Antinatalism and Extinction
One's initial reaction to a hypothetical in which humans are extinct is that of unsettlement (at least in my experience). It is a concept more horrifying, even than death itself, as it contradicts evolution and leads to existential questioning. However, upon reflecting I personally have concluded that extinction (only by means of antinatalism, rather than genocide) cannot logically be considered unethical, yet we still avoid it as a species. Here are my premises:
P1: In order for an agent to be morally considered or effected, they must be in existence.
P2: Extinction results in a lack of existence.
Conclusion: extinction cannot hold any moral value greater than the neutrality of death.
Premise 1 must be true, 'else one is morally obliged to give birth.
Premise 2 is self evident.
Could it be argued that extinction isn't only not unethical, but the only way to guarantee the removal of unethical practices?
P1: In order for an agent to be morally considered or effected, they must be in existence.
P2: Extinction results in a lack of existence.
Conclusion: extinction cannot hold any moral value greater than the neutrality of death.
Premise 1 must be true, 'else one is morally obliged to give birth.
Premise 2 is self evident.
Could it be argued that extinction isn't only not unethical, but the only way to guarantee the removal of unethical practices?
Comments (66)
There’s a difference between obligatory and supererogatory goods. It can be a good thing to bring people into existence, without it being obligatory, i.e. without it being impermissible to do otherwise.
So while voluntary human extinction may be morally permissible, it may still on the whole be bad, and continuing sapient life still good, if only a supererogatory good.
That's what I hold to be true, more or less. Pretty straightforward antinatalism argument.
However, you seem to approach this from an anthropocentric angle and consider only humans and human extinction, which is quite arbitrary and something I profoundly disagree with. Ethics doesn't depend on taxonomy. Of course, if you for some reason do limit yourself to antinatalism and not genocide, then for sure, the only ones you can convince through argumentation are other humans so it makes practical sense.
Obvious answer. Like a suicide pact. You never really know if it's carried out.
The classic example of a supererogatory good is donating to charity. On most accounts, it is not morally obligatory to do so, it’s not wrong to refrain from doing so, it is permissible to refrain from doing so; but it’s still good to do so. It’s totally okay if you don’t, but it’s still better if you do.
It could be to the resultant child's benefit, if that child's life is on the whole more enjoyment than suffering, or brings about more enjoyment than suffering.
Basically, imagine two worlds, one completely devoid of life, and one of them teeming with the most blissful amazingly enjoyable lives imaginable. Which is better? I think clearly the second. That doesn't make failure to realize the second wrong, because nobody is suffering for the absence of it, but there is more enjoyment happening in the second than in the first.
Of course, you could also imagine two worlds, one completely devoid of life, and one of them filled with unending misery and suffering beyond compare. Which is better? I think clearly the first.
So it's uncertain whether creating life will be on the whole better or worse, which is a large part of why it's supererogatory, not obligatory. (Even giving to charity is like that: in some circumstances it would be better overall if a particular person didn't give to charity, because the suffering they would incur would be worse than the good their donation could do). But it's conceivable (no pun intended) that it might be better. If it weren't, then it would not only be supererogatory, but impermissible; if creating life was guaranteed to make things worse, then creating life should be outright prohibited.
You could just as easily flip this and say that procreation is ethical because it’s the only way to guarantee ethical actions.
How so? You don't know you'll be around long enough to ensure any offspring is raised desirably, even if you are you don't know they'd follow along.
But isn’t it also true that you won’t be around after extinction to know that life will not appear and evolve again, and that those life forms will not act unethically? If you’re looking for 100% guarantees, you’re not going to find any almost 100% if the time. :razz:
Yes, that is the correct answer to that rebuttal, JacobPhilosophy.
Three things being born has that makes it a detriment for the person being born:
1) The child now has to "deal with" life. Putting someone in a position to deal with survival, finding comfort (and navigating social, political, economic challenges) is not an ethical position, in my opinion. It is "throwing" someone into a game of challenges, that did not need to be played in the first place, but cannot be stopped, lest brutal harm to oneself via suicide.
2) There is a component of necessary suffering in all life, especially human life. We are dissatisfied much of the time, as shown by our own wants and desires. They are representative of things we do not currently have now. We constantly are becoming but rarely ever being. This goes into principles similar to Eastern philosophy and Buddhism, but are certainly touched upon in ancient Greek sources, and of course Schopenhauer describes this principle (which he calls Will) at length.
3) There is an obvious component of contingent suffering. People are born into different causal circumstances, different personality types, different brain chemistrys, different family circumstances. Someone can be a complete insomniac, have physical or mental disorder, have a shitty job, have an accident, have no job, live in a garbage heap, etc. etc. The billions of contingent negative circumstances anyone might find themselves in, in terms of their own causal life-story is endless. Positive psychology, and the hope for change to something better does not prevent contingent harm from befalling, and it often simply feeds back to point 1 ("dealing with"). So there is the initial negative circumstance, and the dealing with the challenges to get out of it, and then calling this "good" and "right" for the person to endure. I believe this to be the equivalent of philosophical gaslighting. Blame the victim for not liking life's circumstances and telling them, that this is the way things are. No they don't have to be anything. People don't have to be born in the first place. Nothing (no thing) ever suffers nor cares about not experiencing the good. That's only a worry for the already born (already too late).
And no, the logic that there needs to be someone around for suffering to matter is false. That would be like saying that in a world with no torture, having no torture doesn't matter because no one is experiencing it. You don't bring about torture in order for it to be prevented. Rather, if there was no torture to begin with, that in itself is good and better than having to prevent torture that already exists.
Others acting unethically is also beyond one’s control.
Quoting JacobPhilosophy
But the statement is still true nonetheless, right? If not, how would you answer the question of how to guarantee ethical actions?
I’m not really trying to present an argument. Antinatalism being good or bad seems to me to be a matter of opinion. It focuses on reducing harm, but there are other moralities that focus on increasing happiness, pleasure, etc. And as best as I can tell, the reason one chooses to emphasize one or the other is arbitrary, and depends on their own inherent biases and values. I’m just pointing out that the statement “If we continue to procreate ethical actions will also continue” is factually true, as is its inverse. Therefore, both fail to establish much persuasive ability.
Quoting JacobPhilosophy
I’m not as quick to agree with this either, at least not in absolute terms. For example, is it permissible to eliminate harm for one person if doing so also reduces happiness for 10 people? Also, I typically think antinatalists exaggerate suffering/harm. I equate them with intolerable pain, either physical or mental. So I don’t consider being hungry as suffering, at least not until it reaches the person’s subjective threshold for pain.
I get it. But if that is the case, how do you explain so many people that judge life to be enjoyable or pleasant? Or, in a word, worth living? I don’t see the logic of trading a life of mostly pleasure/happiness for no life at all.
Quoting JacobPhilosophy
But there are existing human beings who are deprived of pleasure by not having a child. If tomorrow we woke up and everyone was sterile, happiness would decrease, and suffering would increase. I get it that the unborn cannot experience pleasure, so no suffering is experienced by them if they are not born. But why should my duty be to the unborn, rather than the living? Why should I be more concerned about the potential suffering an unborn person could experience by being born more than the potential suffering those already born could experience by not procreating? If a couple approaches me and is suffering because they are not able to have children, isn’t the ethical thing to do to try to help alleviate their suffering through some fertilization process if possible? If I am able to prevent suffering of those that are already born, shouldn’t I do so?
You can put up a better rebuttal than this...
Not getting to cause other people's pain because one wants children, is not a good argument to go ahead and proceed causing others pain.
If one can prevent pain for another person when one is able to, that is the correct action.
If i get pleasure from an action that directly causes a lifetime of known and unknown forms of suffering for another, that should be questioned at best.
So using fertilization treatment to relieve the suffering of being unable to have children is permissible in your view?
Sorry, I should say, if one can prevent ALL pain for another person when one is able to, that is the correct action.
Otherwise, of course not to your example. If coming into existence brings about all possibilities of future harm for someone else, and fertilization treatment brings this outcome for someone else into fruition, then no.
Also, part of your critique of procreation is the expectation for the person being born to deal with whatever suffering it may occur. But, in this case at least, you’re doing the exact same thing; expecting those who suffer because they can’t have children to just deal with it.
Anyway, I’m not convinced that preventing potential suffering should take precedence over reducing actual suffering in cases where one has to choose one or the other. One reason being that you can’t assess whether or not the amount of suffering the person being born will experience will be greater than the amount of suffering experienced by the unhappy couple. It seems logical that you should reduce/prevent the greatest amount of suffering possible, and seeing how the unborn person isn’t even experiencing suffering, why not focus on reducing actual suffering that is being experienced?
