Kalam cosmological argument
Hey!
I have some questions concerning The kalam cosmological argument.
This is the argument I'm working with:
1. Whatever begins to exist has a cause of its existence
2. The universe began to exist
Conclusion: The universe has a cause of its existence
So my problem is this:
in order to exclude god from premise one, we have to say that god has never began to exist and has therefore no cause, god is timeless and existed infinitely long.
If you grant that its possible in case of god that infinite things can exist, why can't we say that to the universe as well, why do we need a god for this?
You might say: it's impossible for the universe to exist infinitely long but not for god because physics dont apply to him
But doesn't god prove that it's indeed possible for things to exist infinitely? And if its not impossible why is it so strange to think that the universe has that same attribute.
help me out guys im very ignorant on this
I have some questions concerning The kalam cosmological argument.
This is the argument I'm working with:
1. Whatever begins to exist has a cause of its existence
2. The universe began to exist
Conclusion: The universe has a cause of its existence
So my problem is this:
in order to exclude god from premise one, we have to say that god has never began to exist and has therefore no cause, god is timeless and existed infinitely long.
If you grant that its possible in case of god that infinite things can exist, why can't we say that to the universe as well, why do we need a god for this?
You might say: it's impossible for the universe to exist infinitely long but not for god because physics dont apply to him
But doesn't god prove that it's indeed possible for things to exist infinitely? And if its not impossible why is it so strange to think that the universe has that same attribute.
help me out guys im very ignorant on this
Comments (35)
And furthermore, even if the universe (as we know it) did begin to exist, whatever caused it to exist may have likewise begun to exist (as you say, we can’t exclude God from that category without just assuming otherwise), and so have been caused by something else that began to exist, which in turn was caused by something else that began to exist, and so on ad infinitum.
That is how we understand the parts of the universe to have developed over time: each finite thing was caused by some prior finite thing. So if there was such an infinite chain of finite things, that would just be the same thing as the universe as we currently reckon it.
E.g. modern inflationary cosmology posits a cause for the big bang as we know it, but that cause has a cause, and so on, possibly infinitely back.
I know all about the Kalam argument. One of my biggest problems with the argument is that there’s so much background knowledge needed to fully appreciate it. And I’m not saying that to compliment it neither. The argument has no meat to it; (that’s probably why it so appealing to those defending it). IMO, the best way to attack the argument is to expose the philosophical predispositions behind it. And believe me, there is a lot!
I don't know isn't cause pretty self-explanatory?
With cause i mean something that is responsible for something happening.
For example a rock can't move by its own it needs something that caused him to move, like strong wind or a human kicking the stone.
The argument is saying that everything that beginns to exist needs to have something that caused it to do that
First, as others have noted you need to define what you mean by cause. You also need to specify exactly what your own definition of begins to exist even encompasses or means. Especially because your concept of beginning to exist probably depends on a particular conception of time (A-theory vs. B-theory) and what does actually begin to exist. We think that electrons or atoms exist always materially throughout long spans of time but a chair doesn't exist UNTIL a particular configuration of matter is arranged chair-like.
We need to coherently distinguish between creatio ex materia and creatio ex nihilo. This all becomes much more complicated if we even abandon a substantivalist interpretation of time or of general relativity focusing more on the reality of change than of time so then does the beginning of space-time even make sense under that perspective.
Heck, what happens to the beginning of time or meaning of beginning to exist if we abandon the A versus B theory discussion?
Causation has a long and popular philosophical tradition of being either overly complicated in terms of accompanying ontology or extremely reductive to the point that causation becomes a fancy word for repetitive pattern. Start here.
Second, what do you mean by everything? This could mean the observable universe or it could mean the greater cosmos roughly defined as all that has, does, or will exist.
What you list is W L Craig's argument.
Craig then proceeds to somehow make this cause "divine" (of his own flavor, too), which mostly looks like a sleight of hand move.
(1) is ampliative:
1. whatever begins to exist has a cause of its existence
2. every causal chain began to exist (and there's a finite amount of them)
3. therefore causation has a cause of its existence
There's one more cause than all of them?
Spacetime is an aspect of the universe, and "before time" is incoherent. Causation is temporal, and "a cause of causation" is incoherent.
If there was a definite earliest time (or "time zero"), then anything that existed at that time, began to exist at that time, and that includes any first causes, deities, or whatever else.
If there's an "atemporal cause" of the universe, then there's no sufficient reason that the universe has a definite age (like 14 billion years). The argument violates the principle of sufficient reason. (Isn't (1) a special case thereof?)
"Atemporal" mind (and decision making and thinking and action) is incoherent in the first place. Anything "atemporal" would be strangely inert and lifeless.
Something's amiss somewhere. Craigian cosmology doesn't seem right anyway.
Yeah, I know there is probably a lot more to consider here but I will try best.
1. so with cause i mean something that is responsible for something happening. (i dont know how to explain it any further)
2. With existing I mean everything material whether that is all the fundamental particles or atoms, depends (where all fundamental particles are included) on your view of existing things. But in either case it's all material.
