Sleeping Through The Hard Problem of Consciousness

Reply to TheMadFool
I see here that you started a whole new thread so I'm going to answer you in here.

Quoting TheMadFool

As I understand it, the hard problem of consciosuness claims that there exist subjective mental experiences (qualia) that can't be explained in physical terms, herein meant the brain. In other words, (physical) brain activity is not sufficient to explain subjective mind experiences.

This is not necessarily a true characterization of the hard question of consciousness. The hard question recognizes that brain states correlate and are necessary for mental states, and one may even be a complete materialist (there is nothing more than physical processes). However, the hard question is pointing to the fact that there is an unexplainable phenomena (i.e. the "explanatory gap") for how or why it is that brain states are correlated with mental states. It is the difference between causing an event and being an event. We know that biological/chemical/physical activity causes mental states, but what is not explained is why this particular set of bio/chemical/physical events are mental states.

Quoting TheMadFool

When a person sleeps, brain activity ceases in relevant respects and this person stops having any and all subjective mind experiences. This implies that brain activity is necessary for subjective mind experiences.

As a person awakens, brain activity resumes, and all subjective mind experiences are restored. What this means is that brain activity is sufficient for subjective mind experiences.

This is irrelevant based on what I said above between the difference between "causing" and "being" a mental state. No one positing the hard question is denying brain states cause mental states.

Quoting TheMadFool

1. Brain activity is necessary for subjective mind experiences

This the hard questioners agree with.

Quoting TheMadFool

2. Brain activity is sufficient for subjective mind experiences

Most materialist hard questioners may agree with this. That isn't necessarily the issue either.

Quoting TheMadFool

3. Brain activity is both sufficient and necessary for subjective mind experiences (1 & 2)

Same thing repeated yep.

Quoting TheMadFool

Ergo,

4. There is no hard problem of consciousness.

This is not necessarily true. Hard questioners are asking why/how it is that mental states are (metaphysically speaking one and the same) as this particular set of physical events. Just saying brain states are necessary and sufficient does not explain this.

Reply to TheMadFool

TMF!

If the subjective experience explains the nature of reality, what would explain the information acting [that acts] upon all matter (or emergent matter as it were)? In other words, how do we reconcile informational energy acting upon all matter within our consciousness(?).

I think that would be one of the missing pieces there, as it relates to your notion that the nature of reality (consciousness) is subjective.

Otherwise TMF, I agree with your Subjective Epistemological/Ontological Problem. This is the problem associated with “subjective” versus “objective” perspectives on being in the world. Of course the way to think about this is that subjective experiential consciousness is fully "contained" within the individual. This containment results in two important sub problems, which are mirror images of each other. The first is the problem of directly knowing another’s subjective experience—the problem being it cannot be done. This is the problem of: “How do I know that you see red the way I see red?” This problem also relates to our knowledge of consciousness in other animals, which we can only know indirectly. This is also related to the philosophical problem of zombies.

Indeed, all subjective experiences can only be inferred via behavior from an objective perspective. The second issue is the inversion of this problem. This is the problem that, as individuals, we are trapped in our subjective perceptual experience of the world. That is, the only way I can know about the world is through my subjective theater of experience.

An even harder question is whether or not the brain is a formidable tool for ascertaining reality as it is. I would argue that it probably isn't. It's just too small and personal to grasp the over extending hierarchy of the universe.

We only experience time when we're awake, too. Does that mean time is a product of the brain. You would say no, because another observer can detect its passing. Yet mind does have a relationship to time, and what is the nature of that relationship.

So, no, the nature of mind isn't entirely located in the brain. A faucet can produce water, and if you were a caveman you might believe it creates water. But that no water comes out when it's off doesn't explain the origin of water. When it comes out when it's on doesn't tell us anything about the nature of water.

Similarly, conscious subjective experience may seem to be generated by the brain, but this tells us nothing about the properties of subjective awareness. We have no idea if it forms oceans that evaporate and rain back down to earth.

This is slightly longer than your typical post, but I think you guys will find it interesting. Proposed solution to the hard problem!


Scientists have identified entanglement in photosynthetic reaction centers, within which light-activated electrons of multiple chlorophyll pigments are actually more like a single perturbing quanta field than a particle transport chain, with energization transmitted to centrally located reaction center molecules responsible for initiating biochemical pathways that drive much of cellular metabolism in plants, stimulation that can take place from any direction and while diffuse electron wavicle structure is in any orientation. We can liken this type of quanta phenomenon to a subatomic body of water, where translation of light into kinetic energy at any point in the electron field generates a holistic ripple effect that never fails to evince statistical signs of reaction center activation in nearly identical proportion to UV exposure, total energy yield from any quantity or orientation of ultraviolet photons.

The key functional role of ‘entanglement systems’ or hybrid electron waves spanning multiple molecules to a biological process as basic as photosynthesis makes it seem probable that this type of phenomenon is one of the core components of physiology, a pillar of life’s chemistry.

Photons of different wavelengths have additive properties when combined: any two primary colors synthesize to produce a secondary color, all visible wavelengths together produce white light, and so on. Like photons, electrons also have a wavelike nature and no doubt additive properties within single atoms or small collections of molecules, which are probably minute enough to evade detection by the naked eye, and most likely decompose quickly in an inorganic environment due to decoherence from thermodynamic “noise” of kinetic entropy characterizing large aggregates of agitated mass.

However, in a physiological context, mass is much less subjected to entropic effects of kinetic motion, being stabilized as emergent structurality in biochemical pathways and additional types of molecular systems, so that these additive properties of electron wavelength may possibly be sustained for a prolonged period. Not only this, but electrons can hypothetically be entangled in multiple ways at once, creating a superposition in which additive properties of numerous entanglement structures are simultaneously congregated into larger entanglement structures, systems within systems that we might want to distinguish from the relatively simplistic situation inhering in photosynthesis, a categorically different phenomenon of hybridized ‘coherence field’. If coherence fields are found to be supported by the molecular assemblages of cellular biochemistry in the nervous system, especially likely to be discovered in the brain, their extremely complex additive properties may be what we know as ‘qualia’. In this scenario, qualia are not merely an immateriality supervenient on atoms, but instead a kind of exceedingly complex “color” or electromagnetically quantum resonance, material states intrinsic to tangible structure of the physical world.

The question then is how what we know as our conscious self-awareness can emerge from this basic qualia phenomenon. How do qualia give rise to the qualitative “experience” of a perceiver? A possible explanation is that biochemical and physiological structures exist, particularly in the brain, for synchronizing these sustained coherence fields, analogous to the clock mechanism of a CPU, so that qualia are metaorganized into a large array of experiential modules, parts of which compose the self-aware mind. Activity of these compound modules may manifest as the standing brain waves detected by EEG (electroencephalogram).


In exactly what way consciousness emerged via evolution is a mystery, but we can be fairly certain about what eventually had to obtain in order for it to be possible. Initially, electrical properties in aggregates of tissue such as the brain needed to be robust enough that a stable supervenience of electromagnetic field (EMF) was created by systematic electron fluxing. Quantum effects in molecules of the body are sensitive to trace EMF energy sources, creating a structural complex of relatively thermodynamic mass containing pockets of relatively quantum biochemistry integrated by sustained radiation. EMF/quantum hybridization is likely responsible for our synthetic experience of qualia, how we perceive unfathomably minute and diverse fluctuating of environments as a perpetualized substrate, perturbed by its surroundings but never vanishing while we are awake and lucid, the essence of perceptual “stream of consciousness”.

Nonlocal phenomena are ever underlying the macroscopic substance of qualitative consciousness, its EMF properties as well as bulked three dimensional matter in which nonlocality is partially dampened, and quantum processes in cells interface perception instantiated in bodies with the more or less nonlocal natural world mostly still enigmatic to scientific knowledge.

Quantum features of biochemistry have likely been refined evolutionarily so that mechanisms by which relative nonlocality affects organisms, mechanisms of EMF/matter interfacing, mechanisms targeting particular environmental stimuli via functionally tailored pigments along with further classes of molecules and cellular tissues, and mechanisms for translation of stimulus into representational memory all became increasingly coordinated until an arrangement involving what we call ‘intentionality’ emerged, a mind with executive functions of deliberative interpretation and behavioral strategizing, beyond mere reflex-centric memory conjoined to stimulus/response. Qualitative consciousness precedes the degree of unification we experience as humanlike awareness, for qualia can exist and perform a functional role in consort with quantum effects and additional gradations of nonlocal reality while an organism is almost entirely lacking executive, centralized control in the form of intentions.


It can be tested experimentally and explains how qualia and matter coexist.

Quoting neonspectraltoast

We only experience time when we're awake, too.

I have experienced dreams that had temporality as an important factor. To give a general example, imagine a nightmare, in which the dreamer is aware of some impending sense of doom, but also having to wait for the cause of said doom to occur. There is a felt duration that makes the nightmare all the more agonising.

So?

Reply to neonspectraltoast

So I dispute your assertion that dreams are a non temporal experience. Is there any conscious experience outside of time? If the answer is no, then we can begin to posit at least something about reality. That it is essentially durational (Of course, this depends on whether you think the brain creates the attributes of subjective experience) .

Quoting schopenhauer1

However, the hard question is pointing to the fact that there is an unexplainable phenomena (i.e. the "explanatory gap") for how or why it is that brain states are correlated with mental states. It is the difference between causing an event and being an event. We know that biological/chemical/physical activity causes mental states, but what is not explained is why this particular set of bio/chemical/physical events are mental states.

Firstly, thanks for the clarification. What you say makes sense but the hard problem of consciousness characterized as being about an explanatory gap is, essentially, to claim that physical brain activity is not sufficient in providing an explanation of subjective mental experiences but if we recognize the fact that when we wake up from sleep, reactivated brain activity corresponding to a return of subjective mental experiences, we'll come to the realization that the explanatory gap you speak of has more to do with our ignorance than anything even remotely linkable to the many versions of dualism that are doing the rounds.

To sum up, notwithstanding the fact that, as of now, subjective mental experiences haven't been explained by brain activity, I've demonstrated a sufficient and necessary connection between the brain and these subjective mental experiences which entails that there really is nothing spooky going on at all - it's not a matter of "IF mental phenomena can be explained with brain activity?" but of "WHEN this will happen?"

One problem: I never asserted that dreams were non temporal.

Quoting 3017amen

TMF!

If the subjective experience explains the nature of reality, what would explain the information acting [that acts] upon all matter (or emergent matter as it were)? In other words, how do we reconcile informational energy acting upon all matter within our consciousness(?).

I think that would be one of the missing pieces there, as it relates to your notion that the nature of reality (consciousness) is subjective.

Otherwise TMF, I agree with your Subjective Epistemological/Ontological Problem. This is the problem associated with “subjective” versus “objective” perspectives on being in the world. Of course the way to think about this is that subjective experiential consciousness is fully "contained" within the individual. This containment results in two important sub problems, which are mirror images of each other. The first is the problem of directly knowing another’s subjective experience—the problem being it cannot be done. This is the problem of: “How do I know that you see red the way I see red?” This problem also relates to our knowledge of consciousness in other animals, which we can only know indirectly. This is also related to the philosophical problem of zombies.

Indeed, all subjective experiences can only be inferred via behavior from an objective perspective. The second issue is the inversion of this problem. This is the problem that, as individuals, we are trapped in our subjective perceptual experience of the world. That is, the only way I can know about the world is through my subjective theater of experience.

Since brain activity correlates with everything mental, inclusive of so-called subjective mental experiences, it goes without saying that these so-called subjective mental experiences are explicable just with brain activity and since this is exactly what the hard problem of consciousness claims is impossible, I'd say there really is no hard problem of consciousness.

Quoting neonspectraltoast

One problem: I never asserted that dreams were non temporal.

"We only experience time when we're awake"

I suppose it doesn't necessarily follow that dreams themselves are non temporal (iyo), but in any case you assert that time is not experienced in sleep. My assertion that time is experienced outside of the waking state remains. And the rest holds.

So you're saying time is created by dreams?

Quoting TheMadFool

Firstly, thanks for the clarification. What you say makes sense but the hard problem of consciousness characterized as being about an explanatory gap is, essentially, to claim that physical brain activity is not sufficient in providing an explanation of subjective mental experiences but if we recognize the fact that when we wake up from sleep, reactivated brain activity corresponding to a return of subjective mental experiences, we'll come to the realization that the explanatory gap you speak of has more to do with our ignorance than anything even remotely linkable to the many versions of dualism that are doing the rounds.

Well, yeah, you are just reiterating the point of the hard questioners.. Why/what/how is it that bio/chemical/physical processes of the brain-body are also experiential/mental states as well. That explanatory gap is not explained by the functions of sleep and awake states. That just says what we know already- that consciousness can have sleep and awake states. It in no way points towards an answer to that explanatory gap. Saying that "brain activity corresponds with mental experiences" is already understood and agreed upon. That is not the issue though so you are making a case for the wrong problem.

Quoting schopenhauer1

Well, yeah, you are just reiterating the point of the hard questioners.. Why/what/how is it that bio/chemical/physical processes of the brain-body are also experiential/mental states as well. That explanatory gap is not explained by the functions of sleep and awake states. That just says what we know already- that consciousness can have sleep and awake states. It in no way points towards an answer to that explanatory gap. Saying that "brain activity corresponds with mental experiences" is already understood and agreed upon. That is not the issue though so you are making a case for the wrong problem.

Yes, I'm repeating myself (again) - sorry, not the sharpest knife in the drawer myself.

This explanatory gap you speak of is basically the claim that brain activity is insufficient for providing an explanation of subjective mental states. That's the bottom line of the hard problem of consciousness.

Given the above, have a look at what sleep and awake states imply:

1. Brain activity present (person is awake) and all mental states are present, including subjective mental states

2. Brain activity absent (person is asleep) and all mental states are present, including subjective mental states

From 1 and 2 we can discern that the only difference between the presence and absence of mental states (including subjective mental states) is the presence and absence of brain activity. This, in my humble opinion, proves that an explanation for mental states, even subjective mental states can be found in brain activity alone. There's no need to hypothesize a non-physical mind substance at all.

As an analogy think of a person C who has zero knowledge of electricity and is given an on/off switch and a bulb with a working circuit. Think of brain states as the on/off switch and all mental states, including subjective mental states, as the glow of a bulb.

When the switch is on (brain activity present-awake), the bulb glows (mental states including subjective ones present); when the switch is off (brain activity absent-asleep), the bulb stops glowing (mental states includint subjective mental states absent).

For C there exists an explanatory gap as he doesn't know how the switch effects the bulb's behavior due to his ignorance of electricity - this is exactly like the explanatory gap you mention: the hard problem of consciousness.

However, upon playing with the switch a number of times, putting it on/off(waking/sleeping), C will notice that the bulb's state (presence/absence of mental states, including subjective mental states) correlates with the state of the switch and he'll realize that if there's an explanation for the bulb's state then it has to do with the on/off switch (brain activity/brain inactivity). C, due to his ignorance, doesn't know the explanation for the bulb's behavior (present/absent mental states, including subjective mental states) - the explanatory gap - but what he does know is that it must have something to do with the on/off switch (brain activity/inactivity).

There's no need for C to look for an explanation elsewhere - he needs to examine the on/off switch more carefully. Similarly, the person trying to explain mental states, including subjective mental states, doesn't need to entertain the possibility of dualism being true; all he needs to do is examine brain activity more closely for the correct explanation.

Quoting TheMadFool

This explanatory gap you speak of is basically the claim that brain activity is insufficient for providing an explanation of subjective mental states. That's the bottom line of the hard problem of consciousness.

But that is not. It is sufficient if we are explaining the causes of subjective mental states. It is not sufficient in explaining how neurons, bio/chemical/physical activity (more generally) are/is mental states. See the difference?

Quoting TheMadFool

2. Brain activity absent (person is asleep) and all mental states are present, including subjective mental states

First of all brain activity is happening, just different areas of the brain. But I'll overlook this point..

Quoting TheMadFool

There's no need to hypothesize a non-physical mind substance at all.

Hard questioners aren't necessarily doing that. Some may be dualists but not all.

Quoting TheMadFool

However, upon playing with the switch a number of times, putting it on/off(waking/sleeping), C will notice that the bulb's state (presence/absence of mental states, including subjective mental states) correlates with the state of the switch and he'll realize that if there's an explanation for the bulb's state then it has to do with the on/off switch (brain activity/brain inactivity). C, due to his ignorance, doesn't know the explanation for the bulb's behavior (present/absent mental states, including subjective mental states) - the explanatory gap - but what he does know is that it must have something to do with the on/off switch (brain activity/inactivity).

No one is questioning that brain activity correlates and is necessary and maybe even sufficient for understanding how consciousness operates. Rather, it is how mental states and brain states are one in the same. You keep moving from a metaphysical question (the hard question/ why it is that brain states are mental states too), to easier questions (how bio/chemical/physical processes cause or are correlated with mental states). That is a major difference.

Quoting TheMadFool

As I understand it, the hard problem of consciosuness claims that there exist subjective mental experiences (qualia) that can't be explained in physical terms,

It would be better states as 'no objective description is the same as a subjective experience.'

As often with this problem, your attempt to 'explain it away' only demonstrates that you don't understand it. Google Facing Up to the Hard Problem of Consciousness and have a geezer at the original.

[quote=David Chalmers]The really hard problem of consciousness is the problem of experience. When we think and perceive, there is a whir of information-processing, but there is also a subjective aspect. As Nagel (1974) has put it, there is something it is like to be a conscious organism. This subjective aspect is experience. When we see, for example, we experience visual sensations: the felt quality of redness, the experience of dark and light, the quality of depth in a visual field. Other experiences go along with perception in different modalities: the sound of a clarinet, the smell of mothballs. Then there are bodily sensations, from pains to orgasms; mental images that are conjured up internally; the felt quality of emotion, and the experience of a stream of conscious thought. What unites all of these states is that there is something it is like to be in them. All of them are states of experience.

It is undeniable that some organisms are subjects of experience. But the question of how it is that these systems are subjects of experience is perplexing.[/quote]

http://consc.net/papers/facing.html

Personally, I think the above passage reads better if 'being' was used in the place of 'experience'.

Reply to Wayfarer
Good quote.

@WayfarerQuoting schopenhauer1

But that is not. It is sufficient if we are explaining the causes of subjective mental states. It is not sufficient in explaining how neurons, bio/chemical/physical activity (more generally) are/is mental states. See the difference?

Again, I've failed to make you see my point. Let me try again; perhaps a little detail about David Chalmers, the author of the hard problem of consciousness will help. Before I begin, take note that there might be some inaccuracies but hopefully they will not prove to be an impediment.

David Chalmers is a dualist i.e. he believes there's a non-physical aspect to mind. The hard problem of consciousness is, in all likelihood, foundational to his dualist outlook which implies that the hard problem of consciousness entails dualism. I will stick to your characterization of the hard problem of consciousness as an explanatory gap, the basic assertion being that, to keep it short, qualia can't be explained in terms of brain states.

My reply to the above is not to deny that there's an explantory gap - there is. However, and this is my claim, this explantory gap doesn't entail dualism as Chalmers seems to believe. The fact that when the brain shuts off, qualia disappear and when the brain is reactivated, qualia return, clearly demonstrates both the necessity and sufficiency of brain states for qualia. If brain states are both sufficient and necessary for qualia, which entails that qualia have a physical basis, why entertain dualism? It's unnecessary and therefore unwarranted.

Think of it like a mystery that needs solving. Someone has given qualia to conscious people. We know, with certainty, that Materialism did it for Materialism (brain states) is both sufficient and necessary for qualia. Why then should the investigators of this mystery about who gave qualia to conscious people have another suspect, Dualism?

Quoting TheMadFool

foundational to his dualist outlook which implies that the hard problem of consciousness entails dualism

I don't think the problem entails dualism.

Quoting TheMadFool

My reply to the above is not to deny that there's no explantory gap - there is. However, and this is my claim, this explantory gap doesn't entail dualism as Chamlers seems to believe. The fact that when the brain shuts off, qualia disappear and when the brain is reactivated, qualia return, clearly demonstrates both the necessity and sufficiency of brain states for qualia. If brain states are both sufficient and necessary for qualia, which entails that qualia have a physical basis, why entertain dualism? It's unnecessary and therefore unwarranted.

I believe Chalmers is a kind of panpsychist, so more like a neutral monist, but he could have various positions at different times. Anyways, the main point here is that the explanatory gap needs to be explained. How is it that brain activity is mental activity? You say all is brain activity. That's fine.That's great. Now tell me how brain activity is mental activity.

Quoting TheMadFool

Think of it like a mystery that needs solving. Someone has given qualia to conscious people. We know, with certainty, that Materialism did it for Materialism (brain states) is both sufficient and necessary for qualia. Why then should the investigators of this mystery about who gave qualia to conscious people have another suspect, Dualism?

Because it is one way around the problem. It may not be the right way, but it is one way to solve it. Panpsychism is more subtle I think in that it the material aspect has an internal mental aspect as well on some level. Anyways, that is just one way to try to close the gap. There could be others perhaps. Many materialist arguments have a "hidden dualism" embedded in it, where the homunculus is posited by some "magic" integration of physical events, or as I stated in a previous thread, is illegally put in the equation without explanation as simply "illusion". Of course, no explanation is offered as to exactly what illusion is, other than the concretion of physical events over the course of time.

Quoting schopenhauer1

I don't think the problem entails dualism.

Qualia and Dualism

Reply to TheMadFool
So someone raised a question about qualia in stackexchange and this means the hard problem must be one only dualists care about? It is a problem all of these things must face if we want to explain the gap between physical and mental states. A functionalist or identity theorist is only going to say "When I see red, these brain states are occurring". So? How IS red THOSE brain states? How are body/brain states a subjective experience itself?

Quoting TheMadFool

My reply to the above is not to deny that there's an explantory gap - there is. However, and this is my claim, this explanatory gap doesn't entail dualism as Chamlers seems to believe. The fact that when the brain shuts off, qualia disappear and when the brain is reactivated, qualia return, clearly demonstrates both the necessity and sufficiency of brain states for qualia. If brain states are both sufficient and necessary for qualia, which entails that qualia have a physical basis, why entertain dualism? It's unnecessary and therefore unwarranted.

Is the brain a physical thing? Well, of course, there's the physical brain - but only if you separate it from the organism, at which point it does indeed become several kilos of organic matter. But the brain, in the context in which it is meaningful, as part of the living being, is the most complex phenomenon known to science. So I think that saying that it's physical, simply assumes physicalism - which is the point at issue. Hence, it assumes what is at issue - it begs the question.

I should add, that I don't believe anything is purely or only physical. If science knew what was purely physical, then there would be no outstanding problems in physics. But science doesn't know that.

Quoting schopenhauer1

So someone raised a question about qualia in stackexchange and this means the hard problem must be one only dualists care about? It is a problem all of these things must face if we want to explain the gap between physical and mental states. A functionalist or identity theorist is only going to say "When I see red, these brain states are occurring". So? How IS red THOSE brain states? How are body/brain states a subjective experience itself?

[quote=Wikipedia]Chalmers argues for an "explanatory gap" from the objective to the subjective, and criticizes physicalist explanations of mental experience, making him a dualist.[/quote] :chin:

Regarding Chalmer's dualism, his Wiki entry simply says 'Chalmers characterizes his view as "naturalistic dualism": naturalistic because he believes mental states supervenes "naturally" on physical systems (such as brains); dualist because he believes mental states are ontologically distinct from and not reducible to physical systems.'

And I agree with that, although I think his 'philosophical zombie' argument is nonsense.

Reply to TheMadFool
So? The explanatory gap has to be explained by both camps. I don't necessarily agree with dualists either. In a way dualism seems to be bypassing all we know of empirical evidence. But this doesn't mean the materialists get a pass either. All is material yet the material can't explain how material is mental (in some circumstances). All we have is talk of emergence, illusion, integration, which just amounts to hidden dualism (which is essentially saying "magic" as far as I see).

A different way to illustrate the problem (the explanatory gap / mind conundrum) could be to ask:
Can you derive what a bat's echolocation is like by examining the bat?
Can you derive those special formats of experience (qualia) from looking at an (alleged) experiencer?
We can guess and correlate of course; is that the extent of it?
Either way, I cannot experience your self-awareness, since then I'd be you instead.

Quoting schopenhauer1

material can't explain how material is mental

Yes, indeed, there is an explantory gap. I'm not questioning that at all. I'm primarily concerned about where, in materialism or dualism, the explanation will be found and my argument suggests the explanation is located somewhere in materialism rather than dualism.

Quoting Wayfarer

Regarding Chalmer's dualism, his Wiki entry simply says 'Chalmers characterizes his view as "naturalistic dualism": naturalistic because he believes mental states supervenes "naturally" on physical systems (such as brains); dualist because he believes mental states are ontologically distinct from and not reducible to physical systems.'

Thanks as always Wayfarer although I feel I should disagree with the last sentence: "...not reducible to physical systems"

Reply to jorndoe
I don't know how to explain this, but this is almost like a sub-division of the bigger question.

The more general question is: How do brain states have mental states?

The more specific questions are things like: Does that specific entity have an internal state or How do I know other people have internal states?

Quoting TheMadFool

Yes, indeed, there is an explantory gap. I'm not questioning that at all. I'm primarily concerned about where, in materialism or dualism, the explanation will be found and my argument suggests the explanation is located somewhere in materialism rather than dualism.

That's great, now answer how.

Quoting TheMadFool

although I feel I should disagree with the last sentence: "...not reducible to physical systems"

Right. And let me suggest why: because the strong consensus in our culture is to believe that everything is reducible to physical systems. That is what we make the world out to be: that which is understandable in physical, or natural, or scientific terms. Whatever is not thus understandable is subjective or private or personal - right?

Quoting schopenhauer1

That's great, now answer how.

I already did. Brain activity (something physical) both sufficient and necessary for qualia . :chin:

Quoting Wayfarer

Right. And let me suggest why: because the strong consensus in our culture is to believe that everything is reducible to physical systems. That is what we make the world out to be: that which is understandable in physical, or natural, or scientific terms. Whatever is not thus understandable is subjective or private or personal - right?

Right but I fail to see what follows.

Quoting jorndoe

A different way to illustrate the problem (the explanatory gap / mind conundrum) could be to ask:
Can you derive what a bat's echolocation is like by examining the bat?
Can you derive those special formats of experience (qualia) from looking at an (alleged) experiencer?
We can guess and correlate of course; is that the extent of it?
Either way, I cannot experience your self-awareness, since then I'd be you instead.

The hard problem of consciousness is the bedrock for all arguments for dualism for it addresses the issue of qualia directly, without resorting to imagined scenarios. Refute it and you undermine the significance of qualia and do that and all qualia-based arguments fall.

Quoting TheMadFool

Right but I fail to see what follows.

That's because you need to look at your assumptions, not just through them.

Quoting Wayfarer

That's because you need to look at your assumptions, not just through them.

Most valuable comment so far. :up:

My premises, based on known facts of sleep and awake states, are:

1. Brain off -> no qualia
2. Brain on -> yes qualia

3. yes qualia -> brain on (contrapositive of 1)

4. brain on is sufficient for qualia (from 2)

and

5. brain on is necessary for qualia (from 3)

Ergo,

6. Brain on is both sufficient and necessary for qualia (from 4 and 5)

Reply to TheMadFool 1 is false. If you’re asleep you’re still perfectly capable of feeling - the brain is not off, that would correspond with anesthesia or coma. Which proves nothing. If you’re asleep and someone pours cold water on you you’ll experience qualia aplenty.

Quoting Wayfarer

1 is false. If you’re asleep you’re still perfectly capable of feeling - the brain is not off, that would correspond with anesthesia or coma. Which proves nothing. If you’re asleep and someone pours cold water on you you’ll experience qualia aplenty.

Only if I wake up :chin:

Reply to TheMadFool But if your brain really was off - and I do wonder - then you wouldn’t. :razz:

Quoting Wayfarer

But if your brain really was off - and I do wonder - then you wouldn’t. :razz:

:up:

??? :chin:

Reply to TheMadFool

The scientific revolution of the 17th century, which has given rise to such extraordinary progress in the understanding of nature, depended on a crucial limiting step at the start: It depended on subtracting from the physical world as an object of study everything mental – consciousness, meaning, intention or purpose. The physical sciences as they have developed since then describe, with the aid of mathematics, the elements of which the material universe is composed, and the laws governing their behavior in space and time.

We ourselves, as physical organisms, are part of that universe, composed of the same basic elements as everything else, and recent advances in molecular biology have greatly increased our understanding of the physical and chemical basis of life. Since our mental lives evidently depend on our existence as physical organisms, especially on the functioning of our central nervous systems, it seems natural to think that the physical sciences can in principle provide the basis for an explanation of the mental aspects of reality as well — that physics can aspire finally to be a theory of everything.

However, I believe this possibility is ruled out by the conditions that have defined the physical sciences from the beginning. The physical sciences can describe organisms like ourselves as parts of the objective spatio-temporal order – our structure and behavior in space and time – but they cannot describe the subjective experiences of such organisms or how the world appears to their different particular points of view. There can be a purely physical description of the neurophysiological processes that give rise to an experience, and also of the physical behavior that is typically associated with it, but such a description, however complete, will leave out the subjective essence of the experience – how it is from the point of view of its subject — without which it would not be a conscious experience at all.

Thomas Nagel, The Core of "Mind and Cosmos"

Quoting schopenhauer1

Does that specific entity have an internal state or How do I know other people have internal states?

I guess solipsism and the gap are related, proving one impacts the other. I wonder if, say, Searle's "Chinese room" and Jackson's "Mary's room" are impacted as well.

Quoting TheMadFool

The hard problem of consciousness is the bedrock for all arguments for dualism for it addresses the issue of qualia directly, without resorting to imagined scenarios. Refute it and you undermine the significance of qualia and do that and all qualia-based arguments fall.

Substance dualism simply declares "mind stuff" (irreducibly) fundamental or without any explanation in other terms, even in principle. An easy answer.

• say, some sort of physicalism (or maybe speculative realism) and qualia do not contradict, rather neither entails the other, hence the gap
• placing qualia (or whatever aspects of mind) as basic/fundamental/irreducible does not explain mind, but rather avoids explanation by said placement, thereby disregarding some things we already do know about mind

Maybe we can at least account for the gap rather than bridge it.


Plenty evidence pointing in one direction ...

• Brain makes decisions before you even know it (Kerri Smith; Nature; Apr 2008)
• Brain Scanners Can See Your Decisions Before You Make Them (Brandon Keim; WIRED; Apr 2008)
• Mind-reading program translates brain activity into words (Ian Sample; The Guardian; Jan 2012)
• Scientists Use Brain Waves To Eavesdrop On What We Hear (Peter Murray; Singularity Hub; from the Public Library of Science (PLoS) Biology; Feb 2012)
• Neural Decoding of Visual Imagery During Sleep (Horikawa, Tamaki, Miyawaki, Kamitani; Science AAAS; Apr 2013)
• Researcher controls colleague’s motions in 1st human brain-to-brain interface (Rajesh Rao, Andrea Stocco; University of Washington; Aug 2013)
• Brain decoding: Reading minds (Kerri Smith; Nature; Oct 2013)
• Mind-Reading Computer Instantly Decodes People’s Thoughts (Tia Ghose; LiveScience; Jan 2016)
• Device that can literally read your mind invented by scientists (Ian Johnston; The Independent; Apr 2017)
• After 15 years in a vegetative state, nerve stimulation restores consciousness (Cell Press via AAAS; Sep 2017)
• Computer system transcribes words users “speak silently” (Larry Hardesty; MIT News Office; Apr 2018)
• Amazing New Brain Map of Every Synapse Points to the Roots of Thinking (Shelly Fan; Neuron via Singularity Hub; Aug 2018)
• Our brains reveal our choices before we're even aware of them, study finds (Lachlan Gilbert; University of New South Wales; Mar 2019)

Reply to schopenhauer1

An easy solution to the problem of how objective brain states produce subjective mental states:

The vast variety of different kinds of neurons and glia in the brain may be an indication of why there are such widely varying classes of qualia - visual, aural, olfactory, gustatory, tactile, and so on - a gigantic miscellany in possibilities for additive electromagnetic quantum resonance.

Each unique arrangement of biochemical ingredients is comprised of different qualia, just like differing matter is of different sizes, shapes and colors.

Quoting Enrique

Each unique arrangement of biochemical ingredients is comprised of different qualia, just like differing matter is of different sizes, shapes and colors.

That answers the easy problem, not the hard problem.

Reply to Wayfarer

Matter doesn't merely generate or correlate with qualia, it is qualia. Next problem!

Reply to Enrique You're not addressing 'the problem'. You think your misunderstanding of it constitutes an answer. A lot of people do that.

Reply to Wayfarer

The problem was the explanatory gap, not the distinction between traditional explanations. Subjective substance collapsed with objective substance resolves the explanatory gap. Doesn't mean counseling or expression in language is any less reasonable than or independent from neuroscience.

Reply to TheMadFool The hard problem is not that something cannot be explained, but that it hasn't been. Your OP is mainly assertions that the brain covers subjective experience. But that is not an explanation of how consciousness arises within otherwise non-experiencing matter - as many physicalists think of it.

Saying that the brain is all one needs does not solve the hard problem.

Quoting TheMadFool

I already did. Brain activity (something physical) both sufficient and necessary for qualia . :chin:

That doesn't explain the how.

You are arguing in favor of a monist physicalism. That's not the hard problem, that's a different issue.

I also don't think your argument holds, even for that. We do have subjective experiences in sleep. We can even have the experience of non-dreaming sleep. We don't remember that, generally, but memory is a specific cognitive function. Brute experiencing may not need to make memories.

Quoting Enrique

Subjective substance collapsed with objective substance resolves the explanatory gap.

Except that it doesn't. It means you're not addressing the problem. Here are some examples of what David Chalmer's calls 'the easy problem of consciousness':

• the ability to discriminate, categorize, and react to environmental stimuli;
• the integration of information by a cognitive system;
• the reportability of mental states;
• the ability of a system to access its own internal states;
• the focus of attention;
• the deliberate control of behavior;
• the difference between wakefulness and sleep.

All of the suggestions made above, including yours, address the 'easy problem'. It's because you are still dealing with the problem in objective terms.

Chalmers uses the word 'experience' to differentiate the hard from the easy problem, as follows:

The really hard problem of consciousness is the problem of experience. When we think and perceive, there is a whir of information-processing, but there is also a subjective aspect. As Nagel (1974) has put it, there is something it is like to be a conscious organism. This subjective aspectis experience.

Here, I don't agree with his terminology. 'This subjective aspect' is broader than experience - it is being. A being is the subject of experience; one of the hallmarks of beings is that they are subject of experience. And it is the 'nature of the subject' that eludes objective description - for reasons that really ought to be obvious.

Reply to Wayfarer

Then maybe we need a new term: how about subobtive experience? lol

However, I believe this possibility is ruled out by the conditions that have defined the physical sciences from the beginning. The physical sciences can describe organisms like ourselves as parts of the objective spatio-temporal order – our structure and behavior in space and time – but they cannot describe the subjective experiences of such organisms or how the world appears to their different particular points of view. There can be a purely physical description of the neurophysiological processes that give rise to an experience, and also of the physical behavior that is typically associated with it, but such a description, however complete, will leave out the subjective essence of the experience – how it is from the point of view of its subject — without which it would not be a conscious experience at all.

I never completely understood Nagel's point. His argument rests entirely on the subjective-objective distinction and it appears to be that he's implying that science being objective and consciousness being subjective make it impossible for science to study consciousness.

Look at the following excerpts on subjectivty/objective that I picked up from wikipedia:

1. Philosophical objectivity: Objectivity is a philosophical concept of being true independently from individual subjectivity caused by perception, emotions, or imagination.

2. Scientific Objectivity: Objectivity in science is an attempt to uncover truths about the natural world by eliminating personal biases, emotions, and false beliefs. It is often linked to observation as part of the scientific method.

3. Subjectivity: A subject's personal perspective, feelings, beliefs, desires or discovery, as opposed to those made from an independent, objective, point of view

As you can see, 2 (scientific objectivity) doesn't contradict 3 (subjectivity); after all where's the contradiction in being scientifically objective about a subjective experience unless Nagel's implying that before we can be objective about anything an observation needs to be made and in the case of consciousness this isn't possible because consciousness is subjective and inaccessible for observation. This interpretation matches two other definitions of subjective/objective I found; they're listed below:

4. Subjective = private

5. Objective = public

:chin: :chin:

Quoting Coben

Saying that the brain is all one needs does not solve the hard problem.

Where does one look for an explanation for something aside from the sufficient and necessary conditions for it?

Quoting jorndoe

Substance dualism simply declares "mind stuff" (irreducibly) fundamental or without any explanation in other terms, even in principle. An easy answer.
say, some sort of physicalism (or maybe speculative realism) and qualia do not contradict, rather neither entails the other, hence the gap
placing qualia (or whatever aspects of mind) as basic/fundamental/irreducible does not explain mind, but rather avoids explanation by said placement, thereby disregarding some things we already do know about mind
Maybe we can at least account for the gap rather than bridge it.

:up: Thanks.

Quoting TheMadFool

Where does one look for an explanation for something aside from the sufficient and necessary conditions for it?

If you don't know the mechanism or cause of consciousness, you can't claim to know what the necessary conditions are or the sufficient conditions are. You can make arguments as you did that brains are enough, but the hard problem is precisely how does it arise. And we don't know that? We don't even know where it isn't. We do not places where it is. And those places are able to do all sorts of cognitive functions, like remember, and generally report. But we have no idea if these functions are necessary for raw experiencing. So, I see two problems with the OP: it doesn't actually address the hard problem - which is how does consciousness arise? and then since it doesn't address the how, we can't even know where to limit consciousness to.

The hard problem of consciousness is the problem of explainingwhy and how sentient organisms have qualia or phenomenal experiences—how and why it is that some internal states are subjective, felt states, such as heat or pain, rather than merely nonsubjective, unfelt states, as in a thermostat or a toaster.

You're arguing against dualism, say. That's not the same issue. It's related, but it doesn't solve this problem.

Quoting Coben

If you don't know the mechanism or cause of consciousness, you can't claim to know what the necessary conditions are or the sufficient conditions are. You can make arguments as you did that brains are enough, but the hard problem is precisely how does it arise. And we don't know that? We don't even know where it isn't. We do not places where it is. And those places are able to do all sorts of cognitive functions, like remember, and generally report. But we have no idea if these functions are necessary for raw experiencing. So, I see two problems with the OP: it doesn't actually address the hard problem - which is how does consciousness arise? and then since it doesn't address the how, we can't even know where to limit consciousness to.

I agree that it's very likely that I'm completely mistaken here. I have a simple request: Can you give me synopsis of your views on what explanations are?

Reply to TheMadFool It depends on what you are trying to explain, iow not simply the specific thing you are trying to expain, but what kind of explanation. If we are trying explain why we believe brains are necessary for consciousness, we might use the examples of being knocked unconscious or brain death or chemical effects on the brain. If we want to know how the matter in the brain has interiority (an experiencer) we have to do some other kind of explaining. Since I have no idea what that is, I can't give an example.

Explain why water has surface tension....

The water molecules attract one another due to the water's polar property. The hydrogen ends, which are positive in comparison to the negative ends of the oxygen cause water to "stick" together. This is why there is surface tension and takes a certain amount of energy to break these intermolecular bonds.

The cohesive forces between liquid molecules are responsible for the phenomenon known as surface tension. The molecules at the surface of a glass of water do not have other water molecules on all sides of them and consequently they cohere more strongly to those directly associated with them (in this case, next to and below them, but not above). It is not really true that a "skin" forms on the water surface; the stronger cohesion between the water molecules as opposed to the attraction of the water molecules to the air makes it more difficult to move an object through the surface than to move it when it is completely submersed. (Source: GSU).

Other molecules in the water are being pulled all directions, whereas the ones on the surface are forming bonds, based on the positive and negative parts of the water molecules towards the sides, more than other directions. This means they cohere more. This means they resist being separated more that others and water has a high surface tension, compared to other liquids because its molecules are very dipolar.

That's getting into the how and why, which is what the hard problem is about. Why does and how does consciousness arise in brains - so even if it is a physicalist monism, how does it arise? You're not answering this. You are trying to rule out dualisms. I don't think your argument works, but it's not dealing with the hard problem. It can be viewed as a kind of explantion, sure. But it's not explaining the answer to the hard problem.

The hard problem of consciousness is the problem of explainingwhy and how sentient organisms have qualia or phenomenal experiences—how and why it is that some internal states are subjective, felt states, such as heat or pain, rather than merely nonsubjective, unfelt states, as in a thermostat or a toaster.

Quoting TheMadFool

(Nagel) is implying that science being objective and consciousness being subjective make it impossible for science to study consciousness.

You can study consciousness through cognitive science and psychology. That's why I keep saying the question really is about the nature of being - 'what it is like to experience [x]', or what it means to be the subject of experience.

Quoting TheMadFool

As you can see, 2 (scientific objectivity) doesn't contradict 3 (subjectivity); after all where's the contradiction in being scientifically objective about a subjective experience unless Nagel's implying that before we can be objective about anything an observation needs to be made and in the case of consciousness this isn't possible because consciousness is subjective and inaccessible for observation. This interpretation matches two other definitions of subjective/objective I found; they're listed below:

4. Subjective = private

5. Objective = public

Getting close to the nub of the problem.

Remember the previous exchange:

Quoting TheMadFool

I feel I should disagree with the last sentence: "...not reducible to physical systems"

Quoting Wayfarer

Right. And let me suggest why: because the strong consensus in our culture is to believe that everything is reducible to physical systems. That is what we make the world out to be: that which is understandable in physical, or natural, or scientific terms. Whatever is not thus understandable is subjective or private or personal - right?

The point is that in the culture of the scientific west, there's a view that humans are part of this objective order, which is why it is believed that they - we - can be completely understood through the perspective of evolutionary biology and brain science, even if in practice it is very difficult to fill in all the details.

Nagel and Chalmers are both arguing that this view is mistaken in principle, and not simply as a matter of lack of detail. Chalmers lays it out in terms of the 'hard problem of consciousness', which refers to Nagel's earlier essay 'what is it like to be a bat?'. And then Nagel's 2012 book, Mind and Cosmos, elaborates on this point in some detail. (You know this was nominated as most despised book of 2012, right? Because it questions the strong consensus.)

With all due respect, I feel you are assuming the scientific/western perspective in pretty well everything you write. Please don't take this as a personal pejorative, but a philosophical critique (and hope you can appreciate the distinction.) But that's why I said we have to learn to look at this perspective, and not simply through it - which is extraordinarily difficult to do, because of the strong consensus.

Reply to CobenOk. Here's a hypothetical scenario to consider. Imagine that for the last couple of months a person, say X, hasn't been getting his sleep on more than a just a few nights. X is troubled by this and seeks an explanation for his insomnia. In order to do that X makes a record of all his activities on nights he slept well and on nights he didn't get his shuteye. On examining his record he discovers that on each sleepless night he had drunk coffee and on nights he slept well, he hadn't had coffee. X's sleep record clearly indicate that coffee was both sufficient and necessary for his inability to sleep well; in other words the explanation for his sleep problems was to be found in the coffee.

Compare the above scenario to the fact that when there's brain activity, there's qualia and when there's no brain activity, there's no qualia. Brain activity is both sufficient and necessary for qualia just as the coffee was both sufficient and necessary for X's sleep issue. That suggests that the explanation for qualia is to be found in the physical, in brain activity.

Quoting Wayfarer

With all due respect, I feel you are assuming the scientific/western perspective in pretty well everything you write

Mea culpa!

Quoting Wayfarer

Please don't take this as a personal pejorative, but a philosophical critique (and hope you can appreciate the distinction.) But that's why I said we have to learn to look at this perspective, and not simply through it - which is extraordinarily difficult to do, because of the strong consensus.

Will try and heed your advice although I must say I haven't been making a conscious effort to be scientific. Just shows how a person can be oblivious to his/her own biases.

Quoting TheMadFool

Here's a hypothetical scenario to consider.

Which is just the kind of problem that Chalmer’s describes as ‘the easy problem’.

Quoting TheMadFool

a person can be oblivious to his/her own biases.

I’m not accusing you in particular of bias, I’m making an observation about the accepted wisdom.

Quoting Wayfarer

Which is just the kind of problem that Chalmer’s describes as ‘the easy problem’.

Some people are of the opinion that the hard problem's solution will be found in solutions to the "easy" problems although how exactly is beyond me.

It seems Chalmers did consider the difference between wakefulness and sleep. One of his "easy" problems is:

[quote=wikipedia]the difference between wakefulness and sleep.[/quote]

Perhaps it was an oversight on Chalmer's part, although I'm more inclined to think that I am in error (as is usual), to not have seen the full implication of the difference between sleep and wakefulness. Applying basic principles of causal logic, we're in fact forced to conclude, from the difference between sleep and wakefulness, that brain activity is both sufficient and necessary for qualia, making brain activity suitable enough as an explanatory platform for qualia. In effect that means an explanation of qualia is within the reach of the physical.

At this juncture Nagel's use of the subjective-objective distinction needs to be given attention. All this distinction does is prove that scientific objectivity is incapable of studying subjective consciousness. It doesn't, and this is the key point to note, prove that qualia are not physically effected. That I have a poor climbing equipment doesn't imply that there are no cliffs and rockfaces to climb. Likewise, that scientific objectivity is a poor tool to investigate subjective consciousness doesn't make qualia automatically nonphysical.

All of the above taken into account, the takeaway here is that qualia or other subjectivity based arguments most assuredly do not entail dualism. At best they expose limitations of the scientific method and at worst they're conflating a shortcoming in the scientific method with a problem in the area of inquiry, to wit consciousness.

Please take note that I'm not denying the existence of an explanatory gap but I am denying that this gap entails dualism, specifically dualism that hypothesizes a nonphysical mind substance distinct from the brain.

Thanks for your valuable comments.

Quoting TheMadFool

Some people are of the opinion that the hard problem's solution will be found in solutions to the "easy" problems although how exactly is beyond me.

Daniel Dennett, who is Chalmer’s most obvious opponent, doesn’t believe there’s any hard problem whatever. But then, he can’t, because if there is one, then his life’s work is up the chimney (which is where it belongs, in my view.)

Amusing anecdote: One of Dennett’s early books was called ‘Consciousness Explained’. It was almost immediately re-titled ‘Consciousness Ignored’ by many of his learned critics.

Quoting TheMadFool

All of the above taken into account, the takeaway here is that qualia or other subjectivity based arguments most assuredly do not entail dualism.

What is it about dualism that you so desperately want to avoid? What’s the matter with it?

Oh, and thank you for being such a polite interlocutor.

Quoting TheMadFool

that scientific objectivity is a poor tool to investigate subjective consciousness doesn't make qualia automatically nonphysical.

Not non-physical, perhaps, but certainly not objective, nor capable of being treated as objects.

Incidentally, I regard ‘qualia’ as a nonsense word. It is only ever used by a clique of American academic so-called ‘philosophers’ in this very specific debate, and its use demeans the subject which it is ostensibly about.

I googled the word and came up with the Wikipedia article, which commences:

In philosophy and certain models of psychology, qualia (/?kw??li?/ or /?kwe?li?/; singular form: quale) are defined as individual instances of subjective, conscious experience. The term qualia derives from the Latin neuter plural form (qualia) of the Latin adjective qu?lis (Latin pronunciation: [?k?a?l?s]) meaning "of what sort" or "of what kind" in a specific instance, such as "what it is like to taste a specific apple, this particular apple now".

This is nonsense, absolute bollocks, and typical of the debasement of the subject of philosophy by American materialist ‘philosophers’. What is really at issue is quality of being, what quality being entails or enjoys, and what it means. And that is a profound question, but to speak about it in terms of pseudo-intellectual nonsense terms such as ‘qualia’ debases the conversation.

Quoting Wayfarer

One of Dennett’s early books was called ‘Consciousness Explained’. It was almost immediately re-titled ‘Consciousness Ignored’ by many of his learned critics.

I did hear about Dennett's impressively titled book and how poorly received it was by scholars and ordinary people alike. I think he's the type who has the courage of his own convictions but I fear that doesn't help in making his case.

Quoting Wayfarer

What is it about dualism that you so desperately want to avoid? What’s the matter with it?

Truth be told, I'm probably like many others who are troubled by the possibility that everything is just physical, for reasons that range from simple curiosity to a wish and hope for meaning, something that the mere physical generally fails to satisfy. However, I value truth and rationality enough to recognize wishful thinking isn't going to make my wishes/hopes come true. Consider me a fan of dualism, cheering for physicalism but only to coax my side to play better.

Reply to TheMadFool :cheer:

Quoting Wayfarer

This is nonsense, absolute bollocks, and typical of the debasement of the subject of philosophy by American materialist ‘philosophers’. What is really at issue is quality of being, what quality being entails or enjoys, and what it means. And that is a profound question, but to speak about it in terms of pseudo-intellectual nonsense terms such as ‘qualia’ debases the conversation

In my defense I used the "qualia" as a representative word for all subjective mind experiences.

Reply to TheMadFool yes but that is my point. It is a nonsense word that has crept into the philosophical lexicon, and ought not to be used. The only place you will ever encounter it, is in discussions involving this clique of American materialist philosophers - Dennett, Rosenberg, Churchlands and a couple of others. Using it legitimates their attempted coup. :-)

Quoting Wayfarer

yes but that is my point. It is a nonsense word that has crept into the philosophical lexicon, and ought not to be used. The only place you will ever encounter it, is in discussions involving this clique of American materialist philosophers - Dennett, Rosenberg, Churchlands and a couple of others. Using it legitimates their attempted coup. :-)

:ok:

Quoting TheMadFool

Compare the above scenario to the fact that when there's brain activity, there's qualia and when there's no brain activity, there's no qualia.

There is always brain acitivity unless the person is dead. Further the coffee is added to the situation. The brain is not added to the situation.

But again, that situation is not parallel to the hard problem of consciousness.

The hard problem of coffee is HOW the coffee keeps you awake not THAT it keeps you awake.

While it may sound like advanced science, it's really pretty simple. As the brain creates adenosine it binds to adenosine receptors. That binding of adenosine causes drowsiness by slowing nerve cell activity. The adenosine binding also causes the brain's blood vessels to dilate, most likely to let in more oxygen during sleep.

Caffeine looks just like adenosine to a nerve cell. Caffeine therefore binds to the adenosine receptor. But unlike adenosine, it doesn't slow down the cell's activity. As a result, the cell can't identify adenosine -- the caffeine is taking up all the receptors. Instead of slowing down because of the adenosine's effect, nerve cells speed up. The caffeine also causes the brain's blood vessels to constrict. It is, after all, blocking adenosine's ability to open them up. This is why some headache medicines contain caffeine -- if you have a vascular headache, caffeine will close down the blood vessels and offer relief.

Now, you have increased neuron firing in the brain. When the pituitary gland sees all of this activity, it thinks an emergency must be occurring. The pituitary, therefore, releases hormones to tell the adrenal glands to produce adrenaline (epinephrine). Adrenaline, the "fight or flight" hormone, has a number of effects on the body:

Pupils dilate.
Breathing tubes open (which is why people suffering from severe asthma attacks sometimes can be injected with epinephrine).
The heart beats faster.
Muscles tighten up, ready for action.
Blood pressure rises.
Blood flow to the stomach slows.
The liver releases sugar into the bloodstream.

This explains why, after drinking a big cup of coffee, your muscles tense up, you feel excited, your hands get cold and you can feel your heart beat increasing.

So, all that would make it harder to sleep. We know the mechanism. That brains are present when there is qualia (in us, but perhaps not limited to those times) does not mean we know the answer to the hard problem consciousness. We don't know why the make up of the brain leads to qualia. And we also do not know if qualia are limited to brains. I've given some reasons for this last already.

You guys keep talking about the physical, but none of you know what that means. Particle or wave? You can't even determine that. The Uncertainty Principal. Perspective: completely limited. So I don't even understand what you're saying when you say qualia is physical, and I know you don't know either.

The real problem, as I see it, is one of identity. Why would a bunch of dead, lifeless matter, in any assemblage, believe it is a person. All of us knowing what being a person entails. If everything is dead and lifeless, I can't imagine how this could be the case. It would be a cruel abberation, and I certainly see no evolutionary advantage to it.

So what do we do? We roll back. It's all an illusion and means nothing. I've never heard a more elegant formula for slavery.

Reply to Coben Thanks for your reply. G'day.