The Reality of Time

Reply to aletheist

In a 1908 paper that established the parameters for many of the debates within the philosophy of time ever since its publication, John Ellis McTaggart argues for "The Unreality of Time." His basic claim is that time cannot be real because it is contradictory to predicate past, present, and future of the same moment or event; and he alleges that the obvious rejoinder--that a moment or event is past, present, and future only at different times--is viciously circular. McTaggart's implicit assumption is that time is a series of discrete positions, which are what he calls moments, and an event is the discrete content of a particular moment. In other words, he treats any single moment or event as an existential subject, which is why it is precluded from having incompatible determinations.

Does any of those guys ever consider the applicability of their concepts of time? He is still talking about the same thing, just awkwardly, and at the end the concept must produce equations of motion as we know them, or it’s false, so what is his comment on:

speed = distance / time

Two of those three have to be actual properties and only one abstract relation between them. Which one is fake? I think it’s self evident if you consider it in terms of what is “primary” or “more basic”, so I say time and space are actual, while velocity is abstract or virtual property, i.e. “relation”.

My point here is that I don’t see how any argument considering time can be sensible if it does not consider equations of motion. Motion / change is the only way to perceive time, it is thus essential to be the focus of any time related argument, and also, just because we perceive time only indirectly should not fool us to think it is illusory.

Additionally, either time or space have to be discrete to avoid Zeno’s paradoxes. Or both have to be discrete, I forgot and can’t remember how I concluded that, but I insist it is true.

Quoting Zelebg

I think it’s self evident if you consider it in terms of what is “primary” or “more basic”, so I say time and space are actual, while velocity is abstract or virtual property, i.e. “relation”.

On the contrary, it is continuous motion that is the reality, while discrete positions in space and discrete instants in time are both abstractions that we invented in order to describe motion.

Peirce, 1906:... nobody is ever in an exact Position (except instantaneously, and an Instant is a fiction, or ens rationis), but Positions are either vaguely described states of motion of small range, or else (what is the better view), are entia rationis (i.e. fictions recognized to be fictions, and thus no longer fictions) invented for the purposes of closer descriptions of states of motion ...

Quoting Zelebg

Motion / change is the only way to perceive time, it is thus essential to be the focus of any time related argument, and also, just because we perceive time only indirectly should not fool us to think it is illusory.

On the contrary, we directly perceive the continuous flow of time.

Peirce, c. 1895:To imagine time, time is required. Hence, if we do not directly perceive the flow of time, we cannot imagine time. Yet the sense of time is something forced upon common-sense. So that, if common-sense denies that the flow [of] time is directly perceived, it is hopelessly entangled in contradictions and cannot be identified with any distinct and intelligible conception.
But to me it seems clear that our natural common-sense belief is that the flow of time is directly perceived.

In fact, if we did not directly perceive the continuity of time, then we would have no concept of continuity at all.

Peirce, c. 1902:One opinion which has been put forward and which seems, at any rate, to be tenable and to harmonize with the modern logico-mathematical conceptions, is that our image of the flow of events receives, in a strictly continuous time, strictly continual accessions on the side of the future, while fading in a gradual manner on the side of the past, and that thus the absolutely immediate present is gradually transformed by an immediately given change into a continuum of the reality of which we are thus assured. The argument is that in this way, and apparently in this way only, our having the idea of a true continuum can be accounted for.

Quoting Zelebg

Additionally, either time or space have to be discrete to avoid Zeno’s paradoxes. Or both have to be discrete, I forgot and can’t remember how I concluded that, but I insist it is true.

On the contrary, Zeno's paradoxes are only dissolved by recognizing the continuity of both space and time.

Peirce, 1868:All the arguments of Zeno depend on supposing that a continuum has ultimate parts. But a continuum is precisely that, every part of which has parts, in the same sense. Hence, he makes out his contradictions only by making a self-contradictory supposition. In ordinary and mathematical language, we allow ourselves to speak of such parts--points--and whenever we are led into contradiction thereby, we have simply to express ourselves more accurately to resolve the difficulty.

Reply to aletheist

On the contrary, we directly perceive the continuous flow of time.

Peirce is talking gibberish. You only ever directly perceive a physical thing moving from point A to point B, and in no way anything about it suggests time is continuous, i.e. infinitely divisible.

In fact, if we did not directly perceive the continuity of time, then we would have no concept of continuity at all.

Can not be a fact as is clearly demonstrated to be false by virtual reality simulation and cases from clinical studies.

On the contrary, Zeno's paradoxes are only dissolved by recognizing the continuity of both space and time.

What? You either do not understand what “continuity” means or your logic circuit is broken. This is not even supposed to be controversial, no one makes that claim.

All the arguments of Zeno depend on supposing that a continuum has ultimate parts. But a continuum is precisely that, every part of which has parts, in the same sense. Hence, he makes out his contradictions only by making a self-contradictory supposition. In ordinary and mathematical language, we allow ourselves to speak of such parts--points--and whenever we are led into contradiction thereby, we have simply to express ourselves more accurately to resolve the difficulty.
— Peirce, 1868

Ultimate parts? It's gibberish. Why quoting a guy from the 19th century? Actually, why quote anyone, it’s unclear if you understand what is being said or whether your interpretation is the one intended.

Reply to aletheist

For instance when traveling from west to east, another paradox presents itself by virtue of one being unable to live the lost hours (or in the opposite you get to relive them).
— 3017amen
No, there are no "lost" or "relived" hours. That is an illusion created by our arbitrary manner of marking and measuring time.

As it relates to time, if you could enumerate for me which is considered an illusion, and which is considered real, I would greatly appreciate it.

Quoting Zelebg

Peirce is talking gibberish ... continuous, i.e. infinitely divisible ... You either do not understand what “continuity” means or your logic circuit is broken ... Ultimate parts? It's gibberish.

Considering Peirce's remarks on this topic in general and about ultimate parts in particular to be gibberish, along with suggesting that being continuous is synonymous with being infinitely divisible, demonstrates quite conclusively which one of us does not understand what "continuity" means.

Quoting Zelebg

Why quoting a guy from the 19th century? Actually, why quote anyone ...

Why invoke a guy from the 5th century BC? I tend to quote Peirce and other noteworthy philosophers when I believe that their own words are more perspicuous than any rephrasing that I might attempt, but YMMV.

Reply to aletheist

Nonetheless, the synopsis of that video could be summed up in the simple statement: Eternity is Time. Time, eternity.
— 3017amen
Where are you getting that from the video? For one thing, the word "eternity" is never mentioned.

The video presents discourse over past, present and future perception of time, hence ..."every moment is present". Notwithstanding the Aristotle/Cantor distinctions, how does eternity relate to Time?

And by the way thank you very much for taking the time to posit both arguments. I will be reading McTaggart's paper shortly...

Quoting aletheist

By contrast, Charles Sanders Peirce held that time is real and continuous.

This is problematic, as Zelebg points out . That time is continuous is an unsupported assumption which forces us into violation of the law of non-contradiction. This is exactly what the following paragraph says, the existence of an "event" is a violation of the law of non-contradiction:

Peirce, c. 1896:The event, therefore, considered as a junction, is not a subject and does not inhere in a subject. What is it, then? Its mode of being is existential quasi-existence, or that approach to existence where contraries can be united in one subject. Time is that diversity of existence whereby that which is existentially a subject is enabled to receive contrary determinations in existence.

Quoting aletheist

An event is "an existential junction of incompossible facts":

This is an example of the gibberish. Instead of saying that one state exists, followed in time by a distinctly different state, Peirce assumes the two incompatible states exist together, at the same time, as an "event". In reality, the "event" is what is artificial, a mere description, completely dependent on perspective.

Quoting 3017amen

As it relates to time, if you could enumerate for me which is considered an illusion, and which is considered real, I would greatly appreciate it.

I am sorry, I honestly do not understand what you are requesting here. All I can say (again) is that the reality of time has nothing to do with how we arbitrarily mark and measure it. Changing one's location on earth does not actually add or subtract hours from time itself.

Quoting 3017amen

The video presents discourse over past, present and future perception of time, hence ..."every moment is present".

As I said before in the other thread, every moment is present when it is present, but no longer present when it is past and not yet present when it is future. The only moment that is present now is the present moment, when the indeterminate future is becoming the determinate past.

Quoting 3017amen

Notwithstanding the Aristotle/Cantor distinctions, how does eternity relate to Time?

What specific Aristotle/Cantor distinctions do you have in mind? What exactly do you mean by "eternity" in this context?

Reply to aletheist

Considering Peirce's remarks on this topic in general and about ultimate parts in particular to be gibberish, along with suggesting that being continuous is synonymous with being infinitely divisible, demonstrates quite conclusively which one of us does not understand what "continuity" means.

You failed to mention any reason behind your statement. Zeno is not making any assumptions, and his arguments are indeed about infinite divisibility, i.e time / space continuity. Google it!

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

That time is continuous is an unsupported assumption ...

No, it is the conclusion of various arguments based on our phenomenal experience. I already provided a couple of them above, and here is another succinct example:

Peirce, c. 1893-5:We are conscious only of the present time, which is an instant, if there be any such thing as an instant. But in the present we are conscious of the flow of time. There is no flow in an instant. Hence, the present is not an instant.

It follows from the first sentence that there is no such thing as an instant at all.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

This is exactly what the following paragraph says, the existence of an "event" is a violation of the law of non-contradiction:

That is not even remotely what the quoted paragraph says. Surely it is not in the least bit controversial to recognize that incompossible facts are realized at different times. An event simply corresponds to the transition from one state to the other.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

Instead of saying that one state exists, followed in time by a distinctly different state, Peirce assumes the two incompatible states exist together, at the same time, as an "event".

Peirce assumes no such thing, and that is not how I described an event. I respectfully suggest carefully rereading the entire OP, but here is the most pertinent portion:
Quoting aletheist

An event is not itself an existential subject, it is the state of things that is realized at a lapse of time when a definite change occurs--an existential subject initially has one determination, such that a certain fact is realized; but then it receives a contradictory determination, such that a negation of that fact is realized.

Let me try to spell it out more thoroughly. Before the commencement of the lapse of time at which the event is realized, an earlier state of things is realized, which is a fact as signified by the true proposition "S is P." After the completion of the event-lapse, a later state of things is realized, which is an incompossible fact as signified by the true proposition "S is not-P." The two incompatible states do not exist together, at the same time, because they are separated by the whole event-lapse; so the principle of contradiction is not violated. However, during the event-lapse itself, an indefinitely gradual state of change is realized, such that neither "S is P" nor "S is not-P" is true; so the principle of excluded middle is false while the event is in progress. It can be successfully maintained in classical logic because we are almost always reasoning about prolonged states of things, rather than states of change.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

In reality, the "event" is what is artificial, a mere description, completely dependent on perspective.

Again, I instead hold with Peirce that instants are artificial creations of thought for the purpose of describing states of things, including facts and events. Besides, if time were really composed of discrete instants at finite intervals, how would we get from one to the "next"? How could there be any continuity in our experience at all? In Peirce's words:

Peirce, c. 1904:It is logically impossible for a state of things to be realized in the present instant and not to be at all so in the past and future. Were the instants independently actual, as they are in the Time of the analysts, memory would be a perpetual miracle.

Peirce, 1908:The argument which seems to me to prove, not only that there is such a conception of continuity as I contend for, but that it is realized in the universe, is that if it were not so, nobody could have any memory. If time, as many have thought, consists of discrete instants, all but the feeling of the present instant would be utterly non-existent.

Quoting Zelebg

Zeno is not making any assumptions, and his arguments are indeed about infinite divisibility, i.e time / space continuity.

Everyone is always making some assumptions, and again, infinite divisibility is necessary but not sufficient for true continuity. The rational numbers are infinitely divisible, yet no one seriously claims that they are continuous.

Reply to aletheist

Everyone is always making some assumptions, and again, infinite divisibility is necessary but not sufficient for true continuity.

I said Zeno did not make any assumptions, and time is either analog or digital, where analog, continuous, and infinitely divisible is all one and the same concept.

The rational numbers are infinitely divisible, yet no one seriously claims that they are continuous.

Do you even know what you just said or why, are you a robot?

Quoting aletheist

No, it is the conclusion of various arguments based on our phenomenal experience. I already provided a couple of them above, and here is another succinct example:

OK, let's assume "time is continuous" is a conclusion. It is a conclusion which forces us to accept violation of the law of non-contradiction. Therefore we ought to address those arguments directly, which lead to that conclusion, to determine their deficiencies.

Peirce, c. 1893-5:We are conscious only of the present time, which is an instant, if there be any such thing as an instant. But in the present we are conscious of the flow of time. There is no flow in an instant. Hence, the present is not an instant.

"The present is not an instant" is a valid conclusion if "the present" is defined by what we are conscious of, as stated in the first phrase. This is evident from the fact that we are consciously aware of motion. Motion requires a period of time, so if we are consciously aware of motion, then consciousness must span a period of time. Since any period of time has an earlier part, and a later part, and "the present" is used to divide past from future in this way, then the opening phrase above, "we are conscious only of the present time", is a false statement, and that's where the problem lies.

We are actually conscious of the past and the future, at the same time, so the first sentence is a falsity, we are not conscious of the present. The phrase I used, "at the same time" is the deficient phrase here, as demonstrated by relativity theory, and rejection of this phrase is what renders the law of non-contradiction impotent. Therefore we must reject the idea that consciousness represents "the present", because we are conscious of a period of time which contains both a past, and a future. That we are consciously aware of a present is an illusion. We are not aware of any such thing.

So, what we have here is a situation where "the present" is defined by what we are conscious of, but we are conscious of the future and past together, not the present. so this definition of "the present" is incorrect. Here, "the present" is defined as a combination of future and past (what we are conscious of), and this leads to the problem of contradiction, as the present is now inherently contradictory. A proper definition of "the present" would be the separation of the future from the past, the division, or boundary between them. This allows us to uphold the law of noncontradiction.

In general, the arguments presented do not include the premise required for the conclusion that time is continuous. Failure of the human consciousness to determine the precise boundary between future and past does not provide the premise necessary to conclude that there is no such boundary. The fact that the human determination of "an instant" is an arbitrary determination, is insufficient for the conclusion that there is no such "instant" in reality. This would require the assumption that if the human being cannot produce that determination, it cannot be done, but that implies the human being is omniscient, or omnipotent.

Quoting aletheist

Peirce assumes no such thing, and that is not how I described an event.

It's clear as day. I suggest you reread what you printed:
Quoting aletheist

An event is "an existential junction of incompossible facts":

Peirce, c. 1896:Its mode of being is existential quasi-existence, or that approach to existence where contraries can be united in one subject.

Notice, that the "event" is completely artificial, constructed, it is an "approach" to existence. But since it is an approach "where contraries can be united in one subject", it is an approach which ought to be rejected as deficient.

Quoting aletheist

Let me try to spell it out more thoroughly. Before the commencement of the lapse of time at which the event is realized, an earlier state of things is realized, which is a fact as signified by the true proposition "S is P." After the completion of the event-lapse, a later state of things is realized, which is an incompossible fact as signified by the true proposition "S is not-P." The two incompatible states do not exist together, at the same time, because they are separated by the whole event-lapse; so the principle of contradiction is not violated. However, during the event-lapse itself, an indefinitely gradual state of change is realized, such that neither "S is P" nor "S is not-P" is true; so the principle of excluded middle is false while the event is in progress. It can be successfully maintained in classical logic because we are almost always reasoning about prolonged states of things, rather than states of change.

All this does is render the "event lapse" as unintelligible in relation to the two states of P and not-P. It is neither "S is P" nor "S is not-P", therefore it must be described in terms other than "P". Now we have no way to relate the event lapse, which is the change between P and not-P, to the determinations of "P and not-P". It is something categorically distinct from "P and not-P". This produces a discontinuity between the supposed continuous time where P becomes not-P, and necessitates the conclusion that time is not continuous.

Alternatively, we could say that the "event lapse" is a combination of both "P" and "not-P", and this would allow for continuity. But that violates the law of non-contradiction. So it appears like either time is discontinuous, or time is continuous in violation of the law of non-contradiction.

Quoting aletheist

Again, I instead hold with Peirce that instants are artificial creations of thought for the purpose of describing states of things, including facts and events. Besides, if time were really composed of discrete instants at finite intervals, how would we get from one to the "next"? How could there be any continuity in our experience at all?

