Can I say this to divine command theory?
Are there something else in our mind makes us know that divine commands are moral? If we have it, we don’t need divine commands, as our hearts know what to do. If we don’t, we shouldn’t follow divine commands, as we are not slaves of some sort of external entity.
If some people have noticed this before, may I know who’s the first one? I would like to know more about his ideas.
If some people have noticed this before, may I know who’s the first one? I would like to know more about his ideas.
Comments (27)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euthyphro_dilemma
No, you don't second-guess God, that's not how divine command works. All you need to know is that you must accept God's authority. This is where your role as a moral agent ends and God's begins.
If god's commands are arbitrary, and not derived from moral facts, I see no reason to follow them and not one's own values. God has no commanding authority apart from his own unjustified commands under Divine Command Theory, and even commanding his commands to be obligatory would be arbitrary.
I find your viewpoint to be refreshing!
Here's my two cents:
God is defined as omnibenevolent and so whatever he commands will be moral, don't you think? Defined as all-good, morality is god's essence and so god can never command something immoral. This is the "solution" to Euthyphro's dilemma.
Yes indeed. If Mummy loves me and Mummy knows best, then I should do what Mummy says. But 'does She?', is rather the question here. Mummy is not defined by me. Mummy might be an uncaring and cruel alcoholic paedophile.
The question "does She?" arises only if it's a possibility that She "does not [know best]" but this is exactly what becomes impossible by making goodness god's essence. To think so (that it's possible god doesn't know what's best) entails a contradiction: one moment you're attributing goodness to god and at another you're entertaining god could be immoral.
No, he's supposed be one of the "good" guys but I never met anybody who thought Zeus was omnibenevolent.
Well, these are facts of the world and yes, they clearly contradict god's omnibenevolence but I feel it's not releated to the Euthyphro dilemma, at least not directly.
Euthyphro's dilemma is characterized by arbitrariness of morality if god's commands, by virtue of these being his commands (wishes) and nothing else, are automatically moral. However, god is omnibenevolent and so his commands will always be moral. To think otherwise would be a contradiction: god is good & god's commands are immoral.
Perhaps if you look at it from a virtue ethics perspective it'll make sense. A virtuous man will always do what's best and god, surely, is the pinnacle of virtue. Ergo god will never command something immoral.
Please note that my comments are specific to Euthyphro's dilemma and although there are good arguments, such as yours in your last post that brings into doubt god's omnibenevolence, this discussion excludes them.
Quoting TheMadFool
Quoting SophistiCat
Clearly there is something in some people's minds that make them know that divine commands are moral. Whatever it is, it is not the faculty of reason, because there is something in some other people's minds that says that the world is the creation of an evil god. And there is no contradiction in that belief.
The thing in peoples minds that tells them what is moral is called conscience. You might call that the still small voice of God, if you are of that tradition. You might make the personification of goodness your god, and then you can say that if the world was created by the personification of goodness then that is the god I obey. And if it was created by another god, that is not my god.
I might come right out and say that my conscience, which is the voice of God, tells me
that God the creator is God the good. And after that I don't second guess what God tells me, and then I have to defend corona virus as somehow good. Recourse to 'mysterious ways' is probably the best option, or in the case of the guinea worm, 'mysteriously disgusting and gratuitously painful but still somehow benevolent ways'.
Or I can drop benevolence entirely and just say the Creator is in charge and I as created just do what I'm told the way an arrow flies where it is aimed. or a computer runs the way it is programmed.
Or...
What you cannot say is that it is a contradiction that the Creator is not omni-benevolent. Well you can, but it's not true.
I think some people believe that the god created the physical laws of this universe and then let human themselves decide their fate.
Well said and fully accepted. As I said in my last post it is extremely difficult to believe in an all-good god; it would be like getting drenched to the bone in a downpour and remarking how sunny and dry the weather is. I have no issue on that point.
However, though there maybe a multitude of arguments against god's omnibenevolence, I wish to discuss only Euthyphro's dilemma (ED) because it's pertinent to the OP and to your response to it.
It's my understanding that ED's main conclusion, (1)that god commands something because it's good, is derived by rejecting the disjunct that asserts (2)that something is good just because god commands it so. Rejecting (2) comes at the heavy price of a contradiction for doing so is equivalent to saying god's commands can be immoral but that's impossible if one of our premises is the omnibenevolence of god and it is.
I posted this in another thread but its relevant here too.
There is one objection to divine command theory that I used to find definitive but now realized needed more work.
It goes like this: if god is omnibenevolent and all that is good, and his moral commands are also defined as good, then his commands would be: "God commands god." Which of course makes no sense; that's not a valid command. This renders god's commands meaningless. If you want them to mean anything you have to drop god's omnibenevolence.
I don't understand. If Mummy loves me, and Mummy says 'don't run into the road', then Mummy already knows not to run into the road. What's the problem?
That's not a moral command but rather learned prudence. But even so her commands are intelligible because they are not tied to her nature but rather just known from experience. Its not inherent to her character or nature. She embodies no concepts. Furthermore for it to be a parallel mummy would have to command prudence exclusively.
My point remains.
I am the last person to care about a god's commands. Why bring that up?
As an overman defines meaning by himself, he also defines good and evil.
Yes, most secular people do seem to define good and evil for themselves. Not certain I understand the bit about increasing and decreasing meaning though. Could you explain that?
I'm still confused. What does the promoting or harming? And what is being promoted or harmed?