Consciousness and Incompatibilism

Michael Ojo April 23, 2020 at 12:49 1075 views 2 comments

If free will is at variance with determinism, what do we make of philosophical consciousness? Granted that we are not always free to choose in mitigated circumstances in which we cannot but settle with available alternatives, can we still sustain the argument of the compatibilists with regards to constraints to choose freely? Considering the law of nature, past events and uncertain future, is there is anything like free will??

Comments (2)

Zophie April 23, 2020 at 13:09 #404596 0 likes

If you're okay with a semi-serious answer, I'd venture our collective human ignorance will always present the appearance of genuine choice, which I'm okay with. I can't say how that relates to consciousness.

Pfhorrest April 24, 2020 at 00:08 #404827 0 likes

Reply to Michael Ojo I don’t see what connection you are trying to draw between consciousness and free will here, or what question about that connection you are asking.

I do think there is a connection though, in that consciousness and free will are analogous to each other. Phenomenal consciousness is like incompatiblist free will: everything has it, it’s just an inevitable aspect of existing, so it doesn’t differentiate anything from anything else, and isn’t of any practical importance. Access consciousness is like compatibilist will: they are the important kinds of their respective things, that distinguish fully fledged people from rocks and trees and simple machines, but they aren’t of a much philosophical interest, being only a kind of reflexive functionality (self-awareness and self-control respectively) built up out of simpler ordinary physical functionalities.