An Argument Against Reductive Physicalism
P1) A phenomenon can be given an exhaustive Objective explanation iff all its aspects can become an Object(s)-for-a-Subject.
P2) All aspects of Objective states can become an Object(s)-for-a-Subject.
C1) Therefore, Objective states can be given exhaustive Objective explanations. (From P1 and P2)
P3) Physical states are Objective states.
C2a) Therefore, physical states can be given exhaustive Objective explanations. (From P2 and P3)
C2b) Therefore, physical states have the property of being “something which can be given an exhaustive Objective explanation.” (Corollary to C2a)
P4) Conscious mental states have a Subjective and Objective character.
C3) Therefore, the Subjective and Objective character of Conscious mental states can be given an exhaustive Objective explanation iff all aspects of a Conscious mental state’s Subjective and Objective character can become an Object(s)-for-a-Subject. (From P1 and P4)
P5) An aspect of the Subjective character of all Conscious mental states is the “Subject” to-whom and for-which Objects are presented.
P6) The “Subject” is unable to become an Object-for-a-Subject (i.e. an Object for-itself).
C4a) Therefore, there is an aspect of the Subjective character of all Conscious mental states that cannot become an Object-for-a-Subject. (From P5 and P6)
C4b) Therefore, there is an aspect of all Conscious mental states that cannot be given an exhaustive Objective explanation. (Corollary to C4a)
C4c) Therefore, there is an aspect of all Conscious mental states which does not have the property of being “something which can be given an exhaustive Objective explanation.” (Corollary to C4b)
P7) Physical states have the property of being “something which can be given an exhaustive Objective explanation.” (Restatement of C2b)
C5) Therefore, there is an aspect of all Conscious mental states that is not a physical state. (From C4c and P7 using Leibniz’ Law)
P8) Reductive physicalism is true iff all aspects of Conscious mental states are physical states.
C6) Therefore, reductive physicalism is false. (From C5 and P8)
A Defense of the Argument
We always find a Subject and Object internally correlated in Conscious experience; and to step outside that correlation would be for us to literally go out of our minds (Bradley, 1927, p. 323). The perspectival character of an Object is not only inseparable from a Subject’s Conscious experience of the Object, but also the Subject’s conception of it. In fact, the inherent perspectival nature of Conscious experience renders any conception of an Object that is absolutely unconditioned by a Subject absolutely futile. In other words, any Object of experience, conception, or feeling always has a determinate and perspectival character, a gestalt constitution, and an ineffable qualitative aspect. Indeed, it is logically inconceivable—in principle—for an Object to remain “Objective” (i.e. for-a-Subject) without said Object being qualitatively and perspectivally determinate or exhibiting a form and character contingent upon an internal relation to a Subject. Philosopher A.C. Ewing held a similar stance on this issue, writing that:
This dichotomy remains the case even when we examine the nature of “Self-Conscious” experience. The "Object of Self-Consciousness” is not the Subject (or Self) simpliciter, rather it is an Object contained within the Subject's consciousness. In essence, it is an Object-for-a-Subject. However, rather than being an Object of the outer sense (i.e. a spatiotemporal Object), it is an Object of the inner sense (i.e. an Object of introspection). To suggest that the Subject can become an Object for-itself while retaining its Subjectival character would be no different from saying that the "eye can see itself,” which is false. The "eye" cannot see itself because it is that which sees. An “eye” cannot be placed in front of itself in order to catch a glimpse of itself seeing itself. If one were to reply, "But I can see my eye in the mirror," they forget that what they are seeing is not their "eye," (i.e. the Subject) but a reflection on the surface of a mirror (i.e. an Object).
Furthermore, the Subject cannot present itself as an Object for-itself while retaining its Subjectival character because anything that is presented to a Subject is something other than the Subject to whom that something is presented. Subject and Object are two poles of conscious experience that cannot be collapsed into one side or the other without vicious abstractionism—any attempt to do so would destroy the Objectival character that is essential to the Object or the Subjectival character that is essential to the Subject.
“Experience,” unlike the vitalist’s “élan vital,” is neither a folk-theory, nor an ad hoc explanatory construction; on the contrary, it is the prius of all conceptualization, explanation, description, and investigation. Experience simpliciter is not contingent upon a given conceptual theory or a discursive collection of propositions. Indeed, any conceptual theory derives the entirety of its matter and form from content abstracted from experience. The actual process of designing, reworking, and testing conceptual systems are isolated events that occur within the whole of experience itself. Experience is the vessel that upholds and retains the meaning, significance, and existence of the “concept.” A concept that neither holds a relation to an experiential source, nor tainted by an experiential aspect is pure unmeaning and hardly qualifies as a word. One could transpose some terminology from set-theory to help visualize this. If the concept “experience” is a set that contains all of what has been or ever will be the “stuff” of experience, then the concept “experience” would itself be an “improper” subset of itself. Or, to put it differently, the concept “experience” is an “improper” abstraction from itself because the very material referred to by the concept “experience” is the “stuffing” in-and-out-of-which all concepts (including the concept of “experience”) are contingent upon for their meaning and being.
Responses/Objections and Replies
“Isn't this just another way of laying out the “Mary’s Room” thought experiment?”
Very good question. I would have to say no, the argument is not another way of laying out the “Mary’s Room” thought experiment. I say this because my argument does not seek to demonstrate that "qualia" are non-physical (although they very well may be non-physical). Rather my argument looks to the nature of the relationship between Subject and Object in conscious experience—a dichotomy which serves as the basal structure of conscious experience itself. One might even be justified in saying that qualia are contingent upon their being an “Object-for-a-Subject” or a “Subject-having-an-Object.”
Unlike the Subject to and for whom the Object is presented, qualia always manifest themselves as the formal, perspectival, and aesthetic quality (and value) of that Object. Indeed, qualia always clothe the Object in an aesthetic, qualitative, and gestalt shroud that possesses a tacit, felt character that is unique to the Subject to-whom and for-whom the Object is presented. The Subject is never given in such a way; nor could it be without ceasing to be Subject and becoming an Object (a transition that necessitates a new Subject to apprehend that new Object).
Unlike the “Mary’s Room” thought experiment, my argument looks to the structure of experience rather than the content of experience. I’ll briefly summarize my argument and then contrast it with Frank Jackson’s argument:
My Argument (roughly sketched)
(Premise 1) Whatever cannot become an Object-for-a-Subject cannot be given an exhaustive Objective explanation (An Objective explanation implies an Object being described/explained).
(Premise 2) The Subject is an aspect of all Conscious mental states that cannot become an Object-for-a-Subject.
(Conclusion 1) Therefore, all Conscious mental states have an aspect which is incapable of being given an exhaustive Objective explanation. (From (P1) and (P2))
(Premise 3) Physical states can be given an exhaustive Objective explanation.
(Conclusion 2) Therefore, there is an aspect of all conscious mental states which is not a physical state. (From (C1) and (P3) (using Leibniz’ Law))
Jackson’s Argument (Taken from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
(Premise 1) Mary has complete physical knowledge about human color vision before her release.
(Conclusion 1) Therefore, Mary knows all the physical facts about human color vision before her release. (From (P1))
(Premise 2) There is some (kind of) knowledge concerning facts about human color vision that Mary does not have before her release.
(Conclusion 2) Therefore, there are some facts about human color vision that Mary does not know before her release. (From (P2))
(Conclusion 3) Therefore, there are non-physical facts about human color vision. (From (C1) and (C2))
Works Cited
Bradley, F. H. (1927). Ethical Studies. London: Oxford University Press.
Ewing, A. C. (1934). Idealism: A Critical Survey. London: Methuen.
P2) All aspects of Objective states can become an Object(s)-for-a-Subject.
C1) Therefore, Objective states can be given exhaustive Objective explanations. (From P1 and P2)
P3) Physical states are Objective states.
C2a) Therefore, physical states can be given exhaustive Objective explanations. (From P2 and P3)
C2b) Therefore, physical states have the property of being “something which can be given an exhaustive Objective explanation.” (Corollary to C2a)
P4) Conscious mental states have a Subjective and Objective character.
C3) Therefore, the Subjective and Objective character of Conscious mental states can be given an exhaustive Objective explanation iff all aspects of a Conscious mental state’s Subjective and Objective character can become an Object(s)-for-a-Subject. (From P1 and P4)
P5) An aspect of the Subjective character of all Conscious mental states is the “Subject” to-whom and for-which Objects are presented.
P6) The “Subject” is unable to become an Object-for-a-Subject (i.e. an Object for-itself).
C4a) Therefore, there is an aspect of the Subjective character of all Conscious mental states that cannot become an Object-for-a-Subject. (From P5 and P6)
C4b) Therefore, there is an aspect of all Conscious mental states that cannot be given an exhaustive Objective explanation. (Corollary to C4a)
C4c) Therefore, there is an aspect of all Conscious mental states which does not have the property of being “something which can be given an exhaustive Objective explanation.” (Corollary to C4b)
P7) Physical states have the property of being “something which can be given an exhaustive Objective explanation.” (Restatement of C2b)
C5) Therefore, there is an aspect of all Conscious mental states that is not a physical state. (From C4c and P7 using Leibniz’ Law)
P8) Reductive physicalism is true iff all aspects of Conscious mental states are physical states.
C6) Therefore, reductive physicalism is false. (From C5 and P8)
A Defense of the Argument
We always find a Subject and Object internally correlated in Conscious experience; and to step outside that correlation would be for us to literally go out of our minds (Bradley, 1927, p. 323). The perspectival character of an Object is not only inseparable from a Subject’s Conscious experience of the Object, but also the Subject’s conception of it. In fact, the inherent perspectival nature of Conscious experience renders any conception of an Object that is absolutely unconditioned by a Subject absolutely futile. In other words, any Object of experience, conception, or feeling always has a determinate and perspectival character, a gestalt constitution, and an ineffable qualitative aspect. Indeed, it is logically inconceivable—in principle—for an Object to remain “Objective” (i.e. for-a-Subject) without said Object being qualitatively and perspectivally determinate or exhibiting a form and character contingent upon an internal relation to a Subject. Philosopher A.C. Ewing held a similar stance on this issue, writing that:
[To] know any [Object X]…or form any intelligent opinion about X I must ultimately think X as it would be for a [Subject] which was consciously aware of it as a present fact though there may never be or have been such a [Subject]…Thus ultimately we can only think of unperceived physical things in terms of a possible observer in the sense that we must think of them as if they were objects [for a Subject] (Ewing, 1934, pp. 56-57).
This dichotomy remains the case even when we examine the nature of “Self-Conscious” experience. The "Object of Self-Consciousness” is not the Subject (or Self) simpliciter, rather it is an Object contained within the Subject's consciousness. In essence, it is an Object-for-a-Subject. However, rather than being an Object of the outer sense (i.e. a spatiotemporal Object), it is an Object of the inner sense (i.e. an Object of introspection). To suggest that the Subject can become an Object for-itself while retaining its Subjectival character would be no different from saying that the "eye can see itself,” which is false. The "eye" cannot see itself because it is that which sees. An “eye” cannot be placed in front of itself in order to catch a glimpse of itself seeing itself. If one were to reply, "But I can see my eye in the mirror," they forget that what they are seeing is not their "eye," (i.e. the Subject) but a reflection on the surface of a mirror (i.e. an Object).
Furthermore, the Subject cannot present itself as an Object for-itself while retaining its Subjectival character because anything that is presented to a Subject is something other than the Subject to whom that something is presented. Subject and Object are two poles of conscious experience that cannot be collapsed into one side or the other without vicious abstractionism—any attempt to do so would destroy the Objectival character that is essential to the Object or the Subjectival character that is essential to the Subject.
“Experience,” unlike the vitalist’s “élan vital,” is neither a folk-theory, nor an ad hoc explanatory construction; on the contrary, it is the prius of all conceptualization, explanation, description, and investigation. Experience simpliciter is not contingent upon a given conceptual theory or a discursive collection of propositions. Indeed, any conceptual theory derives the entirety of its matter and form from content abstracted from experience. The actual process of designing, reworking, and testing conceptual systems are isolated events that occur within the whole of experience itself. Experience is the vessel that upholds and retains the meaning, significance, and existence of the “concept.” A concept that neither holds a relation to an experiential source, nor tainted by an experiential aspect is pure unmeaning and hardly qualifies as a word. One could transpose some terminology from set-theory to help visualize this. If the concept “experience” is a set that contains all of what has been or ever will be the “stuff” of experience, then the concept “experience” would itself be an “improper” subset of itself. Or, to put it differently, the concept “experience” is an “improper” abstraction from itself because the very material referred to by the concept “experience” is the “stuffing” in-and-out-of-which all concepts (including the concept of “experience”) are contingent upon for their meaning and being.
Responses/Objections and Replies
“Isn't this just another way of laying out the “Mary’s Room” thought experiment?”
