If objective truth matters
If everything is relative, than everything is crooked and there is no truth about what a person is, what he has done, and what he deserves. The world would therefore be entirely abstract and meaningless if there was no objective truth. Is this enough to prove relativism wrong?
Comments (101)
Why would our beliefs need to be objectively true in order for them to have meaning?
Objectively, it is. But I wouldn't know anything about that.
Objective truth is just an epistemological position, it's a statement about your requirements for certainty or our collective requirements for certainty. This applies to "objective meaning" as well... if you believe in such a thing.
Notice that the OP says pretty much the same thing, even though I removed the word Objective.
How's that?
If all houses are just bricks, and no one can live in a brick, everyone would be homeless. Does this prove houses are not made from bricks?
you are correct on this. Atheism and post-modernism really are at odds with each other even though somehow some Atheists feel the need to be post-modernists. Are you familiar with Noah Harrari's book "Sapiens"? If you don't feel like reading the 1st 4 or 5 chapters then check out some of his youtube videos.
You're not following the news lately? There's no truth. There's just the mob, backed by spineless and complicit politicians. This won't end well.
So I'll answer my own question. It's truth that is important, not objectivity.
All you did was make OP's post more ambiguous.
OP distinguished objective truth from subjective truth? Which is significant since creating your own truth is the heart of relativism.
Edit: Cheers,
The distinction between objective and subjective truth breaks down on analysis. What can be maintained is a distinction between objective and subjective justification.
A better approach to ridding ourselves of relativism is found in dismissing the notion of incommensurate descriptions. Truth is not bound to particular conceptual schemes, but rather is what allows us to compare them one to the other.
The grain of truth in the OP is that it is truth that allows us to determine which descriptions are wrong.
What is objective justification?
What do you think OP is arguing for and against?
@Enai De A Lukal
You can answer too, what do you think OP is arguing for and against?
That I prefer vanilla is justified subjectively. The answer to "why do you prefer vanilla" can be "I just do".
Objective justifications can be contrasted to this. That Hydrogen is flammable is not subject to my preference.
The OP is arguing that relativism is muddled. I agree. Our discussions about the world would indeed be entirely meaningless if there was no truth. That some statements are true is what allows us to talk to each other, roughly speaking, by matching the someone's utterances to one's beliefs - by triangulating the utterance, beliefs, and the truth.
I am pretty sure OP is talking about moral relativism and objective morality.
Quoting Gregory
"There is no truth about what a person is, what he has done, and what he deserves"
He then goes onto clarify.
"The world would be therefore entirely abstract and meaningless if there was no objective truth".
It seems fair to read this as "there is an objective truth about what a person deserves" which is a very different statement from "there is a truth about what a person deserves". Do you disagree?
@Enai De A Lukal
I could be wrong about what OP is saying but if I'm not then his entire argument is about objective truth in morality and the meaning of objective here is that it is not dependant upon the opinions of people. How can that be the same as just saying "truth" when it can be used in contexts where it is dependant upon people? Isn't this clarified by the word "objective"? Hence ambiguity is added without "objective" where it wasn't before.
Yeah, I disagree. If you deserve some specified consequence, then it is true that you deserve it. Nothng is gained by adding that you objectively deserve it.
It's a pedantic point; but that's what we do here.
Moral relativism says that the "truth" about the consequence being deserved is subjective and objective morality says that the "truth" is an absolute and unquestionable fact. It is the same distinction that you made between a preference for vanilla as opposed to hydrogen being flammable. With the minor point that subjective morality isn't simply a preference.
Better to set out moral relativism as holding that moral truths are relative to some given opinion. It avoids considerable philosophical baggage.
I'm not talking about consensus, you can read below for clarification.
I don't see a need to "rid ourselves" of relativism and I'm not trying to do that. I don't really see what you've done besides replacing terms. If you see the distinction between "objective and subjective justifications" then you see my distinction between "objective and subjective truth". I think my nomenclature is standard and I've never heard of yours.
I don't really know what you mean by saying that "set out moral relativism as holding that moral truths are relative to some given opinion".
That seems to be the usage on Stanford and IEP, much as one ought not appeal to authority. It's the view that morality is merely the opinion of this or that group.
But isn't this what the whole issue hinges on, and therefore removing it would re-frame the problem? Take the quest for the Holy Grail - I could define The Holy Grail as the cup from which Christ drank before the crucifixion (I think), but that definition has nothing to do with my ability to recognise it when I see it. The definition used to tell whether my quest for the Holy Grail has been satisfactory must be an algorithm I can apply to any given cup, the output of which will tell me if it is The Holy Grail. Since I can't directly check if it's the cup from which Christ drank before the crucifixion, this is a useless definition for me. I need something more like "It has six rubies around it which glow in the dark" or some such, so that I can apply that test to all the cups I find. I can't think of a test that can be applied to propositions or beliefs to see if they are true propositions or beliefs that does not involve consensus, thus making 'truth' de facto consensus-based.
I'm fine with that just haven't heard it put exactly as you have.
It's not about saying you "objectively" deserve it, it's about saying this claim about deserving it goes into the "I prefer vanilla" subjective category or the "hydrogen is inflammable" objective category because they have different implications. That's what is being said when one talks about "objective morality", that it's not an opinion or subject to context but an immutable fact that applies to all.
What else would be the alternatives besides moral relativism if not claiming morality has elements of objective truth?
Alternatively, to see the truth of relativism, notice that truth is relative to conceptual schemes or discourses, but that these are fictions that need weaving from smaller ones and joining into bigger ones.
The grain of truth in the OP is that truth is how we define the consistency we demand in the weaving and joining.
So the contention here is that statements of fact and analytic truths, are expressed in terms of what is, or what is not; but that statements concerning human affairs frequently appeal to what 'ought' or 'ought not' to be so. And as Hume points out, they are statements of a different nature.
Maybe you could say objectivity applies in the realm of what can be measured, whereas ‘oughts’ are connected with moral principles.
I think this is the objectivity error in a nutshell. Everything I experience in discussion with another is a subjective experience, likewise for them. Somehow we muddle through without any access to or necessary knowledge of objective truth. I can say "Objective truth is unnecessary", you can say "Objective truth is essential", and we can disagree and yet understand one another perfectly solely on the basis of our subjective experiences of these terms being used and our assumptions that, if we had not at least a similar understanding of these things, a confusion would arise, the very meaningless discussion you predict without objectivity.
At no point in this process does an angel of objectivity turn up to keep our language, and thus our understanding of each others' language, on the same field. We are clever enough to understand that we probably have similar subjective experiences of language, and can assume until proven otherwise that we therefore have mutual understanding. Occasionally subjective experience is sufficiently incomparable that confusion genuinely does arise.
Of a different nature to be sure, as Kant elaborates: “....The philosophy of nature relates to that which is, that of ethics to that which ought to be....”
Why do you suppose, if the difference is “....of the last [i.e. most important] consequence.”, he didn’t carry his investigations further, rather than demur to a personal opinion (“...nor is perceived by reason.”)?
A product of his time, I suppose; he just didn’t see any benefit in venturing further from his empiricist roots, then his basic inquiry into human understanding would allow, to wit:
“....And tho’ we must endeavour to render all our principles as universal as possible, by tracing up our experiments to the utmost, and explaining all effects from the simplest and fewest causes, ’tis still certain we cannot go beyond experience; and any hypothesis that pretends to discover the ultimate original qualities of human nature, ought at first to be rejected as presumptuous and chimerical....”
“....the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects...”
(So close.....)
“....nor is perceived by reason.”
(Yet, so far away)
What does this mean?
Are you saying that when you look at the quote above, you are not seeing the same thing as I see? But there is a clear sens ein which wht I quoted above is what you wrote, so how could that be?
And again, if we replace the quote with "Everything I experience in discussion with another is an experience, likewise for them", what has changed, apart from the indefinite article?
Among the fields that rapidly advanced were philosophy, political economy, engineering, architecture, medicine, geology, archaeology, botany and zoology, law, agriculture, chemistry and sociology. Among the Scottish thinkers and scientists of the period were Francis Hutcheson, David Hume, Adam Smith, Dugald Stewart, Thomas Reid, Robert Burns, Adam Ferguson, John Playfair, Joseph Black and James Hutton.[/quote]
Hence the emphasis on objectivity and the corresponding deprecation of 'any hypothesis that pretends to discover the ultimate original qualities of human nature.' It was at this juncture that the division between fact and value began to manifest, and precisely as a consequence of the emergence of naturalism. (The influence of the 'Scottish Enlightenment' on Darwin ought also be noted.)
Meaning that, 'objectivity' asserts itself as the sole criterion of actuality, and that value judgements are subjectivised.
Note Adorno's comments on nihilism:
Morality and Nihilism
It doesn’t matter how abstract and meaningless the word is, I’m still enjoying myself typing these very words.
I like your linked post. Not quite how I would phrase the issue, but we do overwhelmingly agree as to the facts; our disagreements being forced to the edges of our discussions.
There's a philosophical approach that seeks to force a wedge between an inner self and an outer world, usually following this up with a diminution of the import of the outer world.
For the most part the dichotomy is false. We find ourselves embedded in the world and inseparable from it.
No, I don't accept it in the sense that they are compatible. The process itself is deterministic.
The above has nothing to do with what what you wrote and, maybe, for a moment, you wondered how to understand it or whether you had been understood. It is precisely because this current paragraph seems to you relevant and meaningful to your post that you know that in fact we probably understand each other at least well enough to proceed. We have a seeming two-person consensus of the ideas under discussion that will remain in place until something comes to light to disprove it.
This is how meaning is assumed to be conveyed linguistically, pending proof of irreconcilability. It's much the same way that theoretical scientific models are assumed true if they seem to work until disproven. Like science, we have no direct knowledge of any objective truths that do not arise other than subjectively and via consensus. But so long as our conversation seems to be working, it's as if we're guided by the angel of objectivity. But we're not. :smile:
This is not to say that consensus itself can't be formed in part by underlying objectivity. But it's always good imo to ask the question: if we removed the objective bit, would all this still hang together by itself? Laws of physics... seems unlikely. Morality... seems highly likely.
This view assumes the subject/object distinction.
It's the view eviscerated in the first part of Philosophical Investigations.
OK.
Thanks.
Ah! An idealist, after all. :wink:
No, the juxtaposition of realism and idealism is itself an outcome of this same division between an internal mental world and an external physical world.
Check against observations?
That's making justification consensus-based, not truth.
Objectivity is just the absence of bias, as subjectivity is bias. If the two of you have shared experiences to refer to, then that is all you need for objectivity enough for the two of you. And total objectivity is just the limit of that process: what accounting for more and more sharable experiences converges toward. We can’t ever finish that process, but there being an objective truth just means that that process converges toward something.
That is definitely something that needs to be accounted for, but I see no reason why both types of question can’t be treated separately but equally. Both can be approached in an objective, critical, but open-minded (or “liberal”) way, adjudicating between different possibilities by appeal to the experiences we have in common with each other.
Pretty much; and that's fine.
Subjective is ambiguous. It means the negation of the definition of objective given above - that is, based on personal feelings; and also "dependent on mind or an individual's perception".
That's a problem. Folk think that if something is not objective then it is dependent on individual perception. That leads to all sorts of confusion, as, say, ones perception of a tree is seen as being based on one's feelings... and various forms of ontological idealism follow.
To me it seems the positing of a mind-independent reality is the hallmark of scientific realism and is also widely assumed by common sense realism.
I think the ‘juxtaposition’ you’re referring to is the vacillation in the Western tradition between objectivism (generally manifesting as materialism, positivism, etc) on the one hand, and subjectivism (generally manifesting as subjective idealism) on the other.
I think the fallacy of either of those views is that we can speak from a perspective outside the ‘self-and-world’ and thereby objectify one or another pole.
Whereas the embedded (embodied?) perspective is characteristic of Wittgenstein (and also in a different way of Heidegger and phenomenology generally.)
Quoting Pfhorrest
But what do you mean, ‘equally’? A quantitative matter is quantitative by definition: it can be measured precisely. You can attain your ‘inter subjective agreement’ through the whole process of experiment and observation. But questions of value are of a different order entirely; there’s no consensus on how to account for them.
This is actually the crux of the problem.
Quoting Enai De A Lukal
You can say you don't agree but it's been laid out plainly.
Example.
Person A thinks incest is immoral, Person B thinks it isn't.
Person A thinks you can breathe underwater, Person B thinks you can't.
