Ontology is about how what is relates to what we know. The materialist is saying that what is stands independently of what we know. The materialist is basically saying "I don't know anything until the world tells me." For some strange reason somebody started calling that realism... I don't quite understand why.
Terrapin StationDecember 07, 2016 at 17:48#373960 likes
The materialist is saying that what is stands independently of what we know.
People say all sorts of things about materialism here that I don't agree with as a materialist. This is one of them. Maybe it's just a matter of how you're expressing the above, but at least as expressed, my materialism doesn't amount to that.
but at least as expressed, my materialism doesn't amount to that.
I was having difficulty expressing the thought... different brands of ontology are basically different ways of picturing the relationship between ontology and epistemology. It's a simple thought that somehow gets complex when put into words.
I think materialism is like a musical strain (where cultures are symphonies over time.) But as a card-carrying materialist, what does it amount to.. to you?
Terrapin StationDecember 07, 2016 at 19:10#374010 likes
The materialist is saying that what is stands independently of what we know. The materialist is basically saying "I don't know anything until the world tells me." For some strange reason somebody started calling that realism... I don't quite understand why.
Realists argue for the independence of things. Materialists argue that all things are material. The latter might entail the former, but the former doesn't entail the latter. Objective idealists, for example, are realists but not materialists. And depending on what is meant by "matter", physicalists are another example of realists who aren't materialists.
And others might reject the very notion of some fundamental substance (and so wouldn't be materialists, physicalists, or idealists), but nonetheless claim that things are independent (and so be realists).
Reply to Michael And some might say things aren't that thingly. I've borrowed this from Anon before: An object is a slow event.
Even physicalists (as many materialists have taken to calling themselves) don't claim to know the intrinsic nature of matter. (Of course, it could be question that's beside the point) Perhaps energy is eternal delight, as Blake announced. Or was it bert?
Realists argue for the independence of things. Materialists argue that all things are material. The latter might entail the former, but the former doesn't entail the latter. Objective idealists, for example, are realists but not materialists. And depending on what is meant by "matter", physicalists are another example of realists who aren't materialists.
OK. But if realists argue that things are independent, what is the opposing view? That things aren't independent? If things are dependent.. then on what?
I've been looking for how Nietzsche would have used the word. In the 19th Century, the most common meaning of realism had to do with painting, literature, and theater.
And others might reject the very notion of some fundamental substance (and so wouldn't be materialists, physicalists, or idealists), but nonetheless claim that things are independent (and so be realists).
Some just focus on causation. You're a physicalist if you believe all causes are physical.
That was my response to your message that materialists believe everything is material. I was making a giant diagram relating all ontological brands with their accompanying epistemology and you're like... "No. It has nothing to do with epistemology. They just think everything is material." :)
OK. But if realists argue that things are independent, what is the opposing view? That things aren't independent? If things are dependent.. then on what?
I think the easiest way to understand the independence of things is with reference to Dummett's account of realism and anti-realism. If the truth of "X exists" is verification transcendent than X is an independent thing, and if it isn't then it isn't.
Some just focus on causation. You're a physicalist if you believe all causes are physical.
And to say that a cause is physical is to say that the causal object/process is made of physical stuff?
Terrapin StationDecember 08, 2016 at 13:16#375000 likes
Reply to Mongrel Haha, oh--well, I wouldn't say that realism implies any particular epistemological view. I don't see how that wouldn't be misleading to suggest. It would be like suggesting that atheists have particular views on evolution, or science in general. "Atheism" simply denotes one fairly simply, straightforward view or status, and doesn't imply, even if it tends to be correlated with, other views.
If we were talking about philosophy of perception per se, there's "naive realism" or "direct realism," but that's a stance specifically on how perception works/what perception's relationship to what's perceived is, Realists certainly do not need to be naive/direct realists on perception.
Terrapin StationDecember 08, 2016 at 13:18#375010 likes
Dummett's account of realism and anti-realism. If the truth of "X exists" is verification transcendent than X is an independent thing, and if it isn't then it isn't.
That certainly doesn't work for me, because of my view on what truth is/how it works as well as my view about whether sentences can refer mind-independently, my view on meaning, my view on what propositions are, etc.
That certainly doesn't work for me, because of my view on what truth is/how it works as well as my view about whether sentences can refer mind-independently, my view on meaning, etc.
Which is why I (and I believe a few others) think that your self-proclaimed realism isn't realism (as it's usually understood) at all.
Of course, if you just want to call your view "realism", then you're more than welcome to. But it does get confusing when the label is used for two (or more) vastly different positions.
Terrapin StationDecember 08, 2016 at 13:30#375030 likes
Well, realism isn't usually understood per Dummet's definition, or with respect to something specifically about truth claims.
Conventional philosophical definitions are rather along the lines of:
"the belief that some aspects of reality are ontologically independent of our conceptual schemes, perceptions, linguistic practices, beliefs, etc." (Wikipedia)
"the viewpoint which accords to things which are known or perceived an existence or nature which is independent of whether anyone is thinking about or perceiving them." (Encyclopedia Britannica)
"First, there is a claim about existence. Tables, rocks, the moon, and so on, all exist, as do the following facts: the table's being square, the rock's being made of granite, and the moon's being spherical and yellow. The second aspect of realism about the everyday world of macroscopic objects and their properties concerns independence. The fact that the moon exists and is spherical is independent of anything anyone happens to say or think about the matter. Likewise, although there is a clear sense in which the table's being square is dependent on us (it was designed and constructed by human beings after all), this is not the type of dependence that the realist wishes to deny." (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
I think the easiest way to understand the independence of things is with reference to Dummett's account of realism and anti-realism. If the truth of "X exists" is verification transcendent than X is an independent thing, and if it isn't then it isn't.
So if something has the property of independence are we not supposed to ask: "Independent of what?"
The fact that the moon exists and is spherical is independent of anything anyone happens to say or think about the matter.
And I understand this as saying that the truth of "the moon exists" is verification transcendent.
Or at the very least, that this is what it must mean if it's to count as realism. If you want to say that the moon exists independently of anything anyone happens to say or think about the matter but also that the truth of "the moon exists independently of anything anyone happens to say or think about the matter" is verificiation-immanent then I'd count that as metaphysical anti-realism.
Terrapin StationDecember 08, 2016 at 13:34#375070 likes
That would work if one were a truth realist. I'm not. Realism, in general, doesn't imply truth realism. Realism, in general, doesn't imply anything like a thoroughgoing realism about everything, because, after all, no realist is going to say that human thought, belief, etc. is independent of human thought, belief, etc.
That would work if one were a truth realist. I'm not.
Sure, and my claim is that traditional realism is (implicitly, if not also explicitly) truth-realism. It's historically tied to the correspondence theory of truth. If all you want to say is that "mind-independent things exist" is true, but not also that this statement is made true by some verification-transcendent truth-condition, then it isn't traditional realism. I think that if one says that "mind-independent things exist" is true, but that truth is to be understood according to something like the coherence theory of truth, then you're a metaphysical anti-realist.
Chalmers' paper on ontological anti-realism argues for something much like this. The distinction between the truth-realist and the truth-anti-realist both claiming that mind-independent things exist is akin to his distinction between the nominalist and the Platonist both claiming that numbers exist. Although they're both making the same assertion, what they mean by it is very different; they're arguing for different metaphysics.
Terrapin StationDecember 08, 2016 at 13:47#375150 likes
my claim is that traditional realism is (implicitly, if not also explicitly) truth-realism. It's historically tied to the correspondence theory of truth. If all you want to say is that "mind-independent things exist" is true, but not also that this statement is made true by some verification-transcendent truth-condition, then it isn't traditional realism.
You can say that, but you're simply saying it. It would require extensive empirical evidence. And that empirical evidence would have to support not that truth realism and correspondence theory are typically correlated with realism (in other words, the simple fact that most realists tend to be truth realists and/or tend to employ correspondence theory wouldn't work); it would have to be evidence of people saying or at least strongly implying that realism includes truth realism and correspondence theory, otherwise it isn't realism.
It also couldn't be evidence of simply a handful of philosophers asserting or at least strongly implying this. To claim that it's the traditional view, you'd need evidence of that being the widespread view.
Do you have that evidence available?
Terrapin StationDecember 08, 2016 at 13:56#375180 likes
By the way, I do personally adhere to correspondence theory, but on my analysis it is a subjective affair--as all "truth phenomena" are, whether people believe that to be the case or not. So the idea of truth possibly being verification transcendent doesn't work on my view.
Terrapin StationDecember 08, 2016 at 14:00#375200 likes
The distinction between the truth-realist and the truth-anti-realist both claiming that mind-independent things exist is akin to the distinction between the nominalist and the Platonist both claiming that numbers exist. Although they're both making the same assertion (and so both saying that this claim is true), what they mean by it is very different; they're arguing for different metaphysics.
That seems completely unsupported/arbitrary by the way. Does he have some sort of argument for that?
It might make sense if one were defining realism in a manner such as Dummett, but that underscores why trying to define realism that way doesn't work.
That seems completely unsupported/arbitrary by the way. Does he have some sort of argument for that?
Yes, he has a paper: http://consc.net/papers/ontology.pdf
Terrapin StationDecember 08, 2016 at 14:07#375250 likes
Reply to Michael I started reading through it already. So far, the mention I see of the number analogy has absolutely nothing to do with truth realism. I'm searching for a section that might,
What does he call truth realism in the paper? That phrase doesn't occur . . . (later edit) ah--I found one place where he uses "objective and determinate truth values." So I'll search for stuff about objective truth values.
You can say that, but you're simply saying it. It would require extensive empirical evidence. And that empirical evidence would have to support not that truth realism and correspondence theory are typically correlated with realism (in other words, the simple fact that most realists tend to be truth realists and/or tend to employ correspondence theory wouldn't work); it would have to be evidence of people saying or at least strongly implying that realism includes truth realism and correspondence theory, otherwise it isn't realism.
It also couldn't be evidence of simply a handful of philosophers asserting or at least strongly implying this. To claim that it's the traditional view, you'd need evidence of that being the widespread view.
Do you have that evidence available?
Not to hand. But you just need to read what people have said (and often between the lines). Very few self-proclaimed realists will claim that the existence of the moon is independent of human experience and belief and linguistic practices but that this claim is only true because, for example, it coheres with some axiomatic sentences within our language game. If someone were to say something like this then I would think it quite right to call them anti-realists.
Terrapin StationDecember 08, 2016 at 14:13#375290 likes
Very few self-proclaimed realists will claim that the existence of the moon is independent of human experience and belief and linguistic practices but that this claim is only true because, for example, it coheres with some axiomatic sentences within our language game.
And I'd not disagree with that in the slightest. But I already explained this. It's a correlative belief. It's not part of what realism refers to.
It's no different than it being a fact that very few atheists will say that evolutionary theory is hogwash. But atheism doesn't refer to a stance on evolutionary theory. The beliefs simply have a strong positive correlation with respect to atheism.
Terrapin StationDecember 08, 2016 at 14:15#375300 likes
I found a place where Chalmers says, "We are now in a position to state ontological realism and anti-realism more precisely. Ontological realism, at least in its strongest variety, holds that every unproblematic ontological existence assertion has an objective and determinate truth-value."
I completely disagree with that. I'm looking for whether he provides any sort of argument to support that characterization of ontological realism.
(One unrelated earlier big problem with Chalmers paper is that he actually says that ontological realism started with Quine! haha)
And I'd not disagree with that in the slightest. But I already explained this. It's a correlative belief. It's not part of what realism refers to.
It's no different than it being a fact that very few atheists will say that evolutionary theory is hogwash. But atheism doesn't refer to a stance on evolutionary theory. The beliefs simply have a strong positive correlation with respect to atheism.
And how do we determine what realism refers to? Ask self-proclaimed realists what they mean by "I'm a realist". I'd say that for the most part they'd say "it means that I believe that the existence of the moon is independent of human belief and linguistic practices and that the truth of this belief is independent of human belief and linguistic practices".
I think that if someone were to say "it means that I believe that the existence of the moon is independent of human belief and linguistic practices but that the truth of this belief is dependent on human belief and linguistic practices" then it would be appropriate to consider their use of the label "realist" a misuse. Although they're making a realist-like existence claim, what they mean by this claim shows them to be a metaphysical anti-realist.
Again, it's analogous to the nominalist and Platonist who both make the same existence claim "numbers exist" but mean very different things by it.
Terrapin StationDecember 08, 2016 at 14:45#375420 likes
Some comments on the stuff leading up to the passage I quoted before (these will make more sense if you're familiar with the paper; I'm just quoting the sentences I want to comment on):
"There is a strong intuition that we are thereby in a position to know everything relevant
there is to know about the objects." --which is a mistake in my view. We only know it from a particular reference point.
"Ontological anti-realism, at least in its strong form, is committed to denying that these theses have
objective and determinate truth-values."--there's absolutely no argument prior to this establishing that realism/antirealism should have something to do with a belief in objective truth values.
Alright, reading through the rest of the early part of the paper, prior to "We are now in a position to state ontological realism . . . " I wouldn't say that he provides an argument for realism necessarily having something to do with belief in objective truth value. He's also leaving truth unanalyzed (which isn't surprising, as the paper isn't about an analysis of what truth is ontologically), but the problem with this is that he seems to simply be using "truth" so that it could be a synonym for "fact."
Terrapin StationDecember 08, 2016 at 14:48#375430 likes
Via familiarity with a wide span of philosophcial literature, as well as definitions such as those in the dictionaries and encyclopedias I quoted earlier (where putatively the authors of those definitions are doing their work based on familiarity with a wide span of philosophical literature).
I'd say that for the most part they'd say "it means that I believe that the existence of the moon is independent of human belief and linguistic practices and that the truth of this belief is independent of human belief and linguistic practices".
Yeah, but it just has nothing to do with your intuitive beliefs re what you'd guess that people would say.
You'd need empirical evidence of what people with a philosophical education actually do say. And once again, you'd need to sort out correlative beliefs from definitions (since there's no disagreement that the vast majority of realists are going to also be truth realists).
By the way, what would you say the ontological stance is of someone who believes that the moon, etc. exist external-to-minds, independently of any persons, etc., but who doesn't believe that truth is mind-independent? You wouldn't say that they're anti-realists, would you? And you wouldn't say that they're realists. So what would you say they are?
By the way, what would you say the ontological stance is of someone who believes that the moon, etc. exist external-to-minds, independently of any persons, etc., but who doesn't believe that truth is mind-independent? You wouldn't say that they're anti-realists, would you? And you wouldn't say that they're realists. So what would you say they are?
I'd say that they're anti-realists. Their claim that the moon is independent is, to use Chalmer's terminology, an ordinary existence claim, not an ontological existence claim, and so says nothing about their view on metaphysics. They're just playing along with our language game, not doing philosophy. Their views on metaphysics are instead given in their account of truth.
Terrapin StationDecember 08, 2016 at 15:06#375460 likes
Okay, but in my case, using Chalmers' terminology, my claim that the moon is independent is an ontological existence claim, not an "ordinary existence claim." So what stance is that in your view?
Also, I'm just curious if you recall why I do not believe that truth can not be mind-independent. As a hint: in my view, it's an objective fact that the moon is mind-independent. It is not an objective truth however, since no truths are objective.
Okay, but in my case, using Chalmers' terminology, my claim that the moon is independent is an ontological existence claim, not an "ordinary existence claim." So what stance is that in your view?
That it's to be understood as saying that the truth of "the moon is independent" is verification-transcendent. That's what distinguishes an ordinary from an ontological existence claim; the latter says something about what makes an existence-claim true (making it an account of metaphysics) whereas the former just asserts the claim's truth (making it just a (non-philosophical) move in a language game).
Also, I'm just curious if you recall why I do not believe that truth can not be mind-independent. As a hint: in my view, it's an objective fact that the moon is mind-independent. It is not an objective truth however, since no truths are objective.
I don't think that this makes any sense. To say that the mind-independence of the moon is an objective fact just is to say that the truth of "the moon is mind-independent" is verification-transcendent.
As an aside, would you mind if I move these comments out of the Shoutbox and into their own discussion?
Terrapin StationDecember 08, 2016 at 15:29#375520 likes
That it's to be understood as saying that the truth of "the moon is independent" is verification-transcendent.
Aside from that not being the name of a stance (although you could make it one I suppose), you'd have a problem there because that's not at all my stance. My stance is that the moon is mind-independent/extra mental, where I'm making an ontological claim, not an "ordinary claim," but I am NOT saying anything about truth. I'm saying something about the moon and its relationship to us.
That's what distinguishes an ordinary from an ontological existence claim;
Not per that Chalmers paper. Here are his definitions:
"An ordinary existence assertion, to a first approximation, is an existence assertion of the sort
typically made in ordinary first-order discussion of the relevant subject matter. For example, a
typical mathematician’s assertion of ‘There are four prime numbers less than ten’ is an ordinary
existence assertion, as is a typical drinker’s assertion of ‘There are three glasses on the table’.
"An ontological existence assertion, to a first approximation, is an existence assertion of the sort
typically made in broadly philosophical discussion where ontological considerations are paramount.
For example, a typical philosophers’ assertion of ‘Abstract objects exist’ is an ontological existence
assertion, as is a typical philosophers’ assertion of ‘For every set of objects, there exists an object
that is their mereological sum’."
Per those definitions, I'm making an ontological existence assertion about the moon being mind-independent/external to minds, yet I'm not saying anything about truth (being mind-independent/external to minds) in that. (By the way, for people reading this discussion but who haven't read the Chalmers paper, his discussion prior to that of Carnap's "internal"/"external" distinction with respect to existence questions in linguistic frameworks is helpful in understanding the distinction Chalmers is making. That starts on page 4.)
I don't think that this makes any sense. To say that the mind-independence of the moon is an objective fact just is to say that the truth of "the moon is mind-independent" is verification-transcendent.
Truths and facts are not the same thing. Truth-value is a property of propositions, and on my account, it's a judgment about whether propositions have the property in question, as that's the only means by which the property can obtain (also on my account, propositions only obtain when people are thinking about them, as meaning is a mental phenomenon only). Facts, on the other hand, are states of affairs in the world.
Re moving the discussion--sure, that would be a good idea.
Not per that Chalmers paper. Here are his definitions:
"An ordinary existence assertion, to a first approximation, is an existence assertion of the sort
typically made in ordinary first-order discussion of the relevant subject matter. For example, a
typical mathematician’s assertion of ‘There are four prime numbers less than ten’ is an ordinary
existence assertion, as is a typical drinker’s assertion of ‘There are three glasses on the table’.
"An ontological existence assertion, to a first approximation, is an existence assertion of the sort
typically made in broadly philosophical discussion where ontological considerations are paramount.
For example, a typical philosophers’ assertion of ‘Abstract objects exist’ is an ontological existence
assertion, as is a typical philosophers’ assertion of ‘For every set of objects, there exists an object
that is their mereological sum’."
Per those definitions, I'm making an ontological existence assertion about the moon being mind-independent/external to minds, yet I'm not saying anything about truth (being mind-independent/external to minds) in that. (By the way, for people reading this discussion but who haven't read the Chalmers paper, his discussion prior to that of Carnap's "internal"/"external" distinction with respect to existence questions in linguistic frameworks is helpful in understanding the distinction Chalmers is making.)
And he continues by saying that "ordinary and ontological existence assertions differ with respect to an important sort of utterance evaluation, which I will call correctness", and draws a distinction between heavyweight and lightweight quantification. Following it through, for a claim like "the moon is mind-independent" to be a true ontological existence assertion it is required that there is some relevant verification-transcendent truth condition.
If you reject verification-transcendent truth conditions then, as an ontological existence assertion, a claim like "the moon is mind-independent" can't be true. It might be true as an ordinary existence assertion, but then that's insufficient to count as metaphysical realism.
Truths and facts are not the same thing. Truth-value is a property of propositions, and on my account, it's a judgment about whether propositions have the property in question, as that's the only means by which the property can obtain (also on my account, propositions only obtain when people are thinking about them, as meaning is a mental phenomenon only). Facts, on the other hand, are states of affairs in the world.
Then you're just shifting the verification-transcendence from truth to facts, which hardly makes any difference. There's some verification-transcendent state-of-affairs which is (somehow) described by the sentence "the moon is mind-independent".
Unless you're also saying that these facts -- these states-of-affairs in the world -- aren't independent of our beliefs, experiences, and linguistic facts, in which case you're back to being an anti-realist.
Out of interest, what word do you use (if any) to describe a sentence that describes a fact if not "true"?
Truths and facts are not the same thing. Truth-value is a property of propositions ... Facts, on the other hand, are states of affairs in the world.
This distinction does not make any sense to me. All facts are propositions--ones that correspond to states of affairs in the world; i.e., true propositions. If it is an objective fact (state of affairs in the world) that the moon is mind-independent, then "the moon is mind-independent" is a true proposition. What am I missing?
Terrapin StationDecember 08, 2016 at 17:26#375880 likes
And he continues by saying that "ordinary and ontological existence assertions differ with respect to an important sort of utterance evaluation, which I will call correctness",
Which he explains is not the same as, or at least need not be the same as a truth claim.
If you reject verification-transcendent truth conditions then, as an ontological existence assertion, a claim like "the moon is mind-independent" can't be true.
This is incorrect. It can be true, it's just not verification-transcendentally or objectively true, as nothing is.
Then you're just shifting the verification-transcendence from truth to facts, which hardly makes any difference.
It makes a difference in that truth and facts are not the same thing. If someone says that Toyotas and Rolls Royces aren't the same thing, they're not going to say "Sure, I'll take a Toyota" when they want a Rolls Royce. For someone who just wants a car, any car, it wouldn't make a difference. So if you take truth and facts to be the same thing, it won't make any difference to you. They're very different things on my view, however, so it makes a big difference to me. In any event, yes, I'm saying that "The moon exists independently of us/it exists extramentally" is an objective fact that in no way hinges on our thinking about it, our verification, etc. It's just that no proposition is true objectively, because truth of what truth is ontologically--it's a judgment about the meanings of statements.
Out of interest, what word do you use (if any) to describe a sentence that describes a fact if not "true"?
A "descriptive sentence" would do, or a claim (where the persons asserting it and agreeing with it are taking it to describe the fact at hand), etc. Note that these things only obtain when someone thinks about them in that way. Aside from thinking about them, sentences are just marks on paper, or sounds, or whatever, with no meaning, no reference, etc.
Terrapin StationDecember 08, 2016 at 17:40#375890 likes
Okay, but it's been an explicitly-expressed (maybe first in Russell's Philosophy of Logical Atomism), standard, received-view distinction in analytic philosophy for more or less 100 years now.
All facts are propositions--ones that correspond to states of affairs in the world;
On the standard, received view, propositions are the meanings of (declarative) statements. So, you're saying that in your ontology, facts are the meanings of (declarative) statements? Or you disagree with the received view in this regard?
Also, if on your view all facts are propositions, and then you're specifying propositions that correspond to states of affairs, you're saying propositions that correspond to propositions and/or facts that correspond to facts? That seems like a mess, doesn't it? It seems, rather, that you are making a distinction between the two, otherwise the notion of correspondence between facts and propositions wouldn't even make any sense (unless you're just saying that anything "corresponds" to itself a la that being an alternate way of describing logical identity).
If it is an objective fact (state of affairs in the world) that the moon is mind-independent, then "the moon is mind-independent" is a true proposition. What am I missing?
What you're missing on the standard, received view, where I'll use correspondence since that's what you prefer, is that the reason that "The moon is mind-independent" is a true proposition is because the proposition, that is, the meaning of that declarative statement, corresponds to a fact, that the moon is mind-independent. It's not that they're identical, that they're the same thing. (If we weren't using correspondence and we were using something else, like consensus, say, what you'd be missing is that the proposition is held to be true by consensus (at least of the relevant parties).)
On my account, what you're missing is that (a) the proposition has no meaning aside from people thinking about it and assigning meaning to it (to the sentence), that (b) it has no relation to the states of affairs in question aside from people thinking about it and assigning meaning to the sentence, and (c) the property of corresponding (or whatever property we go with re truth theories) only obtains by judgment of an individual with respect to assigning meaning and thinking, in the context of that meaning, about the relation of the proposition with the facts in question.
No, of course not, since there is no such thing as objective truth. It is a fact, however.
Is "there is no such thing as objective truth" a true proposition? If not, then why should anyone believe it? And how can it nevertheless be a fact that there is no such thing as objective truth?
So, you're saying that in your ontology, facts are the meanings of (declarative) statements?
Every proposition purports to declare a fact. Every true proposition does declare a fact. If it is a fact that the moon is mind-independent, then "the moon is mind-independent" is a true proposition--i.e., an objective truth.
On my account, what you're missing is that (a) the proposition has no meaning aside from people thinking about it and assigning meaning to it (to the sentence), that (b) it has no relation to the states of affairs in question aside from people thinking about it and assigning meaning to the sentence, and (c) the property of corresponding (or whatever property we go with re truth theories) only obtains by judgment of an individual with respect to assigning meaning and thinking, in the context of that meaning, about the relation of the proposition with the facts in question.
All this is really saying is that every proposition is a symbol--a sign that represents its object by convention, rather than direct causal connection (index) or resemblance (icon). Words like "moon" and "mind-independent," as well as combinations thereof, only represent their objects because people interpret them as doing so; but the object of a true proposition, that which it represents, is still a fact--a state of affairs in the world.
I'm saying that "The moon exists independently of us/it exists extramentally" is an objective fact that in no way hinges on our thinking about it, our verification, etc.
So you're saying that the sentence describes a verification-transcendent fact. That's what I mean when I say that realism requires verification-transcendent truths. I'm just using the word "true" where you'd use the sentence "describes a fact".
So this is just a trivial terminological dispute. Whereas you use the word "true" to describe a sentence that's judged a certain way, I'm using the word "true" to describe a sentence that describes a fact.
Whereas you use the word "true" to describe a sentence that's judged a certain way, I'm using the word "true" to describe a sentence that describes a fact.
We seem to be on the same page here. By what other criterion, besides describing a fact, would someone judge a sentence--or rather, the proposition that a sentence expresses--to be true?
Terrapin StationDecember 08, 2016 at 19:07#375950 likes
Is "there is no such thing as objective truth" a true proposition?
It certainly is in my view, yes. Re why you should believe it, why you should believe anything is up to you--it depends on what you take to be good reasons to buy one thing versus another.
Every proposition purports to declare a fact . . .
If only you'd answered the question I asked you. Note that I'm not suggesting that you didn't answer it in your opinion. I asked a simple yes or no question, however, and you didn't respond with a direct yes or no or an explanation why a direct yes or no didn't work for you.
By what other criterion, besides describing a fact, would someone judge a sentence--or rather, the proposition that a sentence expresses--to be true?
I personally use correspondence theory, but you seem to be educated enough about philosophy that you should be aware of several other popular truth theories, such as coherence, pragmatism, etc., no?
When we do an inventory of the world, we do not find truth outside of minds making judgments about propositions.
Are you saying that truth is a property of judgments about propositions, and thus subjective, rather than a property of propositions themselves, and thus objective? I think of truth in the latter sense; our (subjective) judgments about propositions are then fallible assessments of whether they are (objectively) true.
I asked a simple yes or no question, however, and you didn't respond with a direct yes or no or an explanation why a direct yes or no didn't work for you.
I hoped that my answer would make it apparent why a direct yes or no did not work for me. Declarative statements express propositions, and propositions purport to represent facts. True propositions really do represent facts, but false propositions do not.
In that case--by what other criterion, besides describing a fact, would someone who subscribes to the correspondence theory judge a sentence--or rather, the proposition that a sentence expresses--to be true?
Terrapin StationDecember 08, 2016 at 20:47#376180 likes
Are you saying that truth is a property of judgments about propositions, and thus subjective, rather than a property of propositions themselves, and thus objective?
Well, first I don't agree that propositions are objective. I believe that meaning, as well as truth, is subjective. So truth is a (subjective) property of propositions, which are also subjective, and more specifically, it's a property that obtains via making a judgment about the relation of a proposition to something else (like facts when we're talking about correspondence theory).
In that case--by what other criterion, besides describing a fact, would someone who subscribes to the correspondence theory judge a sentence--or rather, the proposition that a sentence expresses--to be true?
I'm pretty sure I explained this above, but at any rate, you judge it by assigning meaning to the terms in the declarative sentence (that's what a proposition is--the meaning of a statement) and then assessing (on correspondence theory, for example) whether that meaning matches the fact(s) you take the statement to pick out.
So truth is ... a property that obtains via making a judgment about the relation of a proposition to something else (like facts when we're talking about correspondence theory).
Are you saying that my judgment makes a proposition true or false, rather than its correspondence to the facts? If so, then it seems to me that I can never be wrong when I judge a particular proposition to be true, because that very judgment is what makes it true. Again, what am I missing?
I disagree that "it represents its object by convention." I might also disagree that it's a sign, but it depends on just how you're defining sign.
A sign is anything that stands for something (its object) to something else (its interpretant). If a proposition does not represent its object--a purported fact--by convention, then how does it do so?
I'm pretty sure I explained this above, but at any rate, you judge it by assigning meaning to the terms in the declarative sentence (that's what a proposition is--the meaning of a statement) and then assessing (on correspondence theory, for example) whether that meaning matches the fact(s) you take the statement to pick out.
How does this differ significantly from my criterion that a proposition is true if, and only if, it represents a fact?
If we can reach any logical conclusion then this means that in reality we are not restricted exclusively to self reference.
If we can reach any logical conclusions than necessarily there is something which exists independently of our own minds which allows us to avoid the infinite regress of exclusive self reference..
If it were a reality that we were limited exclusively to self reference then there would be no way to prove that was true in reality and in fact there would be no way to prove anything because we would be trapped in an infinite loop of self regress inherent of exclusive self reference.
Terrapin StationDecember 09, 2016 at 01:54#376700 likes
If so, then it seems to me that I can never be wrong when I judge a particular proposition to be true, because that very judgment is what makes it true.
What makes you wrong with respect to judging a proposition to be true or false is that a different judgment is reached, either by someone else, or by yourself at a different time. You're right or wrong in your truth-value assignments always to someone, by virtue of their own judgments, or by your own judgment (at a different time).
How does this differ significantly from my criterion that a proposition is true if, and only if, it represents a fact?
That would depend on whether what you're referring to is an individual thinking about things. If that's what you're referring to, then it might not differ.
A proposition corresponding to facts is a judgment about the proposition's relationship to facts.
A proposition is not itself a judgment; rather, a judgment is an evaluation of a proposition as either true or false. If I judge a proposition to be true, then that judgment is correct if and only if the proposition really does represent the fact that it purports to represent.
By individuals thinking about the proposition in a representational way. That doesn't require any sort of convention or consensus.
We typically represent propositions in words, which only represent anything by convention. Another way of saying it is that a symbol represents its object only because it will be interpreted as doing so.
Terrapin StationDecember 09, 2016 at 03:45#376820 likes
words, which only represent anything by convention.
Obviously I disagree on that. There certainly are conventions, but representation works via individuals thinking about things in a particular way, even when we're talking about conventions.
In other words, the action or status of corresponding to facts is a judgment.
Whether a proposition corresponds to facts is itself an objective fact. The judgment does not determine such correspondence, it evaluates it, and can be mistaken in doing so.
There certainly are conventions, but representation works via individuals thinking about things in a particular way, even when we're talking about conventions.
If you are thinking about something concrete using words or other symbols, then you are representing it by conventions. The word "moon" represents the moon only by convention--that is what English-speakers typically call the very large spherical mass of rock that orbits the earth. Even if you are primarily using icons or indices, conventions are almost always also involved. You can draw a picture of the moon, but you will have to use certain artistic conventions in order to do so. You can simply point at the moon, but it is only by convention that this typically directs someone else's attention to it.
Terrapin StationDecember 09, 2016 at 14:44#377300 likes
Whether a proposition corresponds to facts is itself an objective fact. The judgment does not determine such correspondence, it evaluates it, and can be mistaken in doing so.
I certainly understand that view, I understand that it's the popular view, and I understand that it's your view.
However, it's not my view. Objective correspondence is an incoherent idea on my view. Whether a proposition corresponds to facts is a subjective judgment. Being mistaken is equally a subjective matter of evaluation, either by others or by oneself at another time.
In any event, there's not really any need to keep explaining the standard view in contradistinction to my own. It's not as if I'm not familiar with or do not understand the standard view. I just believe that the standard view has the facts wrong/is incoherent/etc. Other people think that I have the facts wrong obviously. I'm not going to switch over to the standard view unless you have some whopper of an argument for it/against my own view that I've not encountered before, and you're extremely unlikely to come up with an argument I've not encountered before because I've been around the block a couple times. I don't expect you to switch over to my view, either, for a number of reasons, including that I simply don't spend the time/energy on attempting that any longer online (because I believe it's generally futile to do that in these online contexts for a variety of reasons relating to how people interact online, especially when they're anonymous/when they don't also know each other offline).
If you are thinking about something concrete using words or other symbols, then you are representing it by conventions.
What makes it a convention or not is simply whether it's the common/standard representation and/or way of representing. It doesn't have to be, though. You can do something (relatively) idiosyncratic. (It doesn't have to be completely unique to you to not be a convention, though.)
What makes it a convention or not is simply whether it's the common/standard representation and/or way of representing.
No, what makes it a convention is that it is arbitrary--there is nothing about the moon itself that makes "moon" the proper term for it in English. The only difference with a private, idiosyncratic convention is that it is not very useful for communicating with others.
Objective correspondence is an incoherent idea on my view. Whether a proposition corresponds to facts is a subjective judgment.
So whether or not the proposition "the moon is independent" corresponds to a fact is a subjective judgement and not an objective fact? And yet before you were claiming that it's an objective fact that the moon is independent. These seem contradictory claims.
Terrapin StationDecember 09, 2016 at 17:07#377400 likes
I doubt that the definition of "convention" that you're using is "arbitrary." I don't know what definition you're using exactly, though.
I'm using standard dictionary definitions such as "general agreement or consent; accepted usage, especially as a standard of procedure," "a set of agreed, stipulated, or generally accepted standards, norms, social norms, or criteria, often taking the form of a custom," or "a way in which something is usually done, especially within a particular area or activity"
Terrapin StationDecember 09, 2016 at 17:10#377410 likes
Then you're not examining the claims very closely. One claim is about how it is that (or in other words how it works that) propositions correspond with facts. The other claim is about the ontological status of particular objects.
Then you're not examining the claims very closely. One claim is about how it is that (or in other words how it works that) propositions correspond with facts. The other claim is about the ontological status of particular objects.
It's the same thing. What does it mean to say that it is an objective fact that the moon is independent if not that the proposition "the moon is independent" corresponds to an objective fact?
Terrapin StationDecember 09, 2016 at 19:01#377570 likes
The moon being independent of us has nothing to do with our language. Why would you think that we're only talking about language?
Your claim that the moon is independent of us has everything to do with our language. How am I to make sense of this claim. Does your claim that the moon is independent of us correspond to an objective fact or not?
Terrapin StationDecember 09, 2016 at 19:03#377590 likes
Your claim that the moon is independent of us has everything to do with our language.
Sure, the claim, as a claim, has something to do with language. You don't believe that what the claim is about is language, though, do you? That's a really infantile confusion.
Sure, the claim, as a claim, has something to do with language. You don't believe that what the claim is about is language, though, do you? That's a really infantile confusion.
You're not answering the question. Does your claim that the moon is independent of us correspond to an objective fact or not?
Terrapin StationDecember 09, 2016 at 19:04#377610 likes
You didn't answer mine to my satisfaction.
Terrapin StationDecember 09, 2016 at 19:05#377620 likes
Do you believe that what the claim is about is language?
I had said: "The other claim is ABOUT the ontological status of particular objects."
No, I don't think your claim is about language. Now, answer my question. Does your claim correspond to an objective fact?
Terrapin StationDecember 09, 2016 at 19:06#377640 likes
Okay, I'll answer once we finish with this. If one claim is ABOUT a proposition (which has something to do with language) and the other claim is ABOUT the ontological status of the moon, which doesn't have something to do with language, how are they the same?
Okay, I'll answer once we finish with this. If one claim is ABOUT a proposition (which has something to do with language) and the other claim is ABOUT the ontological status of the moon, which doesn't have something to do with language, how are they the same?
You did this every time. You refuse to answer my questions and instead insist that I keep answering every one of yours.
So I'm not going to even ask you a question. I'm just going to tell you what's going on. If your claim that the moon is independent of us doesn't correspond to an objective fact then it isn't realism.
Terrapin StationDecember 09, 2016 at 19:09#377660 likes
No interest in meta discussion. And no interest in you avoiding what I just asked you.
I doubt that the definition of "convention" that you're using is "arbitrary."
It is arbitrary in the sense that there is no particular reason why that particular arrangement of those particular marks on a page (or pixels on a screen) represents what it does, other than that someone interprets it as doing so--or, in this case, lots of people thus interpret it. It does not resemble its object in any way, and there is no direct causal connection with its object.
Terrapin StationDecember 09, 2016 at 19:13#377710 likes
If your claim that the moon is independent of us doesn't correspond to an objective fact then it isn't realism.
Of course not--TS has made it quite clear in this and other threads that he is not a realist, he is a nominalist. Again, the usual caveats about labels are hereby acknowledged.
I said I'll answer once we finish with the earlier dispute. Can we finish that?
No, I've said my piece. Your account of meaning and truth precludes you from being a realist. At best it's quasi-realism/fictionalism. At worse it's a contradiction.
Terrapin StationDecember 09, 2016 at 19:15#377740 likes
Of course not--TS has made it quite clear in this and other threads that he is not a realist, he is a nominalist. Again, the usual caveats about labels are hereby acknowledged.
Nominalism is contrasted with realism if we're scholastics talking about universals.
Since the context isn't that, and we're hundreds of years on, your comment doesn't make sense.
Terrapin StationDecember 09, 2016 at 19:16#377750 likes
"Lots of people" make it a convention. Just someone, and not lots of people, make it not a convention.
You are missing the point. I am looking at HOW a particular sign represents its object. There are only three options--by resemblance (icon), by direct connection (index), or by convention (symbol). If the word "convention" is what bothers you, then just substitute the notion that a symbol represents its object only because it will be interpreted as doing so. Suppose I designate "glutchski" as a made-up word that represents the moon in my private thoughts. It is a symbol, because I will interpret it as representing the moon, even if no one else ever does.
Terrapin StationDecember 09, 2016 at 19:21#377770 likes
So when you use a word like "convention" where I disagree that the claim hinges on "convention" in any sense of that word, what is your recommendation, to just ignore the word and figure that you must mean something else by it, something that I'd agree with?
Nominalism is contrasted with realism if we're scholastics talking about universals.
Or if we are PF participants talking about whether possibilities and habits are real, not just existents; but that is another thread. I am not sure what we are talking about in this one now.
Terrapin StationDecember 09, 2016 at 19:23#377790 likes
I just tried to clarify what I meant. A symbol represents its object only because it will be interpreted as doing so, not because of any resemblance or direct connection.
Terrapin StationDecember 09, 2016 at 19:28#377810 likes
Okay, we agree on that, although I'd clarify that it might be interpreted as representing whatever it's taken to represent because of resemblance (per interpretation) and maybe per direct connection (again per interpretation).
Reply to Terrapin Station
Habits, necessities, laws, regularities--take your pick. Are they real apart from their instantiations? Can a conditional proposition--if I let go of this rock, then it would fall to the ground--represent an objective fact, even if the antecedent is never actualized?
Terrapin StationDecember 09, 2016 at 19:36#377840 likes
Can a conditional proposition--if I let go of this rock, then it would fall to the ground--represent an objective fact, even if the antecedent is never actualized?
Yes on my view, but it's not representing something (real) that's not actualized.
Yes on my view, but it's not representing something (real) that's not actualized.
Then what object--if not a real habit, necessity, law, or regularity--is that conditional proposition representing? Given that the antecedent never obtains, it cannot be something actual.
Terrapin StationDecember 09, 2016 at 19:49#377870 likes
It's representing gravitational attraction in that case, which is actual.
In other words, I wouldn't say that the conditional "maps" to a conditional that is actual in the world. That conditional is a way of talking about the fact that gravitational attraction obtains.
I don't in general buy that the non-linguistic world is structured like language. That's (part of) why statements and the like don't represent anything "on their own." They need us to interpret them as you say.
It's representing gravitational attraction in that case, which is actual.
Gravitational attraction occurs whether the antecedent obtains or not, so that cannot be what the conditional proposition is representing. It says what would happen, not why it would happen.
I wouldn't say that the conditional "maps" to a conditional that is actual in the world.
Neither would I; rather, I would say that it maps to a habit/necessity/law/regularity that is real, regardless of whether it is actualized. Am I right to perceive that you see no meaningful distinction between reality and existence?
I don't in general buy that the non-linguistic world is structured like language.
The idea that I am entertaining is more along the lines that there is an alignment between reality and logic; how we think, in some sense and to some degree, reflects how the universe is--which is why we are able to learn about it at all.
Terrapin StationDecember 09, 2016 at 21:28#378060 likes
so that cannot be what the conditional proposition is representing.
Wait a minute--how do you figure that there are any limits on what a proposition is representing, so that we can say that a proposition isn't representing something?
Wait a minute--how do you figure that there are any limits on what a proposition is representing, so that we can say that a proposition isn't representing something?
Consider the proposition that the moon is made of green cheese. Can we say that this proposition is representing the fact that Abraham Lincoln was the 16th President of the United States? If not, then evidently there are some limits on what a proposition is representing.
The conditional proposition--that if I let go of the rock, then it will fall--is representing the fact that if I let go of the rock, then it will fall. Gravitational attraction is an explanation of this fact, not the fact itself--and it is a habit/necessity/law/regularity, not a mere brute actuality. Furthermore, the conditional proposition is true regardless of whether I ever actually let go of the rock, and would still be true even if no one ever expressed it as a statement.
Terrapin StationDecember 09, 2016 at 21:57#378230 likes
Can we say that this proposition is representing the fact that Abraham Lincoln was the 16th President of the United States?
Yes. Any words/text strings/sounds/drawings/whatevers could be taken by an individual to represent anything. Hence me wondering why you'd say something like, "X can't represent Y."
Yes. Any words/text strings/sounds/drawings/whatevers could be taken by an individual to represent anything. Hence me wondering why you'd say something like, "X can't represent Y."
But that proposition as ordinarily understood can't represent that fact as ordinarily understood.
Reply to Terrapin Station Fine, we are back to words and their combinations being symbols that represent their objects by arbitrary conventions. Stipulating that we are using contemporary English vocabulary and grammar, the proposition that the moon is made of green cheese cannot represent the fact that Abraham Lincoln was the 16th President of the United States.
Is this a digression, or are you trying to make a relevant point?
Terrapin StationDecember 09, 2016 at 22:50#378490 likes
But that proposition as ordinarily understood can't represent that fact as ordinarily understood.
Maybe as ordinarily understood it doesn't represent what I said . . . I'm not sure what philosophical significance that contingent fact would have, though.
Terrapin StationDecember 09, 2016 at 23:00#378540 likes
Fine, we are back to words and their combinations being symbols that represent their objects by arbitrary conventions.
Well, if you're using "convention" in a conventional way, that's why I brought up the objections I did earlier. Conventions are simply conventions. They're not correct or anything like that by virtue of being conventions, and the convention doesn't come first--it's just a contingent fact about how people are thinking about things (in this case) (and also of course conventions, once instantiated, can influence how people think about something, but that influence doesnt determine how individuals think about something, and it doesn't make the convention right, it doesn't limit how someone can think about something, etc.)
I wouldn't say that conditionals imply somehow extramentally instantiated "ifs," even if most folks think about what they represent that way. But I would say that conditionals can represent objective facts where the objective fact--that gravitational attraction obtains in this case, for example, has some significant relation to the conventional way if thinking about that conditional.
I am looking at HOW a particular sign represents its object. There are only three options--by resemblance (icon), by direct connection (index), or by convention (symbol).
While it seems fairly clear that conventional symbols represent I don't think resemblance represents. Resemblance is symmetric, i.e. one thing resembles another by actually possessing some of its recognizable properties. Representation, however, is asymmetric, i.e. one thing represents another, regardless of whether they share properties.
Therefore, resemblance does not represent. Neither does direct connection (index) or perception. Conventional symbols, statements, and beliefs represent things. Resemblance and direct connection, or perception don't (they present things).
For example, a photograph presents properties which resemble properties of the optical state of affairs which was photographed, i.e. the photo reflects light in ways which resemble how the photographed things reflected light when they were photographed. The resemblance relation does not re-present the things (nor an impression inside the head of the photographer). It presents what's really there to see on the surface on the photo: properties shared by two different optical state of affairs.
Reply to jkop A portrait does not represent the person whom it portrays (resemblance)? A weather vane does not represent the direction of the wind (connection)? You do not recognize a familiar face in a photograph (both)?
A portrait does not represent the person whom it portrays (resemblance)?
Any picture can represent the person, but then it is used as a symbol, regardless of its resemblance. A caricature, for instance, seldom resembles yet represents; resemblance is neither necessary nor sufficient for representation. A portrait, however, resembles, and a photographic portrait could be visually indistinguishable from the present features of the person. Granted that it could also represent the person, but if the question is: how does the picture signify, then it seems fairly clear that while a caricature represents by asymmetrically exaggerating or contorting known features of the person the portrait signifies primarily by resemblance.
You do not recognize a familiar face in a photograph (both)?
There is no face in the photo but colour patches, and the photographic process arranged those patches in a way that resembles the way which makes the face familiar. The photo does not represent the face, it presents certain features which are recognizable as the face.
Reply to jkop You are not adhering to the definitions that I am using, which come from Peirce and are well-established in semiotics, so we are just talking past each other. In particular, you seem to have a very narrow concept of representation. If "the portrait signifies primarily by resemblance," then it represents its object by resemblance--it is an icon. The weather vane represents (i.e., indicates) the direction of the wind, regardless of whether anyone interprets it as doing so--it is an index. If the photo "presents certain features which are recognizable as the face," then it represents the face--iconically due to the resemblance, and indexically due to the causal process that placed the image on the film. Now, just about every sign has all three aspects--iconic, indexical, and symbolic; but I am focusing on the predominant relation of the sign to its object.
You are not adhering to the definitions that I am using, which come from Peirce and are well-established in semiotics, so we are just talking past each other.
There is no good reason to exclusively adhere to the terminology of a 19th century theory of signs. It is fairly easy to see that representation is an asymmetric relation whereas resemblance is symmetric. That's what sets portraits apart from representational symbols, e.g. traffic signs or words.
In particular, you seem to have a very narrow concept of representation. If "the portrait signifies primarily by resemblance," then it represents its object by resemblance--it is an icon.
Granted that a portrait can both resemble and represent its object, but if resemblance is the predominant relation which determines how a portrait signifies its object, then in this respect (i.e. as in how it predominantly signifies its object) it cannot represent its object, because representation is asymmetric whereas resemblance is symmetric. The portrait may, of course, represent its object in other respects by way of convention, for instance. *
Would it make sense to say that the portrait primarily signifies its object symmetrically (by resemblance) and therefore "represents it" (i.e. signifies the object asymmetrically)? I don't think so.
The weather vane represents (i.e., indicates) the direction of the wind, regardless of whether anyone interprets it as doing so--it is an index.
But the question is how, recall. A tumbling dust ball is also connected to the direction of the wind, but that does not make it a representation of it, does it?
If the photo "presents certain features which are recognizable as the face," then it represents the face--iconically due to the resemblance, and indexically due to the causal process that placed the image on the film. Now, just about every sign has all three aspects--iconic, indexical, and symbolic; but I am focusing on the predominant relation of the sign to its object.
I'm also focusing on the predominant relation, but the mere application of semiotic terminology is not an argument for "HOW a particular sign represents its object".
(*some clarification the day after my original post)
A photograph of Ghandi signifies its object, the man, by resemblance between some of his visual features and some of the visual features of the photo. The photo may also represent the man, or what he stood for. But as a representation the photo is used as a symbol, and in order to represent the man or what he stood for we could substitute the photo with his name without changing the representation relation. From the logical difference between resemblance and representation it follows that if a portrait resembles, then it cannot represent in the same respect.
For someone who does not know of Ghandi the photo may still signify by resemblance between some of its visual features and visual features of men, whereas its possible use as a representation of Ghandi or what he stood for remains unknown. Unlike what the photo resembles, what it represents does not depend on the photo but on symbolic convention. Someone who has never seen a photo, nor a half-naked man, could arguably still see a symmetric relation between colour patches on the photo and the visual features of the man.
Terrapin StationDecember 11, 2016 at 13:22#380380 likes
A photograph of Ghandi signifies its object, the man, by resemblance between some of his visual features and some of the visual features of the photo. The photo may also represent the man, or what he stood for. But as a representation the photo is used as a symbol, and in order to represent the man or what he stood for we could substitute the photo with his name without changing the representation relation. From the logical difference between resemblance and representation it follows that if a portrait resembles, then it cannot represent in the same respect.
I think the distinction you're making between representation and resemblance makes some sense--it's clear that they're not coexhaustive, but I'd say that (a) resemblance is often a subset of representation, and (b) representations by resemblance often have representational aspects that other sorts of representations, such as just a name, for example, lack.
I don't know if you'd agree with me, though, that representations exclusively obtain via individuals thinking about things in a signifier/signified manner.
Reply to Terrapin Station It seems clear that thought about things in a manner of signs and signified is presupposed in representation.
Yet an overwhelming amount of the things in our environment are not signs, they don't represent something else. We identify trees and pictures whose coloured shapes resemble trees because we have a background capacity to perceive and identify things in our environment and their properties, including differences and resemblances. In this sense resemblance is psychologically more primitive than representation.
For example, you see what a bundle of coloured shapes on a photograph resembles, but you've got to learn what a traffic sign represents. It seems clear that in order to know what something represents we need more than a capacity for identifying things: we need a symbol system, a language, and thus thought about the thing in a manner of sign and signified.
Comments (108)
People say all sorts of things about materialism here that I don't agree with as a materialist. This is one of them. Maybe it's just a matter of how you're expressing the above, but at least as expressed, my materialism doesn't amount to that.
I was having difficulty expressing the thought... different brands of ontology are basically different ways of picturing the relationship between ontology and epistemology. It's a simple thought that somehow gets complex when put into words.
I think materialism is like a musical strain (where cultures are symphonies over time.) But as a card-carrying materialist, what does it amount to.. to you?
That everything extant is comprised of (dynamic structures/relations of) matter.
(Not sure what you're saying there)
Realists argue for the independence of things. Materialists argue that all things are material. The latter might entail the former, but the former doesn't entail the latter. Objective idealists, for example, are realists but not materialists. And depending on what is meant by "matter", physicalists are another example of realists who aren't materialists.
And others might reject the very notion of some fundamental substance (and so wouldn't be materialists, physicalists, or idealists), but nonetheless claim that things are independent (and so be realists).
Even physicalists (as many materialists have taken to calling themselves) don't claim to know the intrinsic nature of matter. (Of course, it could be question that's beside the point) Perhaps energy is eternal delight, as Blake announced. Or was it bert?
OK. But if realists argue that things are independent, what is the opposing view? That things aren't independent? If things are dependent.. then on what?
I've been looking for how Nietzsche would have used the word. In the 19th Century, the most common meaning of realism had to do with painting, literature, and theater.
Quoting Michael
Some just focus on causation. You're a physicalist if you believe all causes are physical.
That was my response to your message that materialists believe everything is material. I was making a giant diagram relating all ontological brands with their accompanying epistemology and you're like... "No. It has nothing to do with epistemology. They just think everything is material." :)
I think the easiest way to understand the independence of things is with reference to Dummett's account of realism and anti-realism. If the truth of "X exists" is verification transcendent than X is an independent thing, and if it isn't then it isn't.
And to say that a cause is physical is to say that the causal object/process is made of physical stuff?
If we were talking about philosophy of perception per se, there's "naive realism" or "direct realism," but that's a stance specifically on how perception works/what perception's relationship to what's perceived is, Realists certainly do not need to be naive/direct realists on perception.
That certainly doesn't work for me, because of my view on what truth is/how it works as well as my view about whether sentences can refer mind-independently, my view on meaning, my view on what propositions are, etc.
Which is why I (and I believe a few others) think that your self-proclaimed realism isn't realism (as it's usually understood) at all.
Of course, if you just want to call your view "realism", then you're more than welcome to. But it does get confusing when the label is used for two (or more) vastly different positions.
Well, realism isn't usually understood per Dummet's definition, or with respect to something specifically about truth claims.