3. I don't really understand what you mean with conception of time. Do you maybe mean that beginning of something needs further explanation because I refer to something where time wasn't even existing?
forgive me if thats just non-sense
"Craig then proceeds to somehow make this cause "divine" (of his own flavor, too), which mostly looks like a sleight of hand move."
Correct me if I'm wrong but if we grant that there is a cause for the universe, this cause has to have at least some godlike qualities right?
What I'm arguing is that we don't really need a god in order to establish something timeless and infinite
In other words if we believe that god can be infinitive then the universe can be infinitive too
in other words: when someone believs god is infinite in order to exclude him from premiss one, why dont we just believe that the universe is infinite, since god proves that its possible
For some philosophers causation is as elaborated upon as you intuitively put it. Note that some causation models merely specify conditions and then conditionally (similar to an "if. . . then. . ." statement) are led to their effects. Some think this lacks a physical or casual omph and so there have even been physics models of causation based on energy transfer as well as other rather esoteric philosophies on it across the board. I'll specify that in philosophy there is a difference between (though you could perhaps blur the line) metaphysical grounding, sufficient reasons, or causation.
I could quibble with you on materiality as for me i'd rather use physicality, definitely recommend this book and here is another helpful link. Physicalism/materialism has greatly evolved over the years from some thesis that certain atomic elements only exist to more a statement about what we discover through scientific methodology and thusly add to our ontology.
Finally, you can start reading about interpretations of spacetime here. The key idea is that you need a fairly particular philosophical interpretation of general relativity without recourse to quantum mechanics to willingly assert there was a beginning to time let alone any creation of matter ex nihilo as is usually brought up by apologists. It depends on the relationship between matter and spacetime as well as whether spacetime itself exists as an entity in its own right. Some of which i've recently began to discuss in this thread. Much of the discussion is usually done assuming that you have a substantival spacetime (like a bucket that could have stuff in but be empty without issue) but this is to me a great misfortune. A good analogy for what i'm getting at is sydney shoemakers argument from time without change. Does it even make sense to say that time passes without change? Reflections on these issues creates not so much a rebuttal but a greater issue for apologists who propagate particular interpretations of general relativity.
What are those qualities and are they coherent? It may perhaps even be the case that actual infinities cannot exist in reality only merely potential infinities such as constantly adding one to another number versus the whole natural number line.
Infinite in. . . what? Is he omni-present and infinitely large or are their infinitely many capable actions he could undertake (omnipotence) or perhaps in some sense of the word he has a form of consciousness that is able to take in infinitely many conceptually possible scenarios (omniscience)?
with infinite i mean infinite in time. if he is infinite in time, he has no cause.
"What are those qualities and are they coherent? It may perhaps even be the case that actual infinities cannot exist in reality only merely potential infinities such as constantly adding one to another number versus the whole natural number line"
he would have to have some kind of free will and some sort of creative power right?
There is a difference between being atemporal or out of time and being eternal.
You have to now define what you mean by free will and creative power. As well as justify that this thing possesses said qualities (such as consciousness and thusly free will) while being atemporal or out of time and or being changeless. Further does anything ever even come out of nothing or ex nihilo or is it only ever a reformulation of previously existing stuff, properties, and relations. Thusly can this god create universe from nothing, if such a concept is even coherent, or can it only be something arranged differently.
"I'm responsible for getting my laundry washed. Maybe you have a similar responsibility. If you do, then you know as I know, that responsibility gets nothing done."
i feel like that a diffrent kind of responsibility though.
Further, while such a thing may not have a cause there would still need to be a sufficient reason or metaphysical grounding for said entity (if you subscribe to such metaphysics). Even for an eternally existing entity or thing you could conceptually without logical contradiction ask why have this be the case that such an entity or state affairs obtain?
Who knows. Are, say, relativistic quantum fields "godlike"?
Depending on some details, I wouldn't say so.
I really have to read a lot more on this to fully understand the argument.
Would be great if you guys give me some recommendations on what to read.
Thanks!
There is a lot to unpack in that argument and it's not un-like many others to look upon its simple form thinking there wasn't much under the surface. Neither is this the case with respect to any other arguments for god which equally as much assume more metaphysics than is said in the premises. You can start on William Lane Craig's website (don't buy anything from him as I personally think he's rather dishonest). I would also recommend looking back to my own previous replies which had many helpful links sprawled about many of which came from stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. A good site to start on with these sorts of issues as well as numerous others including cosmological arguments for god.
The conclusion is baked it. If we said, "Whatever exists must have a cause," then there could be nothing that exists that wasn't caused. Even God was caused, so he must not actually be God.
The premise is therefore worded: "Whatever BEGINS to exist (my emphasis) must have a cause." Now the casual reader, the first-timer to this argument, passes over that without thinking about it. So that a few lines later, we conclude that there must be an uncaused existing thing. Which we call God.
But really, you don't need the rest of the argument, which serves more to obfuscate the chain of logic. Once you say that anything that BEGINS to exist must have a cause, and then you say (without any proof or evidence) that there can't be an infinite regress of causes, that there was an uncaused cause.
Which might be Allah, or the Flying Spaghetti Monster, or the Brahman, but never mind. As William Lane Craig tells it, the uncaused cause just happens to be the God of the Christian Bible. But nevermind that unwarranted leap. The problem is that the premises have baked in that there is an uncaused cause.
But both premises are easily falsified. If causes go back like the negative integers: ..., -3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, ... then:
* Each cause has an immediate predecessor cause; and
* There is no uncaused cause.
This simple model of causality falsifies the argument.
The Kalam argument assumes everything it claims to prove. It's circular and fallacious proves nothing.
Why take infinite regress when the ground state could be necessary and thus uncaused?
By this logic, Last Thursdayism is the most parsimonious explanation!
He only says that so that he can pull God out of his sleeve. There is simply no fundamental reason, no known law of physics, that rules out an infinite regress of causes in a causal universe. But who says the universe is causal? Quantum physics casts doubt though the issue is far from settled. WLC's razor is, "Whatever answer I want to get, that's what Ockham's razor would pick." It's a rhetorical trick.
While I think you are right that we cant deny a regress just because its a regress. Stanford says this on the issue:
What would an alternative be to causality? Surely quantum particles causually rely on their quantum fields?
We know WLC already believes in God before the arguments but I dont see special pleading. The basic argument itself just says that the universe had a cause. But then after that he sometimes argues that such a cause would have to supervene space and time itself and therefore God. I dont know how a mind can work without time. And I know jack shit about philosophy of time (apparently he has written a good amount on time though) So theres that.
Again I dont know much. I'm simply playing devils advocate to learn more. I dont have a positive or negative opinion of WLC. But I do wonder why people dislike him so much. Where is he dishonest?
William Lane Craig has problems with the existence of actual infinities but not necessarily potential infinities. I would preface this with the fact that general relativity, the theory he thinks supports his argument, has an actual infinity at t=0 or when the density and temperature become actually infinite. He either avoids this by modifying the theory which puts him on scientific grounds to be objected to, what if his modification of GR makes the singularity avoidable, or he tries to obscure the result saying it isn't an actual infinity because. . . reasons.
Though, remember that Occam's razor only applies to situations in which you have two theories which both accurately explain the same observations experimentally but there is a way of quantifying excess structure meaning the one with more is less parsimonious so less likely to be correct. Think Galilean spacetime vs. Newtonian spacetime in which absolute space is clearly excess structure that could be cut away. Can you apply this same principle to finite vs. infinitely old spacetimes? How is one simpler than the other? Is being a-causal/uncaused more parsimonious than infinite casual chains?
Depends on how you define causality. Are you the person who given a Humean reductive analysis of the concept or are you the person that philosophical needs a casual omph at the base of reality?
Quoting DoppyTheElv
If causation as defined by you or others requires the inclusion of change/time then yes it would be nonsense to suppose that without time/change there could be causation. Note that he's assuming an interpretation of general relativity that presumes that all the matter that was compressed close to each other close to the big bang singularity just appeared out of nothing ex nihilo. To assert time began citing general relativity as evidence you would need to defend a spacetime substantivalist perspective of the theory as well as mess around with this interpretation in a vacuum away from most all none work on quantum gravity. In my perspective I take change to be fundamental to reality with time merely being an abstraction from such a central concept. Spacetime to me is either coexistent or emergent from materiality and the least parsimonious answer in my eyes is to argue that stuff got really close to each other then. . . just. . . popped out of existence the farther back in time we go?
Quoting DoppyTheElv
Some claim and perhaps have good reason to regard him as dishonest but my problem with him has more to do with his messy philosophical defenses for a god. They assume too much and there's always too many asterisks to have on its own without recourse to objections put the argument in question. Many opponents to him also cite video evidence of him on numerous occasions saying (possibly in contrast to other apologist/counter-apologists) that no amount of evidence could convince him other wise that his religious convictions are wrong because the holy spirit supports such convictions. He would still believe even if all his arguments fell through, his words paraphrased not mine. Play devils advocate all you want, it's good to entertain contrary positions to keep bias in check.
Premise one (Whatever begins to exist has a cause of its existence) is justified by our intuitions that observe things beginning to exist from a prior state of affairs in which the thing did not exist.
Premise two (The universe began to exist) is justified by the inference that the past is finite, so spacetime had a beginning. However, this is not consistent with the justification for premise 1 - because there is no prior time at which spacetime didn't exist. In fact, a finite past just entails an initial state for the universe (more properly: for material reality), one that cannot have been "created" because there is no prior state at which it didn't exist.
It is not temporal causal relationships that matter. The question 'What came before the beginning of time?' is almost trivial. Physical Time, like any physical object, is a property of the material universe and ultimately a property of energy. The real question here is 'What are the necessary conditions for contingent things to exist?'
"Before time" is incoherent nonsense, much like "a cause of causation".
And the quote is self-contradictory, both asserting "the beginning of time" and "what came before".
Put differently, if we proceed from such phrases, then we're moving into "anything goes" territory. :confused: