The fundamental question of Metaphysics: Why something rather than nothing
Why is there something rather than nothing? was labeled as the fundamental question of metaphysics by Martin Heidegger. The basic concern here seems to be a lack of an explanation for existence of the universe and all it contains for the other alternative nothingness is considered possible. In my own way, perhaps failing to achieve my goal, I will attempt to show that the belief that nothing is possible is wrong and in the process provide an "explanation" for why there is something rather than nothing?.
Firstly, the question itself indicates an absence of a reason for why nothing cannot exist i.e. nothingness is considered possible and ergo the need to explain why not nothing but something.
From my limited perspective and knowledge, the only impossibility that categorically excludes something from reality is logical impossibility. If something is logically impossible then it can't be true in any possible world.
Consider the idea of nothing which for this discussion, and hopefully staying true to the meaning as intended in the question, "why is there something rather than nothing?", will simply mean the state of nonexistence.
If we're in agreement so far let's take a simplified version of the universe as one with 3 objects A (5 cm long), B (3 cm long) and C (1 cm long). These 3 objects will represent everything in our universe and the length of these objects stand for any conceivable property of objects in our universe, the one we live in.
In this hypothetical universe it is ok to say:
1. object A is the longest
and
2. Object C is the shortest
Another way of expressing the above two statements is:
3. Nothing is longer than A
4. Nothing is shorter than C
Ergo, we can combine statements 3 and 4 as:
5. Nothing is longer than A which is longer than C which in turn is longer than nothing. In other words the following statement is true:
6. Nothing > A > C > Nothing (">" here means "longer than")
But from statement 6, what follows is:
7. Nothing > Nothing
We also know, from the law of identity that it is true that:
8. Nothing = Nothing
9. From 7 and 8 we get the contradiction (Nothing > Nothing AND Nothing = Nothing)
10. Ergo, the idea of nothing leads to a logical contradiction (9) and so is impossible. Nothing is impossible.
Let's now take absolute nothing.
The following is true of absolute nothingness:
11. Nothing is greater (in terms of nothingness) than nothing
12. From 11 we get Nothing > Nothing
13. From 8 and 12, we again get the logical contradiction: Nothing = Nothing AND Nothing > Nothing
14. Therefore, again, Nothing is logically impossible
15. Either something or nothing
16. Impossible that nothing (from 10 and 15)
17. So, there must be something rather than nothing.
Some may object that in statements such as "nothing is longer than A" and nothing is shorter than C" are just turns of phrases and in no way implies that nothing has length, let alone being shorter/longer. However, take a look at the following diagram for the 3 object universe I described:
|....................1cm.........3cm.................5cm...............|
Nothing........C.............B......................A........Nothing
Viewed as above, "nothing is longer than A" and [I]"nothing[/i] is shorter than C" seems to have the literal meaning that nothing does possess length and that these lengths can be comparatively longer/shorter.
Firstly, the question itself indicates an absence of a reason for why nothing cannot exist i.e. nothingness is considered possible and ergo the need to explain why not nothing but something.
From my limited perspective and knowledge, the only impossibility that categorically excludes something from reality is logical impossibility. If something is logically impossible then it can't be true in any possible world.
Consider the idea of nothing which for this discussion, and hopefully staying true to the meaning as intended in the question, "why is there something rather than nothing?", will simply mean the state of nonexistence.
If we're in agreement so far let's take a simplified version of the universe as one with 3 objects A (5 cm long), B (3 cm long) and C (1 cm long). These 3 objects will represent everything in our universe and the length of these objects stand for any conceivable property of objects in our universe, the one we live in.
In this hypothetical universe it is ok to say:
1. object A is the longest
and
2. Object C is the shortest
Another way of expressing the above two statements is:
3. Nothing is longer than A
4. Nothing is shorter than C
Ergo, we can combine statements 3 and 4 as:
5. Nothing is longer than A which is longer than C which in turn is longer than nothing. In other words the following statement is true:
6. Nothing > A > C > Nothing (">" here means "longer than")
But from statement 6, what follows is:
7. Nothing > Nothing
We also know, from the law of identity that it is true that:
8. Nothing = Nothing
9. From 7 and 8 we get the contradiction (Nothing > Nothing AND Nothing = Nothing)
10. Ergo, the idea of nothing leads to a logical contradiction (9) and so is impossible. Nothing is impossible.
Let's now take absolute nothing.
The following is true of absolute nothingness:
11. Nothing is greater (in terms of nothingness) than nothing
12. From 11 we get Nothing > Nothing
13. From 8 and 12, we again get the logical contradiction: Nothing = Nothing AND Nothing > Nothing
14. Therefore, again, Nothing is logically impossible
15. Either something or nothing
16. Impossible that nothing (from 10 and 15)
17. So, there must be something rather than nothing.
Some may object that in statements such as "nothing is longer than A" and nothing is shorter than C" are just turns of phrases and in no way implies that nothing has length, let alone being shorter/longer. However, take a look at the following diagram for the 3 object universe I described:
|....................1cm.........3cm.................5cm...............|
Nothing........C.............B......................A........Nothing
Viewed as above, "nothing is longer than A" and [I]"nothing[/i] is shorter than C" seems to have the literal meaning that nothing does possess length and that these lengths can be comparatively longer/shorter.
Comments (107)
If Nothing is understood to mean the state of nonexistence, then these 2 statements are false. For what they're claiming is that "The state of nonexistence is longer than A" and "The state of nonexistence is shorter than C". But that is not at all what we normally mean when we say such phrases. Rather, what we mean to say is that "No object is longer than A" and "No object is shorter than B".
I'm not exactly sure what this is supposed to mean. Could you elaborate on this?
The thing you've done is matched each length to an object and while A, B and C were matched with the correct measurements, notice that you paired both 0.5 cm and 9 cm with nothing. In a sense then, both anything less than 1 cm and anything greater than 5 cm are nothing.
What is wrong in saying "nothing is greater than nothing"? Is it not true that there can be nothing more nothing than nothing? Doesn't this amount to saying nothing is greater than nothing? Apply the same principle I did with the objects in the previous 2 paragraphs: nothing matches with nothing and a greater nothing would, again, match with nothing.
I would say this in my head, but I would not thereby mean that the state of nonexistence is 0.5 or 9 cm long, since the state of nonexistence cannot have a length. Rather, I would be thinking that "There is no object in the universe which is either 0.5 or 9 cm".
I don't know what is wrong with saying this, because as yet I don't have any idea what these statements are supposed to mean. I do not know how to interpret "There can be nothing more nothing than nothing."
I agree that it's itself paradoxical that the property of length could be attributed to nothing for there's nothing there to which we may attach the property of length, and for that matter no property at all can be of nothing.
Let me ask you this then: to what would you assign, in the universe I described, lengths greater than 5 cm and less than 1 cm?
I think this statement already highlights the problem with the notion of "nothing" as an ontological category. You can only meaningfully talk about the nonexistence of something. Nothing is always a relative term, denoting the relative absence of something, whose attributes we know.
It seems to me the entire question of "why is there something rather than nothing" is just a result of a mistake in our reasoning. We tend to subconsciously reify categories and relational terms into ontological "things". In this case, we turned relative absence into it's own absolute thing "nothingness".
But you can just change the wording to ask, "Why does anything exist"? Which doesn't need to reference some ontological nothing.
True. But then we'd at least be able to evolve that question into a number of questions about specific things (since "anything" is again merely a category for "all individual things). We could ask of any one thing why it is, and why it is that specific way. And that kinda describes metaphysics in general.
So I guess if you leave the "nothingness" out of it, instead of a fundamental question, you have a fundamental descriptionn of metaphysics.
No object in your universe has these lengths, so I would not assign them to anything. This doesn’t at all mean that I would assign them to the state of nonexistence.
It is now clear to me where your confusion lies. As Echarmion points out, you are equivocating Nothing as a state of nonexistence with Nothing as a quantifier. It is like the old joke:
“1. Nothing is better than eternal happiness.
2. A ham sandwich is better than nothing.
3. Therefore, a ham sandwich is better than eternal happiness.”
It is clear that ‘nothing’ in 1 is being used as a quantifier, while ‘nothing’ in 2 is being used to refer to a certain state of nonexistence.
Therefore, your argument does not work because it commits the Fallacy of Equivocation.
Speak of the devil :lol:
You're erroneously treating "nothing" as a rigid referrent.
Consider Propositions 3 and 4:
3. Nothing is longer than A
This means: For all x: x<=A
4. Nothing is shorter than C
This means: For all y: y>=C
y and x are two different variables, having no mathematical or logical relation between them. In your proof, you conflate them (in effect).
You're argument is that the world is necessary, and you get there because you don't understand nothingness. The world is contingent and things exist because it's beautiful. Consciousness is intimately involved with beauty. Nothingness is not material nothingness
Quoting Alvin Capello
I was anticipating this response but suppose the scenario I presented to you, which I will not repeat here for brevity, was a homework assignment and your teacher specifically demands that you must find a match for each length (0.5 cm, 1 cm, 3 cm, 5 cm). To what would you assign 0.5 cm and 9 cm to?
If it's mandatory that each length be matched, the most logical option is to match both 0.5 cm and 9 cm to nothing. If you disagree then it is required of you to find something that matches these lengths and, of course, none exist.
:yikes: What do you mean? Of course a ham sandwich is better than God - assuming you also have water to drink daily, you can live on 'nothing but ham sandwiches' indefinitely, but without a doubt after only a couple of months with 'nothing but God' you'd starve to death. Kosher ham or not, like the song says: 'all you need is ham / ham is all you need' ... :yum: :hearts:
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As I explained above, you are equivocating on the use of the term ‘nothing.’ We can correctly say that these lengths match up to nothing in the quantificational sense, i.e. in the sense that no object possesses these lengths. But we cannot say that they match up to nothing in the ontological sense, i.e. in the sense that they match up to the state of nonexistence,
Do you not recognize these 2 very distinct senses of the word ‘nothing’?
What do you mean? Take this universe (matter, energy in space-time) and begin with your idea of "relative" absence and suppose you have an anti-matter gun that annihilates matter. You shoot objects into oblivion one by one i.e. you cause relative absence of things. Ultimately, you would've destroyed everything after shooting yourself and programming the gun to take itself out. That which is left, after the gun self-destructs, is absolute nothing.
I understand that nothing can't have properties and it is irrational to say it can for it leads to paradoxes and I respect your position that you would simply refuse to match 0.5 cm and 9 cm to anything at all.
However what I'm asking of you is very simple. If a match for 0.5 cm and 9 cm is mandatory and you are given two options - something or nothing. What would be the most logical match? It can't be [I]something[/i] for there are no objects of given lengths. Ergo, 0.5 cm and 9 cm have to be matched with nothing. All I'm requesting you to do, after I take away the option of refusing to assign a match, is to find a match for 0.5 cm and 9 cm given the choices [I] something[/i] and nothing.
You are still equivocating on the term 'nothing'. All I can do in response is to emphasize that I can only assign these to nothing in the quantificational sense, but not the ontological sense. Your argument conflates these 2 quite different meanings of the term.
So, in terms of quantity, you would assign 0.5 cm and 9 cm to nothing. It's the most logical choice, right?
Again, I would assign these to nothing in the quantificational sense, i.e. in the sense that I would not assign them to anything. But I would not assign them to nothing in the ontological sense, i.e. nothingness considered as a state of nonexistence. Your argument crucially depends upon an equivocation of these senses.
I will repeat the question from above: Do you, or do you not, recognize these 2 very distinct senses of the term?
Bear with me. I'm slow-witted.
Firstly we have a 3-object universe (A = 5 cm, B = 3 cm and C = 1 cm)
You have to (mandatory it is) to match the measurements 0.5 cm, 1 cm, 3 cm, 5 cm and 9 cm with, there being only 3 possibilities: something, everything, nothing
The following matches are true: 1 cm - C, 3 cm - B and 5 cm - A. In other words the lengths 1 cm, 3 cm and 5 cm match with something.
We're left with 0.5 cm and 9 cm. Can either of them be matched with something? No.
Can either of them be matched with everything? No.
Can either of them be matched with nothing. No because nothing can't have a length.
So, 0.5 cm and 9 cm can't be matched with something, everything or nothing. What is not nothing, not something and also not everything. Nothing, of course. This process can be iterated to infinity and you will always have only nothing as the only logical option as a match for 0.5 cm and 9 cm or any length less than 1 cm and any length greater than 5 cm.
I'm examining a property, here length, which x and y can share.
Again, you are assigning these lengths to nothing in the quantificational sense, but not in the ontological sense.
To ask again, do you not recognize the distinction between these 2 senses of the term?
:yum: :up: :party:
If I am equivocating then it implies that there must exist an ambiguity in the meaning of nothing. You seem to think that nothing has a quantitative and an ontological meaning and in my argument, although there's no need that it not be done, I haven't used zero (the quantitative aspect of nothing) and my focus has been purely on nonexistence (the ontological meaning).
If that's the case, then as I explained above, premises 3 and 4 are false. Because they both assert that the state of nonexistence has a length which can be compared to a given measure. Therefore, your argument cannot even get off the ground.
By the way, do you think that when people say things like "Nothing tastes better than fettuccine alfredo", they are really saying something like "The state of nonexistence tastes better than fettuccine alfredo?" Because it seems quite clear to me that what we actually mean when we say this is something like "There exists no object which tastes better than fettuccine alfredo."
Indeed you're right. Nothing tastes better than fettuccine alfredo doesn't imply that nothing has a taste but the issue is not that nothing has a taste or not but if taste could be extended in terms of a measured value beyond that of fettuccine alfredo, what would lie in that region? Nothing, of course. Now imagine a great chef invents a dish tastier than fetuccine alfredo in 2021. Where would this dish lie on the taste scale after 2021. It would be located in the region previously occupied by nothing, no?
To reference the 3-object universe, imagine now a fourth object D = 3 cm. On the length scale both B and D would occupy the same spot and then I would have to conclude they have the same length. If the great chef in the previous paragraph created a dish tastier than fettuccine alfredo in 2021 then that dish would occupy the taste scale at the spot previously allocated to nothing. Doesn't that mean nothing, if it were possible to taste it, would taste better than fettuccine alfredo? :smile:
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This makes it amply clear that you are indeed conflating the two senses of the term. As before, no object lies in the region, but it is not the case that the state of nonexistence lies in the region.
I’m not exactly sure if there is much more I can say on this issue, but I guess I can ask your opinion of the ham-sandwich argument from earlier. Do you not see how that argument equivocates the two senses of nothing, and how you are doing the exact same thing?
No, I'm not conflating anything at all.
Suppose dish x is the tastiest in the world in 2019; this will allow us to say, "nothing is tastier than x" If the taste scale extends from 0 and then goes on to 10 (0 being least tasty and 10 being tastiest) then x would be a 10. Beyond 10 on the taste scale would be nothing. Now imagine in 2020, a chef creates a dish y which is tastier than x. What would be the position of y on the taste scale? Beyond 10, no? But this was the region of nothing in 2020. Now dish y is in at the same position occupied by nothing in 2019. Can I not then say that just as y is now tastier than x, that nothing was tastier than x? After all, both occupy the same region on the taste scale? If you disagree then you would have to say that another dish z with the same score of 10 that dish x has isn't equally tasty as x which is obviously false.
Since we keep going in circles and you won’t answer my questions, it would not be productive to continue down this line of discussion.
No problem. Thank you for your time. I'll give it more thought; hopefully I'll see your point. Will get back to you if anything we can agree on comes up. :up:
Sure thing. Until next time :smile:
You'd be left with a lot of energy, which isn't nothing.
Mass-energy equivalence?
Yes.
# Our universe is one-dimensional, its contents quantified by "length." Units are centimeters.
# Our universe is a set of objects, defined as follows...
UNIVERSE = {A: 5, B: 3, C: 1}
# The only way we can define what does not exist is in its relation to that which does exist. We can only visualize "nothing" as sort of a negative image of "something."
NOTHING = {x in RANGE(?, ?) where x not in UNIVERSE}
# NOTHING = {..., -2, -1, 0, 2, 4, 6, 7, 8, ...}
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It's similar to the common inquiry into our cosmological origin: "But how can something come from nothing? We've never seen something come from nothing before, why should it happen now?"
Such a question is based on the premise that we've actually ever seen "nothing" at all; which is by definition impossible.
As soon as we can define nothing it ceases to become nothing.
Most people don't know how to think about nothing properly because it's deeper, more mystically philosophical than they realize
Would you be willing to elaborate on that statement?
Also I would like to clarify that I am not implying that we cannot necessarily define the concept of nothing but rather its contents.
I assure you, in the most personal way, ultimately, there will be nothing rather than something for each one of us.
"It has no content. It has form and no form. It has no content". That is how I would say it. It implies a contradiction, but I don't believe a contradiction is definable, so that is not a problem. Anything mystical will appear "paradoxical" at first
The problem is here:
[Quote]Ergo, we can combine statements 3 and 4 as:
5. [B]Nothing [/b]is longer than A which is longer than C which in turn is longer than nothing. [/quote]
In this statement, "nothing" means there is no x > A. i.e. such a thing doesn't exist. Properties are associated with existents, but you're claiming a non-existing thing has properties.
Yes, I did mention this "difficulty" or perhaps better described as an embarrassment, in my OP and in my later posts. However there is a sense in which nothing can be assigned a property as I tried to show in my discussion with Alvin Capello. How about if you view it from the point of potentiality? If I say "nothing is larger than the sun" then I mean that if the size of the sun is 10 then there's no object that is larger than 10. Now, "there's no object" is basically nonexistence or nothing. Expressed differently, if we consider the size of 11, bigger than 10, then I would not find an object to assign the size 11 to; the absence of an object is, weil, nothing. This could be taken to mean that beyond the size of 10, there's nothing.
Now imagine a discovery is made and an object, a supersun is found and its size is greater than 10. Does this star not occupy the region that once previously belonged to nothing. This indicates that though nothing doesn't, can't, have a size and can't be, in any sensible sense, larger than the sun, it is also the region in which anything real must exist in for it to be larger than the sun. Nothing can then be viewed as a realizable potential in which something larger than the sun can exist. It's not that nothing is larger than the sun but that if anything can be larger than the sun it must exist so in the region that nothing occupies on the size-scale.
An analogy will perhaps help. Imagine a row of books arranged according to size from the smallest to largest on a rack. The smallest book forms the lower limit and the largest book forms the upper limit. Beyond the smallest book and the largest book lies the nothing of space. If I were now to say there's a book B that is larger than the largest book in the rack then it would occupy the space or nothing beyond the largest book in the original row. Can't I then conclude that, if nothing could possess the property of size, then it would be conclusively larger than the largest book in the original rack? Basically, in terms of potential that can be realized, nothing is, in the sense of size, larger than the largest book in the original rack.
