Simple Argument for the Soul from Free Will
Premise P1: Everything that is physical is determined, as per the laws of physics.
Premise P2: Free Will enables some of our acts to be freely chosen, and therefore not fully determined.
• An act is called freely chosen when it is voluntary, intended, willed, as opposed to being accidental, fully caused by external forces outside our control.
• Note: for this discussion, we are assuming this premise to be true. Hey, it’s a simple argument.
Conclusion C: The part of us that possesses free will is not physical.
• This non-physical part is what is typically referred to as the Soul.
What do you think?
Premise P2: Free Will enables some of our acts to be freely chosen, and therefore not fully determined.
• An act is called freely chosen when it is voluntary, intended, willed, as opposed to being accidental, fully caused by external forces outside our control.
• Note: for this discussion, we are assuming this premise to be true. Hey, it’s a simple argument.
Conclusion C: The part of us that possesses free will is not physical.
• This non-physical part is what is typically referred to as the Soul.
What do you think?
Comments (180)
I think that you need a definition of "soul."
Well, that's wrong, for starters.
P1 is false
P2 is meaningless
C is nonsense.
False premise. Freely chosen does not entail undetermined. Free choice is a deterministic process; random (undetermined) choice is unfree.
This is correct, but being voluntary, intended, willed, is a deterministic matter (of whether your judgement of the merits of alternative courses of action determines your actions), and being accidental is more or less the same as being random, undetermined.
The soul is what attempts to guide our imagination, it's the part of us that seeks particular outcomes.Just my opinion .
https://www.britannica.com › science
In a way, we can end at the conclusion that we have a non-physical part, and that's already a decent find. But otherwise, by soul I mean the same as what religious groups mean when they say the soul outlasts the body. More technically defined, it is that which gives a human being a personal identity, a particular person rather than merely a member of a species. E.g. Due to my body, I am a human being, but due to my soul and its power of free will, I am more specifically Samuel.
Can you elaborate on why P1 is false? Are you saying that some physical things do not obey some laws of physics, or in other words that equal causes may give unequal effects?
Quoting Pfhorrest
I think I get what you are saying, namely that although our acts are freely chosen, those choices are based on what we judge to have the most beneficial outcome, and thus this judgement determines our choices.
I accept that, but I believe these judgements are based on our values we choose, and this choice is indeterministic (though I don't mean by that that ethics is subjective). E.g. most rational persons understand that cheating on their spouse is morally wrong, but some are tempted to do it because it gives pleasure. Free will kicks in when they choose between moral value and pleasure. At that point, indeed, the act is determined by that judgement of the best outcome, based on the values they chose.
Does this uncertainty principle entail that equal causes may give unequal effects, or does it merely say that we cannot predict with precision what these effects may be? If the latter, then I don't think this invalidates the argument in the OP.
I mostly agree with that you said. I would just replace the term "imagination" with "free will". I think some animals have imagination, e.g., dogs can have dreams, but not free choices.
It is a fallacy to think that things 'obey the laws of physics'. The laws of physics are merely a description of how matter behaves.. and a rather approximate one at that.
Quoting Banno
And that's without talking about butterflies.
No, Heisenberg's 'uncertainty principle' is much more radical than that. It's not that we can't know both the position and momentum of the object that is being observed, it's that these cannot both be known (or determined) with certainty at all.
It undercuts the first premise in your argument, i.e. that everything physical is determined by the 'laws of physics'. This is why Einstein used to grouch that he can't believe God plays dice.
In the mid-twentieth century, there was quite a bit of philosophical literature devoted to the philosophical implications of the uncertainty principle, much of which is pretty murky. But it does undermine the principle of LaPlace's daemon:
That is a canonical statement of physical determinism, but it is undermined by uncertainty even for such an 'intellect'.
There's a primer on the subject here and also here.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
So, this is a simplistic way of thinking about it. There is no non-physical 'part' because 'parts' generally characterise physical things; in other words, physical things are composed of parts, and it is not as if 'the soul' is one part amongst others.
The way I prefer to think of the soul is that it represents the totality of the being - all of the talents, inclinations, dispositions, past, and future of that being. And that is out of scope for the physical sciences for reasons which ought to be obvious with a little reflection.
There's also an interesting fact that has been validated by the natural sciences, which is that science can't account for the 'subjective unity of individual perception'. There is no neurobiological account of whatever system it is that generates the unified whole that experience comprises (see this reference for details.) This problem is (as the author of the linked article states) related to the hard problem of consciousness.
I think this is a confusion about the dilemma of free will. Volition is just an action with a goal. An intention is simply a goal that a voluntary action is directed towards. "Ordinary" will is simply about initiating a voluntary action.
Free will is supposed to involve choice, which is none of the above things. I voluntarily reach towards the chocolate ice cream after I deliberate about whether to get chocolate or vanilla.
I would say that if someone did something that they themselves though was the wrong thing to do, then they did not do it freely, but rather had a lapse of will and did something they meant not to do. And that deciding that something is the right course of action is identical to deciding that it is moral. Someone who cheats on their spouse thus either honestly thought that the pleasure it brought them was more important than the other consequences of it, and acted according to that judgement, in what they felt was a justified, and therefore moral, way; or else they thought that they should act out of more consideration for those other consequences than for their own pleasure, and yet did not act that way, doing something they thought was wrong ought of weakness of will.
In either case, no indeterminism need be involved, and if it were involved at most it would be on disrupting the causal chain between intention and action, creating that very weakness of will.
To say that all physical things "obey the laws of physics" is merely an expression. It refers to the Uniformity of Nature, which is the principle that the course of nature continues uniformly the same. For a given cause A, we always expect to see effect B.
I would accept the claim "we don't know what causes [...]", but "nothing causes [...]" is a logical fallacy.
It goes against the Principle of Sufficient Reason; which is one of the four Laws of Thoughts.
Also, curious about the butterflies...
Quoting Banno
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
There's your problem.
That's okay. What I meant by "determined" is not that we can know it with certainty, but that the cause-effect is consistent or uniform, even if we don't know it. So identical causes yield identical effects.
Quoting Wayfarer
Indeed, "parts" don't apply to non-physical things. But if we define a human being as the whole system of body and soul, then the soul is a part of that system.
Quoting Wayfarer
Thomas Aquinas was already talking about this back then (but I cannot find the source of this anymore).
But you have used that claim to further claim that the world is determined. If the 'laws of physics' are merely a description, which they are, then any claim of determinism is unjustified.
As for the uniformity of nature, as being some sort of fundamental principle, it is naïve. Nature is not uniform, there is no claim for that in physics, and any claim to uniformity is at best, very very approximate and even then only in some circumstances.
We are also animals.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Alright, I'll ask it. Does Free Will violate the Principle of Sufficient Reason?
Meh. People have developed technology in the past before fully understanding the theory behind it; like boats before fully understanding buoyancy. Also I'm wondering if order can result out of chaos, which sounds like what something-out-of-nothing would be.
Quoting Banno
Oh ok. I didn't know this was disputed as a Law of Thought. The Principle of Sufficient Reason is self-evidently true, because any attempt to give a sufficient reason for or against it would presuppose it. This is why it fits as part of the basic laws of thoughts or logic.
I don't understand this statement. If nature is uniform, consistent in its effects resulting from a given cause, then it is indeed determined; where the opposite of "determine" is "randomness", when free will is not involved.
Quoting A Seagull
So is the alternative randomness? This seems to fail the Principle of Sufficient Reason. In addition, how do you explain technology without the Uniformity of Nature? E.g. planes consistently fly.
Quoting Daniel
Sure. But what's your point with regards to this discussion?
Hmmm... I don't think a choice in outcome is necessary for free will. You can tie me up so as to remove my choice in outcome of moving vs not moving, but this would not take away my free will, because I can still choose to intend to move.
Quoting InPitzotl
I don't believe so.
E.g. What caused this person to act in such a way, if it did not follow the cause-to-effect we observe in other physical things? Answer: His free will.
I think what you refer to is "will power" or "self-control", which is indeed related to free will but different still. You say we obtain free will through educating ourselves; but then what causes us to educate ourselves if not free will? Something cannot cause itself into existence.
I think dogs only have instinct; and can walk away from a treat once we have modified their instinct through training.
We have a few disagreements.
Quoting Pfhorrest
By "moral value" I mean breaking the golden rule of ethics: do onto others as you would want them to do onto you. This rule is simple enough that most people can correctly judge what is morally right and wrong; and this removes the possibility of honest rational mistake about moral judgements.
Quoting Pfhorrest
Once judged that cheating is morally wrong, then they can freely choose between moral value or pleasure (picture the angel and demon on each shoulder like in cartoons). If they ended up cheating from choosing pleasure, then the act was intended, willed. If they chose the moral good but somehow ended cheating anyways (say they were drugged), then the act indeed happened against their will; but free will must exist for something to go against it.
So the free choice is at the step of choosing between moral value and pleasure, and then the remaining outcome is determined.
That is not a compelling argument. That you can intend to move demonstrates volition. That you have no choice by definition rules out free will. Essentially, you're conflating free will with volition, then arguing that you aren't by conflating free will with volition. You can call anything by any name you like, but when most people refer to free will it involves making some kind of a choice; and there are plenty who believe there is no such thing as free will, who have no problem whatsoever with volition. So if you want to speak the same language as these people, free will requires choice of some sort; and volition per se doesn't demonstrate it.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Okay, so let's back track. Banno says:
Quoting Banno
Your response to that was:
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
I'm a bit curious then. If it's a logical fallacy to say that nothing causes the photon to go left instead of right, how is it not a logical fallacy to say that nothing causes me to pick vanilla instead of chocolate?
It seems to me that you are placing humans in a pedestal by assigning to us a non-physical entity (the soul) and taking it away from other animals, as if we were not. Just because other animals are not humans, it should not be assumed they don't have their own "humanity".
That's different from thinking that it is always binding, and they ought to follow it, but then failing to follow it anyway.
It sounds like you're thinking of "assessing moral value" in a kind of quotated sense, as in "assessing what people would commonly consider to be of moral value", rather than assessing what that person themselves genuinely finds of most value (all value being fundamentally moral in nature, morality being all about value).
Consider beliefs for comparison. Nobody believes something they think is false. They may believe things that are false, and they may believe things that they think other people think are false, but thinking that it's true and believing it are the same thing.
Likewise, nobody intends something they think is bad. They may intend things that are bad, and they may intend things that they think other people think are bad, but thinking that it's good and intending it are the same thing.
Argument 1:
1. We have free will
2. Determinism is true for all physical things
3. If we have free will and determinism is true for all physical things then, the part of our being that has free will is nonphysical
4. We have free will and determinism is true for all physical things (from 1 & 2 conjunction)
5. The part our being that has free will is nonphysical and is what we call a soul(from 3 and 4 modus ponens)
Argument 2:
1. We have free will
2. If we're entirely physical then determinism is true of us
3. If determinism is true of us then we don't have free will
4. Determinism isn't true of us (1, 3 modus tollens)
5. We're not entirely physical (2, 4 modus tollens)
6. If we're not entirely physical then there's a part of us that's nonphysical
7. There's a part of us that's nonphysical (5, 6 modus ponens)
8. Either the part of us that's nonphysical has free will or the part of us that's physical has free will
9. If the part of us that's physical has free will then determinism is true for us
10. It's not the case that the part of us that's physical has free will (4, 9 modus tollens)
11. The part of us that's nonphysical has free will (8, 10 disjunctive syllogism)
12. There's a part of us that's nonphysical AND the part of us that's nonphysical has free will (7, 11 conjunction). This nonphysical part of us that possesses free will is what we call soul.
Which version (1 or 2) of your argument do you prefer? As might be obvious to you, the difficulty is in making the connection between the nonphysical part of our being that has free will and what we consider as the soul. Are they the same or are they different?
I am not sure it's accurate to say that any events are uncaused. The double slit experiment shows that if you measure passage through the slit, the interference pattern disappears. So, whenever you have a specific event (photon passes left slit), that event has a cause. It's only in the absence of observation, i.e. when you don't know whether or not there is an event, that we can only work with probabilities.
The emitter caused the particle/wave, including whatever properties it ends up having. The path it takes isn't deterministic, but I don't think that means any specific path it did in fact take was uncaused.
Note that asking "what caused it to go left" is a shorthand for asking "which properties of the preceding event were the most significant for this consequent event". Otherwise the answer is always "the entire state of the universe".
So,
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
??
Well, I am inclined to agree with you that calling the result "determined" as per some clockwork model of the universe, isn't supported by current science.
I am also with @A Seagull insofar as the laws of physics are descriptive, not prescriptive.
As far as I understand 20th century physics, events are still causally connected, but the connection is probabilistic going forward.
As for the laws of physics, yes, they are descriptive. Perhaps they are not prescriptive, but they are predictive. Either way, they are not proscriptive in the way that Sam might hope.
As I said earlier, another fact is that we can act on ideas that do not reflect reality...therefore we are not marionettes being played by the world around us.
What I think is that you're putting the cart before the horse.
All that exists is consciousness and things within consciousness. Then you don't need to posit free will or dualism unnecessarily. Ockham's Razor suggests we start there.
It's weird because in french, "free will" is translated as "volonté libre", and "volition" as "volonté". Be that as it may, a choice is still present as long as you have the choice to intend one way or another. Intentions must be free and have multiple choices, otherwise they would be no intentions at all. And if you tie me up so that I am immobile, we say this was done "against my will", that is, against my intention, my consent.
Quoting InPitzotl
Alright. You pick vanilla because vanilla tastes better than chocolate for you, and since this choice in taste is not voluntary, it must come from psychological history; and everyone with the same history would do the same. Now if that was the whole story, then indeed positing free will would be superfluous. But let's add to the example that vanilla is more expensive than chocolate. You then have to choose between two conflicting values: taste and money. And choosing between values is voluntary, and so is caused by our power of free will (or volition if you prefer).
I actually am haha. But that is besides the point of the discussion which is about the argument in the OP.
Why? The vast majority of humans have a unique genome. Human brains it's rumored have 100 trillion neural connections. And human males seem to find female humans attractive significantly more often than they find female turkeys attractive. So, yes; humans indeed are a highly social species, so nurture (for which "psychological history" is longhand) is very significant. But nature is also very significant; and even if you count development (phenotype from genotype) entirely in the nurture camp, there's plenty of nature to go around to explain different behaviors.
But that's a false dilemma, because for reasons mentioned above it cannot be the full story anyway. To make this argument you would have to prove a point you don't even believe... that we are tabula rasa.
Making preferences complex isn't impressive. AlphaZero learned to play chess with no heuristics and, though there's still a tad bit of controversy about some particulars, it seems to have bested the prior best chess engines. Many chess experts who have seen sample games recognize the games that AlphaZero plays as "beautiful" compared to typical engines, FWIW. Now I'm not going to argue that AlphaZero is conscious or sentient, or on par with human agency (because, quite frankly, I don't believe it), but... imagine AlphaZero "choosing" which chess piece to move in a particular game; weighing variables that it literally "invented" a way to even valuate (read up on how it works if you're curious). AlphaZero is a program; it runs on a deterministic machine (I don't know; it could use entropy, but even if it does it could in principle run off of a CSPRNG). I've no idea how many variables of this self-learned valuation AlphaZero uses, but compared to my "choosing" to get vanilla versus chocolate, preferring the taste of chocolate, but weighing it against price; since AlphaZero can definitely beat the best human players hands down, I don't quite think that choice is as impressive as you're making it out to be.
I've no problem with choice, and no problem with volition; I just make a distinction between these two things. I'm agnostic on the free will question, though I can't take libertarian free will too seriously without new physics (and some better argument for why we should buy it than I've heard). That's not the problem here, though.
The problem I have with your argument can be described with two metaphors: (1) You're telling God what to do, (2) You want to have your cake and eat it too. (1) comes into play with how you argue that physics is fully determined; it must be, "laws of thoughts" demand it to be. That to me sounds not so much like an argument as it does an excuse not to give one. What's worse is that when it comes to how we behave, this rule suddenly gets thrown out the window; "laws of thoughts" demand physics to be fully determined; "free will" demands us to not be. That's (2). Even if logic did demand physics to be fully determined, how is it logic doesn't demand us to be? If we're excepted by free will how come photons and radioactively decaying atoms cannot be excepted? This immediately flunks my baloney detector test; real logical implications are invariant with respect to what they apply to.
The Golden Rule is an absolute; here's why. Fairness is defined as treating everyone equally; no discrimination. Nobody in their right mind can judge that being unfair is morally good, and that being fair is morally bad. And unfairness necessarily results when breaking the Golden Rule.
Quoting Pfhorrest
Yes I agree with this when it comes to beliefs; but not when it comes to morality. You make it sound like the way people act is always out of the honest belief that the act is morally good. But this is absurd for a couple of reasons.
(1) Rapists exist; and nobody in their right mind would honestly believe rape to ever be the morally good. They do it because of some sort of pleasure it brings, not out of moral duty.
(2) A prerequisite of guilt is that the defendant knows or should have known that the act was bad. Thus if all moral errors are honest errors, then nobody can be a morally bad person.
Maybe the following test will work. As a child, have you ever lied? If so, was it really out of honest belief that it was your moral duty to lie at this time; or was it because it was an easy escape while knowing it was morally wrong?
I like the first one better, as it is simpler and thus easier for me to follow.
You are correct that the argument can only go as far as proving that we have a non-physical part, and that the claim that this is the soul is an add-on at the end. That's okay, I think the hard work is in the first part for most people. After that, it is not great effort to connect this part which is non-physical and has free will, to what is commonly referred to as the soul.
Quoting Echarmion
Quoting Banno
I agree that when we say "physical things obey the laws of physics", it is merely an expression to say there is uniformity or consistency in causality, and the laws of physics describe that uniformity. That's also all I meant in P1.
But there appears to be a discrepancy with our meaning of the term "determined". My understanding of "determined" is that a given Cause A will consistently result in Effect B; not necessarily that we can know with certainty what Cause A and Effect B are. Do you mean something else by it?
Sounds good to me.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
I don't think that's true, at least not on the quantumn scale. Particles don't have fixed positions, they instead have probablity distributions. So you have cause A and then 50% chance for effect B, 20 % chance fo effect C etc. This does not normally occur on the macro scale, but the jury is still out on exactly when this breaks down into determined effects. It may just be that probablities are so skewed on the macro scale that it seems the effect is always the same, but in reality there is an infinitesimal chance that, for example, your desk spontaneosly turns into an octopus.
Edit: There is of course the "hidden causes" line of argument that claims this apparent probablity distribution is just dues to lack of knowledge. But so far experimental results have not backed it up. I think there have actually been a number of experiments that make "hidden causes" seem less likely.
Not act, but intend. People often act in ways they wish they hadn’t; that’s what regret is. Regret is a great way to frame this, if we ignore regret from unforeseeable consequences. Someone doesn’t regret something that they honestly meant to do (unless they didn’t foresee some consequence of it). They regret things that they did out of weakness of will, despite intending to do otherwise, knowing that to do otherwise would be the best course of action.
If someone honestly thought that the pleasure of sex was more important than their marriage or whatever, they wouldn’t regret cheating. That they do regret it shows that they thought it would be better if they didn’t cheat, but they did anyway, indicating weakness of will on their part.
I think I understand what you are saying better now. Yes, if self-control is not a result of knowledge but is applied alongside knowledge, there perhaps it is indeed synonymous to free will.
Quoting Chester
I'm not sure about this one though. Ideas like unicorn indeed do not reflect reality, but they might still be caused by our perception of reality in the first place. I don't think determinism and imagination are incompatible.
Defending the existence of free will would take too long, and so it is assumed to be true in this discussion. However, if we were to argue about free will, then I agree that Ockham's Razor would be a good starting point, and that the free-willer would then have the onus of proof.
I agree. :up:
That's fine. The point was that to explain our resulting taste, nature and nurture are sufficient without having to bring in free will.
Quoting InPitzotl
It's not about complexity. I'm okay with computers making highly complex decisions and still being fully determined. It's about how we all feel we freely chose our values; which once chosen, determine the rest of our behaviour accordingly.
Quoting InPitzotl
I still don't understand the distinction between volition and free will. How can intentions truly exist if they are not freely chosen? To contrast, AlphaZero, being nothing but a program that goes through the motions, has no intentions.
Quoting InPitzotl
That sounds to me like an ad hominem attack. Are you objecting because there is a flaw in my reasoning, or merely because it seems I am telling God what to do?
Quoting InPitzotl
This is a misunderstanding. Laws of Thoughts, specifically the Principle of Sufficient Reason, does not allow for random causality. This therefore leaves two possibilities for causality. Free Will, and Determinism for things which don't possess free will. Neither of these possibilities violate the Principle of Sufficient Reason, as far as I can tell. But if it does, let me know.
No objection; just thinking out loud. What you describe indeed does not fit determinism, and yet a probability distribution still implies some sort of order. It is odd that it is not fully ordered, yet not fully random... For some reason, I would be more willing to accept full absence of order over partial order.
Quoting Echarmion
That seems to me simply the result of Central Limit Theorem; where the macro scale averages out the inconsistencies. If so, then I'm pretty sure it's quantifiable with some confidence interval.
Quoting Echarmion
This poses a difficulty. I am fairly sure that the Scientific Method is founded on the Principle of Sufficient Reason; and any scientific theory that goes against its founding principles would be self-defeating, like sawing off the branch it's sitting on.
So people always intend to do the good (at least in their view), and when they don't do the good, then they have regret.
But is this even logically possible? The following appears to be a logical necessity:
Intention + Possibility = Act
If you intend to do something, and it is possible for you to do it, then you will necessarily do it. If you did not do it, it was either because it was not possible, or because you did not really intend it.
E.g. Who can say "Yes I cheated, but it was unintentional"? (Aside from this of course)
Suppose there's a classic, old, voodoo style zombie (not a p-zombie) hanging around. The zombie's master orders him to clean the troughs; the zombie complies. The zombie's actions in cleaning out the trough are not involuntary... this zombie isn't having tics or shaking from a siezure, for example; it's identifying the shovel, intentionally grabbing it, and performing the commanded act. That's volition. But the zombie has no freedom not to obey the master's commands; so it has no free will.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
That's fine, but your example took something like a desire (preference for vanilla), and added a second variable to it (cost). What is the purpose of having two variables involved in the choice? This is what I took away from what I read... my response to optimizing two variables was the fact that AlphaZero makes decisions among multiple variables. Loosely, if AlphaZero can deterministically judge multiple variables, then pointing out that I judge two doesn't demonstrate a break in determinism (i.e., this is solely about the argument... maybe my choices aren't deterministic, but we certainly didn't demonstrate it by saying that I'm weighing two variables... if that was not your intent, tell me what you think really implies there's indeterminism happening).
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Yes, a flaw in your reasoning. The phrase is a reference (Einstein: "God does not play dice with the universe." Bohr: "Don't tell God what to do.") The error is in specifying how the universe should behave a priori, because you imagine it to be "logical"; what's really happening when you do this is that you're prescribing your preconceived notions onto the universe... hence, "telling God what to do". There is no solid a proiri reason that the universe must fit our preconceived notions of how it works.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
I have no idea what random causality means, so I'm just going to substitute "random indeterminism". Determinism is the notion that for every effect there is a sufficient antecedent cause. PoSR is almost identical to this definition; it differs only that it allows "reason" to be used instead of "cause". But let's grant a charitable interpretation of free will here... compatibilist free will does nothing for your argument so we need LFW. To be sensible we'll invoke the notion of "original cause"; an agent having free will implies that the agent is an original cause of some event E. Again, charitably speaking, we might say this fits the PoSR; it's "allowed" if you will. But there's still the same conflict I told you about... if I, a conscious sentient agent, can be an original cause; how come a photon cannot be an original cause, or a radioactive atom?
So you would say the original command to go clean the troughs is not intended by the zombie, but everything else in that set of acts is intended with the goal of cleaning the troughs, is that correct? Would this therefore be different than a computer program which only goes through a programming code line by line with no intentions involved? Genuinely asking.
Quoting InPitzotl
Right. The reason I added the second variable was because my position is that free will doesn't apply for the taste example only, but does apply if we have conflicting values. I'll try again.
In a situation with only one type of value, like choosing between chocolate or vanilla, then free will is not really involved; because free will or not, everyone would simply pick their preferred flavour, and that's that. Free will only applies at the "very beginning", when it comes to ranking our values in order of priority. E.g. ethics #1, safety #2, pleasure #3. Then in a situation where several values are in conflict, then our intentions are directed with the end of achieving the higher values over the lower ones. Note, I acknowledge I did not defend why that is; because as per the OP, this free will is assumed to be true for this discussion.
Quoting InPitzotl
Sure there is. The Laws of Thoughts are also called Laws of Logic. Take the Law of Non-Contradictions. If two propositions contradict, then at least one of these is necessarily false. This not only means that we made an error in our reasoning, but more importantly it means that one of these propositions is not reflective of reality. If this wasn't the case, then these Laws would serve no purpose.
Quoting InPitzotl
Yes, we can also entertain the hypothesis that photons have free will. But I think the OP argument would still hold, because this power of free will still cannot be physical if science has determined that no antecedent physical cause exist.
Not really; quite the opposite. As the zombie carries out the command, he is indeed intending it. The zombie picks up the shovel in order to clean the troughs. The goal of his action is to clean the troughs. That is the intention.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Yes; it would be different. The zombie is an agent; it has to navigate a complex environment that it doesn't have full knowledge about. Imagine master without his zombie, but instead he is a master engineer, and wants to build a wind-up doll. The wind-up doll will go through the exact actions needed to clean the troughs; all built-in. Doesn't that sound a bit tough, and fragile even? If you accidentally have the doll rotated half a degree from where it has to be to clean the troughs, it will completely fail to; if the troughs are an inch off, you could have complete failure. An unplanned for cat running in your doll's path and it's again a complete and total failure. Someone hangs the shovel on the wrong peg, and you have to reprogram the entire wind-up doll. The zombie, by contrast, can pull this off quite easily, because the zombie's actions are oriented towards the goal state. That's what an agent is, and what a goal is.
The computer program you describe, insofar as it is just following the programming, isn't exhibiting goal oriented behavior; the "environment" it "navigates" by following its programming is insanely simple. This symbol goes in, clock ticks, this has to happen. That symbol goes in, clock ticks, that has to happen. There are no shovels on the wrong pegs to figure out are on the wrong pegs and adjust behaviors for, at that level. Now put the computer into a robot and have it clean troughs, and you might have to deal with goal oriented behaviors (at least, if you want the robot to be effective, and you're not prescient enough to solve the problem with the programmatic equivalent to "wind-up dolls").
I take the time to explain this because I think one of your listed premises is a bit confused.Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
But that just sounds like AlphaZero building its own valuation system, which it does deterministically.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Let me make this a bit more clear. I present the following dilemma to you:
1. At time T=0, the universe is in state A.
2. At time T=1, the universe evolves to state B.
3. At time T=k, the universe evolves back to state A.
4. At time T=k+1, the universe evolves to state C.
5. B!=C
This must be logically consistent, according to you, because it is logically possible. Specifically, it is logically possible if state A includes a being that has free will. However, you're also saying that physical laws must be deterministic, which this certainly does not describe. Let's represent that thusly:
6. State A involves the physical.
Now, 1 through 5 is logically consistent. But 1 through 6 is presumably logically inconsistent. Why? Incidentally, I read the phrase "The Laws of Thought are also called Laws of Logic" as demanding the burden of a logical proof... so, what is the logical proof that 1 through 6 is a contradiction?
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
You misunderstand. Free will => original causation does not entail original causation => free will. If a photon has just original causation, then it's not fully determined. We need never have photons with free will.
Oh okay. So "intention" means "aiming towards a goal", not necessarily choosing that goal. I will think a bit more about this definition; to see if true intentions can exist without freely choosing them.
Quoting InPitzotl
A simple wind-up doll, fine. But what if we add sensors to the doll, so it can see, hear, feel, smell, and taste, like the zombie; and make the program a lot more complex such as "if shovel not found at location A, then search for it", etc. At this point, is there still a difference between the zombie and the doll-with-sensors-and-complex-program?
Quoting InPitzotl
I thought we agreed that computers, being nothing but programs, cannot have intentions. People on the other hand can have intentions, and intentionally choose our own ranking of values. Now for the tricky part: maybe there is such a thing as "deterministic intentions", that is, we always aim towards the goal which results in the greater value for us. But by this definition, then intention towards values themselves must be different than deterministic intentions.
Quoting InPitzotl
Does this mean State A is fully physical or merely that some of it is physical? I hope the two syllogisms below cover both options.
P1.1. All that is fully physical is determined, so that state A will always evolve to state B.
P1.2. State A is all physical.
C1. State A will always evolve to state B.
or
P2.1. All that is fully physical is determined, so that state A will always evolve to state B.
P2.2. State A does not always evolve to state B.
C2. State A is not fully physical.
Quoting InPitzotl
One of the expressions of the PoSR is that "every change (or event) necessitates a sufficient cause".
If photon A always causes effect B, then that's sufficient. But if sometimes photon A also causes effect C, then there is a change between causation A-B and causation A-C, and this change necessitates a cause other than photon A alone.
Well, let's slow down a bit. Consider actually building a robot that does things the "right" way (that is, it's not tough and fragile). Now take just "see"; we could define that as ability to sense light; namely, "pixels" in a camera. That's obviously not enough though; we need it to be able to recognize things it's looking at, and not only that, but to recognize those things in real time. We do that when we see, for example. However, for our robot, we don't really need much more than this; the robot need not be conscious for example. So although we're conscious agents, the robot doesn't really need to be one to do this.
But as part of the mechanics of this robot, to make its actions effective, it does need to orient itself towards the high level goal state "clean the troughs". That requires a particular kind of relating of the things it "sees" to the goal, and its actions to attempting to attain the goal, and some basic world modeling such that it can avoid cats running before it, and so on. So the "what if" is that we can have goal oriented behaviors (like a stable version of "clean the troughs) with precisely this minimalist sense of "seeing"; it's more than just having access to camera pixels, but doesn't require the whole shebang of our visual experience. (In fact, there's a human analog; the rare person with blindsight can carry out intentional actions involving "seeing" in a not quite conscious way).
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
No, we didn't agree on that. We agreed that computers, in following a program line by line, are not carrying out intentions by doing so at that level. (See example below with the shaky people).
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
The robot in cleaning up troughs is different than the computer in following its program line by line. The zombie in cleaning out the troughs is probably different than the robot, too; a hired servant or contractor that cleans up the troughs would be different still.
I know people who shake; there's nothing wrong with them, they just aren't "steady"... you wouldn't want them operating on you but beside that they're just fine. Maybe you would even say that have free will; they can certainly intentionally drive a car, while their hands are shaking.
But the wind-up doll, the person whose hands shakes, and the computer executing a computer program line by line have something in common... none of those things are exhibiting goal oriented behaviors in doing these things. Likewise, the zombie in cleaning out troughs, the robot in cleaning out troughs, and the shaky person in driving a car, all have something in common... all of these entities are exhibiting goal oriented behaviors.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
It means what it means exactly; if it's not specified, it doesn't mean it. That's why you can't possibly maintain an inconsistency in 1 through 5; it's your model of human action... namely, humans have free will which implies they are not fully determined (your words) which requires non-physical souls. But other than having non-physical souls, it's implied that you agree humans can actually exist.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
I think you misunderstand. You're trying to prove that physics is fully determined; you can't just hold that as a premise. That's begging the question.
But let me just try this a different way. I'll grant that we have free will, and we're not fully determined. So now we're good. I'll grant your premises too, and your argument; since we're not fully determined, and all things physical must be fully determined, then we're not physical. So the conclusion you want is, we have some non-physical thing, called a soul.
Banno, however, has raised an objection to this. He has identified a photon (and radioactive atom) as being not fully determined. Here's the problem... there's nothing to disagree with. What's good for the goose is good for the gander... a photon isn't fully determined? No problem! All physical things are fully determined? Okay, fine. There's no contradiction here; rather, we simply apply your second syllogism and wind up proving the photon isn't physical. Same with the radioactive atom decaying... it's not fully determined. Is that allowed? Of course it is, if the radioactive atom isn't physical. So, same thing... now photons and radioactive atoms are not physical.
In all honesty, I don't see a problem with this, except that you're going to have really long discussions with people who want to call photons and radioactive atoms physical. And to avoid such strange language barriers, might I suggest instead of using the word "physical", since all you really mean by that is apparently "fully determined", that you just use that word... determined.
But on the off chance that you do have a problem with it, I'd like to see a logical proof that photons are physical.
So my question is, how are they different, such that a robot can have intentions? I'm fairly sure a robot is nothing more than a computer executing a program line by lines, with sensors attached.
Quoting InPitzotl
?? Sorry; I don't understand the point of this whole paragraph, or the previous demonstration with steps 1 through 6 anymore. How does this fit with the original objection about the laws of thoughts?
Quoting InPitzotl
That's not what I was trying to prove with the previous syllogisms. These were merely a response to your 6-step objection, which admittedly I apparently have misunderstood.
I thought we already showed that the physical is determined: PoSR. Let's loop back. I think there are only 2 alternatives to determinism: randomness and free will. PoSR disallows for randomness, and I believe you already dismissed the hypothesis that photons have free will. This only leaves determinism.
Quoting InPitzotl
This is really straining away from common sense. Of course photons are physical; why wouldn't they be? And even if they weren't, this doesn't mean they are undetermined. As per above, the only alternative to determinism is free will, and this goes for all things, regardless if they are physical or not.
Words are our slaves, not our masters. The robot I described is the minimal system for which it makes sense to say that it is trying to do something. If you want to add other criteria for "intentions", that's fine; but I find one thing very, very interesting... using this robotic minimal version of intention, I can distinguish between voluntary actions and involuntary actions in humans. Voluntary actions are those for which there's a goal driving behavior like that robot has; involuntary actions are the rest. Using this criteria I can tell the difference between my hand shaking due to a tic and my hand shaking because I'm trying to shake it.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Not a problem. The robot has a computer in it, and that computer is executing a program line by line. But there is no sense in which that computer is trying to execute a program line by line; there's no "attempt" to "attain a goal" of executing programs line by line, because there's no representation of what it's doing at this level, no observation of how things are occurring, and no calculated adjustment towards "execute the instruction". It's just a wind up doll. There is by contrast a sense in which the robot, with the same computer in it, is trying to clean the troughs; there is a representation of what it's doing at this level, an observation of how things are occurring, and a calculated adjustment towards "cleaning the troughs". Or if you don't follow that, fine; look at the shaky person driving the car. There is nothing in that shaky person trying to shake his hands. But in the same person, even with the same hand still moving, insofar as it is reaching towards a gear shift and shifting it, there is something in that shaky person that is trying to shift the gears. There is no more a contradiction between the computer program following a program line by line not intentionally doing so and yet the same computer trying to clean troughs, as there is in the shaky person having their hands shake not intentionally shaking them and yet the same shaky person shifting a gear trying to shift.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
You're arguing that physical things must be fully determined, because logic; that humans aren't, because free will (which gets them a logic-pass to not be fully determined); and therefore, humans are not physical. This argument applies different yardsticks to humans than it does to physical things. You opened a thread here to discuss this, so here I am... to my eyes, it looks like you're rigging the game to reach your goal.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
The 5 statement thing and the 6 statement thing are meant to emphasize that if you have a problem with the logic of how physical things work, then it would be inconsistent to say that it is with the 1 through 5 things... that it must be with thing 6. And all thing 6 does is invoke the word "physical". You yourself gave two syllogisms; one to argue that physical things are fully determined, the other to argue that if something isn't fully determined, then it's not physical.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
You can't meet the burden of logic by appealing to common sense.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
By your argument. If we look at photons and find out that they cannot be fully determined, we just apply syllogism 2, and we get that they aren't physical. I mean, it's pretty straightforward... your syllogism is a recipe for proving something non-physical and, like it or not, that recipe applies to anything we show is not fully determined.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
So, photons have free will? (Incidentally, since you mentioned logical fallacies, how does appeal to personal incredulity and false dilemma sound here?)
ETA: Let me cut to the chase for you. There are two main ways you can talk about things: (a) prescriptively, and (b) descriptively. When you're using method (a), you're basically specifying all of the properties that a thing has to have to be the thing you're talking about. When you're using method (b), you're basically referring to a thing, and you use the referent to try to figure out what kinds of properties the thing has. The problem with your approach of the physical is that you're trying to do both of these things at the same time. You want to refer to photons, but prescribe their mechanics.
I think there is. If A is nothing but B which is doing nothing but C, then A is doing nothing but C. If a robot is nothing but a program which is doing nothing but executing lines, then the robot is doing nothing but executing lines. The robots' "intentions" is thus only an expression for what we perceive it is doing, and points to nothing in reality.
As for the rest of the discussion, let's clean it up by summarizing where I think we are.
(1) There are only 3 possible explanations for all events: determinism, free will, and randomness, as so:
(2) Determinism: Cause A always gives Effect B.
(3) Free Will: Cause A may give different effects; and this is explained by Cause A having free will.
(4) Randomness: Cause A (including "nothing") may give different effects; but this is not explained by Cause A having free will.
(5) The PoSR disallows for randomness. This only leaves determinism and free will for possible explanations for all events.
(6) From observation, it appears everything that is physical (ie matter and energy) is determined, with perhaps the exception of photons and humans.
(7) Photons: Science states events with photons have no physical cause.
(8) But PoSR demands a sufficient cause.
(9) So they must have a non-physical cause, which could be free will or other.
(10) If free will, this proves that free will is non-physical.
(11) If other, then the cause is both non-physical and determined.
(12) In both cases, it follows that everything that is physical is determined.
(13) Humans: Humans have free will (assumed in the OP).
(14) Humans have a part that is non-physical.
I believe the notions of determinism and free will only apply to the topic of causality, not the topic of identity. But do you think identity is relevant to the discussion?
It's pretty difficult to find A's that are nothing but B's. Generally, either A and B have to be identical or B has to not only be a superclass of A but one that necessarily entails all things about it. My house key, for example, is an object that is shaped in such a way that it allows me to open the door. It is also a flat metallic object that maintains an electric current as a result of changes in the surrounding electromagnetic field, a lump of mass that exerts a gravitational influence on Jupiter, and a lot of other things.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
A robot is not even a program, much less nothing more than one. Robots and programs are different things.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Okay, let's take this in a different direction. I'll just pick on (6) through (8).
What, then, do you have to say about Bell's Theorem ("cliff note" version by Derek/Veritassium)?
Ok. And how so?
But a robot is essentially a program + mechanical parts; and if a robot is going to have volition, it's going to be through its program and not through its mechanical parts. No?
Quoting InPitzotl
Me? Nothing. I failed to see the relation with my summary. But it's your objection; not mine. What then do you have to say about it with regards to the summary?
More or less, sure.
Actually, no. It is going to involve those mechanical parts, critically so. The robot must actually act in the world and achieve a "real" goal state in the world. To do that by means that don't involve magic, it must model the world via sensors, model the effects of potential actions, use the action-models to select actual actions that attempt to attain the goal states, monitor the actual results of actions through the sensors in order to compare the predictions to the actual results, and make adjustments as necessary as the actual results differ from the goal state it is directing itself to attain. The modeled goal state, the fact that the behaviors are directed towards that modeled goal state, and the fact that this modeled goal state is a result of modeling the sensed world as opposed to just simulating something, collectively are what make it meaningful to say that this robot is trying to attain a goal. Without those pieces you lose this meaning. To have those pieces, you need all three of the program, those mechanical parts, and that world.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Point (8): PoSR demands a sufficient cause. Bell's Theorem: Under reasonable presumptions of classical mechanics, a "conspiracy" to yield particular results (i.e., whether there are sufficient causes for the results) in families of experiments would suggest probabilities that conflict with standard quantum mechanics; in particular, with the probabilities predicted by the Born Rule for such experiments. The conflict between these two things provides an experimental way to test which is true, and the experiments conflict with any classical results. Bell's Theorem is in essence the death nail of hidden variable theories in quantum mechanics.
I have to be blunt... I'm having an incredibly difficult time taking you seriously when you say that you fail to see the relationship between this and your summary. And when I see this:
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
...I can't help but think that you're just bluffing.
But if all you mean by "volition" is "respond to external information to achieve a goal", then mere programs without mechanical parts can do this too. There exists programs which goal is to win at a game of chess for example.
Quoting InPitzotl
It may disprove classical mechanics, but not the laws of thoughts, and so does not conflict with the PoSR. As per my summary, there can be a non-physical cause, which is not necessarily empirically detectable, and if so, then falls outside the realm of science; but not of philosophy.
Quoting InPitzotl
The guy in the video says that one of the two explanations given by physicists is that "entangled particles can signal each other faster than light" which would be a sufficient cause. So I did not see any real objection to my summary.
Also as a general rule, giving links to other sources is not an argument. Ideally one would formulate an argument, and may add a link for additional, but non-necessary, information. Part of the onus of proof is to do the ground work for it.
You're confused. You're both choking on this and ignoring it: "The robot must actually act in the world and achieve a "real" goal state in the world." That statement is a specification for the robot not a definition of volition. Volition is still goal oriented behavior, not an achievement. The type of goal is described by that specification... it's describing something like cleaning troughs. Attaining that goal doesn't even require goal oriented behaviors; rather, goal oriented behaviors involve orienting behaviors towards those types of goals. So take cleaning troughs as an example... that involves manipulating the state not of a robot, or an output device, but a trough:
...mere programs without mechanical parts are not going to clean troughs.
...not the right type of goal, and not the right type of behavior. If May and Joe play chess in the park, May, too, may lead with E4. But May plays this move by carrying out a series of voluntary actions that manipulate a physical chess piece... that white king's pawn... such that it moves to a specified location... the E4 square. That manipulation of the world states is the voluntary behavior that May is exhibiting; that is the thing that requires May to invoke a series of voluntary actions... you know, moving the arm with intention as opposed to having tics or seizures. E4 is just abstract shorthand for this concrete behavior. Note that May neither is a white king's pawn, nor has a white king's pawn; the state of the board after May's play is not a state of May; it is a state of something in the world that isn't May.
As for the other topic, let's take this side track. First this tiny bit:
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
...you're confusing "conflict with" with "contradict". Now let's take a bigger side track, much more important:
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Your epistemic approach is all messed up here. The burden you place on having your beliefs is virtually non-existent; and the burden you place on discarding them is not only too high, but you're placing that burden on me. It's not my job to fix your false beliefs; you're the one who has them. Mine is just to fix my own false beliefs.
You're applying debate semantics here... that's quite popular but it's a fool's errand. Debates are worse than useless... they are counter-productive to truth. In a debate, two sides go in with an opinion, two sides go out with the same opinion they went in with, both sides think they won, and both sides delude themselves into becoming more confident because they "won". Opinions are the real problem; everyone has opinions, and people disagree with each other, so trivially a lot of those opinions are wrong. You are a person, therefore, it's reasonable to suspect you have a lot of false opinions yourself. But your epistemic approach is one that favors clinging to whatever false opinions you have for as long as you possibly can, which is the exact opposite strategy you should have if you want to believe in as few false things as possible. You want to get rid of your own false opinions... the lower the amount of time between your forming a false opinion and your rejecting it, the better. To do this, you should be looking honestly for all of the ways in which your opinions might be wrong, not could still be true. To summarize, debating is a bad epistemic approach... what you want to do on these forums, instead, is discuss. When you do debate, however, know fully well that it's just a game.
I'm not even interested in "proving you wrong". My beef with you is that you're confusing your opinions with logic.
Quoting Samuel LacrampeDerek.
Don't take Derek too seriously here; there are more than two intepretations, and the FTL one doesn't even have that much representation among physicists. The random view is one of the mainstream ones; the others are are quantum logic (QL) and many worlds (MW), neither of which mesh well with your confuse-your-intuitions-with-logic approaches.
MW, however, does grant determinism; not only that, it has locality. And it might be true. But to think it's true because you developed an opinion that it "has to be" is still wrong... it might be false, after all. And you don't want to believe false things.
So volition is goal oriented behaviour with acts in the world. So far so good?
And a wind-up doll, who is a simple program (ie wind-up system) with mechanical parts, does not have volition.
And a robot, who is a more complex program with mechanical parts, has volition.
And so would you say the critical part to volition is complex programming?
Quoting InPitzotl
Debates are formal discussions in which arguments are put forward; and the function of (sincere) arguments is to find truth; therefore debates lead to truth. All the discussions in this forum are debates, minus the formality part.
Quoting InPitzotl
That's precisely the type of problems that rules such as "Fulfilling the Onus of Proof" aim to resolve. Both sides cannot "win" if one side has not fulfilled the onus of proof when it applies to them.
Quoting InPitzotl
Which part in the summary is nothing but an arbitrary opinion?
Quoting InPitzotl
Ok, so if I understand correctly, your intent of bringing up the video was neither to attack or defend the points made in the summary, but only to show that it was related; is that right?
No, the critical part is not how complex the programming is... the critical part is having the right kind of system. That system involves a continuous monitoring of world states by developing world models based on sensory inputs, a representation of a goal state in terms of the world model, and the use of said world model (and action models) to guide the robot towards the manipulation of the world states in accordance with said goal. This in place, there's a causal correlation between world states and the state of the world model, and another causal correlation between modeled goal states and the counterfactual world states that would represent attainment of the goal. Likewise, there's a world model for the robot's actions and a corresponding world in which the robot is actually acting. So the system here isn't just the computer in the robot... it is the robot interacting with the world in this type of way. By the way, we, too, interact with the world... continuously. That is what makes us agents. We also initiate voluntary actions of precisely this sort. We do a lot more things as well... the robot simply reflects the simplest level that can be meaningfully called intention.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Well let's sanity check this idea. You're talking about free will, mechanics, and the existence of the soul. Your position is that by debating this you're going to find truth. People have been debating this for over two millennia... did they find the truth? What are you doing different than them?
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Well, let's start by how you qualify that very question. We went from "opinion" to "nothing but an arbitrary opinion". So let me offer you another opinion (I'll fake it, because I don't really have one on this)... Banno is correct (<- do you see why I even started this line now?); experiment supports that the universe is indeed random. If we add the evidence-supported premise that the universe is random to your summary, we get a contradiction. Having a contradiction implies that one of the premises is wrong. My opinion is that premise (5) is wrong. Having gone through this, let me turn this question back to you. Which part of that rebuttal is nothing but and arbitrary opinion?
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
It was to get your opinion on Bell's Theorem, which is obviously related. FTL is incredibly whacky, by the way. MW, though it is deterministic and local, is a lot more counterintuitive to most people than randomness. And that is what I think your (5) premise really is... it's not logic, it's just your intuition.
Quoting InPitzotl
He who's arguments have not been refuted is the closest to knowing the truth. That is in fact the entire purpose of sincere arguments. If the pro-souls debaters over the millennia were not refuted and their opponents were, then the pro-souls were indeed closer to knowing the truth (and vice versa of course). But don't worry too much about other people, as truth is not found by consensus. What matters is whether my summary argument can be refuted or not.
Quoting InPitzotl
I don't see one. You started with an opinion, namely that Banno is right (about not all physical things being determined), and defended it with a reason. That's good. This is by the way the definition of an argument: a position (or opinion) defended by a reason.
Quoting InPitzotl
I feel we are finally having a productive debate. So then, what do you say is wrong with premise (5)? That the PoSR disallows for randomness, or that the PoSR is simply not true?
Exactly.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Wrong. There are invalid arguments for true things and irrefutable arguments for false things. To know a truth requires aligning your beliefs according to those things that would make it true. So if you want to get close to knowing truth, what's critical is not whether or not you have won arguments or how many you have won... those things are weak indicators at best. Rather, what's critical is what things justify your belief and whether or not they are affected by the veracity of the thing.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Okay, good. But you do realize that both you and Banno cannot be correct, right? But both of your views are not "nothing but abritrary opinions".
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Oh I hope not; that would be the most unproductive thing I can think of. You might feel it makes progress towards truth but that's illusory.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Neither of those are particularly problematic. What's problematic is this:
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Put it this way. Banno's view is logically consistent, and supported by evidence, legitimately. It may or may not in the final analysis be correct, but it's certainly not fallacious.
A lesser problem with your use of PoSR isn't that it suggests determinism, but that it allows for free will, which specifically in this context means libertarian free will. LFW of the sort you discuss necessitates the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP). Given I choose A among options A and B out of LFW, PAP demands B is possible. PoSR demands there be a sufficient reason for A, suggesting B is not possible, because A both happened for that sufficient reason and that reason was sufficient for A to happen.
An even lesser more sophisticated possible objection, should you find some way to justify PoSR free will, would be that your list of determinism, randomness, and free will may not be exhaustive.
Yes but you wouldn't be closer to knowing the truth; where knowledge means "justified true belief".
Quoting InPitzotl
How would you know this if the arguments cannot be refuted? :wink:
More seriously though, an "irrefutable argument" is also called a "proof", which gives truth with certainty.
Quoting InPitzotl
Right; justified true belief. But what do you mean by "justified", if not that the position is defended by a valid reason? Because this is also the definition of a valid argument.
Quoting InPitzotl
I would not be arguing if I thought both our views were compatible. And so if contradicting, then one (or both) of us must have made an error: Inasmuch as math does not contradict math, reason does not contradict reason.
Quoting InPitzotl
It is not logically consistent if it contradicts a law of logic that is the PoSR.
Quoting InPitzotl
Both options A and B are possible, AND there is a sufficient reason for choosing A over B: free will. Where do you see a contradiction?
Quoting InPitzotl
It is. Due to the Law of Excluded Middle: Either p or not-p is true.
Either "Cause A always gives Effect B" (Determinism) or "Cause A does not always give Effect B".
And if the latter, it is either because there exists in Cause A the power to choose the effect (ie Free Will), or there does not (ie Randomness).
Closer when? By what metric? What is it you imagine is happening? You advance an invalid argument for some true thing S. Your opponent refutes your argument. Then... what?
Let me propose something to you, because you sound horribly confused. At the time that I type this, there is a plastic cup sitting on my desk to the right of my mouse pad. That cup is either a red cup or it is a blue cup, and it is not both. Now consider what you would need to do to get to the truth of the question: "What color is that cup?"
What I'm hearing you propose is that one person forms an opinion of the cup, then finds an opponent. The two debate. The guy whose opinion that the cup is red puts a burden on his opposition to disprove his opinion for him. They keep going until one proves the other wrong. The one not proven wrong has not been refuted, and therefore, must be correct. To me, this sounds horribly misguided and ridiculous... the entire exercise. Even forming the original opinion is ridiculous. Having formed one, finding an opponent with an opposing opinion before you change yours, is ridiculous. Having found them, placing the burden on them to prove you wrong, is ridiculous. Having "exposed" the flaw in their argument, using that as confirmation of your opinion, is ridiculous. The entire thing, end to end, is a bunch of nonsense... but this is what you're proposing as how we get to truth. There is no part here that has anything to do with the color the cup.
The only way to figure out the color of the cup is to do something relevant... something that involves forming a belief about the cup's color based on what that cup's color actually is. You know, like looking at it? And yes, you might debate after that with nimwits who form random opinions, but your confidence only comes from that relevance.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
No, an irrefutable argument is simply one that cannot be refuted. A proof establishes an argument is valid. Valid arguments do not entail truth; sound arguments do.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Because I can construct contradictory arguments that are irrefutable.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
No, this is an amphiboly. "Valid reason" is just a reason recognized as relevant. "Valid argument" is a term of art referring to an argument that follows from its premises. Besides, you're not proposing the use of justification to get to truth... you're proposing debating. I could just mix these two chemicals and see what happens, but no, I have to form an opinion of it, find an opponent, and tell my opponent that he has to prove my opinion is wrong.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Why? Both arguments can be valid. At most one can be sound.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
You're begging the question. PoSR is unnecessary to presume for logic. It is a premise.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
The term sufficient has a meaning. To say that X is a sufficient reason for A is to say that if X is present, A manifests. To say that A has a sufficient reason is to say that A manifests for some reason X such that if X is present it will manifest. If A manifesting excludes B, as in this case, and A manifests for reason X, and X is sufficient for A, then B is impossible. That's simply what that word sufficient means... that is the S in PoSR.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
"Cause A does not always give Effect B" is bordering on gibberish; importing causality where it doesn't belong. Technically we can have a cause leading to random effects, but I don't think that is what you mean here. If you talk about states and evolution it becomes more coherent... (1) State A always evolves to State B, or (2) State A does not always evolve to State B (still clumsy; what's meant is that it doesn't always evolve to the same state, but it'll do). So let's focus on scenario 2. Random roughly means unpredictable. So if we have randomness, it's something like (2a) State A leads to an unpredictable state in the set States B where B has cardinality of at least 2. Without appealing to free will just yet, how about... (2b) State A leads to predictable states in the set States B where B has cardinality of at least 2. (2c) State A leads to semi-predictable states in the set States B where B has cardinality of at least 2. In fact, free will actually involves something like (2c), with an agent. But somehow you want 2c to only count as a possibility if it has an agent. Recall the discussion we had with the photon being an original cause? Well, it sounds to me like you're not just failing to exhaust the possibilities, but that you're intentionally constraining them.
Knowledge is "justified true belief", where "justified" means you have sound argument for why it is true. If you believe something that is true for the wrong reasons, then you have not acquired any knowledge.
Quoting InPitzotl
Relax. I said the purpose of debates is to find truth. I did not say it was the only way to find truth. Of course your method of looking at the cup is a sufficient way... At least to make your opinion the Prima Facie, and thus the burden of proof is shifted to the other side. Here's what I mean:
You claim the cup is red because it looks red to you (this is an argument by the way: position defended by a reason). But I claim it is in fact white, and the reason you see it red is because you are wearing glasses with red lenses, and once you remove them, you will see the cup as white. You then remove the glasses, and indeed you now see the cup as white. I have refuted your original argument, and the Prima Facie has shifted to the other side. This was a debate, and we got closer to knowing the truth.
Quoting InPitzotl
I would have said that a proof needs to be sound, not just valid. But fine; minor disagreement.
Quoting InPitzotl
Can you give an example? I claim it is not possible.
Quoting InPitzotl
Sure. I meant sound then.
Quoting InPitzotl
I personally believe it is a law of logic, but for the sake of argument, let's suppose it is merely a premise. Okay, but it is a premise we have accepted as true. So if Banno's demonstration contradicts a true premise, then there is an error.
Quoting InPitzotl
Why do you say "A manifesting excludes B"? B can still manifest later.
Are you perhaps conflating the terms "impossible" with "not actual"? E.g. Both options A and B are possible. Before I choose, A and B are non-actual (or in potential). Once I choose A, A becomes actual (what you call manifest), and B remains non-actual, but still possible.
Quoting InPitzotl
Sorry, I just don't understand what you are saying in this whole section. I don't get your states 2b and 2c. Additionally, random is not equal to unpredictable. Things could be fully determined, and yet remain unpredictable if we cannot observe the cause. But as you originally said this was only a minor objection, maybe we can just drop it?
Justified means you have good reason to think a thing is true; having a justified belief doesn't guarantee truth. That's why we talk about knowledge as JTB's instead of just JB's.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
You can debate all you like. That's not going to tell you what color that cup was.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
...and here is what I mean. Going to simple quotes mode (with italics added for clarity):
"You claim the cup is red" ...I never did that, so the whole thing is moot. But let's continue, as a hypothetical: "But I claim it is in fact white" ...why? Did you just guess? "the reason you see it red is because you are wearing glasses with red lenses ..." ...how did you know, did you even know? "You then remove the glasses" ...how come I was so dense I didn't realize I was wearing them? "indeed you now see the cup as white" ...lots of problems so far, but when I look at the cup and see its color is white, that would give me justifiable reason for believing it's white. "I have refuted your original argument" ...unless you knew, you didn't refute it... you were just insanely lucky... so lucky that we cannot possibly take this into consideration in our how-to-obtain-truth toolkit. And if you knew, you didn't come to this conclusion because you formed an opinion, or debated it; you came to this conclusion because you were justified... because you formed a belief in such a way that the actual truth of the claim affected what you believed. Now backing out of hypothetical-land, there was a real, not hypothetical, cup to the right of my mouse pad. Think of a way to find out what color it was.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
This is what you did say:
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
...I cannot see ever having such a proof. But I can easily see two people arguing with neither being capable of establishing soundness. And that's the real problem here:
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
But that doesn't mean it is true; only that we're treating it as if it were true for some purpose.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Banno was questioning the premise. The only "error" here is that he did not as you requested accept the premise.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
B here is the alternate possibility you require; it is literally the AP in PAP. B "manifesting later" would require a choice later, which would be a different choice.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
No. Since you apply PoSR to rule out randomness, let's presume that manifestation in this case is due to causality, and talk in those terms. If A happens at T2 (i.e., happens at all), then PoSR demands that A happens for a sufficient reason X. If X is a cause, that means (a) X caused A (the reason part), and (b) A must arise from X (the sufficient part). Since A must arise from X (due to sufficiency), and B is an alternative (supposed to be an alternate possibility), then B is not possible. I did not use PAP to come to the conclusion that B was not possible, nor did I presume that A happening means B isn't possible. I derived that B wasn't possible by applying PoSR. It's the sufficiency of the reason demanded to exist by PoSR that makes B impossible. PoSR itself suggests it's impossible. As I originally stated, the definition of PoSR is almost the definition of determinism from the get go; if you interpret PoSR in a causality sense, it is the definition of determinism.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Your possibility 1 was that A always leads to B; that is predictable, but it is always the same for state A. 2b is just predictable, but not the same. 2c is sometimes predictable, sometimes not. 2c isn't really that different than how you think of free will, except that you imagine that itself as a mechanic that comes whole cloth with a conscious entity.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
If you like, but shouldn't you be interested in all of the ways in which your assumptions can be wrong?
But how else can you determine if a thing is true, other than by using justification or reasoning?
Quoting InPitzotl
You look at it, and based on the color you perceive, you conclude it is reasonable to believe the cup is the color you perceived, until given a reason to believe otherwise.
Quoting InPitzotl
But if you and I both accepted the PoSR premise as true, then both you and I must conclude Banno made an error by contradicting the PoSR. We must accept the consequences of our assumptions.
Quoting InPitzotl
But B was possible before the choice was made. As so:
At time T1, both A and B are possible choices. At time T2, we make a choice which causes A to manifest, and not B. If free will necessitates choices, then it can exist during T1. And this makes sense: we choose to act before we act.
Quoting InPitzotl
I just don't think we are going to make progress on this one. I don't understand why we need to add the property of predictability, and how 2b can be always predictable even though cause A may lead to different effects, and in 2c, how a thing can be sometimes predictable and sometimes not. If a thing is not always predictable, then it must be unpredictable.
I'm not proposing that there's another method. I'm just highlighting that being justified does not imply being correct.
Yes, that would work, if you could do that.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Nope; it's always possible our acceptance of PoSR is in error. What is its justification?
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
But that doesn't help; you're explaining the wrong thing. This is just an account of LFW; as such, there's no problem there. Your choice causes A to happen, but it didn't have to cause A; it could have caused B. But the problem isn't to make sense of LFW; the problem is to explain its compatibility with PoSR. This type of cause is not a sufficient reason. A sufficient reason for A must cause A; it cannot cause B (where B is an alternate). Choice of the nature you specify is incompatible with PoSR.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
...the need is simple; you're making an argument where you enumerate possibilities, rule some out, and have the rest "by default". You can't do this properly if your enumeration is incomplete.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Semi-predictable is perfectly coherent, even useful; it's why your smart phone has a weather app on it.
So it looks like you are changing the position you took here where you said you saw no problem with the PoSR.
Anyways, the PoSR is a self-evident principle, because asking for a justification is asking for a sufficient reason for it, which begs the question. This is similar to asking for a justification for the Law of Non-Contradiction.
Quoting InPitzotl
Why can't free will have sufficient power to cause A if it chooses A, and cause B if it chooses B?
Quoting InPitzotl
Sure, but as previously stated, as both determined and undetermined things can be both predictable and unpredictable, then I don't see the point of adding the "predictable" property to the list.
Quoting InPitzotl
Okay. So semi-predictability is like probability. Note that most systems that have a probable outcome are fully determined. The lack of full predictability does not come from random effects, but from our lack of knowledge of all the causes.
There's no change in my position; I think you may have misinterpreted something. Doubly so, because if you assume I would never question my own opinions, then you must have forgotten what I was doing when I first questioned your epistemic approach. It sounds like you're doubling down on being grandiose; so I'll quadruple down on anyone being susceptible to error; that applies just as well to you as it does to me. I kind of beat you to the punch, though, by being slow to opinion in the first place.
I've no opinions on PoSR. My opinions are about people who make opinions without justification. Speaking of which:
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
You make it sound like the only way to justify PoSR is to use PoSR. If that's the only reason you think it's justified, then it is begging the question. But calling that self-evident because it begs the question is literally rationalizing away begging the question.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Not even close. If you start with traditional logic and deny the law of non-contradiction, you wind up with the principle of explosion; given PoE, you can prove 2=5 (though PoE could be avoided by using paraconsistent logics). If you deny PoSR, you simply wind up with not everything having a reason; you don't wind up with the PoE. These two things are not the same.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
It's very simple. If your free will could lead to either then it's not a sufficient reason for either. Again, that's just what that word "sufficient" means. You're trying some weird convoluted way to promote "reason" to "sufficient reason" with some if it's this it's sufficient if it's that it's sufficient, but that's just meaningless word play. Sufficient is sufficient is sufficient. If alternate things can happen, it's not sufficient.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Not really. Probability is but one form of semi-predictability. Probability that changes over time is another. Of the latter, you can have probabilities that change unpredictably with stability of some sort (such as locally; like the weather), or probabilities that change based on particular circumstances (such as the sudden jump from completely unpredictable to absolutely known that occurs when you measure properties of one of a set of entangled particles in QM).
Position, opinion; same things. I am not saying it is a bad thing to change it. I just wanted to clarify this is what happened, so that I understand your new points.
Quoting InPitzotl
Not if there is no other way to justify it. A claim is self-evident if (1) it cannot be evidenced (i.e. justified) by anything else, and (2) if everyone believes it to be true by default (to remove the possibility of its opposite also being self-evident). Now can you think of a way to justify the PoSR without begging the question?
Quoting InPitzotl
So what? Why should we not believe in the PoE or that 2=5, if not because it violates the law of non-contradiction?
Quoting InPitzotl
This is not how I interpret sufficiency. E.g. Observing that a floor can support a 10 kg weight is sufficient to conclude that it can support 10 kg or less; but it could also support more. But maybe you can give me an example of what you mean by efficiency?
So, let me clarify. You're going with: "'X is self evident because it begs the question' does not beg the question if I cannot justify X"?
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
(1) is a red herring; not being evidenced in no way suggests self-evident. (2) is an appeal to popularity.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Me? Absolutely! It would go something like this. QM is well evidenced. A popular theory that grants indeterminism, on analysis, really only becomes indeterministic per application of the BR. But said application is strange. When Schrodinger has his cat in a box, per this story, we're supposed to use a particular rule to describe the box contents... the cat is in superposition. But when Schrodinger opens the box, we use a different rule... the box's wavefunction collapsed. That seems wrong... introduce Everett. Let's say we put Schrodinger and his cat-box in a bigger box now, shut the lid, and have Everett describe this system. How is he supposed to describe it? According to the rules he should describe it the same way Schrodinger describes the cat in the box contents... Schrodinger is in superposition. But Schrodinger, inside this box, describes the same thing differently... well, sort of. There's a portion of the wavefunction where Schrodinger describes seeing the live cat, and another where he describes seeing the dead cat, and these two are in superposition. But each of these reports a collapse of the wavefunction. So is something really collapsing? BR seems redundant and unreal; it introduced bigger issues. So let's just toss it out; instead of thinking that us "Everett's" are part of "the world", imagine we're just parts of a bigger universal wavefunction. Now SE is all that really happens; the rest is just what that wave function looks like to Schrodinger, and to Everett. Given that only the SE is real, since there's no indeterminism in the SE, the universe must be deterministic. Maybe there's a deeper principle like this, where everything happens for a reason.
This is an example justification of PoSR. I don't think it helps you.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
You're responding to the so what.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
What use would that have? By contrast, embracing LNC and denying PoSR would have the use:
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
...of modeling the randomness possibility. I've asked this as a question, now I'll rephrase this. You should be interested in all of the possible ways you can be wrong. It is suspicious for you to propose to be interested in truth but not be interested in such things.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
That's not a problem but it doesn't help you. A floor that can support 20kg ipso facto can support 10kg; these two things are not alternates, they are counterfactuals. Note that both can be true for the same floor at the same time, regardless of whether there's a 20kg weight on it, a 10kg weight on it, or neither. But a man who poaches an egg cannot scramble that egg and vice versa. So if this man does poach an egg, but "could have" scrambled it, it's not true that the egg was scrambled. Those are alternates. If that man's free will does lead to poaching the egg, but could have led to scrambling it, then we can't say the man's free will is sufficient to poach the egg. (Unless you want free will possibilities that are counterfactual; but such being consistent with determinism, that implies compatibilist free will, which stops dead steps before your soul conclusoin).
From implication, if P=>Q, then P is sufficient for Q. That means that if P holds, Q absolutely must hold. So P is sufficient for Q. By contrast, Q is not sufficient for P (though we can say it's necessary; if Q doesn't hold, P cannot hold). To use your example with counterfactuals, if the floor can hold 10kg then it can hold 5kg. If it cannot hold 10kg, it cannot hold 20kg. So for it to be able to hold 20kg, it has to be able to hold 10kg; but it still can be true that it can hold 10kg and not hold 20kg. So the fact that it can hold 10kg is necessary for the fact that it can hold 20kg to be true (same reason as in implication; were it not to support 10kg, it cannot support 20kg), but is not sufficient (same reason as in implication; that it can hold 10kg does not imply that it can hold 20kg). Again, back to alternates, if a man's free will is a sufficient cause for the egg to be poached, that egg will get poached; it's impossible for it to be scrambled, because "free will is sufficient" is like saying "free will => egg is poached". And if that's the case, the egg cannot be scrambled, which conflicts with the possibility of the alternate.
I don't understand your statement; can you rephrase it another way? Otherwise if it helps, begging the question to defend a claim does not entail that the claim is false. It actually means the claim is not a self-contradiction, which is a good thing.
Quoting InPitzotl
(1) The term "self-evident" literally means "evidenced by itself". You don't see it? Similar to how the term "Triangle" has the words "tri" (three) and "angle" in it.
(2) When a claim cannot be evidenced any other way, then the appeal to popularity is sufficient to tip the scale in its favour. We could also use a reductio ad absurdum too instead.
Quoting InPitzotl
Your lengthy paragraph seems to be an attempt at giving an adequate reason to justify the PoSR. Now if that reason is inadequate, then it fails to justify the claim; and if it is adequate (or in other words sufficient), then it presupposes the PoSR, that is, it begs the question.
Quoting InPitzotl
To claim that the alternative to the LNC has no use that you see, does not prove the LNC to be true.
Quoting InPitzotl
I am. You just haven't shown how I was wrong yet, since we are still arguing about the PoSR. Of course, I trust your comment applies to you too.
Quoting InPitzotl
Sure; but so what? Free will means that before the choice is made, there are numerous possibilities, like poaching and scrambling. As you wrote, before choosing to poach an egg, the man "could have" scrambled it.
Follow the quotes back.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Self evident means something that does not need to be demonstrated.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
I see a perfectly rational way to deny PoSR.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
While I can appreciate the meta-ness of argumentum ad populum defenses of argumentum ad populum, it does nothing for me. The popular opinion was wrong in the past... there's no reason to believe it has any unique access to truth. "If a million people believe a foolish thing, it is still a foolish thing." Ambrose Bierce.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Who said anything about adequate, except for you just now?
I'm perfectly okay with that. So it's inadequate. But it's a justification.
I apparently have to remind you again; I have no particular opinions on PoSR, except that you're flat wrong about it not needing justification.
Might I remind you... justification does not entail truth. Justifications aren't proof; they're just good reasons to think something is true.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
But you're the one bringing up proving that LNC is true, not me. For me, it's enough that it's useful. Paraconsistent logics may also be useful. A system with PoE isn't "bad" because it lacks LNC; it's "bad" because everything is both true and false, which suggests that truth and falsity have no meaning. That's good enough for me; if it's not good enough for you, fine. Demonstrate a (non-vacuous) use for a system with PoE in play.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
But you're not. You just changed "possibly wrong" to "shown how I was wrong". Those are entirely different things.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Ways you have established that I can be wrong, so far:
(a) Denying PoSR is not logically consistent (with a system in which you presume PoSR)
(b) You personally believe PoSR is a law of logic
(c) If we assume PoSR and someone else doesn't, they made an error
(d) PoSR is self-evident because asking for a justification for it begs the question
Regarding (a), that's not compelling because it begs the question. (b) is testimonial. (c) presumes personal inerrancy. (d) one need not appeal to PoSR to justify it, and even if one did that does not suggest it needs no justification. Also, it's possible PoSR is wrong (in the case of random mechanics), therefore, it's not necessarily true that it's correct. Since it's not necessarily true, that it holds requires justification. IOW, all of your claims of PoSR being self evident are trivially refuted by the mere possibility of considering random mechanics.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Free will being a sufficient reason for any of those possibilities means that's the only possibility. Go back to randomness... if a collapsing wave function (CWF) causes the photon to go left, as a result of Born Rule application which specifies a 50% probability of doing so, it still factually goes left. I might incorrectly say, if it goes left, then the CWF was a sufficient reason for it to go left; but if it goes right, then the CWF was a sufficient reason for it to go right. That would be incorrect because it would be a redefinition of sufficiency to the degree that it becomes meaningless. But under such redefinitions, randomness would follow PoSR. See how that works?
Again, it's really, really simple. It boils down to a single question... how many things can your free will decision possibly result in? If you say one, it's a sufficient reason for that thing, but you can't prove we have a soul. If you say more than one, it's not a sufficient reason for whatever happens, and you can't say it follows PoSR. That should be enough, but I understand why it's not. It's inconvenient for you.
But everything needs to be demonstrated ... as per that one principle called PoSR :joke:.
But if you are serious with that claim, then how do we determine what needs and does not need to be demonstrated?
Quoting InPitzotl
A justification is defined as "showing a claim to be right" (source). So it cannot be inadequate.
Quoting InPitzotl
True, but I see no better way to pick one first principle (or axiom) vs its opposite. E.g. some people may not believe in the LNC, and be very consistent in their beliefs (ie they contradict themselves), and I see no way to refute them other than to show it's a very unpopular belief.
Quoting InPitzotl
I have provided a justification for the PoSR, namely, that it is a self-evident principle.
Also, you are appealing to the PoSR for demanding a reason to justify it. From this link, "The principle of sufficient reason states that everything must have a reason or a cause."
Quoting InPitzotl
Recall that you denied that "the LNC is self-evident because it cannot be evidenced by anything else", by attempting to justify it in another way. Since this has not been accomplished, my position on the matter stands, namely that the LNC is self-evident, in a similar manner as it is for the PoSR.
Quoting InPitzotl
You may give it a try. Just remember that "The principle of sufficient reason states that everything must have a reason or a cause", and to justify is to give a good reason.
Quoting InPitzotl
What is this random mechanics, and what's your justification to claim it exists?
Quoting InPitzotl
As per underlined, why is that the case? I suspect you have a wrong grasp of the term "sufficiency". Just because A is sufficient to cause B, it does not follow that A will necessarily cause B every time.
No, that was a correction, not a claim. I responded to your definition of self-evident, which was based on armchair lexicography (some misguided "definition-by-literal" theory you invented), with the accepted definition. By the way, atom literally means indivisible; awful literally means full of awe; pompous literally means having magnificence.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
At least you're using a dictionary now, but you're over-interpreting "show". Also a dictionary isn't a great source for this (dictionaries document how words are commonly used; we're discussing terms in philosophy, which isn't a lay subject... though I could defend my definition this way anyway). What you need is a philosophy based reference that discusses this particular usage, like IEP:
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
No method is better than a bad one.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Might I suggest it more rational to give up your view that winning debates is a metric of truth than it is to embrace logical fallacies as a method of winning debates?
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
I don't recall that because it never happened. First off, begging the question isn't wrong on the condition that I provide an alternative ("by attempting"...); it's wrong on the face of it. To say "LNC is self evident because it cannot be evidenced by anything else" is to say "X is self evident when X cannot be evidenced by anything else", and if that were true for X=LNC, it would have to be true for X=an invisible massless cow is eating invisible massless grass in the middle of the sun. Second, I didn't justify the LNC being "true"; in fact, I explicitly pointed out a case where it wasn't "true" (paraconsistent logic). Third, it's not my rule that I should be able to prove things are self-evident; it's your rule. My rule is simply that things aren't self evident just because you wish them up to be by committing logical fallacies out of desperation to win arguments against hypothetical deniers. But I do have an applicable rule; one I've mentioned before. Any referential claim (by which I mean something about the properties of or behaviors of an object to which you refer) requires justification (i.e., the don't-tell-God-what-to-do principle). PoSR falls into this camp.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
By that criteria, both LNC and PoSR are not self-evident, because you commit three logical fallacies when debating a hypothetical denier of both. Your logical fallacies are invalid defenses of these things being self-evident, since they are, well, logical fallacies. So since you failed to refute the denier's position, the denier's position stands...namely, that neither LNC nor PoSR are self-evident. Not quite a checkmate, but definitely a stalemate. I mentioned this before, too; debates cannot be criteria for truth because I can easily construct conflicting irrefutable arguments. Only here, you actually provided the conflicting irrefutable argument (well, mostly; I just tweaked it slightly).
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
That's the wrong question, with the wrong burden. Random mechanics involves a process whereby an event happens as a stochastic selection among a set of possibilities, such as by application of the Born Rule. Your claim is that PoSR is logically self-evident. Logic implies necessity. If random mechanics were possible, that would suffice to refute necessity. Random mechanics is possible. Therefore PoSR isn't necessarily true. O/c, this is insufficient to disprove PoSR; PoSR still could be true. It's just that, if it is true, it's contingently true.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
By definition of sufficiency.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Then you're wasting your words... "proof by suspicion" is not valid.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
If A can cause B, but B doesn't always happen, then in those cases where B does in fact happen, A is (maybe) a reason for B. For example, if a car swerves into my path while I'm driving, and as a result we have an accident, then the car swerving into my path is a reason for the accident. But cars swerving into my path don't necessarily cause accidents every time; I may see the car swerving and swerve to avoid it. But because it doesn't necessarily cause accidents every time, that reason is not sufficient to cause an accident. That's what you have here... A that causes B, but only sometimes. Such, given B, can be a reason for B, but cannot be a sufficient reason, because B doesn't always follow.
You are using the common use definition as opposed to the philosophical definition. Better reference is here. But this doesn't matter. Let's use the term "First Principle" or "Axiom" if it makes things clearer.
This does not invalidate my point that justification means "showing a claim to be right". Before Einstein, that belief was justified because Newton's demonstrations were believed to be right. Once Newton's demonstrations were no longer believed to be right after Einstein, then we would no longer have a justification for them. To loop back, you cannot have an "inadequate justification".
Quoting InPitzotl
The method is not "bad" but "weak-yet-valid". In a situation where we cannot remain agnostic, then it is more reasonable to side with the popular belief than against it. So a weak-yet-valid method is better than no method.
Quoting InPitzotl
I give you an equally non-rational and rhetorical response: I suspect you deny the PoSR, and the effectiveness of debates, and the criteria for first principles because believing in the soul is an inconvenience. :halo:
Quoting InPitzotl
You forget that "self-evidence" (or first principle if you will) has 2 criteria. (1) cannot be evidenced by anything else, and (2) is the popular belief, or its opposite is absurd. You are missing criteria (2).
Quoting InPitzotl
Your argument is valid IF paraconsistent logic is true, that is, we observe that some objects behave in a way that does not follow classical logic but paraconsistent logic. Otherwise, this paraconsistent logic is merely a thought experiment.
Quoting InPitzotl
It is indeed my position, that I have defended with an argument, and it stands until the argument is refuted.
Quoting InPitzotl
Is this different from the PoSR?
Quoting InPitzotl
What three logical fallacies?
Quoting InPitzotl
Why do you claim random mechanics is possible?
Quoting InPitzotl
Do you not see yourself appealing to the PoSR every time we enquire about what is true?
Quoting InPitzotl
Are you perhaps conflating the terms "sufficient" with "necessary"? Otherwise, what is the difference between the two terms for you?
Nice try, but the definition I use aligns well with the definition given by your source, and poorly with your linked to "common" definition. And your definition-by-literal definition doesn't seem to fit at all.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Not much of a difference; axioms (in philosophy) are statements presumed to be self-evident.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
It invalidates this point:
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
But Newton's equations weren't "true"; they were just close. So Newtonian physics wasn't "sound", it was just justified. But the beliefs weren't justified because the demonstrations were believed (this isn't a chicken-and-egg game); they were believed because they were justified by being demonstrated.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Einstein predicted the location of a star in the famous 1919 eclipse. Once the eclipse happened the star was observed to be in the predicted spot. That justified belief in relativity.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
But that's superfluous, since all "adequate" means is enough to convince you. That one star observation was enough to convince a lot of people. Some people wanted more. To this day there's doubt that relativity is "true", since QM and GR haven't been melded together yet (and since in addition there are singularities).
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
To me that looks like an argument from ridicule with a tu quoque fallacy thrown in for good measure. That's quite a great distraction from, you know, actually defending the point in question... which, here, is, how is committing three fallacies to argue that a thing is self-evident going to help in your goal to convince the LNC denier that he shouldn't deny the LNC?
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Begging the question, appeal to personal incredulity ("I see no better way to..."), appeal to popularity.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Can you point to, or write, a philosophical paper that adequately justifies the belief that wavefunction collapse is unreal?
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
No, just dealing with question begging separately. The appeal to popularity doesn't help; miasma theory, phlogiston, vitalism, spontaneous generation, all were popularly believed. We know people spread urban legends, because we have inventories of them. Cult personalities and propaganda run rampant; group think is a thing, Milgram is a thing, Dunning-Kruger is a thing, cultural differences is a thing. The only situations where popular opinion is trustworthy are those in which you have some other justification (at a minimal, the specific situations in which you have good reason to believe the populace itself is justified); in such cases, you have a valid justification other than "everybody else thinks its true". Two wrongs just make two wrongs.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
In this "productive" debate, that tiny little phrase is actually rational. Begging the question, appeal to personal incredulity, and appeal to popularity are just as garbage as they ever were, and will always be as garbage as they always were. But reductio ad absurdum? That can actually be a valid argumentation technique. This is a glimmer of actual rationality that I welcome. Do you think you can attempt a reductio on PoSR (without meaninglessly just "opining" the absurdity)?
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
All humans are capable of reasoning about conflicting information without concluding that 2=5.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
If it's your position that you can prove self evident things, and it's your position that PoSR is self evident, then why all the fuss? Just prove PoSR, like I asked you to several posts before.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Because there's no inconsistency in a model including it. And since this is about reality, the most accurate authority of what reality is like is... reality itself. Instead of telling God what to do, you should just ask him what he's doing. So far, in the randomness camp, the ball could land either way... maybe it's MWI-like, maybe it's CI-with-BR-like.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
If inquiring about what is true is equivalent to appealing to the PoSR, then you should be able to drop the PoSR postulate and replace it with a simple inquiry about what is true. So, if you're serious, do that... and derive that wavefunction collapse is unreal.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
No; and you would know that if you knew what necessary and sufficient means (i.e., you're bluffing again). But, okay, let's do this. A is sufficient for B means that if you have A, you definitely have B. A is necessary for B means that in order to have B, you have to have A. These are related but not the same; you can have mere reasons, necessary reasons, sufficient reasons, and necessary and sufficient reasons. The car swerving was a reason for the crash (but not necessary; I could have a crash by running into a telephone pole... and not sufficient; I could swerve to avoid such a car). For Pat to be a bride, it is necessary that Pat is female (but not sufficient; simply being a female doesn't make you a bride). If you ate a bowl of cereal this morning, that's sufficient to say that you had breakfast this morning (but not necessary; eating pancakes this morning would also be having breakfast this morning). For a computer to be Turing Complete, it is both necessary and sufficient that it be capable of simulating a Turing machine (a computer that cannot simulate a Turing machine is never Turing Complete; a computer that can is always Turing Complete).
From the same link: "In informal speech, self-evident often merely means obvious, but the epistemological definition is more strict." And also "A logical argument for a self-evident conclusion would demonstrate only an ignorance of the purpose of persuasively arguing for the conclusion based on one or more premises that differ from it (see [...] begging the question)."
Quoting InPitzotl
It does not. We believe a claim was justified because we believe the argument was sound. One cannot say that a claim was justified even though the argument was not sound. Hopefully that helps with your Newton objection too.
Quoting InPitzotl
Inadequate in this context means "no rational error"; that is, the argument cannot be refuted given the currently available set of evidence. Note that it could be refuted at a later date, once further evidence is available. This is what happened with Newton and Einstein. Note also that a flawless argument can still fail to convince some people; but that doesn't make the justification itself "inadequate".
Quoting InPitzotl
We are definitely not on the same page; because my point is that not being able to prove the LNC is part of what makes the LNC self-evident.
Quoting InPitzotl
Begging the question: Showing that one cannot avoid begging the question to demonstrate self-evidence is not a fallacy.
"I see no better way ...": Do you see a better way to dismiss the opposite of a first principle like the LNC? If not, then it stands that my way is the best one available. No fallacies there either.
Appeal to popularity: See the explanation below regarding reductio ad absurdum.
Quoting InPitzotl
That's the problem. Your counter-examples fail to deal with criteria (1) and (2) at the same time. Dealing with criteria (1) or (2) separately is ... insufficient. :wink:
Quoting InPitzotl
You seem to fail to realize that a reductio ad absurdum is effective only when most of the population believes the alternative claim is absurd. In other words, reductio ad absurdum and appeal to popularity are both sides of the same coin.
Quoting InPitzotl
Sure thing; although note that it is not much different than my first attempt.
A claim is self-evident if (1) it cannot be evidenced by anything else, and (2) choosing the contradictory claim is absurd. PoSR: (1) To justify it is to provide a sufficient reason to believe in it. (2) Its contradictory (ie "not everything must have a reason or a cause") is absurd, because it invalidates the demand to justify any claims ever. E.g. the soul exists. Much shorter OP.
Quoting InPitzotl
If that's all you mean by paraconsistent logic, then it does not conflict with classical logic, and so we are done with this topic I suppose.
Quoting InPitzotl
Correction: I can prove claims to be self-evident, not self-evident claims to be true. By definition, self-evident claims cannot be proven.
Quoting InPitzotl
What kind of model do you speak of? A computer model? But generating truly random numbers from computers is not possible. A model in your mind? But none of your thoughts are random or uncaused. There is a difference between the perception of randomness (ie we lack information to predict an effect) and real randomness.
Quoting InPitzotl
Quoting InPitzotl
Are you saying that the wavefunction thing and the PoSR are incompatible? If so, I would just say that the wavefunction may be real, but that it has a cause, even if that cause may not be observable.
Quoting InPitzotl
I agree with you on the definitions of sufficient and necessary in logic. But I see 2 errors. First, as per the original link you sent, "This article is about the formal terminology in logic. For causal meanings of the terms, see Causality." and free will is about causality, not identity (logic). Second, if we must stretch the example to speak about cause and effect, then what causes you to eat cereals is the intent to have breakfast. So "intending to have breakfast" is the cause, and "eating cereals" is the effect. And like you said, the cause can also have the effect of "eating pancakes". So the PoSR does not remove the possibility of many options.
Side note: the posts are getting long. Good to consider dropping a few side topics to better focus on the main ones? We'll call it a draw on the topics we drop haha.
Sure, that's the "common" one... "it's obvious". But also, in the common one, it simply says the epistemological definition is more strict. So my definition was: "Self evident means something that does not need to be demonstrated.". And the "philosophical" one, from the link: "a self-evident proposition is a proposition that is known to be true by understanding its meaning without proof". And your definition-from-literal:
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
You're quibbling over some interpreted "strictness" of my definition, but mine still aligns with the philosophical one, and yours is still nowhere close.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
...okay, but that doesn't quite fit, because far from being ignorant of begging the question, you're literally embracing it. Your source seems to treat it as a bad thing. Also, you have this theory that debates lead to truth; so there must be something you can debate me with that would convince me.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
No, because we believe Newtonian mechanics was justified pre-Einstein, yet we don't believe it's sound. And belief that an argument is sound is not the same thing as an argument being sound.
IEP did.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Okay, let's go with that one then. In the current knowledge base of physics, best I understand, randomness cannot be refuted given the currently available set of evidence, nor can determinism be refuted given the currently available set of evidence. So neither conclusion is a rational error.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
And that's ridiculous. Not being able to prove massless cows are eating massless grass in the center of the sun doesn't make it self evident. You can't prove something is self evident by begging the question. And you can't prove it by begging the question and appealing to popularity.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
I agree. But using the fact that something begs the question to "prove" that something is self evident is a fallacy.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
No, that's not the problem. The problem is that you're using logical fallacies to justify that claims are self evident, not that I'm not using enough of them.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
The problem isn't that I "fail to realize" this; the problem is that it's flat out wrong and you're just making it up. Since when did reductio have to do with popular opinion? Wiki gives this example of a reductio:
...how is this even related to people's beliefs in smallest positive rationals?
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
As for (1), you're confusing justification with proof; I don't hold PoSR to be self evident; and you're trying to prove PoSR anyway. As for (2), nonsense; denial of PoSR does not require invalidating the demand to justify all claims. In fact, Quantum Indeterminism itself is even a thing because it can be justified. Real experiments show QM works. Born Inequalities provide a way to show the difference between application of BR according to QM and hidden variables. Real experiments bear BI out. Add some aesthetics, such as presumptions like that classical physics is real (by presuming that QM is just a calculation trick for example), and you get justified randomness.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
A conceptual model; a Copenhagen Interpretation of QM with WFC realism. It's conceivably possible WFC is real.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
How do you know? They could be. But even if they aren't, that's irrelevant. None of my thoughts grow leaves either, but I can think of trees. And even if my thoughts are all caused and non-random, I can think of the word "random". There are thoughts like Bell Inequalities, and thoughts like "let's find out"; as agents we can interact with the world and, say, perform experiments confirming Bell's Theorem. Ask God what he's doing.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
And?
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Yes; "real" WFC and PoSR are incompatible ("real" meaning a WFC theory that treats it as real rather than merely MWI or QD or something).
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Ironic... you're right on both fronts, but in being right you demonstrate you have no idea what you're talking about. Lucky you for being right. Wavefunction realism is what MWI posits. The wavefunction evolves according to the Schrodinger Equation, and that's completely deterministic. It's also, coincidentally, not observable. But that's not where quantum indeterminism comes in. Quantum indeterminism comes in when the Born Rule applies; the Born Rule is entirely stochastic in nature. The Born Rule results in a wave function collapse (WFC). Wave function collapses take the quantum wavefunction and bring them into a classical result, when it's observed. WFC realism would posit that the collapse is real... that pieces of the wavefunction actually disappear into classical measurements. That implies quantum indeterminacy, and that is incompatible with PoSR.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Funny, because you didn't show any error in what you typed. You just had two comments:
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
...so go to that link.
Incidentally, remember when you said this?:
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
...well, that link phrased it thusly:
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Doesn't matter. PoSR states that everything has a sufficient reason. That includes "eating breakfast", but it also includes "eating cereal for breakfast". Ignoring the latter is simply cherry picking; the rule, if it applies, applies to everything (because that's what the rule says it applies to). Besides, if we can just clump alternatives and ignore the specifics and that "counts", then PoSR doesn't rule out randomness, because Banno's photon went through "a slit".
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
But we're playing the debate game... isn't that what you wanted? After all, isn't that how truth is demonstrated... by spinning wheels trying to convince people your points don't need justified because by committing the right two fallacies you prove it's self evident?
If you want an alternative, we could just have a discussion about ways in which you could be wrong.
A physical , interlocked, universe of causation does not exist.
The Universe exists as an Idea in a greater mind than our own, a Universe of correlation that builds reality rather than causation building reality.
We are a sub-set of the greater mind given a degree of autonomy from it , by it. Its thoughts are the boundary of our lives so it can give us autonomy if it so wills.
I don't think Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle undermines determinism. What humans can or can't measure don't say much. Likewise with radioactive decay. It is a function in quantum spacetime but we measure it in physical spacetime. What is 'random' in physical space time does not need to be random at its source. It is very easy to create mathematical functions that generate seemingly random results where the input is perfectly ordered*. So these are not arguments against determinism. What human beings can determine or measure does not have any bearing on whether events are truly deterministic.
If the physical universe is deterministic and mind is non physical then mind can create a non deterministic event. Say a rock rolls down a hill. That, the determinists would argue, is purely deterministic. But if a person, with a mind, decides to put his foot out and stop the rock, that is not physical determinism. If mind/soul are non physical then non deterministic events can be possible.
*eg. X[sup]3[/sup] modulo p where p is prime and X = 1, 2, 3...
Here are the results for p = 43 with input 1, 2, 3...Input is regular but output is random.
The function calculates the remainder when X[sup]3[/sup] is divided by 43
1
8
27
21
39
1
42
39
41
11
41
8
4
35
21
11
11
27
22
2
But if a claim does not need to but can be demonstrated, then it means it could be demonstrated without begging the question, which the statement in the wiki disallows. Or leaving the wiki aside, we agreed we could also call a self-evident claim a "first principle". But we demonstrate a claim by appealing to a principle prior to that claim, which cannot exist for first principles, by definition.
Quoting InPitzotl
?? My point is the same as that of the wiki, namely that any attempt to demonstrate a self-evident claim to be true would be committing the fallacy of begging the question.
Quoting InPitzotl
It was justified. It no longer is. Similarly, we believed it was sound, we no longer do.
Quoting InPitzotl
But randomness and determinism are contradictory, aren't they? If so, then how can the currently available set of data lead to two contradictory conclusions?
Quoting InPitzotl
Why do you say the "massless cows" claim cannot be demonstrated true or false without begging the question? And why do you say the claim is popularly believed?
Quoting InPitzotl
Why is that a fallacy? Also I suspect you do not understand the statement in the Wiki link, because it supports my claim.
The Wiki states the reductio ad absurdum "attempts to establish a claim by showing that the opposite scenario would lead to absurdity or contradiction." Your example is an example of contradiction, not absurdity. Admittedly, I did not know we would also call it "reductio as absurdum" in that case. Anyways, back to the self-evident criteria, I mean it to say "absurd", not "contradiction". And "absurd" means "away from common sense".
Quoting InPitzotl
A proof is a justification that gives certainty. And I honestly don't understand the rest of your claim.
Quoting InPitzotl
You seem to appeal to the PoSR to support these theories, and then conclude that the PoSR is false. Is this not like sawing off the branch you are sitting on? I offer a better explanation that preserves the PoSR all the way through: these theories don't exclude the possibility of a non-physical cause.
Quoting InPitzotl
We can imagine the literal word "random" made of letters, we cannot imagine randomness; because we have never perceived randomness, and we cannot imagine something we have not perceived, inasmuch as a blind man born blind cannot imagine a colour. At best, we can imagine "unpredictability". Similarly, it is useful to talk about "infinity" in math, but we cannot imagine it.
Interesting. I did not know that was what "sufficient cause" means. Alright.
But... that is not what "sufficient" means in the PoSR. The PoSR states: "For every event E, if E occurs, then there is a sufficient explanation for why E occurs." This should be interpreted as "the cause has enough 'power' to produce the effect", or "an effect cannot be greater than its causes". For example, if a lightbulb is on, then there must exist a power source sufficiently large to light it up. That power source of course could also be used for other things.
You keep treating demonstrate/justify and logical proof as the same thing. All three are different things. You demonstrate something by just doing a thing and showing that a principle is working, for that one event. You justify something by giving a good reason to believe it. You prove something logically by applying logical axioms and/or theorems.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
We're not agreeing on what is self evident. But you're trying to prove something is self evident, and at the same time, trying to say that you cannot prove it.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
No it's not; you've confused yourself into thinking it's the same. The wiki says exactly this:
...what you're not grasping is that this is a direct criticism of your attempts to logically argue for a self evident conclusion. This wiki is saying that you by doing so are demonstrating an ignorance of the purpose of persuasively arguing for the conclusion... that you're begging the question. That's supposed to be a bad thing, but you're doing it.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
It was justified but it was never sound. Relativity didn't become true when Einstein proposed it; to the degree that it's "truer" than Newton, it was "truer" dating back to the Big Bang singularity.Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
No, you suspect I don't understand the Wiki link because you do not understand it. See the quote above? Who is offering a logical argument that PoSR is self evident? That's not me, that's you. So who is being demonstrated ignorant of the purpose of persuasively arguing that position? If anyone that would be you, not me; I'm the attempted persuadee, you're the persuader. I'm the one doubting the PoSR is self evident. And who is begging the question by proposing that logical argument? Not me; that's you. I'm unconvinced PoSR is self evident, so I'm asking, not for a logical argument, but for a justification. Because... whose opinion is it that debates lead to truth? Not mine; that's yours.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
...according to Einstein (apocryphally but believably), common sense is the set of prejudices learned by the age of 18.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
How?
Wrong; I conclude PoSR isn't necessarily true. It's just a simple modal logic exercise. Maybe instead of bluffing you should read up on modal logic.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
It's trivially false that I cannot imagine something I don't perceive. I can imagine that there's a kidney underneath my skin somewhere; I can imagine the pipe running to my property delivering water. I can imagine uncomputable numbers, incompressible numbers, Godel numbers, and TM's that UTM's cannot decide are halting or not. I can imagine dependence and independence. You're fishing.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Unless you're prepared to argue that there are a finite number of counting numbers because PoSR, I don't think you want to go there.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Sufficient has meant that since before you started your post. And I've been telling you what it means. I linked to an article even; you obviously didn't read it. Not until I spoon fed it did you agree. So what made you think you were qualified to lecture me on what sufficient means if you had no idea?
Not in the context of the PoSR; which is what matters for this post. To confirm, in the statement about the PoSR "For every event E, if E occurs, then there is a sufficient explanation for why E occurs", "sufficient" means that the effect cannot be greater than its causes. And it is in that sense that I use the term "sufficient" for this post.
Quoting InPitzotl
I'll try one more time, but I'm running out of ways to explain the same thing. To demonstrate that a claim is self-evident is not the same as to demonstrate that a self-evident claim is true. The latter is a fallacy; the former is not. My aim is to show that the PoSR is self-evident, not that it is necessarily true.
Replace PoSR with LNC in your above statement, and similarly, I could show the LNC is self-evident, but not necessarily true. A denier of the LNC cannot be persuaded to be wrong with arguments that presuppose the LNC. As it is with the LNC, so it is with the PoSR.
Quoting InPitzotl
Sounds like we are in agreement here. Let's close this topic.
Quoting InPitzotl
By saying that "Quantum Indeterminism itself is even a thing because it can be justified", it is appealing to the PoSR in the form of "For every proposition P, if P is true, then there is a sufficient explanation for why P is true." So QI theory is believed to be true because there is a sufficient explanation in support of it. Likewise, if there was not a sufficient explanation in support of it, then QI would not be believed to be true.
Quoting InPitzotl
That's not quite what I meant, but that's okay because I have changed my mind on this. We can after all imagine an event without imagining a cause for that event. That's fine; it just means that the PoSR is not derived from logical necessity (which is what we'd expect from a self-evident principle).
Quoting InPitzotl
It is indeed not "necessarily true" in the sense that it is not derived from logical necessity, as per above, but I clam it is nevertheless true for all cases, similar to how logic cannot itself be derived from logical necessity, and yet is believed to be true for all cases.
it's everywhere in his writings on the soul
That sounds like special pleading to me. But, okay.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
And what does greater mean? Surely snowflakes can cause avalanches, and hurricanes can result from a butterfly flapping its wings. Is a rock greater than a stick? Is elasticity greater than magnetism? Are you just saying that if something requires x amount of energy then you need at least x amount of energy? Greater has to actually mean something you can use if you're going to define PoSR this way, and if it does, I'd like to know what that meaning is.
But whatever greater means, that has to be the thing you use to rule out Born Rule application of wave function collapse, because that's precisely what you're ruling out when you rule out the randomness Banno was talking about. (But even this would not be too convincing, because even if you ruled this out, the theory Banno described would do perfectly well as a physical theory... it just wouldn't apply to our world).
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Okay, I'll attack this differently too... let's start here. Do you mean that PoSR is "obvious" (the common definition)? Because it's not so obvious to me. Or do you mean that PoSR "is known to be true without justification"? Because that would entail that I know it to be true, and I can find reasonable doubt of it being true (WFC realism). Because I can reasonably doubt it, you have to justify it to me. That's what this stuff really means. And what you're really trying to do is futile on top of futile... you're trying to prove to me that you don't have to justify PoSR to me.
Well, what about my reasonable doubt... the possibility that WFC is real?
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
It's not even related to the that claim; it's appealing only to the fact that a belief is justified if there's justification for it, which is kind of tautological. In fact, "For every proposition P, if P is true, then there is a sufficient explanation for why P is true" is not even true! If your version of PoSR entails that it is, then I straight out disbelieve it; Godel's First Incompleteness Theorem's much better justified.
Greater in terms of "causal power" or "ability". This is still quite generic, so I'll give examples.
Indeed if talking about energy events, then the energy from the effect cannot be greater than the energy from the causes. If reality is nothing but physical, which can be reduced or supervened by matter, energy, and arrangement of matter, then the effect cannot be greater in amount of matter/energy than the causes. If on the other hand a property cannot be reduced to anything simpler, let's assume free will for example, then the cause of free will must also possess free will.
A closed system with nothing but one snowflake cannot cause an avalanche, or with nothing but a butterfly cannot cause a hurricane. Now an effect cannot be greater than the sum of its causes. In a system that is highly unstable, a single snowflake may be sufficient to cause an avalanche. Finally, if a rock has more matter than the stick, then we could carve a stick out of the rock.
Quoting InPitzotl
I assume "randomness" here means that sometimes we observe event A and sometimes event B, with no apparent causes to explain that change. So if every change requires a sufficient cause, this type of randomness indeed cannot exist.
Quoting InPitzotl
If the possible worlds only retain logic, then indeed randomness is possible in other worlds; but if they retain both logic and causality, then randomness is not possible. I'd say both should be retained because possible worlds are thought experiments, and both LNC and PoSR are laws of thought (as further explained below).
Quoting InPitzotl
This one. The PoSR cannot be founded on anything else because nothing is below a first principle; but we can explain how it came about: The purpose of reason is to find truth, and we observe that when we reason about a topic, we always demand an explanation that is sufficient to defend the claim, and we reject the claim when the explanation is found to be insufficient (ie failing to fulfill the burden of proof). Thus inductively, the PoSR is the generalization of this observation. I'm pretty sure the LNC came about in a similar way, for it cannot be demonstrated either. Leibniz says the LNC and the PoSR are the two pillars of our reasoning about reality, where the former is for identity, and the latter for causality.
Quoting InPitzotl
The scientific method is based on reason, which uses both the LNC and the PoSR. E.g. "Assume a claim is false until given a sufficient reason to be true", or Occam's Razor which is "pick the simplest hypothesis that explains all the data", etc. So a scientific claim which refutes either the LNC or the PoSR would be sawing off the branch it is sitting on. That said, the WFC may be compatible with the PoSR if we posit non-observable causes. I just don't know enough about that theory.
Quoting InPitzotl
I'm not sure what your point is in this last paragraph.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Within the domain of math, per your definition, I read "sufficient reason" as being equivalent to proof.
Here's some notation I'll be using:
Qualifiers: ?=for all, ?=there exists, ?=there does not exist
Operators: A?P=A is a proof of P, ?=and, :=such that
Your statement: ?P, P ??O:O?P
But per Godel's First Incompleteness Theorem: ?P : P ? ? O : O?P
...namely, the Godel statement G that says that G cannot be proved within a system would be such a P. I would posit that if you extend your system, you just get another system.
In terms of math, when you say "X can be justified" appeals to your phrasing of the PoSR, given "proof"=sufficient reason, then you're literally saying that "O?P" appeals to "?P, P ??O:O?P", which is ridiculous on the face of it.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
That doesn't sound generic to me, though it sounds a bit trivial. If we agree that A causes B, we could say that A has "resulting in B" as its causal power, which I see as simply a fancy way of saying that A can cause B. I don't get where "greater" comes in though. Wavefunction collapse causes the photon to go left. Okay, and?
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
That implies that the total amount of energy in the universe can remain the same, or decrease, but cannot increase. But that conflicts with the fact that the total amount of energy in the universe is increasing (due to dark energy). So, what gives?
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
No, I mean that state ? sometimes evolves into state A and sometimes evolves into state B, and we can demonstrate that there exists no hidden variable that can explain the evolution of state A from state ? as opposed to state B from state ?. Being able to demonstrate that there are no HVT's is strikingly different than merely not seeing an apparent sufficient cause. Quantum indeterminacy is not based on pattern matching events; it's based on an evidence supported no-go theorem (Bell's Theorem).
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
That does not imply?P, P ??O:O?P; all it implies is that we don't commit to P until we find an O such that O?P (with a much weaker sense of ?... an outright falsifiable sense... since we're dealing with induction most of the time).
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Reason doesn't rely on PoSR. You're making that up. There is no "?P, P ??O:O?P" in "O?P".
First, bear with me when using symbolic logic, because I am not familiar with these.
Now the term "proof" is too strict. A reason that yields reasonableness instead of certainty is also acceptable for the PoSR. Of course, first principles cannot be proven to be true, by definition, but sufficient reasons nevertheless are given to make them reasonable, such as induction.
Quoting InPitzotl
"Greater" may not always apply, as per your example. But it does in some cases: If a shelf can support a 10 kg weight but can also support more, then the being that is the cause has greater power (supporting power) than the effect (the supporting of the 10 kg weight).
Quoting InPitzotl
Dark Energy... sounds ominous. I don't know what that is, but doesn't it conflict with the first law of thermodynamics, that the total energy of an isolated system is constant; energy can be transformed from one form to another but can be neither created nor destroyed?
Quoting InPitzotl
The domain of the empirical sciences (what we refer to as science for short) is limited to the empirical. But reality is not necessarily limited to the empirical. So while science may demonstrate there are no additional empirical causes, it cannot make claims about possible non-empirical causes.
Quoting InPitzotl
But we don't commit to P, precisely because there is an insufficient explanation to claim that P is true.
Quoting InPitzotl
It sure does. The three types of reasoning are deductive, inductive, and abductive. Abductive is "inference to the best explanation"; and this implies a sufficient explanation.
Not in the realm of mathematics; proof is generally the level we're looking for. What weaker sufficient reason would you apply to mathematics?
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Could you explain that a bit more?
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
But this is your burden... to show randomness is impossible. Quantum Indeterminacy comes from application of Born Rule, which is the rule that you apply when you get classical states from the wavefunction collapsing. If greater doesn't apply here, then there's no argument against randomness in this.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Yes. This is an analog to Newton's Laws we were discussing earlier. Conservation of energy is a really great law, and it's "almost" true; it is, in fact, so close to being true that we may as well just say that it is. But we can derive conservation of energy from more fundamental laws; in accordance with Noether's Theorem, conservation of energy is a result of time translation symmetry. Dark energy introduces a time translation asymmetry, and dominates the universe at cosmic scales.
You were telling me a couple of posts ago something about greater... but when I tried to directly apply that to randomness, which you're ruling out, you're saying it doesn't apply there... and the one example you gave me of greater is actually false? Now regarding this "can support 10kg" stuff, sure, that seems to have a greater concept in it somewhere, but I don't really see one for three justifying any general rule. More importantly, if the one thing you're trying to rule out by the rule doesn't apply, then why are we discussing "greater"?
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
This paragraph is meaningless to me. Based on my understanding of what the word "empirical" means, it's a bunch of babble, and straight out false... it's tantamount to saying that there's no such thing as a no-go theorem in science, which is quite silly given Bell's Theorem is such a thing. But based on what I understand the word "empirical" to mean, some of these phrases are outright nonsense; for example, what is this supposed to mean?: "may demonstrate there are no additional empirical causes"
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
What are you talking about? P=an english speaker is engaging me in a conversation. O=this thread. O?P. Are you failing to abstract? You're talking about a principle that supposedly applies to all true things.
Probability. Reasonableness is equivalent to probability in mathematics without being quantitative. Note however, that the PoSR applies first and foremost to causality, and secondarily to knowledge, as an extension.
Quoting InPitzotl
Take the LNC as a first principle for example. It cannot be proven to be true, for a logical proof presupposes the LNC. But through induction, by observing that there exist no contradictory facts, and that we cannot even imagine contradictory images, then it is reasonable to believe the LNC to be true, both as an epistemic and a metaphysical principle.
Quoting InPitzotl
There is a misunderstanding somewhere here. I thought you were just asking if along with being greater, the cause can sometimes just be equal, and I meant to say that it can; that it just cannot be less. If that's not what you meant, then what was your original objection?
Quoting InPitzotl
I wish laws would stop being broken. :shade:
This should still be okay with the PoSR. This "time translation asymmetry" as you say could provide a sufficient cause for the added energy to a system. There is also the possibility of turning mass into energy with relativity if I understand it correctly.
Quoting InPitzotl
That science may be able to show in some cases that it has accounted for all the causes that science can account for: observable, detectable causes. E.g. there may exist things which are typically judged to be non-physical such as the soul, free will, and objective values. As non-physical things, they might fall outside the realm of empirical sciences, and are part of the realm of philosophy (which nowadays means "non-empirical or rational sciences"). As possibly real things, they would be part of the causal chain of events alongside with physical things.
Quoting InPitzotl
So this translates to "this thread is a proof that an engligh speaker is engaging me in a conversation". So far so good; no conflict with the PoSR that I see. But then what is your point?
You seem to be losing the ability to understand what you're quoting. Mathematical conjectures are not judged based on the probability that they are true; they are judged based on whether they can be proven or disproven.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
But if you're appealing to induction, then induction is in play; in that case, we can appeal to quantum indeterminacy as a reason to doubt PoSR.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Indeed there is. You said this, here:
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
...and I got two concrete examples from you; one was support-ability of a beam by weight... the other was conservation of energy. The weight thing sounds fine, but hardly universal; I can think of several other principles where "lesser" amounts of some total are required for some thing, but PoSR must apply to all things not just certain classes of things, else there's no such rule. The conservation of energy thing plain fails, but:
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
...and that seems to be a curious exception. You gave this as an example of PoSR applying; turns out it flunks. But now you're backtracking. I'll allow this, but, there's a cost. So maybe PoSR is fine with energy increasing after all; you can pin that on time translation asymmetry. But if you can be wrong about this because energy can indeed increase due to time translation asymmetry, then how can we be sure you cannot be wrong about quantum indeterminacy because events can indeed be stochastic due to wavefunction collapse, in the same manner in which you allow indeterministic free will because events can be caused by original causes who are free agents?
If I were cynical, I would say that "greater" and therefore "sufficient" don't mean anything at all, because you just retrofit them to whatever is there post hoc. If energy is conserved, greater fits; if not, well, that's okay too. PoSR by this theory is meaningless, and lacks the ability to rule out randomness. But apparently the whole point of PoSR was to rule out randomness so you could use this proof of souls. So, come on, give me something meaningful enough to do the job you want to do; something that doesn't sound like special pleading.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
The word "empirical" refers to something you actually observe though; so phrases like ruling out empirical causes literally mean that you're ruling out causes that you observe, which is kind of nonsensical. In like fashion your previous rant about empirical science being science and what not is a bunch of meaningless babble that should just be ignored. As for the above statement, that's a bit more meaningful, but it shows lack of imagination and a complete ignorance of what a no-go theorem is. Bell's Theorem does not require the causes be observable or detectable; it merely requires that there be some sort of fact of the matter of the classical system that leads to the result.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
And now we're full circle? The photon goes left because it has a soul, free will, and objective values?
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
You have a talent for not following the discussion. You posited that by using a justification for a belief (O?P) that I'm appealing to PoSR (?P, P ??O:O?P). I'm saying that just using a justification for a belief (O?P) does not require an appeal to PoSR (?P, P ??O:O?P). Think of ? mathematically as meaning proof; outside of math, as simply being a metaphor for justifies. But you're still trying to cargo cult some sort of ridiculous foundational dependency of (O?P) to (?P, P ??O:O?P).
Apart from what has been brought forward against P1, your argument reminds me of the Kantian notion with regard to the possibility of freedom. In short, he asserts the possibility of freedom on grounds of his distinction between the object (in our case the action of someone as the objectification of their "soul") in sensory perception, which, by necessity, is either subject to physical laws and thus determined or possesses some negative freedom (other comments have elaborated on that), which, indeed, is unlike the positive freedom that an autonomous individual should possess, and the thing-in-itself, which is fully disclosed from sensory perception and, thus, not necessarily subject to any determination, rendering the coexistence of the seemingly determined action (as it is perceived by, say, other beings) and a cause (the soul as an imperceptible thing-in-itself) that possesses some form of positive freedom uncontradicted. (naturally, this is a simplification of the argument!)
In that sense I would associate the non-physical nature of this freely acting facility (insofar as, given that it's undetermined, it cannot be the object of an appreciation without contradiction) with your argument.
Cheers!
Pure mathematics is in the domain of identity, not causality. E.g. 2+2=4 means that 2+2 is identical to 4, not that 2+2 causes 4. PoSR is in the domain of causality. Regardless, why bring up maths?
Quoting InPitzotl
Quoting InPitzotl
As previously stated, the PoSR is part of reasoning (at least abductive) which is part of the scientific method which is used for that QI theory. You cannot remove the PoSR from scientific topics. It would be like showing through science that some facts about reality are contradictory, thereby concluding that the LNC sometimes fails, and this would be acceptable because the LNC was also obtained through induction. We judge scientific theories based on their agreement with principles of reason, and not the opposite way around.
Quoting InPitzotl
You misunderstand. My position is in defence of the PoSR, not the laws of thermodynamics. So this time-translation-asymmetry thing is what explains an exception in the law of thermodynamics. Great. It's a blow for the laws of thermo, but it perfectly agrees with the PoSR. Your example would only go against the PoSR if it wasn't explained by something like the time-translation-asymmetry.
Quoting InPitzotl
No. PoSR states that all changes have a sufficient cause. Randomness means that nothing causes the change between scenarios 1 and 2, where in scenario 1, Cause A results in Effect B, and in scenario 2, Cause A results in Effect C. Randomness fails the PoSR.
Quoting InPitzotl
Let's get one thing out of the way. The whole objection about those quantum theories doesn't actually harm the original argument in the OP. All I need to do is to revamp it a bit as per below. This is to clarify that my position on the PoSR is not driven by my position on the soul.
Premise P1: Everything in the non-quantum scale that is physical is determined, as per the laws of physics.
Premise P2: Free Will enables some of our acts to be freely chosen, thereby making them not fully determined in the non-quantum scale.
Conclusion C: The part of us that possesses free will is not physical.
Quoting InPitzotl
It means that science cannot rule out non-empirical causes.
Quoting InPitzotl
I would say another non-physical cause; but yes. But now are you claiming that you know for a fact that non-physical things don't exist? Because it seems this would be needed to invalidate the PoSR.
Quoting InPitzotl
Can you find an example of a claim that is widely accepted as true and also has no justification for it? If not, then it is an indication of the universal appeal to the PoSR.
An opinion does not count as an argument or a refutation.
Mathematics includes many fields, not just equations with equals signs on them. But provability is not just an analog of justification, but an example of it. And it was justification that you claimed appeals to PoSR.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Who is this "we"? The scientific community has no consensus on whether quantum indeterminacy is a thing or not. So if there's a PoSR that science relies on that does rule this out, somebody forgot to inform scientists about it.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Quantum indeterminism is explained by something like wavefunction collapse, backed by the Born Rule. Let me label this so you can follow:
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
(b) first off is more nonsense. Randomness has nothing to do with changing a scenario to a different one. Quantum mechanics (per ordinary CI) involves a state A (namely, the state of a wavefunction) sometimes leading to Effect B (a particular classical state) and sometimes to Effect C (a distinct classical state). Quantum indeterminacy treats this collapse of quantum states to classical ones as real. Bell's Theorem rules out that there's a classical fact of the matter that leads to Effect B as opposed to Effect C in conditions where the former happens, by demonstrating that if there were, you would wind up with constraints in probability distinct from the Born Rule probabilities, and showing by experiment that you actually get the BR ones. So QI in this sense is justified by induction and reasoning (which is not the condition of a, but still conflicts with b). You're trying to rule out that reasoning, by saying that by reasoning we appeal to some foundational principle of reason that rules it out. But there is no such thing in the reasoning that leads to QI. The entire argument is nothing but sophistry. If there were any meat to it, and any actual scientific consensus (such as the one you pretend to appeal to), then the scientific community would rule out quantum indeterminacy based on such principles.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Again, that's nonsensical. I drop a rubber ball in a dark room. I hear it bounce off of the floor, then bounce again, and again. The time distance between each bounce is faster. I can infer that the ball is falling, bouncing, and going back up; each time, it's losing energy to heat and sound, causing it not to return to the original height, causing it to fall back down faster. I don't have a thermometer, and I don't see the ball. The ball bouncing in this case is theoretical, as is the explanation of what I hear; it's not empirical because it's not observed. The causes I attribute are theoretical and not empirical. There is a non-empirical cause inferred by the evidence supported theory, and that is an application of science. We can rule out the non-empirical cause of the sounds we hear that energy is just being lost, based on appeal to the scientific theory. This is proper use of the term "empirical". Your usage is kind of an abuse.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
You're lost again (and just flirting with the fallacy fallacy). Bell's Theorem is a no-go theorem that rules out HVT's. You replied to this by some nonsense about how science cannot rule out "non-empirical causes" like it actually does in the simple example above. In your response you give "examples" of "non-empirical causes" like souls, free will, an objective values. So naturally, in context (were you not lost), you would be proposing that Bell's Theorem fails to rule out HVT's involving souls, free will, and objective values. But of course, you are indeed lost. Your fault, not mine; follow the threads back.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
But that's the entire basis of my objection. If you stop trying to wring blood out of this stone, I have the right to revise my entire stance, up to and including having no particular objections. However, this particular rephrasing of your premises is a bit weak. You seem to be saying now that everything deterministic is physical, unless it's at quantum scales, in which case it gets to be physical and not be deterministic. That... seems a bit fuzzy. It's a strange, contextual sense of physical, which doesn't quite seem like that's enough to save your argument. Pardon me, but out of curiosity, why exactly do you need the soul to be non-physical in the first place? What's wrong with a physical soul?
Sure, provability is an example of justification; but not the only one. And one field of mathematics that is relevant to causality is statistics, which uses probability as a justification. In fact, most scientific hypotheses are validated with a probability (such as rejecting the null hypothesis), not a certainty.
Quoting InPitzotl
Quoting InPitzotl
My understanding is that the reason why the QI theory is not universally accepted, and deemed incomplete by some, is precisely because the theory fails to satisfy our demand for a sufficient explanation. E.g. "God does not play dice", etc.
Quoting InPitzotl
A requirement for empirical science is that the hypothesis brought forth must be empirically verifiable. Your hypothesis falls under this science because we can empirically verify it by turning on the light, or by using a night-vision camera, etc. On the other hand, if the hypothesis was not empirically verifiable, e.g. illusion caused by brain-in-a-vat, then it would not be considered scientific, but philosophical.
Quoting InPitzotl
Let's examine this line of reasoning some more. You are here making an inference to the best explanation, aka abduction, which brings forth the simplest hypothesis that sufficiently explains all the data. This is correct scientific reasoning founded on the PoSR. If on the other hand, we dropped the PoSR and allowed the possibility that nothing causes the phenomenon observed, then this "no cause" hypothesis would be the simplest and thus most reasonable one to begin with; which would be absurd.
Quoting InPitzotl
To clarify, I am not claiming we should believe that non-physical things exist until given a reason to believe otherwise. But likewise, we shouldn't believe they don't exist as default. And if we remain agnostic on non-physical things but allow the possibility for their existence, then the absence of a physical cause in an event is not an effective argument against the PoSR.
Quoting InPitzotl
Based on what I've read, the HVT is in reference to local hidden variables, which implies entities with a location property. And all entities that have a location property are physical, because physical properties such as location don't apply to non-physical entities.
Another similar reason is that measuring instruments, equipped with physical sensors, can only detect physical properties.
Quoting InPitzotl
Traditionally, what is referred to as the "soul" is that non-physical entity that survives the body after death. It is immortal because the passage of death is a physical event. If one were to prove the existence of a new physical thing and call it a soul, it would not match with what is traditionally referred to as the soul.
sounds like a mixture of one of the forms of pan-psychism and also to some extent scientific determinism. I don't have enough evidence for me to say your'e partial rejection of scientific determinism (~fate) is wrong.
Thats interesting.
This is why some New age people say all people have a chance to become gods. I don't believe thats true, however pan-psychism isn't entirely unbiblical. Spinoza and Plato both believe in Pan-psychism. Spinoza went against his Jewish faith when he accepted it. Jews i believe do accept pan-psychism to some extent.
...and that's all that matters. Your PoSR analog does not apply to math. If you restrict PoSR to causality you can get out of this, but the causal analog of justifying a claim also does not appeal to the causal analog of PoSR for the same reason the proof analog doesn't appeal to the proof version of it.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
...but that is uninteresting. You're proposing a rule (PoSR) that you propose scientists rely on that rules out randomness. So what's interesting isn't that scientists don't universally accept QI, but that scientists do not universally reject it.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
No, we can't. If we turn on the light and/or bring in a night vision camera, all we'll find is a ball resting on the floor. We can empirically verify the theory, but applying the theory is not an empirical verification. At best we can apply the data we gathered to confirm that the theory is consistent with it. Empirical measurements apply to data; and science likes data. Laws are next... they're ways to quickly understand the data by formulating relationships... science really likes laws. But the real golden nuggets for science are theories... they try to formulate models of reality that explain deeper concepts of reality. But theories (in a scientific sense) are theoretical (in a philosophical sense)... they are not empirical measurements, they are extrapolations based on them onto features of reality.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Here's a bad theory about slot machines. There are three types: lucky, expecting, and due. If a slot machine has hit faster than expected in the past, it's lucky; you should play lucky machines because they're likely to pay off. If a machine hasn't hit for a bit but is reaching the frequency at which it should, it is expecting; you should play that machine because it's likely to pay off. And if a machine has gone on longer than expected but hasn't payed off yet, it is due; you should play that machine because it's going to pay off very soon. Slot machines can change types, though, so it's best to be a bit careful.
This theory of slot machines is a sure fire recipe for going broke. It is, however, simple; and it can explain all of the data... every slot machine you've ever seen is explained here, and any machine you'll ever encounter is covered. The problem with this theory is that it doesn't stick its neck out.
What we want in a theory isn't just to explain the data, but to explain it in the most precise way. A theory should stick its neck out... the farther the better. There should be plenty of ways the theory can be wrong; if there's no way it can be wrong, then having that theory pass a gauntlet of tests tells us nothing... of course it would pass tests... it's useless. That's why we don't like the slot machine theory...its neck is all the way in the shell. It explains everything, but it explains everything in such a manner that it explains nothing.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
No it's not. It's founded on simply the principle that we have a good working justified theory, and this explanation applies it. PoSR has nothing to do with it.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
No, it would not be any more reasonable than the slot machine theory, but the problem is not that it doesn't appeal to your PoSR. The problem is that it is a useless theory... like the slot machine theory, its neck is entirely in its shell. It explains everything in such a manner that it explains nothing.
Bell's Theorem contrasts with this... it sticks its neck out. HVT's suggest probabilities that fall within certain ranges. The Born Rule suggests probabilities that fall outside of those ranges. There's a very simple way BT can fail... if the measured experimental probabilities are consistent with the HVT's, BT is wrong period; throw it out and go to the next thing. In fact, a great next thing to work on would be to see if you can find out what HVT is behind those results consistent with these probabilities. But if BT falls in the BR ranges, then those HVT's can be ruled out... throw them out and go to the next thing. That is reason; that is correct scientific reasoning; and that is precisely why you find Bell's Theorem in the scientific literature. If it had to do with PoSR, per your (as yet incomplete) definition, QI would be ruled out already.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
There are a lot more conditions required on the range of HVT's ruled out by Bell's Theorem, but you're missing the point. You are offering that you have a proof of souls. Your proof has a flaw in it... if QI is a thing, you aesthetically want to call it physical, and therefore random things are physical. Covering up this flaw with reasoning such as "well it might be okay because that only applies when" is antithetical to the purpose of claiming that you have a proof of souls. You're trying to prove something, not make excuses for it; so if there's a way your proof can have a hole, your proof should address it.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
I understand that... but the question is what is wrong with a physical soul... are you saying that the problem is that tradition says it's not physical?
"Free will" is a manmade conventional name. It was invented solely as a means to exhonerate the God of Abraham from the existence of evil. That need cam and yet still comes as a result of a brilliantly worded argument against the God of Abraham. The problem of evil.
Look it up and do yourself a favor.
We made choices long before the need to exonerate the God of Abraham from the existence of evil. We make a choice each and every time we consider the options. The problem, of course, is that sometimes one is completely unaware of some of the options that are available to them. When those unknown options are the best, there is no ability to 'freely' choose what's best.
Feel me?
This sounds like an anachronism; the concept of free will traces back to the ancient Greeks... who were not exactly God of Abraham types. As far as the name goes, we're talking BCE, so this conceptualization predates the English language. Mind you, a quick search does confirm that Augustine advanced this argument, but the proposal here still sounds out of order.
Quoting creativesoul
That makes sense to me; what we subjectively seem to do when we choose is limited to what we know and think, and doesn't get to "sniff out" the result.
I don't understand your objection. Mathematical claims demand sufficient explanations like any other claims. Explanations don't always need to be proofs to be sufficient, though proofs are of course always sufficient.
Quoting InPitzotl
Quoting InPitzotl
Empirical sciences don't deal with metaphysics which is the science of reality. So when scientists say "nothing causes this event", it implies that "nothing in the empirical domain causes the event"; and they could be right about that. Empirical sciences have no say with what is real and what is not. For example, everything we observe, including the stuff QI deals with, could be caused in reality by a "brain-in-a-vat" situation. Thus even though the QI stuff would really be caused by the vat, scientists could still truthfully say that "nothing (in the empirical domain) causes the event".
Quoting InPitzotl
So what? If we can empirically verify the theory, then it falls under empirical sciences.
Quoting InPitzotl
I think your point is that the PoSR is not the only principle needed to find truth? Sure. Neither is the LNC. It doesn't mean they are false. Note also that if your theory about slot machines did not sufficiently explain the data observed, say, "they never hit", then this theory would automatically be rejected for it fails to sufficiently explain what we observe.
Quoting InPitzotl
That doesn't matter. So long as those variables have a location property, then they are physical.
Quoting InPitzotl
I don't get your refutation of my new argument. Whether QI deals with physical things or not is irrelevant, since my argument only applies to things in the non-quantum scale.
Quoting InPitzotl
The property of being non-physical is essential to the concept of the soul. So if you find a new physical thing, you are free to call it whatever you want, including "soul", but it would merely be a homonym.
I think you are referring to "Intellectual Determinism", which holds that the human will necessarily acts on the mind's judgment that something is better. This is true in the case when our reason is not in conflict with our "appetite", which is our desire for pleasure and undesire for pain. But in a case when our reason conflicts with our appetite, then we can make the free choice to obey our reason or our appetite. The fact is that not all mistakes are honest mistakes, where a dishonest mistake is when we decide to act a certain way despite "knowing better".
Actually when it comes to talking about the human will and whether or not it makes any sense at all to claim that it is free...
Calling the will "free" is to neglect the fact that our will is influenced by more things that we can possibly become aware of. In short, the human will is not free from influence, whether that be internal or external or both. If the will is not free from influence, then it makes no sense whatsoever to call it "free". The closest thing we could possibly have to free will is for us to carefully pick the right kind of influences.
Regarding the bit about mistakes...
There is no mistake that is made on purpose. One is aware of one's own mistake, regardless of the variety, when the unexpected happens.
To talk in terms of "when reason conflicts with our appetite" is unhelpful here. Even in the cases where the individual is knowingly, intentionally, and deliberately breaking the rules, they do so because they think it's the best thing to do at that time, based upon whatever they are thinking at that time. Even here, it is only as a result of something somewhere along the line not going as expected, that one is mistaken.
All mistakes are based upon false belief about what's not yet happened, but is expected to.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
No; my point is that the PoSR is superfluous, not foundational, to science.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
The slot machine theory isn't false; it's vacuously true. That's why you can't use it to bet... it's useless. You will go flat broke using your slot machine theory before proving it untrue, because fundamentally it's irrefutable, because it doesn't actually say anything. It's a "facade" of a theory... it presents the illusion of meaning without actually having to mean something.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
We require a mathematical conjecture be proven before we believe it is true. But there are mathematical conjectures that are true that we simply haven't proven yet; likewise, there are mathematical conjectures that are true but unprovable.
Analogously, we require inductive claims to be justified before they warrant belief. But there are propositions about the world that are true that have yet to be justified. And there's no guarantee that a true proposition about the world can be justified.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
This is special pleading though, and I'm not sure how your argument can survive it. If QI were a thing, then certain classes TRNG's are truly random, and they produce random effects on classical scales. The scale isn't the problem; the random mechanics is.
But you have an unfinished new definition of PoSR to work on anyway (didn't come up in the last post except by quick mention). PoSR is the principle that for all things there is a sufficient cause where sufficient refers to the fact that the cause cannot be "greater" than the effect, but we still have no functional definition of greater... and this is part of why I'm rearranging this post... because the more we try to resolve what PoSR is, the more it looks like slot machine theory.
Regarding the physical, I think it may be best to just back up and try to get a much better definition of the physical than you currently have... I think you're underestimating what it takes to explain what physical means:
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
...it's not quite that easy. In quantum mechanics, and especially in context with Bell's Theorem, counterfactual definiteness itself is questionable. Related to this context, that means that particles in QM do not in fact have a well defined location. This can get more complicated with certain theoretical physics constructs such as the Holographic Principle.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
You can technically talk about empirical science, but the thing we talk about when we say science doesn't equate to empirical. Empirical refers only to that which we measure and observe... when we make measurements and observations, they become data. Theories are not data; they are speculative attempts to describe the reality that produces the data. Sure, you can test a theory empirically, but that's part of the problem with your definition... because you can also test a theory theoretically (non-empirically)... this is, for example, a large part of what theoretical physics does. It seems you want to describe the limits of science, but to do that properly in a proof, you cannot be lazy here.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
...we need not refer to 17th century thought experiments here. MWI posits that reality is a universal wavefunction, and classical physics is emergent. CI with real WFC posits that QM is just an odd calculation trick, possibly ontic somehow, but that classical physics is fundamental. Those describe different metaphysics. But here's the problem with your "easy" description of the physical... it's kind of an open question still whether science can or cannot distinguish these two metaphysically distinct theories. The way you phrase it, though, it's just "obvious" science can't do this. A more fair assessment is simply that there's no guarantee of what science could do here versus could not do... someone could always invent a clever trick to test something that we just didn't think of. All we really know is that if we use good science and manage to show e.g. that MWI is what reality is like, that we leave a trail of justification worthy to warrant belief.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Why? Because some religious leader or lexicographer dictated it? What do you lose should the soul be physical? What if, say, there were indeed a whole spiritual aspect to reality, but, it turned out, that this aspect was much more complex and rich than what the current batch of religions describe? What if spirituality followed principles and laws? And if we write those down side by side with the principles and laws we call "physical", how clear is it exactly whether some arbitrary new law we discover should go into the physical bucket or the spiritual one? What is it about the soul being non-physical that's so important to you?
"Invoked" would have been better than "invented" if the Greeks invented free will. I had not heard that before you... Haven't checked. I'll take your word for it until I do. Years back, the etymology led me to what I said earlier....
...or so I thought.
:wink:
Just to jump in here as a quantum theorist myself, quantum theory is not demonstrably non-deterministic. The wavefunction evolves deterministically. The issue is with the interpretation of Born's postulate that the absolute square of the wavefunction projected onto some fixed state is proportional to the probability of finding it in that state. There are determinist interpretations of this (many-worlds interpretation) and probabilistic ones (Copenhagen). How nature evolves a system from a deterministically-evolving wave to a final state (the measurement problem) is unsolved, however early evidence points in one of two directions, both of which are deterministic.
So P1 is valid, but not definitely true. But then what is...
P2 seems to me the faulty one, for reasons Forest has already covered. There is nothing in the definition of free will inconsistent with determinism. Your defense iirc was that you believe free will to be non-deterministic in nature, making the argument circular.
They are not incompatible. Picture the good and bad angels on each side of a person's shoulders like here. There are two influences, and the will can pick a side. This is of course not an argument in defence of free will, but it shows it is possible to be both influenced and free.
Quoting creativesoul
How can we pick anything if the will is not free?
Quoting creativesoul
You have heard of "willpower"? Take a 5km jog. All the runners on that jog know rationally that the short-term pain felt will result in long-term health benefits, and that they will not get injured from it. Yet some runners finish it, and some quit before finishing. Those who finished have applied more willpower than those who quit.
I know that this is way off topic, but jeesh, I'm glad I'm not the only one who realizes this, and I'm no quantum theorist.
You're just calling the ability to choose between options "free will". I'm not interested...
Be well.
I think the theory is false. It seems to commit the Gambler's fallacy. You can also disprove it statistically by playing it a large amount of time, or better yet, dismantle it to know its mechanism.
Quoting InPitzotl
Sure; if we don't know if a claim is true, then we likely also don't know why it is true. But how does that go against the PoSR? The PoSR just states, in the case of epistemology, that if we claim to know that a claim is true, then the explanation must be sufficient.
Quoting InPitzotl
That doesn't sound right. At the classical scale, we have the laws of physics, and they are called laws because they are universal. So even if there is randomness at the quantum scale, it fades away before reaching the classical scale. This is possible due to such things as the Central Limit Theorem and Law of Large Numbers.
Quoting InPitzotl
I started explaining "greater" here, then I forgot where we ended up. Do you have specific questions in mind?
Quoting InPitzotl
I think "theoretical physics" is more in regards to how the theories came about, not in regards to whether the theory can be empirically verified or not. E.g. the theory of relativity is part of theoretical physics, but can be and has been empirically verified. Now the reason I define "science" as "the search for truths that are empirically verifiable" is to contrast it with "philosophy" which I define as "search for truths that are not empirically (so rationally) verifiable", and which exists separate from science. That's the reason why such fields as ethics, metaphysics, epistemology and even "philosophy of science" are not part of science.
Quoting InPitzotl
Sorry, I can't let this one go. Along the same line as the brain-in-vat, there is always the logical possibility that your entire conscious life experience is nothing but a dream. And this would include everything you know about science. Thus the "science as you know it" could not counter this (but philosophy can).
Quoting InPitzotl
What do you lose should a triangle have four sides, or a rock be made out of plastic? Concepts come before the words that refer to them; and these have essential properties.
Quoting Kenosha Kid
Sounds good to me.
Quoting Kenosha Kid
I forget the reasons brought forth by Forest; but aren't free will and determinism contradictory by definition?
Determinism: Given Cause A, Effect B always follows.
Free Will: The will has the ability to choose between multiple effects.
I can and do choose between multiple actions with associated hoped-for effects. It's me and me alone working out the most efficacious course of action in a given situation at a given time, which meets your definition of free will.
Other definitions have the "could have done otherwise" problem, or the "without constraint from fate" problem which, for a given definition of fate, can mean that it is insufficient for it to be me choosing between multiple options, I must also do so without cause. This would be nondeteterministic, but it doesn't describe how I choose my actions.
[EDIT: Hello back! Where are my manners?!?]
You forget that SMT says machines can change types. There's no way it can fail! Your empirical statistical test will simply count 100% success rates, since there's no failure scenario. SMT isn't just true... there's no way it can be false. Or to use the traditional term, it's unfalsifiable.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
And you seem to be committing a fallacy fallacy. SMT's unfalsifiable; that makes it useless. SMT is simply an illustration of an unfalsifiable useless theory. I have no idea why you're trying to challenge it; it's as if you have an allergy to the concept of an unfalsifiable/useless theory. But, okay. Let's make a bet. I'll bet you cannot name a single scenario where SMT fails.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Have you never heard of TRNG's? How about Geiger Counters? Or interference patterns or breaking of them? Or challenge yourself at the most basic of levels... how do you think us classical level beings ever managed to develop a theory of quantum mechanics in the first place if quantum mechanical effects always fade before reaching our scale?
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
No, they're called laws because they summarize the data in predictable terms. Hooke's law, for example, is known not to be universal... it fails once your spring exceeds its elastic limit.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Yes. What does greater mean in terms of your new definition of sufficient? Forgetting I understand, but all of these posts are still here... just go back and review them.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
I don't get it. This is the year 2020, supposedly well into the information age... so instead of opining, why not just look things up?
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Sorry, but what is the point of this? MWI's you're-splitting-into-countless-versions-of-yourself-that-you-aren't-aware-of is actually part of a respectable theory. You're allegedly trying to make the point that science doesn't deal with the metaphysical, despite this counterexample, by brain-vatting and Tommy-Westphalling? Not even theoretical physicists treat Boltzmann brains and superdeterminism seriously.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Not analogous. We can both count to four, but you don't quite know what physical means. Let's back up. Why is it important to you that we have souls at all? What does not having a soul mean we cannot say, that having a soul means we could?
I'm not fully understanding your point. That said, given the first definition of free will you wrote, do you still think that it is compatible with determinism?
Yes, absolutely. I am free to choose, that is: I am the agent selecting the course of action of whatever potential actions occur to me, and to realise that action.
The question of whether this is deterministic is the question of how I choose. The situation I am in is fixed. In that situation, I must identify a most-attractive outcome. With respect to that outcome I must think of various potential actions. And of those actions, I must assess which is the most likely to realise that outcome. There is no part of this that is necessarily non-deterministic unless one has assumed non-determinism elsewhere.
Caveat: not all human behaviour is rational. Free will discussions usual focus on rational decision-making and I have followed suit.
Quoting InPitzotl
But all 3 types are expected to pay off soon; so if you test them repeatedly and they don't pay off soon, then the theory has been falsified. Also you can still dismantle one of each type to check the mechanism. Also the theory concludes that you should play regardless of the type, even though you said the theory is a sure fire way to go broke; so the theory will be falsified simply by applying it. Finally, even if a theory is empirically unfalsifiable, it can still be rationally rejected as unreasonable. That's why we have such principles as Parsimony (Occam's Razor).
Quoting InPitzotl
Alright. It appears that if QI exists, then randomness can carry all the way to the classical scale. So my new argument is flawed.
For fun, I could revamp it as so (needs polishing but you get the overall idea):
Causally speaking, everything that is physical is either determined or random. Acts from agents with free will are neither determined nor random. Therefore agents with free will are not physical.
Quoting InPitzotl
Alright.
Quoting InPitzotl
I have already answered this general question here. What specific questions do you have, starting from there?
That's right, theoretical physics may differ from experimental physics in the amount of mathematics it uses. But the model output must still be empirically verifiable. From the same page (underlines added): "A physical theory is a model of physical events. It is judged by the extent to which its predictions agree with empirical observations. The quality of a physical theory is also judged on its ability to make new predictions which can be verified by new observations."
Quoting InPitzotl
Is it not empirically verifiable, at least in principle? Side note: I suspect the MWI came about due to our desire to satisfy the PoSR; because if not for that, then why don't scientists just accept QI and be done with it?
Also my points on the brain-in-a-vat and dream still stand. Metaphysics is beyond science. But what about you? How do you make the distinction between fields of science vs philosophy?
Quoting InPitzotl
For me? Religious reasons. But this should not count for or against any of the arguments brought forth previously.
I agree that if humans were always willing to obey their voice of reason, then they would act in a determined way, called Intellectual Determinism, and all errors would merely be honest rational errors. But that is not the case.
Typically, the free will chooses between two conflicting values, where one value is driven by the "appetite" (ie our desire for pleasure and undesire for pain) on one hand, and another value is driven by reason on the other hand (such as health, moral duty, etc). This image comes to mind, where the dark angel is the appetite, and the white angel is the reason.
Ah, but you're forgetting the "falsity indemnification clause":
Quoting InPitzotl
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
...if you could. But, if you could, you still won't falsify the theory. You'd merely have more information as to what type of machine it is. In fact, such a thing would simply be being careful, which the theory tells you to do.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
...it not so much concludes that you should as waffles; again, see indemnification clause.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Of course it's unreasonable... that's the whole point of it! But the problem with the theory isn't its lack of parsimony. Strictly speaking, a machine will either pay off before, roughly at, or after the expected frequency of payoff. There's no simpler description of when the machine would pay off. The problem with the theory is that it's useless. It doesn't give us any real information or use... it doesn't let you predict anything, doesn't tell you what you don't already know. But you said the problem was that it doesn't appeal to PoSR, which in our current form is some foundational principle about what you believe based on whether causes cannot be greater than effects or what not.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Indeed, you can revamp it that way. So as I understand it, this form of argument goes roughly like this. Random things and deterministic things are physical, but free will being neither random nor deterministic is non-physical. We have free will. Therefore we have a non-physical component, which we shall call a soul. Is that the form of argument you wish to present?
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
No, you haven't. You used the word greater and said "in terms of", but there's no real lemon test I can put to this. Like the slot machine theory, there's no actual prediction I can rule out based on PoSR. You tried this twice, remember, and actually managed to rule out things that increase in energy one of those two times? That's how bad this definition is. We need something useful... something that can either actually be used, or something to where when we find a counterexample we can say for sure, "oh, I'm sorry, PoSR must be false then". If we don't have that... if you don't stick your neck out here... we just have a slot machine theory... nothing more than a poetic way to describe whatever is post-hoc.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Not.... really. At the theoretical phases it simply should be coherent; it helps if it's "aesthetic" in some way. At some point down the road hopefully it'll be verifiable somehow, but the guy making the theory can still publish papers on it and discuss it even if he has no idea how to verify it. How do we verify String Theory? We don't know yet; don't know if it can be verified. Still, working out what forms it can take is part of the theoretical physicists' jobs, if they're interested in such things. So whereas this:
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
...is true, it's not a requirement for outputting (discussing/publishing/debating/etc) theoretical physics... it's instead a requirement for acceptance of the theory.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
We don't quite know yet.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Again with the opining of things already on the internet. Hugh Everett discusses his motivations in the introduction to his paper "The Theory of the Universal Wavefunction". Basically, compared with prior theory, the Born Rule looked a bit odd, artificial, and anti-symmetric. Roughly, the cat is supposed to be in a superposition, but Schrodinger is supposed to be a classical observer. But if Schrodinger were in a bigger box he's supposed to be in superposition. The rule being applied here is parsimony... the Born Rule is redundant, arbitrary, and inconsistent, so throw it out.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
I'm not sure distinct is the right word... how would you distinguish natural sciences from natural philosophy?
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
That's not what I'm after.
Joe and Bob are part of an elite group of people with a particular superpower; a mental feat requiring great intelligence that sets them apart from the rest of humanity. Or, so they thought. A guru comes to Joe one day and, to his great surprise, demonstrates that he's wrong... in fact, as it turns out, generally all humans have this capability. Later, the same guru visits Bob, demonstrating the same thing. Joe becomes severely depressed... Joe has believed all his life that he was special, and the guru just proved him wrong. Bob, OTOH, gets really excited. He believed all his life that he was special but, as it turns out, the guru proved that all of humanity is special.
Let's forget religion for just a second, except for that part of it that says whatever it says about the soul. But suppose the guru comes and proves that we are, in fact, physical. Are you Joe in this story, or are you Bob? Are you going to say, oh gee, we're not special because we're nothing but stinking dead matter? Or will you say, wait, physical things are like us too? I never thought physical things could be so special?
I'm not interested in defusing you of your religion... just your preconceptions. What I am asking is what the soul actually does for you, that you think being physical kills... with a side question of, why does it kill it?
That was part of my caveat. But this too may be deterministic. There are people who would starve to deatg before stealing a loaf of bread. There are criminals who would steal for the least reason. The rest of us would steal a loaf of bread if we were sufficiently hungry. How we choose depends on the circumstances (what are my values, am I starving, is there bread, will anyone know, etc), i.e. is deterministic.
“The scientific community has no consensus on whether quantum indeterminacy is a thing or not“ Brings up Schrödinger's cat. The act of observation changes the physical thing.
Your use of the word "physical" is ambiguous. The controversy is based on your favorite interpretation of quantum mechanics (see Sean Carroll's "The Most Embarrasing Graph in Modern Physics"). In QM there are two processes... the Schrodinger Equation and the Born Rule. The former is deterministic; the latter is where indeterminacy comes in. The second process is controversial; MWI, for example, just "rejects" it (it's still there, it's just emergent... it's an anthropic consequence rather than something real)... when Schrodinger opens the box, his wavefunction just entangles with its contents (measurement is entanglement in MWI), leading to a world where Schrodinger sees a living cat and a world where he sees a dead cat (and to MWI, the wavefunction itself is physical; I'm guessing you mean what I tend to call classical?) Keeping that and Sean Carroll's embarrasing graph in mind, see this table for an inventory of where various interpretations stand on quantum indeterminacy (the Deterministic column should do).
Butting in, there are five postulates of QM, one of which is the Born postulate, and that is not rejected by MWI. The Born rule does not dictate collapse, it just maps solutions of the Schroedinger equations to statistical outcomes. How those outcomes individually arise is the measurement problem, which lies outside of scope of QM. One proposal is spontaneous collapse upon observation (Copenhagen). Another is branching (MWI). Then there's all the others.
Bohm theory is mathematically identical to QM, to that extent is the same theory, but does not contain indeterminacy*, so has no fundamental use for the Born rule. For the Bohm interpretation, the Born rule is simply a way of predicting statistical outcomes of a large number of experiments whose starting conditions are exactly knowable in principle but unknown in practise. I'm not aware of any other interpretation that doesn't include indeterminacy.
*ish
Indeterminacy doesn't seem an obvious way of getting non-materialistic phenomena in by the back door. For instance, I've heard that God selects the outcome of every measurement, which rather confines God to adhering very strictly to predictable statistical patterns.
Sorry, I'm a bit late in responding to these posts. I'll get to them tomorrow.
You should be aware of something about me personally related to that... I'm incredibly patient. Don't ever feel you have to reply to me "timely"... in fact, I would prefer you took your time, and got about any actually important stuff in your life (including just enjoying it, which I consider important).
Reply whenever you're ready, not when you feel you're "supposed" to, because I'm not holding you to any time frames.