How do you prove that incest is immoral and how do you prove that you can't breathe underwater.
Is it true that Person A thinks incest is immoral? Yes, can he claim that it is moral truth? Yes. The question remains on whether he thinks that Person A believes his moral truth is a fact or a viewpoint.
An example of objective morality is that within Christianity/Islam it is said that God CANNOT be wrong. He is always right. So if God lays out what is sinful and what isn't then this is a matter of fact, if you disagree then you are simply wrong.
Equally, if there is any kind of objective moral truth then there are correct answers and the other answers are false. If you remove "objective moral truth" and say "moral truth" then I don't think this is clear, you would need to explain your stance. Even now, because you refuse to describe your views as believing in objective moral truth, I still see ambiguity in your position.
It's like saying "this soccer ball is truly round (sorta)" . It's saying "I am truly this in the battlefield of morality".
And so this is a perfect example of the confusion and redundancy I'm talking about, and which I don't think has adequately been supported. I think its relatively obvious the question does not remain- if someone thinks that their moral judgments express truths, then they are rejecting moral relativism and holding that- in your terminology here- there are something like moral facts (which we can express via moral judgments and propositions) and that morality is not merely a "viewpoint". So I don't see what is added, beyond unnecessary baggage/confusion/controversy, by introducing some peculiar (and I think illusory/untenable) distinction between various kinds of truth that differ in whether they are "objective" or not. "Objective" truth is a redundancy. To ask whether there are moral truths, is (more or less) just to ask whether there is some ("objective", subject-invariant, etc) fact of the matter in virtue of which certain moral judgments are true and others are not. Which is also the rejection of moral relativism (or anti-realism). And so the issue is (imo) more straightforwardly posed as a dilemma between relativism and moral truth, rather than different varieties of truth.
There's not total consensus that questions of reality are to be settled by appeal to observation either: people disbelieve observable things and believe unobservable things all the time.
But regardless of whether there is consensus that we should do so, we can if we choose adjudicate disagreements on moral issues the same way we do factual ones: appeal to our shared experiences. For factual questions those are sensations: sight, hearing, etc. (Instruments are just additional things we're observing, with those same senses; the ways they interact with the environment, etc). For normative questions those are appetites: things like pain and hunger etc.
Just as we can rule out factual possibilities by saying if you go and stand here and do this such-and-such will just look obviously false, so too we can rule out normative possibilities by saying if you go and stand here and do this such-and-such will just feel obviously bad.
The objective truth is whatever looks true rather than false when all different perspectives and circumstances are accounted for. The objective good is likewise whatever feels good rather than bad when all different perspective and circumstances are accounted for.
That does of course depend on people agreeing to base their judgements on such experiences and not just saying "I know it looks false / feels bad but it's true / good anyway", and agreeing to account for all experiences and not just saying "I can't see it right now so it's not real / it's not hurting me right now so there's nothing wrong with it" etc.
I generally agree with the point you're making, that strictly speaking "objective truth" is redundant because if there's any actual truth it must be objective, but because there are some people with the confused notion of "subjective truth" (which should strictly just mean "opinion"), I think it's helpful to include that redundancy for clarity. Redundancy helps clarify in a lot of kinds of communication.
By way of expanding the discussion, what are we to make of someone who does not think murder is wrong? Does their insistence that murder is fine tell us something about murder, or something about them?
Murder is not such a good example, because by definition it is wrongful killing; so someone who thinks it is fine has made a logical error. Let's change the example. Suppose someone claims that kicking a puppy gives them pleasure, in order to justify habitual cruelty. Does this tell us something about the ethics of kicking puppies, or does it tell us something about them?
It seems to me that it tells us about them.
That is just to accept the contention that there is a worthwhile distinction to be made between objective and subjective truths, and then to say that all real (Scotts?) truths are objective.
I don't think that's a worthy compromise. It's rather that the subject/object distinction is ill-applied to truth.
I don't understand what objective morality means. It seems to me it's all contingent on what the conscience tells each person. We are social animals, so morality is a tricky question. But we are a type of animal, and questions like abortion, which some call murder, is difficult. If someone means by saying "this moral opinion is objective" that "we all feel this way", we have to ask if homo erectus felt that way, and if morals evolve. I'm sticking to my argument though that one's soul or karmic state is objective
Good, because that's my contention - it is senseless.
Here's an analysis that is not the subject/object distinction, but which runs in a similar vein.
That I like vanilla is a fact about me. I don't expect that you also like vanilla. It's not a moral preference.
My "preference" for not kicking puppies is different to my preference for vanilla precisely in that I do expect you not to kick puppies. Hence what characterises moral statements is that they are taken to apply generally.
This general applicability might be taken to look like objectivity. It is however quite different.
It means there is some standard, that is not itself simply one person or group's opinion, against which anyone's opinions on what is good or bad can be judged as more or less correct than others.
Just like objective reality means that there is some standard, that is not itself simply one person or group's opinion, against which anyone's opinions on what is true or false can be judged as more or less correct than others.
Quoting Banno
What would "objectivity" be in this case that would be different from that? I mean, what you're describing is what I'd call a claim of objective morality, which claim may or may not be entirely correct. Is that last clause all you mean to distinguish it from being actually objectively moral?
I understand your points and in a different world where people did not use truth in other contexts such as "things true to me" in any shape then I could wholeheartedly agree. We do not live in that world, there are many circumstances where one can talk about "their truth" as "their perspective" and "their reality". If you want to dislike all of these instances, I don't have an opinion on that but I won't be assuming that people who use the word "truth" in any context are trying to make a claim of objective moral truth.
It's not just "my truth" either, I think I could find many examples where upon further investigation, the word truth is used but is not meant to be taken as a declaration of fact.
I consider this to be a linguistic dispute about the redundancy of "objective" in the usage of the term "objective truth". You say it's a redundancy but I say it clarifies what exactly is being said and helps me to understand. We may just have to agree to disagree on this.
Indeed, yet it makes no mention of objectivity. It is just an analysis of the logic, the grammar, of certain sorts of statements. Again, the aim is to remove the baggage of objectivity.
Sure but we don't have to oblige such abuses of language by adopting them ourselves, especially not when we're having philosophical discussions where clear and precise language is advisable and productive. That something is "true for me" is a misleading way of saying that you hope/want something to be true, that you are going to believe or behave as if it were true (i.e. regardless of whether it actually is)- or, I suppose, a peculiar way of characterizing a matter of taste or personal preference (i.e. that Coca-Cola is the best cola is "true for me"). But "relative" or "subjective" truth is not a thing, and so "objective" is not distinguishing anything here and so not doing any work (+ potentially opening up a separate can of worms in the bargain- like I said its not only redundant, but an unnecessary source of potential controversy or confusion).
"My truth" is just a recognition that the way I perceive things which is true for me internally is not necessarily true externally. I see beauty, I see evil, I think "delicious" and so on. Is it true that chocolate is delicious? Well, for me it is. This includes but is not limited to opinion, I see beauty and think delicious can be explained as having evolutionary utility. I don't even have a choice in the matter.
If I said "you deserve a reward!" and you said "that's true" there is simply no way that I would think that you are talking objectively. It wouldn't happen and I would be shocked if you said "no, actually, what I mean is, if you think I don't then you're just wrong, it's a FACT that I deserve a reward".
I can simply not accept that it is a total redundancy when the language being used in literally thousands of contexts does not make it clear whether we're speaking objectively or not. If you say, it's better that it wasn't this way, maybe but it is that way. We can agree to disagree but I am going to continue in my ways and I think it would make things harder for me if I stopped.
Isn't that just what we call your belief? Again, removing all that internal/external paraphernalia, whilst at the same time returning to common parlance.
Right, so like I said, "true for me" as a peculiar way of describing matters of taste or personal preference (i.e. whether chocolate is delicious). But then, why talk of truth when we mean opinion or taste? Or why talk of truth when we mean belief or perception (much less hopes or wishes)? And I certainly don't see why the prevalence of a confused usage should be a persuasive argument for adopting it in a philosophical context, if anything philosophy ought to be helping dispel linguistic and conceptual muddles not adopting/perpetuating them.
Really, You'd happily label a proposition 'true' based solely on your own observation? That seems uncharacteristically hubristic. I'd at least entertain the possibility that I was wrong and not claim 'truth' until I'd had that observation confirmed, by the consensus of others. Take your approach and UFOs are true.
Not really, being human and morality is part of this, puts me in a place of experiencing and seeing things in a particular way, that while subjective, is not within my control and cannot be characterised as belief.
Honestly, the way you two are describing subjective truth as preference and belief is painting a different picture for me. I may be more inclined to think the same way about truth if I felt that subjectivity is belief and preference.
Wouldn't then the resulting propositions be labelled 'well-justified'? But they're not, they're labelled 'true'. If we want to know the meaning of a word we must look to its use. 'True' (among other things) is used of proposition where we would expect and epistemic peer to agree with it given the same evidence. Those are the situations in which we use the term. We don't ordinarily go around adding '...is true' to the end of every proposition.
We use it mostly where there is, or could be, some disagreement '...no, it's true'. What we expect to happen is the person then agrees with us (or is more likely to) that's why we added it the unadorned proposition. We expect that if they don't agree with us, they will find themselves in error later (some action will lead to unexpected results - ie, they will come to agree with us one way or another.
We sometimes use it as a summary for the simple repetition of a collection of propositions too large or unforeseeable to repeat. "Everything in that book is true", "They always tell the truth", but here it is deflationary - we could simply repeat all the propositions - but even if we did, we might still embellish some with "...it's true", if we wanted extra agreement.
What I can't think of is a single example of the use of the term that's not measured by agreement. The membership criteria for that which is within the set {propositions which are true} are propositions which we expect an epistemic peer would agree on given the same evidence.
But we've trod this ground before, I know we don't agree on this and probably never will, that's why I made the comment to @Enai De A Lukal, and not in response to your post. Not that I'm not quite happy to go through it all again with you, I perfectly enjoyed it last time, but we are repeating ourselves, and so if you're the only person interested in refuting this line of argument, people might get bored - and we can't have that.
Perfect. I would add though, that, in some cases, I also think there's something wrong with the other person if they want to kick puppies. It's not just an expectation about behaviour, it's an expectation about character.
Then there is perhaps space for a chat about characterising belief.
Anyway, cheers.
Fair enough, your point was sufficiently made without it. It's of interest to me how some moral pronouncements fall into that category, but others don't. Refraining from sex before marriage, we expect the person to desire it, but suppress that desire for moral reasons. With kicking puppies we expect the person to not even want to kick puppies. I think here the religious takeover of morality (with its ideas of original sin) has caused two perhaps completely separate aspects of psychology to be lumped under one term - but that's an aside here.
Interesting.
Our Christian Brethren might not be able to see that distinction, and insist that we ought not even want to indulge in premarital fucking. So much the worse for their view.
Funnily enough, I didn't actually have Wittgenstein in mind because I wasn't thinking specifically of philosophical problems. I was coming more ftom a structuralist angle, but yes... more succinctly, words do not need objective meaning to be used successfully in language. What we do need is feedback from others that suggests consistency in language use, e.g. someone handing me an apple while saying "Have an apple!" As long as everything is consistent, we proceed as if objective truth were forthcoming. But it isn't.
It is apparently simple to hijack this system to get people talking about things with no objective reality, with no means of establishing or querying objective truth, and with apparent consistency.
Things like mortgages?
Well yeah, value generally. I had theology in mind.
Yes, with the caveat that, just because there is apparent convergence, it doesn't follow that there is some mind-independent truth at that limit. Convergence can be dependent on starting values.
But you are still referencing your preference. The 'your' in the preceding sentence justifies the use of the word subjective. It is no nonsense to say that others may hold a different preference. So the morality as you come to believe it should apply to everyone else does not make it a truth just because it has a universal scope.
The experience of the should-not-ness of kicking puppies is local to you. That you and I may share that experience doesn't mean the experience is truer than the person who prefers kicking puppies or even prefers kicking puppies for everyone. We may come to a state of solidarity, but that is not the same as identifying a truth.
I think we agree that there is value in avoiding the phrases like "objective truth" and "subjective truth." Where we differ is that you want to dispense with the objective/subjective dichotomy where I see value in moving past the illusion of "truth" entirely.
The way language works still offers plenty of options to express claims that produce useful outcomes.
Ah, so none of what you say is true.
So be it.
I would genuinely love to watch the spectacle of someone trying to "moving past the illusion of truth entirely" with complete consistency. I'm extremely skeptical that its even possible, but would be quite curious to see what it would look like in practice, even just the attempt.
