His teacher, Bertrand Russell, described Wittgenstein as "perhaps the most perfect example I have ever known of genius as traditionally conceived; passionate, profound, intense, and dominating".[18]
I certainly understand why Russell himself was a genius: (1) his paradox, (2) Principia Mathematica, (3) etching the standard notation of mathematics in stone with help from Whitehead, and last but not least, (4) his type theory. That was just off the top of my hat. Russell may have achieved more influential breakthroughs than that.
However, I have never understood why Wittgenstein would be a genius. I have never seen anything Wittgenstein wrote, reused at all, by anyone, and in any other context. Seriously, I have never seen anybody doing anything even remotely useful with his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus or his posthumously published notes.
Perhaps Wittgenstein was a genius, but in that case, he was also a genius at expertly concealing it.
Wittgenstein's argument is essentially against linguistic relativists. We can't see what someone else means, but we can get a gauge on it to the extent that we can play the game. Those who say there are words in some languages you simply cannot translate into English are confounded by Wittgenstein. Anything and everything can somehow be expressed, but we don't know for sure what in this infinity is actually expressed in conversation. Maybe we are all talking past each other, or maybe opponents in debate are actually saying (trying at least) the same thing
So if I understand correctly, this "relativism" with respect to language means not only that noone can understand my private language but also that I myself cannot really be said to understand it, because there is no meaningful rule to use it properly. That - I think - is the subtle point I am stuck on. Why should we say this? If I have a private language which is meaningful to me, why should it be deemed to be an irrational method of describing my own states to myself?
I take umbrage at the suggestion that I am as intelligent as a five year old. Five year olds are much smarter than I am.
If you want my question to be more specific then what i really want to know is how and why a private language is not only unintelligible to others, but also unintelligible to myself. I am fairly convinced at this point that that is what Wittgenstein's argument was heading to, and i do not know how he got there.
So far your contribution is at the level of a five-year-old. Good job! - if you're five. is there anything you can articulate that any of us can respond to?
He's confused, and it's a confusing topic - and this is coming from someone who has taken an upper level philosophy course on the topic years ago. If it can confuse people who have studied philosophy for years he's well within his right to be confused here.
However, I have never understood why Wittgenstein would be a genius. I have never seen anything Wittgenstein wrote, reused at all, by anyone, and in any other context. Seriously, I have never seen anybody doing anything even remotely useful with his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus or his posthumously published notes.
You can divide wittgenstein into "late wittgenstein" and "early wittgenstein." Early wittgenstein is tractatus, while late wittgenstein is philosophical investigations and I believe his essay "on certainty." philosophical investigations is a total reversal of tractatus (I have read the former but not the latter.) philosophical investigations is basically a critique on a platonic/a correspondence theory of language which, as wittgenstein believes, gives rise to philosophical problems (most notably metaphysical ones.) by shifting how we conceive of language, according to wittgenstein, many of these philosophical problem disappear (but certainly not all of them - for instance obviously ethics is still an issue regardless.)
As long as I used the term in a coherent manner, I would have to say I am using it "correctly", according to my own rules.
For example, if I am on a desert island, and write the symbol "s", every time I find something funny, I have established a rule for myself as between "s" and funny things.
Seems perfectly intelligible to me. Intelligible enough that when I write "s" when I encounter something that isn't funny, I have enough grounds to tell myself that I've made an error.
And how would you be able to tell that you are using it coherent? Suppose on Day Fourteen on the island you mis-remember that "S" is for things you found ironic...
That same way I would check the meaning of any public language terms. If i am on a desert island and I write "tree" whenever I see a tree, then I have the same problems with coherence and verification of meaning that I would have with the term "s".
And how would you be able to tell that you are using it coherent? Suppose on Day Fourteen on the island you mis-remember that "S" is for things you found ironic...
How do you check the meaning of "S"?
Suppose there are only two people on this island (hopefully just me and you, that'd be bliss) and I misremember that S is for things you found ironic. You then tell me that I misremember and I tell you I don't. We both stubbornly refuse to change our views and so S means different things to each of us until we then one day start using S to mean popcorn, at which time we agree it means popcorn, until I say it means ironic, but you stick with popcorn. And then we keep doing this, and we never realize we're doing this because we're both fucked up, but not as fucked up as the argument that the best way to remember what words mean is to rely upon someone else. Especially when the someone else is you.
