The Principle of Universal Perception
Problem: David Hume (non-verbatim) says doing metaphysics is impossible because what is beyond the physical cannot be perceived.
Solution: The Principle of Universal Perception (PUP) states that if a large majority of subjects perceives the same object, then it is reasonable to conclude that the object perceived is objectively real. It links the metaphysical with perceptions. [Note that even though I came up with the name, this principle has been used implicitly before by philosophers like by C.S. Lewis and Peter Kreeft.]
To illustrate the principle: imagine you are stranded on a desert with a friend. You eventually perceive an oasis in the horizon. You wonder if the perception is true or false, i.e. if the oasis is real or merely an hallucination. You can verify this by asking your friend what he sees. If he also perceives an oasis, then it is either that the oasis is real, or else that you have a collective hallucination; but what are the odds that you are hallucinating about the same thing, with the same details, at the same time, located at the same place? Now let’s add a third observer, then a fourth, and so on… The more subjects there are that perceive the same object, and the more reasonable it is to conclude that the object is real.
Explanation: Our perceptions of an object are either true or false. Knowing nothing else about it (such as not being able to cross-check with our other senses like sight, hearing and touch), the two are equally possible. But if there are numerous subjects, and they all perceive the same object, then the only two possible explanations are that the object perceived is real, or else that we have a collective hallucination. As the first explanation is simpler than the second one, by the Principle of Parsimony (aka Occam’s Razor), it is the most reasonable one and becomes the Prima Facie.
A few more details about the PUP:
Do you think this principle is valid?
Solution: The Principle of Universal Perception (PUP) states that if a large majority of subjects perceives the same object, then it is reasonable to conclude that the object perceived is objectively real. It links the metaphysical with perceptions. [Note that even though I came up with the name, this principle has been used implicitly before by philosophers like by C.S. Lewis and Peter Kreeft.]
To illustrate the principle: imagine you are stranded on a desert with a friend. You eventually perceive an oasis in the horizon. You wonder if the perception is true or false, i.e. if the oasis is real or merely an hallucination. You can verify this by asking your friend what he sees. If he also perceives an oasis, then it is either that the oasis is real, or else that you have a collective hallucination; but what are the odds that you are hallucinating about the same thing, with the same details, at the same time, located at the same place? Now let’s add a third observer, then a fourth, and so on… The more subjects there are that perceive the same object, and the more reasonable it is to conclude that the object is real.
Explanation: Our perceptions of an object are either true or false. Knowing nothing else about it (such as not being able to cross-check with our other senses like sight, hearing and touch), the two are equally possible. But if there are numerous subjects, and they all perceive the same object, then the only two possible explanations are that the object perceived is real, or else that we have a collective hallucination. As the first explanation is simpler than the second one, by the Principle of Parsimony (aka Occam’s Razor), it is the most reasonable one and becomes the Prima Facie.
A few more details about the PUP:
- A large majority of subjects, say ?95% as opposed to 100%, is sufficient. Outliers can exist. Some observers may be blind, and thus would not see the oasis; but these cases are expected to be rare.
- The PUP is a principle of “reasonableness”, not of certainty. Collective hallucination remains a logical possibility; but the PUP makes it an unreasonable one.
- This is NOT the principle of universal belief or opinion. It wouldn’t be reasonable to believe the Earth is flat just because a large majority believed it to be so. Beliefs and opinions, when not about things that are directly perceived, can be false for many other reasons: incorrect premises, incorrect deductions, etc. Perception on the other hand is direct information from the object to the subject, with only one point of failure being hallucination.
Do you think this principle is valid?
Comments (87)
Yes & no. It's true that anything non-physical cannot be perceived via our physical sensory organs. Yet Metaphysics (at least in my definition) is not about Perception but Conception. By using our power of conception (to give birth to novelties), we can create mental images (abstractions) of things that are not there, and we can "see" into the future by conceptually projecting current trends. So metaphysics may be impossible for lower animals, but humans do it all the time.
Other than that quibble, your PUP is a practical definition of scientific Objectivity. It combines multiple subjective impressions into a statistical approximation of ultimate Truth or Fact. Ironically, PUP is also used by religious believers to confirm their faith in cases of mass delusions or apparitions.
Conception : The power or faculty of apprehending of forming an idea in the mind; the power of recalling a past sensation or perception; the ability to form mental abstractions. An image, idea, or notion formed in the mind; a concept, plan or design.
https://www.yourdictionary.com/conception
Perception : In psychology and the cognitive sciences, perception is the process of getting, interpreting, selecting, and organizing sensory information. It includes the collection of data from sense organs through to the interpretation made by the brain. ... Perception is a lot more than just "information coming in".
Metaphysics : Physics refers to the things we perceive with the eye of the body. Meta-physics refers to the things we conceive with the eye of the mind. Meta-physics includes the properties, and qualities, and functions that make a thing what it is. Matter is just the clay from which a thing is made. Meta-physics is the design (form, purpose); physics is the product (shape, action). The act of creation brings an ideal design into actual existence. The design concept is the “formal” cause of the thing designed.
http://blog-glossary.enformationism.info/page14.html
Objectivity : Agreement in different subjects’ judgments is often taken to be indicative of objectivity. Philosophers commonly call this form of agreement “intersubjective agreement.”
https://www.iep.utm.edu/objectiv/
Religious Mass Perceptions : What you see sometimes depends on what others say they see.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Our_Lady_of_Medjugorje
That's not what anyone sensible wonders in a desert. What they wonder is whether or not what they see is a mirage, which is a form of illusion, not a hallucination. Any number of people can see the same illusion, because to put it very shortly, an illusion is a trick of the light, whereas an hallucination is a trick of the mind. Specifically, what happens in the desert is that the differential expansion of different layers of air turn the atmosphere into a kind of lens that distorts images such that things can appear where they are not.
Which rather undermines your principle, I'm happy to say. The idea that reality is to be decided by a vote is repugnant.
Don't even need a desert for this.
On a hot day with a stretch of roadway in front on you...almost everyone looking will see the distortion or illusion, unemlightened, mentioned. You could get a hundred people seeing the illusion of water on the roadway...and and all one hundred would be wrong.
Yes, this "intersubjective agreement" is very much what I am trying to describe in the PUP.
Quoting unenlightened
This is missing the point (which admittedly with hindsight is unsurprising when using the desert example). We could have used the perception of a unicorn in a room instead. If I am the only subject, then I would second-guess my perception, but if many subjects perceive the same unicorn, then it is reasonable to suppose that it is real, until given a reason to believe otherwise.
Furthermore, the case of a mirage does not work against the PUP. First, if there is a mirage of an oasis, then the oasis must still exist. Second, different subjects are not expected to perceive the mirage-oasis in the same fashion if they are seeing it from different locations. Third, is it not still more reasonable to believe the perceived oasis is real, if given no reason to believe it is caused by a mirage? Remember the PUP gives reasonableness, not certainty.
But some things CAN be perceived. And the PUP connects the perception to conclusions about reality, which is metaphysics.
Sure, but Hume is not denying that some things can be perceived, nor he is denying that there is a connection between perception and reality. So, again, your principle seems to be irrelevant to his worries, at least in the way you formulated them in the OP.
I think he is in fact denying there is any connection between perception and reality. To him, making any claims about metaphysics is impossible.
I apologize for this next response in advance, but these are desperate days, and ...well...
If you are in a room with many others and all of you perceive a unicorn...
...you ought really to ask the group leader for a group-therapy break...so everyone can take their medication.
(Hey, I did apologize in advance!)
Well, according to you, he is saying that what is not perceivable is not physical, which seems a pretty strong connection between perception and reality...
True story.
As it happens, in my mis-spent youth, I spent an hour or so with a friend who was having an animated conversation with what seemed to me to be an empty armchair. As they were both, it seemed to me, ignoring me, particularly the occupant of the armchair, who neither spoke to me nor made himself visible, I should probably have concluded that I was an imaginary being. However, I stubbornly maintained that it was the person in the armchair that was the hallucination, and my friend was having the hallucinations.
Again democracy fails us, because if one can hallucinate a unicorn, one can surely equally hallucinate a crowd of other people shouting "Bloody hell there's that damn unicorn again, shitting on the lawn and having it off with the last virgin in the country."
Still missing the point. Let's tweet the story some more.
Replace unicorn with horse; replace room with "field on the other side of the fence" (so that you cannot verify its existence by touching it). You still wouldn't believe it is real?
No. He claims that you cannot draw conclusion about reality from perception.
But then, how can he justify that what is beyond the physical cannot be perceived? Surely this a metaphysical claim about the nature of whatever it is beyond the physical? Anyway, I would like to be clearer about what exactly is the position you're attributing to Hume before considering whether what you are proposing is or is not an answer to it.
That is some Sixth Sense stuff right there! You may relax and know you are real because Cogito Ergo Sum. Even Bruce Willis was real; just not visible.
Quoting unenlightened
True. Unless you have confirmed before that the crowd is real (through interacting with them in the past, or seeing, hearing and touching them, etc). Let's say that's the case here.
Also, if stuck on the unicorn idea due to it being inconceivable, then let's use a horse instead. Is it more reasonable to believe that the horse is real, or that it is an hallucination along with everyone else in the room and everything else you know in this world?
Quoting unenlightened
I agree only when it comes to votes based on opinions without reason. Otherwise, we do this all the time, and reasonably so. If 9 out 10 cancer experts claim you have cancer, is this not grounds to take the claim more seriously than if it was 1 out of 10?
It's only metaphysics if you specify non-empirical reality, because empirical reality is the domain of physics, no meta involved.
The problem with your argument (which itself would count as metaphysics) is that you never reference anything beyond the phenomena. You say a collective hallucination is "less likely" but what is that judgement based on? If you're basing it on empirical research on hallucinations, then you're just referencing another phenomenon, which might be just as illusory as any other.
Humes problem was that he couldn't find a way to anchor our perceptions to something beyond perception. Adding more perceptions doesn't help.
I think it's just a matter of definitions. The physical is that which can be perceived.
I will answer your question seriously this time, Samuel. But in order to do so, I must take issue with the word "believe" here.
My answer would be, "NO, I do not 'believe' there is a horse there. I KNOW there is a horse there."
Please treat this the way you would if I wrote "I do not 'believe' 2 + 2 = 4 in base 10...I KNOW it does."
It is not a minor consideration.
Quoting Echarmion
I think I understand your point, that to quantify the likelihood or probability of hallucination demands a reference that must be more certain. But rather than using Probability, I am using Complexity of the explanation to appeal to the Principle of Parsimony. Regardless of the probability, the explanation that the object is real is simpler than the explanation of collective hallucination, because it would also need to explain where the hallucination comes from, and how come it is so consistent among all subjects etc.
Another example of using complexity instead of probability for reasonableness: If an object looks and sounds like a duck, it is more reasonable to conclude it is a duck than to conclude it is a robot piloted by an alien. This is not because we know the probability of that explanation, but its level complexity.
This is admittedly nitpicky, but doesn't "knowing" imply certainty? Math is indeed certain. But for the horse story, there is the alternative possibility of collective hallucination (though of course nobody in their right mind would choose it I think).
That aside, whether we use the word belief or knowledge, it sounds like it is a yes. Now consider 2 scenarios with 10 subjects trying to determine if there is a horse in a field:
(1) 9 out of 10 subjects see a horse; the other 1 does not.
(2) 1 out of 10 subjects see a horse; the other 9 do not.
In which of the 2 scenarios is it more reasonable to believe the horse is real?
It seems I have trouble clarifying to you what I think Hume is saying. But in a way it is not relevant, for the point of the OP is not to determine if I answer Hume's problem, but if the PUP is a valid principle.
Well, I thought that you wanted your principle as a solution to a problem described in the OP. If the relation between them is irrelevant to you, ok, I'm happy to leave matters as they are.
This is a strawman.
In an Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Hume starts off by saying we “must cultivate true metaphysics with some care, in order to destroy the false and adulterate," but he then goes on to describe a problem that has less to do with metaphysics -- as we ordinarily understand it -- as it does our ability to perceive actual objects. Hume notes that the only things we can perceive are perceptions (i.e. internal and perishing existences), but the vulgar confuse perceptions with actual objects; that is, they confuse representations with what is actually represented.
Yeah sure. That "problem" line was more of an intro to present the principle.
Quoting Wolfman
Sounds good; I accept the correction on Hume's position. Then the PUP also solves that new problem; that the actual objects can reasonably be predicted if the perceptions are consistent among the subjects.
Two problems:
First, the principle of parsimony cannot deal very well with hallucinations. "I'm hallucinating" is a very simple explanation, and while I am hallucinating, perhaps I am also hallucinating the people that agree with me. Are more complex hallucinations also more complex theories?
The bigger issue is that you haven't justified the principle of parsimony. Why is the less complex explanation closer to reality? Is reality obligated to be simple and parsimonious?
The reason we can use the parsimony as a principle in the scientific method is because we're concerned with making predictions, which means making working models of reality. A simpler, more inclusive model is more useful than a complex, less inclusive one. But it's a tool for of practicality, not objectivity.
This doesn’t avert Hume’s attack, because his very point is to highlight the insufficiency of perception in representing external objects. As such it makes little sense to invoke probability or numerics as a solution. Hume would simply say more people -- the vulgar as he terms them -- are mistaken. Hume is agnostic about the existence of external objects, but if they do exist, we could never know it since all we can perceive are our perceptions.
I will give you the answer you want...and then give the answer I would give if I were not being accommodating, Samuel. #1!
Now...the answer I would much prefer. Neither! I do not do "believing"...by which I mean I NEVER EVER say that I "believe" anything.
If you were asking, "Which would I be more inclined to suppose to be correct?"...I would respond, "I would be more inclined to suppose #1 to be correct"...that there is, in fact, a horse in the field. Any hesitation to do so would be occasioned by MY not being able to see it myself.
So...your point is?
Well call me an arrogant twat, but if I can see the whole field and see that there is no horse in it, I will trust my eyes over the talk of 9 people. Because I know that people lie, that people see what they want to see, and that people conform. See also The Emperor's New Clothes.
The principle of universal perception, as I see it, is already alert to the skeptic's universal doubt and collective hallucination is but a part of this doubt. What the PUP is mainly interested in is the private hallucination which we all know happens; after all if we begin to accept private hallucinations to be as real as is possible for the skeptic then, it would amount to making dreams of magic shows as legit as the actual magic itself.
To make the long story short, a collective hallucination is what the skeptic already assumes to be the case and is accounted for if only in the form of a meek capitulation to it. The private hallucination, however, is not part of our deal with reality for it's, as a worst case scenario, an illusion of an illusion, a double jeopardy so to speak.
It seems that out of habit, if nothing else, we regard what can be collectively perceived as something outside of us (objective) and what is perceived only by one or a few as inside of us (subjective).
This situation is probably one of the main reasons why people reconfigured their trust, leaning towards what I will loosely refer to as rationalism, something that can't be fooled by mere appearance in a manner of speaking.
No because it is abnormal (using common sense alone, the normal is to not hallucinate), and so we would need to further explain the cause of that abnormality. In contrast, we don't need to further explain the existence of an oasis, as it is not abnormal.
Quoting Echarmion
Might as well believe that the whole world is an illusion, on the mere grounds that it is logically possible. But logically possible does not entail reasonable. For this, we appeal to further principles of reasonableness like Parsimony.
Quoting Echarmion
This discussion defends the PUP on the grounds of Parsimony, which is indeed assumed. I am hesitant to defend that here, with fear that I would need to defend the premises for Parsimony etc. All I will say for now is that it is a perfectly accepted scientific principle, and that the alternative (that more complex is more reasonable) leads to a reductio ad absurdum: Can't prove there is no teapot in space? Then we'll believe there is.
Quoting Echarmion
I'm not sure that statement makes sense. Reality implies objectivity. And as both philosophy and science aim to predict reality, what works for science for that aim also works for philosophy. Note also that the Principle of Parsimony was first introduced not for science but for philosophy; and that science is a branch of philosophy (ie the search for truth), specializing in what is empirically verifiable.
Why is this claim the most reasonable one? Appealing to the Principle of Parsimony, you (or Hume) have the onus of proof to defend it.
That I think you are applying the PUP when you say you are more inclined to pick scenario (1) over (2). We are in agreement that reasonableness does not give certainty, but it is powerful enough to tip the scales.
Quoting Frank Apisa
This is an aside, but I want to say that your demand for certainty, all or nothing, is unreasonable for this world. Sure, this horse experiment is not consequential, but a lot of things are. We are not certain that Climate Change is real, but being agnostic is not a choice in this case. Either we fight it or we don't. And a 97% agreement among experts (let's assume that part is true) is sufficient to pick a side.
The fact that is it possible for people to lie does not count against the PUP. It is like saying that the scientific method is flawed because scientists who apply it can always lie about the results.
Quoting unenlightened
Don't these two sentences contradict? Unless you say you are above the second claim; and indeed, that does sound arrogant :joke: .
Quoting unenlightened
This is true, and we must take it seriously. Fortunately, it can be controlled by doing things like a double blind test, etc.
You made an assumption on what I meant that was incorrect.
I am not looking for certainty in all things...even in questions about whether at least one god exists or not.
But when I make a guess about something (X)...I say, "I guess X. NOT "I believe X."
When I make a supposition about something (X)...I say, "I suppose X" NOT "I believe X."
If I estimate something (X)...I say, "I estimate X" NOT "I believe X."
If I have an opinion about something (X)...I say, "It is my opinion that X" NOT "I believe X."
I make guesses, I make suppositions, I estimate things, I have opinions just like everyone else...
...I just do not disguise my guesses, suppositions, estimates, or opinions by using "I believe..."
That is what I meant when I wrote, "I do not do "believing"...by which I mean I NEVER EVER say that I "believe" anything."
I hope that was clear.
As for the "climate change" example...I certainly see lots of reason (mostly from what the vast majority of climate scientists say)...that the danger "climate change" presents requires each of us to do as much as possible to get our elected officials to fight it with the same vigor they would use to fight an invasion from a foreign enemy.
That is not something I would say "I believe we should do it"...it is my opinion that we should do it.
If I understand your post correctly, you say the PUP fails against radical skepticism, because the explanation of collective hallucination already presumes some things about reality, such as the reality of other subjects, where as the evil demon theory is more radical and makes no presumption about reality (except for the existence of said demon).
