Difference between Frege and Russell on Definite Descriptions?
I'm relatively new to philosophy and I'm starting out with the 'staple' philosophers - namely Frege and Russell. I've read Frege's "Sense and Reference" and Russell's "On Denoting."
One thing I have an issue with distinguishing and properly putting into words is how Frege and Russell deal with definite descriptions differently. If the sentence was something like "John believes that the present Queen of America is bald," where "the present Queen of America" does not denote any real object or person - how do their respective theories still argue that such a sentence can be true?
One thing I have an issue with distinguishing and properly putting into words is how Frege and Russell deal with definite descriptions differently. If the sentence was something like "John believes that the present Queen of America is bald," where "the present Queen of America" does not denote any real object or person - how do their respective theories still argue that such a sentence can be true?
Comments (1)
Russell says it can be true that John believes a false proposition, a proposition expressed by the sentence "the present Queen of America is bald". Frege says it can be true that John (like Russell) believes that the sentence expresses a proposition.