The question: "Why is there something rather than nothing?" presupposes, uncritically, that the principle of sufficient reason, according to which my intellect operates, must also necessarily be applicable, without exception, to everything that exists, including, myself. In other words, my intellect is compelled to assume that there must be a reason that explains why anything, including myself, exists.
WHICH MAY NOT BE SO. THE WHY MAY SIMPLY BE AN EXPRESSION OF THE ULTIMATE IN ANTHROPOMORPHISM
:clap:
That would sound very impressive, were you the only sentient being in the Universe - but then, you'd lack an audience, so I guess there wouldn't be anyone to impress.
Which puts me in mind of the following: modern science is unwittingly anthropocentric. Why so? Because the move of 'bracketing out the observer' that lies at the base of scientific objectivity, is a methodological step, not a metaphysical postulate. In other words, science, for the purpose of arriving at an objective view, brackets out anything which can be attributed to subjective factors, so as to consider only what exists, irrespective of any particular viewpoint. But what it doesn't see is that the mind itself, including the mind of the scientist, has an irreducible role in any kind of scientific analysis or observation whatever. A perspective is required to make any statement about anything whatever, and there is nothing that can be shown to, or known to, exist without existing from a perspective. The perspective is what the mind brings to the object of analysis.
For naturalistic purposes, none of this matters. Where it does matter, is as soon as it ventures into metaphysical propositions, about what is real, and the like, which it most often does.
The principle of sufficient reason (PSR) is similar in structure to the statement, all swans are white. If you wish to disprove the claim all swans are white you need to first assume that all swans are white and if you want to disprove the PSR you have to first assume the PSR. This is what I did and there is a reason why there's something rather than nothing viz. that nothing, the idea, causes contradictions and so, is impossible.
Be courteous! Arguments "ad hominem" are often the last resort of the ignorant!
Ugh. No doubt it's already been pointed out somewhere in this thread, and certainly elsewhere, that this "fundamental question" according to Everyone's-Favorite-Nazi is rhetorical, in that it assumes that nothing is something, or a kind of something, which would otherwise be available if there was no "something." Accept the question and you accept the assumption. Or, if you don't, you realize that the question is, in fact, "why is there something?"
And this realization, I think, provides one with an insight as to what motivates the speculation engaged in by those who believe this to be a "fundamental question." Heidegger was, like Nietzsche, a Romantic, and Romantics who find themselves unable to believe in the God of their fathers also find themselves deprived of a time-honored explanation for life and source of the meaning of life. But they remain convinced that there must be a reason for the existence of the universe and, most importantly, their own existence. So, they deploy in pursuit of that all-important reason; a reason which, presumably, can only be determined by philosophers (as opposed to scientists).
If, as you state, " ... nothing, the idea, causes contradictions and so, is impossible," how, then, in the first place, can the idea of nothing be a "cause," since, by definition, it does not exist?
Also, might there not be a significant difference between nothingness as a logical, rather than as an existential, cause?
For a someone who is dying, nothing definitely "exists" as an existential, rather than as a merely logical, reality which will shortly be experienced, or encountered. Nothing is eminently real to the dying! Do we really want to insist that what they are dreading is impossible?
Well before Heidegger, both Leibniz and Schopenhauer dealt with this question. It is not a peculiarly "Nazi" question.
It's interesting (to me at least) that in pre-Christian times, Epicurus was admired for his teaching that there was no afterlife. We simply cease to exist; there is no punishment, no dull, dreary existence in the kind of grey shadow world envisioned by pagans when eternal torment was not expected. As a result, the fear of death was thought irrational. We recall nothing bad happening to us before we were born, as we didn't exist then; nothing bad will happen to us after we die as we won't exist. Lucretius and others considered him a kind of savior as he was thought to have freed us from the superstitious fears which cause us to fear death and dissolution.
Now, apparently, we're horrified because someday we won't exist. Something in us has changed, it would seem.
I agree, and don't mean to say this is something of significance to Nazis only. I think it may be a general, and emotional, reaction to a loss of faith in what served as providing a reason for our existence for centuries, and a perceived need to replace it with some other reason.
Excellent piece! Well thought out!
Unfortunately, rational explanation has never been an effective antidote for the majority of humanity. The majority of humanity always was, still is, and always will be horrified by the approach of death's nothingness. In my opinion, it seems that nothing in us has really changed.
It is not discourteous to examine fundamental philosophical presuppositions, although it is sometimes uncomfortable.
Very "impressive"!
OK I'll accept your explanation. Thanks.
By the way, I agree with your comments regarding perspective.
Quoting Ciceronianus the White
Amor fati.
Quoting Ciceronianus the White
:death: :flower:
:strong: "I ham that I ham"?
:rofl:
Well, if nothing must have something to do with existence then it would have to be in a sense beyond logic for the concept itself is logically problematic as I attempted to demonstrate within the framework of contradictions not obtainable in any possible world.