The problem which I've explained to you before, and you didn't seem to grasp, is that "an event" requires instants. If individual events exist within a continuity, then they must be separated, individuated from that continuity, by means of "instants". Without such instants as divisors, there are no separate events. Therefore, Peirce is forced to apprehend events, as well as instants as artificial. This I believe he does, as indicated by my quoted passage above, but you do not. Grasping this is essential to understanding Peirce's approach to boundaries and the vagueness we find in boundaries. A "boundary", like an "instant" is an artificial construction, therefore the things created by these applications, whether it be an object, or an event, are also artificial constructions. The boundaries are vague due to the subjectivity of such constructions.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

We are actually conscious of the past and the future, at the same time, so the first sentence is a falsity, we are not conscious of the present. The phrase I used, "at the same time" is the deficient phrase here, as demonstrated by relativity theory, and rejection of this phrase is what renders the law of non-contradiction impotent. Therefore we must reject the idea that consciousness represents "the present", because we are conscious of a period of time which contains both a past, and a future. That we are consciously aware of a present is an illusion. We are not aware of any such thing.

So, what we have here is a situation where "the present" is defined by what we are conscious of, but we are conscious of the future and past together, not the present. so this definition of "the present" is incorrect. Here, "the present" is defined as a combination of future and past (what we are conscious of), and this leads to the problem of contradiction, as the present is now inherently contradictory. A proper definition of "the present" would be the separation of the future from the past, the division, or boundary between them. This allows us to uphold the law of noncontradiction.

Thank you MU, you've articulated one of my concerns, better than I could have.

Just a couple thoughts/observations/questions if you don't mind:

1. Do you think then, that the reality of time is continuous (which would preclude/deny the law of noncontradiction) in nature?
2. If the answer to #1 is yes, could the reality of time and eternity also be, essentially, an illusionary abstract that exists in a phenomenological way (considering we are unable to consciously separate past, present and future during everydayness/cognition; the cognitive process of subconscious and consciousness working together)?

An example, albeit not the best, combines the two notions: If someone asks me to run a calculation to size-up a structural beam, I proceed to run the math as requested. During that time, there is a slice of time in which it took me to run the calculation. And during that period of time, I experienced past, present and future.

And so when completed, I say: " Here, I just finished the calculation." That process of computation spanned or bridged the past, present and future. Does that in anyway, violate the law of noncontradiction?

I want to say yes, because using formal logic, the end result was just one thing that combined all three of those phenomenal elements in a simultaneous fashion (during cognition). On the other hand, my thinking of creating the formula itself, the subsequent mental computation, and producing the resulting written formula, was a clear increment in time that required a distinct mental process. Is that a bad example?

Keep in mind, I'm also trying to define time and eternity as one continuum (such as the eternal laws of physics), but I know more has to be worked out there.

This is an awesome thread because there are so many take-away's from same... ! ( I can think of many more questions.)

Thanks OP and everyone...

Quoting aletheist

I am sorry, I honestly do not understand what you are requesting here. All I can say (again) is that the reality of time has nothing to do with how we arbitrarily mark and measure it. Changing one's location on earth does not actually add or subtract hours from time itself.

Hi aletheist!

Ok. So if I travel from west to east, how can I live the lost hours (or in the opposite east to west, you get to re-live them)?

The way we measure time cannot be arbitrary can it? If so, then is all of time an illusion I wonder? How can we escape from that illusion; hypothetically, is there a way to do that?

Quoting Zelebg

I said Zeno did not make any assumptions ...

Of course he made assumptions, as all of us do.

Quoting Zelebg

... and time is either analog or digital, where analog, continuous, and infinitely divisible is all one and the same concept.

If they were "all one and the same concept," then we would not have three different terms for them. I acknowledge that analog and digital loosely correspond to continuous and discrete, respectively; but again, infinitely divisible is not synonymous with continuous.

Quoting Zelebg

Do you even know what you just said or why, are you a robot?

Wait, are you suggesting that the rational numbers are continuous? Even the analysts (Cantor etc.) deny that, claiming instead--also wrongly, in Peirce's view (and mine)--that the real numbers are continuous.

Reply to Metaphysician Undercover
I am not ignoring you, it will just take more time than I have right now to compose a response.

Quoting 3017amen

So if I travel from west to east, how can I live the lost hours (or in the opposite east to west, you get to re-live them)?

Again, there are no "lost hours." Your age in hours is always exactly the same as it would be if you stayed where you were born for your entire life. We simply adjust our patterns of behavior in accordance with when the sun rises and sets at each location where we find ourselves.

Quoting 3017amen

The way we measure time cannot be arbitrary can it?

The unit by which we measure time is arbitrary. A second is now defined as a certain number of vibrations of a cesium atom, although historically it was intended to be 1/86,400th of the time required for the earth to complete one rotation about its axis. We had leap day last week because the time required for the earth to complete one revolution around the sun is not an integer multiple of its rotations.

Moreover, how we set our clocks is to some extent arbitrary. It is now standardized around the world, although historically it was intended to be such that noon would always correspond to when the sun is directly overhead each day. We will turn our clocks forward an hour this weekend because people generally prefer having extra daylight in the evening, rather than in the morning.

Quoting 3017amen

If so, then is all of time an illusion I wonder? How can we escape from that illusion; hypothetically, is there a way to do that?

I am still not sure what exactly you mean by calling time an illusion. As the thread title indicates, my view is that time itself is real, although our perception of it (and everything else) is certainly fallible.

Reply to Metaphysician Undercover

This is evident from the fact that we are consciously aware of motion. Motion requires a period of time, so if we are consciously aware of motion, then consciousness must span a period of time.

This has no impact on the argument, I think, but it is quite possible we are only aware as a sequence of conscious instants in time. Motion can then be perceived via motion blur effect.

This would mean, I suppose, that “subjective experience” of visual perception is an effect immediately connected with the refresh rate of updates / impressions onto the video memory buffer, and sound with updates to audio buffer… just like in video games.

But this can happen only after information is already processed, so we are only aware not of the present time, but some milliseconds after that. We are only ever aware of the past.

Reply to aletheist

Can we summarize for one second, ha:

Past= real or allusion or... ?
Present=real or allusion or... ?
Future=real or allusion or... ?

( And eternity= real or illusion?)

Reply to 3017amen
Employing Peirce's definition of "real" as that which is as it is regardless of what any individual mind or finite group of minds thinks about it:

• All past states of things are real as determinate actualities.
• Some future states of things are real as either indeterminate possibilities or conditional necessities.
• The present state of things is real as an indefinitely gradual state of change, during which some future possibilities/necessities are becoming past actualities.

Again, please provide your definition of "illusion" in this context.

Quoting aletheist

Again, please provide your definition of "illusion" in this context.

Basically, Einstein's' block universe is where there is really no present; only one static-flow of time (my interpretation). Meaning, if you were to stand outside the universe—outside both space and time—and look at your life, you would see your birth, your death and every moment in between laid out as distinct points. From this angle, time does not flow, but is static and fixed (which ties with McTaggart's view/the previous video).

Reply to 3017amen
That is the theory of time known as eternalism. It is sometimes called "block universe" because it posits that the past, the present, and the future all exist. By comparison, my view is sometimes called "growing block universe" because it posits that only the past and the present exist, and that the past is constantly getting "larger" as the present advances into the nonexistent future--much like how space is widely thought to be expanding, even though there is presumably nothing beyond its boundary.

It seems like you are suggesting that the present and/or the flow of time is an illusion in a block universe, but I am not sure that is accurate. Again, the present does exist as a time-slice that is advancing through the block from the growing past toward the shrinking future. What I suppose would be an illusion is the indeterminacy of the future; i.e., eternalism seems to entail determinism, such that every state of things that is actually realized is necessarily realized. I invite correction if I am wrong about that.

Reply to aletheist

One of the things Einstein argued with the theory of special relativity is that time is hard to measure accurately unless the measurement is done to a very small subset of the universe (such as inside a car or on an airplane). This has been proven with tests in P-3 airplanes flying over the chesapeake bay (P-3 can stay in the air for a very long time). The clocks on the plane were much slower than the clock on the ground in maryland. As a clock is thrown through space over a long period of time at a high speed or simply if it approaches the threshold of the speed of light (C) its components that are in the clock slow down and thus the clock slows down. Time is really just an iteration of events such that particles collide with each other and move around. Time can be said to not be relative only in a very small subset of the universe.

I would argue part of this is due to the fact that the vectors of a particles motion (vector X, vector Y, and vector Z) when combined can never exceed C (speed of light). So when you increase the particles velocity in vector Z, vector X and vector Y in many cases will have to slow down (only true when velocities approach the threshold of C).

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

OK, let's assume "time is continuous" is a conclusion. It is a conclusion which forces us to accept violation of the law of non-contradiction.

No, it does not. Again, there is never an instant or lapse of time at which incompatible states of things are realized such that both "S is P" and "S is not-P" are true, which would violate the principle of contradiction. Initially there is a lapse at which a state of things is realized such that "S is P" is true. Then there is a lapse at which a state of change is realized such that neither "S is P" nor "S is not-P" is true; i.e., the principle of excluded middle is false. Finally there is a lapse at which a state of things is realized such that "S is not-P" is true.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

Motion requires a period of time, so if we are consciously aware of motion, then consciousness must span a period of time.

Yes, and that is precisely why the present cannot be an instant, but instead must be a lapse of time.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

Since any period of time has an earlier part, and a later part, and "the present" is used to divide past from future in this way, then the opening phrase above, "we are conscious only of the present time", is a false statement, and that's where the problem lies.

No, from a phenomenological standpoint the present is defined as that part of time of which we are conscious. Another way of putting it is that the temporal present corresponds directly to whatever is present to the mind.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

Therefore we must reject the idea that consciousness represents "the present", because we are conscious of a period of time which contains both a past, and a future.

No, we must simply recognize that the present is an indefinite lapse of time--a moment--such that it cannot be sharply distinguished from the immediately past moment nor the immediately future moment:

Peirce, 1903:The present moment will be a lapse of time, highly confrontitial, when looked at as a whole, seeming absolutely so, but when regarded closely, seen not to be absolutely so, its earlier parts being somewhat of the nature of memory, a little vague, and its later parts somewhat of the nature of anticipation, a little generalized. It contains a central part which is still more present, still more confrontitial, but which presents the same features. There is nothing at all that is absolutely confrontitial; although it is quite true that the confrontitial is continually flowing in upon us ... Another plain deliverance of the percipuum is that moment melts into moment. That is to say, moments may be so related as not to be entirely separate and yet not be the same.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

A proper definition of "the present" would be the separation of the future from the past, the division, or boundary between them. This allows us to uphold the law of noncontradiction.

Yes, but there is no inconsistency between this additional definition and what I have stated above.

Peirce, 1899:The consciousness of the present, as the boundary between past and future, involves them both.

In fact, boundaries are precisely the sort of thing for which the principle of excluded middle is false.

Peirce, 1905:Thus, a point of a surface may be in a region of that surface, or out of it, or on its boundary. This gives us an indirect and vague conception of an intermediacy between affirmation and denial in general, and consequently of an intermediate, or nascent state, between determination and indetermination ... [The Present] is plainly that Nascent State between the Determinate and the Indeterminate that was noticed above.

The present is when the indeterminate future becomes the determinate past, and as with any other event, this is realized at a lapse of time rather than an instant.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

In general, the arguments presented do not include the premise required for the conclusion that time is continuous.

No, the required premise is quite simply that we directly perceive the continuous flow of time.

Peirce, 1903:No more than the present moment directly confronts us. The future, however little future it may be, is known only by generalization. The past, however little past it may be, lacks the explicitness of the present. Nevertheless, in the present moment we are directly aware of the flow of time, or in other words that things can change.

As you pointed out, we are directly aware of motion; so we can go one step farther than Peirce did, and say that in the present moment we are directly aware that things are changing. That is what I mean when I say that the state of things in the present is an indefinitely gradual state of change--it is always the case that innumerable events throughout the universe are currently in progress.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

All this does is render the "event lapse" as unintelligible in relation to the two states of P and not-P.

No, what I frankly find unintelligible is your entire paragraph that begins with this sentence.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

If individual events exist within a continuity, then they must be separated, individuated from that continuity, by means of "instants". Without such instants as divisors, there are no separate events.

No, this is self-contradictory; if events were "separated" and "individuated," then they would necessarily be discontinuous. Besides, I explained already--more than once--that an event is realized at a lapse of time between two other lapses of time at which incompatible states of things are realized.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

Therefore, Peirce is forced to apprehend events, as well as instants as artificial.

No, events are undeniably real in the sense that contradictory states of things are realized at different determinations of time, which entails that there must be another determination of time at which the change from one state to the other is realized. The only alternative to an indefinitely gradual state of change at a lapse of time is an instantaneous event, which is impossible since there can be no change whatsoever at an instant.

Peirce, c. 1895:Imagine a series of instantaneous photographs to be taken. Then, no matter how closely they follow one another, there is no more motion visible in any one of them than if they were taken at intervals of centuries.

Reply to christian2017
Thanks for your comments, but I am honestly not sure whether or how they bear on the thread topic. The fact that the speed of light in a vacuum is constant strikes me as consistent with my contention that continuous motion is the fundamental physical reality, while discrete positions in space and instants in time are artificial creations of thought to facilitate describing such motion.

Quoting aletheist

consistent with my contention that continuous motion is the fundamental physical reality, while discrete positions in space and instants in time are artificial creations of thought to facilitate describing such motion

Here is Peter Lynds' paper in which he postulates that there are no instants of time. This was published in Foundations of Physics and generated heated arguments, with a strong contingent of physicists declaring it nonsense. But who knows? Lynds is or was a college dropout.

https://arxiv.org/ftp/physics/papers/0310/0310055.pdf

Quoting aletheist

Thanks for your comments, but I am honestly not sure whether or how they bear on the thread topic. The fact that the speed of light in a vacuum is constant strikes me as consistent with my contention that continuous motion is the fundamental physical reality, while discrete positions in space and instants in time are artificial creations of thought to facilitate describing such motion.

When you say continuous motion, who would argue with you on that? Perhaps i just don't know what you meant by that. I did read the OP carefully. As for discrete positions in space, if there was two galaxies or two asteroids roughly (roughly) in line with each other (hypothethical situation) and at at same time they were moving in opposite directions (roughly parallel to the original line that they form with each other), the speed with which they are moving and the distance traveled would be proof that discrete positions in space are not artificial creations. I understand that all objects form a line with each other (until you have 3 or more), but what i meant by that is if two objects have an original vector to their motion, I meant the original line formed prior to the vectors of the two objects changing. This is assuming the vectors of the objects change anytime soon anyway.

As for instants in time, well Calculus would teach that for calculation purposes, the concept of instances in time are real in the extent that they are used by engineers and physicists. If you want to elaborate on why you think instances in time is a ridicoulous concept i would be more than happy to hear what you say.

Quoting jgill

Here is Peter Lynds' paper in which he postulates that there are no instants of time.

Thanks, I read it a couple of months ago and found it relatively unremarkable since Peirce had that insight a century earlier.

Quoting christian2017

When you say continuous motion, who would argue with you on that?

People who insist that space and time are composed of discrete positions and instants, rather than truly continuous.

Quoting christian2017

As for discrete positions in space, if there was two galaxies or two asteroids roughly (roughly) in line with each other (hypothethical situation) and at at same time they were moving in opposite directions (roughly parallel to the original line that they form with each other), the speed with which they are moving and the distance traveled would be proof that discrete positions in space are not artificial creations.

The motion is real, but speed and distance are measurements facilitated by marking positions and instants, and then comparing them with arbitrary unit intervals.

Quoting christian2017

As for instants in time, well Calculus would teach that for calculation purposes, the concept of instances in time are real in the extent that they are used by engineers and physicists.

Usefulness does not entail reality; positions and instants are paradigmatic examples of "useful fictions."

Quoting christian2017

If you want to elaborate on why you think instances in time is a ridicoulous concept i would be more than happy to hear what you say.

I never suggested that it is a ridiculous concept, just that time is not composed of discrete instants, contra McTaggart.

Quoting aletheist

... John Ellis McTaggart argues for "The Unreality of Time." His basic claim is that time cannot be real because it is contradictory ...

A remark that I need to make on McTaggart's work, is very similar to what Karl Popper wrote in his seminal publication, Science as falsification:

Quoting Karl Popper in 'Science as falsification' on the requirement to take a risk

With Einstein's theory the situation was strikingly different. Take one typical instance— Einstein's prediction, just then confirmed by the finding of Eddington's expedition.

