What determines who I am?
Let's assume we have multiple people with subjective first person perspective experiences. What determines which first person experience I am going to experience? This is not a trivial question, I am not asking why a banana is a banana.
One answer to this question is that MY first person perspective is the ONLY first person perspective that I could experience. However, this means that my perspective is somehow special, compared to the others, because it has the property of "mine".
On the other hand, if my first person perspective is not special in any way, then I cannot reliably tell that when I say "mine", which first person perspective I'm referring to, because none of them has a property called "mine". For example, person "A" has perspective "a", person "B" has perspective "b". However, then that means I don't exist, because no perspective has the property of "mine".
Now, each of us knows that only one first person perspective among all perspectives has the property of "mine", but for each of us, this "mine" property corresponds to a different perspective. However, this would imply that ALL first person perspectives have the property of "mine", and that is in direct contradiction to what I'm experiencing, since I only have one of the perspectives, not the others.
So the question is, how is the "mine" property assigned to one of the first person perspectives?
One answer to this question is that MY first person perspective is the ONLY first person perspective that I could experience. However, this means that my perspective is somehow special, compared to the others, because it has the property of "mine".
On the other hand, if my first person perspective is not special in any way, then I cannot reliably tell that when I say "mine", which first person perspective I'm referring to, because none of them has a property called "mine". For example, person "A" has perspective "a", person "B" has perspective "b". However, then that means I don't exist, because no perspective has the property of "mine".
Now, each of us knows that only one first person perspective among all perspectives has the property of "mine", but for each of us, this "mine" property corresponds to a different perspective. However, this would imply that ALL first person perspectives have the property of "mine", and that is in direct contradiction to what I'm experiencing, since I only have one of the perspectives, not the others.
So the question is, how is the "mine" property assigned to one of the first person perspectives?
Comments (71)
In "my" experience (lol), the concept of "I" is a construction created by interactions with others and the environment around us which gives us an awareness of what we influence and what we do not. For example consider possession. I can possess a pen. This pen is "mine." If I were a dictator I could possess a whole country. The country would be "mine" - my territory and the people within it "my" subjects. It has a lot to do with the selfs sphere of influence or the ego. One would say an egotistical person is one who has an over inflated sense of self. Controlling people feel they have authority over other egos and that they should obey their personal ego as if by extension of the self.
Thirdly... consider an environment where a child "A" is born and is told their whole life that they are worth nothing and mean nothing and dont have the same rights as everyone else meanwhile another child "B" is born and told they are everything and everyone manifested in one person. They are the whole universe, powerful and the creator of all things and selves and is considered as such by everyone they meet. Child A will feel like they dont exist or have minimal impact and existence in the world. A tiny sense of self, constantly oppressed. Meanwhile child B will feel they are the only thing that exists and that everything and everyone they meet is just another facet of themselves giving them a ridiculously large ego (Not necessarily a bad thing but unusual). The sense of self is relative to that selves beliefs about what they can and cannot do and how they define themselves.
People who are in love regard the other person as their "better half" or the that they "complete me" meaning they are so alike that they are unified together as one. That they are in essence the same self. So again it depends on core beliefs and values and how one relates the environment to their conscious awareness.
Lastly.. imagine two identical selves, twins. Assume they are exactly the same in every way; they eat the same things at the same times, same friends, same dreams and ambitions, same everything. Except they must occupy a different point in space (unless they are absorbed/conjoined twins). So... even if all other factors remain constant, they must - by reason of not ever being in the same point in space - have a different perspective in their environment and eachother/ others around them. Even if one twin tried to repeat exactly what the other did in the space they occupied they would be actions done at two separate times and so wouldnt be the same. This means they are irrevocably two different selves. You are unique in yourself in that no one else can ever follow the same space-time path that you do through life and so cannot be "hit by the same football simultaneously" or hugged by the same person in the same spot simultaneously. The space you occupy as a singular living unit is yours until you die.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z10_6uaqVQc&list=PLCdW3jMJiDFAYG5-VFQy0eLyHqdGnstnB&index=3
There's been some good threads on it in the past. The best one was on the old forum unfortunately. I wonder if I saved it somewhere? I might have done, I'll have a look.
My short answer: this problem is a real one, indexicals can't in principle be done away with (but they probably can in practice if you work hard), this is metaphysically significant, and I don't know the answer.
Perspectives can be likened to attire. Sharing the same perspective makes people one, individual differences in identity overwhelmed by what is in common and differences in perspective shape unique identities.
An interesting scenario is if someone comes up with a brand new, never-before-heard, perspective. Can this person claim this perspective as his/hers? Mine? Surely, s/he can.
Another thing: if perspectives determine an individual does that mean when someone changes his/her perspective, the person changes too? I've heard the statement, "he changed his perspective" as if the identity of the "he" is independent of the perspective that changed as frequently as I've heard the statement, "he's changed" for the very same thing, a change in perspective. People seem to be in the fog regarding the matter.
Quoting bizso09
No, and neither would you assume that we have multiple bananas to be correlated with some number of subjective first banana experiences.
... or, would you?
Rather, you are asking: why this banana is this banana. This means that this banana is somehow special, compared to the others, because it has the property of "this".
I don't think that is the question @bizso09 is asking. I think the question @bizso09 is asking is:
"Out of all the possible perspectives in the universe, why do I have this perspective? Out of all the pairs of eyes that people look out of, why am I looking out of these ones, and not some other ones?"
Is that right bizso09? Do correct me if I am wrong. Tim Wood may be right and I may have missed your point.
But unless the banana is conscious, there is no asymmetry (that is relevant to this issue anyway) between one banana and another, and this banana can happily be self-identical without raising any philosophical issues. If a banana is conscious however, then there is an asymmetry, and it would make sense for the banana to ask of itself, why am I this banana, and not my yellow friend over there.
SO we have Peter, Paul, and Petunia. And they have, in order, first person experience A, first person experience, and first person experience C. It seems you are asking why is it that Peter has first person experience A and not first person experience C.
But if Peter did have first person experience C, then Peter would be asking "Why do I have first person experience C rather than first person experience A?"
That is, whichever first person experience one has, one might ask the very same question.
Peter's thinking "this is my first person experience" is not special, because each person can say the exact same thing about their first person experience, regardless of which it is.
It seems to me that to say "mine" is a property of a first person perspective assumes that a first perspective is something owned by, or part of, something else. What would a first person perspective be owned by, or part of - your body? Is my brain, eyes and ears, without which wouldn't I have a first person perspective, mine?
If you are saying that "mine" is a defining property of a first person experience, then your first person experience is only part of what/who you are, as "mine" implies being part of a larger whole. So, are you a first person experience, or are you something that has a first person experience? If you are more than a first person experience, then your first person experience only defines part of what you are, and you'd have to look beyond the first person experience to determine who you are.
DNA is just the holder of your genotypes. An organism is a phenotypical expression. Phenotypes are influenced greatly by DNA, but they are also influenced by environmental factors.
Regardless, I think this typology isn't directly relevant to identity. Banno's suggestion I think is the way to think about this. I always like to add in that it's not just your first person perspective, but the memories you build up; including, specifically, the memories of having had a first person perspective. So even twins with the same DNA will have different identities; the one would not only never have the perspective of the other, but would never remember those perspectives (one could say, never remember being the other).
The asymmetry arises as soon as the banana becomes this banana. Consciousness has nothing to do with it.
I don't see the asymmetry.
This banana is the only banana in the world that is this and not any other. What's so hard about this?
Yes, I know that you want to work the self-selection of the first-person perspective into the problem, but the original "problem" as stated does not display this feature. Indeed, the OP rejects it at the outset.
Let's address the semantics first. 'Mine' is a linguistically relative term. Your arm is your arm and my arm is my arm both of which can be referred to as 'mine' by either of us, respectively.
Now, depending on belief, assuming you are you and someone else is someone else. The perspective or experiences of another could share many similarities to your own. Say if you were raised in an orphanage or you lost a parent at a young age, someone else who also went through this has "your" perspective or experience and you have "theirs" in the general context of this event. Aside from the fact its virtually impossible between exact circumstance, place, society, or genetics you literally went through the absolute same experience and thus have the same perspective, yours would be yours and theirs would be theirs.
Yes, but what determines which one you are?
By "you", which one of us are you referring to?
Well, a qualified mental health professional if nobody else. :D
I don't get it. Don't get me wrong as analytical as I try to be things can and do go over my head, especially here. This isn't one of those secret society doublespeak things were somebody says "I'm (something)" and the person is supposed to think about it later and feel mocked is it?
It seems to me that we need to establish what a first person perspective is because you only know about other perspectives via your own.
It seems to me that via your first person perspective you acquire knowledge about others, that they seem to have other perspectives because the seem to behave as if they possess knowledge/first person perspectives as well, not just bodies.
So, what determines which one you are - logically organizing your observations using your first person perspective into a consistent worldview.
It is like asking how do we determine that things continue to exist once they leave our first person perspective (object permanence). Children logically organize their experiences in order to make sense of them. It only makes logical sense that the object that disappeared and now reappears is the same object because to if that weren't the case, then it would be impossible to make sense of objects in the first place and then solipsism would be the case and there would be no other first person perspectives, and saying that there is one that is mine would be incoherent.
I was gripped by your question some years ago until I realized something that I think solves a whole host of philosophical problems in one fell swoop. This question is indeed a good one and can lead to interesting things. I like the way it is formulated here:
From Mind and Materialism, by Geoffrey Madell; Edinburgh University Press, 1988. 151 pgs., page 103
But this doesn't really address the question of why you find yourself being the particular person you are rather than someone else.
I used to ask what the odds are that I would find myself being a human. I had an intuition that I could have been anything. And there is so much more that is lifeless! How did I get so lucky?
Many people would say that you are your brain, that you literally are identical with your brain. This doesn't seem so problematic until you start to think about it. It isn't the identity with the brain itself that is problematic, in my view, but rather the extent of what "you" are. It is the problem of indexical extent. When people say you are your brain, what they are really saying needs to be clarified. They are saying that you literally are identical with this particular finite collection of particles and no more and no less. That's what "your brain" is. And if you are identical with your brain, that's what they are saying.
If what these people say is true, then I literally am a three pound hunk of matter. And I am only this three pound hunk of matter. This is really strange! Why so little? Why so much? Why this particular collection of particles? Why am I not just one quark? Clearly, my identity spans multiple things. How? My identity seems restricted but extensive. I don't find myself being a whole population of people. What I am seems bounded somehow, as if there is a line drawn around this brain that designates it, and no more and no less, as belonging to me, whatever that is.
Think now about the fact that these particles that compose your brain were once scattered all over, maybe a few particles in a carrot somewhere, some others in a rock, some others in a cloud, and so on. Were you these same particles then? Absurd, isn't it? What are the odds that your particles would just happen to come together in a brain like that?
Consider that objectively, this boundary around what you seem to be does not exist. There are no magical membranes. Out in the world itself, there is no clear separation of a person from their environment. There is nothing special about the matter composing a brain.
Let's return for a moment to the idea that you are lucky to find yourself being a human. While thinking about this, try to keep in mind that it is important whether you consider it from a first-person perspective or a third-person perspective. Objectively, it is silly to suggest that a certain banana is lucky to find itself being that banana, right?! Of course! But subjectively, matters seem different. The first-person perspective is what presents the puzzle. If you abandon it and try to solve the problem from the objective, third-person by declaring, "Of course this banana is this banana!", you miss the point!
Think about the odds of winning a lottery. Suppose that we are to randomly select one person out of seven billion to win a trillion dollars. It is assured that one person will win. When the winner has been determined, objectively, it is not at all surprising that someone won. That was always assured. And if you are not among these people and are just seeing it all strictly objectively, no matter who wins, there is nothing surprising. But if instead, you are one of these people and you find that you are the winner, you will naturally be surprised! You certainly should not have expected to find yourself the winner!
The situation with our identity as humans seems somehow similar to the lottery. Objectively, it isn't surprising that these creatures should be identical with themselves and should declare that they are themselves. Nothing puzzling at all. But if you find yourself occupying such a perspective, it seems different. There is the sense that you could be seeing the world from the perspective of anything. And if you were to draw one three-pound collection of particles out of a hat, the odds are overwhelming that you would end up with some lifeless material. Isn't it a bit surprising that you should find yourself in such a privileged position? Even if you can only find yourself being something alive, humans are vastly outnumbered by other possibilities. Why are you a human and not a mouse?
Let's get to what I think is the solution to all of this. That you are yourself is not the problem. The problem is the belief that your identity is restricted, period. Drop the boundary. That's it. You are everything. You occupy all perspectives. There is only one. The world is itself. That's it. There are no demarcation lines separating this from that. There are no true individuals, no separate objects. The first-person perspective finds itself everywhere simultaneously, and likely at all times as well. The world is everywhere present to itself.
There is only one thing to explain, and that is why our identity seems limited, why we aren't aware of being everything all at once. The answer to that lies in how information gets integrated. That which finds itself being me is the very same one as that which finds itself being you. But from over here, I don't know anything about being you because your memories are not in this brain. It's that simple. It is a question of access to information.
Consider an amnesiac named Bob who uses a chalkboard in a room as a substitute for his lacking memory. If we show him something, he records his observations on the chalkboard. If we ask him a question about what he has observed, he consults the chalkboard. Suppose we move him to another room with another chalkboard. He doesn't know he has been moved! If we ask him about what we showed him in the other room, he consults the chalkboard in this room and finds nothing. He has no way of integrating information between the two rooms. He might integrate information between them if he has a mechanism for this, such as a notebook, a way of carrying information back and forth.
This is analogous to what happens in experiments with split-brain patients, where it seems that by cutting the corpus callosum, we have turned one person into two, where it can be demonstrated that what is observed from only one hemisphere cannot be reported by the other.
If we show that in room B, Bob cannot report observations made in room A, we have not thereby demonstrated that Bob in room A and Bob in room B are two different subjects. The situation with you and me is similar. From my brain (think room with chalkboard), I cannot report your memories. And there is the illusion that who I am is restricted to the information I have access to.
Notice an interesting asymmetry with respect to time. You can remember the past, but not the future. When you look back, you feel identical with that past self because you remember those experiences. You have access. Not so with the future. Your future self is hypothetical and isn't really included in your sense of self. But once that future has arrived, you will feel that you are both that person and this now-past person.
In reality, your relation to your future self is not much different than your relation to me. It is a question of access.
The analogy of Bob in the rooms fails in a very important sense. Bob is someone who is separable from the rooms and moves between them. We are not similarly separable. It isn't that there is one little homunculus that runs around and occupies all the perspectives. No. There is nothing separable. There is just the whole world being identical with itself. There is one 'I', and it is everything. There is nothing from which it can be separated.
Your body is experienced simultaneously by this one from the perspectives of all that interacts with it. You as 'other' and you as 'my body' are just what that particular body is like from two different angles. Both angles are experienced by the one subject simultaneously. But the information from the two perspectives is not integrated in such a way that there is a structure of experience that involves knowing that you are both at the same time.
So why do you find yourself being you, that particular human? It because you find yourself being everything. If one person is sure to hold the winning lottery ticket, and you are all of the people, you should expect to find yourself the winner, as well as all those who didn't win.
I think that people should rethink all anthropic principle stuff in light of this way of looking at things.
Also, if you think I am crazy, just some guy on the Internet, consider that many important thinkers have held a very similar view, Erwin Schrodinger and Arthur Schopenhauer among them. Also, Daniel Kolak, a living philosopher, has written an interesting book called I am You:
link
Also this guy. https://jkrishnamurti.org/content/structure-self-centred-concern
Well, first off grammar is connected to the world. So even when it is just a matter of grammar, it can tell us about stuff.
Second, and for example, "I can see everyone's face except my own" is true not just for you, but for everyone; so should you feel surprise at it's being true? I don't see why; there is nothing unique about "I can see everyone's face except my own" such that your place in the world is different to everyone else, since the same is true for everyone.
Realising that "I can see everyone's face except my own" is true not just for you, but for everyone, is part of the development of theory of mind (a somewhat misleading technical term). That is, a toddler or a cat might not be able to understand that someone else sees things from a different place; that they might not be able to see what you see. Something quite the same seems to be going on in the OP.
There might be some more interesting modal considerations here.
If Peter did have first person experience C, then isn't Peter just Petunia? "Peter" is a rigid designator, so we would say that in some possible world Peter had Petunia's first person experiences...
Suppose that in some possible world Peter and Petunia swapped places, so that each had the experiences of that other. What would be different? Nothing.
Quoting petrichor
I'd add that while this sounds profound, it isn't. For example, I take it that you are not here advocating solipsism, nor that your reader must be a Boltzmann brain, nor any other grand metaphysical consequence.
Rather you are saying something like that my talking in the first person is talking about me... Hardly world shattering; but perhaps sufficient to dissipate the philosophical concerns of the OP.
Luck has nothing to do with it.
The intuition that you could have been anything is evidence that you don't have an understanding of evolution by natural selection.
Just as the theory solved the paradox of which came first - the chicken or the egg - it has also solved the problem of how you came to be who you are.
I'm not sure why I am bert1 rather than someone else
Is bert1 a human being, internet bot, scribbles on a screen, or what? You seem to know what you are - a bert1 - but are ignorant of why you are bert1? Is that not a question about causation?
Yes, I think it might be. But not about the causation of bert1 - that is independent of the question of why I am bert 1, that is to say, why an I looking out of bert1's eyes and not, say Banno's. One could rephrase to say "What caused me to be bert1 rather than someone else."
That's one possibility, I'm not sure it's the right one and I'm not sure it actually answers the OP even if it is right. But I'm interested in why you think this could not be the case.
Maybe the astrologers are right, and it's the stars. I've been around enough babies to know that they are born with distinct dispositions, though.
These can be ingrained or these can be discouraged, but they remain intact throughout life. In a very real sense, we are all still newborns.
I don't know how to explain it. Why people are born with personalities and unique identities is one of the world's greatest mysteries. It doesn't make a difference if it all boils down to DNA. That's still not a sufficient explanation for why you are you. Your parents randomly had sex, and here you are, an actor on the stage.
There's no sense in looking for explanations where there can't be any. A cosmic abberation is a cosmic abberation.
The difference isn't about my being one of several possible qualitative identities, but about being one of several quantitatively/numerically distinct entities that I might have been any one of, but were not. (Not sure if that's right)
Banno understands the question I think, even though he thinks it rests on a misunderstanding or mistake.
Let me ask you a direct question. If I refer to the bert1 that typed this stuff onto the forum and submitted it, and I refer to the bert1 that is currently reading what I'm typing, are these two states of being the same bert1?
If you say, "yes", and I imagine you would (and I would agree), then I want to directly ask you... how do you know? What is it about bert1-poster-of-quote and bert1-reader-of-this-post that makes these two states of being the same identity?
Hold on. You didn't answer the first question: What is bert1?
You asserted that bert1 has eyes, so I'm assuming that your answer is that you are a human being. Don't we currently have a good understanding of how humans as individuals and as a species came to exist?
You asserted that you are bert1, yet you go on to question how it is that bert1 is looking out of bert1's eyes, and not Bannos'. If those are your eyes, then why is there a question of how you came to look out of them? How did bert1 come to have eyes?
As interesting as that is, what is the actual argument here? Because my perspective is clearly limited in my experience. So if one wants to claim that this limit is illusionary, there'd need to be an argument as to what justifies that conclusion.
Quoting bert1
There seems to be, consciously or not, some sort of "humunculus theory" of consciousness underlying this question. Why would you think there is a "you" that is somehow independent from the properties of any specific "substrate"?
Others are already them, in fact, everyone are themselves, it's quite common. :)
Say, you can't experience someone else's self-awareness, since then you'd be them instead.
A separate example of this sort of thinking:
Some are suffering and poor (e.g. tragic stories of African orphans), some are more fortunate and have spare resources to post stuff like this on Internet forums.
But why do I happen to be one of the latter, luckier ones...? :chin:
I'm guessing that's (also) what @bizso09's opening post is about, but please correct me otherwise.
Anyway, there's a theorem of sorts stating that indexical information can't be derived from non-indexical information.
Suppose we have two similar, nondescript rooms, and a pair of twin robots, one in each room (alternatively, you and your identical twin).
One room is ?, the other ?, and they're marked as such over in a dark corner.
To the rest of the world, it doesn't make much difference which robot is in which room, describing the world (non-indexically) doesn't really differentiate, including to the robots if they had access to such a description.
(For the sake of argument, since it's a thought experiment, we'll just ignore the no-cloning theorem and such.)
But, once this robot checks the dark corner, it has acquired a (new) piece of information that makes a difference (to this robot), "I'm in room ?", and it can then go on about its business.
Maybe not the best example; some writings feature the amnesiac Rudolf Lingens to illustrate the theorem.
I don't think it's specifically about mind or physicalism or whatever as such, rather the other way around, self-awareness is essentially indexical.
