Does free will exist?

Depends on your definition of freedom. Freedom is an ambiguous word limited by the restrictions of language. To Kant freedom is the faculty in reason to give the universal moral laws unto your will which is like in effect, the observer effect making the universal moral laws appear in existence. In doing so, you do not allow objects of the senses to subject your will unto them due to a relative illusory self interest. This is Heteronomy.

Essentially freedom is to detach yourself from the empirical relative physical world. The self, the ego is what enslaves you through your desire and grasping constantly seeking a past sense of happiness which is only a empirical ideal, not an absolute ideal.

Even this freedom would seem limited but it is the extent of freedom that we as rational beings can achieve.

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Quoting chatterbears

it is "the ability to have acted differently"

I don't understand that definition. Let's suppose there's a universe exactly like ours, excepting that there's "the ability to have acted differently". What would that look like? It doesn't sound like the proposal is that we can actually retroactively change what we did... but the suggestion is that there's some distinction between that universe and our universe... ours being, one in which there is no such ability. And I have no idea what form that distinction would take, if any.
Quoting chatterbears

I would argue that there are 3 things that enforce your actions. Beliefs, Desires (or wants), Mood.

Not sure I quite understand this either. Let's take an example action... you typed stuff on a keyboard in English. To me, I would explain your ability to type in terms of your ability to interact with your keyboard; and to type in English as a result of your prior interactions with other English speakers.

We might could argue that belief is involved, but that sounds like an imprecise view. In order to type what you want to type, you have to hit the right keys. Since you're presumably doing so, then somehow you had to either learn the layout of your keyboard, or you're during the act searching on the keyboard for the letters. Either way it's more precise to say that you're interacting with the keyboard (whose precise layout was designed by the manufacturer) than it is to say you're just being driven by your beliefs about it. That you're typing in English is kind of the same thing, only it involves interacting socially with other humans.
Quoting chatterbears

Can you choose to believe in magical leprechauns? Can you choose to desire homosexuality over heterosexuality? Can you choose to be happy instead of sad?

This sounds like cherry picking to me. Your definition of free will has something to do with the ability to do otherwise. Your point is that we have no free will. But your argument is to point out particulars we can't influence. I don't think that matches the burden you selected... if you're trying to make the point that we have no free will, your burden is to argue that nothing we do is such that we had the ability to do something diferent, not that some particulars are such.

Quoting chatterbears

I've been leaning towards free will NOT existing, after some deep thought on the subject. And to define 'free will' quickly, I would say it is "the ability to have acted differently". I would argue that there are 3 things that enforce your actions. Beliefs, Desires (or wants), Mood. None of which are your choice. Can you choose to believe in magical leprechauns? Can you choose to desire homosexuality over heterosexuality? Can you choose to be happy instead of sad?

An interesting fact is that people seem to have conflicting thoughts on the matter of whether we have free will or not: people say things like "that's just like John to have done something like that", implying that we have some general predispositions, presumably having no control over them, and then people also say "I didn't expect that from John" which suggests people can "free" themselves of these predispositions.

Nevertheless, if we are to judge which of the two intuitions/beliefs, described above, society operates under then it's the one that we do possess free will; after all we have the concept of responsibility. However, the existence of responsibility as a concept only indicates we believe that we have free will and isn't evidence that we actually do possess it.

So, is our intuition that we have free will correct? Do we actually possess free will?

Well, compare humans, us, to animals, say dogs. I've seen news of dogs having killed people and while some did claim a dog was responsible for the killing, nobody ever thought of such incidents as murder. This I take as an indication that full responsibility can't be assigned to animals: animals have little control over their instincts which in this example led to ferocious attacks on people by dogs and so dogs aren't be as responsible for their actions as humans, in full possession of their faculties, are.

In the above context then free will can be understood as an ability to resist/overcome our animal instincts which presumably we possess, animals that we are. Viewed through this lens we're justified in saying, if not that we possess complete freedom of will, that we have more freedom than animals in re our actions. However, this is only comparative freedom and might not satisfy the actual definition of free will for some. To make the long story short, we have more freedom (of will) than animals for sure but that doesn't imply that another higher level of freedom, as yet beyond our reach, doesn't exist.

Picking up on the last sentence above, what would a "higher" level of free will look like? We have or can overcome our so-called animal instincts; what else is there that bears on our freedom (of will)? Here I wish to make what I feel is an important point: as it appears to me, the essence of free will is negation, negation and denial of influences on our thoughts and actions which can come in many forms. Evidence for why this is the case is the fact that humans consider themselves more free, in possession of a certain level of free will, than animals and that because we can negate/deny our animal instincts.

Affirming as herein relevant amounts to giving in to our predispositions and that is precisely what no free will is.

Given that we can negate/deny our animal instincts it means we're in possession of the power to negate and that power - to say "no" to things that influence us - is the key to free will. My question is then if we possess the ability to negate and that ability is the key to free will and we've managed to use this ability to negate to free ourselves from our animal nature what influence (mood, desire, beliefs, etc) on our choices are there that is resistant to this ability to negate? None! We are free! We do possess free will!

Coming to your definition of free will as an ability to have acted differently, I see this to be problematic because to demonstrate it would require time travel into the past (to prove that I could've acted differently, I would've have to be put in the exact same situation (again) and that's only possible if I went back in time) and that serves only to worsen what is already a complicated issue. Why do that?

What say you?

Quoting chatterbears

I would argue that there are 3 things that enforce your actions. Beliefs, Desires (or wants), Mood. None of which are your choice.

Your beliefs, desires, and mood contribute to making you who you are. Your choices are therefore a product of you, and you alone.

It's true that you (your beliefs, desires, moods) were caused, but you weren't intentionally caused, whereas your misdeeds are intentional acts - and it is this intentionality that makes you morally accountable. Your DNA and environment were not product of deliberation, and choice making.

You chose the misdeed from among a set of options, and you knew your choice was morally wrong. This makes you blameworthy. Blaming your mama, no matter how bad her parenting, doesn't get you off the hook, because you own your choices.

You would not have done the misdeed had you been more mindful of the harm it would cause, or taken the consequences more seriously. The memory of your guilt will have changed you. You will have learned from your mistake, and because of this learning you will not repeat it. If you abandon the notion of blameworthiness, you will be rationalizing continuing bad behavior. You are a moral agent because your moral beliefs can influence your actions. You have both the knowledge and freedom you need to do the right thing. Your DNA and past environment had no such freedom, and their respective consequences were not the product of moral deliberation.

Contrary to what? Restricted will? No.

Our will is - to some degree - restricted - but not in the way you posit.

You posit "no control in life", when at times, you're in control, partially, and at others you aren't, partially.

Perhaps it isn't totally free mind...

There's definitely an amount of liberty in our body to perhaps move left or right.

It doesn't happen at the thought, but rather, the act, which is interesting...

The only primary reason why irrelevant "free will" debates exist within the context of popular debates and media, is because idiots and lowlifes want to use it to affirm fatalistic, "behavioralistic" or "deterministic" nonsense, which they'd ultimately believe no matter what, simply because they want to, even if every thinker was in consensus that free will "exists", in total ignorance or apathy to the vast majority of legal and moral philosophy which is relevant in 1st world countries, from the 19th century and before, all the way up to the present day, and more or less known and considered to be nonsense and silliness even in the outdated days where they were trendy and popular to begin with, as far as serious legal and moral philosophy and the various evidences, reasonings, logic, and axioms which they and/or it were based on to begin with.

Such as associating "addictions" such as cigarette smoking with "brain disorders" to imply that the addict doesn't have the "free will" to quit, when in reality, in practice, people do quit, regardless of whether it was by "free will", or whether they were "pre-destined" or "pre-determined" to quit to being with, while others' weren't, a la Calvinism.

As well as ignoring other aspects of scientific data or research that don't fit their childish and nonsensical agenda or logic, and allow them to peddle snake oil in the form of unhealthy or antisocial dependency to the sheep who fatuously and selfishly consume it to begin with, such as brain neuroplasticity.

Reply to chatterbears

IMO, a priori arguments cannot predict the outcomes of single-case research across human participants. One needs scientific testing. For example, when looking at outcomes for people that play slots, we find that some people overuse.

Because different people experience different effects on their behavior, philosophical and psychological explanations often pay too much attention to the individual and too little to the conditions when trying to explain addiction.

People attempt to explain the apparent loss of will through metaphysical schemas. They postulate a will at work when people do something normative, or a will that is absent or inaccessible when behaving at the extremes--due to other hypothesized psychological processes at work. In the end, they ignore the simplest explanations (from demonstrations) that the schedule of reinforcement delivered at the slots selected the person's gambling behavior in a way that looks very similar to what happens when arranging those schedules of reinforcement for non-human species used in experiments.

What experimentation shows through replicable effects on people's behavior is that the person is not the origination point for the choices they make. People that want to appeal to free will need the person to be the one that creates the thought, otherwise, assigning credit or blame to the person for the things they do becomes tenuous.

Quoting CeleRate

In the end, they ignore the simplest explanations (from demonstrations) that the schedule of reinforcement delivered at the slots selected the person's gambling behavior in a way that looks very similar to what happens when arranging those schedules of reinforcement for non-human species used in experiments.

Quoting CeleRate

One needs scientific testing.

Quoting CeleRate

Because different people experience different effects on their behavior, philosophical and psychological explanations often pay too much attention to the individual and too little to the conditions when trying to explain addiction.

I'm having some difficulty untangling what you're trying to say here. The demonstrations you're referring to sound like something akin to Pavlovian experiments. That in my mind qualifies as scientific testing, in particular, in the field of psychology. Where I'm choking is that you're partially complaining about psychological explanations on the basis that one needs scientific testing, but then appealing to scientific testing performed as part of a psychological investigation.
Quoting CeleRate

What experimentation shows through replicable effects on people's behavior is that the person is not the origination point for the choices they make.

Quoting CeleRate

Because different people experience different effects on their behavior

I'm confused. If different people experience different effects, then in what sense are those replicable effects?

Quoting InPitzotl

The demonstrations you're referring to sound like something akin to Pavlovian experiments.

Pavlovian experiments were based on reflexes and stimulus-stimulus pairing. Operant conditioning is fundamentally different in that it appeals to the selective effects of consequences on behavior in a manner analogous to how biological evolution appeals to the selective effects of contingencies of survival.

Quoting InPitzotl

I'm confused. If different people experience different effects, then in what sense are those replicable effects?

Good question. Experimentation reveals the orderliness of events on behavior, and with proper experimental control, allows the scientist to predict, verify, and replicate the effects. This further reveals principles at work that are then described with models that explain the observed phenomena.

However, when stepping away from experimental settings and experimental control, and people casually observe one another doing things for what appears to be capricious reasons, the naive observer assigns causes to events noticed in conjunction with what the person was doing (i.e., Hume's problem of induction), or will speculate metaphysical psychological explanations, or will rely on reports of what a person believes was felt (or at work) at the time the person made a choice--a reliance on an unreliable source of information.

Quoting InPitzotl

Where I'm choking is that you're partially complaining about psychological explanations on the basis that one needs scientific testing, but then appealing to scientific testing performed as part of a psychological investigation.

This is a common misunderstanding. Psychology is the study of the mind. Although it is true that operant conditioning had its beginnings in psychology, it eventually became a field unto itself as the study of the self went from metaphysics, to logical positivists, to radical behaviorists in one of the lines of epistemological changes. The study of the mind became the study of behavior, with an entirely new set of tools and scientific methodology.

Quoting CeleRate

Experimentation reveals the orderliness of effects on behavior, and with proper experimental control, allows the scientist to predict, verify, and replicate. This further reveals principles at work that are then described with models that explain the observed phenomena.

That I would describe as replicable experiments; i.e., we get the same results when we repeat these experiments. To me the term "replicable effects" is stronger, suggesting that the effects themselves are replicable.
Quoting CeleRate

However, when stepping away from experimental settings and experimental control, and people casually observe one another doing things

...this to me sounds like it's describing folk psychology; and I would agree there are problems with folk psychology. I don't think folk psychology is entirely flawed, because it's demonstrably useful (theory of mind, for example, is critical for deceiving people... not necessarily unethically). Things like personality traits and such get muckier; e.g., we are susceptible to things like attribution bias... so I can buy a general criticism here.
Quoting CeleRate

This is a common misunderstanding. Psychology is the study of the mind. Although it is true that operant conditioning had its beginnings in psychology, it eventually became a field unto itself as the study of the self went from metaphysics, to logical positivists, to radical behaviorists in one of the lines of epistemological changes. The study of the mind became the study of behavior, with an entirely new set of tools and scientific methodology.

Wait... back up. What is a common misunderstanding?

According to multiple primary sources, the study of behavior is psychology. Wikipedia: "Psychology is the science of behavior and mind.", Merriam-Webster: "1 : the science of mind and behavior.", Random-House Unabridged is a bit more interesting: "1. the science of the mind or of mental states and processes. 2. the science of human and animal behavior." Per these primary sources, I interpret a field claiming to be a science of behavior as being psychology.

It sounds to me like you're using the terms a bit differently than these sources suggest. That's... actually, just fine by me. Let's say then the study of mind per se psychology, and the study of behavior we'll just call behaviorism (just as an umbrella term; we can call anything you like a branch of behaviorism).

So would you say that the mind does not affect behavior, that there is no such thing as the mind, or that the mind itself is simply a result of operant conditioning?

Quoting InPitzotl

That I would describe as replicable experiments; i.e., we get the same results when we repeat these experiments. To me the term "replicable effects" is stronger, suggesting that the effects themselves are replicable.

Different experimental tactics reduce threats to internal validity to varying degrees and add to the strength of statements describing the influence of the independent variable (IV) relative to the dependent variable (DV). As the effects on a DV are repeated through the systematic application of the IV across increasing numbers of participants, the study's external validity (i.e., replicability) strengthens. The effects of the IV on the DV can be demonstrated within an experiment and across experiments. When an individual participant's behavior changes within an experiment, you know the degree of impact on that individual. When study replications occur and the effects of the IV on the DV are repeated across experiments, we may eventually reach the point that theories and models are formulated to describe the observed phenomena. This is what has happened in the behavior analytic literature with respect to gambling as just one example.

Quoting InPitzotl

It sounds to me like you're using the terms a bit differently than these sources suggest

It could very well be. Dictionary terms are descriptive, not prescriptive. Members of the fields view the subject of why people do what they do fundamentally differently. Psychology has been tied to metaphysics in a way that behavior analysis has not
http://www.behaviorpedia.com/conceptual-issues/is-behavior-analysis-part-of-psychology/

Quoting InPitzotl

So would you say that the mind does not affect behavior, that there is no such thing as the mind, or that the mind itself is simply a result of operant conditioning?

I view "mind" as shorthand for the sense of agency we all have, and a way to describe the thoughts that we happen to notice. How this sense came to be I would speculate had more to do with the evolution of our genetic endowment and the evolution of our culture. Because our vocal musculature came under operant control in our evolutionary past, we are now able to create all sorts of fun and interesting paradoxes for ourselves to argue about. Now we might have even more time to sit at the safety of our computers opining about such topics.

Quoting CeleRate

I view "mind" as shorthand for the sense of agency we all have, and a way to describe the thoughts that we happen to notice.

Interesting... that's somewhat similar to how I view mind, only I would describe it more in terms of what's useful at the agency level as opposed to the sense of agency per se. I think I generally get here from a different path though... more like a software engineer reverse engineering his mind.
Quoting CeleRate

Now we might have even more time to sit at the safety of our computers opining about such topics.

Well, the way I see it, on the topic of free will, everyone is an expert but nobody can agree. That itself looks a bit fishy to me; my gut instinct suggests that there are flaws in our assumptions (at least most of us) at play. (I suppose at some level this has to be true of everyone; but for me, I'm more interested in pausing here and just trying to find those flawed assumptions).

For me, I think the answer is both yes and no.

Could I switch off my computer and go to bed right now without posting this comment? Of course, if I wanted to. But I want to post the comment, so that's what I'm going to do.

Here's the question though. If time were rewound and my mum gave birth to me all over again, and I had no memory of my first run-through, would my life unfold the same way the second time around, or differently?

At the time of birth, my body was configured a certain way. My brain cells were too. That particular configuration of cells gave rise to me – my conscious mind; my personality. Was my entire life mapped out at that point? Would changing a single brain cell have led me to make different choices at different points throughout my life? If, as they say, you simply can't avoid being the person you are, then I'd be tempted to say that free will does not exist.

In a way I think it depends on how you see consciousness. If you take it as an inevitable outcome of the human brain being what it is, then perhaps all your choices are essentially made for you the moment you are born.

I don't know where I stand on consciousness, and as a result I don't really know where I stand on free will either. But there are certainly times when I agonise over a particular decision ad nauseum that I wish I didn't have free will!

Quoting chatterbears

the ability to have acted differently

I heard Daniel Dennett speak on this definition of free will. He said something to the effect that this definition is suspect because it's premised on recreating a choice scenario (the occasion where a choice is made) in every possible relevant way and that, he goes on to say, is an impossibility. Perhaps he was exploring the utility of this definition in proving the existence/nonexistence of free will. I don't know.

That being said, we could imagine a path that forks into two other paths and you walking down that path. When you reach the fork in the path, you choose the left path and proceed. At some point, you turn back and travel back to the fork - this amounting to recreating the choice scenario - and you will discover that you can choose to take the right path. The only difference between the first time you encountered the fork and the second time you encountered the fork is time - nothing else has changed - and time seems to lack a causal power. You can act differently. Free will!?

You can't act differently, but only because you are you. You're not some standard human who will always make the same choices given your body.

I see a tendency towards disassociation here. Your identity includes your body. No, you can't entirely choose your identity, but if you accept that is who you are, then your choices are wholly your own.

There's no time gap where you could choose an alternative. And you can't choose your environment. But you aren't abstract from it, either. You know you make choices. They may not be "free," per se, but they are personal, and the personal is real.

So maybe not "free" will...we are constrained...but personal will is real.

Reply to chatterbears The clue to comprehending free will is that the question what the agency of a choice is, is a subjective issue.

That you throw out free will equally means that you have thrown out the concept of personal opinion, like opinion on beauty.

Sadness and happiness are subjective, therefore they are agency of choices. You choose things out of sadness and happiness.

You cannot choose any subjective thing, like happiness, but you can make a morality to achieve such a state where you judge yourself to be happy.

Quoting chatterbears

I've been leaning towards free will NOT existing, after some deep thought on the subject. And to define 'free will' quickly, I would say it is "the ability to have acted differently". I would argue that there are 3 things that enforce your actions. Beliefs, Desires (or wants), Mood. None of which are your choice. Can you choose to believe in magical leprechauns? Can you choose to desire homosexuality over heterosexuality? Can you choose to be happy instead of sad?

We are formed by nature and nurture, they are two sides of the same coin. They define how we act. But free will needs to be defined first. If you are talking about free will versus determinism then no, we don't have any free will. There are those arguing for quantum randomness to be a part of the neurological activity and therefore randomness can be part of how we choose something, but outside of evidence supporting it, it won't give you free will anyway. You are a product of deterministic pathways and you can't change that.

However, in terms of practical philosophy, the nature of the universe is separated from how we define acts of freedom as human beings. Even though we live in an illusion of free will, it doesn't mean you are doomed to fate. That's a universal law that we live within, but not something we perceive. The choices you take might be determined, but you act through your experience and knowledge in a way where choices feel free.

One of the best cases to study the consequences of free will as we live by it would be to look at the justice of criminals. By the very definition of determinism, criminals are the result of deterministic paths that lead them there. If you put aside emotion when viewing justice of criminals you realize that there are no criminals at all; it is a social construct of defining the outliers who suffer consequences from society, other people or mental illness. By determinism, they haven't chosen to be criminals, no one in their right mind would, they are forced or compelled by different factors.

So through this lens, criminals should be treated as victims of determinism. And correcting those paths is the only way to get rid of criminality. Everyone who studied justice and society concludes the same thing, that harsh punishment for their actions won't change a dime in terms of fighting crime.

But we still punish them and many advocates for harsher punishments. This is the act of our emotion towards them, not our intellect. And if we do, we are really acting as if free will existed. You cannot be a determinist without accepting this fact of justice, that would be cognitive dissonance.

So how do we apply practical philosophy towards this? How do we draw the line between determinism and practical ideas about free will? Because if we all just say we are the result of determinism we could argue against any change. A criminal would just say that he's a product of determinism and he doesn't have free will. But in order for us to treat the criminal back to a place where he can function and be part of the society we first need to cut the deterministic sources for crime, but also enforce the illusion of free will onto him in order for him to choose a new path.

Therefore, we apply free will as a practical concept towards people, in order to open up change within them. It's an illusion, but it's a practical illusion for society to work. The philosophical challenge, however, is where to draw that practical line. Most people draw that line out of emotion, without any rational thought put into it, the path of harsher punishment. But the empathic, empirical path is to study the determinism of every situation and draw the line where it is rational to do so. In terms of justice, most people are unable to draw the line correctly.

Quoting chatterbears

And to define 'free will' quickly, I would say it is "the ability to have acted differently".

If this is true, what is the difference between free will and free choice then? Would you say all choices are made freely or that none are? I do not buy your definition.

In fact free will as such can reduce the number of available choices. Universal moral laws given as a reason. You'd not be free in not following them - you'd be an animal.

I've yet to see a coherent analysis of free will. SO for instance the one given in this OP begs the question.

Free will is the determination of ends(purposes) by reason in and for itself.

- A mere bodily reaction (perceived as such by the subject in question) is not a process based on reasoning and hence is not an argument for anything (a desire isn't as well).

- A choice to do something or not is no indicator of free will per se. The question is if the purpose of a choice is itself determined by reason. Acting against reasoning and understanding does not make the choice free. In fact, this is exactly what would make the choice unfree.

- From this (the choice being based on reason) many people seem to conclude that arbitrary choices must be possible - as if everything that could potentially be done could be justified by reason

- The choice is determined by reason in and for itself. This means the subject perceives it as a choice it makes freely. This rules out "determinism" as a comprehensible reason, but not as a reason for a particular process of reasoning.

- Subjects may preserve their dignity by switching to an objective sight onto themselves: This does not question but underline their free will.

Quoting Heiko

Free will is the determination of ends(purposes) by reason in and for itself.

What is it that you are calling "reason"? It's an odd term, conflating the noun and the mass noun; The reason given for an action is a self-serving back construction thought up as an excuse after the act.

Quoting Banno

What is it that you are calling "reason"? It's an odd term, conflating the noun and the mass noun; The reason given for an action is a self-serving back construction thought up as an excuse after the act.

You are surely right that when talking about observed events the explanation follows them. The explanation makes them understandable. But here we are not talking about observed events but about intent and decision. You wouldn't say I think about how mathematics work after I write down the result of a equation.

Quoting Heiko

You wouldn't say I think about how mathematics work after I write down the result of a equation.

You think that a good model of human action?

More often we act without forethought. And even in the presence of forethought it is rare that our plans go unthwarted.

We make it up as we go along.

Quoting Banno

You think that a good model of human action?

The subject is not a model of human action, but the question of free will. "Will" denotes an intent not an action. If you act without any intent what is the point? Sh*t happens.

Quoting Heiko

"Will" denotes an intent not an action.

As if you could have an intent that was not an intent to do such-and-such.

Quoting Banno

As if you could have an intent that was not an intent to do such-and-such.

"such-and-such" is pretty universal, but: You do not really want the act in itself but you want what the act achieves.

Reply to Heiko Fair point. So what?

Quoting Banno

So what?

You think an analysis must lead to conclusions?

Reply to Heiko You think that deserves a reply?

Quoting Heiko

Free will is the determination of ends(purposes) by reason in and for itself.

Quoting Heiko

You do not really want the act in itself but you want what the act achieves.

So... what is it rational to want? Do I smell Kant?

Reply to Banno Why not? I think this was an ingenious answer.

Quoting Banno

So... what is it rational to want? Do I smell Kant?

The good, of course :grin:

Reply to Heiko Ah. Well, that's an end to that, then.

Quoting Banno

Ah. Well, that's an end to that, then.

Do I smell resentment?

Freewill IMHO is not "the end justifies the means".
I believe ultimate freewill is a product of spontaneity, making your own decisions, and the FREEDOM and OPPORTUNITY to do what you choose. Non-conformity would have to be important, as any ready guide that one follows blindly cannot be considered true freewill. Some might argue that blindly conforming is a choice itself; but you don't know the edict until it has been told to you, so it is the "choice" of someone else that you must wait on.

Quoting Heiko

So... what is it rational to want?
— Banno

The good, of course

I like where you’re going with your groundwork here, but do you see where THE good, if taken as a transcendental principle, cannot be that which is “rational to want”, that being merely A good, or some good or another, as a practical end?

Yes, but there is also the spirit, temperament or mood is made up of the continuum of 2.

Want is an active effect of heart whilst believing is passive effect of mind.

Think of them selflessly, in rhythmic proceudure.

Quoting Mww

I like where you’re going with your groundwork here, but do you see where THE good, if taken as a transcendental principle, cannot be that which is “rational to want”, that being merely A good, or some good or another, as a practical end?

But that is exactly the point why it has to be "the good". This is simply a question of intension and extension. You can always mistake a fungus for a plant.

I can't see any way to disprove the idea that we may have free will in the following sense:

We have a will which is able to choose between two or more options, without that choice being determined by anything else.

However, when you think this through, it seems that the choice is arbitrary.

Imagine you are faced with competing choices. One in what you desire to do. The other is what you think you should do, or that you believe you have reason to do, or whatever.

If you recognise that one choice is the rational one etc., then presumably you will do it if you are rational, see that you have the most compelling reasons to do it, etc. It might be said that you still have the option of doing the other thing. But how could you then be said to be rational etc.?

Now imagine you simply do what you desire. The above dilemma assumed that this wasn't the choice that it made sense or you had reason to do. But then you must have been more drawn to doing that than being rational. Maybe you could say that you still had the option of being rational.

But how do you decide whether you are going to be a rational person, or a person who acts on their desires, whatever reason says? Well, if this is even something that you can decide (and maybe it's not) then you need to decide on some basis, or else on no basis, which would be arbitrary. But if you decide on some basis, then it would not make sense to say you still have the option of choosing to be the other kind of person. As if you did choose the second option, you would not be choosing on what you take to be the basis of the first option - as that would lead you to take the first option. So you are either choosing on some basis which supports the second option, or else though you want to choose the first option, some other aspect of your psychology is getting in the way and you end up choosing the second option.

Now if the choice between the two options is arbitrary, then you can choose either, and, if you have free will as described above, then your choice isn't determined by anything beyond your caprice. But then you aren't choosing either on any basis. But if you can think of a basis for one or the other, then if you accept that basis, and you don't get deflected by some other part of your psychology, then you will act on that basis. If you can think of a basis for either choice, then you can either evaluate those bases comparatively, or not. But if you can evaluate them comparatively, then you will go for the one which wins out in the comparison, unless something throws you off course. And if you can't evaluate them comparatively, then the choice between them lacks any deciding basis, and hence is in a certain way arbitrary. If you have free will, you can then decide for either, but there won't be anything counting for one or the other distinctly (it might be that both have something going for them, but we furthermore need a way to arbitrate between them).

If I remember, Sartre's view of freedom was very similar to this, and the criticism was much along these lines, as free will ends up bring arbitrary. I guess what I think is that Sartre's view was correct, if free will exists, but it suffers from the kinds of criticisms pointed out at the time. What people want of course is for us to have free will and be morally culpable for doing the right thing or the wrong thing. But I think these things come apart and can't be essentially connected.

If a person recognises the reason for doing the right thing, but ends up doing the wrong thing, that can either be because their motivation to do the right thing was stymied by some other aspect of their psychology (weakness of will), or because they decided there was more reason to do the wrong thing (i.e. they aren't a good person), or because they chose arbitrarily. If we move the choice one stage back, and ask them to chose between the reasons to be righteous, and the reasons not to be, then either they compare them on a common scale and chose one which wins out, or they chose one but chose it for no overall reason, i.e. an arbitrary reason. If they end up being a bad person at the end of all this, I think it is fine to call them that, but we can't then say they are ultimately choosing badness because they are bad, because they either see badness as having the most considerations behind it, or because they have chosen it arbitrarily and not because it is bad.

Sorry if this is more verbose than it should be. I guess this is a forum.

If you attribute some doing to anything else but the rational decision, there is no choice and hence no freedom. You cannot be free in doing other than you think you should do.

Quoting Heiko

a question of intension and extension

Oh. Ok. Never mind.

I firmly believe we possess free will. Determinism and randomness are our explanations of events, but only because they can be understood logically. This does not exclude the possibility of free-standing casuality, as in the case of free will. Just as a book has an author, thoughts are authored as well.

Quoting Cidat

Just as a book has an author, thoughts are authored as well.

The problem I see here, is, that a rational decision must be based on thoughts. If a decision is required to think a particular way that decision cannot be based on reason. And hence not be free.

Reply to Heiko Things are genuinely created in the universe. The universe itself was created. It didn't "just happen".

Quoting Cidat

Things are genuinely created in the universe. The universe itself was created. It didn't "just happen".

I am not into religion. Sorry.

Reply to Heiko It's not religion. It's philosophy.

Quoting Cidat

It's not religion. It's philosophy.

Paradox as it may seem: I am not into philosophy either.

I like music.

Reply to Heiko By imagining a thing that you call "The Good" you closed off the interesting line of thought here. Reification does that.

Quoting Mww

I like where you’re going with your groundwork here,

It'll come out as something like "It's rational to want the good because the good is what it is rational to want"

Not all that helpful.

Reply to Banno Because we don’t know what is ‘good’ and so rationally we should be cautious about assuming that one thing is ‘good’ and another ‘bad’ with absolute certainty. So really it may be more rational to say we can expect, in our clumsy way, to have what is ‘good’ and ‘bad’ partially revealed to us through life if we’re attentive to change and perspective (a ‘rational’ use of our hindsight and foresight).

It’s a bit of a tail eater, which generally says to me ‘be cautious’ and ‘don’t be in search of an iron-cast conclusion’.

