De Jure and De Facto Rigidity
I'm reading some of Routledge's Philosophy Guidebook to Kripke and Naming and Necessity, and have stumbled on an interesting philosophical question.
On pg. 62-63 the author writes:
This is really abstract; but, essentially, Kripke is saying that de jure and de facto rigity sometimes interchange. When he say's later about the definition of a name as the referent itself in a world will always be true within that reference frame.
What do you think about this?
On pg. 62-63 the author writes:
This is really abstract; but, essentially, Kripke is saying that de jure and de facto rigity sometimes interchange. When he say's later about the definition of a name as the referent itself in a world will always be true within that reference frame.
What do you think about this?
Comments (3)
I believe this is best explained through the last portion of the text, in that;
"the length of stick S is not ridged at time t",
where,
"one meter" is a ridged.
That doesn't have to do with the distinction between de facto and de jure rigidity. Both de facto and de jure rigid designators are rigid.