Wittgenstein Plays A Game
This is a spin-off from another thread starring Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889 - 1951), an imposing figure in modern philosophy if only because he claimed that philosophical problems were pesudoproblems generated by miscomprehension of language.
To begin with, I must confess my poor understanding of his concept of language games and his belief that meaning is use is still unclear to me. That being said, I have a relatively better grasp of what Wittgenstein means by family resemblance with regard to words and his rope analogy, which some forum members were kind enough to remind me, seems not too complicated for the likes of me.
I'll start off with what I claimed I know (Wittgenstein's family resemblance and rope analogy) and build up my case against Wittgenstein's ultimate claim that referential meaning is flawed or even wrong and refute the obvious conclusion that follows from his views viz. that there are no philosophical problems.
Family resemblance: Let's take Wittgenstein's own example - the word "game". He, or perhaps someone else, asserts that the word "game" has a problem with its definition for it applies to quite a many activities, recreational or professional, but, as Wittgenstein rightly points out, there is no one feature/characteristic that runs through, is common to, all these various activities. Had such common characteristics existed we would've identified the essence of what a game is. A good way to illustrate this is to consider some hypothetical games e.g. games J, K, and L such that
1. J has features A, B
2. K has features, B, C
3. L has features A, C
Some feature is common to any two games but no feature is common to all games. Thus, J, K, and L constitute the Wittgensteinian family resemblance. The word "game" refers to all three of them but the meaning of the word "game" is determined on the basis of shifting intension - sometimes it's feature A that determines what a game is, other times it's feature B that does that and there are times feature C decides what is a game or not. The bottom line is the absence of an essence - no universally common theme - that unites J, K, and L.
This is a problem for philosophy because, if I'm correct, philosophers are in the business of finding the essence of a word's meaning - that common thread that runs through all usages of that word - and then philosophizing on that essence and here we have Wittgenstein, telling us that some words, and herein lies the rub, including philosophically important words, may lack such an essence. No essence to a word and the word becomes a slippery customer for we can't get a fix on its meaning. How does one philisophize about a word whose meaning we haven't yet figured out? It may not be impossible but disagreements wil be the rule rather than the exception.
That said, let's return to the games J, K and L but before that a remark on what a definition is: a definition basically lists both the sufficent and necessary features of things the word refers to.
1. J has features A, B
2. K has features B, C
3. L has features A, C
When we conclude that J and K are games, we're, in fact, making two claims: the feature B is sufficient to infer both J and K are games AND that the feature B is also necessary for the same. The first claim is a no-brainer; the second claim is somewhat harder to notice (for me) but suffice it to say that without the feature B, there's no family resemblance and so the one (either J or K) lacking the feature B would NOT be a game . The same logic applies to all other combinations, (J & K), (J & L) (K & L), the two claims about sufficient and necessary applying to the features B, A, and C, respectively.
This implies A + B + C, being all sufficient and necessary features for something to be a game, is the definition of "game". How then is J or K or L a game? After all each one of them seems to lack a feature (J lacks feature C, K lacks feature A and L lacks feature B) and we just said a game is when A + B + C are present. This is best explicable as a misuse of the word "game": all people aren't philosophers or logicians and the rules of both philosophy and logic are relaxed in ordinary conversation and this has the net effect of words being misused in the sense that definitions are only applied in bits and pieces. For instance, when "game" actually means features A + B + C altogether, people willingly, although erroneously, accept things that possess only a part of A + B + C as games. This is the reason why we have what Wittgenstein calls family resemblance.
It then becomes clear that seeking an essence - the feature in common - in games J, K, and L would require for the word "game" (A + B + C) to have been applied correctly and were this so, the essence would jump out at us as A + B + C.
However, the word "game" is actually misused and erroneously applied to J, K and L - only some, not all, features are taken into consideration and this then became the basis of calling J, K, and L games. This automatically makes searching for an essence in these instances where the word "game" has been misapplied, a wild goose chase - bound to end in failure.
Thus, it follows that Wittgenstein makes a mistake by supposing J, K, and L are actually games (that the word "game" applies to them) when they are not and this leads him to the erroneous conclusion that meaning is use and not referential.
To begin with, I must confess my poor understanding of his concept of language games and his belief that meaning is use is still unclear to me. That being said, I have a relatively better grasp of what Wittgenstein means by family resemblance with regard to words and his rope analogy, which some forum members were kind enough to remind me, seems not too complicated for the likes of me.
I'll start off with what I claimed I know (Wittgenstein's family resemblance and rope analogy) and build up my case against Wittgenstein's ultimate claim that referential meaning is flawed or even wrong and refute the obvious conclusion that follows from his views viz. that there are no philosophical problems.
Family resemblance: Let's take Wittgenstein's own example - the word "game". He, or perhaps someone else, asserts that the word "game" has a problem with its definition for it applies to quite a many activities, recreational or professional, but, as Wittgenstein rightly points out, there is no one feature/characteristic that runs through, is common to, all these various activities. Had such common characteristics existed we would've identified the essence of what a game is. A good way to illustrate this is to consider some hypothetical games e.g. games J, K, and L such that
1. J has features A, B
2. K has features, B, C
3. L has features A, C
Some feature is common to any two games but no feature is common to all games. Thus, J, K, and L constitute the Wittgensteinian family resemblance. The word "game" refers to all three of them but the meaning of the word "game" is determined on the basis of shifting intension - sometimes it's feature A that determines what a game is, other times it's feature B that does that and there are times feature C decides what is a game or not. The bottom line is the absence of an essence - no universally common theme - that unites J, K, and L.
This is a problem for philosophy because, if I'm correct, philosophers are in the business of finding the essence of a word's meaning - that common thread that runs through all usages of that word - and then philosophizing on that essence and here we have Wittgenstein, telling us that some words, and herein lies the rub, including philosophically important words, may lack such an essence. No essence to a word and the word becomes a slippery customer for we can't get a fix on its meaning. How does one philisophize about a word whose meaning we haven't yet figured out? It may not be impossible but disagreements wil be the rule rather than the exception.
That said, let's return to the games J, K and L but before that a remark on what a definition is: a definition basically lists both the sufficent and necessary features of things the word refers to.
1. J has features A, B
2. K has features B, C
3. L has features A, C
When we conclude that J and K are games, we're, in fact, making two claims: the feature B is sufficient to infer both J and K are games AND that the feature B is also necessary for the same. The first claim is a no-brainer; the second claim is somewhat harder to notice (for me) but suffice it to say that without the feature B, there's no family resemblance and so the one (either J or K) lacking the feature B would NOT be a game . The same logic applies to all other combinations, (J & K), (J & L) (K & L), the two claims about sufficient and necessary applying to the features B, A, and C, respectively.
This implies A + B + C, being all sufficient and necessary features for something to be a game, is the definition of "game". How then is J or K or L a game? After all each one of them seems to lack a feature (J lacks feature C, K lacks feature A and L lacks feature B) and we just said a game is when A + B + C are present. This is best explicable as a misuse of the word "game": all people aren't philosophers or logicians and the rules of both philosophy and logic are relaxed in ordinary conversation and this has the net effect of words being misused in the sense that definitions are only applied in bits and pieces. For instance, when "game" actually means features A + B + C altogether, people willingly, although erroneously, accept things that possess only a part of A + B + C as games. This is the reason why we have what Wittgenstein calls family resemblance.
It then becomes clear that seeking an essence - the feature in common - in games J, K, and L would require for the word "game" (A + B + C) to have been applied correctly and were this so, the essence would jump out at us as A + B + C.
However, the word "game" is actually misused and erroneously applied to J, K and L - only some, not all, features are taken into consideration and this then became the basis of calling J, K, and L games. This automatically makes searching for an essence in these instances where the word "game" has been misapplied, a wild goose chase - bound to end in failure.
Thus, it follows that Wittgenstein makes a mistake by supposing J, K, and L are actually games (that the word "game" applies to them) when they are not and this leads him to the erroneous conclusion that meaning is use and not referential.
Comments (70)
It therefore rejects the idea that games must have necessary and sufficient features.
Did you read the later paragraphs? I'm not saying you didn't but I went into, what seemed to me as, quite some detail how those features that determine family resemblance amounts to a comprehensive list of sufficient and necessary features that decides when a word is applicable (or not).
Which is to say that "games" is a meaningless scribble as it doesn't represent or invoke any necessary and sufficient features other than the scribble itself.
If your list of features was sufficient and necessary then each game (of J, K and L) would have all three features (of A + B + C). But none of them has all three features, as per your example:
Quoting TheMadFool
To answer your question here: they can all be games precisely because of family resemblance, which rejects that games must be defined in terms of sufficient and necessary features.
Which words have meanings that "we haven't figured out yet"? You could always refer to a dictionary to find the common meanings/uses of a word.
It seems to be that there's something fundamentally wrong about looking for that one or more common thread(s) in the different usages of the word "game"(and other words that exhibit a similar behavior) with an intent to grasp what the word "game" means.
Why?
The simple and obviously overlooked reason as far as Wittgenstein is concerned is that the definition of the word "game" is being used piecemeal and not in its entirety, the latter being the correct method of course.
Take the word "owl". Let's suppose its definition comprises of the following features
1. It lays eggs
2. It has wings
3. It is nocturnal
Now, if I were to misuse the word "owl" then I would say the chicken (lays eggs + wings) is an owl, the bat (wings + nocturnal) is an owl and the tuatara (lays eggs + nocturnal) is also an owl. As you can see, chickens, bats, and tuataras constitute the family resemblance of the word "owl". However, this situation came to be not because "owl" doesn't have referential meaning for there are owls but because I misused the word "owl".
Another problem with the family resemblance argument is best revealed with another example. Take the word "good" and the following sentences:
1. Tom is good because he gives to charity and believes people shouldn't hurt other living things
2. Dick is good because he believes people shouldn't hurt other living things and believes in god
3. Harry is good because he gives to charity and believes in god
Tom's, Dick's, and Harry's goodness become the family resemblance of the word "good"
There is no common theme detectable in these three people and if Wittgenstein has the say then, good doesn't have a universally applicable meaning - its different for different people and has no fixed referent.
However, list all of the features present in Tom, Dick and Harry and we get the following definition of "good":
X. Must give to charity
Y. Must believe people shouldn't hurt other living things
Z. Must believe in god
You don't need to think too hard to realize that the definition of "good" comprises all three features (X, Y, and Z). This clearly shows that, sometimes, the meaning of words is to be found not in some shared common feature that unites the various usages of a word but in combining all features present in the different ways the word is used.
Wittgenstein is criticizing platonism, the idea that we cannot understand the good without understanding what all uses have in common. I think Plato had this backwards. We do understand each use of good and do not need to have a universal concept of good.
This is not analogous with the example of games. This analogy implies that non-games all constitute a family resemblance of the word "game". Instead, games are "connected by a series of overlapping similarities where no one feature is common to all". They share enough similar features that we call them all games, but there is no essential feature (and no distinct boundary) of what is (or is not) a game.
Quoting TheMadFool
None of these features is essential to the definition of "good" and there are possibly other features as well.
Argumentum ad infinitum or maybe I don't get you. Do you mind elaborating a bit more.
But there is such a thing as universal good - consisting of the union set of all things to which the word "good" has been applied to.
Okay. But that seems abstract. Plato asks what is common about a good shoemaker and good statesman. After we say they perform their tasks well, what knowledge has been added to what we already knew? The problem with universals is not that they are wrong but that they don't convey the knowledge they're supposed to have.
Yes, the issue you raise by saying "but that seems abstract" is one I encountered in my analysis of Wittgenstein's language game theory.
I run the risk of boring you here but look at the word "game" and suppose it's being used to label the following:
1. Chess is a game because of features p and q : feature set C ={p, q}
2. Solitaire is a game because of features q and r : feature set S = {q, r}
3. Bullfighting is a game because of features p and r : feature set B = {p, r}
My suggestion is that to find out the actual meaning of "game", we have to carry out the set union operation on C, S and B: (C U S) U B. Now the problem I encountered was that (C U S) U B = {p, q, r} [s]doesn't[/s] may not have a real-world referent i.e. there may not be any game that has all features p, q, and r. In other words, the combined features list (p, q, and r) has an imaginary referent.
However, there's no hard and fast rule saying that referents can't be imaginary. The word "unicorn" has meaning despite its referent being imaginary. Platonic forms do make an appearance, in my study of Wittgenstein's language games as perfect, but not necessarily actualized, specimens of things words denote.
Do you mind articulating the essential feature of all games? Maybe I'm misusing the word.
I think Wittgenstein's point is that chess is very complex because of its play and defining piece movements and rules will not tell us what the game is about.
That you recognized that misusing words is a possibility says enough.
To tell you the truth, I don't know what the essential features of games are but here's a hint - gather all the essential features of each activity thought to be a game and put them under the heading "game".
Chess:
1. Two players
2. Rules
3. Ends with one player winning, the other losing (checkmate) or a draw or a stalemate
4. Needs a board
Football:
5.Two teams
6. Rules
7. Ends with one team winning and the other losing or a draw
Solitaire
8. One player
9. Rules
10. Ends with a win or a loss
Game:
1, 2, 3,...,8, 9, 10
Matters might get a bit complicated as games diversify.
I'm trying to get you to give up on the idea that games must have an essential feature. Wittgenstein's family resemblance rejects and replaces this idea. I don't really think I'm misusing the word.
Quoting TheMadFool
Then why should I accept that games must have an essential feature? How do you know that you're not misusing the word?
And what you have done is show that this assumption is false, by reaching the contradiction that games J, K and L are not games.
...and then invent a new game that has none of those features.
Quoting Luke
But games do have essential, defining, features; we're simply failing to notice them and that not least because we're just too lazy to put in the required amount of effort.
I, like you, don't want to repeat myself; so, you'll have to focus on the arguments I made in my preceding posts.
Quoting Banno
Where would the family resemblance anchor itself to then?
If anyone has done a philosophical or logical no-no, then it's those people who've used the word "game" improperly - employing only part of, and not the whole of, the definition.
"We"? I've asked you to produce this/these essential feature(s) and you haven't. Your entire argument hinges on this.
Indeed it does and I did:
Quoting TheMadFool
Matters might get [more] complicated as games diversify.
You've listed different "essential" features for each game. Which one is essential to each that makes them all games?
All of them.
A human is a rational animal, a female OR a male.
Maybe I do and maybe I don't know what "essential" means for I could be misusing philosophical terminology but that's the point isn't it? Not that there's another valid meaning of "essential" which I'm fully justified to use as part of my language game but that there's a correct definition that the word "essential" has which must be adhered to if this conversation must amount to something.
You are assuming this. It just need not be so.
Quoting Banno
Quoting Banno
I gave it my best shot.
Below is another attempt at proving that Wittgenstein's core assumption - that all uses of a word are correct - is false.
Suppose a word "dox" and that the following family resemblance holds for "dox"
a. "dox" applies to R (R is a dox) because of features A, B
b. "dox" applies to S (S is a dox) because of features B, C
c. "dox" applies to T (T is a dox) because of features C, D
1. All uses of the word "dox" are correct (Wittgenstein's claim) [Assume for reductio ad absurdum]
2 . If all uses of the word "dox" are correct then R is a dox AND T is a dox
3. R is a dox and T is a dox (1, 2 modus ponens)
4. If R is a dox then A is an essential feature of dox
5. If T is a dox then A is not an essential feature of dox
6. R is a dox (3 simplification)
7. T is a dox (3 simplification)
8. A is an essential feature of dox (4, 6 modus ponens)
9. A is not an essential feature of dox (5, 7 modus ponens)
10. A is an essential feature of dox AND A is not an essential feature of dox (8, 9 conjunction) : contradiction
Ergo,
11. Not the case that all uses of the word "dox" are correct (1 to 10 reductio ad absurdum)
The conclusion (11) basically exposes the contradiction lying hidden in Wittgenstein's theory of language games. It can't be that all uses of the word "dox", or any other word for that matter, are correct
This is not a 'core assumption of Wittgenstein', which you would know if you actually had even a passing familiarity of the view you are trying to 'critique'.
It's one of the reasons Witty qualifies use as use in a language game, and not just use as such - one of the unfortunate elements which is lost when people shorten the quote to "meaning is use", which in turn leads to completely nonsense threads like the OP.
Questionable if that's really a game. I say it is, though. In a loose sense the child has the objective of retrieving the ball, and if he/she doesn't it's a failure or a "loss " I do believe all games have a common feature.
This discussion doesn't really revolve around the fallibility of the word "game," though.
I can't accept it as a counter example. I can accept it at times as a game (sometimes just practice,) but then there is still the objective of catching the ball. No one is keeping score, necessarily, but the success or failure still lingers. That it's posited as a game guarantees that.
A game can be something where you fail yourself as well, I suppose. But if you consider something a game I can't imagine a scenario where it's not a question of success or failure.
A game would require the concept of a successful performance. Does not have to mean winning.
Nevertheless, what about a game such as truth or dare. Is that a game? If so, what counts as successful and unsuccessful performance?
Generally I agree with what your position is. But it does seem that a language game has to convey something and not just be gibberish.
Right.
I would say truth or dare can be a game. And termed as such is still a matter of success or failure, yes. There is an objective. It's kind of a foggy objective, but an objective nonetheless.
It's still a matter of feeling like a success or failure. I suppose completely embarrassing yourself would be a failure, as opposed to successfully surviving the truth or dare.
As does me cooking fried rice of course. Delicious game.
I wouldn't consider "surviving" the game or preventing embarassment to be the point of the game of truth or dare. Why can't it just be for fun? It is seeming to require more and more contortion in order for you to maintain that success/failure is a necessary feature of all games.
If the objective of a game is to have fun, then you're a success if you have fun and a failure if you don't. And Truth or Dare can go either way, which is why it's a game. It's a matter of personal success or failure. You can feel brave and win, or you can chicken out and lose.
Even though no one says "You lost the game" you still come away either with satisfaction or anxiety.
You maybe right you know. I did admit that I could be mistaken.
Let's assume that I'm wrong and that
[1. All uses of a word are correct]
wasn't a core assumption in Wittgenstein's theory.
If that's true then what means Wittgenstein by language games? Surely, now that I have a relatively better grasp of the issue, he means to validate the different meanings of words as determined by use in any and all the language games they take part in. For instance, being Wittgensteinian about the word "game" means its meaning when used in the sentence, "chess is a game" is equally justified as the meaning of "game" in the sentence "life is a game". For Wittgenstein, neither of the two meanings of "game" is better/worse; they're both true in the particular language game they're a part of. This is exactly what statement 1 claims.
If this isn't the case, them the contradictory of statement 1 must be true and that statement is: [2. Some uses of a word are incorrect], and the immediate consequence of 2 is that there can be no such thing as language games for the simple reason that 2 implies that there's one correct meaning of the word "game" and that is precisely what Wittgenstein is denying by claiming that meaning of a word is use-dependent and can vary, without any problem at all, with the language game the word participates in.
No, this has nothing to do with truth.
Forget 'correct' meaning. There is meaning, or there isn't meaning (something is meaningful, or meaningless), that's it.
If I were to say "dog" means a block of ice with a straw wouldn't that be false? Isn't this the incorrect meaning of "dog"?
If I were to say "dog" means an domesticated canine wouldn't that be true? Isn't this the correct meaning of "dog"?
:chin:
Everything in my humble opinion for Wittgenstein is claiming that there is no such thing as an incorrect meaning - every use of the word is perfectly ok in the language game the word partakes in.
Moreover, nothing is stopping you from employing 'dog' to mean 'block of ice with a straw': but you'd better be consistent about it, and you'd better be clear that this use has nothing to do with what anyone else refers to as 'dog'.
"Correct" and "incorrect" are "language-game relative": 'inside' a language-game, one can use or not use a word correctly: but those terms lose applicability once you start comparing across different language-games. The rules of chess don't apply to checkers - but this doesn't mean that one can move one's King in any which way. Neither does it mean that checkers is 'wrong' in any sense.
Yeah, it's obviously a true Scotsman.
What?
No, don't bother.
:ok: I agree.
[quote=StreetlightX]Moreover, nothing is stopping you from employing 'dog' to mean 'block of ice with a straw': but you'd better be consistent about it, and you'd better be clear that this use has nothing to do with what anyone else refers to as 'dog'.[/quote]
This is a vital piece of information for me. There is no necessary connection between a word and its meaning by which I mean a word could've been given any definition at all. So, while it isn't true that "dog" means a block of ice with a straw hat, it could've been given that meaning but, as you noted, we'd have to be consistent and therein lies the rub.
Why do you warn me to be consistent with my word usage? I reckon it's because if I use the word inconsistently i.e. misuse the word, confusion will result. For an inconsistency in usage to go unnoticed, it must be be so subtle that the correct usage and the incorrect usage should possess a family resemblance[Wittgenstein] that masks the inconsistency. It's a real possibility then that what Wittgenstein calls family resemblance comprises of inconsistent usages the differences between them being so fine as to be imperceptible to the untrained eye (most people).
Given all of the above, the specter of word misuse continues to threaten Wittgenstein's theory of language games because family resemblance of a word could be nothing more than a list of inconsistent uses of that word. Said differently, words do possess perfectly working referential meanings but these are hidden from view by a thick overgrowth of pesudo-referents generated by extremely subtle but still inconsistent word usage.
[quote=StreetlightX]"Correct" and "incorrect" are "language-game relative": 'inside' a language-game, one can use or not use a word correctly: but those terms lose applicability once you start comparing across different language-games.[/quote]
Correct! But bear in mind that Wittgenstein is claiming all uses of a word are correct (in the setting of particular language games)
:chin:
A material conditional that Wittgenstein would reject and provides plenty of grounds for rejecting. You seem simply to be gainsaying Wittgenstein, not arguing against him.
...says the world-renowned, multiple award winning, well-published author and the only living fully certified authority on Wittgenstein and almost everything else (by his own reckoning). :joke:
Hey you said it buddy. Everything else you wrote is simply this, delaborated.
The argument you're commenting on is flawed as Banno already curtly dismissed. Thank you for your criticism. As StreetlightX said, my idea is half-baked which on the whole makes me unhappy but the half bit is reasonably comforting. :smile:
So, your comment wasn't based on any analysis of the issue. Just took my words and rephrased it. Even a child could do that.
If it is beneath your serious engagement I have a serious problem on my hands. Am I that stupid? :joke: