Classical theism

Reply to Thorongil

Pantheism is the belief that all of reality is identical with divinity, How does "Deus sit ipsum esse subsistens." separate or differentiate itself from such a claim or does it?

I guess because God is good, existence must be good, but how do you show that God is good or that he is a personal God.

Reply to Thorongil I'll have to get back to you in a bit, I'm currently reading Brian Davies' introduction to philosophy of religion. As of now I will say that contemporary theistic personalists see classical theistic conceptions of God as incorrect, usually based upon Scriptures, although there are some theological arguments brought up.

Reply to Thorongil

Some initial questions that spring to mind:
Is the totality of being the totality of beings, or something else besides?
Is the being of anything something separate from, or additional to, the thing?
Is there any being where there isn't a being?
Is being an idea, a quality, an entity or...what?

I think 'being' is coterminous with 'existence' and 'a being' is coterminous with 'an existent'. I see no justification for thinking that 'being' and 'existence' refer to different ideas or qualities or entities or whatever it is they jointly refer to.

Being itself cannot be said to be, because otherwise it would be a being . Similarly existence cannot be said to exist, because if it did it would be an existence or an existent.

So, if God is being, then is He separate from and additional to beings;and if he is the totality of being, is he separate from or additional to all beings?

In view of these questions I share your concern that thinking of God as being is to objectify Him.

Quoting Thorongil

Being itself clearly could not be said to not exist, so if God is being itself, then he ipso facto exists.

I would maybe reference Tillich's concept of God as the "ground of being", or "God above God", which is similar to Gnostic concepts of God. Not to sound banal, but we can imagine different forms of modality that we include in the word "existence". It's not hard to imagine the physical world as an "emanation" from God, and consciousness as a further emanation from the physical world; all of it imbued with a "divine spark", a memory of God, a certain essence. This doesn't mean God exists in the same way his creation does; an artist imbues the art work with the "essence" of himself, but he's not of the same order as his created work (on a mental level; obviously the artist and the artwork are both physical things).

Thorongil:I know Wayfarer has tried argue that existence and being are not the same thing, but even if one grants a distinction between them, my criticism still stands. Being itself clearly could not be said to not exist, so if God is being itself, then he ipso facto exists. Once again, the burden of proving his existence evaporates. Another way of phrasing my criticism is to say that the classical theist's conception of God is unfalsifiable. Of course, unfalsifiable beliefs are not necessarily false, but there's also no reason to accept them either.

What I have tried to argue is that the terms 'being' and 'existence' aren't exactly synonymous, but that this is a very hard distinction to make in the current philosophical lexicon. Those whom I have debated it with will frequently say it is a distinction without a difference. That is why I always start with the question of the sense in which abstract entities exist. What I'm trying to argue is that such entities as natural numbers are real, but that they don't exist as phenomena. They only exist as intelligibles; they are real, being the same for anyone capable of counting, but their reality is purely intelligible, not phenomenal.

I believe that this distinction echoes one that was found in ancient and medieval epistemology, but which has since been forgotten. That happened as a consequence of the debate between nominalism and (scholastic) realism. I believe nominalism is overall the greater influence in modern philosophy. And this gave rise to the characteristically 'flat' ontological model that is impicit in scientific realism, within which the word 'existence' is taken to be univocal, only possessing one meaning - meaning that the only real substance is matter-energy, and what that gives rise to through the processes of physical development and evolution.

Quoting Thorongil

Being itself clearly could not be said to not exist, so if God is being itself, then he ipso facto exists.

Words move and have their being (and meaning) within the context they are used. A chair is a being, and it exists because it is found within Being. But Being itself isn't found within Being. Rather, it is Being. Thus, in what sense can the Being of beings exist? The beings exist, surely, but to say their Being also exists in the same sense that the beings exist would be a category error. But this sense of existence - the one in which beings exist - is the only sense of existence that we have. Thus when we talk of God existing we talk merely analogically (and flawed) - as I have told you, we don't know what we mean and what we say when we say God exists. We are like the blind man who says the sky is blue - he is right, but doesn't really know what he's saying. We don't really know what we're saying, it's part of the finitude of being human. And there we go - there's a reason I call Wittgenstein the greatest philosopher :P

Reply to Agustino I see a fundamental distinction between objects and beings; because beings are subjects of experience whereas chairs (etc) are not. Which is why in classical theology material things are more 'distant' from the source of being than are beings.

Quoting Wayfarer

I see a fundamental distinction between objects and beings; because beings are subjects of experience whereas chairs (etc) are not. Which is why in classical theology material things are more 'distant' from the source of being than are beings.

Yes but that distinction isn't necessary to see the distinction I was making above. Subjects of experience are transcendental to the objects of experience - and thus we can intuit the Being of beings, while chairs can't.

Reply to Agustino Think about what in ordinary speech are called 'beings'. (It's quite a small list).

Quoting Wayfarer

I see a fundamental distinction between objects and beings; because beings are subjects of experience whereas chairs (etc) are not. Which is why in classical theology material things are more 'distant' from the source of being than are beings.

This is a bit confusing, because as far as I'm aware it's not the traditional distinction used in Western philosophy, going all the way back to the Greeks. Generally, being in philosophy is to do with what is, or what exists; and whatever has or partakes in being is a being. Thus both subjects and objects are beings.

Quoting jamalrob

Thus both subjects and objects are beings.

Let me ask you this question, then. There is a well-known research programme, called SETI - Search for Extraterrestial Inteligence. This programme has found massive amounts of data about objects. But if it found one piece of data about a being, it would be quite a news story, don't you think?

Reply to Wayfarer According to your usage, yes, but I think that's a non-philosophical usage.

Reply to jamalrob Not 'my usage'. You're writing a blog on SETI. Would you say 'SETI has found evidence of billions and billions of beings?'

You're a fire-chief outside a burning building. If you asked 'are there any beings in that building?', would you expect the answer to be 'yes, chief, many tables and chairs!'

So - get real! I'm talking about ordinary language, which, I'm saying, implicitly makes a real distinction.

:D Get real, you say, after offering this real-life utterance from a fire-chief:

Quoting Wayfarer

'are there any beings in that building?'

Anyway, it seemed like you were trying to engage with the philosophical tradition, so I thought it was relevant to point out roughly the way that being has been used in philosophy since the pre-Socratics.

And I'm saying, there is a distinction in 'kinds or levels of being' that has been lost in the transition to modernity.

Have a read of the SEP entry the Periphyseon by John Scotus Eireugena.

The second mode of being and non-being is seen in the ‘orders and differences of created natures’ (I.444a), whereby, if one level of nature is said to be, those orders above or below it are said not to be:

For an affirmation concerning the lower (order) is a negation concerning the higher, and so too a negation concerning the lower (order) is an affirmation concerning the higher. (Periphyseon, I.444a)

According to this mode, the affirmation of man is the negation of angel and vice versa. This mode illustrates Eriugena's original way of dissolving the traditional Neoplatonic hierarchy of being into a dialectic of affirmation and negation: to assert one level is to deny the others. In other words, a particular level may be affirmed to be real by those on a lower or on the same level, but the one above it is thought not to be real in the same way. If humans are thought to exist in a certain way, then angels do not exist in that way.
...
The fourth mode (I.445b-c) offers a roughly Platonic criterion for being: those things contemplated by the intellect alone (ea solummodo quae solo comprehenduntur intellectu) may be considered to be, whereas things caught up in generation and corruption, viz. matter, place and time, do not truly exist.

Whereas, these are precisely the distinctions between levels or kinds of being which were dissolved by Duns Scotus' much later declaration of the 'univocity of being', i.e. that 'existence' is a univocal term, that the being of deity is of the same kind as the being of creatures:

Univocity of being is the idea that words describing the properties of God mean the same thing as when they apply to people or things, even if God is vastly different in kind.

I know this is all the territory of scholars reading dusty tomes in classical languages, and that I'm the merest amateur in all this stuff. But what I'm working on is retracing the thread back to the point where materialism became dominant.

Wiki on Duns Scotus:The doctrine of the univocity of being implies the denial of any real distinction between essence and existence. Aquinas had argued that in all finite being (i.e. all except God) the essence of a thing is distinct from its existence. Scotus rejected the distinction. Scotus argued that we cannot conceive of what it is to be something, without conceiving it as existing. We should not make any distinction between whether a thing exists (si est) and what it is (quid est), for we never know whether something exists, unless we have some concept of what we know to exist.[24]

Quoting Wayfarer

But what I'm working on is retracing the thread back to the point where materialism became dominant.

July 20, 1969.

Reply to Thorongil

If we say that God is being/existence itself, then God certainly exists, but the problem is this: what does being/existence itself have to do with any of the conventional lore about God? For example, what does it have to do with anything said of God in the Bible? Being/existence itself, overall, that is, isn't sentient, it doesn't react to things, etc. That's limited to particular entities that exist.

So it would be like defining God to be the shirt one is wearing or something like that. You could do that, and then plenty of people who previously said that there is no God would now change their verdict, but what would it have to do with the conventional notions of God?

Or, we could take your Bigfoot example. You could just as well non-flippantly define Bigfoot as being/existence itself, and then it's the case that there is Bigfoot, but what would it have to do with a hairy ape-man running around in the woods?

Quoting Wayfarer

Think about what in ordinary speech are called 'beings'. (It's quite a small list).

Perhaps - but what does this distinction have to do with the point that I was making, or really the point of this thread? Thorongil understood what I meant by being. I didn't mean what is in common language understood by being, but rather what is, as Jamalrob put it, philosophically meant by it (and Thorongil got this - in fact, your distinction did nothing to help or prevent his understanding - it was simply irrelevant). Yes your distinction is a valid one. So? It has nothing to do with either the point I was trying to convey to Thorongil or the subject of this thread.

Quoting Wayfarer

That is why I always start with the question of the sense in which abstract entities exist.

Abstractions are simply ideas in persons' heads. They don't exist aside from that.

Quoting Agustino

A chair is a being, and it exists because it is found within Being.

What is the semantic difference you're denoting via a capital versus a lower-case "b" there? (And just as a note of trivial curiosity, what do you do when you want to begin a sentence with whatever the lower-case "being" denotes? Do you always just have to rearrange those sentences so that you don't have to capitalize the lower-case term and thus create semantic confusion?)

Quoting Wayfarer

Not 'my usage'.

If you're using the term that way, it's your usage. That's not a claim that you invented it, and it's not a claim that you're the only person to use the term that way. But it's still your usage.

Quoting Wayfarer

You're writing a blog on SETI. Would you say 'SETI has found evidence of billions and billions of beings?'

You'd presumably write with the audience in mind. If you're writing for an audience where you expect most of the readers to be well-educated in philosophy, you'd write something different than you would where you only expect most of the readers to be interested in science, or where you expect simply a minimal general education (as is the case when one is writing for most newspapers, for example). And in any event, I don't think anyone would actually write that evidence was found of "beings" (where they'd have sentient beings in mind). They might write the phrase "sentient beings," but more likely they'd say that evidence was found of "intelligent life" or something like that.

Quoting Wayfarer

Have a read of the SEP entry the Periphyseon by John Scotus Eireugena.

. . . a passage that suggests nothing along the lines of "being" not applying to objects, by the way. Maybe Eriugena proposed that elsewhere--if I ever read anything by him more than a couple lines or a quote here and there I sure don't recall doing so--but then find the relevant passage.

Quoting Terrapin Station

What is the semantic difference you're denoting via a capital versus a lower-case "b" there?

being refers to any existing thing
Being refers to the existence of the thing.

Quoting Terrapin Station

And just as a note of trivial curiosity, what do you do when you want to begin a sentence with whatever the lower-case "being" denotes?

The reader understands from the context.

Quoting Agustino

being refers to any existing thing
Being refers to the existence of the thing.

Thanks. That seems clear on its surface, I suppose. But I'm a bit confused then about your earlier usage. So a chair is an existing thing, but "it exists because it is found within the existence of the thing (the chair)"??

And then re "in what sense can the Being of beings exist," we're asking "in what sense can the existence of the thing <> existing things exist"??

Probably that's not supposed to work grammatically, and that's fine, but I don't even get roughly what we're saying/asking in those cases.

Reply to Terrapin Station Classical Christianity holds existence to be a quality, which I think is what you're stumbling over, perhaps.

Reply to Thorongil Interestingly though, the claim that God is Being has tended to hew worryingly close to atheism itself, insofar as the difference in kind from God to His creation becomes threatened by any such affirmation. It's possible, of course, to create finer and finer distinctions like one between, say, Being and Existence, but then you revert to being caught up again in the problems that the identity of God and Being is meant to solve: precisely how God is meant to relate to the rest of creation. So the God=Being thesis has always had to proceed very carefully, and has generally turned around the rather esoteric theses regarding the various types of 'distinction' advanced by different mediaeval theologians. Thus the Scholastic literature is littered with debates regarding God's 'numerical', 'formal', 'real', or 'analogical' distinction from creation (among others), and all of which tends to runs rings around itself trying to hold on to two ends of a chain that spans from God to Creation.

Thus you have, for example, Nicholas of Cusa's delightful affirmation that: "The absolute maximum [God] is a 'this' in such a way that it is all things, and it is all things in such a way that it is none of them." Or Catherine of Sinea's well known divine revelation that for God: “Just as the fish is in the sea and the sea in the fish, so am I in the soul and the soul in me". These kinds of ambiguities will generally be seized upon and sharpened into mysticism and negative theology on the one hand (Eckhart, where God's relation to Creation becomes entirely negative and undefinable), or a kind of pantheism on the other (Spinoza, Duns Scotus, where the relation is one of strong identity). Its a wonderful and rich history, much of it trying to respond in different ways to the ways in which God can relate to Creation without simply dissolving Him into it. Basically, while the identity of God and Being does 'solve' certain theological problems, it tends to actually open up a whole host of new ones.

@ThorongilYou can do a thing of making God/Being the reservoir of potentiality and sustainer of relations(so the source of novelty, free will/desire & order) and then 'creation' is simply the actual, or existent - bodies in space.

Interesting topic. I have little background in traditional disputes regarding the nature of God, but I think Heidegger does an admirable job of highlighting the ontological difference between beings and Being, specifically through everyday activities like using a hammer or a piece of chalk. This distinction - in which we understand what something 'is' primarily by using it - underlies the priority of human beings (Dasein) as the beings who stand within the broader 'clearing' in which beings are understood in myriad ways and not just one-dimensionally as physical entities.

This clearing is not an existing (physical, tangible) thing, but without 'it' we would be closed off from a meaningful world of people, things, etc. It's like a great emptiness in which we 'live and move and have our being' without noticing the 'it' that opens up our world. This tentative line of thinking and questioning seems fertile to me as it relates to theology and, what seems essential to a reinvigorated theology, a new understanding of what it means to be human.

I wouldn't be sure how to cash out this conception of 'God' in a social and practical way, or, what amounts to the same, in a way that squares with the ostensible interest a personal God takes in our lives. I actually don't find that idea as ridiculous as I once did. Seems more akin to maybe Heraclitus' Logos, Parmenides' Being, or possibly even the Tao of Eastern thought. In other words, not a notion of 'God' that would resonate with many people.

I'll stop talking out of my ass though and hope that others will correct my mistakes.

Quoting Cavacava

Pantheism is the belief that all of reality is identical with divinity, How does "Deus sit ipsum esse subsistens." separate or differentiate itself from such a claim or does it?

If by "all of reality" you mean "the sum total of all the things that exist," then, because God is not a thing, God is different from all of reality.

Quoting darthbarracuda

As of now I will say that contemporary theistic personalists see classical theistic conceptions of God as incorrect, usually based upon Scriptures, although there are some theological arguments brought up.

Despite the disagreement I have with classical theism that I sketch above, I do still tend to side more with it than with theistic personalism.

Quoting John

Is the totality of being the totality of beings, or something else besides?

Being itself seems to be something else besides the totality of being or beings.

Quoting John

Is the being of anything something separate from, or additional to, the thing?

I tend to agree with Kant that existence is not a predicate.

Quoting John

Is there any being where there isn't a being?

I don't think I understand the question.

Quoting John

Is being an idea, a quality, an entity or...what?

I have no idea.

Quoting John

Being itself cannot be said to be, because otherwise it would be a being . Similarly existence cannot be said to exist, because if it did it would be an existence or an existent.

Interesting. This may be one way classical theists would attempt to answer my objection, since I want to say that being itself cannot but be.

Quoting Noble Dust

I would maybe reference Tillich's concept of God as the "ground of being", or "God above God"

I like Tillich but find the use of the word "God" to describe "the ground of being" superfluous. The ground of being is, to me, just another way of phrasing Kant's thing-in-itself.

Quoting Agustino

But Being itself isn't found within Being. Rather, it is Being.

But this seems to say that being is being, which is a tautology.

Quoting Agustino

we don't know what we mean and what we say when we say God exists

According to what you have said and to classical theism as I understand it, we can't say God exists; hence my curiosity that classical theists like Aquinas still proceed to concoct proofs that he does.

Quoting Terrapin Station

For example, what does it have to do with anything said of God in the Bible? Being/existence itself, overall, that is, isn't sentient, it doesn't react to things, etc. That's limited to particular entities that exist.

Yes, well stated! This is another of my criticisms. I fail to understand the leap made from this vague God as being itself to the seemingly intelligent, personal character of God in the Bible or the Quran, one who has plans, gets angry, talks to people through burning bushes, etc.

Quoting StreetlightX

Its a wonderful and rich history, much of it trying to respond in different ways to the ways in which God can relate to Creation without simply dissolving Him into it. Basically, while the identity of God and Being does 'solve' certain theological problems, it tends to actually open up a whole host of new ones.

Indeed, well said.

Quoting csalisbury

You can do a thing of making God/Being the reservoir of potentiality and sustainer of relations(so the source of novelty, free will/desire & order) and then 'creation' is simply the actual, or existent - bodies in space.

You mean like in an Aristotelian sense? That would certainly reverse what people like Aquinas say, which is that God is pure actuality, not potentiality.

Reply to Thorongil

You mean like in an Aristotelian sense? That would certainly reverse what people like Aquinas say, which is that God is pure actuality, not potentiality.

I'm not sure, I don't know Aristotle as well I would like to. And I don't know Aquinas very well at all, though I find his name extraordinarily euphonious. I'm just spitballing here. Potentiality strikes me as relational - certain circumstances and encounters will draw out - actualize - different potencies. So there's a near infinite, unknowable, range of possibilities, which rely on 'hidden' potentials. That feels a little God-y to me. Divine embers cozying up to other divine embers and Lo! a spark. Something new! (and isn't the truly novel always a bit miraculous?) But, yeah, I'm not not drawing on any well-defined theological tradition, to the best of my knowledge (tho I'm kinda riffing on some metaphysicians i like)

Quoting csalisbury

euphonious

Quoting csalisbury

God-y

Quoting csalisbury

auto-affectively

Quoting csalisbury

pathe

:-O

Reply to Thorongil haaa that was supposed to be an im, no idea how i accidentally posted it here. I won't apologize for euphonious tho, or God-y.

Reply to csalisbury Get a hold of yourself, man!

Thorongil:I like Tillich but find the use of the word "God" to describe "the ground of being" superfluous. The ground of being is, to me, just another way of phrasing Kant's thing-in-itself.

Not really - I don't think the ding an sich is a religious idea.

A snippet on Tillich

'Existence' refers to what is finite and fallen and cut of from its true being. Within the finite realm issues of conflict between, for example, autonomy (Greek: 'autos' - self, 'nomos' - law) and heteronomy (Greek: 'heteros' - other, 'nomos' - law) abound (there are also conflicts between the formal/emotional and static/dynamic). Resolution of these conflicts lies in the essential realm (the Ground of Meaning/the Ground of Being) which humans are cut off from yet also dependent upon ('In existence man is that finite being who is aware both of his belonging to and separation from the infinite' (Newport p.67f)). Therefore existence is estrangement."


"Although this looks like Tillich was an atheist such misunderstanding only arises due to a simplistic understanding of his use of the word 'existence'. What Tillich is seeking to lead us to is an understanding of the 'God above God'.

And a supporting passage concerning Hegel's philosophy of religion:

Robert Wallace:Hegel begins with a radical critique of conventional ways of thinking about God. God is commonly described as a being who is omniscient, omnipotent, and so forth. Hegel says this is already a mistake. If God is to be truly infinite, truly unlimited, then God cannot be ‘a being’, because ‘a being’, that is, one being (however powerful) among others, is already limited by its relations to the others. It’s limited by not being X, not being Y, and so forth. But then it’s clearly not unlimited, not infinite! To think of God as ‘a being’ is to render God finite.

But if God isn’t ‘a being’, what is God? Here Hegel makes two main points. The first is that there’s a sense in which finite things like you and me fail to be as real as we could be, because what we are depends to a large extent on our relations to other finite things. If there were something that depended only on itself to make it what it is, then that something would evidently be more fully itself than we are, and more fully real, as itself. This is why it’s important for God to be infinite: because this makes God more himself (herself, itself) and more fully real, as himself (herself, itself), than anything else is.

Hegel’s second main point is that this something that’s more fully real than we are isn’t just a hypothetical possibility, because we ourselves have the experience of being more fully real, as ourselves, at some times than we are at other times. We have this experience when we step back from our current desires and projects and ask ourselves, what would make the most sense, what would be best overall, in these circumstances? When we ask a question like this, we make ourselves less dependent on whatever it was that caused us to feel the desire or to have the project. We experience instead the possibility of being self-determining, through our thinking about what would be best. But something that can conceive of being self-determining in this way, seems already to be more ‘itself’, more real as itself, than something that’s simply a product of its circumstances.

Putting these two points together, Hegel arrives at a substitute for the conventional conception of God that he criticized. If there is a higher degree of reality that goes with being self-determining (and thus real as oneself), and if we ourselves do in fact achieve greater self-determination at some times than we achieve at other times, then it seems that we’re familiar in our own experience with some of the higher degree of reality that we associate with God. Perhaps we aren’t often aware of the highest degree of this reality, or the sum of all of this reality, which would be God himself (herself, etc.). But we are aware of some of it – as the way in which we ourselves seem to be more fully present, more fully real, when instead of just letting ourselves be driven by whatever desires we currently feel, we ask ourselves what would be best overall. We’re more fully real, in such a case, because we ourselves are playing a more active role, through thought, than we play when we simply let ourselves be driven by our current desires.

What is God, then? God is the fullest reality, achieved through the self-determination of everything that’s capable of any kind or degree of self-determination. Thus God emerges out of beings of limited reality, including ourselves.

From here

Reply to Wayfarer You mean this Tillich? :-* It seems not even his philosophy could save him, why should any of us trust it?

Reply to Agustino Interesting link, thanks, but... So? He was an academic theologian, not a candidate for sainthood. And as a non-candidate for sainthood, sexual adventurism (aka adultery) doesn't invalidate what he had to say about God being the ground of being. Maybe he had that useful insight during theological pillow talk with a paramour.

You, for instance, might end up committing adultery, and that won't invalidate what you have had to say about various topics (except your comments on your immunity to adultery. those might then go down the drain).

Quoting Bitter Crank

So? He was an academic theologian, not a candidate for sainthood.

The purpose of theology and philosophy is to free man of the chains of vice, and lead him towards an enlightened state of being. Thus, if his philosophy didn't even help him, why should I trust it? I insist on the question. Philosophy is not just empty thought, it has to work. If it doesn't work, isn't it useless? Obviously thinking of God as the ground of being wasn't helpful for Tillich.

Quoting Bitter Crank

(except your comments on your immunity to adultery. those might then go down the drain).

>:O

Quoting Thorongil

But this seems to say that being is being, which is a tautology.

Yes, because it aimed solely to point at what Being isn't. Being isn't a being. Existence isn't an existent. Existents are in existence. Existence isn't itself in existence.

Quoting Thorongil

According to what you have said and to classical theism as I understand it, we can't say God exists; hence my curiosity that classical theists like Aquinas still proceed to concoct proofs that he does.

We can but we're not too sure what we mean when we say it. You insist on being sure of what the meaning of your statements is. They don't.

Quoting Thorongil

You'll often hear classical theists, and here think of Aquinas as a paradigmatic historic example thereof, claim that God is not a being among beings, but being itself.

Aquinas is known for his claim that God is a being Whose existence is His essence. If we interpret "essence" as the form, or 'what' a thing is, and existence as the fact that a thing is, then we have "the fact that God is, is what God is".

I think you have provided a somewhat inverted and I believe, invalid interpretation. You have said, the essence of God, is existence. God is being itself. Notice the difference. My interpretation makes God a specific type of being, allowing that there are other types of beings, but this special type of being, God, is such that what it is, its essence, makes its existence necessary. What this being is, is its existence. Your interpretation makes "God" the name of the category, being, or existing, such that all existing things, by the fact that they exist, are God, or part of God. My interpretation makes "God" the name of a being which cannot be other than existing.

Quoting Thorongil

The main problem is that it seems to define God into existence.

Yes, God is defined as existing, and you might even say that God is defined into existence, but this should not be seen as a problem, it's very consistent. The type of existence which God is understood to have, is as a separate Form. A form is an intelligible object, a concept, and the existence of such an object is substantiated by its definition. Therefore the substance of God's existence must be His definition. Just like any intelligible object (concept) God is what God is defined as. That cannot be avoided if God is understood as a separate Form.

Quoting Thorongil

One wonders why he even bothered with the five proofs, which leads me to believe that I've neglected something, though of what that might be I have no idea at present. In sum, it's a nice little trick that I'm surprised hasn't been employed more often. "Oh no, I don't have to prove that Big Foot exists, because he's existence itself, you see, so he naturally must exist!"

You actually have neglected something, because as I explained above, this interpretation "God is existence itself" is invalid. So the position is not that God must exist because God is existence, the claim is that God must exist because the very definition of "God" is that the being referred to by "God" exists. To speak of a non-existent God is necessarily contradiction, and therefore must be rejected and denied, because this is not to use the word "God" to refer to something existing, therefore negating the definition of "God". I had a long thread on this subject at pf, and there are numerous atheists who just cannot comprehend this. When the essential properties of a thing are identified, then these are the defining aspects of that thing. If we proceed to talk about that thing as if it does not have those defining features, then we are not actually talking about that thing, but something else. To claim that we are talking about that named thing, is contradiction. So if "God" is defined solely by the feature "existence", then to speak about a non-existent God is the most pure contradiction.

The difference with Big Foot, is that "Big Foot" is not defined as existing. Atheists will use such a tactic, and claim God is not defined as existing, claiming omnipotence, omniscience, absolute good, and such things, as the defining features of God, and these in substitution for existence, allow without contradiction, that God does not exist. But who do you think knows better how to define God, a theologian such as Aquinas, or an atheist?

The Five Ways are necessary in order to provide an understanding of why we need something such as "God", which is defined as existing. If there is no need for such a term then we can cease using it. And it would drop out of our vocabulary.

Quoting Thorongil

Is the totality of being the totality of beings, or something else besides? — John

Being itself seems to be something else besides the totality of being or beings.

Yes, but is the being of a being something separate from, or independent of, the being? Could the being of a being itself be independently of the being? Can being itself be at all in any sense?

Quoting Thorongil

Is the being of anything something separate from, or additional to, the thing? — John


I tend to agree with Kant that existence is not a predicate.

So, the being of a being is not something additional to the being, as a predicate would be additional to that which it is predicated of, then?

Quoting Agustino

Being isn't a being. Existence isn't an existent. Existents are in existence. Existence isn't itself in existence.

This is counter-intuitive to me. I don't know how I would object to it at the moment, but it just seems off.

Quoting Agustino

We can but we're not too sure what we mean when we say it.

Well hold on. You just got done saying that existence isn't itself in existence. If so, then Aquinas shouldn't be saying that God exists, period. You don't get off the hook by saying "we don't know what we mean when we say this." If you mean to say that existence isn't in existence, then God, as existence itself, cannot be in existence; hence it is impossible to prove that he is; hence also, and once again, my bafflement over the fact that he does proceed to try and prove just this.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

God is a being

No, he doesn't permit the indefinite article here, so far as I can tell. That's precisely the trap the classical theist wants to avoid.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

I think you have provided a somewhat inverted and I believe, invalid interpretation.

Great, then show me a passage in Aquinas or some other classical theist to this effect and I might believe you.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

So the position is not that God must exist because God is existence, the claim is that God must exist because the very definition of "God" is that the being referred to by "God" exists.

Does this not amount to the same thing? I ask anyone reading this to explain the difference here.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

"Big Foot" is not defined as existing.

Actually, I did just define him in such a way. Unless you're going to tell me that God has only one unambiguous definition, then my stipulation about Big Foot is perfectly justified. If you still don't like it, I could make up a word, like "fdjh" and say that this is defined as existing. How would you dispute that?

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

But who do you think knows better how to define God, a theologian such as Aquinas, or an atheist?

That is indeed the question! Why should I accept Aquinas's definition and not another kind of theist's definition, or an atheist's definition? Who knows.

Quoting John

Can being itself be at all in any sense?

It's my view that it must be.

Quoting John

So, the being of a being is not something additional to the being, as a predicate would be additional to that which it is predicated of, then?

Yeah, I think so.

Quoting Thorongil

Great, then show me a passage in Aquinas or some other classical theist to this effect and I might believe you.

All you need to do is read the first section of Summa Theologica. Here's the gist of Pt1,Q3, Art1:
"I answer that God is not only His own essence, as shown in the preceding article, but also His own existence.
...
Therefore it is impossible that in God His existence should differ from his essence.
...
Therefore His essence is His existence."

Quoting Thorongil

Does this not amount to the same thing? I ask anyone reading this to explain the difference here.

No it doesn't amount to the same thing, for the reasons I explained in the preceding post. God's essence is His existence. This does not mean, as you claim, that God is existence. It has to do with how one concept participates in another. "Animal" participates in "human being", such that a human being is necessarily an animal. "Existence" participates in "God", such that God necessarily exists. But just like an animal is not necessarily a human being, existence is not necessarily God.

If you still don't see it, try this. Notice how Aquinas always refers to "His existence" when relating God to existence. Existence is a property which God has. This is not the same as equating God to existence, as is what you do when you say "God is existence". Aquinas recognizes that existence is something which God has, while you claim God and existence are one and the same thing. To say that God necessarily has the property of existence, because this is God's essence, is not the same thing as equating God and existence.

Quoting Thorongil

Actually, I did just define him in such a way. Unless you're going to tell me that God has only one unambiguous definition, then my stipulation about Big Foot is perfectly justified. If you still don't like it, I could make up a word, like "fdjh" and say that this is defined as existing. How would you dispute that?

I would not dispute that, but that is not what you said about Big Foot. This is what you said:

"Oh no, I don't have to prove that Big Foot exists, because he's existence itself, you see, so he naturally must exist!"


To define "God" as necessarily existing, is to say that God could not be conceived of in any other way than existing. This would be to conceive of something other than God. But this says nothing about what existence itself is, except that it is something which God has. To say that God is existence is to equate God and existence, and this is to say what existence is.

Let's define "human being" as necessarily animal. This means that "human being" cannot be conceived of in any way other than as an animal. To conceive in another way would not be the conception of "human being" it would be the conception of something else. But this says nothing about "animal" other than that it is something which a human being necessarily is. To equate these two, human being and animal, to say that human being is animal, is to say what animal is.

So Aquinas does not say what existence is, which would be the case if he said God is existence.

Also notice that Aquinas, and 'classical theists' generally, freely admit that there's a lot they don't know. They're not describing a specimen in a bottle.

Quoting Wayfarer

They're not describing a specimen in a bottle.

No, they're just defining a different one into existence.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

All you need to do is read the first section of Summa Theologica.

I have. There's no need to patronize.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

"Existence" participates in "God", such that God necessarily exists. But just like an animal is not necessarily a human being, existence is not necessarily God.

But this seems to propose that there is something outside of God, namely existence. That's not something classical theists would want to maintain.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

Aquinas recognizes that existence is something which God has, while you claim God and existence are one and the same thing. To say that God necessarily has the property of existence, because this is God's essence, is not the same thing as equating God and existence.

I get this. What I still don't get is the purpose of the five proofs (or any other proofs a classical theist might concoct). What are they proving? That God possesses a property called existence? But that already presupposes that God exists, which is what the proofs are meant to demonstrate. It's a circular mess.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

To define "God" as necessarily existing, is to say that God could not be conceived of in any other way than existing. This would be to conceive of something other than God.

According to Aquinas. But why should I accept his conception of God? You conveniently ignored that question.

Quoting Thorongil

They're not describing a specimen in a bottle.
— Wayfarer

No, they're just defining a different one into existence.

But in saying that, you assume that it's axiomatic that the corpus of revealed religion is to be disregarded. Aquinas would never for a moment suggest that one can arrive at faith by way of syllogisms.

Quoting Thorongil

But this seems to propose that there is something outside of God, namely existence. That's not something classical theists would want to maintain.

There are existing things, and God created them. God's creation is other than God. You seem to be thinking of pantheism which is somewhat different from classical theism.

Quoting Thorongil

I get this. What I still don't get is the purpose of the five proofs (or any other proofs a classical theist might concoct). What are they proving? That God possesses a property called existence? But that already presupposes that God exists, which is what the proofs are meant to demonstrate. It's a circular mess.

I think that Aquinas specifically states that the five ways are not to be taken as "proofs", in the sense of arguments which are meant to prove God's existence. They are called the five ways, and they are meant to explicate, or enhance one's understanding of God.

Quoting Thorongil

According to Aquinas. But why should I accept his conception of God? You conveniently ignored that question.

I avoided this question because I have no simple answer for it. Why should I accept anyone's conception of anything, "blue" for example? Because it makes sense? Because other people accept it? Because it is useful? There are many different reasons. That's what the five ways are for, to present to you, some of these reasons. You don't have to accept it though, if you don't want, that's a matter of choice, and that's why the five ways are "ways", and not "proofs".

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

Aquinas specifically states that the five ways are not to be taken as "proofs", in the sense of arguments which are meant to prove God's existence. They are called the five ways, and they are meant to explicate, or enhance one's understanding of God.

True. There was a blog post, since lost, about how taking the proofs as proofs in a modern scientific sense (as Dawkins always does) is based on a misinterpretation. The proofs are for the intellectual edification of the faithful, not to convert the heathen.

Quoting Wayfarer

The proofs are for the intellectual edification of the faithful, not to convert the heathen.

Except that Aquinas presents them even in the Summa Contra Gentiles.

Reply to Thorongil But that doesn't affect my point. They're not aimed at conversion. Nowhere does classical theology presume that you could arrive at faith without, well, faith. And Christian faith takes the Bible as the 'inspired word of God', which conveys truths that have been revealed, truths that one cannot simply discern through philosophical reasoning. Then, given that you accept the premisses, such arguments can be made. (I will see if I can find that reference I mentioned.)

Quoting Wayfarer

Then, given that you accept the premisses, such arguments can be made

For what purpose? It's just fides quaerens intellectum, I suspect you will answer. But why is understanding necessary when faith is already certain?

Quoting Wayfarer

(I will see if I can find that reference I mentioned.)

Sure. I'd be interested.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

There are existing things, and God created them. God's creation is other than God. You seem to be thinking of pantheism which is somewhat different from classical theism.

No, I'm thinking that, according to Aquinas, existence is a property independent of God, in that God can possess or partake of it just as created things can.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

They are called the five ways, and they are meant to explicate, or enhance one's understanding of God.

See my response to Wayfarer on this point. "Enhancing" understanding doesn't make sense.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

You don't have to accept it though

Very well, but this is not how many, many apologists conceive of and use them.

Quoting Thorongil

No, I'm thinking that, according to Aquinas, existence is a property independent of God, in that God can possess or partake of it just as created things can.

I don't understand what you wrote. Created things are contingent, they are dependent on God as the cause of their existence. God exists necessarily. The reason why God exists necessarily is that created things are contingent, therefore there must be a cause of their existence. That there "must be" a cause is necessitated by the fact that these contingent things are actually existing. The necessary cause is God. So here's the logical order. We observe that things are actually existing. These things are understood to be contingent, they don't exist of necessity. Therefore it is necessary that there is a cause of their existence. This necessary cause is God.

You wrote this:

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

"Existence" participates in "God", such that God necessarily exists. But just like an animal is not necessarily a human being, existence is not necessarily God.

Take a look at the wording again. Existence participates in God? You've set up a binary here.

Reply to Metaphysician Undercover I will also say that you've basically already ceded the main problem I have with classical theism, its unfalsifiability. The conversation we're having above is much less interesting to me.

Quoting Thorongil

Take a look at the wording again. Existence participates in God? You've set up a binary here.

This is Aristotelian logic. The concept "animal" is within the concept "man", because "man" is defined by "animal". Animal is within the definition of man. Likewise, the concept of life is within the concept of animal. The more general is within the more particular. But since "life", as a concept, is within "plant" as well as "animal", we can say that the concept participates in both, "plant" and "animal". God has existence, so existence is the more general, and the concept of existence is within the concept of God. But this doesn't mean that "God" is the only concept which the concept of "existence" participates in.

Quoting Thorongil

According to Aquinas. But why should I accept his conception of God? You conveniently ignored that question.

God is always and everywhere defined as the necessary being. The five proofs are meant, in their different ways, to show that there must be necessary being as well as,and as the very condition of the existence of, contingent being.

I don't particularly like the equation of God with being. You could say the same as I did above without using that word 'being':

"God is always and everywhere defined as the necessary, The five proofs are meant to show that there must be the necessary as well as, and as the very condition of, the contingent."

It is also worth noting that 'contingent' in this context just means 'dependent on something other than itself for its existence'. The existence of any finite thing is contingent, but from this it does not follow that the very existence or being of finite things is contingent. No finite being is God, and God is not a finite being, but all finite beings have their necessary existence in God.

I think it's also worth noting that it is reasonable to think of this as a mystery which cannot be comprehended by the human intellect, as much as we might want to.

Aquinas probably saw this great mystery: he was reportedly celebrating Mass when he had a revelation so profound that he ceased writing, leaving the Summa Theologiae unfinished. To Brother Reginald (his secretary and friend) he reputedly said,"The end of my labors has come. All that I have written appears to be as so much straw after the things that have been revealed to me." When later asked by Reginald to return to writing, he said, "I can write no more. I have seen things that make my writings like straw."

God = the 'is' in existence.

Quoting John

I have seen things that make my writings like straw."

I always thought a great comparative religion essay question would be: 'this is the starting point for N?g?rjuna. Discuss'.

Reply to Wayfarer

(Y)

I haven't read that much of N?g?rjuna, but I can remember being impressed at how meticulously he strove to formulate what cannot be formulated, while also trying to build the acknowledgement of the impossibility of formulation into his formulations. All in all a great formulator of the formless. 8-)

Reply to John you get it.