Now the impressive thing about this case is the risk involved in a prediction of this kind. If observation shows that the predicted effect is definitely absent, then the theory is simply refuted. The theory is incompatible with certain possible results of observation—in fact with results which everybody before Einstein would have expected.[1] This is quite different from the situation I have previously described,when it turned out that the theories in question were compatible with the most divergent human behavior, so that it was practically impossible to describe any human behavior that might not be claimed to be a verification of these theories.

Einstein's characterization of time is indeed risky:

Quoting Wikipedia on time in physics

Albert Einstein's 1905 special relativity challenged the notion of absolute time, and could only formulate a definition of synchronization for clocks that mark a linear flow of time. Einstein's equations predict that time should be altered by the presence of gravitational fields (see the Schwarzschild metric). That is, the stronger the gravitational field (and, thus, the larger the acceleration), the more slowly time runs. The predictions of time dilation are confirmed by particle acceleration experiments and cosmic ray evidence, where moving particles decay more slowly than their less energetic counterparts. Einstein's theory was motivated by the assumption that every point in the universe can be treated as a 'center', and that correspondingly, physics must act the same in all reference frames. There is no 'universal clock'. An act of synchronization must be performed between two systems, at the least.

As you can see from the quote mentioned above, Einstein took a real risk in his theory of time, as he predicted the gravitational slowdown of time. It can be tested. It could have turned out to be wrong, but it didn't.

I do not see where McTaggart would be taking any risk at all in his theory of time.

Therefore, McTaggart's theory must be considered too easy. In line with what Karl Popper wrote, McTaggart's work is irrelevant in a sense that you cannot do anything with it. It simply does not matter whether time is discrete or continuous until it can actually be tested.

Quoting 3017amen

1. Do you think then, that the reality of time is continuous (which would preclude/deny the law of noncontradiction) in nature?

No, I think there is evidence from quantum physics which indicates that time is likely composed of discrete units.

Quoting 3017amen

And so when completed, I say: " Here, I just finished the calculation." That process of computation spanned or bridged the past, present and future. Does that in anyway, violate the law of noncontradiction?

There is no violation of the law of non-contradiction if the different described states are at different times. The problem occurs when we consider what occurs between the states, what the ancients called "becoming", and Aristotle addressed as "change". The "becoming" which is the event of change between one describable state and another, is neither the one nor the other state. So like aletheist explains, we are inclined to say it violates the law of excluded middle. But once we make this separation between the described states of being, and the activity of becoming, we need to establish a relationship between them such that they can both be real. The modern inclination is to affirm that activity is real, states are artificial descriptions, and assume a continuous reality of activity. However, then there is nothing to validate the law of non-contradiction, and it may be precluded from epistemology as an unrealistic way of looking at the world.

Quoting Zelebg

This has no impact on the argument, I think, but it is quite possible we are only aware as a sequence of conscious instants in time. Motion can then be perceived via motion blur effect.

If this is the case, it does have an effect on the argument, because it would indicate that the perspective of the conscious human being spans numerous instants of time. If consciousness were restricted to one instant, the present instant, then we would observe a succession of instants. To get the "blur effect", the conscious being must be observing numerous instants in what appears (from the perspective of the consciousness) as "at the same time". The consciousness is observing numerous instants "at the same time", and is incapable of detecting the division between them.

Notice that "at the same time" here is an artificial determination made by the consciousness, and does not necessarily mean simultaneous. The problem is that any determination of "a time", in the sense of "what time it is", consists of a period of duration. There is no such thing as determining a point in time, when we say "now" this consists of the duration of time required to say "now". So "at the same time" here does not imply instants which are simultaneous, it implies the succession of instants which exist within that determination of "now". "The time it is" is determined by the ability of the consciousness to determine the shortest period of time, but within that short period, there is still numerous distinct instants, which from the perspective of the consciousness, exist at the same time, because it has not the capacity to individuate them. This is why the consciousness is inclined to violate the law of non-contradiction.

Quoting aletheist

No, it does not. Again, there is never an instant or lapse of time at which incompatible states of things are realized such that both "S is P" and "S is not-P" are true, which would violate the principle of contradiction.

You are not understanding the issue. If "S is P", and "S is not-P", are real applicable descriptions of the world and they may be true or false, then within any lapse of time both of these may be true. At the beginning of the time lapse one is true, and at the end of the time lapse the other is true. Depending on what S and P signify we can extend this to any lapse of time. That is the problem. If time is truly continuous, and any determination of "now", "this time", or "that time", necessarily designates a duration of time, then within that time period the law of non-contradiction will be violated because there will be change within that time lapse.

So if we assume that time is continuous, then we need to face the reality that descriptions such as "S is P", and "S is not-P", have no real bearing on reality, because they become incoherent with the loss of the law of non-contradiction. Therefore we proceed to the conclusion that a true description of reality would not include such descriptions, we opt to violate the law of excluded middle, and assume that reality is neither, the terms are not really applicable. But now we have a division between our descriptions and logical assessments of the world (the world can be described by true and false propositions), and what we truly believe the world is like (such descriptions cannot describe the world).

Quoting aletheist

No, from a phenomenological standpoint the present is defined as that part of time of which we are conscious. Another way of putting it is that the temporal present corresponds directly to whatever is present to the mind.

As I explained, this is a false description. This is very evident from the fact that we are conscious of memories of the past, and conscious of future occurrences. Defining the present as "that part of time which we are conscious" is completely subjective, unscientific, and misleading. Therefore we need an objective, scientific definition, supported by empirical observation. Since we notice that the past is substantially different from the future, we can produce a much more objective definition by defining the present as the division between past and future.

Quoting aletheist

Yes, but there is no inconsistency between this additional definition and what I have stated above.

That's right, there is no real inconsistency between my definition and your definition, but your definition includes ambiguity inherent within, due to the subjective nature of consciousness. You say the present is determined by consciousness. But each individual consciousness might determine "the present" in its own way. Therefore there is ambiguity as to what "the present" really is. I say the present is the division between past and future, and each consciousness may determine this division in its own way. So I remove the ambiguity from "the present", with a clear and precise definition of what the present is, and assign the appearance of ambiguity to a deficiency in the human capacity to determine the present.

Here's an analogy. Your way of defining would define "sugar" as whatever the conscious being perceived as sweet (the present is what the conscious being perceives as present). So there would be some ambiguity and variance as to which foods exactly have sugar, because of a variance in human tastes. I would define "sugar" according to some principles of chemical constitution (the present is the objective division between past and future), then the ambiguity as to which foods have sugar is a function of the variance in conscious experience, not an ambiguity in nature (the ambiguity in "the present" is a feature of human deficiency, not a feature of nature).

Quoting aletheist

The present is when the indeterminate future becomes the determinate past, and as with any other event, this is realized at a lapse of time rather than an instant.

This is the debatable principle, and the difference between our two perspectives can be clarified in reference to discussion of this principle. Let's assume that your description of the future as indeterminate, and your description of the past, as determinate, is a real, true description, supported by reality. There must be a separation, division, or boundary between these two, which is a real objective boundary, supported in reality. That is my definition of "the present", this real, objective boundary between past and future. Your definition of "the present" states that the present is "that part of time which we are conscious". Therefore in your definition "the present", is stated as something dependent on the conscious experience, with its subjectivities, and determined with the deficiencies of the human capacity. My definition looks beyond the deficiencies of human experience to define "the present" in relation to something within the objective world which is responsible for that experience of the present.

However, once we assume a real objective boundary between future and past, then we have real division within time, and we can no longer assume time as continuous. Recognition that the future is indeterminate, and the past is determinate is sufficient for the conclusion that continuity is not an aspect of time, because that part of time which is past must be distinct from that part of time which is future.

Quoting aletheist

if events were "separated" and "individuated," then they would necessarily be discontinuous.

Right, this is the point which you do not seem to be able to grasp. If reality consists of "events", then there is necessarily separation between the individual events, and it is impossible that time is continuous. You speak as if you believe that reality consists of events, and time is continuous. That is impossible.

Events would be mental snapshots, or categories, of the continuous flow causation. Minds break up the analog signal of the world into binary bits that are meaningful to our goals. The separation/discontinuity only exists in our minds.