Very good question. I would have to say no, the argument is not another way of laying out the “Mary’s Room” thought experiment. I say this because my argument does not seek to demonstrate that "qualia" are non-physical (although they very well may be non-physical). Rather my argument looks to the nature of the relationship between Subject and Object in conscious experience—a dichotomy which serves as the basal structure of conscious experience itself. One might even be justified in saying that qualia are contingent upon their being an “Object-for-a-Subject” or a “Subject-having-an-Object.”
Unlike the Subject to and for whom the Object is presented, qualia always manifest themselves as the formal, perspectival, and aesthetic quality (and value) of that Object. Indeed, qualia always clothe the Object in an aesthetic, qualitative, and gestalt shroud that possesses a tacit, felt character that is unique to the Subject to-whom and for-whom the Object is presented. The Subject is never given in such a way; nor could it be without ceasing to be Subject and becoming an Object (a transition that necessitates a new Subject to apprehend that new Object).
Unlike the “Mary’s Room” thought experiment, my argument looks to the structure of experience rather than the content of experience. I’ll briefly summarize my argument and then contrast it with Frank Jackson’s argument:
My Argument (roughly sketched)
(Premise 1) Whatever cannot become an Object-for-a-Subject cannot be given an exhaustive Objective explanation (An Objective explanation implies an Object being described/explained).
(Premise 2) The Subject is an aspect of all Conscious mental states that cannot become an Object-for-a-Subject.
(Conclusion 1) Therefore, all Conscious mental states have an aspect which is incapable of being given an exhaustive Objective explanation. (From (P1) and (P2))
(Premise 3) Physical states can be given an exhaustive Objective explanation.
(Conclusion 2) Therefore, there is an aspect of all conscious mental states which is not a physical state. (From (C1) and (P3) (using Leibniz’ Law))
Jackson’s Argument (Taken from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
(Premise 1) Mary has complete physical knowledge about human color vision before her release.
(Conclusion 1) Therefore, Mary knows all the physical facts about human color vision before her release. (From (P1))
(Premise 2) There is some (kind of) knowledge concerning facts about human color vision that Mary does not have before her release.
(Conclusion 2) Therefore, there are some facts about human color vision that Mary does not know before her release. (From (P2))
(Conclusion 3) Therefore, there are non-physical facts about human color vision. (From (C1) and (C2))
Works Cited
Bradley, F. H. (1927). Ethical Studies. London: Oxford University Press.
Ewing, A. C. (1934). Idealism: A Critical Survey. London: Methuen.
Comments (51)
Not at the same time. See Quantum Mechanics.
Quoting PessimisticIdealism
Yes and no. The house you see through the window is hit by photons if you look there or not. If you shoot photons at electrons to see them you know how an electron shot by photons looks like.
->
Quoting PessimisticIdealism
Therefor one of the mental states has elecrodes pinned at his head.
You could just as well say imagine an object that cannot be imagined. As it cannot be imagined there is no object and hence it cannot be an object. This clearly shows there is no subject as such subject would have imaged an object.
Your objection seems to rest on a misunderstanding of what is meant by "Subject" and "Object." All "Knowledge" is a relationship between a knowing "Subject" and a known "Object." Whatever is an "Object" is merely something that is either known or knowable by a "Subject." If something is an "Objective" state, then it can become an Object-for-a-Subject in principle. The "in principle" is very important. All of our knowledge about a physical state is by virtue of a relation between the physical state (which is the "Object") and a knower (i.e. a "Subject").
But to be an object it cannot be a subject. It just has to be there to be an object. An object is per definition what is not-the-subject. So what are your speaking of?
I can't tell what you are trying to get at here.
Either there is something to relate to or there is not. :grin:
A phenomenon can be given an exhaustive Objective explanation iff all its aspects can be related to an Object(s)-for-a-Subject.
i.e the emergetive theory of consciousness’s subjective aspect from the processing of information in an objective medium.
There even are philosophers who actually explain the objective aspect from the subject itself. Although coherent in themselves none of them could be used for a "proof" of this kind I guess.
A "relation" is always (at least) binary. To get the object from the subject, in logical mathematical terms, you need a function like y = f(x) and can then write rel(x, y). Just as the other way around one would just have to buy that y=f(x), though. :D
This is a very interesting idea, and I have spent a great deal of time thinking about whether or not such an explanation can do justice to the whole and its manifold aspects. If Q originates from P, then Q could be given a "reductive" explanation that exhaustively explains every aspect of Q exclusively in terms of P. Your rephrasing of the first premise seems to permit Q's "relation" to P as the necessary and sufficient condition for an exhaustive explanation of Q exclusively in terms of P. I don't think that merely "relation" simpliciter warrants such a conclusion. Take, for example, John and Mary, a husband and a wife respectively. The John and Mary enter into an internal relation (i.e. that of matrimony) and this would mean that John is the husband of Mary, and Mary is a wife of John. If John were to die, John's death would change Mary's relationship to John (because of the internal relation). Mary would become a widow. The relation is symmetrical and effects both terms that have entered into the relation. Going back to your rephrasing to the first premise, I would have to disagree that a mere "relation" satisfies the conditions necessary for an exhaustive explanation of Q that is exclusively in terms of P. Tornadoes and Hurricanes are both weather phenomena (and thus are related to one another by virtue of both being weather phenomena), yet no one would say that you could exhaustively explain hurricanes exclusively in terms of tornadoes. This is why I think there is a significant difference between my first premise and your rewriting of it.
My first premise:
Quoting PessimisticIdealism
Your rewriting of it:
Quoting Vanbrainstorm
If the Subjective aspect of consciousness is reducible to the Objective aspect of consciousness, then the Subjective aspect of consciousness could be given an Objective description that exhausts the Subjective aspect's subjectival character. If you can exhaustively explain Q exclusively in terms of P, that implies you can exhaustively describe Q exclusively in terms of P. In fact, an explanation of anything would presuppose a description of what is to be explained. If Q cannot be exhaustively described exclusively in terms of P, then Q is not identical to P, because P can be exhaustively described exclusively in terms of P. Before going further into this, I'll wait for your response.
This seems to be denying the possibility of self-knowledge.
Edit: Also worth noting iff is bivalent equivalence, not an identical equality.
Quoting PessimisticIdealism
If subject can never become object, then subject can never know itself as a subject. But your entire argument depends on knowledge of the subject (e.g. it contains knowledge claims about subjects). Therefore, your argument is self-undermining.
Edit: Here is a link to the diagram (the image wasn't popping up in the previous comment)
Diagram
Agreed. It is impossible to intuit the self, for intuition is always an undetermined phenomenon, and all phenomena, hence all empirical intuitions, are predicated on sensibility. Therefore, to intuit the self is to have it met with perception, which is impossible. But it is nonetheless not contradictory, to think and thereby conceive a representation of the unity of consciousness in one transcendental object, and name such representation as “I”. While all that does is nip infinite regress in the metaphysical bud, whole philosophical paradigms have faithfully clung to it. For better or worse.
Wouldn’t it have to exhaust something, in order to circumvent such infinite regress illusions as the dreaded homunculus argument?
But that’s alright....I don’t want to sidetrack the progress of the standing dialogue.
In the context of what we are dealing with here, I don't think the fact that we cannot in principle make the Subject an Object for-itself (while retaining its Subjective character) threatens us with an infinite chain of homunculi. The grounding of the "Self" in the "Subject" saves us from the vicious regress that would ensue if someone were to ask, "What is my Self?" and the interlocutor replies, "Your Self is your mind?" or "Your Self is your body."
Understood.
Thanks.
I’m working on something related to this at the moment. The difficult part is in conveying via what can only be a conceptualization what is referenced to be a first person subjective state of affairs – a state of affairs in which the subject of conscious awareness is simultaneously the object of which it is aware. Without examples of actual experience this would likely go nowhere. So here are some:
First person knowledge of being thirsty, sad, confident, elated, in pain, meditative, angry, anxious, in love, sleepy, and so on.
To express these states of being is, of course, to convey concepts which, as such, are other than the subject which holds conscious awareness of the given concepts – concepts which the utilized language conveys. Yet when one is thirsty, sad, confident, etc., that which one is aware of is no way differentiated from that which is aware. Rather it is the thirsty, sad, confident, etc., subject of awareness that then holds thus colored awareness of anything other – from physical objects, to concepts and intuitions as other than the subject so aware of them to, to awareness of other subjects, etc.
Our wording in at least the English language reflects the reality of this state of affairs: one here doesn’t feel oneself to be X (which expresses one as subject of awareness experiencing some object of awareness via feeling) but, instead, one here is X: “I am thirsty”, “I am sad”, etc.
I’ll try to further comment and support this, but for now I’ll keep it relative short.
Ps. I’m not one to believe that that which is real is created by the language(s) which we use. So, while there is no given term or phrase in the English lexicon for this mode of awareness that I know of, this of itself to me doesn’t negate the personal experiences of this, which we all have – which, as experiences, I deem to be real. In my own work I’ve termed this form of awareness “autological”. So, we are autologically aware of our own states of being as subjects of awareness. It if helps, one can critique this post’s understanding by so addressing the subject matter as autological awareness.
I’ll defer, designate myself as second chair.
The Subject is felt, it is not known as one of the Objects present to-and-for-itself.
Quoting Theorem
Actually in the argument I give at the beginning, I am speaking of exhaustive explanations as opposed to something as general as "knowledge."
It is known as the form of it's perception. There is always the perceiving and the perceived. But this only establishes it's mere existence. If it was felt, this would belong into the realm of the perceived.
It's not "perceived" because the Subject is not perceived by any sensory modality. When I use the term "feeling," I mean something much more subliminal than an emotion, a discomfort, or any kind of proprioception. The Subject is felt as repelling its Object, or as being in opposition to it. The Subject is felt as that which determines its Object's perspectival character, gestalt form, and aesthetic qualities.
Kudos on originality. Under the assumption, of course, that you were not aware of the “transcendental unity of apperception”, which for all intents and purposes, fairly well describes the content of your thesis, but originated in 1787. Sorry ‘bout that. (grin)
Or....you are aware of said apperception, and found it wanting.
——————-
Quoting javra
Quoting javra
These two are arguable. As to the first, because “thirsty”, “sad”, etc, are not objects, so “simultaneously the object” becomes an empty, hence impossible, judgement, and as to the second, to suggest the conjunction of the two, carries the implication that “....I must have as many-coloured and various a self as are the representations of which I am conscious....” (CPR B135), which is exactly the opposite of what the unity of consciousness is supposed to represent.
(On soapbox)
Still....congrats on the depth of your investigations. The dearth of good philosophy is understandable these days, given the mere crumbs left by the masters.
(Off soapbox)
Ok, but your argument contains claims about the subject, which implies conceptualization and pretensions to knowledge.
Quoting PessimisticIdealism
You defined knowledge in a later post, it's true, but presumably "explanation" would fall under that general definition.
Thanks for the informative reply. From second-hand readings, I’m aware of transcendental apprehension, and agree with it, but on its own find it somewhat wanting. To me it’s not concrete enough to conclusively establish what it seeks to establish: the delimitations of being conscious. It’s a very challenging topic matter, so I’m grateful for any feedback I can get. And so it’s known, what autological awareness is supposed to reference is one of four general modalities of our awareness, which I then endeavor to use so as to demonstrate our three tiers of awareness, one of the latter being synonymous to transcendental apprehension and, hence, the attribute of being conscious. Hence, autological awareness does not of itself equate to transcendental apprehension. The devil’s in the details, though.
As one example, one is autologically aware of one’s own enactive faculty of sight when seeing anything – for one is (some say, "transparently") aware of being endowed with sight when seeing. And one’s own faculty of sight is not other relative to oneself which sees some given – the given seen is other, but not the sight via which it is seen. Nevertheless, one’s faculty of sight is not itself that aspect of self which is perpetually unified but ever-changing. It, instead, is one of multiple and discrete means via which the “transcendentally apprehensive self” (so to phrase), which is unitary and indifferentiable, apprehends that which is other relative to itself (not only empirically but also conceptually … for any concept we contemplate is other relative to us as transcendentally apprehensive selves). All means of apprehending that which is other, from senses such as that of sight to faculties such as that of understanding, will then be autologically known but not in themselves the transcendentally apprehensive self which knows.
Hoping that makes enough sense in its summarized form to illustrate the difference.
[edit: for added clarity, thus understood, not all autologic givens will be the transcendentally apprehensive self, but the transcendentally apprehensive self will always be an autologically known given]
Quoting Mww
As to the first critique, a proper contextualization for me would be the otherwise existent dichotomy between a) the subject of awareness and b) the objects of its awareness. So generalized, intuitions, concepts, and one’s conscience, would hence all be objects of awareness when thus contextualized – but these are all what I’ve termed “allologic”, for they are other relative to the subject which apprehends them. In contrast, when I am glad, I as subject of awareness am aware of being glad, and my being glad is the object of awareness of which I am aware – but, here, that of which I am aware is momentarily unified and indifferentiable from me as that which is aware. So, here, there is a non-duality between the subject of awareness and its object(s) of awareness.
As to the second critique, I don’t take my being glad to of itself be a re-presentation, not until it is expressed via language which does re-present givens via concepts. So, in being conscious of being glad I am not conscious of a representation of what I am but, instead, am conscious of what I momentarily am as subject of consciousness which apprehends representations. This, then, to me remains consistent with the unity of consciousness, for while this aspect of awareness is unified and indifferentiable, it is experientially evidenced to be in constant change.
What say you?
Quoting Mww
Glad you got off of the soapbox. Thanks though.
Why should thirst be that different from a chair or tree as perceived content? Isn't this based on presumptions?
Hm, the easiest way for me to answer this is via reference to linguistic convention: When I tactilely feel the chair I am sitting on or else look at a tree, I am that which apprehends said chair and tree as something other – and I therefore don’t express this state of awareness as “I am chair (or chair-ness, or what have you)” nor “I am tree-y”. Yes, when it comes to physiological thirst (as compared, for instance, to an experienced thirst for life), one empirically perceives the state of being of one’s own body via interoception. Yet this culminating perception is not apprehended as other relative to oneself as subject, but instead is the state of being in which the subject momentarily finds him/herself – and therefore we express this state of awareness as “I am thirsty (as a subjective being)”.
To say "I feel thirsty" does not necessarily entail that "I am thirsty".
I'm not here addressing logic but a report of (granted, personal) experience.
In parallel, a physiological perception (as contrasted to, for example, a visually imagined perception) that might serve as a better example is the difference between “I am in pain (due to the pain in my finger from a splinter … which might cause me to sweat, or to momentarily be in some degree of shock)” and “I feel pain in my finger on account of the splinter in it (as something one apprehends of one’s own body without momentarily experiencing the sensation of being in pain as the subject of the experience – and thereby something which one can calmly address as needed)”. If this latter example doesn’t ring true as something experientially evidenced, I’d like to know. It may or may not be a good example for me to use.
Still, to the extent that it might make sense on account of being commonly experienced, when being in pain, the pain sensed would thereby be autologically experienced: indistinguishable by the subject which experiences from the subject which experiences. When sensing pain in a body part from which one as subject is removed, the pain sensed would thereby not be autological – instead being other relative to oneself as conscious subject of the experienced pain as object of awareness ... though the pain obviously would very much yet pertain to one’s total self of body and mind (of which the transcendentally apprehensive self is aware).
Yet the "subject" in that case means the worldly self. This is quite different from the epistemological subject of transcendental philosophy. In fact, the thirst is very different from me. If I turn away attention I might even completely forget about it. This seems to be a strong indicator that it cannot really be a being of the subject itself but just a stimulus among many.
I, personally, don't subscribe to a duality between a "worldly" first person point of view and any non-worldly first person point of view which one would, I presume, simultaneously be (in the same respect?). There could be both ideal and possible states of being as an aware being - there hence being a duality between what is momentarily actual and the potential as goal to be actualized in the future which one strives for - but to me the transcendentally apprehensive self is just as much worldly as it is non-worldly at any given juncture of its being.
Can you better elaborate on the difference applicable to the same "I" you've mentioned?
Quoting Heiko
This might be a mistaken phrasing of what I have been saying. I did not claim, with great emphasis, that
thirst is what a subjective being is (!). My only claim is that when a subjective being is momentarily thirsty, that subjective being will at that juncture be in just such state of being.
I'm not here directly focused on the metaphysics of what a subjective being is - nor can be. I'm here simply stipulating - fallible though I acknowledge being - the concrete facts of what we can and do experience as subjective beings.
This is merely a differentiation between mind and body. As far as "duality" goes - that word carries some meaning (substantiality and stuff) in which I do not want to take stance right now. Dreams are an example where your self (as perceived by the mind) and your more worldly existence presumably can be doing quite different things.
Quoting javra
I think your claim was that because of this there was no object other than the subject itself. This, as I tried to point out, does not seem to hold as the thirst appears as just-another stimulus (which you link to your bodily self and hence say "I am thirsty")
Yet the transcendentally apprehensive self is neither its mind nor its body, though conjoined to both. To what extent do you disagree?
Quoting Heiko
I'm very surprised by this interpretation. How was it obtained from what I said? No, this is in no way what I've been expressing.
Not in the case of dreams. It is literally the empty form of perception.
Dreams are experienced non-physiological perceptions (and concepts, which are not percepts, but to keep things simple ...), this just as much as is a visually imagined bird, its auditorily imagined chirping, the tactilely imagined feel of its feathers, and so forth, experienced during waking states. Furthermore, unless we start to hypothesize the possibility of experiences held by incorporeal beings (ghosts, forest fairies, deities, and the like), all REM dreams are dependent upon the workings of an organism's physiological body.
How does the case of dreams dispel the proposition that "the transcendentally apprehensive self is neither its mind nor its body, though conjoined to both"?
Because your body does not need to be there (as normal) in dreams.
You may very well be right that "dreams are dependent upon the workings of an organism's physiological body". But this is simply not what the "subject" means in trancendental dialectics. Here the perceptions are taken "as-is" without presumptions. What can be said for sure is that they are perceived. Explaining them by the means of (other) perceptions is tautological. Not more, not less.
Technically everything is relative to the subject which apprehends, except whatever one chooses to represent his self, re: ego, “I”, consciousness......whatever floats boats. The only problem here would be, depending on the extent of metaphysical reductionism being called into play, it becomes inevitable that different renditions of a common representation will conflict with each other. That is to say, if “thirst” is an object of awareness and “basketball” is an object of awareness, some method must be instituted in order to tell them apart, which mandates that ideas such as thirst and sadness and such not be converted to phenomena on the one hand, and physical objects of sense not be converted into mere contingent ideas on the other.
That said, I’ll stick with these non-cognizable ideas as being called subjective conditions, rather than objects of awareness. Just because I am consciously aware of both basketballs and thirst, doesn’t mean I apprehend them the same way or use the same faculties for it.
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Quoting javra
And there ya go......momentarily am as subject is the same as being in a subjective condition.
Well done!!!!
Yeah...that damn soapbox. Been luggin’ that thing around for better than half a century. It’s harmless, though, don’t worry.
Yes, our waking awareness of our physiological body is absent in most REM dreams. All the same, doesn’t there remain the same disparity between subject of awareness and that which it is aware of as other in REM dreams? For instance, if one sees something in an REM dream, does not one see this given from a visual first-person point of view? And if what one sees causes one to be in a state of being of fright, for example, is not one (as a transcendentally apprehensive self) frightened during such juncture at seeing this other during the dream?
I don’t intend to be a badger, so I’ll take a breather from the forum for now.
Just saw this.
Quoting Mww
Yes, but of course. I won't bicker too much about term use. But I'm supposing that if well enough defined for the purposes employed beforehand, what you mention shouldn't be a problem.
Thanks again for the replies.
Big point: There is no "self".
Since this will be just as laconic:
An equally big point: Neither is there an absence of a first person point of view as self - a plurality of these coexisting in the world, that is.
That was the difference we started with. All there is is there.
We experience "Subjectivity" as a kind of locus of felt, qualitative "intensity" as it were; and this Subjectival intensity cannot be "known" Objectively or exhaustively articulated in a way that does justice to what it is like to be a Subject.
Could the Subject know "knowing" as such without an Object that is not itself something other than the act of knowing "knowing?" Surely it could not. To visualize the concept "knowing" is not the same as knowing "knowing." When the Subject knows an Object, the Subject is itself the knowing knower. This is no different from asking the question, "Can running run?"
Schopenhauer defends a similar position to this in his essay, On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason:
Edit: Perhaps the phrase "point-of-view" might help clear things up (note: I am not using "point--of-view" in a spatiotemporal sense). A Subject cannot make its "point of view" an Object-for-itself that simultaneously preserves both the Subject's "point-of-view" and the Subject's "point-of-view" as its own Object.
Let's see what Schopenhauer has to say about this issue. These passages are taken straight from his Fourfold Root.
My usage of relation is quite vague and I apologize for that. What I meant by relation is the phenomenon by which the properties of Q are the direct result of P, through ways that may be known or unknown to us.
Example
The property of wetness can be described as a direct result of water molecules, through a process known to us: when water molecules assemble to give liquid the property of wetness emerges. one water molecule is not wet by itself nor is the property of wetness external and unrelated to the water molecules.
And in case of consciousness’s subjective aspect there are different theories that link it to the objective aspect of the mind through different processes yet to be proven scientifically.
One example is the theory where consciousness’s subjective aspect is an emergency of information processing in mind, thus transcending the layer in which it emerges from the physical parts of the mind but rather emerges from what those physical parts are doing: processing information.
My definition of relation in the above case mentioned that be interpreted in different ways so ask me again if you are not sure what I want to say.
And your example of using tornadoes and hurricanes was not a case for what I tried to say by relation between an emergetive property and the object that gives rise to the property, since Tornadoes and hurricanes aren’t related in such way.