Quoting bert1
Are you asking how a particular view from behind some pair of eyes came to be named "bert1"?
Maybe this will work?
Individual human beings are a product of the genetic material contributed by a particular man and a particular woman.
Bert1 is an individual human being
Bert1 is a product of the genetic material contributed by a particular man and a particular woman.
In defining Bert1 as a human being, we preclude that Bert1 has eyes and information about the world relative to his eyes. Bert1 also has an opposable thumb and walks on two legs. Just as bert1's eyes, thumbs and legs, and their corresponding functions and processes, are part Bert1, so to is Bert1's working memory that his information about the world relative to his eyes are part, which is a function and process of his brain.
Ok, that's good, thanks.
I am bert1
Is this a necessary or contingent truth? (Banno will like this)
If "I" (when spoken by bert1) just means "bert1" then presumably the answer is that this is a necessary truth, and the problem is solved. I am bert1 because it is necessarily true that I am bert1. Denying this would entail the contradiction: bert1 is not bert1.
If I is not in every sense bert1, then the fact that I am bert1 is a contingent truth, and could have been otherwise.
So if we take the OP seriously, and think this an interesting question, and we think that I could have been other than bert1, then we must think that "I", even when spoken by bert1 does not entirely mean "bert1". That is, when bert1 is completely specified, there remains some leftovers, like cold Christmas dinner.
So this question will split philosophers between those who think that (at least metaphysically) "I am bert1" = "bert1 is bert1" and those who think that "I am bert1" is not the same metaphysical statement than "bert1 is bert1"
Thoughts on this characterisation of the problem?
I’m having a hard time following. IMV, and in disagreement with causal determinism, of course you could have been other than who you are, but you would still be you.
You present an issue of signified and signifier, or of designated and designator, in reference to identity. “bert1” designates you as a particular conscious being – which, as such, is a composite of particular past and present experiences and cognitive actions (here overlooking complexities of body and what determined it to be it … although I’d like not to fall into a dualistic mindset in so doing).
You as a conscious being are designated by “bert1” due to your own choice, cognitive act, of which avatar name to hold. Had you chosen “bert2” instead, the designator would have been different due to your different cognitive actions. So you as designated conscious being would have held a different history of cognitive actions and would thereby now be a different you.
There is the truism that a rose by a different name is still a rose. But, firstly, this would be a different designation provided from without that which is being designated – thereby not altering the internal history, so to speak, of that which is designated. Secondly, and maybe here more pertinently, without going into the details of what you as a particular conscious being specifies, every change in your experiences and cognitive actions is a change in what you as a conscious being are. However, if we’re searching for the you that remains relatively continuous over expansive periods of time – this so as to ask why are you you and not some other – this is a fuzzy or else elusive topic. An age old question that can be simplified into the dictum, know thyself.
It seems to me that prior to premising what you as a conscious being are, questions of why you are the conscious being you are rather than being some other will be devoid of grounding.
Or if I completely misconstrued, are you by "I" referring to awareness in general? But then are we not individual instantiations of this general property, individualized by our experiences and actions?
Haven't read the whole thread, so hopefully I'm not repeating topics.
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BTW, I have the suspicion that the OP was aiming at trying to prove solipsism. :grin: If so, I’m glad you took things in the direction that you did! A whole bunch of “solipsists” conversing and debating over why I’m me and not some other … makes for a nice rebuttal. :up:
The question isn't about why this body has the form that it has, or how humans originated, how this particular human originated, or any such thing. Our question isn't pointed at the objective situation. The question regards puzzles of personal, subjective identity. Why am I seeing the world from this perspective and not another? Suppose that there are only three objects in the world, three spheres, A, B, and C. Objectively, all we can say is that there are these three spheres, and they are in such and such an arrangement. Questions like the one this thread deals with don't even yet arise as long as this world is described only in objective terms. We can ask questions about how the spheres came to be arranged the way they are. (And questions about how humans came to be, how they came to have their shape, and so on, which evolution by natural selection likely explains, are questions about how the world is objectively arranged.) But that has nothing to do with the question at hand. Where our question enters is when we find that we are one of the spheres. As a subject, we occupy some point-of-view in the world. If you find yourself as sphere A, you might wonder why you are occupying that position in the world rather than finding yourself as B or C. Why are you A and not B or C? In my post, I offer a possible answer to this sort of question.