Conventional philosophical definitions are rather along the lines of:
"the belief that some aspects of reality are ontologically independent of our conceptual schemes, perceptions, linguistic practices, beliefs, etc." (Wikipedia)
"the viewpoint which accords to things which are known or perceived an existence or nature which is independent of whether anyone is thinking about or perceiving them." (Encyclopedia Britannica)
"First, there is a claim about existence. Tables, rocks, the moon, and so on, all exist, as do the following facts: the table's being square, the rock's being made of granite, and the moon's being spherical and yellow. The second aspect of realism about the everyday world of macroscopic objects and their properties concerns independence. The fact that the moon exists and is spherical is independent of anything anyone happens to say or think about the matter. Likewise, although there is a clear sense in which the table's being square is dependent on us (it was designed and constructed by human beings after all), this is not the type of dependence that the realist wishes to deny." (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
So if something has the property of independence are we not supposed to ask: "Independent of what?"
Quoting Michael
You know, I may have been thinking of naturalism: all causes are natural causes.
And I understand this as saying that the truth of "the moon exists" is verification transcendent.
Or at the very least, that this is what it must mean if it's to count as realism. If you want to say that the moon exists independently of anything anyone happens to say or think about the matter but also that the truth of "the moon exists independently of anything anyone happens to say or think about the matter" is verificiation-immanent then I'd count that as metaphysical anti-realism.
That would work if one were a truth realist. I'm not. Realism, in general, doesn't imply truth realism. Realism, in general, doesn't imply anything like a thoroughgoing realism about everything, because, after all, no realist is going to say that human thought, belief, etc. is independent of human thought, belief, etc.
Really? I thought it's primary weakness is that it falls back on Correspondence.
No. A realist could employ any conceivable truth theory--correspondence, pragmatic, consensus, coherence, etc.
Sure, and my claim is that traditional realism is (implicitly, if not also explicitly) truth-realism. It's historically tied to the correspondence theory of truth. If all you want to say is that "mind-independent things exist" is true, but not also that this statement is made true by some verification-transcendent truth-condition, then it isn't traditional realism. I think that if one says that "mind-independent things exist" is true, but that truth is to be understood according to something like the coherence theory of truth, then you're a metaphysical anti-realist.
Chalmers' paper on ontological anti-realism argues for something much like this. The distinction between the truth-realist and the truth-anti-realist both claiming that mind-independent things exist is akin to his distinction between the nominalist and the Platonist both claiming that numbers exist. Although they're both making the same assertion, what they mean by it is very different; they're arguing for different metaphysics.
You can say that, but you're simply saying it. It would require extensive empirical evidence. And that empirical evidence would have to support not that truth realism and correspondence theory are typically correlated with realism (in other words, the simple fact that most realists tend to be truth realists and/or tend to employ correspondence theory wouldn't work); it would have to be evidence of people saying or at least strongly implying that realism includes truth realism and correspondence theory, otherwise it isn't realism.
It also couldn't be evidence of simply a handful of philosophers asserting or at least strongly implying this. To claim that it's the traditional view, you'd need evidence of that being the widespread view.
Do you have that evidence available?
That seems completely unsupported/arbitrary by the way. Does he have some sort of argument for that?
It might make sense if one were defining realism in a manner such as Dummett, but that underscores why trying to define realism that way doesn't work.
Yes, he has a paper: http://consc.net/papers/ontology.pdf
What does he call truth realism in the paper? That phrase doesn't occur . . . (later edit) ah--I found one place where he uses "objective and determinate truth values." So I'll search for stuff about objective truth values.
Not to hand. But you just need to read what people have said (and often between the lines). Very few self-proclaimed realists will claim that the existence of the moon is independent of human experience and belief and linguistic practices but that this claim is only true because, for example, it coheres with some axiomatic sentences within our language game. If someone were to say something like this then I would think it quite right to call them anti-realists.
And I'd not disagree with that in the slightest. But I already explained this. It's a correlative belief. It's not part of what realism refers to.
It's no different than it being a fact that very few atheists will say that evolutionary theory is hogwash. But atheism doesn't refer to a stance on evolutionary theory. The beliefs simply have a strong positive correlation with respect to atheism.
I completely disagree with that. I'm looking for whether he provides any sort of argument to support that characterization of ontological realism.
(One unrelated earlier big problem with Chalmers paper is that he actually says that ontological realism started with Quine! haha)
It'll be what came before, given that the passage starts with "We are now in a position...". ;)
Yeah, no duh.
And how do we determine what realism refers to? Ask self-proclaimed realists what they mean by "I'm a realist". I'd say that for the most part they'd say "it means that I believe that the existence of the moon is independent of human belief and linguistic practices and that the truth of this belief is independent of human belief and linguistic practices".
I think that if someone were to say "it means that I believe that the existence of the moon is independent of human belief and linguistic practices but that the truth of this belief is dependent on human belief and linguistic practices" then it would be appropriate to consider their use of the label "realist" a misuse. Although they're making a realist-like existence claim, what they mean by this claim shows them to be a metaphysical anti-realist.
Again, it's analogous to the nominalist and Platonist who both make the same existence claim "numbers exist" but mean very different things by it.
"There is a strong intuition that we are thereby in a position to know everything relevant
there is to know about the objects." --which is a mistake in my view. We only know it from a particular reference point.
"Ontological anti-realism, at least in its strong form, is committed to denying that these theses have
objective and determinate truth-values."--there's absolutely no argument prior to this establishing that realism/antirealism should have something to do with a belief in objective truth values.
Alright, reading through the rest of the early part of the paper, prior to "We are now in a position to state ontological realism . . . " I wouldn't say that he provides an argument for realism necessarily having something to do with belief in objective truth value. He's also leaving truth unanalyzed (which isn't surprising, as the paper isn't about an analysis of what truth is ontologically), but the problem with this is that he seems to simply be using "truth" so that it could be a synonym for "fact."
Via familiarity with a wide span of philosophcial literature, as well as definitions such as those in the dictionaries and encyclopedias I quoted earlier (where putatively the authors of those definitions are doing their work based on familiarity with a wide span of philosophical literature).
Quoting Michael
Yeah, but it just has nothing to do with your intuitive beliefs re what you'd guess that people would say.
You'd need empirical evidence of what people with a philosophical education actually do say. And once again, you'd need to sort out correlative beliefs from definitions (since there's no disagreement that the vast majority of realists are going to also be truth realists).
By the way, what would you say the ontological stance is of someone who believes that the moon, etc. exist external-to-minds, independently of any persons, etc., but who doesn't believe that truth is mind-independent? You wouldn't say that they're anti-realists, would you? And you wouldn't say that they're realists. So what would you say they are?
I'd say that they're anti-realists. Their claim that the moon is independent is, to use Chalmer's terminology, an ordinary existence claim, not an ontological existence claim, and so says nothing about their view on metaphysics. They're just playing along with our language game, not doing philosophy. Their views on metaphysics are instead given in their account of truth.
Okay, but in my case, using Chalmers' terminology, my claim that the moon is independent is an ontological existence claim, not an "ordinary existence claim." So what stance is that in your view?
Also, I'm just curious if you recall why I do not believe that truth can not be mind-independent. As a hint: in my view, it's an objective fact that the moon is mind-independent. It is not an objective truth however, since no truths are objective.
That it's to be understood as saying that the truth of "the moon is independent" is verification-transcendent. That's what distinguishes an ordinary from an ontological existence claim; the latter says something about what makes an existence-claim true (making it an account of metaphysics) whereas the former just asserts the claim's truth (making it just a (non-philosophical) move in a language game).
I don't think that this makes any sense. To say that the mind-independence of the moon is an objective fact just is to say that the truth of "the moon is mind-independent" is verification-transcendent.
As an aside, would you mind if I move these comments out of the Shoutbox and into their own discussion?
Aside from that not being the name of a stance (although you could make it one I suppose), you'd have a problem there because that's not at all my stance. My stance is that the moon is mind-independent/extra mental, where I'm making an ontological claim, not an "ordinary claim," but I am NOT saying anything about truth. I'm saying something about the moon and its relationship to us.
Quoting Michael
Not per that Chalmers paper. Here are his definitions:
"An ordinary existence assertion, to a first approximation, is an existence assertion of the sort
typically made in ordinary first-order discussion of the relevant subject matter. For example, a
typical mathematician’s assertion of ‘There are four prime numbers less than ten’ is an ordinary
existence assertion, as is a typical drinker’s assertion of ‘There are three glasses on the table’.
"An ontological existence assertion, to a first approximation, is an existence assertion of the sort
typically made in broadly philosophical discussion where ontological considerations are paramount.
For example, a typical philosophers’ assertion of ‘Abstract objects exist’ is an ontological existence
assertion, as is a typical philosophers’ assertion of ‘For every set of objects, there exists an object
that is their mereological sum’."
Per those definitions, I'm making an ontological existence assertion about the moon being mind-independent/external to minds, yet I'm not saying anything about truth (being mind-independent/external to minds) in that. (By the way, for people reading this discussion but who haven't read the Chalmers paper, his discussion prior to that of Carnap's "internal"/"external" distinction with respect to existence questions in linguistic frameworks is helpful in understanding the distinction Chalmers is making. That starts on page 4.)
Quoting Michael
Truths and facts are not the same thing. Truth-value is a property of propositions, and on my account, it's a judgment about whether propositions have the property in question, as that's the only means by which the property can obtain (also on my account, propositions only obtain when people are thinking about them, as meaning is a mental phenomenon only). Facts, on the other hand, are states of affairs in the world.
Re moving the discussion--sure, that would be a good idea.
And he continues by saying that "ordinary and ontological existence assertions differ with respect to an important sort of utterance evaluation, which I will call correctness", and draws a distinction between heavyweight and lightweight quantification. Following it through, for a claim like "the moon is mind-independent" to be a true ontological existence assertion it is required that there is some relevant verification-transcendent truth condition.
If you reject verification-transcendent truth conditions then, as an ontological existence assertion, a claim like "the moon is mind-independent" can't be true. It might be true as an ordinary existence assertion, but then that's insufficient to count as metaphysical realism.
Then you're just shifting the verification-transcendence from truth to facts, which hardly makes any difference. There's some verification-transcendent state-of-affairs which is (somehow) described by the sentence "the moon is mind-independent".
Unless you're also saying that these facts -- these states-of-affairs in the world -- aren't independent of our beliefs, experiences, and linguistic facts, in which case you're back to being an anti-realist.
Out of interest, what word do you use (if any) to describe a sentence that describes a fact if not "true"?
Is it an objective truth that no truths are objective?
Quoting Terrapin Station
This distinction does not make any sense to me. All facts are propositions--ones that correspond to states of affairs in the world; i.e., true propositions. If it is an objective fact (state of affairs in the world) that the moon is mind-independent, then "the moon is mind-independent" is a true proposition. What am I missing?
Which he explains is not the same as, or at least need not be the same as a truth claim.
Quoting Michael
This is incorrect. It can be true, it's just not verification-transcendentally or objectively true, as nothing is.
Quoting Michael
It makes a difference in that truth and facts are not the same thing. If someone says that Toyotas and Rolls Royces aren't the same thing, they're not going to say "Sure, I'll take a Toyota" when they want a Rolls Royce. For someone who just wants a car, any car, it wouldn't make a difference. So if you take truth and facts to be the same thing, it won't make any difference to you. They're very different things on my view, however, so it makes a big difference to me. In any event, yes, I'm saying that "The moon exists independently of us/it exists extramentally" is an objective fact that in no way hinges on our thinking about it, our verification, etc. It's just that no proposition is true objectively, because truth of what truth is ontologically--it's a judgment about the meanings of statements.
Quoting Michael
A "descriptive sentence" would do, or a claim (where the persons asserting it and agreeing with it are taking it to describe the fact at hand), etc. Note that these things only obtain when someone thinks about them in that way. Aside from thinking about them, sentences are just marks on paper, or sounds, or whatever, with no meaning, no reference, etc.
No, of course not, since there is no such thing as objective truth. It is a fact, however.
Quoting aletheist
Okay, but it's been an explicitly-expressed (maybe first in Russell's Philosophy of Logical Atomism), standard, received-view distinction in analytic philosophy for more or less 100 years now.
Quoting aletheist
On the standard, received view, propositions are the meanings of (declarative) statements. So, you're saying that in your ontology, facts are the meanings of (declarative) statements? Or you disagree with the received view in this regard?
Also, if on your view all facts are propositions, and then you're specifying propositions that correspond to states of affairs, you're saying propositions that correspond to propositions and/or facts that correspond to facts? That seems like a mess, doesn't it? It seems, rather, that you are making a distinction between the two, otherwise the notion of correspondence between facts and propositions wouldn't even make any sense (unless you're just saying that anything "corresponds" to itself a la that being an alternate way of describing logical identity).
Quoting aletheist
What you're missing on the standard, received view, where I'll use correspondence since that's what you prefer, is that the reason that "The moon is mind-independent" is a true proposition is because the proposition, that is, the meaning of that declarative statement, corresponds to a fact, that the moon is mind-independent. It's not that they're identical, that they're the same thing. (If we weren't using correspondence and we were using something else, like consensus, say, what you'd be missing is that the proposition is held to be true by consensus (at least of the relevant parties).)
On my account, what you're missing is that (a) the proposition has no meaning aside from people thinking about it and assigning meaning to it (to the sentence), that (b) it has no relation to the states of affairs in question aside from people thinking about it and assigning meaning to the sentence, and (c) the property of corresponding (or whatever property we go with re truth theories) only obtains by judgment of an individual with respect to assigning meaning and thinking, in the context of that meaning, about the relation of the proposition with the facts in question.
Is "there is no such thing as objective truth" a true proposition? If not, then why should anyone believe it? And how can it nevertheless be a fact that there is no such thing as objective truth?
Quoting Terrapin Station
Every proposition purports to declare a fact. Every true proposition does declare a fact. If it is a fact that the moon is mind-independent, then "the moon is mind-independent" is a true proposition--i.e., an objective truth.
Quoting Terrapin Station
All this is really saying is that every proposition is a symbol--a sign that represents its object by convention, rather than direct causal connection (index) or resemblance (icon). Words like "moon" and "mind-independent," as well as combinations thereof, only represent their objects because people interpret them as doing so; but the object of a true proposition, that which it represents, is still a fact--a state of affairs in the world.
So you're saying that the sentence describes a verification-transcendent fact. That's what I mean when I say that realism requires verification-transcendent truths. I'm just using the word "true" where you'd use the sentence "describes a fact".
So this is just a trivial terminological dispute. Whereas you use the word "true" to describe a sentence that's judged a certain way, I'm using the word "true" to describe a sentence that describes a fact.
We seem to be on the same page here. By what other criterion, besides describing a fact, would someone judge a sentence--or rather, the proposition that a sentence expresses--to be true?
It certainly is in my view, yes. Re why you should believe it, why you should believe anything is up to you--it depends on what you take to be good reasons to buy one thing versus another.
Quoting aletheist
By that being what the world is like. When we do an inventory of the world, we do not find truth outside of minds making judgments about propositions.
Quoting aletheist
If only you'd answered the question I asked you. Note that I'm not suggesting that you didn't answer it in your opinion. I asked a simple yes or no question, however, and you didn't respond with a direct yes or no or an explanation why a direct yes or no didn't work for you.
Quoting aletheist
That's not something I agree with, so it's probably not "all that I'm really saying."
A sentence doesn't do anything except sit there as ink marks on a page or whatever outside of people thinking about it.
I personally use correspondence theory, but you seem to be educated enough about philosophy that you should be aware of several other popular truth theories, such as coherence, pragmatism, etc., no?
I think I've got it.
Are you saying that truth is a property of judgments about propositions, and thus subjective, rather than a property of propositions themselves, and thus objective? I think of truth in the latter sense; our (subjective) judgments about propositions are then fallible assessments of whether they are (objectively) true.
Quoting Terrapin Station
I hoped that my answer would make it apparent why a direct yes or no did not work for me. Declarative statements express propositions, and propositions purport to represent facts. True propositions really do represent facts, but false propositions do not.
Quoting Terrapin Station
With what, exactly, do you disagree--that a proposition is a sign, or that it represents its object by convention?
Quoting Terrapin Station
In that case--by what other criterion, besides describing a fact, would someone who subscribes to the correspondence theory judge a sentence--or rather, the proposition that a sentence expresses--to be true?
Well, first I don't agree that propositions are objective. I believe that meaning, as well as truth, is subjective. So truth is a (subjective) property of propositions, which are also subjective, and more specifically, it's a property that obtains via making a judgment about the relation of a proposition to something else (like facts when we're talking about correspondence theory).
Quoting aletheist
So then you do not believe that facts and propositions are the same thing. Or, "No" is your answer to the question I asked.
Quoting aletheist
I disagree that "it represents its object by convention." I might also disagree that it's a sign, but it depends on just how you're defining sign.
Quoting aletheist
I'm pretty sure I explained this above, but at any rate, you judge it by assigning meaning to the terms in the declarative sentence (that's what a proposition is--the meaning of a statement) and then assessing (on correspondence theory, for example) whether that meaning matches the fact(s) you take the statement to pick out.
Would you mind clarifying what you mean by "subjective" vs. "objective"?
Quoting Terrapin Station
Are you saying that my judgment makes a proposition true or false, rather than its correspondence to the facts? If so, then it seems to me that I can never be wrong when I judge a particular proposition to be true, because that very judgment is what makes it true. Again, what am I missing?
Quoting Terrapin Station
Yes, no. :D
Quoting Terrapin Station
A sign is anything that stands for something (its object) to something else (its interpretant). If a proposition does not represent its object--a purported fact--by convention, then how does it do so?
Quoting Terrapin Station
How does this differ significantly from my criterion that a proposition is true if, and only if, it represents a fact?
Exclusive self reference leads to an ill defined infinite regress.
http://mathworld.wolfram.com/Self-Recursion.html
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/self-reference/
If we can reach any logical conclusion then this means that in reality we are not restricted exclusively to self reference.
If we can reach any logical conclusions than necessarily there is something which exists independently of our own minds which allows us to avoid the infinite regress of exclusive self reference..
If it were a reality that we were limited exclusively to self reference then there would be no way to prove that was true in reality and in fact there would be no way to prove anything because we would be trapped in an infinite loop of self regress inherent of exclusive self reference.
Subjective = mental phenomena
Objective = external to mental phenomena
Quoting aletheist
A proposition corresponding to facts is a judgment about the proposition's relationship to facts.
Quoting aletheist
What makes you wrong with respect to judging a proposition to be true or false is that a different judgment is reached, either by someone else, or by yourself at a different time. You're right or wrong in your truth-value assignments always to someone, by virtue of their own judgments, or by your own judgment (at a different time).
Quoting aletheist
By individuals thinking about the proposition in a representational way. That doesn't require any sort of convention or consensus.
Quoting aletheist
That would depend on whether what you're referring to is an individual thinking about things. If that's what you're referring to, then it might not differ.
A proposition is not itself a judgment; rather, a judgment is an evaluation of a proposition as either true or false. If I judge a proposition to be true, then that judgment is correct if and only if the proposition really does represent the fact that it purports to represent.
Quoting Terrapin Station
We typically represent propositions in words, which only represent anything by convention. Another way of saying it is that a symbol represents its object only because it will be interpreted as doing so.
I didn't say that it was. I said a proposition corresponding to facts. In other words, the action or status of corresponding to facts is a judgment.
On my view there is no "really does represent a fact." That is, there is no objective representation.
Quoting aletheist
Obviously I disagree on that. There certainly are conventions, but representation works via individuals thinking about things in a particular way, even when we're talking about conventions.
Quoting aletheist
I don't disagree with that but I see it as being about an individual interpreting something however they do.
Whether a proposition corresponds to facts is itself an objective fact. The judgment does not determine such correspondence, it evaluates it, and can be mistaken in doing so.
Quoting Terrapin Station
If you are thinking about something concrete using words or other symbols, then you are representing it by conventions. The word "moon" represents the moon only by convention--that is what English-speakers typically call the very large spherical mass of rock that orbits the earth. Even if you are primarily using icons or indices, conventions are almost always also involved. You can draw a picture of the moon, but you will have to use certain artistic conventions in order to do so. You can simply point at the moon, but it is only by convention that this typically directs someone else's attention to it.
I certainly understand that view, I understand that it's the popular view, and I understand that it's your view.
However, it's not my view. Objective correspondence is an incoherent idea on my view. Whether a proposition corresponds to facts is a subjective judgment. Being mistaken is equally a subjective matter of evaluation, either by others or by oneself at another time.
In any event, there's not really any need to keep explaining the standard view in contradistinction to my own. It's not as if I'm not familiar with or do not understand the standard view. I just believe that the standard view has the facts wrong/is incoherent/etc. Other people think that I have the facts wrong obviously. I'm not going to switch over to the standard view unless you have some whopper of an argument for it/against my own view that I've not encountered before, and you're extremely unlikely to come up with an argument I've not encountered before because I've been around the block a couple times. I don't expect you to switch over to my view, either, for a number of reasons, including that I simply don't spend the time/energy on attempting that any longer online (because I believe it's generally futile to do that in these online contexts for a variety of reasons relating to how people interact online, especially when they're anonymous/when they don't also know each other offline).
Quoting aletheist
What makes it a convention or not is simply whether it's the common/standard representation and/or way of representing. It doesn't have to be, though. You can do something (relatively) idiosyncratic. (It doesn't have to be completely unique to you to not be a convention, though.)
Interesting ... any other notion of correspondence is an incoherent idea on my view.
Quoting Terrapin Station
No, what makes it a convention is that it is arbitrary--there is nothing about the moon itself that makes "moon" the proper term for it in English. The only difference with a private, idiosyncratic convention is that it is not very useful for communicating with others.
So whether or not the proposition "the moon is independent" corresponds to a fact is a subjective judgement and not an objective fact? And yet before you were claiming that it's an objective fact that the moon is independent. These seem contradictory claims.
I doubt that the definition of "convention" that you're using is "arbitrary." I don't know what definition you're using exactly, though.
I'm using standard dictionary definitions such as "general agreement or consent; accepted usage, especially as a standard of procedure," "a set of agreed, stipulated, or generally accepted standards, norms, social norms, or criteria, often taking the form of a custom," or "a way in which something is usually done, especially within a particular area or activity"
Correct.
Quoting Michael
Correct.
Quoting Michael
Then you're not examining the claims very closely. One claim is about how it is that (or in other words how it works that) propositions correspond with facts. The other claim is about the ontological status of particular objects.
It's the same thing. What does it mean to say that it is an objective fact that the moon is independent if not that the proposition "the moon is independent" corresponds to an objective fact?
What?? You're seriously saying that how it is that propositions correspond with facts is identical to the ontological status of objects like the moon?
Quoting Michael
The moon being independent of us has nothing to do with our language. Why would you think that we're only talking about language?
Your claim that the moon is independent of us has everything to do with our language. How am I to make sense of this claim. Does your claim that the moon is independent of us correspond to an objective fact or not?
Sure, the claim, as a claim, has something to do with language. You don't believe that what the claim is about is language, though, do you? That's a really infantile confusion.
You're not answering the question. Does your claim that the moon is independent of us correspond to an objective fact or not?
I had said: "The other claim is ABOUT the ontological status of particular objects."
No, I don't think your claim is about language. Now, answer my question. Does your claim correspond to an objective fact?
You did this every time. You refuse to answer my questions and instead insist that I keep answering every one of yours.
So I'm not going to even ask you a question. I'm just going to tell you what's going on. If your claim that the moon is independent of us doesn't correspond to an objective fact then it isn't realism.
I have every interest in a discussion. But discussion isn't a one way straight. We both provide answers to questions.
And accusing me of avoiding is beyond hypocritical.
It is arbitrary in the sense that there is no particular reason why that particular arrangement of those particular marks on a page (or pixels on a screen) represents what it does, other than that someone interprets it as doing so--or, in this case, lots of people thus interpret it. It does not resemble its object in any way, and there is no direct causal connection with its object.
"Lots of people" make it a convention. Just someone, and not lots of people, make it not a convention.
Of course not--TS has made it quite clear in this and other threads that he is not a realist, he is a nominalist. Again, the usual caveats about labels are hereby acknowledged.
No, I've said my piece. Your account of meaning and truth precludes you from being a realist. At best it's quasi-realism/fictionalism. At worse it's a contradiction.
Nominalism is contrasted with realism if we're scholastics talking about universals.
Since the context isn't that, and we're hundreds of years on, your comment doesn't make sense.
Okay, and I'll correct you and we'll go through all of this again next time you mention it and I've got the time. That will be fun. ;-)
You are missing the point. I am looking at HOW a particular sign represents its object. There are only three options--by resemblance (icon), by direct connection (index), or by convention (symbol). If the word "convention" is what bothers you, then just substitute the notion that a symbol represents its object only because it will be interpreted as doing so. Suppose I designate "glutchski" as a made-up word that represents the moon in my private thoughts. It is a symbol, because I will interpret it as representing the moon, even if no one else ever does.
Or if we are PF participants talking about whether possibilities and habits are real, not just existents; but that is another thread. I am not sure what we are talking about in this one now.
Haha (and what was the habit thread? I don't recall seeing that one.)
I just tried to clarify what I meant. A symbol represents its object only because it will be interpreted as doing so, not because of any resemblance or direct connection.
Okay, we agree on that, although I'd clarify that it might be interpreted as representing whatever it's taken to represent because of resemblance (per interpretation) and maybe per direct connection (again per interpretation).
Habits, necessities, laws, regularities--take your pick. Are they real apart from their instantiations? Can a conditional proposition--if I let go of this rock, then it would fall to the ground--represent an objective fact, even if the antecedent is never actualized?
No on my view.
Quoting aletheist
Yes on my view, but it's not representing something (real) that's not actualized.
That is what I anticipated.
Quoting Terrapin Station
Then what object--if not a real habit, necessity, law, or regularity--is that conditional proposition representing? Given that the antecedent never obtains, it cannot be something actual.
It's representing gravitational attraction in that case, which is actual.
In other words, I wouldn't say that the conditional "maps" to a conditional that is actual in the world. That conditional is a way of talking about the fact that gravitational attraction obtains.
I don't in general buy that the non-linguistic world is structured like language. That's (part of) why statements and the like don't represent anything "on their own." They need us to interpret them as you say.
Gravitational attraction occurs whether the antecedent obtains or not, so that cannot be what the conditional proposition is representing. It says what would happen, not why it would happen.
Quoting Terrapin Station
Neither would I; rather, I would say that it maps to a habit/necessity/law/regularity that is real, regardless of whether it is actualized. Am I right to perceive that you see no meaningful distinction between reality and existence?
Quoting Terrapin Station
The idea that I am entertaining is more along the lines that there is an alignment between reality and logic; how we think, in some sense and to some degree, reflects how the universe is--which is why we are able to learn about it at all.
Wait a minute--how do you figure that there are any limits on what a proposition is representing, so that we can say that a proposition isn't representing something?
Consider the proposition that the moon is made of green cheese. Can we say that this proposition is representing the fact that Abraham Lincoln was the 16th President of the United States? If not, then evidently there are some limits on what a proposition is representing.
The conditional proposition--that if I let go of the rock, then it will fall--is representing the fact that if I let go of the rock, then it will fall. Gravitational attraction is an explanation of this fact, not the fact itself--and it is a habit/necessity/law/regularity, not a mere brute actuality. Furthermore, the conditional proposition is true regardless of whether I ever actually let go of the rock, and would still be true even if no one ever expressed it as a statement.
But that proposition as ordinarily understood can't represent that fact as ordinarily understood.
Is this a digression, or are you trying to make a relevant point?
Maybe as ordinarily understood it doesn't represent what I said . . . I'm not sure what philosophical significance that contingent fact would have, though.
Well, if you're using "convention" in a conventional way, that's why I brought up the objections I did earlier. Conventions are simply conventions. They're not correct or anything like that by virtue of being conventions, and the convention doesn't come first--it's just a contingent fact about how people are thinking about things (in this case) (and also of course conventions, once instantiated, can influence how people think about something, but that influence doesnt determine how individuals think about something, and it doesn't make the convention right, it doesn't limit how someone can think about something, etc.)
I wouldn't say that conditionals imply somehow extramentally instantiated "ifs," even if most folks think about what they represent that way. But I would say that conditionals can represent objective facts where the objective fact--that gravitational attraction obtains in this case, for example, has some significant relation to the conventional way if thinking about that conditional.
While it seems fairly clear that conventional symbols represent I don't think resemblance represents. Resemblance is symmetric, i.e. one thing resembles another by actually possessing some of its recognizable properties. Representation, however, is asymmetric, i.e. one thing represents another, regardless of whether they share properties.
Therefore, resemblance does not represent. Neither does direct connection (index) or perception. Conventional symbols, statements, and beliefs represent things. Resemblance and direct connection, or perception don't (they present things).
For example, a photograph presents properties which resemble properties of the optical state of affairs which was photographed, i.e. the photo reflects light in ways which resemble how the photographed things reflected light when they were photographed. The resemblance relation does not re-present the things (nor an impression inside the head of the photographer). It presents what's really there to see on the surface on the photo: properties shared by two different optical state of affairs.
Quoting aletheist It represents the direction of the wind by being used as a conventional symbol for it, regardless of its direct causal connection to the wind.
Quoting aletheist
There is no face in the photo but colour patches, and the photographic process arranged those patches in a way that resembles the way which makes the face familiar. The photo does not represent the face, it presents certain features which are recognizable as the face.
There is no good reason to exclusively adhere to the terminology of a 19th century theory of signs. It is fairly easy to see that representation is an asymmetric relation whereas resemblance is symmetric. That's what sets portraits apart from representational symbols, e.g. traffic signs or words.
Quoting aletheist
Granted that a portrait can both resemble and represent its object, but if resemblance is the predominant relation which determines how a portrait signifies its object, then in this respect (i.e. as in how it predominantly signifies its object) it cannot represent its object, because representation is asymmetric whereas resemblance is symmetric. The portrait may, of course, represent its object in other respects by way of convention, for instance. *
Would it make sense to say that the portrait primarily signifies its object symmetrically (by resemblance) and therefore "represents it" (i.e. signifies the object asymmetrically)? I don't think so.
Quoting aletheist
But the question is how, recall. A tumbling dust ball is also connected to the direction of the wind, but that does not make it a representation of it, does it?
Quoting aletheist
I'm also focusing on the predominant relation, but the mere application of semiotic terminology is not an argument for "HOW a particular sign represents its object".
(*some clarification the day after my original post)
A photograph of Ghandi signifies its object, the man, by resemblance between some of his visual features and some of the visual features of the photo. The photo may also represent the man, or what he stood for. But as a representation the photo is used as a symbol, and in order to represent the man or what he stood for we could substitute the photo with his name without changing the representation relation. From the logical difference between resemblance and representation it follows that if a portrait resembles, then it cannot represent in the same respect.
For someone who does not know of Ghandi the photo may still signify by resemblance between some of its visual features and visual features of men, whereas its possible use as a representation of Ghandi or what he stood for remains unknown. Unlike what the photo resembles, what it represents does not depend on the photo but on symbolic convention. Someone who has never seen a photo, nor a half-naked man, could arguably still see a symmetric relation between colour patches on the photo and the visual features of the man.
I think the distinction you're making between representation and resemblance makes some sense--it's clear that they're not coexhaustive, but I'd say that (a) resemblance is often a subset of representation, and (b) representations by resemblance often have representational aspects that other sorts of representations, such as just a name, for example, lack.
I don't know if you'd agree with me, though, that representations exclusively obtain via individuals thinking about things in a signifier/signified manner.
Yet an overwhelming amount of the things in our environment are not signs, they don't represent something else. We identify trees and pictures whose coloured shapes resemble trees because we have a background capacity to perceive and identify things in our environment and their properties, including differences and resemblances. In this sense resemblance is psychologically more primitive than representation.
For example, you see what a bundle of coloured shapes on a photograph resembles, but you've got to learn what a traffic sign represents. It seems clear that in order to know what something represents we need more than a capacity for identifying things: we need a symbol system, a language, and thus thought about the thing in a manner of sign and signified.
(clarified some parts, deleted others)