I've been re-reading those section of PI and trying to further clarify. The argument seems to be like this:
If I was on a desert island, utilizing "s", whenever I saw something amusing, the reason I would not be able to say whether or not I was utilizing that private language properly is that in order to determine its proper use, I would have to utilize rules which I can only ever learn from a public language.
In other words, the question "what kind of rule can I use to determine whether or not my use of my private language is proper?" can only be answered by reference to rules which originate from the sphere of public language. Not only is the language I am attempting to use private, and therefore incommunicable, but the rules for its use are likewise private, therefore in principle unknowable to anyone other than those persons who can articulate those rules in a public language - in which case they are not private language rules any more, but public language rules.
Wittgenstein explains this unintelligibility with a series of analogies. For example, in section 265 he observes the pointlessness of a dictionary that exists only in the imagination. Since the idea of a dictionary is to justify the translation of one word by another, and thus constitute the reference of justification for such a translation, all this is lost the moment we talk of a dictionary in the imagination; for “justification consists in appealing to something independent". Hence, to appeal to a private ostensive definition as the standard of correct use of a term would be "as if someone were to buy several copies of the morning paper to assure himself that what it said was true."
Reply to Harry Hindu Indeed that is the argument, I think, Wittgenstein is making - that there is indeed no such thing as a private language.
unenlightenedMarch 05, 2020 at 20:19#3887560 likes
So my daughter squeals every time she sees a spider. I might conclude that *squeal* means "spider", or I might conclude that *squeal* means "I'm frightened". But the truth is that it doesn't mean anything in the linguistic sense. *Daughter squealing* means "spider"/ "frightened daughter" equally, in the same way that a footprint means a foot. It's a sign of...
But feet do not speak 'footprint', and though some people read footprints, nobody writes them.
Always get rid of the private object in this way: assume that it constantly changes, but that you do not notice the change because your memory constantly deceives you.
Metaphysician UndercoverMarch 05, 2020 at 21:48#3887860 likes
What Wittgenstein doesn't seem to take into account, and is therefore the deficiency of such a private language argument, is that the use of any word need not be justified. If you assume that the use of any particular words needs to be justified, you will fall for the private language argument, concluding that using a symbol in a way that no one but yourself can understand, is not a case of using language. The problem is that if talking to oneself, using symbols for one's own private reference, is not a case of using language, then what is it?
Indeed that is the argument, I think, Wittgenstein is making - that there is indeed no such thing as a private language.
Then it seems to be a trivial argument.
How are we defining "language" anyway?
I don't know about you (you may be an internet bot or p-zombie), but the contents of my own mind, in which words are only a small portion, inform me of the state of the world, which includes my own body. Colors and sounds and smells and feelings are themselves the "words" of a "language" informing me of the ripeness of apples, the relative proximity of moving cars, what is for dinner, and the state of my empty stomach. Is that a "private language" between the world and I?
Comments (42)
Bertrand Russell considered Ludwig Wittgenstein to be a genius.
Quoting Wikipedia on Russell calling Wittgenstein a genius
I certainly understand why Russell himself was a genius: (1) his paradox, (2) Principia Mathematica, (3) etching the standard notation of mathematics in stone with help from Whitehead, and last but not least, (4) his type theory. That was just off the top of my hat. Russell may have achieved more influential breakthroughs than that.
However, I have never understood why Wittgenstein would be a genius. I have never seen anything Wittgenstein wrote, reused at all, by anyone, and in any other context. Seriously, I have never seen anybody doing anything even remotely useful with his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus or his posthumously published notes.
Perhaps Wittgenstein was a genius, but in that case, he was also a genius at expertly concealing it.
Wittgenstein's argument is essentially against linguistic relativists. We can't see what someone else means, but we can get a gauge on it to the extent that we can play the game. Those who say there are words in some languages you simply cannot translate into English are confounded by Wittgenstein. Anything and everything can somehow be expressed, but we don't know for sure what in this infinity is actually expressed in conversation. Maybe we are all talking past each other, or maybe opponents in debate are actually saying (trying at least) the same thing
Unfortunately I seem to have a simplistic and childish brain - unless someone explains something to me in fairly basic terms I get lost easily.
