Divine Command Theory as a Moral Framework
Within the moral framework of divine command theory, which dictates that moral actions are obligatory just because god commands them, wouldn't denying revelation (the moral disclosures made by god, which would be moral facts if god existed, albeit arbitrary moral facts) be equivalent to not believing in god? Consequently, is it true that if one says that another is amoral for denying judeo-christian values, which are revelation, then it follows that they would be amoral for merely denying god's existence because, once again, to deny god's existence is to deny revelation?
Comments (17)
I am new to it forgive me, from wikipedia:
"Divine command theory (also known as theological voluntarism)[1][2] is a meta-ethical theory which proposes that an action's status as morally good is equivalent to whether it is commanded by God. The theory asserts that what is moral is determined by God's commands and that for a person to be moral he is to follow God's commands."
So it seems it leaves wriggle room? The actions that are not directly commanded by God are allowed to be non-moral, and that would presumably include denying God's existence?
God has also not communicated his commands clearly to us! Ideally, we could have done with some sort of user manual: 'Welcome to your new universe! Here is how to use it'. That would have been nice!
So the lack of clear communication could mean:
- God has no commands for us
- We are meant meant to work out what God commands using our own intellect
Divine command theory could perhaps have two interpretations:
1) Everything that happens is explicitly commanded by God
Or
2) Somethings that happens are explicitly commanded by God
Could you say which one (or elsewise) you prescribe to?
Maybe we have to define amoral? I know my definition and it is certainly not 'not believing in God'. But let's go with that definition for now.
I'll try paraphrasing what you say above, sorry if I have it wrong:
Is it true that if one says that another is amoral for denying God, then it follows that they would be amoral for denying god's existence because, once again, to deny god's existence is to deny revelation?
Who is the 'they' in the above? - I've underlined it. It could be 'one' or 'another'.
Quoting Aleph Numbers
You mean to say that denying revelation is to be an atheist and to be an atheist is to deny revelation. Revelations are essentially serve as proofs of god's existence, the morality bit is only incidental to that primary function. So, yes, if one denies revelation, one is, in essence, denying the existence of god. The other half of the issue is that if one is an atheist then one denies the existence of god and that entails the impossibility of revelations. So, yes, you're right on both counts. No revelation, no god. No god, no revelation.
It falls immediately and irredeemably to the Euthyphro.
it is precisely if there is god, that everything is permitted to those who not only believe in god but who perceive themselves as…direct instruments of the divine will. If you posit or perceive or legitimize yourself as a direct instrument of the divine will, then of course all narrow, petty moral considerations disappear. How can you even think in such narrow terms when you are a direct instrument of god?
Claim one: revelation is received from god and is objective.
Claim two: if revelation is objective, god authored it (and thus exists).
Thus, the next two claims:
Claim three: If revelation would be objective and would also be authored by god if god existed, to not believe revelation is objective is to vacate god’s existence.
Claim four: If revelation would be objective and would also be authored by god if god existed, to not believe in god is to vacate the objectivity of revelation.
Thus, the atheist is doomed to subjective morality within DCT's framework. But I still don't know what to make of the atheist who follows god's commands.
:up: