Divine Command Theory versus Skepticism About Moral Reality
I recently watched this video, courtesy of Dennis Prager of PragerU, and formulated this response.
There are many examples of articles and videos that perpetuate the dichotomy between variations of divine command and skepticism about moral reality. For example, there is a YouTube video that has received hundreds of thousands of views that was released by the popular conservative channel PragerU titled “If There is No God, Murder Isn’t Wrong”. As the description of the video reads: “without God, all morality is opinion” (PragerU). The type of morality being provided as a foil for Divine Command Theory is moral relativism, or so Prager, the narrator of the video, claims, but it is not entirely clear because even according to moral relativism, murder could indeed be wrong according to one's attitude or those of one's culture.
The idea that ethics is a matter of opinion or that moral facts do not exist without god is more consistent with moral subjectivism and skepticism about moral reality. Prager posits that without god, moral facts do not exist and that morality is merely opinion, and, thus, murder, or any intuitively and morally reprehensible act, isn't objectively wrong. To represent it more formally: Prager appears to be saying that “if god does not exist, moral facts do not exist and thus no one has any objective grounds to condemn others’ actions or values, given actions flow from values.” This is somewhat odd because if divine command were true then morality would be just as arbitrary as the supposed moral facts that anybody might espouse in god's absence.
This is because correct moral norms would depend entirely upon god's will. These norms would not be absolute moral facts or laws and, thus, objective ground upon which to condemn other's actions and values or to develop moral inquiry would not exist. And for god's commands to be reasoned moral facts would have to exist as absolutes independent from god, and, thus, one would still be able to condemn other's actions or values or be condemned regardless of god's existence or one's beliefs.
I was hoping someone could read this and give me some feedback, might do something with it.
Comments (54)
Under Divine Command theory whatever god says is moral, is objectively moral and not arbitrary by definition. You have ignored the objectivity of gods law in your counter-argument but Divine Command theory depends entirely on this premiss as part of its argument. Even if we humans cannot determine whats objective, an objective morality would still exist under divine command theory.
Both the law of gravity and the laws of morality presuppose that in order for us to know them there must be some kind of correspondence between the order of being and the order of our knowledge. Why the one but not the other?
Well you are just stating that moral facts can only come from reason. Divine Command theory states that moral facts can only come from divine command.
You haven’t provided a counter-argument, but an alternate theory....that moral facts come from reason. You offered the OP as though you found something internally inconsistent about divine command theory but I don’t think it is...divine command theory is consistent with the premiss that there is a divine, perfectly good creator.
It seems to me that in order to refute divine command theory you have to deal with the all important premiss it is based upon: that there is a perfectly good creator of the universe, god. Without that premiss, divine command theory completely fails.
For some reason Im mot getting alerts when you respond to me.
Anyway, your making assertions, not arguments. Also, are you trying to argue for morality from reason, or argue why divine command theory is wrong. From my perspective you aren’t making clear distinctions and its seems muddled to me.
I'm trying to show why Dennis Prager's worldview is not as consistent or based on sound reasoning as one might think. I just don't see how you can think that something being good merely because god commands it is not subjective. How one might go about determining moral facts in god's absence is irrelevant mostly as this has little to do with their existence. But in order for the commands to be not arbitrary they must have been derived from something that exists independent of god. .
Pragers world view? Divine command theory you mean? Its not just Pragers view, its widespread amongst christian apologists.
Objective morality is one of the traits god possesses by definition, so when they refer to moral facts its consistent with their definition of god and the existence of that god is a premiss for the argument.
The problem I see with your argument is that you are framing using conclusions about morality and reason that are not included in the premises of the divine command theory.
Its the same as if you were making an argument based on secular reasoning, and someone tried counter arguing with “its not reason, god did It”. Id be pointing out to them that god isnt included in the premises of a secular reason argument.
There are good counter arguments against divine command theory, but I dont think the one youre making is valid. The strength of divine command theory is that its internally consistent, you have to attack the premises.
Well, any other objective source I suppose, right? You do not buy any of those other objective sources I imagine but many do and to refute those systems of morality you again must address the premiss, the objective source those systems are built upon.
Oh and thanks for the PM. Your response showed up this time, the first one anyway.
Quoting Aleph Numbers
Depending a bit on what's meant by "moral reality", why would those two together be exhaustive?
FYI, Carrier has a few things to say about "Prager University" aka Dennis Prager.
If you can pass moral judgment on rules (and the like) in scriptures, then they don't define morals. Since you can, they don't. If you refuse to (or somehow can't) pass moral judgment on scriptural narratives, then choosing them as all-foundation wasn't a moral choice, but morally arbitrary. So, either way, scriptures themselves don't define morals. And, in any given situation you still have to personally decide if following them is the right thing to do; no manner of faith or stories themselves can absolve that.
Life (as an autonomous moral agent) isn't always easy, huh? :)
Regardless of whatever dictum you're told, it's still on you to decide whether following it is the right thing to do; Yahweh/Bible is redundant. Yahweh doesn't appear to tell us what the right thing to do is and why, anyway; Yahweh/Bible is useless in the matter. Scriptures and law books don't define morals, rather they're supposed to be moral.
Say, if, in your head, you have accountability to an imaginary friend rather than your fellow man, then what should others expect of you? This could be exemplified by the Slender Man stabbing in 2014 resulting in decades-long sentences, and is principally comparable to allegiance/accountability to someone/something rendered by faith and/or textual narratives alone. Fortunately, such folk are rarely entirely consistent (non-hypocritical) in such a sentiment, or they would have thoroughly forfeit autonomous moral agency.
Divine command theory (and theological voluntarism) is of no use and doesn't exemplify autonomous moral agency in the first place. (Along with the Euthyphro and the Epicurean problem, all this stuff quickly becomes purely academic-theological hand-waving.)
"Alexa, lights off" Zzz
The Internet Encyclopedia of philosophy.
It's peer reviewed and says gods commands under divine command theory would be arbitrary. I think this can end that argument. But perhaps you have more criticisms?
Yes, its arbitrary from the perspective of someone who rejects the premiss of divine command theory, thats what Im saying. You didnt actually address anything I said in my last two posts, you’ve just again reinforced your initial thought. I call that arguing in bad faith, it shows you are not interested in discussion, which requires that you provide counter points to my points not just restating or reinforcing your own initial ones.
Maybe ive misunderstood, I thought you were arguing that divine command theory was internally inconsistent. Above you reference why it doesnt hold up to external reasoning. Which is it? Do you understand the difference? (Not trying to be condescending, for what its worth)
In fact, killing another person is never deemed wrong in absolute terms.
Just like wild dogs or hyenas, human traditionally hunt in gangs or packs.
This principle became extended to the mating season: humans do not attack other humans individually for resources and mating rights but always do that in group.
Hence, within the context of group-versus-group violent combat ("war"), killing another human is not only necessary but also deemed courageous and honourable.
Doing that outside the context of "war" is deemed mostly wrong, because you are generally only allowed to kill enemies, i.e. members of other groups, and not members of your own group. That kind of individual in-group violence is damaging to group cohesion and is therefore considered to be a reprehensible lapse in discipline, to be utterly disapproved.
The reason why murder is wrong for humans, is because it is also wrong for wild dogs or hyenas.
Note that if you fail to kill enemies in warfare, you will be deemed to be a despicable coward, possibly to be shot at dawn. In that case, it is the act of failing to kill other people that will lead to severe reprisals, in which you will be disavowed, repudiated, reprobated, and utterly condemned.
The religious scriptures teach the believers the difference between individual and collective violence, in line with biological reality. In religious lingo: it is God who wanted this biological reality. Therefore, you are held to abide by its rules. Hence, it is indeed God's will that we shall shoot the cowards with a bullet through the back of their heads.
Quite frankly, Dingo, I don't understand half of what you say, and I have not been arguing in bad faith. I did indeed address you because you failed to understand the simple point that just because god commands something doesn't mean that it is not arbitrary. Maybe you can answer me a question: how is it that divine command theory is objective to believers? They might believe that they are following absolute moral laws but in reality they can't be unless absolute moral laws independent of god exist. Their belief is completely irrelevant. If I believe something hard enough does it make it the case?
On point. But he actually says that nothing he's saying applies to normative ethics; he is just making a claim about the objectivity of god's commands. This is, of course, false. Indeed I think that Dennis Prager would just bite the bullet on this one, being he's a nut.
I just realized, or likely misunderstood, something:
An essential defining quality of god is omnibenevolence. Ergo, it's impossible an immoral command would issue from faers person. Some may object that this doesn't imply that god doesn't have a set of principles fae refers to to guide faers commands. I agree but the point is god, being defined as omnibenevolent, has only to consult faerself i.e. god is morality itself; morality is not a set of principles separate from god as Euthyphro's dilemma leads us to believe.
Yes but if god is omnibenevolent and all that is good, and his moral commands are also defined as good then his commands would be: "God commands god." Which of course makes no sense; that's not a valid command.
That doesn't make sense. You're right. Does "god's command is moral" make sense? How different is "god's command is moral" from "god's command is god", given that god is morality?
Yes I believe its possible for god's commands to be moral, but one has to sacrifice the omnibenevolence bit. The now boring main issue is the arbitrariness. And I don't believe that there is a difference.
God's commands are good
god's commands are god
I believe I read this in Practical Ethics.
William Lane Craig has a seemingly worthy objection to my posts:
Dr. Craig grounds the moral values in god's nature without making the claim that god is the definition of the word good. He says that divine command theory is an ontological argument. To say, however, that god's nature is good is to define it with a concept: the concept of goodness. Additionally to call god's commands good is to do the same thing. If good describes both of these things then this leads to the conclusion that God's commands are his nature. This renders god a non-person; a vehicle for arbitrary moral commands since his commands are not informed by his good nature but rather by whimsy.
I have no idea what you're talking about. Did you even read mine or anyone else's posts? And what is creative agility?
That's your ineptitude then. The aptitude to create a universe in this context. I read a lot of posts it's not like I'm unhealthy, I watched the video.
Energy is god if someone powerful enough wants it to be but is not God, it's a lot more.
Belief in God resembles fixating on God as the answer to it all and it's wrong.
Not a man at the top but true driving force.
Can you try harder to contribute? Think before you post please. You don't even have to be correct, just on topic.
If you do not understand half of what I say, how can you make the claim I didnt understand your simple point? I think you are the one lacking understanding here, by your own admission. Ill keep it as simple as possible.
If gods moral commands are defined as non-arbitrary, as they are in Divine Command theory, then your argument fall completely flat.
Your only option then is to attack the premiss of gods definition under DCT. You have only done this by referencing your own standards of morality based on reason. It should end there, with a choice between which of the two moral foundations seems more plausible, but you keep trying to muscle in your argument against DCT which as I pointed put, fails.
Now, if there is anything in there you do not understand, we should elucidate it before you reject it. If you understand and disagree, then directly address where Ive gone wrong.
:rofl:
What? Thats how gods are defined in DCT. Its NOT my theory Im just repeating it.
Similarly, god defined as omnibenevolent is incompatible with god issuing immoral commands.
Euthyphro's dilemma: (1) is something good just because god commands it OR (2) does god command it because it's good?
If one affirms 1 then we're left to conclude that, for instance, if god should command us to murder then murder would be good; a position even our vague moral intuitions rise up against. This choice is unacceptable and so, we must default to 2 which then leads us to conclude god has a set of moral guidelines he must adhere to; god then becomes nothing more than an intermediary between us and these moral guidelines and once we realize that, god, since he's essentially about morality, becomes redundant, dispensable.
However, notice that the reason we rejected 1 was that we entertained the scenario of god issuing immoral commands but that's impossible if god is good and he's supposed to be omnibenevolent. This however is insufficient to conclude the nonexistence of moral guidelines god refers to. In other words option 2 (god commands something because it's good) can't be negated. However, Euthyphro's dilemma doesn't achieve it's intended purpose because option 1 (something is good because god commands it) is still viable and can't be negated.
Yes but even if one takes the first horn god's commands are arbitrary. This is just a fact. If you say that these commands are made good by the properties of god you open yourself up to another dilemma: are properties that are associated with goodness good because God possesses them or does God possess them because they are good?
If you take the first horn then another argument applies:
One might ground moral values in god's nature without making the claim that god is the definition of the word good. One might say that divine command theory is an ontological argument. But an issue arises. Under this view both god and the presupposition of his commands hold the property of being good, even if they are not semantically related. This, however, means that god's nature is identical to the source of his commands. This appears to rob god of moral agency; he is a tool for relaying his own arbitrarily defined nature.
This god might as well not exist.
One could, however, drop the goodness property but then you subject yourself to Euthyphro's dilemma again.
Totally not calling you an apologist TheMadFool, btw. You seem honest and interested in the truth.
I define myself as the ultimate moral arbiter and everything I command is objective because I say so. Now kneel.
Lol, now youre getting it. The big hint is in the title of the theory: Divine Command Theory...not Divine Command if the Commands Seem Reasonable Theory.
Like I said to Streetlight, its not MY theory. All Im saying is your argument is already accounted for in DCT, your criticism doesn't follow logically from the main DCT premiss. Thats why DCT is so widely respected (as with Craig, its main mouthpiece) among theistic apologists, they already firmly, desperately believe the premiss. Also why its do unimpressive to everyone else.
Read my latest post and tell me what's wrong with it. Please.
Why would I do that? So you can ignore what I said and restate your position?
This is what I mean by not arguing in good faith. You aren’t engaging with what Im saying, Im not sure you’ve really answered anything Ive posed to you. This time, you ignored my post and instead posed a new line of argument. (By trying to use DCT, with you as the divine commander). Can you see how thats going to come across as disingenuous?
I stated why I thought your argument falls flat, cuz it ignores a premiss of DCT, and you didnt respond to it. If you think Im wrong about that, then show me how, or why.
If god's moral commands are entirely dependent upon his will then they are arbitrary by definition. If its arbitrary for me then its arbitrary for god.
Lol, i heard you the first time. We’re done here.
What do you mean by predicate? I looked it up but it has a few definitions.
Or maybe I should put in more work. nvm.
ok that makes sense. Thanks.
Quoting Aleph Numbers
The only thing wrong with it is that not all others are going to buy your definition. If they bought it, they would kneel.
Directly the same applies to religions and their god's arbitrary moral authority. If you believe in that god, it's gospel to you. If not, then it's completely ignorable.
If DCT means Divine Command Theory, then your objection of Aleph Numbers' not answering your proposition is false. Because all one needs to do to destroy your DCT is to not believe in the divine. Then the DCT falls apart immediately.
That's A.
B. is that even the DCT is not objective. It was designed by someone, or thought up, or invented, to the faithful, by god. So it does not rest on some general, a priori unassailable logic or truth, it is arbitrary. Arbitrary, by god, for sure, (to the religious), but still arbitrary.
That IS my objection to his argument, thats what I’ve been saying. DCT defines and then assumes a god as one of its premises. Thats why someone like Craig has to combine it with Kalams Cosmological argument.
And again, its not MY DCT. Im just explaining it because Aleph doesnt get it (and therefore doesnt understand how his argument fails) and neither do you as evidenced by your next quote here:
Quoting god must be atheist
DCT defines moral perfection as part of gods “essential nature”. Its not something god came up with its something that he is, perfectly good. Its not arbitrary because it never changes, it would be like saying a human having legs is arbitrary. Which isnt a problem really, as you so cleverly and originally pointed out in “A” above. It doesnt matter because there is no good reason to believe such a god exists.
Arbitrary can easily be permanent
If morals are part of god's essential nature, it is not arbitrary then, as long as god was not created. However, we, humans, are at a loss of using that definition as our moral guidance. What IS god's essential nature? Books and books and books have been written about it by people who never met god, and whohad never met anyone who had met god. God may or may not exist, it's true; but we, humans, are not in a position to learn about the nature of god. Heck, we don't even know for sure he exists.
So, while DCT is a good starting point at defining morals as an objective quality, it stops its ufefulness at the very inception of it, as it gives no guidance about the nature of morals beyond the fact that it's god's essential nature, who, by any theological magnifier, is inscrutable. And we have consensus on that.
Yes, that is another valid criticism of DCT. Even if it were true, we have no reliable means of knowing. A DCT proponent would probably say we do, through divine revelation, but that puts them in the same boat as before with “A” imo. Divine revelation must be shown to be reliable first, and it hasnt.
A key defining quality of God is omnibenevolence. Therefore, it's impossible that an immoral command would issue from Him. Some may argue that this doesn't imply that God doesn't have a set of principles, and I agree with that. But the point is that God, being defined as omnibenevolent, only has to consult himself for moral decisions. In other words, God is morality itself, morality is not a set of principles separate from God according to DCT.
However, one could argue that if God is omnibenevolent and all that is considered good, then his moral commands would be defined as good as well. However, this would result in the statement "God commands good", turning into "God commands God". This makes no sense and is not a valid command.