Are you asking if your parents could have given you a different name, or are you asking if you had a different father but the same mother, would you still be you. You wouldn't. YOU wouldn't exist at all, as you are a product of a specific man and a specific woman, even if your mother chose the name "Bert1" for her child independent of which man she chose to mate with.
Neither of those. Have you watched the video I linked to at the start of the thread?
What I find strange is that "you" seem to have determined what human beings are, but fail to determine what "you" are. So far it seems that you are a determiner of "human beings".
Quoting jorndoe
That's correct. "this" implies an injection of information into the system, the source of which can be traced back to a separate entity, in this case @SophistiCat or @jorndoe, who made the selection. The information can be traced further by asking these people how they made the selection for "this". Similarly, when I say "mine", information is injected as a selection is made, but I can't trace the source of such information in the universe.
Everything is equal to "mine" - contradiction
"mine" cannot refer to all conscious beings, and the universe, because we still need to account for the information that selects one particular point of view that's mine. So assuming that everybody is somehow part of the same "ONE" is not the answer. This is the case of maximum entropy.
bizso09 is equal to "mine" - possible
The only way it could be the answer is if I, bizso09, assert that the ONE universe is in fact me, bizso09. However, this would lead to a contradiction, when another person makes the same assertion from their point of view, i.e. perterpan is equal to "mine". Of course, I can always discredit any such person's assertion, leading to solipsism. This is the case of minimum entropy.
Nothing is equal to "mine" - contradiction
Finally, if we discard the information content of "mine" selection, then we are left with no selection of identity, and hence non-existence. On the other hand, such a state of the world would be incompatible with the subjective first person view I'm experiencing now where I know that such a selection exists ipso facto. This is the case of no entropy.
As an alternative to resorting to solipsism being necessarily true, I introduce the concept of an external universe here that can specify the source of any such information. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/8371/existence-of-an-external-universe-to-the-physical-universe
The problem is there must be a unique information content specifically for me in the world. However, as soon as there’s more options available, i.e. there exists multiple first person perspectives, the assignment problem becomes ambiguous, and hence the information specifying my identity becomes ambiguous too.
One possible resolution is that each conscious being lives in their own unique world that was made just for them. In that case their identity is equal to the universe, i.e. everything that exists, so the mapping is unambiguous. However, as soon as multiple parallel universes can exist with multiple conscious beings, the identity assignment problem resurfaces, but this time across multiple universes.
This problem is not possible to be solved using a logical framework. When I ask, how come I am this particular being, there’s two solutions: Either I am the only being in existence, or that there is no “but”, it’s just how it is.
Although choosing the first option might look attractive, it still doesn’t explain that although it is only me that exists, how come I exist at all? So in fact, this would require another illogical statement, namely everything exists, just because. So in a way, assuming the existence of an external universe that provides the necessary information required to resolve these issues and remain consistent within our universe, is itself unavoidable. This external universe has to give the answers without further question, and asking about a piece of information coming from this external universe as to how come it’s that way and not the other way, would not be sensible.
Doing so would require a private language.
That's the rub; that being me requires there being you.
Pardon, but where is the contradiction? Go back to the robots for a bit; there's robot X and robot Y. Consider fact Fx: "I", robot X, assert that the one "robot" is in fact "me", robot X. Consider fact Fy: "I", robot Y, assert that the one "robot' is in fact "me", robot Y. It sounds like you're telling me that fact Fx contradicts with fact Fy. But that seems to assume that Fx and Fy are the same fact; if they are two different facts, there's no contradiction.
In a similar fashion, we could consider two potential facts... Fb: the ONE universe is in fact me, bizs09; and Fp: the ONE universe is in fact me, perterpan. So how many universes are there? Under bizs09ian solipsism, Fb is a fact and Fp isn't. So there's one non-contradictory fact. Under perterpanian solipsism, Fp is a fact and Fb is not; so again, one non-contradictory fact. Discard solipsism and Fb and Fp are both facts, but there are two facts about two "universes". And so on. I can see constructing a contradiction, but only artificially; Fb and Fp are both facts and there's only one universe, but b and p are different entities, and so on... that contradiction seems vacuous, because it's only there if you put it there. Is there another you're referring to?