This is true. But although outside of the PUP, the evil demon theory also fails the Principle of Parsimony (which falls under rationalism and not under perceptions) which the PUP is also based on, because positing the existence of an evil demon is more complex than not.
You presented your OP as if it were meant to circumvent Hume’s attack on perception, but it doesn’t. This is because on Hume’s view, there is a problem with how perception operates in the first place. This problem makes it impossible to render an accurate depiction of any external reality, if such a thing should exist.
Hume’s defense is on record. He’s devoted several books to explicating it. The onus is on you to explain why is it insufficient. And you don’t do this by appealing to the very system he says is flawed, and then adding a number element to it. That’s like Mill appealing to the supreme principle of utility in order to argue with Kant about how we ought to measure morality. Kant proceeds from a different normative framework, so it would be curious to invoke a rule that he doesn’t accept in the first place.
"common sense" won't fly in a serious discussion. You have to actually give reasons why it's "not normal" to hallucinate. Perhaps we are all hallucinating all the time?
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
How is parsimony going to help if everything is an illusion?
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
The application of the principle is far from clear even in the context of empirical science. There is plenty of discussion around just how to measure simplicity. In an epistemological discussion, it's not clear whether the principle applies at all. The Russel's Teapot example can be solved in other ways. For example, one might say that statements of existence or nonexistence about an object which is defined as unobservable are equally meaningless.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
I think that this is the conclusion you wish to argue for in your argument, so you cannot use it as a premise. The problem Hume brings up is exactly that there seems to be nothing connecting reality (the things we experience) and objectivity.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
That would make the scientific method a fully general method to solve all philosophical problems, and that is clearly nonsense. Philosophy isn't necessarily concerned with predictions. Epistemology, for example, is concerned what we can know, not what we will know.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
While this is true, William of Ockham, whose name has become attached to it, used it two differentiate between hypothses about phenomena, so a domain that we know attribute to empirical science. But regardless of it's origin, the principle must stand for itself.
I think you should call that the principle of universal imperception.
You have a flawed conception of the scientific method. It does not rely on what scientists say but on what they can demonstrate. Thus a scientist may lie about what they did and what happened, but they will be found out when other people do the same thing and something different happens. and this is because scientists believe their own experience over what people say. And this was the revolution in thinking, that the old stories and claims were to be tested, and not believed just because everyone believed them before. "Show me, or it didn't happen" is the essence of science. "Everyone says it so it must be so" is the essence of dogma.
What problem would that be, that is not covered by the PUP?
Quoting Wolfman
The Principle of Parsimony is flawed? Why is that?
Something that might help in general: The first line of the OP on Hume merely served as an introduction to present the PUP. I am not really looking to refute a claim by Hume, but to determine if the PUP is valid.
This is definitely a tangent, but... let's do it.
I think I have a clear enough understanding of the distinction between belief and guess, supposition, and estimate. But what is the difference between belief and opinion? Genuinely asking.
This is risible.
I cannot agree with you there. Have you heard of the "absurd"? Reductio Ad Absurdum? All valid philosophical terms which criteria of judgement is common sense or common life experience.
Quoting Echarmion
No sir. The onus of proof is on he who disrupts the status quo, and the status quo is that it is not normal to hallucinate.
Quoting Echarmion
How is a teapot unobservable?
Quoting Echarmion
Are you confusing the terms objectivity and subjectivity perhaps? Objectivity is defined as "external reality". Source
Quoting Echarmion
True. I should have said that both science and philosophy aim for truth, which is conformance to reality.
Quoting Echarmion
As previously mentioned, it is defended by the fact that the alternative method (that more complex explanations are more reasonable until proven false) leads to a reductio ad absurdum. Can't prove that invisible unicorns don't exist? Then they exist. And please don't ask me to defend the reductio ad absurdum principle, because we will then have a case of infinite regress.
I think you are inconsistent. If you claim that all subjects for the PUP can lie, then all scientists can also lie. How do you know the Earth is round? Did you conduct the demonstrations yourself, or do you rely on the claims of scientists?
Regardless, this is a misunderstanding about the PUP. As described in the OP, it states that "if a large majority of subjects perceives the same object, then [...]". It says "perceives", and not "claims to perceive".
Quoting Banno
Give it time. It will grow on you.
I thought you knew since you invoked Hume’s name at the start of the OP. In any case, on Hume’s account we can only perceive perceptions (i.e. impressions and ideas). Perceptions are momentary and fleeting; hence we cannot perceive anything that is not momentary and fleeting. Your “solution” misses the mark because it presupposes or takes for granted that which Hume is denying in the first place (i.e. the ability to perceive anything other than perceptions). Before moving on you would need to show where Hume goes wrong. An appeal to “reasonableness,” or the “common” way we think about things, is not an adequate response because Hume is making a substantive philosophical point in highlighting the insufficiency of perception. This is why you are guilty of shifting the burden.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
I’m not sure why Hume’s name was listed in the “problem,” since everything you say consequently has nothing to do with any of Hume’s criticisms. As noted earlier, in the context of the ECHU, what Hume describes as “metaphysics” doesn’t align with our contemporary understanding of the term.
The problem with that is that both people need to agree that the conclusion is absurd. Otherwise, why bother with this thread? You could as well have said "Hume says this, but clearly it is absurd, therefore he is wrong".
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Oh that's clever. So you get to set the status quo and then get to ask everyone for proof?
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Let me quote the original argument: [I]"If I were to suggest that between the Earth and Mars there is a china teapot revolving about the sun in an elliptical orbit, nobody would be able to disprove my assertion provided I were careful to add that the teapot is too small to be revealed even by our most powerful telescopes.[/i]
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Dictionary definitions are not arguments. That's how the term is generally used. Hume essentially questioned whether that use was actually correct.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
That sounds good.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
I don't think that those are the two only options. When discussing metaphysics a "true agnostic" position exists, i.e. there are simply things we can't make reasoned statements about one way or another.
YES. There's nothing like doing some experiments and making some observations for oneself, for giving confidence in science. I haven't done every experiment ever reported, life's too short, but I've done enough of the crucial ones to have confidence in the generality of physics and chemistry. This is how science is taught, and how it is done, no experiment is considered definitive until it can be repeated consistently.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
It comes to the same thing. Subjects can only know they perceive the same thing by communicating. But look, you are wrong. you have been shown to be wrong. And I'm going to leave it there. Do some science and stop pontificating about it until you have done some. You started with a misunderstanding of the difference between illusion and hallucination, and it has lead to what is essentially an anti-scientific dogmatic position with a slightly postmodernist spin. Nonsense.
Let me get this straight. You seem to be saying that what you call collective hallucinations are documented facts and that they contradict the Principle of Universal Perception because the latter relies on a large number of observations (many people perceiving what is in question) and that that could easily be an instance of collective hallucination which, in effect, invalidates the PUP.
Well, what needs to be mentioned here is that all knowledge of reality must give due weightage to the skeptic who claims that all that we perceive could be an illusion. Knowledge of anything, reality included, begins only after acknowleging the skeptic. In other words knowledge of reality will look like this: we know such and such about reality but it could be an illusion.
What does this mean for your idea of collective hallucination? As I see it, the skeptic's all could be an illusion is the worst-case scenario of your collective hallucination and we know we've already given due importance to the skeptic in re to knowledge of reality. Doesn't this mean your idea of collective hallucination is redundant? Your idea of collective hallucination, in extremis, is identical to the skeptic's all could be an illusion and since all knowledge of reality begins only after the skeptic's voice has been heard, your collective hallucination which is just all could be an illusion, worded differently, is already something all knowledge of reality factors in as a possibility to reckon with. Collective hallucination is superfluous in that respect.
You are still missing my point. I hope my answer to this question makes it clear.
There is absolutely NO DIFFERENCE between a "belief" and an "opinion"...EXCEPT for the use of the word "belief" rather than opinion. "Belief" HIDES the fact that it is an opinion...whether intentional or not.
Fact is, in most discussions of religion or philosophy...there is absolutely NO DIFFERENCE between belief and guess, supposition, or estimate either...EXCEPT for the use of the word "belief" rather than guess, supposition, or estimate. Using "belief" HIDES the fact that it is a guess, supposition, or estimate being offered...whether it is intentional or not.
Consider this: I "believe" there are no gods. That is a guess...a blind guess at that. But, if the person delivering it said, "I blindly guess there are no gods"...it becomes almost laughable.
Same thing in the other direction. I "believe" (in) God. That is also a blind guess. But, if the person delivering it said, "I blindly guess that God exists"...could you imagine that person (or anyone else) suggesting we should all "respect" other people's blind guesses.
Imagine this: I flipped a coin. If it comes lands "heads" I will guess there is a God; if it lands "tails" I will guess there are no gods. And I expect you to respect my guess.
It is the use of the words belief/believe that I am dealing with...not any difference that people pretend exist.
And what is the physical, anyway? Science is at a loss. We simply have misplaced faith that these men we worship will figure it all out. But the truth is I could claim everything is a metaphysical phantasm. Only the dullness of familiarity convinces us otherwise.
You could, but no one would care.
Can we test if it is real? Can we falisfy solipsism?
... that you fly to the furthest star, you can. Is it this sort of logic? Probably not. It's probably simple.
You know the universe shape well, then you know the fact consciousness can be in P body, meaning that P consciousnss is a equal thought as consciousness.
It also takes great logic behind what's going on to supply your solipsism and it may be a great danger.
They'd care if I had enough money. And whether they cared or not wouldn't determine the truth of the statement. There are literally a million truths no one cares about.
So you claim that when we perceive an object, it is never the object in reality. And why would that be? If it looks, sounds, and feels like a duck, is it not reasonable to believe it is in fact a duck, until given a reason to believe otherwise?
Precisely. A rainbow of wisdom.
Not necessarily wrong. It just means he has the onus of proof. Absurd, common sense, reasonable, status quo, all these are terms which serve to establish who has the onus of proof. Once the onus of proof is fulfilled, then the claim stands, even if it is absurd.
Quoting Echarmion
I don't set the status quo. I discover it by experience. If you want to be formal about it, you could survey what most people believe about hallucination and the normal. My money is that hallucinations are not seen as normal.
Quoting Echarmion
Practical limitation does not entail that a thing is theoretically unobservable; unlike spirits for example.
Quoting Echarmion
My discussion, my rules. By objectivity, I mean "external reality" as per the dictionary, and that's how it will be used in this thread. :cool:
Quoting Echarmion
Unfortunately, if you don't make metaphysical claims, then philosophy is impossible: Metaphysics is the science of what is real. If no knowledge of reality, then no truth (defined as conformance to reality), then no philosophy (defined as search for truth).
And actually... I just realized that the Principle of Parsimony is nothing but Abductive Reasoning, which is a fundamental law of thoughts.
Strawman. Given the context of my last post, it should be pretty clear that I'm explicating Hume's views, not mine own. You should abide by the principle of charity instead of cherry picking and coming back with this kind of response. In any case, whether Hume's theory of perception is workable or not is besides the point. The point is that the principle you're forwarding doesn't address Hume's point at all. This is not surprising since you have thus far demonstrated an inability to understand what Hume's position even is.
It's like one person saying, "God doesn't exist because of reason X," and another person saying, "But I can show you evidence for his existence. Just the other day he made the sun rise." But if person #1 is denying God's existence in the first place, then person #2's evidence is misses the point. This is because it presupposes the very thing person #1 is arguing against (i.e. God).
That's what you're doing. Your principle doesn't circumvent Hume's criticism at all, because it presupposes or takes for granted the very thing that Hume is arguing against. Your "solution" doesn't work because it's one step removed from where it needs to take place.
Well I am genuinely impressed. Nevertheless, this lack of trust, of assuming dishonesty until proven otherwise, is unreasonable. It fails the Presumption of Innocence. And I still maintain that most scientific demonstrations cannot be replicated by most people. If a cancer expert diagnosed you with cancer, would you spend the time to replicate the test yourself prior to going for treatment?
Quoting unenlightened
This also applies to some scientific tests such as testing new painkillers. Anyways, I'll do you a solid. Let's add the condition that the PUP is valid as long as the subjects are honest.
Quoting unenlightened
This demonstration presupposes that the sun is far away from the earth. Flat Earthers would disagree. :razz:
Problem 1: Either some perceptions are true, or else all could be an illusion.
Solution 1: Appealing to Principle of Parsimony, the former is more reasonable than the latter. It thus becomes the Prima Facie.
Problem 2: Some perceptions are true, but we know some are not (e.g sometimes my eyes fail me when I've been drinking). How to validate the perceptions?
Solution 2: Appeal to the Principle of Universal Perceptions. If the perceptions pass the PUP, then the belief that the perceived object is real becomes the Prima Facie.
Is there a problem still pending?
So if I understand correctly, "belief" in our common language is a catch-all term which could mean either "guess", "estimate", "supposition" or "opinion", and as it is less clear than the other terms, it should be avoided. I can accept that. Can't deny that clearer is better.
Fortunately, we have principles of reasonableness like the Principle of Parsimony, to keep us grounded in common sense, and prevent us from getting lost into too many "What if" questions.
Well I thought that since you were defending Hume's position, you agreed with him. My bad for assuming. Bonus, I didn't know about this Principle of Charity. That's a good one.
As for Hume's claim: If he claims something drastically different than what I described in the OP, then we can discard it. It doesn't make the PUP any less valid on its own. Now for fun, we could try to examine Hume's true claim, or else leave it there. Up to you.
Having reread the OP it seems I got the wrong end of the stick. Sorry. I forgot to address the Principle of Parsimony adequately. My apologies. I really appreciate you invoking it to prove your point that some perceptions are true. Great! However, the Principle of Parsimony, as used by you, is a double-edged sword for just as you used it to show the likelihood that some perceptions are true, it can also be used to show that the odds are in favor of it all being an illusion.
Which would be easier or, if you prefer, more parsimonious: an illusion of a universe or an actual universe? The answer to that question is, according to none other than the Principle of Parsimony: an illusion of a universe is simpler than an actual universe. Hence, it must be that it's more probable that all is an illusion rather than there are true perceptions. It seems, to avoid a contradiction, we're forced to conclude that you've made an error in applying the Principle of Parsimony.
How and where does the Principle of Universal Perception fit into all this? Since it's more likely that all is an illusion (as proven above), the PUP is only there to bring some consistency into the illusion: the more people make the same observation, the more consistent it is. This is then taken as a surrogate for actual reality.
Why is consistency important? It seems consistency evidences a shared illusion, something we can make sense of.
I am not a fan of "burden of proof" type arguments outside of a legal context. While I think the general rule that the one who advances a claim is obligated to provide justification is a fine one, it's a rule of debate, not a law of (meta-)physics. I am repeating myself here, but there is no reason to suppose that the world cares about the burden of proof.
And I think it deserves repeating here that "it's a hallucinations" is merely a metaphor for what Hume means. A Hallucination is a specific way in which one persons perception differs from the perception in others in defined, pathologic ways. Hume's scepticism goes deeper than that. It's not about individual mistakes but about whether humans are at all equipped, sensory or otherwise, to gain knowledge about metaphysical reality (by which I mean whatever reality is like before or outside of human perception).
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
But this just seems to bring us back to the starting point. Why is the majority opinion relevant for what is metaphysically real? Hume is not, after all, worried about individual failures of judgement but by a general inability to prove metaphysical propositions.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
While you are correct in general, for the purposes of the example given by Russel the distcinction doesn't matter. For any given ability to observe, one can make up teapots that fall just outside of it.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Sure, but then your statement "reality implies objectivity" reads "reality implies external reality", which is wrong, as there are obviously internal realities.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
I think you misunderstand what metaphysics is about. Not all philosophy is metaphysics. Metaphysics is specifically about the "real-ness" of physics, not things like e.g. normative statements (morality). So even if metaphysics would be impossible, there'd still be truth. There just wouldn't be any truth about the connection between physical reality and metaphysical reality. And an agnostic position is still philosophy - the corrollary to finding truth is finding what we cannot know.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Which is good, if you think that thoughts construct reality. Do you?
What a foolish demonstration, to presuppose something. It is however an example of the way science proceeds, not by asking if everyone agrees, but by inviting them to see for themselves. And your objection is one that might be better accommodated by another experiment, rather than by asking what a bunch of fuckwits think.
Wait why is the illusion the simpler explanation? In both cases, true or false perception, some sort of universe must exist for us to have a perception of it. But in the illusion case, we must posit the state of having an illusion on top of having a universe. Then to be picky, we must also posit an explanation for why the illusion is so structured and consistent (as opposed to continuously changing). With that, I would say the actual universe is the simplest explanation.
But the point of (sincere) debate is to find truth. Proper rules of reasoning and debate (which includes burden of proof) is part of epistemology. You might as well say that the objective world does not care about epistemology as such, which is true, but would miss the point that the function of epistemology is to know the objective world.
Quoting Echarmion
That's fine. Instead of "hallucination" let's called it "false perception", for which "false" means "not in conformance with reality".
Quoting Echarmion
We (at least I) may have lost track of what the original point was here. If that's okay, we can leave this tangent as is.
Quoting Echarmion
I don't believe so. There are only 2 categories of being in that sense: real and imaginary. E.g. a horse is real, a unicorn is imaginary. By "internal reality", I am guessing you actually mean "imaginary" which is the alternative to being real.
Quoting Echarmion
I still challenge this claim. Ethic is only properly speaking a science if it is objective; which means that goodness exists in reality. But if no goodness in reality, then no ethics. Similarly, there is no such thing as "physical reality" if we can know nothing about reality. Even if the physical is the result of a false but universal and consistent perception, we are then still claiming that this false perception exists in reality.
Quoting Echarmion
Of course not. But true thoughts are thoughts which content conforms to reality. And true thoughts are possible only if they follow the laws of thoughts.
Haha! True that.
To create an illusion is much much easier than creating the real. You seem to think that the illusion is an add-on feature to the real world, thus making it more complex than just having the real world. The illusion I'm referring to is, for sure, an added feature to the real world but one that needs only the very basic ingredients of perception (brains/minds + maybe a sensory system) and the rest of the universe is an illusion.
Which would be simpler?
1. A brain in an actual world
or
2. A brain in a vat?
Before you answer the question, I'd like to bring up the issue of simulated universes like the ones we see in the gaming world for its similarity to a world that is all illusion.