Quoting Thorongil

In sum, it's a nice little trick that I'm surprised hasn't been employed more often. "Oh no, I don't have to prove that Big Foot exists, because he's existence itself, you see, so he naturally must exist!"

The more I read about ancient philosophy and the history of Christianity, the more I tend to reject the "nice little trick" judgment.

It seems to me that people were/are honestly trying to figure out how it is that facts (or a reality independent of mind, or objectivity, or mathematics) or anything for that matter, could exist. Plato's forms (I was recently reminded that Nietzsche called Christianity, "Platonism for the masses") were a pretty good idea, as was Aristotle's Prime Mover... and people expanded upon the ideas.

Quoting John

The five proofs are meant, in their different ways, to show that there must be necessary being as well as,and as the very condition of the existence of, contingent being.

Yeah, but as I intimated to a previous poster, this doesn't strike me as positing anything all that different from Spinoza's Deus sive Natura or Kant's thing-in-itself or Schopenhauer's will or Hegel's Absolute or Tian (Heaven) in Confucianism or the Tao in Taoism or Nirvana/Storehouse Consciousness/Buddha Nature in Buddhism or Brahman in Hinduism or Plato's Form of the Good or Plotinus's One.

Each of these seems to meet the criterion of "necessary being" generally speaking. So when Aquinas blithely states at the end of each of the five ways that "this all men call God," I think he's making an unjustified leap. Not all men have called necessary being God. So why does he do so?

Reply to Thorongil

But Aquinas does marshall many other arguments to support his contention that necessary being should be associated only with God; and that any idea of necessary being that is not associated with God is deficient, inconsistent or incoherent. This is not to say anything about whether his arguments are valid or sound, but just to point out that Aquinas, of all philosophers, does not simply "blithely state" anything.

Quoting John

But Aquinas does marshall many other arguments to support his contention that necessary being should be associated only with God

Perhaps I missed them. I see only the identification being made, not the arguments thereto.

Reply to John Are you a classical theist, John? Just out of curiosity.

Reply to Thorongil

I'm not too sure how to characterize classical theism.

Would you say this statement, made by Angelus Silesius, is an example of "classical theism":

"I know God couldn't live a moment without me; if I should disappear, He would die, destitute."

Reply to John I like that quote. Schopenhauer employs it, too, as I recall.

I think it's too vague to classify with any precision. Silesius seems to be coming out of the tradition of the Rhineland mystics, who were classically theistic, I would say.

Reply to Thorongil Mystics frequently flirted with heresy. (When I was enrolled in Comparative Religion I used to refer to it as the Department of Mysticism and Heresy). There is a tendency amongst mystics towards 'antinomianism' which is basically 'do whatever you like as you're already saved'; there were several movements or that kind in medieval Euorpe. (Mind you Eckhardt himself would never sanction such an idea). I think the key point is going beyond metaphysics - maybe that was the import of Aquinas' 'straw' remark. But 'beyond' is a different thing to stopping short of metaphysics which is what much modern philosophy does.

Reply to Thorongil

And yet it would seem to be heretical, that is against classic theism, to suggest that God's existence could depend on my own.

Reply to John I would like to know the provenance of that quote, I am highly dubious about it.

Reply to Wayfarer

It's from The Cherubinic Wanderer 85 (I.1.8) translated by Maria Shardy

Here is the same passage translated by J.E. Crawford Flitch 1932

[i]I know God cannot live one instant without Me:
If I should come to naught, needs must He cease to
be.[/i]

PDF here: http://www.outofbodytravel.org/images/The_Cherubinic_Wanderer.pdf

Reply to John interesting that Me is capitalised. (Have to go out.)

Interesting - I also find it on this page https://en.m.wikiquote.org/wiki/Angelus_Silesius

Many interesting quotes there. I'm reading Dean Inge on mysticism, I will see if he mentions it.

Several more quotes from Angelus Silesius

'O Man, as long as you exist, know, have, and cherish,
You have not been delivered, believe me, of your burden'

'Naught ever can be known in God: One and Alone Is He.
To know Him, Knower must be one with Known.'

Reply to Wayfarer

Yes I wonder about the significance of that. A reference to higher self perhaps?

I remembered that quote roughly from some book I read in the last couple years and when I searched for it to get the exact words, I found the quote in the form I first presented it on that 'wiki quotes' page, but it didn't cite there what work it came from. When I searched that I found the PDF with the earlier translation.

Some evocative verses!

Quoting John

A reference to higher self perhaps?

Perhaps.

That second one could be transcribed directly from the Brahmanas, and the first would sit quite comfortably in the Dhammapada - quite in line with the universality of the mystics.

Reply to John So, John, are you a classical theist?

Reply to Thorongil

Probably not, since I tend to think God is as dependent on us, as we are on Him.

Reply to John There might be a mystical sense in which it is true, as in Angelus Silesius' expression, but one of the distinguishing features of Christian mysticism was the sharp distinction between creature and creator. In traditional theology, the creator was 'uncreated creator' - souls were created by God, so the idea that the creator is dependent on the created would not make sense in that worldview. Authors on mysticism like Dean Inge and Evelyn Underhill frequently differentiate Christian mysticism from the supposedly pantheist forms of mysticism associated with 'the Orient' which are more likely to either emphasise the complete effacement of identity through divine union, or a sense of equality between the soul and God.

Reply to Wayfarer

I think you probably meant to write "distinguishing feature of Christian theology". I certainly don't believe that there is any sharp distinction between creator and created in Christian mystical texts such that it could be claimed to be a "distinguishing feature".

The Christian God is characteristically a triune God, and humanity in the form of the Son, Christ, and the relationship between God and Man in the form of the Holy Spirit is absolutely intrinsic to the Divine Nature, in my view.