If you want my question to be more specific then what i really want to know is how and why a private language is not only unintelligible to others, but also unintelligible to myself. I am fairly convinced at this point that that is what Wittgenstein's argument was heading to, and i do not know how he got there.
He's confused, and it's a confusing topic - and this is coming from someone who has taken an upper level philosophy course on the topic years ago. If it can confuse people who have studied philosophy for years he's well within his right to be confused here.
You can divide wittgenstein into "late wittgenstein" and "early wittgenstein." Early wittgenstein is tractatus, while late wittgenstein is philosophical investigations and I believe his essay "on certainty." philosophical investigations is a total reversal of tractatus (I have read the former but not the latter.) philosophical investigations is basically a critique on a platonic/a correspondence theory of language which, as wittgenstein believes, gives rise to philosophical problems (most notably metaphysical ones.) by shifting how we conceive of language, according to wittgenstein, many of these philosophical problem disappear (but certainly not all of them - for instance obviously ethics is still an issue regardless.)
The Private Language Argument for Five Year Olds: words are only of use if more than one person uses them.
For example, if I am on a desert island, and write the symbol "s", every time I find something funny, I have established a rule for myself as between "s" and funny things.
Seems perfectly intelligible to me. Intelligible enough that when I write "s" when I encounter something that isn't funny, I have enough grounds to tell myself that I've made an error.
And how would you be able to tell that you are using it coherent? Suppose on Day Fourteen on the island you mis-remember that "S" is for things you found ironic...
How do you check the meaning of "S"?
Suppose there are only two people on this island (hopefully just me and you, that'd be bliss) and I misremember that S is for things you found ironic. You then tell me that I misremember and I tell you I don't. We both stubbornly refuse to change our views and so S means different things to each of us until we then one day start using S to mean popcorn, at which time we agree it means popcorn, until I say it means ironic, but you stick with popcorn. And then we keep doing this, and we never realize we're doing this because we're both fucked up, but not as fucked up as the argument that the best way to remember what words mean is to rely upon someone else. Especially when the someone else is you.
I want off the island.
If I was on a desert island, utilizing "s", whenever I saw something amusing, the reason I would not be able to say whether or not I was utilizing that private language properly is that in order to determine its proper use, I would have to utilize rules which I can only ever learn from a public language.
This is about as far as i can stretch.
Wittgenstein explains this unintelligibility with a series of analogies. For example, in section 265 he observes the pointlessness of a dictionary that exists only in the imagination. Since the idea of a dictionary is to justify the translation of one word by another, and thus constitute the reference of justification for such a translation, all this is lost the moment we talk of a dictionary in the imagination; for “justification consists in appealing to something independent". Hence, to appeal to a private ostensive definition as the standard of correct use of a term would be "as if someone were to buy several copies of the morning paper to assure himself that what it said was true."
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Private_language_argument
If more than one person used them, then how does the language qualify as being "private"? So there is no such thing as a "private" language?
But feet do not speak 'footprint', and though some people read footprints, nobody writes them.
PI 207e:
What Wittgenstein doesn't seem to take into account, and is therefore the deficiency of such a private language argument, is that the use of any word need not be justified. If you assume that the use of any particular words needs to be justified, you will fall for the private language argument, concluding that using a symbol in a way that no one but yourself can understand, is not a case of using language. The problem is that if talking to oneself, using symbols for one's own private reference, is not a case of using language, then what is it?
Then it seems to be a trivial argument.
How are we defining "language" anyway?
I don't know about you (you may be an internet bot or p-zombie), but the contents of my own mind, in which words are only a small portion, inform me of the state of the world, which includes my own body. Colors and sounds and smells and feelings are themselves the "words" of a "language" informing me of the ripeness of apples, the relative proximity of moving cars, what is for dinner, and the state of my empty stomach. Is that a "private language" between the world and I?
So you still don't understand that shit even after four years.