Reply to chatterbears Your definition seems more like a position that denies time-travel. Free-will is a bit like Love. It is a term that splays itself far and wide, and can be applied in a variety of ways in colloquial speech that makes it difficult to assess in any universal sense.

I find the subject to be so popular because it touches so many non-intuitive aspects of human cognition, poking at numerous possible contradictions within our limited use of language. Some people even argue that ‘the hard problem’ is merely a repercussion of how we use language, personally I think it is probably to do with a lack of common concepts in our current language rather than ‘language’ itself creating an illusionary problem.

The free will debate is masturbation so people can feel security by believing their actions are beyond their control, freeing them from moral responsibility. On the other hand, by believing in free will you believe you have the power to steer your behavior in a positive direction, away from criminal abuse. If we don't have free will, we can never make any mistakes in our lives, since we could never have done anything any differently.

Quoting Banno

Not all that helpful.

Right. Still, my smell-er reports something very different, so I’m not stymied by such irreconcilable circularity.

Quoting Banno

By imagining a thing that you call "The Good" you closed off the interesting line of thought here. Reification does that.

I would not call the idea a thing.

Quoting Cidat

The free will debate is masturbation so people can feel security by believing their actions are beyond their control,

It is not me who postulates there must be something beyond the rational decision...

Quoting Cidat

On the other hand, by believing in free will you believe you have the power to steer your behavior in a positive direction, away from criminal abuse. If we don't have free will, we can never make any mistakes in our lives, since we could never have done anything any differently.

The question then is just if you are sick or just a criminal.
Criminal if it is a free decision, sick otherwise. No reason to believe.

Reply to InPitzotl Free will is the idea that we have multiple options to choose from regarding the outcome of a particular situation. Thus, free will implies that freely willed actions could have been chosen differently. Free will implies that the world could have looked radically different if we had just exercised our free will differently.

Determinism is an assumption as well. Likewise the assumption that death is the permanent end for a soul, or that consciousness ceases to exist upon biological death. But the universe is far more complex than that.

Quoting Cidat

Free will is the idea that

That doesn't help; this is just the 7th grader overview. I'm looking for the bees knees of the meaning of the thing.
Quoting Cidat

we have multiple options to choose from regarding the outcome of a particular situation.

Let's take a chess playing AI program. On the first move, it can open D4. Or, it can open E4. It cannot open E5. It has "multiple options to choose from regarding the outcome" (e.g., D4 and E4; but not E5) "of a particular situation" (start of a game).
Quoting Cidat

Thus, free will implies that freely willed actions could have been chosen differently.

Take the same program. Suppose it does indeed open E4. That "action" (opening E4) could have been chosen as D4. It couldn't have been E5, mind you, because that's an impossible move. But it could have been D4.
Quoting Cidat

Free will implies that the world could have looked radically different if we had just exercised our free will differently.

...the game could have looked quite different had the chess program opened with D4.

So it sounds like you're telling me that chess playing programs have free will. Is that what you mean?

Oh, since you engaged me, let's destroy this real quick:
Quoting Cidat

so people can feel security by believing their actions are beyond their control, freeing them from moral responsibility

This is an appeal to motive. It's also a bit of a straw man; the main personal psychological appeal to rejecting free will is that it tends to grant you freedom from being responsible; there are less extreme situations, such as a person who is terrified that anything they do is wrong. The main personal psychological appeal to accepting free will is that it tends to grant you the feeling that you are in control; that your actions matter and that you can avoid bad things. The main interpersonal psychological appeal to rejecting free will is that it avoids holding people to standards you believe they can't realistically live up to. The main interpersonal psychological appeal to accepting free will is that it promotes people taking responsibility for their actions; e.g., if something bad happens and someone else did it, that makes it their fault (note that the interpersonal appeal may actually be used to avoid personal responsibility, ironically).

None of this has to do with what philosophers should be worried about, which is, what is the truth? So, your biased account of biases should be summarily ignored, especially here.

Reply to InPitzotl Argue against or for free will all you want, but don't question my definitions. I'm just trying to make him understand what we're talking about. And no, computers are inherently deterministic machines, they produce the same output for the same input, so they cannot have free will.

Reply to chatterbears no if your into determinism, also no if your not, the truth is your biology and the structure around you cancels out free will

Quoting Cidat

Argue against or for free will all you want, but

I believe I did both.

don't question my definitions. I'm just trying to make him understand what we're talking about.

"Him" is me. So if you're really "just trying to make him understand what we're talking about", how about addressing the question "him" asked you instead of literally whining about the fact that he asked you a question.

Quoting Cidat

And no, computers are inherently deterministic machines, they produce the same output for the same input, so they cannot have free will.

But if we take "choice" in a looser sense, this fits entirely with your definition. So if you want to have this discussion, I want to keep a thumb here. You don't want to call this free will, but, it does match everything you say, with a looser sense of choice; a perfectly sane one, but looser one. I'll just grant that it's fake; so we'll just call this fake free will, or FFW.

But as a side note, chess playing programs don't produce the same output for the same input, at least within the universe that is the game play board (that is, they don't move the same in the same game state). If they did, they would be useless, because it would be trivial to "solve" a chess playing program that played the same moves (that is, to find a game that wins, and to always play that game). Computers introduce entropy in basically two ways; they can use a PRNG or a TRNG. The former is deterministic, but just hard to predict; it maintains a state and usually has an entropic seed (like, the former state, or, the current time). But regardless of the source of entropy, the chess playing program only ever winds up playing a specific move. So in our case, it played E4 in this game. So E4 is the only actual game state that is ontic. This is true even if E4 was the result of a TRNG; the precise difference between the PRNG and TRNG isn't whether or not D4 is ontic, because D4 will never be ontic, because it will never happen; you cannot claim a thing to be ontic if it never is. The precise difference, rather, is whether the move E4 is the inevitable consequence of a prior universe state or independent of prior universe states.

So basically, you were saying that determinism doesn't really count as a choice (though there is definitely something at least analogous to choice that's going on here; after all, it's a perfect match to your description if we don't appeal to the unmentioned properties of choice you're now being asked to elucidate). So, okay. Stage 2. Let's toss the PRNG out, and use a chess playing program with a TRNG. Problem solved. Now does it have free will?

Reply to InPitzotl What I'm saying is that given the same circumstances, a computer would always make the same choice. Free will is the idea that given an absolutely identical situation, two agents could choose differently.

Quoting Cidat

What I'm saying is that given the same circumstances, a computer would always make the same choice.

Let's say I played a game of chess; I started at 11:47pm, last Saturday. I was playing against my friend on a computer. It was a rainy night. I opened E4. So you're saying, now, what? That if I play again with my friend at 11:47 next Saturday, I might open with D4 instead? That's no different from the FFW of the computer using a PRNG. Surely you don't mean that last Saturday at 11:47pm, despite my having chosen E4, I can choose to having had chosen D4, right?

No, I think you mean something like, if we go back in time, and now it's 11:47pm, last Saturday, and I play again, then I could play D4. But that's a bit fake, because if I "go back in time" I'll remember doing so. To really be the same circumstance, it would have to be 11:47pm last Saturday. Which means, it's the time at which I played E4. There will never have been a time I played D4 last Saturday at 11:47pm.

Do you see what the problem is? It's easy to say those words, but what do they mean?

Reply to InPitzotl Those situations aren't absolutely identical down to atom level since they are different days, and on different days you have different levels of experiences and memories. Free will means that if you were to somehow revert the state of the universe back to last Saturday, before the beginning of that chess game, down to atom level, you could choose to open with D4. As I said, it's an absolutely identical situation. Literally.

Quoting Cidat

if you were to somehow revert the state of the universe back to last Saturday,

So the chess playing program that uses a TRNG has free will?

Reply to InPitzotl Randomness and free will are different things. Freely willed actions are consciously chosen, so in theory you could choose the same every single time you're given the exact same situation. But you're not obliged to do that. Randomness cannot choose its outcome. And to be fair, TRNGs would generate an identical result if you willed absolutely identically since they rely on physical processes.

Quoting Cidat

Freely willed actions are consciously chosen, so in theory you could choose the same every single time you're given the exact same situation.

So, what makes you think a rational decision could be different all circumstances being the same? Is rationality arbitrary?

Quoting Cidat

Randomness and free will are different things. Freely willed actions are consciously chosen,

I don't think you're aware of how this actually works in practice. We don't make decisions "consciously", at least as a matter of course. We make decisions and become conscious of them. On some rare occasions, we deliberate, but most of the time we just act. The more habituated the action is, the more consciousness is "optional" for it. Also, the "us" in the we is the "subject" of consciousness, not the "object" of it; by which I mean, what you are self-aware of isn't your entire self... it's just a fraction of your self. Any notion of free will that we're actually likely to have must fit into this. And any sensible theory of free will requiring responsibility needs to account for the fact that the guy generating these actions most of the time isn't aware of them while generating them, but is still nevertheless the guy who did them. Otherwise, you're just going to invent a fiction of folk theory. As a curious free will agnostic, I'm more interested in the kinds of free will we might actually have.

Quoting Heiko

So, what makes you think a rational decision could be different all circumstances being the same? Is rationality arbitrary?

TBH I'm kind of wondering about a similar issue... how this works in terms of moral choice. I made a terrible decision last Saturday at 11:47pm; it was a bad thing to do. But now I realize it, and am a better person. Free will means I can go back to that state, down at the atomic level and make a different choice... perhaps a better one. But, now, it's not really identical, because the second time around, I am the "better" person... the first time, I was a "worse" person... so the "revert time" version really isn't as identical as it's being made out to be. Apparently, though, I have to be exactly as terrible as I was last Saturday at 11:47pm, and make a different decision, to have free will. If I make the same decision, being the exact level of blameworthiness as I was last Saturday at 11:47pm, then I don't have free will and therefore cannot be blamed?

To open up a dilemma:
The technicians being on duty in Chernobyl during the meltdown were really just technicians. They were trained for normal operation of the reactor. When things got critical they followed the procedures they were given for certain lights blinking. Which didn't help. It is quite possible that an enigineer that designed the reactor could have circumvented the disaster. Of course the question is not if they were physically unable to press a few buttons. So - are they responsible for the catastrophe and why not?

Interestingly, would one of them just have paniced and started to press buttons wildly it is possible this could have been successful. But no one would put that man back on duty.

Quoting InPitzotl

If I make the same decision, being the exact level of blameworthiness as I was last Saturday at 11:47pm, then I don't have free will and therefore cannot be blamed?

Why would one need the concept concept of free will then to blame someone? This can only be done on rational grounds. The manifestation of free will is understood as a decision based purely on the rational subject itself. This, such a decision can only be based on values set by reason from within itself. As reason is universal such values must be also universal, too. From this the identity of free will and duty follows logically: Freedom lies in the call of duty and the pursuit of universal values common to all rational beings.

Quoting Heiko

Why would one need the concept concept of free will then to blame someone?

I've been trying to figure that out for a long time; the PAP folk swear by this.

Your version of free will is much more coherent to me.

I personally wouldn't define it as the ability to act differently but even if that was the definition it would still imply free will. Normal definition of free will would be us having a choice between this or that. However, I'll use your definition. We can act differently. Suppose I drive home from a place and I take the same route. At times I did act differently. Sometimes the normal route I took had construction and it was closed. Other times, I felt like driving a different way just for a different scenery or whatever. I simply acted how I wished for whatever reason because sometimes not acting differently can be boring. One can even choose to be happy over being sad. It's often taught as a coping mechanism or changing your point of view of how you perceive things. Let me explain. When I lost my grandma I was a wreck. It affected my education and work. When my other grandma died I decided not to repeat the cycle. I took a quick day of grief and focused on positive things. I was up in good spirits planning a party. Since then I prefer to limit how long I remain sad, worried, and all other negative things.

Will is free a-priori. It cannot depend on preference, personal properties or external factors, as those aren't chosen. In fact, if it would depend on anything it would not be "will" but an effect of that property. Being uninfluenced by totally everything is what makes it free and why "will" is always free.
It's freedom leads to the conclusion that only values-in-itself can be a freely chosen end as only those are still valuable when all influences are eliminated. These values bear an intrinsic dignity - which also means that, because of this intrinsic value, these are always a necessary end of the free will.

Quoting Heiko

In fact, if it would depend on anything it would not be "will" but an effect of that property.

I don't know about that:
Quoting Heiko

Being uninfluenced by totally everything is what makes it free and why "will" is always free.

This has a flaw... if an action is uninfluenced by totally everything, then you cannot have willed it. So will necessitates at least influence of the actor; otherwise, in what sense is it will at all? So there must be influence for there to be will. With that crack in the door, though, the rest becomes questionable; if an effect is a result of properties, but those properties make you who you are, then there's no difference between your acting of your own will and the actions being a result of those properties... they are the same thing. The conflict here would be illusory, something analogous to the fallacy of the single cause.

Heey all,

The simplest way to describe my thoughts are as follows: I (my body) consists of tissue which are cells which are molecules which are atoms and those atoms are made of sub-atomic particles, perhaps even smaller. They are bound by the laws of nature, so so are we. If free will exists we should be having control over those laws. And I believe we don't. All we are is energy. I believe we are truly one and the same.

There have been a few experiments and articles made on this subject. All point toward unfree will. If anyone is interested I can look them up. Sometimes researchers could predict someone's choice before they were even consciously aware of this choice.

This helped me accept things in my life and the world. I do feel responsible but I don't believe I could have acted otherwise in the past (so yes, I would accept this as a definition of free will).Most people believe in right and wrong and credit for achievements and blame for wrongdoings.

Clearly there must be a evolutionary reason for the existence of our 'ego'. But I no longer believe my thoughts or take them too seriously.

I actually feel best when I'm not thinking at all and act intuitively. Sort of caught up in the moments.

Feedback and criticism always welcome

You are your cells and atoms. How are you constricted by you?

I don't understand what you mean. How I am made narrow by myself?

Quoting InPitzotl

This has a flaw... if an action is uninfluenced by totally everything, then you cannot have willed it. So will necessitates at least influence of the actor; otherwise, in what sense is it will at all?

I guess "will" cannot be taken as a thing different from the subject. It is part of it's being. A mode of existence. After all, when you do something, the "doing" is just you in a special mode.
So it is my will, my willing, me willing.

Quoting InPitzotl

With that crack in the door, though, the rest becomes questionable; if an effect is a result of properties, but those properties make you who you are

But in this case I'd not be a subject anymore but an object. Not even a "who" but a mere "what" (those properties). How degrading. I guess you meant to say something else.

Quoting InPitzotl

then there's no difference between your acting of your own will and the actions being a result of those properties

The difference is that one holds dignity, the other does not.
Don't be cheap with your will. Most things are not worth it.

Quoting Heiko

Not even a "who" but a mere "what" (those properties)

Why are those mutually exclusive? Who you are is what you are works fine for me.
Quoting Heiko

But in this case I'd not be a subject anymore but an object. Not even a "who" but a mere "what" (those properties). How degrading. I guess you meant to say something else.

Again, only if those things are mutually exclusive. Otherwise, you would be a what that is a who. Who you are is what you are, but not all what's are who's.

The difference is that one holds dignity, the other does not.

I don't buy that.

You're starting with a picture of us as being elevated to a certain level, and x (where x is being a "what" or "properties"... I'm abstracting because this is generic) as being lower. With that in mind, when you hear the suggestion that we are x, you picture that as (a) lowering us from our level to the level of x. But that is an artificial perspective, and it is completely unnecessary. There are at least two other ways of looking at the same thing: (b) it elevates x, (c) it elevates x when x is us.

For x being properties, I take the (c) perspective, not the (a) perspective.

In my opinion people are as free (willed or otherwise), as the consequences they are "willing" to accept.

Quoting InPitzotl

Why are those mutually exclusive? Who you are is what you are works fine for me.

Yes. Your aren't me. That's a no-brainer. But the question is not "what works". There were many things that kinda "worked" but weren't right either.

Quoting InPitzotl

Again, only if those things are mutually exclusive.

To Do and Being done. No difference?

Quoting InPitzotl

Otherwise, you would be a what that is a who. Who you are is what you are, but not all what's are who's.

A "what" is never free. Things are involved in external relations defining them and putting them in place. This would contradict free decisions.

Quoting InPitzotl

With that in mind, when you hear the suggestion that we are x, you picture that as (a) lowering us from our level to the level of x. But that is an artificial perspective, and it is completely unnecessary. There are at least two other ways of looking at the same thing: (b) it elevates x, (c) it elevates x when x is us.

There is no "us" in final things. The point is that either I am a free subject in a decision or I am not.
I decide. This is where I am free.

Quoting Heiko

But the question is not "what works".

For me, it absolutely is. The alternative to this is that the question is, "what is my favorite pet theory"? I prefer the Feynman path: "I can live with doubt and uncertainty and not knowing. I think it's much more interesting 'not knowing' than to have answers that might be wrong."
Quoting Heiko

To Do and Being done. No difference?

A lot of people tend to want to view things as if there are two kinds of things... a subject, and an object; a me, and a world. Why? How come you can't just be part of the world?
Quoting Heiko

A "what" is never free. Things are involved in external relations defining them and putting them in place. This would contradict free decisions.

I think you need to try again. You're trying to convince me that there's some sort of a problem with us being a what, but all I'm getting from this is that you have a term free that you define a certain way and another compound term free decision that you define a certain way, and what's don't really fit the definition too well. Okay, sure, but what should I make out of that outside of it being a linguistic exercise applied to your vocabulary?

Quoting InPitzotl

Okay, sure, but what should I make out of that outside of it being a linguistic exercise applied to your vocabulary?

You either get the distinction between subjects and objects or don't.

To quote M.Heidegger (Being and Time)

The essence of Dasein lies in its existence. Accordingly those characteristics which can be exhibited in this entity are not 'properties' present-at-hand of some entity which 'looks' so and so and is itself present-at-hand; they are in each case possible ways for it to be, and no more than that. All the Being-as-it-is [So-sein] which this entity possesses is primarily Being. So when we designate this entity with the term 'Dasein', we are expressing not its "what" (as if it were a table, house or tree) but its Being.

Or with Descartes: Ego cogito, ergo sum