Yes, this (treating nothing as something) appears to be a problem for my argument. However, I refer you to the way definitions work: as far as I can tell, we define a thing in terms of properties but not just any property but those which are essences of the thing being defined. Since, nothing is a defined concept, it follows then that it has a property that is its essence and that, to my understanding, is nonexistence, the opposite of existence, perhaps referrable to as nothingness.
Ergo, while I'm reluctant to make the claim that nothing is something when something means everything we can sense and/or ruminate on, there is no denying that nothing has an essence, that of "emptiness" on the grandest of scales, and by that token can be considered to possess a property, the property of nothingness. It makes sense then to think of nothing as something, not in terms of either the physical or mental but in terms of a thing that possesses the essential property of nothingness/nonexistence.
Perhaps I'm asking you, if you disagree with the above, to not look at it in terms of properties which necessitates existence but from the vantage point of essences which levels the playing field, so to speak, between something and nothing.
I think the question is a very artificial one to begin with, and that itself creates problems.
I think it's important to understand that when we ask "why is there something?" we aren't asking about a particular thing we call "something." We aren't questioning any particular thing. If we were, we'd ask "why is there that tree?"
As I noted, I think the question posed by Heidegger is properly (if we can speak of anything being "proper" about such a question) "why is there something" which I suppose is intended to ask why is there all this (the universe), or perhaps why are there things, or why do things exist? And, I don't think Heidegger is asking for an explanation of how all things were caused, or came to be, in the sense that science could provide in many cases.
Can we even ascribe a particular property to everything in any meaningful, non-trivial sense? If we say all things that exist have in common the property of existence we indulge in a tautology. But if we say nonexistence is a property of that which doesn't exist, or a property we aren't describing--we aren't really swaying anything.
People just want desperately o keep on living as they have or in a better way than they have. That's all that people can know, or describe.
To begin with, I agree that "something" is meant in the generic sense and not in the particular. Nevertheless, the particulars constitute the class of things Heidegger is referring to with "something" in his question. Heidegger and other metaphysicians are seeking some kind of explanation for why things exist because they didn't find a good reason for why the situation couldn't have been the opposite, nonexistence/nothing.
Then there's the matter of how claiming that all things that exist have existence as a common "property" is a tautology. Well, just as the statement, "clouds, snow and doctors' coats are white" isn't a tautology for I'm not here saying, "white is white" but instead drawing attention to the fact that all the objects mentioned have whiteness in common, the statement, "all objects that exist have existence in common", is also not a tautology. The claim isn't "existing objects exist", in which case it would be a tautology but about a common "property" shared, in which case it isn't.
It's problematic to treat existence as a property. A property is a characteristic that some objects have, and others do not. There are no objects that lack existence.
Well, I don't know. I have trouble understanding the difference between "All things that exist, exist" and "all things that exist have existence in common." Both statements are true by necessity. It's like saying "all men are men" is different from saying "all men have in common the fact that they're men."
Do we ask "why are all men, men and not women (or something else)?" I don't think we do, not really. I thing there's something wrong with such questions. The "answers" to them resolve no real problems, if indeed they can be answered with any assurance.
:up:
He goes on to say seeing the Universal in things is what philosophy ("science" as he calls it) is about. He says inorganic things are more determinate than organic. The later is "fluid movement". This sounds like a scientific claim (in the modern sense). But his old fashion science is still interesting in how he uses it to counter Hume. Hegel says there is some laws within the universe, but they are discovered in action (much as Hedeigger says).
I would say the universe comes from nothing, and that the Hegelian way of looking at the world and yourself as the Platonic Forms (your activity) is a reason the universe. Any spiritual experience is the reason for the contingent universe to come from nothing (a spiritual realm of notta)
That question was raised by Leibniz. Heidegger paraphrases it.
On second thought, perhaps the more accurate question(s) ought to be:
Why is there, simultaneously, both something and nothing?
What kind of being grounds nothing and how does it do it?
Do we actually experience nothingness(es)? If so, what are they like?
Is there one kind of being that grounds something and another kind of being that grounds nothing?
Is the being that grounds nothing itself grounded in the being that grounds something?
These are just some of the kinds of questions Sartre asks and tries to answer in Being & Nothingness.
I assume, with good reason, that you're more knowledgeable than me on this issue. You were kind enough to point out whether the statement "all things that exist have existence in common" could be a vacuous tautology.
If we were to take a set of objects, say, A = {8, 5, 7}, and B = {e, x, z} is there any new content in the statements:
1) 3, 5, 7 are numbers i.e. the set A consists of numbers
and
2) e, x, z are letters of the English alphabet i.e. set B consists of letters of the English alphabet
In other words are statements 1 and 2 tautologies? It does seem like the statements 1 and 2 are tautologies; after all, 8, 5, 7 are numbers and e, x, z are letters of the English alphabet. Ergo, statements 1 and 2 amount to saying, "numbers are numbers" and "letters are letters".
However, consider the following two statements:
3) The elements of set A have numericalness in common
and
4) The elements of set B have letter-ness in common
Statements 3 and 4, although they requires knowledge of what the elements of the sets actually are, are about what property it is that determines membership in a set and in no way can they be translated as "numbers are numbers" or "letters are letters".
Similarly, the statement, "existing things have existence in common" simply mentions the property, here existence, that decides membership in the set of existent things. It doesn't mean, like you seem to be claiming, "existing things exist".
Maybe I'm a victim of the OLP I was taught in the increasingly distant days of my youth (I tend to think I'm a beneficiary of it).
Context is important. I can easily enough conceive of someone unfamiliar with the Latin alphabet asking what e, x and z are, and being told they're letters. The same with someone unfamiliar with our number system asking what 3, 5 and 7 are, and being told they're numbers/numerals. In such a context, the answer to the question asked, e.g., that "3, 5 and 7 are numbers" is appropriate.
Now imagine someone, quite familiar with our alphabet and numbers, asking us "what is the common characteristic of A, B and C?" or "what do 3, 5 and 7 have in common?" The predictable response is something like "are you kidding me?" but could be something like "they're letters/numbers, you ____!"
The interlocutor in these situations, like the person being questioned, knows very well that A, B and C are letters and 3, 5 and 7 are numbers. If either one of them was approached by someone boldly declaring that A, B and C are letters or have "letterness" in common, they would likely, and rightly, think there is something wrong with the declarant, who is merely stating what is obvious or with the statement which serves merely to state the obvious.
One could argue that there is nothing. That the question presupposes what is not the case, and that experiences which involve nothing (negatites) are quite common occurrences, as Sartre has shown. Along these lines, Sartre states: " … the total disappearance of being would not be the advent of the reign of non-being, but on the contrary the concomitant disappearance of nothingness."
Quoting Ciceronianus the White
Well, there's the definition of existence and then there are existing things. Existence, to my knowledge means perceivable by the senses and all things that have in common this property are said to exist. An existing thing is declared to be as such based on nothing but by being perceivable by the senses. However the meaning of existing things depends on existence being a common property. As you can see a single object's existence is different to the existence of existing things; the former, a single existing object depends on testing whether the property of being perceivable by the senses is present/absent but the latter, all existing things, depends on whether the property of perceivable by the senses is common or not.
Ergo, to say that an existing thing exists is a tautology because a thing existing means it exists but "existing things have in common the property of existence" doesn't mean existing things exist but what it actually conveys is that the common property of existence defines the set of existing things. As you can see the meaning of existing things is not based on the meaning of existence "directly" which would lead to a tautology but on the commonness of this property (existence) among existing things.
It's something like saying,
1. Red objects are red (a tautology) = The set of red objects
because
2. Red objects have redness in common
Similarly,
1. Existing things exist (a tautology) = The set of existing things
because
2. Existing things have existence in common
The 1's are tautological statements and the 2's are reasons why the sets or classes in the 1's exist.
Perhaps my problem is I think letters are letters, and numbers are numbers. In other words, I don't think letters have a property of "letter-ness"; they simply are letters.
But I think my difficulty with the "fundamental question" is that it arises out of a very awkward, very artificial, use of language, and reification.
We may say that two objects are both red if they are, in fact, red. We can say that something that is not red is not red, but we don't say that it lacks the property of redness. Something that isn't red will be another color.
We can say, although it would be odd to do so, that a person exists. But we don't say that there is a person who lacks the property of existence, as obviously there can be no such person. We may ask whether there is a person X and may be told there is no such person, but we won't be told that person lacks the property of existence. A person by definition exists. We don't say that a thing lacks the property of existence either, if asked whether there is such a thing. We say there is no such thing.
All these attempts at quantifying nothing in order to justify a difference does not make sense. There is not anything to quantify. This is where sense enters in. Nothing to quantify, means that it can be quantified - so long as there is an inconclusive answer. Nothing as you say is not possible, but it is real. Everything did not begin with o-how-possible everything is. It's absolutely impossible. Nothing is impossible. See how it precedes the unreasonable?
It - however impossible - must be. There is no middle ground. Even without existing - that's what it is. Even when that's impossible - that's what it is. Although it is a variable, it's outcome is not. That's where it started.
It goes beyond the impossible, beyond thinking, beyond even God. That's a little off-topic, but yet not. As it is conducive to the outcome - destiny - through the ultimate everything; and we are asking about the ultimate nothing and why it ultimately is something. It is relevant.
I know these things, before I was there I did that. It works. So, from myself to myself: Would it even be acceptable to permit the inconclusive answer to be that there is both? Everything, nothing and their Jedi-friend - Obi-Wan Kenobi? It only takes one Jedi to keep a galaxy safe you know and only a single galaxy to illuminate every possibility to a concept. Jesus is the absolute Jedi master.