If you've played a sim universe game, you'll notice that only the parts of the sim universe the player is directly perceiving needs to be simulated; the parts of the sim universe the player isn't in, isn't and needn't be simulated at all.
Compare that to an actual universe in which the entire universe has to be even if we stop perceiving it completely e.g. when we're asleep or we die. Which universe, a simulated illusory one or an actual one, is more parsimonious now? In an actual universe, we need brains/minds + the entire universe but in a sim universe, all we need are brains/minds + only parts of the universe these brains/minds are actively perceiving.
You might ask about the "machine" (machine 1) creating the sim universe but it would, for certain, not be as complex as an actual universe. Here I ask you to compare the "machine" creating the sim universe to another "machine" creating an actual universe (machine 2). Machine 2, having to maintain the entire universe at every single moment in time, whether there's perception going on or not, would be far more complex, by many many orders of magnitude, than machine 1 which only needs to simulate the parts that are being perceived by brains/minds.
OK, let's take a look at the OP.
[quote=Samuel Lacrampe]The Principle of Universal Perception (PUP) states that if a large majority of subjects perceives the same object, then it is reasonable to conclude that the object perceived is objectively real. It links the metaphysical with perceptions. [Note that even though I came up with the name, this principle has been used implicitly before by philosophers like by C.S. Lewis and Peter Kreeft.[/quote]
It seems to me this statement can be viewed in one of two ways. (1) You are either making a claim about how we already do things (i.e. using witness testimony to corroborate facts), or (2) or you are concluding from your argument that philosophical realism holds.
In the case of the former, this is a trivial claim with little philosophical import. In the case of the latter, the argument is fallacious because it is begging the question. Your premise already assumes that external objects exist; it's just that whether something is objectively real or not depends on the number of people who saw it. But you haven't even established that external objects exist in the first place, so your argument is non sequitur and begging the question. I suspect your reply will be something like, "If it looks, sounds, and feels like a duck, is it not reasonable to believe it is in fact a duck?" Well, you should know that practical considerations involving how we normally do things (e.g. using witness testimony to corroborate facts) are inadequate to substantiate robust philosophical claims. This debate would have been over hundreds of years ago if it were that easy.
If we are looking at reality, whether or not things are lies or truths, if, per se, I am truthully solipsist or if the universe is logical, and other people are conscious. Then, it's beyond what's "established truth", it is a combination of real and unreal. Is the universe a simulation just for me I cannot see? Do I fragment this all from mind? Then we're looking at unreal mechanics? Are there any?
Let's call the two hypotheses as so: (1) for world as we perceive it; and (2) for brain in a vat.
One formulation of Occam's Razor is: Entities should not be multiplied without necessity.
In hypothesis (1), the entities are: A real world which we perceive.
In hypothesis (2), the entities are: A real world which we don't perceive + an illusion of the world we perceive, created by a machine in that real world.
Hypothesis (1) is composed of fewer entities, and is therefore simpler.
Now you argue that it is easier in (2) to create the illusory world, than in (1) to create a real world. But this omits the fact that in (2), a real world also exists, which includes the machine that creates the illusory world. And appealing to the Principle of Sufficient Reason, an effect necessitates a sufficient cause. The machine containing the information for the illusory world must exist in a world that is at least as rich in information.
Both. The witness testimony uses the PUP to determine the most reasonable story about the case. And that same rationale is used to determine the most reasonable claim about metaphysics.
Quoting Wolfman
External objects must exist for us to have true or false perceptions of them. Also I am fairly sure Hume did not question the existence of external objects; and was only skeptical about their true nature.
Quoting Wolfman
Unless all those debaters used that similar line of circular reasoning. :wink:
Yeah, whatever it is you're doing, it's not philosophy :roll:
I don't really disagree with much of this, but I don't think you're going about the "search for truth" in quite the right way.
The first question of epistemology is "what can we know", and the second is "how do we know it". To answer these question, one has to establish a connection between a certain rule and knowledge. It's not sufficient to identify rules of thinking about the world. One must also establish why, by following these rules, we actually gain information.
So if you want to establish burden of proof as an epistemological principle for metaphysical questions, you'll have to justify the connection between the rule and metaphysical reality.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
The problem is that this false perception may very well be normal, even unavoidable, for humans, and therefore your previous arguments do not work.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
So what about the colour red? Is it real or imaginary?
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
How would that be possible? Do you imagine there to be some actual rulebook hidden somewhere that is the "object" you could base morality on? The question of morality is "what should I do". How is that in any way connected to objects?
Anyways ethics was one example. Another one would actually be epistemology itself. Because if epistemology is about discovering the "objective nature" of the universe, then the truth criterion for that cannot be "accordance with objective nature". That'd be circular.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
I think you're essentially complaining about words here (i.e. this is just semantics). Whether or not you prefer to reserve the term "reality" for "objective" or "metaphysical reality" doesn't change whether or not the latter is connected to physics.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
The just seems obviously wrong. If the criterion of truths is conformance to metaphysical reality, then if you have a collection of random thoughts, some of those could just happen to conform. The process used wouldn't matter. It would have to be the other way round: the laws of thoughts only discover the already existing true thoughts, and are defined by them.
I get what you mean. What you say amounts to the standard argument against the skeptic.
As for what I mean, let me begin by saying I accept that for there to be an illusion there must be the real. However, the real needn't be the whole enchilada - the entire universe, no?
Compare the following:
1. Minds exist + the whole real + the illusion
2. Minds exist + the whole real
3. Minds exist + part of the real (necessary to generate the illusion) + the illusion
2 is definitely simpler than 1 and that's your argument but what about 3? 3 would be more complex than 2 if and only if part of the real (necessary to generate the illusion) must be equal in complexity to the whole real in which case 3 would be identical to 1 and you win. Is this the case? Do we need the whole real to generate the illusion or will only a part of the real (necessary to generate the illusion) suffice?
Before you answers the above question, keep in mind that the illusion need not be of the whole real, thus can be simpler than the whole real and so only a part of the real will suffice to generate the illusion. Then minds and only that part of the real, necessary to generate the illusion need exist and the rest of the whole real becomes unnecessary complexity:
a) The illusion is less complex than the whole real. This is for the following reason:
b) Part of the real necessary to generate the illusion is less complex than the whole real
[Minds exist + Part of the real (necessary to generate the illusion) + The illusion] is less complex than Minds exist + The whole real.
Ergo, 3 (my choice - a universe with illusion) is far more parsimonious than 2 (your choice - a universe without illusion).
The only reason you'll find all this hard to digest is if you think 3 is the same as 1 or that the illusion we're talking about is of the real world which would require the part of the real (necessary to generate the illusion) to be as equally complex as the real whole but that isn't necessarily true. The universe we're familiar with, this universe, could be a simpler illusion, the work of an illusion generator, in a universe our minds actually exist in. If so, minds + the illusion generator is simpler than minds + the entire universe minds exist in.
Take the real universe as 100%, minds form 10% of this universe, and an illusion generator which is 40% of this universe that creates an illusion which is simpler = 20% of the real universe. Isn't (40% + 10% + 20% = 70%) < 100%? Isn't 70% of the universe less complex than 100% of the universe?
I know I've repeated myself more than I would've liked to but the point I'm making isn't so easy to put into words. Sorry.
Sure. Aside from mathematics and pure logic, we never reach certainty for any other sciences. In all other sciences (metaphysics and others), the accepted position about a topic is the one that has not yet been refuted. We say that the position stands, that it becomes the prima facie, and that the onus of proof is on the other side. It is a good alternative to remaining agnostic about everything merely on the grounds that we do not reach certainty. Maybe we can afford to remain agnostic on some topics, but not all. See next paragraph as an example.
Quoting Echarmion
This topic of whether all perceptions are false or some are true, is a good example where we cannot afford to remain agnostic on the grounds that both hypothesis remain possible. We gotta live. We gotta pick a side. Enters the Prima Facie approach as per above.
Quoting Echarmion
Hmmm.... That's a tough one. It's almost worthy of its own discussion. For now, I say real; as we cannot conceive something we have not experienced in the past. E.g. a blind man born blind cannot conceive the colour red.
Quoting Echarmion
The objective basis to ethics is values, ie that some things are good or bad in reality. E.g. I should do this because it is objectively good.
Quoting Echarmion
Siding with Aristotle, the foundations of epistemology are first principles called the laws of thoughts. These laws are Deductive Reasoning (aka logic), Inductive Reasoning (aka stats), and Abductive Reasoning (aka Parsimony). As first principles, they are not founded on any other premises.
Quoting Echarmion
It does. Let me try again another way. We perceive a physical object. Either that object is real or not. If real, then we made a claim about metaphysics. If not real, then the explanation is the existence of a false perception. Then we still made a claim about metaphysics, namely that this false perception is real.
Quoting Echarmion
Good point. Let me try again: Knowledge is achieved when the thoughts are true and justified, and correct justification must follow the laws of thoughts.
But what do we do if there a bunch of conflicting hypotheses, neither of which can be refuted (in the sense of a falsification). Take the classic theism - atheism debate. Refutation really doesn't seem like a good fit for a host of problems.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
But we only need working physics to live. We don't really need metaphysics. That is, we don't technically need to understand what it is we are predicting and explaining, only that our predictions are good enough. After all, the simulation hypothesis and similar thought experiments do not force us into inaction.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
I am sure there have been plenty of discussions on this forum already :wink: . This is just a variant on the "hard problem": Red doesn't seem to be a physical property of anything (light has wavelength, but it doesn't have "redness") and yet it somehow is in our minds. And to make matters worse, there seems to be no way to confirm anyone else sees red the way you or I see it. It's subjective, but also real.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
I don't want to make this a discussion about morality, but my question would remain the same. What is "objective goodness" even supposed to mean? A catalogue of good deeds? A definition? A divine judge?
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Right, so would you call these principles "true" or something else?
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
That seems to be a bit like the logic saying that atheism is a religion. Let's say there is a physical tree. It could be that there also is a metaphysical tree. It could be that the tree is a metaphysical dragon. It could be that the tree is a metaphysical rock. Saying "the tree is really (metaphysically) a tree" is a metaphysical claim. So is claiming it's really a dragon etc. What's not a claim is saying that "it might be a tree, but I don't see how you could ever find out". The latter would, at most, be a claim about epistemology.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Justified true belief. Yes I think that's fine. I don't actually think there is any true definition for truth, it can only be described by example. But I am fine with using this one.
Yeah I think I get what you are saying too, that in terms of total content that is existing in the real world and displayed in the illusory world at one time, (3) can have less total content than (2). But I don't think that "less content in the objects of explanation" translates to "lesser complexity of the explanation". I illustrate with an example.
I observe a house from the front side. Then I circle around to check that all 4 sides are fully built. I observe that no wall is missing. Kinda like this. I can draw 2 explanations.
(1) There are really only 2 walls existing, and a swift house builder just moves the 2 walls around as I circle around, to make it look like there are 4 walls.
(2) There are 4 walls.
One could argue that explanation (1) has less content in the objects of explanation (ie 2 walls + 1 builder as opposed to 4 walls). Yet clearly explanation (2) is the simplest in terms of explanation.
:ok: I wish you'd said something else though.
Are these frequent? Maybe just because some hypotheses haven't been refuted yet, doesn't mean they cannot be refuted. [Side note, I didn't think the theism-atheism problem was too hard; but that could be a conversation for another time].
Quoting Echarmion
That still depends on the metaphysical topic. Is it important to know that the perceived physical rock is metaphysically real? Indeed probably not. But moral values? Quite so. The answer should influence the behaviour of most people.
Quoting Echarmion
Occam's Razor. Boom. :wink:
Quoting Echarmion
If you are asking what is objective goodness, it means that some things are good as a matter of fact, not a matter of opinion. If you are asking for the definition of objective goodness, then skipping straight to the answer of Aristotle without explanation (as it would be a long one), it is "a potentiality being actualized. And as actuality and potentiality are objective states of things, goodness in that sense is objective.
Quoting Echarmion
Truth being defined as "conformance to reality", calling these principles true means that applying them will give conclusions that conform to reality.
Quoting Echarmion
Right; saying "I don't know" is indeed not a metaphysical claim. But my point was that if saying "the perception is a false one", that is implicitly making the metaphysical claim that "a false perception exists in reality".