I’m also not convinced that all suffering is bad and should be eliminated/prevented at all costs. The suffering experienced by receiving a vaccine, for example, pales in comparison to the potential reward. I don’t believe that if everyone lived in a way that they never inflicted harm on anyone else, no matter how great or small, the world would be a better place.
All known and unknown forms of suffering will occur when born. Don't see a problem here. I don't need to actaulize torture on someone to prove that preventing possible torture is bad.
Quoting Pinprick
If someone got pleasure from something that caused someone else known collateral damage (i.e. not intended but known to cause damage), that ain't good. It doesn't matter if they are heartbroken for not getting the pleasure, that action would still cause the collateral damage to someone else. Forcing collateral harm on others, to alleviate one's own desires is not moral. It is an action that is a consequence to another person, not oneself and this needs to be the consideration. If someone likes blowing up stuff in residential areas, but is known to cause people to get maimed by doing so... should we let the person doing this continue because he's heartbroken? He doesn't intend to hurt people, but he really likes the feeling of blowing stuff up in residential areas.
Quoting Pinprick
This is ridiculous reasoning. Forcing suffering on others to alleviate one's own is not justified because you don't know the quantity of suffering that will take place. Again, it involves another person, not oneself. People are not means to your ends. Antinatalism, (perhaps counter-intuitively) honors the dignity of the possible person who will inevitably suffer in known and unknown ways instead of using them as a means to ones own agenda. The reasons prior to birth, can never be for the sake of the child. This is all selfish fulfillment with collateral damage as consequence.
Quoting Pinprick
I said unnecessary suffering. Don't straw man. One can argue, since already born, taking the vaccine is preventing oneself from harming others, besides preventing future harm for oneself. But certainly, preventing birth, prevents all unnecessary harm from occurring for a future person with no negative consequence to that future person.
On this point, extinction does not contradict evolution, as evolution has no direction or purpose. If a species goes extinct, its members were no longer fit for their environment. They are unable - or unwilling - to continue the game.
Quoting JacobPhilosophy
Yes, it can, and it has been.
Quoting JacobPhilosophy
Anti-natalism will likely always be a fringe belief. It contradicts the natural instinct to replicate.
Quoting Pinprick
If we continue to procreate, unethical behavior will continue. The inverse is not true and establishes its persuasive ability.
Quoting Pinprick
Presumably because the potential sufferings of an unborn person can and often do exceed (in great proportion) the potential sufferings of those who do not procreate (because they do not procreate).
Always? If a nurse takes pleasure in vaccinating people it’s bad?
Quoting schopenhauer1
Forcing my daughter to not jump out the window because I desire her safety is immoral?
Quoting schopenhauer1
Maybe...
Quoting schopenhauer1
Neither is allowing the continued suffering of two people to spare the suffering of one. It’s just a different version of the trolley problem.
Quoting schopenhauer1
Nor are they means to your end. You desire extinction and are willing to persuade others to alter their behavior to bring about that end at the potential expense of their happiness.
Quoting schopenhauer1
Wasn’t meaning too, but I don’t see the difference. In your view, what types of suffering are necessary?
Quoting schopenhauer1
Well then consider foul tasting medicine, or something else that illustrates the point that in certain cases harm/suffering is good, even if it only benefits the person involved.
Quoting schopenhauer1
Right, but there are actual negative consequences for those already born.
You’re right. I was looking at it from the wrong angle.
Quoting darthbarracuda
Maybe, maybe not. Personally, I don’t like strict negative utilitarianism. I’m not so quick to discard pleasure as a factor. So for me, there’s more to consider than just potential suffering. The person being born will experience both (suffering and pleasure), and will cause both to occur in others. There are extreme examples of people who have largely caused others to suffer (Hitler), and those that have largely caused others pleasure or comfort (Mother Teresa). Exactly where the person falls on this scale is too difficult to predict, as is the amount of suffering/pleasure the person will endure throughout their life. The point being that everyone is connected. One unhappy couple can cause more people to be unhappy, etc., etc. At least in principle. So it’s too difficult to know, and I’d rather not base my decisions on such an uncertainty. Especially when the cost is so great.
And again, unnecessary suffering (for someone else).
Quoting Pinprick
Was it necessary for her to not get harmed further or are you causing the very harm in the first place because you enjoy it?
Quoting Pinprick
No it isn't. Straw man. This actually has only surface similarities at best. The trolley problem is picking between two bad alternatives to other people. This is about creating all instances of future suffering for someone else to alleviate one instance of suffering of oneself.
Quoting Pinprick
Again, it's to alter their behavior to prevent other people's suffering. Just like the person who likes to blow up stuff in residential neighbhorhods who gets joy from it, should alter their behavior...
Quoting Pinprick
If someone else is born already and was blatently going to get harmed, and you were trying to prevent this, thus causing slight harm... vaccines, pushing someone out of a moving train, educating one's offspring, not neglecting them, that sort of thing.
Quoting Pinprick
Don't understand this argument.. it is making my point. Again I said:
Quoting schopenhauer1
That implied, the small harm to oneself to prevent others harm.. affecting others.. Similar to going through loss of no child to prevent child from future suffering.. Makes my point actually.
Quoting Pinprick
Again, other people's suffering is not a means to your end.. If someone likes blowing up stuff in residential neighborhoods but is prevented from doing so, and cries about it, tough shit.
The funny thing here is that while it is always good that that future person will not suffer if not born, the pleasure foregone for the future person, is not good or bad for any particular person (as there is no one to exist to be deprived).
Quoting Pinprick
Quoting Pinprick
Every decision involves a certain degree of uncertainty.
Having a child involves both the certainty that the person will suffer, and the uncertainty of how much so.
Not having a child involves the certainty that the person will not suffer, and the uncertainty that...?
That the person may enjoy life is not relevant; it is wrong to gamble with another person's well-being. Those who never existed are doing fine.
OMG, the IQ in these forums is really low... Extinction is the second part of the definition of evolution. I.e. - adapt or become extinct. I think both are quite real "choices"... If we assume "choice" is the correct word. To give... very dumb down example (so people here can understand), imagine a plane crashing in the alps, and to survive - people must eat each other. Ok, I know people today don't have even imagination... So, go watch the movie! Well, this is called "adaptation". The refusal to adapt is called extinction. If you are concerned with a complicated topics like moral, actually to preserve your moral, you sometimes need to chose extinction.
People are afraid / refuse death/extinction for a simple reason - instincts. Instincts are beyond reason, although - easy to explain by reason. People that are not afraid of death, get more easily killed, i.e. they propagate more rarely their genes. And voila - we live in a society that is dominated by irrational drives like fear of death, or desire to propagate. These have nothing to do with reason or moral values, or even choice. We are born like this. It's just traits built in the species, that are proven by evolution to give better chance of survival. Not because evolution somehow want us to survive, just being born has this inherited bias.
In such line of thought, trying to be reasonable, refusal of these irrational parts of you, is borderline choice of extinction. Another movie reference - Idiocracy. It's a fact, low IQ people tend to survive easier. They have more friends, they allow their instincts to work, they have no morals or original thought... you will hardly find low IQ antinatalists, or low IQ revolutionary. Some writers get that, so they prefer to write about an epic death, then mediocre survival. And the masses actually like reading such epic stories about dying heroes... But if it was about them... well they wold prefer survival at all costs. And become the future parents of the next generation. Interesting, hm... Sounds a lot like the idea of "original sin", or Samsara. The circle of life that must go on at any cost, since it's out ultimate goal as being born into this world.
On the contrary - transcendence from this ignorance, was always perceived as non-existence (at least as something opposed to what we call existence). This is reflected the ideal of the monk life. Which is first - celibacy - i.e. not bringing new life, and second - disassociation with the worldly affairs.
What types of suffering are necessary?
Quoting schopenhauer1
Explain what you mean by necessary. It was necessary to stop her in order to prevent her from being injured, and the harm I caused is less than what would have occurred. I suppose you could say that I enjoyed keeping her safe, but relieved would be a better term.
Quoting schopenhauer1
In my example, you are a third party whose action affects the suffering of other people. You can either treat the couple (which will enable them to give birth and reduce their suffering), or you can refuse to treat them and prevent the suffering of the unborn child.
Quoting schopenhauer1
So in this case it’s ok to treat them as a means to your end?
Quoting schopenhauer1
So necessary suffering is suffering that is caused in order to prevent or reduce greater suffering?
Quoting schopenhauer1
The argument is that some suffering leads to pleasure, happiness, etc. Suffering can be a means to an end that is regarded as positive. So why focus on eliminating all suffering, and not just suffering that has strictly negative outcomes? You argue that it is best to not procreate because it prevents all suffering (not just unnecessary suffering) for the unborn person. So in this case, you judge allowing suffering of any kind to be impermissible. Yet in other cases, you seem to judge certain types of suffering (those you deem as necessary) as permissible.
Quoting schopenhauer1
This is where you’re misunderstanding me. Let’s say someone will continue to suffer if they do not receive a shot. The issue is if your position is that you should always prevent suffering if possible, you cannot give the person the shot, as it will cause suffering. You are intentionally harming another person, perhaps even against their will.
Quoting schopenhauer1
This is inconsistent. You aren’t considering the bomber’s suffering, and are intentionally causing him to suffer to further your end of preventing the suffering of others. His suffering is a means to your end. What is the difference in causing his suffering and telling him to deal with it, and causing suffering by procreating and telling the child to deal with it? I would also add that it is very likely that at some point in the child’s life he will prevent the suffering of another human being. To what extent, however, is unknown.
I'm going to bypass all of this and reiterate the main point:
The bomber and the parents have the same problem.. their "harm" is predicated on causing harm to others. That's my point.
Well, extinction will as surely guarantee there will be no ethical practices. Is the removal of ethical practices ethical? Does the removal of unethical practices outweigh the removal of ethical practices? There will be no ethics when we're extinct, no good or bad to be done.
But other creatures will still suffer. So, clearly, we can only guarantee the removal of unethical practices and suffering only by removal of all living creatures. Why is their suffering of less significance than ours? Not only must we refrain from procreation, we must stop other creatures from procreating as well. Those creatures that are currently living must be allowed to live, of course, but being unable to understand that reproduction is harmful, they will reproduce if not prevented from doing so. Now that I think of it, though, when we're extinct we won't be able to prevent other creatures from procreating and therefore causing suffering. Perhaps that renders our extinction unethical.
Not having a child involves the certainty that some will suffer as a result. The uncertainty is the amount of good the unborn person would have brought into the world. To be clear, I’m treating this as if it were a universal principle that could not be violated. If you personally don’t want children, that’s fine. I’m not going to convince you that you should. The issue is if you try to convince others they should not. Even worse would be acting in such a way that people were forced to not procreate, or punished for doing so. Which I don’t think anyone here has advocated for, but it seems a logical conclusion to me. If procreating is bad, then one should prevent it whenever possible. Just like if murder is bad, one should prevent it whenever possible.
Nah I don't think this follows. Just because someone is doing something bad does not mean I have any moral duty to get involved to stop them. I didn't ask to be here, and I hate cleaning up messes other people make. I have enough to worry about in my own life, so I mind my own business and let others do their thing.
But surely I am justified in trying to convince people that doing something is wrong, if I believe it is wrong? I should have the freedom to discuss my opinion, and others should have the freedom to disagree or ignore me if they choose. Maybe anti-natalism will gain traction and become more than an obscure internet thing.
Vive la révolution anti-vie!... :scream:
That just means we are not fit for survival. Survival isn't important if you think about it enough.
Again, my point is the idea of forcing pain on someone else for one's own benefit of alleviating pain is not a good one. If you can't see the wrong in that, don't know what to say. People should not enact pain on others just to alleviate their own pain, when it is not necessary to do so (necessary meaning, immediately vital to your life or safety). One can agree with another of course, by way of contract, but that is different. You can concoct some weird scenarios, and there will always be exceptions, but my answer will remain the same for them. A person who likes to assassinate, doesn't get to do so just because they get joy from it and are pained not to do what they get joy from. You know where this goes and am a bit perplexed that you don't see it. Pain is not an amporphous thing that gets passed on. .There are agents and actors involved who experience the pain. Rights of autonomy, force, etc. are involved here when dealing with other actors then oneself.
You can make an argument of intent, perhaps, but I think it is weak. Even if your intent is to not cause pain in alleviating your suffering, the collateral damage is still well known. That is to say, it is well known life has many sources of pain and suffering, let alone all the pain and suffering that we know can happen but cannot predict.
This doesn't negate that one can prevent human source of suffering via antinatalism. It's a red herring of sorts. Not all forms (or many) look at suffering in aggregate, but more on the margins.. how it affects each individual (or how it would affect each individual). One person not born, is one person not suffering. It doesn't have to be this savior of the universe version you are parodying here.
There is a thread on suicide, so ideations and actual acting on suicide does occur. Having the instinct to fear death and pain is not the same as preventing a person from entering into the world (who will inevitably suffer) in the first place. One of the stronger arguments for AN, is that if we were to say "flourishing" was some benefit of being born. If no person "flourished" to begin with, there is no loss to any particular person. However, it is certainly good that all forms of suffering were prevented for that possible person. In other words, where it is always a good state of affairs that suffering is prevented, it is neither good nor bad state of affairs if flourishing doesn't take place unless there was an actual person who already existed for which this would be a deprivation. In the case of no child being born, there is of course no human which is deprived, nor knows if they would be.
I thought antinatalism takes the position that people should not reproduce, as anyone born will suffer. If that's not the case, and it instead takes the position that the decision to procreate should be made on a case-by-case basis considering the circumstances in which the child would be born and its prospects, I think that would be quite reasonable.
No, you misinterpreted what I meant. I meant that, in terms of dealing with suffering, one doesn't have to put emphasis on the aggregate, but rather can put emphasis on the margins. In other words, you can say something like "For antinatlism to be truly effective, all suffering needs stop". This leads to absurd ideas on how to do this. Rather, I'm saying all that needs to take place is incremental non-procreation (and not by case-by-case as not reproducing in any case is always good). So in the marginal approach it would be something like, "One less person procreating, is one less person who will suffer". Suffering is not aggregated into an apersonal entity of "Suffering", but is seen rather as a person not born is a person not suffering. It's the way the problem is approached. For those who get caught up in language games, you can rephrase that "A decision made to not have a child, is a decision that prevents a future sufferer".
I don't see how you can justify that assessment. That person's net effect on the world might be to reduce the suffering of others to a greater extent than their own suffering was increased by being born. The 'logic' of antinatalism (such as it is) does indeed rely on immediate annihilation of the human race, because if there's even one person left, it is possible that creating a second person could feasibly reduce overall suffering.
:chin:
My conception of it is not utilitarian, though a huge component is preventing harm. I don't consider it utilitiarian because I see ethics as agent-based, and not how it affects aggregate total sums (an impersonal maximization sum).
I believe ethics has to be person-centered, not greatest good centered or greatest harm reduction in the aggregate sense. The reason for this, is that there is a nuance of deontology that couples the idea of not harming people and balancing that with not using people either. That is to say:
If we don't want to use people (for any scheme like living for the greater good or flourishing, or keeping parents happy or keeping the species going), AND we want to reduce suffering to what could be a specific person who would if born suffer, then preventing birth is the proper course of action.
One of the interesting things with agent-centered approach is that the asymmetry makes sense:
One of the stronger arguments for AN, is that if we were to say "flourishing" was some benefit of being born. If no person "flourished" to begin with, there is no loss to any particular person. However, it is certainly good that all forms of suffering were prevented for that possible person. In other words, where it is always a good state of affairs that suffering is prevented, it is neither good nor bad state of affairs if flourishing doesn't take place unless there was an actual person who already existed for which this would be a deprivation. In the case of no child being born, there is of course no human which is deprived, nor knows if they would be.
Sounds like a fairly convoluted post hoc ethics stemming from, rather than leading to, a commitment to antinatalism.
So - don't use people and don't harm people, but it's OK to let them be used or harmed, so long as you're not doing it. You're aware, I presume how odd an ethical position that is? If someone routinely saw another person in pain and just walked by we would likely label them a sociopath.
Not really. Not using people and not harming them.. non-force (unnecessarily) and non-harm (unnecessarily) principle are pretty standard ideas.
Quoting Isaac
Don't know how you construed that. Forcing people into harmful situations unnecessarily is the point. Once born, of course one can help reduce harm. I don't consider that force. Similar to once born, children need to be "forced" to do stuff, etc.
Yes shocking that applied ethics is nuanced. What I'm not going to let you do is strait-jacket me so you can try to say it doesn't fit your strait-jacket definition.
Optionality isn't the point. The point is that if someone chooses to walk by we would probably think them a sociopath. No one's talking about being forced to walk by, we're talking about an obligation to help.
Is one ethically obligated to help any and all in need? Is simple awareness enough or is it based on proximity? What level of need is sufficient for this obligation to occur?
There is a difference between ethically virtuous actions and actions that are obligatory.
Yeah, for most people I think that's true. And it does seem to be based on proximity, but also ability. The difficulty required to help is often considered a justification for not helping, and I wonder his much the proximity element is just linked to that. We recognise it's impossible to help all people all the time, so we have parameters.
I don't know where any kind if 'average line' would be, but I think it only requires a general principle to counter antinatalism in this way.
One only needs to be reasonably confident that one's child will probably be capable of reducing suffering (putting whatever reasonable amount of effort in), and it becomes reasonable to assume they'll therefore have such a duty.
I think it is interesting how force and harm have inverse aspects to them. If someone is harmed, it is okay to help them (even if not asking.. this isn't aggressive force). Also, if someone harms another, there can be force taken to ameliorate or defend against this. So the violation of the principle allows for the enacting of the other (in proportion, etc.. but that is epistemological application decisions, not general principle).
However, in the case of procreation, we are talking about a state of affairs where a future person can be prevented ALL harms, period. Also, in the case of procreation, we are talking about a state of affairs where no one is being forced to participate in life (being born). Interestingly, being born causes all deprivation. However, no one existing means no one is deprived, and that means, no one is deprived of good things as well.
Both, at least to me. I maybe wrong though.
You've just side-stepped the point of objection. Either you have a view of morality which most people would consider sociopathic, or you accept, as most do, that failing to help reduce suffering when is it well within your power to do so is bad, even if that means forcing another to help (if forcing another is the only action you can take - you yourself are unable to help for some reason).
If you disagree with this, then that's fine, but your position is no better than the neo-con liberalism which seems to be polluting our societies at the moment ("not my problem!").
If you agree, then having a child, and raising them as best as you can to be both happy themselves and helpful in reducing the suffering of others is no different to fetching a stronger man to help lift an old lady who's fallen. We, quite fairly, use others to reduce harms to the extant we're able because if we're to have an ethic at all, then we presume it applies to others also (otherwise it's pointless).
As I said, the only way round this for the antinatalist is either a neo-con 'not my problem' ethic (which I'd hardly class as ethics at all), or a method of ensuring with 100% certainty that they will be no next generation in need of help, ie the immediate annihilation of the human race.
I just don't know what you are trying to get at.. So you are claiming that people should procreate in the hopes that their progeny will reduce suffering? You realize this is an absurd, unnecessary pyramid scheme right? By creating more people, you are creating more sources of suffering, thereby needing more people to prevent suffering. But besides being absurd on its premise, it is also unethical to use people as suffering-reducers. As with any "grand scheme" (e.g. keeping civilization or the species going), using individual people for some third-party agenda, however noble you think it is, is still using people. This is actually one of the reasons I explained earlier that I don't agree with aggregate total happiness principles and maximizing happiness only in aggregate, which are not person-centered but focus on some outcome.
Once born, reducing harm becomes a necessity of living in a society with people who are brought into existence already. However, to cause all cases of harm (bringing someone into existence) in the first place is unjustified. That is causing the very harm that needs reduction in the first place. It is creating the very circumstances that people have to deal with in the first place. No one needs anything prior to birth, obviously. No one needs harm reduced prior to birth obviously. No one needs prior to birth, period. And so while it is justified once born to reduce suffering, as it is "too late" to prevent all cases of harm for a person, it is certainly not justified to bring about the very situation for "all harms to take place" just because there is the potential for the harm to get mitigated at some point. There is no reason to cause the situation for harm to take place in the first place, and certainly not for a third-party agenda (thus using people for this agenda).
And hence, as a person-centered approach, preventing suffering will prevent suffering to any future individual who might be born. And again, preventing birth, prevents deprivation. Interestingly, this means there will be no actual person deprived of any good/benefit either.
Yes.
Quoting schopenhauer1
Yes. That's why I said the antinatalist's only coherent counter is the immediate annihilation of the human race. Anything less and the next stage ofvthis 'absurd pyramid' is going to happen anyway, whether you like it or not.
Quoting schopenhauer1
Is it? So one cannot call for help, because one cannot use another person to reduce suffering? How grossly individualistic. If one is morally bound to reduce suffering, then one reasonably assumes that others are too. That being the case, those others are already suffering-reducers. You cannot coherently talk about a certain ethical code (do no harm, do nit force others) as if it were categirical and then treat ither miral codes (reduce suffering) as if they were nothing more than a persinal choice which we shouldn't assume apply to others. All one is doing by giving birth is facilitating a duty of the next generation to help reduce suffering.
Quoting schopenhauer1
No it isn't. The harm in need of reduction is caused by other people having children. The reduction in question is caused by you having children. Two different events. All that is required to make the decision sound is that you have reason to believe you're a better than average parent.
Quoting schopenhauer1
Have a look back at the proposition I actually opposed. Unless you are advocating the immediate annihilation of the human race then the situation in which harm takes place is happening anyway, that is not within your control.
Why do you like to straw man my argument? You know very well that it is from the perspective of not causing suffering to begin with for a future person right? You combine that with person-centered ethics, and you see what I mean. A future person who can have all harm prevented should not be then created and harmed, such that already existing people can MAYBE have people that reduce their suffering. I already stated that the situation is different for people already born. Please stop conflating scenarios to suit your rebuttal.
As I stated earlier:
Quoting schopenhauer1
Quoting Isaac
And of course that is my main problem, you are conflating the case of birth with already being born. Thus, read what I said above.
Quoting Isaac
And you see that this is not really person-centered ethics, and therefore unethical. It is unethical to create ALL harm for a person that will be born (all the challenges, dealings and CONTINGENT harms of unknown quantities) for a child, especially for any agenda that the birth of that child is supposed to fulfill. Again, by aggregating harm into some odd ratio of less harm here more harm there, etc. doesn't negate the fact that you did created an individual that will be harmed, when this did not have to happen.
Your bizarre understanding of suffering/harm as an entity which is aggregated and not happening to actual people is unethical in my opinion. I am all for people already existing reducing suffering in other people, but not wholesale creation of the very circumstances for which this whole harm-reducing scheme needs to be there in the first place. All of that can be prevented for a future person if their birth was prevented in the first place (remember, person-centered, not third-party outcome centered). People's inevitable suffering should not be used for any cause, whether you think it's noble or not.
Quoting Isaac
And again, look back to my argument. It is person-centered. One less child is one less experiencer of suffering. It is not about quantity but creating agents who suffer, when it comes to procreation. Once born, there is now no chance to completely prevent all suffering, only amelioration. Do not cause harm, do not force. If someone is harmed. I agree, it is best to develop a moral sense to help reduce people's suffering if you see immediate suffering, but certainly with that one must not FORCE or CAUSE all circumstances of suffering in another, just so they can ameliorate suffering. People are not tools to be used for your cause.
Allowing bad acts to occur when you could have prevented it is morally judged as what in your opinion? Good, bad, or neutral? It seems to me that the point of morality is to either create “good” or reduce “bad,” or both whenever reasonably possible. It is good to do good actions, and bad to do bad ones. At the very least it is good to prevent bad actions from occurring. Since that act is good, and it is good to do good things, you should do it whenever reasonably possible.
Quoting darthbarracuda
Sure, but you have to admit that doing so is attempting to use them as a means to your end. You’re trying to get them to change their behavior so that it suits you and what you think is right or good.
I’m not arguing with this, I’m interested to see what you think about harming X in order to reduce Y’s harm. Or, Harming X in order to prevent future harm for X.
Slightly changing your above quote illustrates my point:
The idea of forcing pain on someone else (by convincing them, or somehow preventing them from procreating) for one’s own (or someone else’s) benefit (the unborn child’s) of alleviating (or preventing) pain is not a good one.
Do you agree with that statement? Why, or why not?
Apart from this, I’m claiming that attempting in any way to alter someone else’s behavior for your benefit is treating them as a means to an end. Promoting antinatalism does this, and thereby violates your claim that it is wrong to treat people in such a way. Therefore, promoting antinatalism is immoral. As a hint, the out here is to concede that the statement “it is wrong to treat people as a means to an end” is not absolute; it’s relative.