Nothing is the nexus for negative time; that's all - the spirit realm. Nothing not possible means everything possible but nothing is real beyond possibility. I love this shit, so I will stop myself there.
How about if I put it this way:
Set E = set of existing things
If I say that existing things exist then it's a tautology alright for existing things must exist. Each existing thing must exist; ergo tautology.
However, when I say that existing things have existence in common, I'm not talking about the existence of each existing thing as existing (a tautology) but I'm actually making a statement about the set of existing things and passing on the information that the property of existence determines membership in the aforementioned set. Just as the set of red objects can't itself be red but redness is a property of each element in that set, the set of existing things itself can't exist, at least not in the way its members do, and so there's no tautology in saying, "existing things (the set) have existence as a common property".
There is no philosopher dumber than Plato.
Therefore, no philosopher is smarter than no philosopher.
:rofl: I'm the dumbest there is.
Why is it nonsensical? The reason why will lead you to the conclusion that nothing, that which is nothingness, is impossible.
These are contradictions and should prompt you to trace it back to some premise(s) in your argument. I did that with my argument and it went back to the concept of nothing. If nothing were possible then it leads to contradictions which in themselves are impossibilities. Ergo, nothing is impossible.
Quoting Luke
:chin:
But we're talking about existence. A "set" of things is normally distinguished, and distinguishable, from a set of other things, or another thing. There is no set of things which lack existence, i.e. which don't have existence as a common quality. We don't, and can't, distinguish things which exist from "things" that don't exist.
No thing is longer than no thing, because it is perpetual infinity. I call that space.
No philosopher is smarter than no philosopher, because it is perpetual wisdom. I call that love.
Both physical and real quantities of absolute nonsense.
Nothingness is eminently logical. It's impossible for nothing not to exist
I doubt you can do that. I doubt anyone can.
We are the dominant carbon based life-form on this rock circling a fairly routine star in a galaxy of 200 - 300 billion stars...in a part of a universe that contains hundreds of billions of other galaxies. We almost certainly are no big deal.
If most of our arguments were made with the conditional "it may be that...X"...some of the discussions could be deemed reasonable. (I personally consider most to be interesting, even entertaining, despite the unreasonable element created by our human chauvinism.)
We do not have answers here...we have speculations...often accompanied by speculations about the solidity of arguments for and against proposed speculations.
I'm not doing anything, nature does it. I think it's pretty well empirically settled that we will all die at some point, isn't it?
Absolutely. That is especially obvious to me. I'm 83...and I can have a high school class reunion in my living room...while keeping reasonable social distancing.
But you said, "I assure you, in the most personal way, ultimately, there will be nothing rather than something for each one of us."
The question of whether or not that means "nothing rather than something" remains a mystery.
Right?
Hey! My Neapolitan Cousin. I'm 80, and, rest assured, I am just as mystified as you are as to what the ultimate outcome will be; viz., "Nothing, or something." But, you and I both know that we will find out soon, won't we?
As I have written elsewhere, to me, it's as simple as this:
If something exists after we die, and we exist after we die, well then, we will know it: but, if nothing exists after we die, and we do not exist after we die, well then, we will not know it.
And that's IT baby!!!!!
My people are Nabalitan (as we say)...from a small village near Caserta. They are getting creamed over there right now. Lots and lots of Italians are finding out that answer of which we speak.
I hope we do not exist after we die. I've had a great life...and still have. But when it ends, I'd just as soon have it end completely. (And that is what I expect!)
Frank:
My paternal grandfather came from a little hamlet called Sant Angelo a Cupolo and my paternal grandmother came from a neighboring hamlet called San Nicola Manfredi, both located in Benevento in the province of Campania. Like you, I hurt for those beautiful people who love life, art, and family so much.
Even though I fully understand and can completely identify with where you're coming from, still, I hope you and I will, in the end, be pleasantly surprised.
Stay healthy buddy!
I'm relying on your ability to discern a difference between statements like "ants bite" and "ants swarm" for you to see my point. "Ants bite" means that each and every ant bites but "ants swarm" refers, not to individual ants themselves but, to the swarming behavior of a colony of ants.
Anyway, coming to the point of, and I quote, "we don't, and can't, distinguish things which exist from "things" that don't exist", I'd like to call upon the all time favorite example of an impossible object, the square circle. The square circle neither exists in reality nor in the imagination and so, doesn't, can't, exist. As you already know, there are many more impossible objects that we can attempt to construct or imagine but on both scores we will be met with failure; these impossible objects don't, can't, exist. Interestingly, like my argument in the OP, this is a proof by contradiction.
:up:
I think we've gone as far as we can with this, but wish you, and others, good luck in answering such questions. Cleary, I'm no metaphysician.