Heh, yeah, that's about it too.. although I suppose it would be even more appropriate if he was attempting to insert his head into his own hind-end.
The things I write still get themselves believed or denied, but they appeal much less to a body of truth (as an existing thing). Other than "none of what I say is true", I would offer that the phrase "___ is true" does not predicate, in much the same way as a subjective/objective distinction of sentences does not offer clear expression of what the author wants to convey.
We still offer sentences as speech acts, but focus less on existences and essences, and instead come to understanding of what happens in that the happening contributes to our experience.
I'll give it my best shot. It's been a while since I absorbed myself in the style that brings about consistency. Some of what I write will get called, and I'll likely find myself agreeing that what I have written is inconsistent or didn't obtain of the meaning I wanted. In the early stages some sentences will get scrapped for better ones.
I apologize if the process gets clunky. Again, while I don't consider myself a postmodernist, I do find value in the critiques that arise from that style. I hope (but don't demand) that you'll be able to differentiate between the rustiness of the author (me) and the effectiveness of the method I'm trying to convey. The writing will improve over time as this author engages with criticism.
Hey friend. I think you were referring to me comment "Saying it is eternally wrong to lie is to make something temporal eternal. It smacks of Platonism". Making the temporal eternal and painting our reality into a Renaissance painting is what the statement "objective morality exists" is all about. Did you know Indian art is designed to bring out fear? Western traditional art is the way of beauty. So there's overcoming fear vs loving beauty as the opposite ways of East and West. I use to love Thomism and the West. I can't get into it anymore. Maybe I'm envious of those people, but again it's always greener on the other side
Quoting Banno
I thought the answer was that "objective truth" was a redudancy. You could remove "truth" from the OP and replace it with "objectivity", and get the same meaning, too. So the fact that you can get by with using just one of the terms and that they are intergchangeable, means that they are redudant.
Quoting Banno
The fact that you prefer vanilla is justified objectively.
The answer to "why is hydrogen flammable" can be "It just is".
That you prefer vanilla is not subject to my or even your preference about you preferring vanilla.
A "subjective truth" would be an oxymoron. A subjective statement is like a category error. If you say, "Vanilla is good", that would be a "subjective truth", where you attributed "good" to the vanilla, when "good" is a characteristic of you when eating vanilla, not a characteristic of the vanilla.
I may disagree. "Vanilla is not good. Chocolate is good." Our disagreement is a product of our projecting our state of "good and not good" onto the ice cream (if flavors of ice cream is what we were talking about). If we realized that what we are actually talking about were our different mental states when eating chocolate and vanilla ice cream and not some innate property of the ice cream, then we realize that we aren't disagreeing at all - we're simply talking about different things (our mental states) and not the same thing (chocolate/vanilla flavored ice cream).
It is an "objective truth" that you prefer vanilla and I prefer chocolate. Our family and friends may know this and give us the appropriately flavored ice cream with the appropriate flavored cake on our birthday. It is a "subjective truth" that "chocolate/vanilla cake is the best".
OK, Harry. I'm somewhat loath to enter into a conversation with you, on past experience. But once more...
I'll agree with you that "objective" can take on the sense of "true"; hence, when it replaces "true" in the OP it does so without replacing the meaning.
Otherwise, your post seems to me a list of the problems ensuing from taking the object/subject distinction seriously.
I wouldn't expect anything more from someone who claims that language is a game.
So you agree with me that "true" and "objective" are synonyms but my attempt to define "subjective" in relation to "objective" is taking the distinction seriously? Are you saying that there is no distinction, or that the distinction isn't useful?
It would seem to me that if you agreed that "objective" and "true" are synonyms, then isn't "subjective" the opposite of "objective", meaning that "subjective" would be the antithesis of "true"?
No, I said that you used "objective" to take on the sense of "true".
You're trading on that ambiguity.
No, you said
Quoting Banno
What is a synonym if not a word that can replace another and does so without replacing its meaning?
Maybe you would be less loathesome to enter into a discussion with me if you didn't try so hard to disagree with me just for the sake of disagreeing. If you actually agree, and it appears that you do, then you don't have to talk to me at all. Just let what I said stand. :roll: