCL

I had to read this a couple of times, and I want to make sure I understand what you're stating. If I understand correctly, you are stating knowledge is an active process. Because we have to consider things such as applicability and consistency, this requires our active faculties. This is versus taking beliefs without question or consideration.

No, my apologies - I really could have phrased this line better. I was trying to make a clear point by stating a tautology. What I should have said was:

"We cannot create a model for seeking knowledge which is not sought."

Of course, the argument that I'm trying to make rests on the assumption that one is doing epistemology or at least trying to search for knowledge (or even search for truth). If no one is searching for knowledge, the whole discussion about how we know anything becomes void by default because even having the discussion necessarily entails that we are trying to search for knowledge (after all, we would be searching for knowledge about knowledge).

It's for this reason that I have designated the search for knowledge as the keystone or initial axiom for proto-epistemology. That might seem odd because of course it is not necessary that one would search, it is only contingent. However, it is necessary that there should be a search if we are to do any epistemology. And so, the Search is the starting point of all of epistemology - this is the point from which all else follows. I risk sounding like a broken record, but this is a point that can't be stressed enough. Hopefully, I have demonstrated this by now.

As for the rest of your comments, you're right on the money. You appear to have understood my argument well. Yes, goals are not a type of knowledge per-se, but they are always necessarily relevant to knowledge and knowledge is always judged in relation to them. However, goals are independent of knowledge in so far as one can choose or aim to pursue knowledge as a goal to a limited extent. However, reality is independent of both one's goals and one's knowledge and nothing in the argument suggests that the goals that one chooses allows them to dictate reality. At best, they can choose or limit which parts of reality they have access to.

Quoting Philosophim

I think however once knowledge is discovered, it is something one decides to integrate into future goals, but it is not a goal itself. Often times in pursuing our goals we are shown that they are impossible to reach. Either that, or we learn something we never event considered, and it opens up new possibilities for us. While the goals may change, the ever present undertaking of the process of knowledge remains with us. Do we decide to continue to apply it in every case? Sometimes yes, sometimes no. And I think this is perhaps what you are trying to imply?

Yes. If by "The Process of Knowledge" you mean the heuristic or argument that I have presented, this is well summarised.

Let's move onto the question you posed, then:
Quoting Philosophim

The question perhaps here is what is the justification for deciding to use the process of knowledge in some cases versus not others.

From everything that has been said, and if we are in agreement, it follows that the justification for deciding to use the "process of knowledge" would be to have one's knowledge in accordance with reality. But not only this, but to ensure that one's goals were also in accordance with reality to the best possible extent.

Quoting TVCL

"We cannot create a model for seeking knowledge which is not sought."

Yes, I think I understand this. Sounds good!

Quoting TVCL

But not only this, but to ensure that one's goals were also in accordance with reality to the best possible extent.

If goals are also subject to the analysis of application and consistency, then I don't think there is a problem.

I think this is a good theory to assist a person in the day to day use of knowledge, and works to avoid the minutiae that epistemological analysis can devolve to. Well done! I had thought to introduce a few epistemological puzzles in here, but I find they are unneeded. This theory is about effective practicality, not games or large societal constructs.

Did you wish to take this theory anywhere else? Were there more advanced concepts you were considering? A pleasure as always to read and discuss, this has certainly been a treat!

Reply to Philosophim

Fantastic.

And so, before we proceed it is worth double-checking to be sure whether you agree with the argument.

It's good to know that you have concluded that I have created a model that we have apparently ironed all of the kinks out of, but I would also like to stress that what I am trying to establish is not just one model to be chosen from many, but the truth. That is to say, I have argued that it is true that if we search for knowledge, all that I have argued about the necessity of consistency and applicability necessarily follows; it is true that these are the basics of our proto-epistemology - provided that we are searching for knowledge, we cannot have a proto-epistemology which removes any of these elements.

Do you agree with this?

Quoting TVCL

what I am trying to establish is not just one model to be chosen from many, but the truth.

TVCL;464407:Do you agree with this?

No, I don't agree it is the truth. What I can agree from your model, is that your model is something that can be known. It can be applied in this instance between the two of us, and it seems to have consistency. But will that be the case when another person is introduced? Will it be the case 5 years from now if humanity makes some new discovery about knowledge we had never considered?

The real question to be asked is, "Does the knowledge model apply to itself?" Because if it does, then we have created a model that, according to us, will give us a more rational method of claiming things that are not contradicted by reality. But we can never claim that such knowledge is "the truth" with certainty, but that is "the truth" with rationality.

Further, this is a model that represents concepts in a way that are usable and digestible to certain people. There will be some that this model is not enough, and for others, that this model is too much. There are almost certainly other ways of expressing the concepts detailed here in greater or lesser detail, with different words, different languages, and different outcomes. At the end of the day it is a tool that fits a certain person and size of problem. Is this tool effective at solving the problem for a good number of people? That is a question that can only be answered by putting it in the hands of several people, and seeing what they do.

There is my technical answer. =) For what its worth, I believe that any model that wants to have a hope of being epistemologically useful is going to have some expression of the elements of consistency, applicability, and context. And for what that is worth, I believe there is a truth to that.

Quoting TVCL

It's good to know that you have concluded that I have created a model that we have apparently ironed all of the kinks out of

Ha ha! I wish. =D Lets call it, "major deal breakers" instead of "kinks". I don't mean this negatively either. Creating an epistemology without any major deal breakers is huge! Something without major deal breakers is a base upon which you can start, and begin refinement. There is no tool, especially one as new as this, that will not still have a kink or two left. You'll run into people that will point them out. You'll probably find some yourself as you use it and refine it. That is not a knock against it, that is the natural course of all things that we use. There may be parts you throw away or tweak in the future, but I believe you have a solid base.

So, a fine job! Feel free to continue, I'm happy to see where you wish to take this from here!

Reply to Philosophim

That's pretty funny... my initial reaction was to be incensed by this, thinking "But if it's logical and all of the arguments follow necessarily from their axioms, it must be true! and so, what are you talking about?"

But then it occurred to me...

Quoting Philosophim

No, I don't agree it is the truth. What I can agree from your model, is that your model is something that can be known.

Which is all the the model is intendent to do. Indeed, that's all that it can do. To posit that it can be the truth at this juncture is absurd. As you say:

Quoting Philosophim

we can never claim that such knowledge is "the truth" with certainty, but that is "the truth" with rationality.

Moreover, I agree with you. The degree to which this model will be convincing to people will depend on a range of things, from semantics to levels of intelligence and even if it was understood perfectly by all, time alone might lead to a dilution of our understanding.

Now, for what it's worth, I do think that there is a thread within the model that makes it stable across time and context (which is related to logic), but we are far away from demonstrating that yet.

What's more, it appears that what I cannot and should never seek out is a perfect model of the truth. Instead, what I am aspiring to develop is the best model for proto-epistemology that can be managed. Even if "the best" never equates to "perfect".

And so, this a good place to be.

For the progression then...
I had previously envisioned that my entire argument would progress through 3 major parts:
1. The foundations (which we have now completed),
2. The direct implications, and
3. Advanced implications and eventual justification for Christianity.

If all has gone well and the model at least holds its own weight, perhaps now we can move onto some of the direct implications which open up the relevance of the argument.

Reply to Philosophim

So, I got to thinking about what problems the theory is trying to solve. You might not have known, but I released a book about a year ago when I was trying to tackle my philosophical problems:
https://www.amazon.co.uk/Practically-True-Tony-Lowe-ebook/dp/B07Y6GDJ16/ref=sr_1_2?dchild=1&keywords=practically+true&qid=1603622262&sr=8-2

(You don't need to read it)

I bring it up because there were a number of issues that I was attempting to break into with this book which the model that we have been discussing was eventually borne out of. However, having come so far with it I had almost forgotten what the problems were that I was trying to solve. Having reached this point it has come time to reconsider these problems. There are basically two key problems that the model that I am presenting is attempting to solve, and I will include a sketch of their solutions below:

Problem 1:
Epistemology is convoluted and long-winded from the outset. If one wanted to know how they search for knowledge, there is precious little that one can offer as an initial foundation.
A new student of philosophy might be presented with a number of epistemological theories and be encouraged to consider some of their problems, but will not be taught how to choose between these theories or how to recognise when a problem has or has not been solved. Indeed, to do so would require that the student knows something about knowledge; namely, how to tell a good theory of knowledge from a bad one. However, if epistemology is the study of knowledge itself, the questions becomes "how do I know how to know before I know how to know?"

Answer 1:
By making an appeal to the search for knowledge as a search we find that there are basic, proto-epistemological standards that must be adhered to from the outset, which provides a foundation for advanced epistemology to be built upon. Of course, adherence to logic/reason alone might provide the foundation for proto-epistemology, but logic/reason alone does not justify itself. For this to function as a foundation, a simultaneous appeal must be made to a general concern for goals and for the search for knowledge in particular.

Problem 2:
Epistemology is not "practical", at least not directly. It is divorced from questions of ethics; that is, there is a separation between it and questions of how we choose and live until some work is done to connect epistemology to the field of ethics. For this reason, one might conclude that there is a disconnect between questions of how we know what we know and why we do what we do.

Answer 2:
The model can be made to argue that there is an intimate connection between ethics and epistemology. One does not quite "lead" onto the other but the two are entwined from the outset. This follows directly from the state of our proto-epistemology.

And so, if you are still happy to proceed it seems that it could be useful for us to discuss whether the argument that I have made either does or is able to solve these two problems and to what extent. This allows us to work into the "direct implications" stage of the overall project. What do you think?

Ha ha! I'm glad you didn't take that the wrong way. Really, you've done a magnificent job with what you have.

Quoting TVCL

Now, for what it's worth, I do think that there is a thread within the model that makes it stable across time and context (which is related to logic)

I agree with you on a personal and intuitive level. You have a solid foundation which I feel is going to be very difficult for people to find a loose brick in.

Yes, I agree with problem 1. Epistemology is bogged down with a lack of clarity. I believe your proposal is a fantastic solution to problem 1.

Problem 2 is interesting. Back when I started epistemology, I actually began the investigation to know the idea of a God, and prove ethics. The problem was I couldn't prove any of those until I knew what knowledge was!

I believe I understand what you mean though. You are answering the problem, "Why should we seek knowledge?" Because you've realized we don't HAVE to seek knowledge. It is a choice. Please continue, I am interested to read where you want to take this!

Reply to Philosophim

Good, really good. This is a great place to be.

First of all, it's interesting that you say:

Quoting Philosophim

I agree with you on a personal and intuitive level.

Large chunks of what I'm doing have been a matter of allow leaps of intuition and then filling out the spaces in between and so it would be interesting see if you can unpack why your intuitions seem to agree with the idea that there is a common thread connected to logic...

Anyway, the main topic for discussion should be the second problem, then. It appears that you are satisfied that the argument can solve the first problem and re-stating why might be tantamount to beating a dead horse, whereas the second needs some further unpacking.

---

Why should we search for knowledge and how is ethics connected to the model of proto-epistemology?

Given the model, we should search for knowledge if we want to be better equipped to pursue our goals.

The process of discerning knowledge requires us to discern what models of belief can or cannot be applied to reality. It follows that some models of belief will accord with reality and some will not. Some models of belief will allow us to proceed through reality towards our goals, some will not. Therefore, the very basic proto-epistemological process is a process of discovering what reality does or does not allow and, therefore, what we can or cannot do.

Now, we have established that the search for knowledge allows us to better pursue our goals; allowing us to find what does or does not allow us to achieve them. However, this does not yet tell us which goals we should or should not have to begin with. This is where an appeal to the inter-goal applicability comes in. Just as the model allows us to discover which means do or do not facilitate the attainment of particular goals, it allows us to discover which goals we can or cannot pursue as-such. After all, if one's belief that a given goal can be pursued cannot be put into action, that belief is not applicable and is therefore not knowledge. Therefore, if we are seeking knowledge the process of discovery will rule out those goals that cannot be pursued. Therefore, the process should whittle-down our goals to only those goals that can be pursued.

But the question remains: of those goals that we know can be pursued, how do we determine which ones should be pursued?

Consider this example:
A mafioso gangster has the goal of being corrupt and unlawful for the purpose of making money. He is able to purse both of these goals and so we find that both of the goals:
a) to make money; and
b) to break the law
are compatible. If knowledge is also of interest, the mafioso would conclude that these goals are not contradictory and are mutually-applicable. Therefore, his belief that he can pursue both counts as knowledge.

However, the mafioso also finds that there are times when he is prompted to be an honest man; perhaps before an ignorant wife, perhaps before the local priest, or perhaps before his innocent daughter when she asks him whether he is a murderous, unjust criminal. The mafioso knows that his honestly will cost him dearly in these relationships or in his work...

Therefore, the mafioso discovers that has can goals which are incompatible:
a) to make money whilst breaking the law,
b) to be an honest man; and
c) to maintain the respect of his family
are three goals that cannot be pursued together. They are mutually non-applicable and so the belief that all three can be pursued together is non-knowledge.

By such a process the mafioso can learn which goals or even set of goals he can or cannot pursue in life. Deciding between them would require a recourse to higher-priority goals. The mafioso cannot be honest and a criminal. Which is more important to him? His wealth and power or his relations?

Choosing between these options is a question of considering which avenue either closes or opens up a goal-set that allows one to pursue their higher-order goals...

Pursuing crime might allow the mafioso to pursue money, power and easy women but exclude his options for pursuing an honest life and genuine, loving relationships. As a more abstract example, we might posit that a man can choose a set of goals that will lead to ultimate misery and another that will have a higher chance of leading to fulfilment.

As of yet, this argument cannot determine whether a man should desire fulfilment over misery 0 perhaps a man is a masochist. What it can do is give us a should based on a contingency... if the man wants, say, fulfilment the search for knowledge will determine that he should adopt particular sets of goals at the exclusion of others.

One more thing...
As was mentioned initially, it follows directly from the logic of the model that it maximises our ability to interact with reality; or, you could say "to navigate reality", or you could say "to make the best decisions within it" in light of our goals and motivations.

It therefore appears that there are two initial axioms that entail the search for knowledge and, therefore, the model:

If one wants to search for knowledge, the model is entailed and one is better equipped to make decisions.

Likewise,

If one wants to make the best decisions, the search for knowledge is entailed, as is - by extension - the model.

A good weekend to you again! I'll jump right in.

Quoting TVCL

Just as the model allows us to discover which means do or do not facilitate the attainment of particular goals, it allows us to discover which goals we can or cannot pursue as-such. After all, if one's belief that a given goal can be pursued cannot be put into action, that belief is not applicable and is therefore not knowledge. Therefore, if we are seeking knowledge the process of discovery will rule out those goals that cannot be pursued.

I just want to clarify a breakdown here. This is where I see an issue with goals being blended with beliefs. A goal does not start out with any idea that the goal can, or cannot be obtained. As we obtain beliefs that are attempts to reach the goal, there may be several failures along the way. But those failures do not indicate that the goal should not be pursued anymore. Look at the many failures of epistemology. Does that mean we should abandon the goal of trying to figure out knowledge? I think not. =)

A goal isn't really a belief. Its an objective someone wants to reach. As you've stated, its the first step toward pursuing knowledge, but it is not knowledge itself. We can believe we can reach that goal, or believe that we will fail in our obtainment of that goal. Knowledge applies to the beliefs that we farm in pursuit of that goal, but I hesitate to claim that knowledge of the beliefs along the way should determine what goals a person pursues.

Why we pursue goals is a weight of personal interest, societal benefit, and energy and time investment needed in its pursuit. Thomas Edison had a goal of creating a cheap and easily manufactured light bulb. He went through 3,000 theories over the course of two years at making such a light bulb before he succeeded. If he hadn't succeeded after 3,000, should he have tried another 3 thousand? At what point of trying to obtain the knowledge he desired should he have quit?

In your mafioso example, I don't feel we're addressing knowledge, or what we should do. We're just addressing that certain goals have conflicts. If my goal is to go left and right at the same time, we find a contradiction of definitions, and therefore a contradiction of goals. This is different from exploring beliefs, and then finding that there is a contradiction in one's beliefs about reality using applicability and consistency.

So I think not pursuing conflicting goals is a given. But that doesn't answer the question of when we should start or stop pursuing goals that are not in conflict with our other goals, but over time and effort have never yielded results.

Quoting TVCL

Given the model, we should search for knowledge if we want to be better equipped to pursue our goals.

As such, I think an adjusted sentence would be, "Given the model, we should search for knowledge if we want to better equipped to obtain our goals". We can pursue our goals in many ways. Knowledge lets us know when we have obtained that goal. But does it necessarily show us that we cannot obtain that goal? I think that is the overall issue.

Reply to Philosophim

A good weekend to you too.

Interesting criticisms... On the one hand, I think that I agree that I might be blending goals too closely with knowledge, but on the other I disagree with some of the claims that you've made...

Let's start with:

Quoting Philosophim

A goal isn't really a belief. Its an objective someone wants to reach.

Are you sure? Let's think about that. Now, I agree with you that knowledge as-such is not a goal, but what of the idea of positing a goal to be pursued if one does not believe that the goal can be attained? We can either say that a goal is a belief or at least based upon a belief: the implicit belief that the goal can be pursued. Now, like any belief, the goal is a working hypothesis - one knows that they can pursue a goal in so far as it is non-contradictory and in so far as the can, in fact, pursue it.

You've stated that

Quoting Philosophim

A goal does not start out with any idea that the goal can, or cannot be obtained.

But what if one knew - using the model - that a given goal could not be pursued? Can a goal start out with the belief that it cannot be pursued? Now, admittedly, one might know that a goal cannot be pursued and still persist in pursing it, but we would simply conclude that, despite being better equipped to navigate reality, such a person would have failed to use this equipment.

This is why the model is important. A goal is not the same as a belief, but goals are based upon beliefs and because beliefs are tested by the model, the belief that a given goal can or cannot/should or should not be pursed are tested in the same basic way.

The mafioso example was used to show that conflicting sets of models cannot be pursued. If the mafioso had pursued knowledge as-such prior to the mere pursuit of power, he might have recognised this and prioritised one path over the other. The question of which he would choose is a question of core motivations, but if he was - at his core - motivated by fulfilment instead of masochism he should have chosen the honest path and application of the model reveals this.

Admittedly, at this point the argument only goes as far as to argue that the model can reveal what sets of goals one should have in reference to their hierarchy of goals or even their primary goals. However, it does not yet give an argument for which primary goal we should have as opposed to another. The only thing that is worth adding to this is that the model will reveal that not all primary goals are possible because some simply cannot be pursued.

And so, I stand by my previous conclusions...

If one is looking to better their decisions the search for knowledge is entailed because this reveals the means to attain goals, including knowledge of which goals can be hierarchically arranged; and

If one is looking to find knowledge, this will make one better equipped to pursue their goals.

Of course, you may still be unconvinced by this and if so I would like to hear your thoughts.

All the best

Reply to TVCL Quoting TVCL

But what if one knew - using the model - that a given goal could not be pursued?

Quoting TVCL

Are you sure? Let's think about that. Now, I agree with you that knowledge as-such is not a goal, but what of the idea of positing a goal to be pursued if one does not believe that the goal can be attained? We can either say that a goal is a belief or at least based upon a belief: the implicit belief that the goal can be pursued. Now, like any belief, the goal is a working hypothesis - one knows that they can pursue a goal in so far as it is non-contradictory and in so far as the can, in fact, pursue it.

Sure, let me break it down the way I see it as I've interpreted your stance so far, and see what you think.

Goals are the precursor to the search for knowledge. If goals are beliefs, then they are not the precursor to the search for knowledge anymore. The evaluating of beliefs to be applicable and consistent is knowledge. That would mean you would have to apply the method of knowledge to the goal itself, as its technically a belief.

But let me clarify what I mean by belief as well. A belief is an assertion that reality is a particular way. While in English we might say, "I believe I can reach my goal, we can also say, I don't believe I can reach my goal. The belief is not in the goal, but whether one can obtain, or not obtain one's goal. The outcome is what we can know, the motivation to seek that outcome is the goal.

Another way to see it is the goal itself is not true or false. What one discovers on the way to obtaining that goal is true or false. What we can determine from pursuing goals is that particular outcomes are false. So let us say my goal was to walk 1,000 miles in a day. I attempt it, and fail. I know that on that day, with what I prepared and did, I did not meet my goal that day. But what if I try something else? Maybe train for a month, or drink water more frequently then I did last time. The result is true or false based on all the circumstances one made in pursuit of the goal on that particular attempt. It does not mean that if you try another way, you will not meet the goal.

Thus I can look at some goals and evaluate certain attempts that have been made to determine if my pursuit of a goal in a particular manner will result in a success or failure. Take epistemology. We know that certain ways of trying to define knowledge fail. Part of evaluating epistemology is trying to examine why it failed, and then not repeating the same mistakes. But that doesn't mean that the goal of figuring out knowledge cannot be obtained if we don't try another way that has not yet been tested.

Quoting TVCL

Admittedly, at this point the argument only goes as far as to argue that the model can reveal what sets of goals one should have in reference to their hierarchy of goals or even their primary goals.

I understood that. I just don't think that is anything that people don't already understand. Evaluating what you want, and making sure that you don't want things that are at odds with each other is a given for most people. Your model has a specific purpose, and I think it does it very well. Its purpose is to answer the question, "Why use knowledge? And in evaluating this, we find knowledge is a rational methodology that will help us obtain our goals better than the alternative, irrationality.

Quoting TVCL

it does not yet give an argument for which primary goal we should have as opposed to another. The only thing that is worth adding to this is that the model will reveal that not all primary goals are possible because some simply cannot be pursued.

Yes, it is a very tricky thing to figure out what goals we must pursue over others. But perhaps this can start with the explanation that demonstrates certain goals cannot be pursued. Recall my examples of people pursuing goals that have failed time and time again. While I think we can both claim we can determine that an attempt at a goal can be knowledge of success or failure, at what point do we rule the goal out entirely as something someone should pursue? Is this even possible?

All the best returned as well. I feel this is an interesting exploration, and one I am not sure I have the answer to.

Quoting Philosophim

But let me clarify what I mean by belief as well. A belief is an assertion that reality is a particular way. While in English we might say, "I believe I can reach my goal, we can also say, I don't believe I can reach my goal. The belief is not in the goal, but whether one can obtain, or not obtain one's goal. The outcome is what we can know, the motivation to seek that outcome is the goal.

Right, that's cleared things up and okay - I think I now agree that the argument has over-reached itself.

A belief can be about a goal, which is why the inter-goal applicability part applies because our beliefs about which goals can be compatible can be right or wrong, but this is not the same as saying that a belief is a goal. And yes, you have the model correct.

Quoting Philosophim

What we can determine from pursuing goals is that particular outcomes are false. So let us say my goal was to walk 1,000 miles in a day. I attempt it, and fail. I know that on that day, with what I prepared and did, I did not meet my goal that day. But what if I try something else? Maybe train for a month, or drink water more frequently then I did last time. The result is true or false based on all the circumstances one made in pursuit of the goal on that particular attempt. It does not mean that if you try another way, you will not meet the goal.

Agreed.

Okay, so let me back-track and try to explain where I am coming from with this approach and what my intuition is saying...

The model that I've presented appears to have a direct connection to ethics because a concern for what we are tying to do in the world or for what decisions we are trying to make is woven directly into the logic of the model. Use of the model or the process of searching for knowledge reveals which sets of goals can be pursued and which cannot. The model does not dictate which courses of action we must take, but application of the model reveals what courses of action/decisions reality does or does not allow.

In so far as this becomes prescriptive, it becomes prescriptive based on a contingency; If you seek to achieve this or that end, either the end cannot be attained at all or you should choose particular sub-goals or particular courses of action in order to attain it. Now, of course, it is not as if that will all be revealed from the outset and it might not be the case that one knows a particular goal can be pursued until they try to pursue it. In any case, this is inter-woven with the search for knowledge because it is the process of searching which reveals these things for us; which reveals knowledge about our goals.

And so, this appears to be as far as the model goes: it cannot tell us what we should do as-such, but can reveal what we should or should not do given particular core motivations.

That is, with one exception: of course, the model entails or necessarily assumes the search for knowledge itself. It would therefore follow that we should make certain decisions if the search is to take place at all (such as the decision to maintain the search).

And, as has already been mentioned, the goal of knowing what decisions or courses of action reality does or does not allow also entails the search for knowledge.

What are your thoughts on all of this?

Quoting TVCL

The model that I've presented appears to have a direct connection to ethics because a concern for what we are tying to do in the world or for what decisions we are trying to make is woven directly into the logic of the model.

I think a short and loose definition of ethics could help here. Ethics in general is the question of, "What actions should I do" for the best outcome. If we have concluded that the knowledge is the best means of making decisions that do not contradict with reality, seeking knowledge when pursuing one's goals seems like a better choice then not. So in one sense, we can say that seeking knowledge is the most ethical manner of pursuing one's goals. I might be reaching here, but its what I've got. =)

Quoting TVCL

Use of the model or the process of searching for knowledge reveals which sets of goals can be pursued and which cannot.

Here again, and I think you're in agreement on this, the knowledge we discover can't (yet) reveal to us which goals we should pursue. It only reveals which beliefs and results we can or cannot use in pursuing our goal. Perhaps knowledge can reveal when a goal should not be pursued anymore. But when I think of the Thomas Edison example, I find it hard to conclude if there is anything in the knowledge gained that can give a concrete solution.

And perhaps this is because a goal is not a belief. It is a motivation. We can examine why a person would be motivated to obtain a goal, and conclude that there is a certain amount of effort a person is willing to put forward to obtain that goal. Once the effort exceeds what the person is willing to put into the search, they likely stop. The problem with this is I'm not sure that's knowledge, just an examination of why a person pursues, or does not pursue a goal. That seems like it would be different for each individual.

And that leads to the big question again, "What goals should a person pursue in life?" That sounds like an entirely different topic from knowledge. Perhaps you can marry the two together, but like you mentioned, it seems this is as far as the model will take us. And that's not anything to be disappointed by either! I think you still have a fantastic model of knowledge that can be explained and used by the layman! Perhaps you'll come up with a new model of ethics. But before then, did you have other places you wanted to take the model? Again, the conversation has been great, so lead it wherever you wish.

Hmm... this is complicated (which is unsurprising)... but this is good because it's giving me an idea of just what the model can or cannot do.

A few thoughts come to mind when reading this which I would like to note down quickly...

1. Quoting Philosophim

If we have concluded that the knowledge is the best means of making decisions that do not contradict with reality, seeking knowledge when pursuing one's goals seems like a better choice then not.

But a decision that "contradicts reality" simply cannot be made. That's what the model reveals: that some courses of action are not allowed by reality. More specifically, some sets of actions or goals are not permitted by reality.

It's as if reality says: "If you want to become a mafia boss you can commit crime. Indeed, you should commit it if that is necessarily entailed by the definition of you goal." However,

"If you want to be a mafia boss you cannot be an honest man at the same time."

Of course, the issue is kind of like us going up to reality and asking "But what should I want!?" and reality throws up its hands.

2. Quoting Philosophim

And that leads to the big question again, "What goals should a person pursue in life?" That sounds like an entirely different topic from knowledge.

Not if the question is "How do I know what goals a person should pursue?" ...

3. Quoting Philosophim

And perhaps this is because a goal is not a belief. It is a motivation.

I'm still not sure about this...
The model does not equate goals with beliefs. Instead, it recognises that goals contain implicit beliefs. The goal "To pursue X" is not a belief. But without the belief that "X can be pursued" why would one have the goal? Come to think of it, perhaps this is where the model is becoming too loose because its an added assumption, not a necessary conclusion. The assumption is that someone would not pursue a given goal unless they believed that the goal could at least be pursued, if not attained. My intuitions are hammering me with this, but this cannot be proven. Then again, I wonder: how could someone possibly pursue a goal if the don't believe that it can be pursued? Not if they don't know that it can be simply don't believe that it can...?

4. "Ethics" could be the wrong term, but the fact that the model is practical seems to be important.

It may well be the case that we have exhausted this topic already and need to move on, but I'd like to mull it over first before hand and make sure we're clear about what we can solidly build. And so, if you have any thoughts, comments or retorts for these thoughts in the mean time it would be great to hear them.

Quoting TVCL

This connection between logic and use can be summarised as follows:

Truth and use?! The only sense I can make of this is that truths are useful. By the way, lies/falsehoods are useful too, even more so on some occasions. So, that's that.

Quoting TVCL

we judge truth by its “usefulness” or regard use as the “measure” of truth because we judge truth by the extent to which our understanding satisfies the parameters of our enquiry

As I said, lies can be useful, sometimes more so. What impact does this have on your thesis that the measure of truth is how useful it is? Doesn't it mean, in some sense, at some level, that truths are, it feels weird to say this, lies. Maybe I'm missing something. Care to share?

Quoting TVCL

If logic is the sole measure of truth, it begs the questions because logic alone cannot justify why it should be adhered to.

This has been one of my deepest worries, not that I'm a somebody in the field. However, if you ask me, what I'd like to do is to point you in the direction the word "self-justifying" and whatever it means, assumes, entails, etc. I know it looks like the case of the clueless priest who pronounces to his congregation, " the Bible is true because the Bible says so" but whatever the truth is, logic, unlike other systems of thinking, e.g. faith, is, in a very moving and inspiring way, self-judging in the sense it's aware of its own limitations which is more than I can say of other options, the one I'm familiar with being faith.

Quoting TVCL

Therefore, both logic and a regard for use are necessary standards for seeking an understanding of the truth that makes sense.

I feel like agreeing despite my views on the critical points of your argument. :smile: Good day. Thanks.

Reply to TheMadFool The argument has undergone much development since the OP and some of the structure, including some of the definitions, have changed. I would like to engage but if you want to proceed constructively I suggest that you read this brief/draft of the argument which was linked to above.

https://docs.google.com/document/d/1ZLiQgp2pJTbxbvMXppGuwTF8ZrkUTPHmYD6EgmLPXLY/edit?usp=sharing

It is then perhaps worth reading through the discussion between myself and @Philosophim that comes after the link

Reply to TVCL Pardon the interruption. Please continue your conversation, I'm sure you guys have made good progress on that front. Good day!

Another weekend arrives! Lets continue.

Quoting TVCL

But a decision that "contradicts reality" simply cannot be made.

In the sense that one decides to do something, yes, a contradiction to reality cannot be made. That does not stop us from believing we can. Now in the case of one's first formation of knowledge, you just have to take a stab in the dark. But once you know a few things, you can build upon it. If I know addition I can then develop and know a method called multiplication, which is adding the same thing many times. If I know Geometry, I can know what angles and lengths of planks I'll need to construct a house.

Quoting TVCL

"If you want to be a mafia boss you cannot be an honest man at the same time."

If you are seeking knowledge, you will realize this. But maybe the guy isn't. Maybe he wants to commit crime, but then say, "But I'm honest otherwise". Sure, he's not, but he doesn't care about knowledge in this case. Because he does not care about knowledge, he does not see the contradiction. If you are not using knowledge, then you can believe in things that are contradicted by reality. People still believe in Bigfoot and the Loch Ness monster. If they were looking for knowledge, they would see their belief is contradicted by reality. But they're not looking for that. They are dismissing all contradictions, and looking for that one conclusive affirmation that they hope to discover some day.

Quoting TVCL

And that leads to the big question again, "What goals should a person pursue in life?" That sounds like an entirely different topic from knowledge.
— Philosophim

Not if the question is "How do I know what goals a person should pursue?" ...

Heh, true. I should clarify what I mean. We can use the application of knowledge to help us find the answer, but the process of knowledge itself, does not give us the answer. So it is not that we don't use the process of knowledge to find the answer, its just the definition of knowledge is not the whole story.

Quoting TVCL

The model does not equate goals with beliefs. Instead, it recognises that goals contain implicit beliefs.

I want to mention these are all good points you have made, and are giving me pause before I reply. Perhaps the tie in is the pursuit of a goal, versus the identification of a goal. This is where the language gets a little funny. A belief that a goal can be obtained can be based on knowledge, but it can also be just an inductive guess. If one recognizes the uncertainty in reaching the goal, one both believes there is a chance of success, and a chance of failure.

For example, I buy a lottery ticket with the belief I might win, but I believe I might also lose. Now if I do the math, I can know that my chance of winning is ridiculously small, and my chance of losing is ridiculously large. In the first case where I did not examine the math, I might believe really strongly that I will win, even if its unlikely I will win. In the second case, I can safely make the statistical decision to not buy the lottery ticket, because I know I will likely waste my money. Essentially the weight of my belief that I will lose is tipped to be greater than the weight that I will win.

In this case the knowledge of the likely outcome, combined with the cost and time investment in buying the ticket, have persuaded me not to buy a lottery ticket. Sure, I might have won, but I will take the safe odds that I will lose.

Pursuing goals is often an act of induction. Meaning we often do not know the outcome until we try. Perhaps you can take your set of knowledge and apply it to inductions to see which inductions are more reasonable than others? I leave you with that to think on.

Reply to Philosophim

Thanks for the engagement. This is to chime-in to say that I am currently working on this problem. Also, I am currently trying to update the initial draft that I wrote in order to improve its structure and clarity. I'll definitely proceed with the discussion but don't want to rush anything and so I don't know how long I'll be - just wanted to give the heads-up.

Reply to TVCL

Understood! I've been making sure I have plenty of time in my replies as well, as the questions at this point take more time to work through. Fantastic work as always!

Reply to Philosophim

Discovered a fragment of the argument today which is worth throwing your way... please note that I am no longer focusing on how the argument is directly normative/ethical (although whether it is in any respect is still to be seen). Instead, I am trying to reflect on the direct connection between the knowledge-seeking model and our decision-making.

Also note: "true belief" = knowledge
This follows from the argument because knowledge = "belief that accords with reality"

"Reality, by its very nature, demands that we live in accordance with it - we cannot do otherwise. What we can do is choose whether our beliefs are in accordance with it or not. Whether they are or not and what does or does not accord with reality is what is revealed by the search for knowledge.

To choose that our beliefs not be in accordance with reality requires that we divorce our beliefs from our decisions because all decisions must bend to reality, whereas all beliefs need not and so, if decisions are based on belief, only those decisions based on true belief will be made (or indeed can be made). If we choose to have beliefs that are not even potentially true but explicitly not true, no decisions based upon these beliefs can be made because these are decisions that reality does not allow by definition.
Therefore, if we choose to not have true beliefs (knowledge) we must divorce our beliefs from our decisions.
Therefore, if we choose to not divorce our beliefs from our decisions we must have true or at least potentially true beliefs (knowledge)."

The general movement of the thinking is towards the argument that, like the search for knowledge itself, acting upon our beliefs is not something that is necessarily given, but a choice and therefore a contingency. However, if this choice is made, like the choice to search for knowledge, it is another basic axiom that leads directly to the search itself and, therefore, necessitates the model.

--------

On a slightly unrelated note:

Quoting Philosophim

We can use the application of knowledge to help us find the answer, but the process of knowledge itself, does not give us the answer. So it is not that we don't use the process of knowledge to find the answer, its just the definition of knowledge is not the whole story.

Was probably your best insight in your last set of comments and makes me think that you might be coming to understand my philosophy better than I do.

All the best.

Reply to Philosophim

Also, as a side note I thought I would throw this your way...

It's a passage that I've just written up near the outset of my second draft which might help to clarify the foundations of the argument:

---------

"How do we know before we know how to know?" This is the question that is trying to be answered and positing the question itself provides the first axiom that the argument starts from. That axiom is that there is a search for knowledge. If there was no search, we would not be searching for knowledge even about knowledge itself. This axiom is contingent in one sense and necessary in another. It is contingent in the sense that merely asserting that there is a search does not necessitate that there must be a search. A man might be searching for knowledge at a given time, and he might not. As such, the argument does not progress from the axiom that there must be a search for knowledge. Instead, the argument progresses from the axiom that if there is a search for knowledge, the rest of the argument is entailed. The axiom is necessary in the sense that it necessarily follows from the search. This claim is as clear as a tautology: if there is a search for knowledge, it necessarily follows that we must recognise the axiom that there is a search for knowledge. This axiom is the necessary underpinning for all epistemology and proto-epistemology.

This is an important point to make a clarification in light of this previous claim. The claim being made is that the axiom that there is a search for knowledge is necessary for epistemology or proto-epistemology, but not for all knowledge as-such. This is because epistemology entails the study of knowledge which is distinct from simply knowing something. The study of knowledge entails that knowledge is sought, even if the knowledge sought is simply knowledge about the structure of knowledge - even those parts of it that we come to know without seeking. That is to say, some means of attaining knowledge might be passive, but to seek an understanding of those passive elements is active. A man may, for example, know that a tree is green by passively receiving the image of one as he walks, but for that same man to know how he knows that the tree is green, he must seek knowledge. Moreover, once the man inquires whether the tree is green or not he is searching for knowledge. This proto-epistemological model is not concerned with how the man passively receives knowledge of the green tree, but is only concerned with the fundamentals that are entailed once he asks any questions of his knowledge, whether that be a given subject of knowledge such as the tree or the very structure of knowledge itself. By extension, this proto-epistemological model is concerned with all inquiries as such. Once we ask how we know something, a search is commenced. This does not limit the scope of this argument - this is the largest possible scope that it can cover because none who ever make an inquiry are not searching for knowledge; they are attempting to discern whether what they might believe does or does not accord with reality. Hence, an active search is taken as the basic axiom of the model because a method of discernment is irrelevant to anyone who would not and does not actively discern, by definition.

Therefore, we have the fundamental axiom of proto-epistemology: that there is a search for knowledge.

Hello again TVCL!

Quoting TVCL

Also note: "true belief" = knowledge
This follows from the argument because knowledge = "belief that accords with reality"

I would be careful here. There is a whole libraries worth of devotion in epistemology to destroying the phrase, "true belief". Also, it is not that our belief accords with reality, it is that our belief is not contradicted by reality upon application. This does not mean our belief is true, only that it is reasonable within the current consistent constructs of our beliefs, and that particular application. It still may be the fact that our application did not consider factors we are unaware of.

Here's a quick example. Imagine you spy a sheep in a field. You walk past it, pet its wool, and move on. Unknown to you however, people have created a mechanical sheep that is very convincing except for a visible switch underneath its belly. Now, you don't know about the switch, so you don't even think to look for it. It is entirely reasonable for you to say, "I knew that thing as a sheep." But it doesn't mean it is a true sheep.

Thus, there must be a different argument as to why we should follow rational beliefs, (knowledge) versus unexamined beliefs. I believe a rational belief should be followed, as a rational belief leads to a necessary conclusion from what you are aware of. A belief which is not rational, but inductive, leads to a conclusion that is not necessary from what you are aware of. In terms of odds, it would seem rationality would win in your likelihood of being correct.

This can be shown with some quick math. X is knowledge, and Y is an unexamined belief. Z, will be the underlying reality.

X is one claim to reality. If Z does not contradict X, there is no alternative to X. But if Z does not contradict Y, there are still alternatives to Y. In the case that both X and Y are contradicted by reality, neither has an advantage. But X will always have the advantage if Z does not contradict X and Y.

Quoting TVCL

Was probably your best insight in your last set of comments and makes me think that you might be coming to understand my philosophy better than I do.

Why thank you! What a compliment! =D

To your second excerpt, it seems too wordy to get to your point. If I recall, you wanted this epistemology to reach the lay person in a clear, manageable and easily understood format. I think your theory can do this. I would try to translate everything you're trying to state into as concise a format as possible. The lay person will want the meat of the idea straight to them. You can add the details as you then dive into the specifics of the argument, and sum up more in this fashion after the reader has read the crux of your argument. Of course, this is just an opinion. Another reader may have different feedback for you on this type of criticism, so I would show it to others besides myself before changing it.

Reply to Philosophim

Just a couple of points/questions quickly...

To the first post:
Doesn't your counter-argument run the risk of making the concept of "truth" convoluted by assuming that when we claim access to truth we claim access to truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth?

To claim that something is true does not necessarily entail that we deem it to be certainly true or objectively true or eternally true etc. Now, I believe that such truths exist but the simple claim that truth is "accordance with reality" appears to be basically tautological and need not bring these other assumptions in which appear to confuse the issue.

Also, this was not an essential point for the first post. Aside from this issue, what are your thoughts on it? Is it cogent?

To the second post:
Admittedly, I've flip-flopped on this a bit. I have two problems to deal with: what the argument is and how to convey it and I don't really have the mental room to solve both problems at the same time, at least not optimally. Also, it's true that I want my argument to appeal to the layman but I've since decided that should probably come later and that I should appeal to the philosopher first. After all, if the argument does not get past the philosopher but gets to the layman that would feel like a kind of lying. And so, it seems worth making a rigorous version of the argument first and then condensing or simplifying it later once the work earns the confidence to do so. Also, when I talk about appealing to the philosopher I'm not talking about all philosophers at all levels. What I'm trying to do is write the argument so that it is i) rigorous, thorough and as airtight as possible, and ii) so that it can be understood by anyone with a nominal understanding of philosophy (much like you and I or better educated laypeople).

In light of that, what is your opinion of the second post?

Reply to Philosophim

[In referece to the second post]

the main thing that I would like to know is whether the argument is valid/rigorous or not. There were some additions in that passage compared to the first draft.

Good morning TVCL! My apologies, but with holidays I've been out of town. I thought I would post this real quick, but I should be back next week. Cheers!

Reply to Philosophim

No worries mate, thanks for letting me know.

And finally back in the saddle! Its been a while since I've read these, so pardon me if I miss something.

Quoting TVCL

To the first post:
Doesn't your counter-argument run the risk of making the concept of "truth" convoluted by assuming that when we claim access to truth we claim access to truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth?

To claim that something is true does not necessarily entail that we deem it to be certainly true or objectively true or eternally true etc. Now, I believe that such truths exist but the simple claim that truth is "accordance with reality" appears to be basically tautological and need not bring these other assumptions in which appear to confuse the issue.

I believe that's what truth is. You can't really have partial truth. You can have knowledge of part of something true. But truth itself is not partial. It is simply what is. I think you're backtracking into equating knowledge with truth again (an easy thing to do). At the end of the day, knowledge is a rational assessment of what the truth is, but truth itself can not be provably grasped.

As for the sense of what you have written, I also do not think it is necessary to address your search for knowledge in such a way. I think you are overcomplicating it. While we may decide to search or not search for truth, I believe what you are implying is there are rational and necessary steps one must do to fulfill this search. I believe the word choice and examination is overly laborous for the audience you are trying to reach. If you view a second pass on your work as only stating what is absolutely needed to convey your intent, it will clean up nicely.

I think in the end you are trying to convey that epistemology is the study and examination of those necessary steps that occur when a person searches for knowledge. Again, I could misunderstand this.

Even if you are not trying to appeal to the layman at first, I still think it just needs a cleanup pass.

Reply to Philosophim

Hope you are doing well.

As to the matter of truth...
I've decided to keep it, whilst including a section comparing it to knowledge. Allow me to explain... It's unwise to drift too far away from our common-sense understanding of things in order to be clear and when all is said and done, what the model reveals is actually closer to the dictionary definition of truth than it is with knowledge. Truth is "that which is the case" and the model reveals what the case is by revealing what it allows. Admittedly, there are two qualifications: first, we do not technically have direct access to the truth (maybe). Instead we have knowledge of the truth (although, if there is no access to it whatsoever, we might ask how we can speak meaningfully of it in the first place). Second, when we "access" the truth we do not access the entire thing. We may come to know some part of the complete truth, but not the whole and therefore, the possibility is open for us to have presumptions based on the parts that we currently know, and for these to require revision when we come to know more.

In brief, the model will be described as a model for searching for truth because that is it's function. When we distinguish belief, knowledge and truth (or "reality") we are framing the model such that must test, access and therefore "find" truth in order to form knowledge. Attempting to side-skirt this conclusion would actually make the argument less coherent and more complicated.

As to the writing...
Your message came in good time. Thank you; it had a sobering effect. I was attempting to write a fourth draft of the work and make it very thorough but the thing was fast becoming very dense, dry and wordy.

On the other hand, I listened plan that I'd made a while back and noted that in that I'd recognised that this work should not and would not be for a layman because the work regards someone who is formally searching for truth. In short, on the one hand the work could be too over-complicated if I either try to make it extremely thorough or extremely clear (which is also ironic because I'm a Wittgensteinian and know that nothing can be so clear as to not be misunderstood).

In any case, the work should be aimed at our level or just below is. My plan it to write as if I am explaining the idea to someone like yourself or a young philosophy student as if for the first at - say - a meal or on a long walk, whilst not missing any of the major points.

My next post to you will be about a final piece I need to think through which is how the model allows for the choice between models.

Best Regards

Hi TVCL, sorry for the late response on this. Your philosophy is your own. If you wish to take it down that route, that is your choice. Just know that the criticism I gave of knowing truth will come back again and again, especially if you wish to make this better than a layman's theory. I am not saying you are wrong to conclude as you are, just spend a lot of time thinking on how best to answer these criticisms from people who are serious about epistemology. If you cannot give an adequate answer to their criticisms, it will cause a fatal hole in your theory.

And yes, I understand about the writing! I've been there myself, I'm glad my points helped. Keep at it, there's a lot of promise here!

I am going to be back on these boards a lot more this week, even with Christmas. I look forward to your details on choosing models!