If so, I respond that (1) It is indeed hard to falsify, due to my claim that it is a first principle, which means it cannot be judged by appealing to any prior principles; very much like the LNC. But also like the LNC, it can be posited from induction and the criteria for self-evidence. (2) it does impact our reasoning in hypothesis testing. E.g. "What caused the Big Bang? Maybe a Little Bang?" This hypothesis would be automatically rejected on the grounds that it does not sufficiently explain the phenomena.
Quoting InPitzotl
Close. The first premise should be changed to "All physical things are either deterministic or random". We can defend this claim either by observations, or by appealing to the Law of Excluded Middle, as previously described here in the last paragraph.
Quoting InPitzotl
Are you a proponent of Scientism? The PoSR is a principle of metaphysics which transcends science. Again, the scientific method does not judge the PoSR, it's the opposite way around due to abductive reasoning. Analogically, how can we test the LNC?
Quoting InPitzotl
From this page: "For a hypothesis to be a scientific hypothesis, the scientific method requires that one can test it." The criteria is not how it can be verified, but if it can be verified in principle. This is why claims like the ones about the existence of God (as a non-physical being, not the greek gods) are judged to be non-scientific.
Quoting InPitzotl
I'm fairly sure the two names are interchangeable, where the former is the modern name of the latter. But this is not the case for the terms "science" and "philosophy" in general (except for proponents of scientism). E.g. Ethics and epistemology are not part of science but of philosophy.
Quoting InPitzotl
Physical things can be destroyed, in the sense of spatially split in pieces. Non-physical things, having no spatial properties, cannot be spatially split. E.g. we can split a red object into two, but not the concept of "red".
Also, by the way you use the word "physical", it sounds like for you there is no difference between the terms "physical" and "reality". What, in theory, would constitute a non-physical thing for you?
But if all the circumstances are deterministic, including our values, then why claim that we have free will at all?
Sort of. The current definition you have for it has both these properties.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
You're missing the point. You're trying to apply PoSR in a particular way. But if your application of PoSR can be wrong without violating PoSR, then there's giant questions as to whether PoSR is meaningful enough to apply. Go back to that CoE thing. You said according to PoSR energy cannot increase. Energy, it turns out, does indeed increase. So that's wrong. But PoSR was true anyway. How can you claim such a thing is inductive or useful?
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Why?
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Let's say LFW exists, and QI is a thing, and somehow we wind up showing both. Then I observe deterministic like things (computers), random things (wavefunction collapse), and original cause things (people). So here's the big question... why can't all three be physical?
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
I think you're confused. The LEM means that you either have something or you don't. But you're treating it as a guide to whether you've enumerated everything or not. It can't be used for the latter. I can't say that because I can only think of four colors, therefore there are only four colors due to the LEM. You enumerated determined things and random things, and you also have this other category of original causation (reminder... my label... this is something I picked up while talking with libertarians). LEM doesn't tell you that these are the only categories.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
You're reaching. You applied "greater" in your definition of sufficient to say that energy never increases, remember? But it turns out it actually does increase, due to dark energy. Being charitable to PoSR, this alone proves that your definition of "greater" is insufficient to be practically used. This has nothing to do with whether I'm a proponent of scientism.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
FYI, a hypothesis and a theory are different kinds of things.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
...so there's your answer... science isn't distinct from philosophy... it's intermingled with it.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Okay... that's a bit bad news then, because it would appear people are splittable into pieces (link: youtube, Ramachandran) (at least two).
Point to your definition of free will that is inconsistent with it. Is it still "I" doing the deciding? Yes. That I am a reasonable person who a) can determine the best outcome and b) will choose the best outcome does not mean I am not choosing, even if the best outcome is obvious and well-defined.
The next topic of concern is a witness to the chief rites..of the world soul..which literally IS the Creator..being smaller than a circle the size of a foot in diameter..
So the soul itself..is a log into the soul of the world..which exists perfectly always as a pure and potent creator..
The Adam Kadmon is the soul itself..and is located in Chochmah.. as the eternal will power being Holy of Gods and Goddesses on Earth..Including Gaia..
Quoting BrendanCount
Is this a definition of the soul? I'm good for consciousness, so I'm fine with a soul being a seat of consciousness, but I'm not quite sure in what sense my consciousness is perfect.
Quoting BrendanCount
...it seems there's the possibility of gaps in my consciousness; specifically under anesthesia (I'm okay with saying I'm conscious while sleeping just in a different "way", I just cannot define consciousness in this specific circumstance). I'm very literal, so I would count those as cessations... is that... fair to you?
Quoting BrendanCount
Not sure what you mean by chief rites, but it sounds like you're describing the soul as having spatial location (in contrast with Sam's description)... is that correct?
Quoting BrendanCount
Before this has meaning to me, you would have to explain what the Adam Kadmon is and what Chochmah is.
Quoting BrendanCount
FYI, just as a commentary... I'm not a big believer in the gods, but I'm good just interpreting this as meaning that the will is sacred in a less literal sense.
As previously stated, energy in a simple closed system with nothing else cannot increase. But a change to the system can serve to explain the change in the results without violation of the PoSR.
Quoting InPitzotl
A Little Bang has insufficient causal power on its own to explain a Big Bang. This would be creating something out of nothing.
Quoting InPitzotl
You have not answered my question about how you define the term "physical"; so I'll stick to my definition: "matter, energy and things associated with these, like forces, geometry, etc". Taken individually, like an individual atom, matter and energy behave in a way that is either deterministic or random. You can rearrange matter and energy to produce a human body, but cannot rearrange either matter, energy, or their behavior to produce free will.
Quoting InPitzotl
How does your example of colors rely on the LEM? You can however categorize all things into red things and non-red things, and this is exhaustive.
Quoting InPitzotl
Theories are built from hypothesis testing. From this link: "The scientific method involves the proposal and testing of hypotheses, [...] if it fulfills the necessary criteria (see above), then the explanation becomes a theory."
Quoting InPitzotl
No sir. In the pre-modern times, philosophy meant "search for truth" and included all fields of study to that end. In the modern times, fields of study have been separated into "science" which means "search for truths that are empirically verifiable", and "philosophy" which means "search for truths that are not empirically (ie only rationally) verifiable". Physics fits in science, metaphysics fits in philosophy.
Quoting InPitzotl
Split personality does not entail split soul. If one side of the brain holds a memory that the other side does not, then this could be sufficient to explain a change in behaviour.
"Free Will: The will has the ability to choose between multiple effects."
Reason allows to determine which outcome is best, but free will allows to choose between our voice of reason and other voices like the appetite. And we observe that we in fact don't always choose the voice of reason. E.g. sometimes my reason tells me not to drink too much because I will pay for it tomorrow, and yet I can and have decided in the past to continue drinking; which resulted in a painful yet unsurprising hangover.
I think, in a choice, this is a false dichotomy. All means and ends can (but not necessarily will) form part of the choice. The fact that there are competing motives is part of a more difficult choice. If I steal, I will eat, but if I don't, I will be thought good.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Ha! You lush! There's two factors here, both pertinent but I think only one of which you meant to touch on.
First is the disparity between language and mechanics. You might choose to get drunk, but I imagine that, more often, like me your decision to open the next bottle of wine has been largely impacted by the preceding bottle(s) of wine, i.e. you have compromised your reason. The choice is not made once but repeatedly. This is true of a lot of choices. My choosing to work is a daily occurrence.
The second is that I find philosophers wont to overestimate the role of reason in just about everything. Because reason is what they do, they see it as having a primacy it does not. Now we are talking about an endeavour that involves reasoning but it doesn't follow that every input has to be reasoned. You could choose between quite unreasonable options: shall I buy something for the sex dungeon or shall I tattoo my face?
As above, reasonable and unreasonable, selfless and selfish, good and bad options can be weighed up and selected. Which I choose will depend on my circumstances. If I am stressed, I am much more likely to choose selfish over selfless, for instance. The factors of the situation resolve the factors of the outcomes, and I am that resolver.
There are times when they do not, when we cannot resolve our options down to one, and then the result itself may be irrational, such as anger ir inaction.
That seems irrational. Are you a post modernist? Post modernism is not rational and flies in the face of science and scientific thought.
There are multiple interpretations of Quantum Physics. Modern Quantum Physics test results to not with out a doubt prove post-modernism.
Mind your manners. No need for name-calling.
Folk tend to assume causation as a hard-and-fast rule, which it isn't. First it is unclear what causation is; next, it is clear that it is neither needed nor useful in QM. Third, complexity theory shows that cause is incalculable on a macro scale.
Hence, P1 is wrong.
You assumption is that because Scientists can't predict all the behaviors of particles means that they aren't based on cause and effect. That is an enormous leap of faith on your end.
I'm not sure i'm going to convince you of anything. It is very strange to find agnostics and atheists who also reject the concept of absolute truth.
When scientists measure the speed of a particle that can also effect it the direction of its travel, but this does not mean it is still not fully effected by cause and effect. I think it is safe to say that the rejection of scientific determinism or determinism is the reject of reasoning and rational thought. I think it this age we live in we get comfortable with creature comforts and don't doubt ourselves.
Quite the opposite. Scientists can do the predictions despite there not being a cause. The electron in a double split will go right or left with a 50% probability, but there is no cause for it to go one way rather than the other.
Quoting tilda-psychist
Ah, so are you yet another who needs causation in order to bolster a religious conviction?
i guess.
That's quite hedged... "closed" seems to imply not getting energy from somewhere else, and "simple" can mean anything. Regardless, there's not necessarily a "place" where dark energy is "coming from", and a principle with a generic out ("simple") isn't a fundamental principle. What you're really doing is pattern matching to save your definition, not applying a principle. To demonstrate, let's just table this...
...instead, we'll look at entropy. Entropy actually increases in time. But that means that effects can indeed be greater than the cause, even in a closed system. In fact, that's just how entropy works. You have a closed system with some amount of entropy, and through causal evolution of states, it yields an effect with greater entropy. I'm sure you're not surprised or even shocked by this, but by the definition of PoSR currently on the table this does indeed violate it. So you have a problem.
To resolve this you need a better definition. If entropy increasing doesn't violate PoSR, then some effects can indeed be greater than causes in some sense of the word "greater". But if all we're doing is finding some things that cannot increase and saying "See? PoSR is true!", and other things that can increase and saying "Well yeah, but that doesn't really count", then PoSR is just a slot machine theory (SMT). "There are two senses of greater... where effects cannot be greater than causes, the PoSR predicts that effects cannot be greater than causes. In senses where effects can be greater than causes, we say that's allowed because x." Do you see the problem?
PoSR has to be able to conceptually fail else it's vacuous.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
You have to first explain why Little Bangs being Little implies they're being Lesser in the right way before you can apply PoSR here. Because entropy increases, either there is a Lesser in the wrong way, or PoSR is evidentially untrue. If the only way we can tell which is which is to see which ways are consistent with the PoSR, then PoSR is vacuously true like Slot Machine Theory. This is why you need a functional definition of greater.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
It doesn't... that's the point.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Red, yellow, green, blue... done. That's all the colors I can imagine. If a color isn't yellow, green, or blue, then by LEM and a bit of deduction, it must be red. I can apply that same argument to yellow; to green; and to blue. Therefore, I'm using LEM to show that my color list is complete. Right? I say, wrong. There could be a fifth color, call it orange. If there is, that's not a matter of LEM being violated; it's a matter of my being wrong about the list being complete. The problem is that my imagination failed me.
So here's what you're saying. Determinism, randomness, original cause... done. That's all the mechanics you can imagine. If something isn't deterministic or random, it must have free will; if it's not free will and not random, it must be deterministic, and so on. So by LEM, the list is complete. Right? I say, wrong. If there can be these three mechanics, there can be a fourth. The problem of showing this list is complete is not a problem of applying the LEM. It's a problem of proving there's no fourth mechanic. Make sense now?
Randomness is hard to define in itself. One might think it's just randomness and determinism that's exhaustive; in fact, people have actually made that argument against LFW. But I'm granting original causation is a third category. But the whole problem is, can there be more, some that you maybe just haven't imagined? LEM is the wrong tool here; that there are more colors than I imagine doesn't violate LEM, and that there are exactly that many doesn't follow from LEM. You cannot argue this is a complete list by applying LEM.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
First off, there's subtlety here... see the plato.stanford.edu page. Second, that does not address my comment. See e.g. here:
Quoting Paul Lucas PhD, quora
It's worth jumping over and reading through Lucas's quora answer... he gives specific examples.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Alien hand syndrome (AHS) is not split personality. Incidentally, I don't think this really shows your religion is flawed (nor intend to do so)... if a soul can be split into two separate souls, that would just be... a fact. We could simply say that there's this interesting tidbit of doctrine you're just mistaken about. You can choose to hang your hat on it if you like, but that's up to you. What I find interesting though, is that this (corpus callosotomy induced AHS) evidentially appears to be a genuine thing.
Yeah, but that sounds like duct tape and bubble gum. The less your souls have to do with subjective experiences and phenomena like making apparent free will choices as it relates to situations like AHS, the more it sounds like it's more about preserving a belief than being correct.
Of course, factors like the circumstance, our appetite, and our reason, all influence the will towards a decision; but they cannot compel the will to the decision if the will is truly free. Worst case, they can compel the body to one path, like forcing someone at gunpoint to do something, but in this case, it would be literally against their will.
Indeed, entropy increases. But as previously mentioned, things can change into different things if both supervene on a same basic thing. E.g. squares can change into circles in a closed system, thereby resulting in more circles in the effect; but both squares and circles supervene on the arrangement of matter. Similarly for entropy, which can be roughly defined as (1) unavailable energy, or (2) disordered matter. For (1), energy was already present, and turned from available to unavailable, and both supervene on general energy; in (2), matter was already present and turned from ordered to disordered, and both supervene on arrangement of matter.
Quoting InPitzotl
The LEM is used to come up with the list in the first place. As per the LEM, all things can be categorized either in category A or not-A; and that list is exhaustive. But we could also continue as so: All things within category not-A can be further categorized in category B or not-B; etc. This is how I came up here with an exhaustive list for determined, random, and free will, based on their definitions.
Quoting Paul Lucas PhD, quora
If theories are supported by hypotheses, and hypotheses are supported by testing, then theories are supported by testing.
Quoting InPitzotl
I don't see how AHS entails split soul. AHS just shows that some of our bodily acts are not voluntary; but this is obviously true: e.g. acts from our digestive system and heart are never voluntary.
Quoting InPitzotl
In the religious view, the soul is the "I" where resides the subjective experiences of the senses or "first-person point of view", consciousness, thinking, feelings, etc. To relate it to the "split-brain video", it is possibly the same "I" that experiences both the theistic and atheistic views, and the "I" simply forgets one event when the other side of the brain is activated, sort of like how a drunk was conscious the night before but forgets the events the next morning.
No, your imagine did. There are people who argue against LFW on the basis that there can only be determined and random things... if it's determined it's "forced", if it's random it can't be will (or so it goes). But they get this list because they enumerate: not determined = random, not random = determined.
(a)They get two things, in their enumerated list. They applied LEM.
(b) You have three things, in yours. You applied LEM.
(c) Supposed there's a fourth thing; maybe it's just "p-zombies". Does that violate LEM? Nope.
So, you're arguing that LEM makes this list. But some people apply LEM and get two mechanics. You apply it, and you get three. If there were a fourth, LEM still holds. So apparently LEM is consistent with discarding your souls, with accepting your souls, and with accepting yet another possibility (p-zombies in this case). So how can you argue that LEM tells you there are three things when LEM works perfectly fine with 2 or 4 things? You're not using LEM to make this list... you're using your imagination. You're just enumerating, and stopping when you can't think of anything else.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
It's a bit more subtle than that. The "more general" things are still theories before they are tested (and accepted). String Theory's a prime example.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
...if it were distinct "I"'s after the split, would that be critically damaging, or just interesting?
Not necessarily, you should also assume P1 as being true. Maybe everything is determined goes for every structure before reaching the biological state.
It is you that does the compelling on the basis of them. This is why abstraction, i.e. ignoring what the will does and how it works, is unhelpful. 'Truly free' in this context can only mean 'act against one's own intentions' or 'act randomly' or such, which are far more deleterious to the concept of free will than 'can only decide once'.
It's a matter of definitions. If randomness was defined as "not determined" or "Cause A does not always give Effect B", then there would only be 2 categories. But this definition is incorrect, because it is possible for a Cause A to not always give Effect B, and yet not have randomness. On the other hand, the definiton "Cause A does not always give Effect B, and there is no agency" seems correct. In that case, what remains is the category "Cause A does not always give Effect B, and there is an agency", and this definition fits for Free Will. I could be wrong if the definition of either of the three terms, Determinism, Randomness, Free Will, is incorrect.
Quoting InPitzotl
Sure, we can come up with a theory first, and proceed to hypothesis testing to validate the theory second; so long as some hypothesis testing is applicable to the theory. My guess is that hypothesis testing applies to String Theory, even if not at the present time. And of course, no theory should be accepted before testing and validation (unless a theory has to be provisionally accepted for some practical reason).
Quoting InPitzotl
At first glance, critically damaging. And interesting.
Quoting Eugen
Are you saying that things are determined prior to the biological state, and then not necessarily determined after that? But then if not for an additional non-physical thing like the soul, how can things go from being determined to non-determined?
What I am getting out of your claim is that the will has the possibility of choosing; but also does not because it will always choose the same decision for a given set of information it receives. If on the other hand, for a given set of information, the will can choose between two decisions, then it can choose between two decisions.
Hello,
For instance: we can assume there is consciousness at the subatomic level, but it cannot manifest itself unless it is integrated in a more complex and proper system, like DNA. So as long as there is no proper combination of atoms to create that ''independent'' circuit, atoms just obey the laws. But when DNA is created, than those atoms obey both the physical laws and the purpose-driven consciousness/life/soul inside them.
Of course, this may be wrong, but nonetheless is a possibility. It's a panpsychist-like view, which states that actually matter and the reality itself is more than materialists think it is. This view is getting more and more popular among thinkers nowadays.
This is of course not a practical concern. Circumstances don't truly repeat themselves. I might find myself in the same situation, but in a different emotional state, in a different mental state, or having learned from experience of last time, or having access to a different subset of my options if the decision is urgent.
For me and my situation to be absolutely identical would be equivalent to reversing time back to the start of the situation and replaying. I think almost all of us would expect the situation to play out in exactly the same way and, because of that, almost all of us are determinists deep down.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
:up: And it usually can choose between many.
Interesting theory. But I wonder if it merely pushes the problem one more step, instead of explaining it. A condition to accept a property as being physical is that it must be observable by physical instruments (I think). Physical instruments have not observed such a property in particles; and so even if particles had such a property, it still would not be correct to call it "physical". Note that when it comes to our own consciousness, although we can observe our own individually, it is not observed by physical instruments either.
What do you think?
I agree that if revisiting a past event as a spectator, we would expect the exact same outcome for that event every time; but note that this expectation is also compatible with free will as I define it: In the original event, the person freely chooses to act in a particular way, and upon revisiting that event, we see a replay of that same act being freely chosen.
Many scientists and philosophers are struggling to show us there are rational scientific physical explanations for everything. Sometimes they provide tons of information, complicated statements, and high-flown phrases with a supposed deep meaning. You asked me what I think: either I am not capable to understand those super-complex explanations, or those super-complicated explanations are simply long complicated senseless phrases that are intended to make ordinary people like me that ''scientists know the truth, but it's complicated'' when in fact there is only the impotence of the materialistic view of the reality.
But again, that is just me and I take very seriously the possibility of me being incapable to understand some things. I am a simple guy and for me anything that is more than simple logic sounds bad.
Right, but if the same scenario were played out a second time, what might change the outcome such that we can point to it and call it free will? Why would a rational person who made the rational decision in that scenario the first time not make it the second?
Some suggested examples:
All of these speak to free will, insofar as I have no higher authority than myself to regard (so long as I don't act illegally). But they also describe different initial conditions the second time around, and determinism does not give you the same outputs if you feed in different inputs.
It is precisely because it is me that decided on bases such as the above one way or another that it is free will, and it is precisely because the decision depends on these factors (via me) that it is deterministic, or at least cannot be dismissed as incompatible with determinism.
I'm with you on that one. "Knowledge" is "justified true belief". I don't think someone truly knows what they are talking about if they cannot justify with simple explanations, even if these simple explanations are a summary of the real thing only.
The key is the word "rational". If a person chooses the path of reason 100% of the time, then you are correct that any change in decision, even freely chosen, must come from a change in the situation. But the real impact of free will comes before that; when it comes to choosing between the path of reason and the path of the appetite (when the two are conflicting).