Reply to Metaphysician Undercover

If this is the case, it does have an effect on the argument, because it would indicate that the perspective of the conscious human being spans numerous instants of time. If consciousness were restricted to one instant, the present instant, then we would observe a succession of instants. To get the "blur effect", the conscious being must be observing numerous instants in what appears (from the perspective of the consciousness) as "at the same time". The consciousness is observing numerous instants "at the same time", and is incapable of detecting the division between them.

Imagine a single photograph represents your conscious instant of visual perception. You put your finger in front and left of your nose and move it to the right. Say, during that motion you were conscious 5 times, so there are 5 of those photographs or frames, but you are only ever aware of a single one at any of those conscious instants, so how do you perceive motion / time?

First frame shows the finger on the left. Time passes until the next frame and this first picture fades, say 50%. Second frame then shows the finger a bit to the right, but “underneath” is still visible that first frame. Time passes, picture fades, third frame shows three fingers, and so on...

So you see, we do actually perceive multiple time points simultaneously even if we are aware only at time separated single instants in time, but with the constant refresh rate that is sufficient to precisely judge the speed and consequently the time. In fact, I do not see there can be any other way to explain the motion blur effect, so likely this is the best theory on the subject, if there are any other theories at all.

Quoting aletheist

That is the theory of time known as eternalism.

Hi aletheist!

No. I am using the Block-universe illustration as a metaphor in trying to describe Mc Taggart's view that present tense of Time is an illusion, and paradoxical. And as such, thinking of how small that interval of time actually is (Planck time if you like), when looking at it graphically from the Block-universe illustration. (That slice of time as it were.)

Considering then, how small the-now really is, aren't we referring to intervals and duration of time itself, not the phenomenon of change in and of itself, correct?

For instance, you and I discussed time zones being an arbitrary measurement of time. Ok we agree. And we certainly have a general understanding of Einstein's Relativity and the associated fluctuations in time thereto. So, how can time really help us here? How should time really exist?

All we do know for sure is, that change exists. For example, we know consciousness requires change for it to cognize. We know giving birth requires change for its existence. And we also know that nature requires change for it to even exist, and function properly. But the distinctions of Time (past, present, future), is what we are trying to reconcile, with change.

And so in the context of change, my concern is how the present tense effects that ongoing change, that appears to be logically necessary. I think that change has effects on the present; the present doesn't effect change. Conscious thought and the process of cognition has proved this.

Consider a flow of water from a hose or the flow of electromagnetic waves. Then consider that we ride that flow. What if the flow stops? What happens to the present tense of existence then? Does it cease to exist?

If the present moment is static, how can it even exist? I believe that is what the video was trying to illustrate. It was trying to show the present is simply trying to divide past from future.

We know from physics that space and time are considered to be continuous. I submit, we now need to focus our thought on change. The phenomenon of change; of being, of becoming, of cognizing.

Again, the subject matter is very intriguing, however, my philosophy is to look for paradox. When I find paradox, I know truth exists.

Reply to aletheist

Imagine a series of instantaneous photographs to be taken. Then, no matter how closely they follow one another, there is no more motion visible in any one of them than if they were taken at intervals of centuries.
— Peirce, c. 1895

Apparently not true, as explained in my previous post. Perhaps if there were video games and virtual reality in 19th century Pierce would know what memory buffer and consciousness is, so we should forgive him for being wrong and you should stop quoting him, if for nothing else than just because he’s not speaking proper language of today, but even generally it’s all just self-refuting gibberish.

Reply to Harry Hindu

Events would be mental snapshots, or categories, of the continuous flow causation. Minds break up the analog signal of the world into binary bits that are meaningful to our goals. The separation/discontinuity only exists in our minds.

That's fine, except for Zeno's paradoxes. The world seems to be digital at the bottom of it, and if we are to believe in contemporary physics, that is exactly what “Planck scale” tells us. But people just don’t like it, for some reason. Is there anything wrong with the digital universe?

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

No, I think there is evidence from quantum physics which indicates that time is likely composed of discrete units.

No, the Planck time is the duration required for light to travel the Planck length in a vacuum, and the Planck length is the distance below which our current physics equations are no longer valid. In other words, I understand them to be mathematical limitations on marking and measuring time and space, not real properties of continuous spacetime.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

If "S is P", and "S is not-P", are real applicable descriptions of the world and they may be true or false, then within any lapse of time both of these may be true.

No, the principle of contradiction is that they cannot both be true at the same determination of time. However, each can be true at different determinations of time, as long as there is a determination of time in between--what I have been calling an event-lapse--at which neither is true.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

At the beginning of the time lapse one is true, and at the end of the time lapse the other is true.

No, before the event-lapse one is true, and after the event-lapse the other is true. Again, during the event-lapse neither is true.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

If time is truly continuous, and any determination of "now", "this time", or "that time", necessarily designates a duration of time, then within that time period the law of non-contradiction will be violated because there will be change within that time lapse.

No, continuous change during a lapse of time does not violate the principle of contradiction; it only violates the principle of excluded middle, which is true only of absolutely determinate--i.e., unchanging--states of things.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

But now we have a division between our descriptions and logical assessments of the world (the world can be described by true and false propositions), and what we truly believe the world is like (such descriptions cannot describe the world).

Yes, we must conclude that classical logic is not universally valid, because the principle of excluded middle is not strictly true:

Peirce, 1881:The principle of contradiction is more elementary than that of excluded middle, so that we may begin by considering the consequences of the former while leaving the latter out of account.

Peirce, 1881:The two principles of contradiction and excluded middle do not stand at all upon the same plane ... what concerns us now is that certain rudimentary forms of reasoning, embracing all those that the traditional logic has handed down to us, depend only upon the impossibility of a fact's being both true and false, and remain equally sound arguments, if we suppose that some things are neither true nor false.

Peirce, 1893:To speak of the actual state of things implies a great assumption, namely that there is a perfectly definite body of propositions which, if we could only find them out, are the truth, and that everything is really either true or in positive conflict with the truth. This assumption, called the principle of excluded middle, I consider utterly unwarranted, and do not believe it. Still, I hold that there is reason for thinking it to be very nearly true.

Peirce, 1893:No doubt there is an assumption involved in speaking of the actual state of things ... namely, the assumption that reality is so determinate as to verify or falsify every possible proposition. This is called the principle of excluded middle ... I do not believe it is strictly true ... It is convenient, not only in a practical but in a philosophical sense, to commence with the study of arguments which assume such an absolutely determinate state of things, without ourselves asserting that such a state is quite realized.

Peirce, 1909:Triadic Logic is that logic which, though not rejecting entirely the Principle of Excluded Middle, nevertheless recognizes that every proposition, S is P, is either true, or false, or else S has a lower mode of being such that it can neither be determinately P, nor determinately not-P, but is at the limit between P and not P ... Thus the Triadic Logic does not conflict with Dyadic Logic; only, it recognizes, what the latter does not ... Triadic Logic is universally true. But Dyadic Logic is not absolutely false ...

As these quotes indicate, Peirce rather remarkably anticipated what we now call intuitionistic logic, which omits both excluded middle and double negation elimination, as well as three-valued logic. In fact, he developed a rudimentary truth table for the latter more than a decade before Lukasiewicz and Post. The "lower mode of being" in the last quote corresponds to an existential subject in a state of change, rather than a prolonged state of things.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

Therefore we need an objective, scientific definition, supported by empirical observation. Since we notice that the past is substantially different from the future, we can produce a much more objective definition by defining the present as the division between past and future.

Yes, but all empirical observation is ultimately phenomenological observation that is always and only happening at the present. We cannot observe the past or the future; we can only remember the past and anticipate the future, which is how we tell them apart. It is perfectly consistent, then, to define the present as both the determination of time at which anything is present to the mind and the indefinite lapse that is later than the determinate past and earlier than the indeterminate future.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

However, once we assume a real objective boundary between future and past, then we have real division within time, and we can no longer assume time as continuous.

No, I hold that the "real objective boundary between future and past" is a continuous portion of time (lapse), rather than a discrete limit in time (instant). The past is indeed distinct from the future, but the present moment--at which an indefinitely gradual state of change is always being realized--is not sharply distinguishable from the immediately past and future moments.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

If reality consists of "events", then there is necessarily separation between the individual events, and it is impossible that time is continuous.

Yes, but I never claimed that reality consists of individual events; that is essentially McTaggart's view, contributing to his assessment that time is unreal. Instead, reality consists of states of things--both facts and events realized at continuous lapses of time--which we abstract from it when we signify them with propositions:

Peirce, 1906:A state of things is an abstract constituent part of reality, of such a nature that a proposition is needed to represent it. There is but one individual, or completely determinate, state of things, namely, the all of reality. A fact is so highly a prescissively abstract state of things, that it can be wholly represented in a simple proposition, and the term "simple," here, has no absolute meaning, but is merely a comparative expression.

The only absolutely determinate--i.e., unchanging--state of things is the totality of what has been realized in the past, and even that is always growing in the present as new states of things are continuously realized.

Reply to aletheist

Of course he made assumptions, as all of us do.

I repeat, Zeno did not make any assumptions, and if you again disagree without actually saying what assumption do you think he made I will conclude you are a robot programmed to waste time.

If they were "all one and the same concept," then we would not have three different terms for them.

How did you arrive at such an obviously false conclusion?

I acknowledge that analog and digital loosely correspond to continuous and discrete, respectively; but again, infinitely divisible is not synonymous with continuous.

So instead of 5 minutes googling and looking up a dictionary you decided to hold on to your personal imaginary language and keep talking gibberish. Please, what is your definition of “continuous”, and where did you find it?

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

I think there is evidence from quantum physics which indicates that time is likely composed of discrete units

But our perception of things in consciousness deny p and -p, no? (Conscious and subconscious mind working together apprehending past present future.)

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

The modern inclination is to affirm that activity is real, states are artificial descriptions,

And are those artificial descriptions time itself?

Quoting 3017amen

I am using the Block-universe illustration as a metaphor in trying to describe Mc Taggart's view that present tense of Time is an illusion, and paradoxical. And as such, thinking of how small that interval of time actually is (Planck time if you like), when looking at it graphically from the Block-universe illustration.

As should be abundantly clear by now after my various responses to @Metaphysician Undercover, I believe that any conception of the present as a discrete instant, or even a definite interval, is false. In other word's McTaggart's model of time as a series of individual positions is indeed unreal, because time itself is not like that.

Quoting 3017amen

All we do know for sure is, that change exists.

Yes, but time is precisely the aspect of reality that makes this possible.

Quoting 3017amen

But the distinctions of Time (past, present, future), is what we are trying to reconcile, with change.

In my view, the past does not change, while the present is always a state of change.

Quoting 3017amen

I think that change has effects on the present; the present doesn't effect change.

I would suggest saying instead that the present is when all change is happening. The present is not a thing that affects other things or is affected by them, it is a general determination of time, which is a real law that governs the changing of things.

Quoting 3017amen

What if the flow stops? What happens to the present tense of existence then? Does it cease to exist?

That would indeed correspond to the hypothetical completion of all time, when everything is in the past and therefore absolutely determinate, such that no further change is possible. In other words, not only would there be no future as the growing block theory posits, but also no present.

Quoting 3017amen

Again, the subject matter is very intriguing, however, my philosophy is to look for paradox. When I find paradox, I know truth exists.

By contrast, I tend to look for ways to resolve paradoxes, but I try to acknowledge and accept them when this is unsuccessful.

Quoting aletheist

Yes, but time is precisely the aspect of reality that makes this possible.

That's an interesting statement! That begs at least one question, does change precede time?

Quoting aletheist

present is not a thing that affects other things or is affected by them, it is a general determination of time, which is a real law that governs the changing of things.

It doesn't seem to be correct, we just discussed that time is arbitrary viz time zones, etc. No?

Quoting aletheist

contrast, I tend to look for ways to resolve paradoxes, but I try to acknowledge and accept them when this is unsuccessful.

Indeed, but unresolved paradox or otherwise brute mystery tells us something.

Peirce, 1895:Imagine a series of instantaneous photographs to be taken. Then, no matter how closely they follow one another, there is no more motion visible in any one of them than if they were taken at intervals of centuries.

Quoting Zelebg

Apparently not true, as explained in my previous post.

The key words here are "imagine," "instantaneous," and "one." This is a thought experiment, since no real camera can take an instantaneous photograph; and even though a real photograph of something moving can have blurs in it due to the duration of exposure, there is still no motion visible in that one image. The same is true of any one frame of a video.

Quoting Zelebg

I repeat, Zeno did not make any assumptions, and if you again disagree without actually saying what assumption do you think he made I will conclude you are a robot programmed to waste time.

Which one of his paradoxes would you specifically like to discuss as relevant to the thread topic?

Quoting Zelebg

Please, what is your definition of “continuous”, and where did you find it?

Google says "forming an unbroken whole; without interruption," so nothing about being infinitely divisible. Again, the rational numbers are infinitely divisible, yet not continuous. For me, infinite divisibility is just one of five properties that are jointly necessary and sufficient for true continuity; here is how I am presenting them in a forthcoming journal paper:

• Rationality - every portion conforms to one general law or Idea, which is the final cause by which the ontologically prior whole calls out its parts.
• Divisibility - every portion is an indefinite material part, unless and until it is deliberately marked off with a limit to become a distinct actual part.
• Homogeneity - every portion has the same dimensionality as the whole, while every limit between portions is a topical singularity of lower dimensionality.
• Contiguity - every portion has a limit in common with each adjacent portion, and thus the same mode of immediate connection with others as every other has.
• Inexhaustibility - limits of any multitude, or even exceeding all multitude, may always be marked off to create additional actual parts within any previously uninterrupted portion.

The application to time is that the portions are lapses, the limits are instants, and the one general law or Idea to which every lapse conforms is an indefinitely gradual state of change.

Quoting 3017amen

All we do know for sure is, that change exists.

Quoting aletheist

Yes, but time is precisely the aspect of reality that makes this possible.

Quoting 3017amen

That's an interesting statement! That begs at least one question, does change precede time?

Since this is The Philosophy Forum, I feel the need to be pedantic and point out that begging a question is a logical fallacy, a form of circular reasoning; it involves assuming that which one is trying to prove. What I take you to mean is that this raises or prompts at least one question, and the answer depends on how we define the terms. What do you mean by "change"? by "precede"? by "time"?

Quoting aletheist

The present is not a thing that affects other things or is affected by them, it is a general determination of time, which is a real law that governs the changing of things.

Quoting 3017amen

It doesn't seem to be correct, we just discussed that time is arbitrary viz time zones, etc. No?

Again, how we mark and measure the passage of time is arbitrary, but time itself is real (in my view).

Quoting aletheist

By contrast, I tend to look for ways to resolve paradoxes, but I try to acknowledge and accept them when this is unsuccessful.

Quoting 3017amen

Indeed, but unresolved paradox or otherwise brute mystery tells us something.

Paradoxes are one thing, but I agree with Peirce that we should be very reluctant to accept anything as a "brute mystery" and give up on finding a rational explanation for it. As he put it:

Peirce, 1898:Upon this first, and in one sense this sole, rule of reason, that in order to learn you must desire to learn, and in so desiring not be satisfied with what you already incline to think, there follows one corollary which itself deserves to be inscribed upon every wall of the city of philosophy,
Do not block the way of inquiry.

P.S. Is there a reason why you keep splitting up your replies into multiple posts? If you do not mind, I would appreciate it if you could group them together instead, as I have been doing.

Quoting aletheist

I feel the need to be pedantic and point out that begging a question is a logical fallacy, a form of circular reasoning; it involves assuming that which one is trying to prove. What I take you to mean is that this raises or prompts at least one question, and the answer depends on how we define the terms. What do you mean by "change"? by "precede"? by "time"?

No. It's not a logical fallacy. Instead, it's an Existential question about Time and change.

If you are unable to answer the questions, just say so, it's ok and quite acceptable.

Perhaps another way of thinking about those questions, in a similar context is (going back to the video), in your view, is every moment present? In other words, if change is an ongoing part of existence, and time and space are continuous, does that not render static phenomena non-existent?

If there is any truth to that, then perhaps change itself, is paramount over the human construct of time. Change precedes time, much like the existential ethos of: existence precedes essence.

Isn't that one unresolved paradox associate with time? So, the question is, which came first, change or time?

Reply to aletheist

Which one of his paradoxes would you specifically like to discuss as relevant to the thread topic?

Any, and that you do not "see” that makes me think you are a robot, but explains why you can not infer continuity and infinite divisibility are one and the same concept.

Google says "forming an unbroken whole; without interruption," so nothing about being infinitely divisible. Again, the rational numbers are infinitely divisible, yet not continuous.

So you see, there is more than one word or phrase describing the same concept, some more, some less specific, and focusing on different aspects.

When talking about continuity of time and space, the aspect of continuity that is important is ‘infinite divisibility’, which is more than obvious from Zeno’s paradoxes.

For me, infinite divisibility is just one of five properties that are jointly necessary and sufficient for true continuity; here is how I am presenting them in a forthcoming journal paper:

Rationality - every portion conforms to one general law or Idea, which is the final cause by which the ontologically prior whole calls out its parts.
Divisibility - every portion is an indefinite material part, unless and until it is deliberately marked off with a limit to become a distinct actual part.
Homogeneity - every portion has the same dimensionality as the whole, while every limit between portions is a topical singularity of lower dimensionality.
Contiguity - every portion has a limit in common with each adjacent portion, and thus the same mode of immediate connection with others as every other has.
Inexhaustibility - limits of any multitude, or even exceeding all multitude, may always be marked off to create additional actual parts within any previously uninterrupted portion.

The application to time is that the portions are lapses, the limits are instants, and the one general law or Idea to which every lapse conforms is an indefinitely gradual state of change.

Uhh. There can either be a finite number of successive points in time between now and then, or the number is infinite. That is all, pick one:

A.) time is continuous / analog / infinitely divisible
B.) time is discrete / digital / consist of finite intervals

Reply to aletheist

No, the Planck time is the duration required for light to travel the Planck length in a vacuum, and the Planck length is the distance below which our current physics equations are no longer valid. In other words, I understand them to be mathematical limitations on marking and measuring time and space, not real properties of continuous spacetime.

That is fine, except for Zeno. Those paradoxes are still very relevant in the deepest metaphysical sense, they are exactly the test you need to apply on your conclusions, so it's something you really need to consider far more extensively as you seem to not be aware of them at all.

Quoting 3017amen

It's not a logical fallacy. Instead, it's an Existential question about Time and change.

You completely missed my pedantic point. You said "begs the question" when you meant "raises the question" or "prompts the question."

Quoting 3017amen

In other words, if change is an ongoing part of existence, and time and space are continuous, does that not render static phenomena non-existent?

Yes, in my view any instantaneous state of things is an artificial creation of thought for the purpose of describing reality, not a constituent of reality itself.

Quoting 3017amen

If there is any truth to that, then perhaps change itself, is paramount over the human construct of time.

Again, I deny that time is merely a human construct.

Quoting 3017amen

So, the question is, which came first, change or time?

"Coming first" already implies temporal precedence, so it presupposes time, but my guess is that what you have in mind is logical priority. It might help to rephrase the question another way: Which is more plausible, change without time or time without change? I lean toward the latter; if there were no time, how could there be any change? We can imagine an unchanging state of things persisting through time--in fact, we routinely identify prolonged states of things by attributing properties to substances that persist through time--which suggests that time is more fundamental than change.

Quoting aletheist

Which one of his [Zeno's] paradoxes would you specifically like to discuss as relevant to the thread topic?

Quoting Zelebg

Any, and that you do not "see” that makes me think you are a robot

You claimed that Zeno makes no assumptions in any of his paradoxes. I am inviting you to choose one of them that you believe is most relevant to the thread topic, and then demonstrate that it requires no assumptions.

Quoting Zelebg

When talking about continuity of time and space, the aspect of continuity that is important is ‘infinite divisibility’, which is more than obvious from Zeno’s paradoxes.

I disagree, all five properties that I identified are important--jointly necessary and sufficient, as I said before.

Quoting Zelebg

There can either be a finite number of successive points in time between now and then, or the number is infinite. That is all, pick one:

Positing points already presupposes discreteness, even if there were infinitely many of them. Again, the rational numbers are infinite but not continuous, and I would say the same even of the real numbers, although most mathematicians since Cantor would disagree. If something is truly continuous, then it is not composed of points, although the number of points that we could theoretically mark on it is not just infinite, but exceeds all multitude.

Quoting Zelebg

Those paradoxes are still very relevant in the deepest metaphysical sense, they are exactly the test you need to apply on your conclusions, so it's something you really need to consider far more extensively as you seem to not be aware of them at all.

Okay, please educate me. Show me how one of Zeno's paradoxes applies to what I have presented in this thread so far. I am actually well aware of them, but it is always possible that I have missed something.

Quoting aletheist

I lean toward the latter; if there were no time, how could there be any change? We can imagine an unchanging state of things persisting through time--in fact, we routinely identify prolonged states of things by attributing properties to substances that persist through time--which suggests that time is more fundamental than change.

Well, that would contradict your statement earlier when you said that placing a phone call through different time zones was an arbitrary use of time. No?

Quoting 3017amen

Well, that would contradict your statement earlier when you said that placing a phone call through different time zones was an arbitrary use of time. No?

No, I never made any such statement. Here is what I actually said (in another thread):
Quoting aletheist

The fact that an east coast clock reads three hours later than a west coast clock is an arbitrary convention of how we mark and measure time, and reflects nothing about the real nature of time itself.

Quoting aletheist

Nonsense, time zones are arbitrary human constructs for marking and measuring time. The east coast is not three hours in the future relative to the west coast.

Frankly, I do not understand why you keep bringing up this particular example as if it were relevant to the thread topic. Why exactly do you think that it contradicts my suggestion that time is more fundamental than change?

Reply to aletheist

Positing points already presupposes discreteness, even if there were infinitely many of them.

Is one second of time infinitely divisible or not?

Reply to aletheist

Okay, please educate me. Show me how one of Zeno's paradoxes applies to what I have presented in this thread so far. I am actually well aware of them, but it is always possible that I have missed something.

https://www.iep.utm.edu/zeno-par/

-- "Because many of the arguments turn crucially on the notion that space and time are infinitely divisible, Zeno was the first person to show that the concept of infinity is problematical."

Quoting Zelebg

Is one second of time infinitely divisible or not?

Sure, but when you mark an instant to divide one second, you get two half-second lapses; and when you mark two more instants to divide those, you get four quarter-second lapses; and so on ad infinitum. In other words, we artificially insert discrete instants to create the parts, which are always continuous lapses.

Peirce, 1903:Kant squarely hit the nail on the head when he said that every part of a lapse of time was a lapse of time. But here as in many parts of his philosophy, Kant did not quite understand himself, and imagined that in saying that every part of a time is a time he had only said that time was infinitely divisible. He spoke wiser than he knew. To say that every part of time is a time is to say that time contains no absolute instant, no exact date; for such instant, or date, would be an ultimate part of time.

Quoting Zelebg

https://www.iep.utm.edu/zeno-par/

Thanks, but that article discusses at least ten different paradoxes. Please stipulate which one you believe is most relevant to the thread topic and supposedly involves no assumptions whatsoever.

Quoting Zelebg

"Because many of the arguments turn crucially on the notion that space and time are infinitely divisible, Zeno was the first person to show that the concept of infinity is problematical."

I suspect that much will hinge on how "infinitely divisible" is defined in the selected paradox; i.e., what assumptions are involved in how it treats continuous time.

Reply to aletheist

https://www.iep.utm.edu/zeno-par/

-- "In the Achilles Paradox, Achilles races to catch a slower runner—for example, a tortoise that is crawling in a line away from him. The tortoise has a head start, so if Achilles hopes to overtake it, he must run at least as far as the place where the tortoise presently is, but by the time he arrives there, it will have crawled to a new place, so then Achilles must run at least to this new place, but the tortoise meanwhile will have crawled on, and so forth. Achilles will never catch the tortoise, says Zeno."

Quoting aletheist

As for discrete positions in space, if there was two galaxies or two asteroids roughly (roughly) in line with each other (hypothethical situation) and at at same time they were moving in opposite directions (roughly parallel to the original line that they form with each other), the speed with which they are moving and the distance traveled would be proof that discrete positions in space are not artificial creations.
— christian2017
The motion is real, but speed and distance are measurements facilitated by marking positions and instants, and then comparing them with arbitrary unit intervals.

Did you see the example, how does that not prove that discrete positions in space are not a reality? Do you have a counter example? Relative time and relative positions are two different concepts. You might try to say that because time is relative that space is relative but it might seem counter-intuitive to you but that is not the case and certainly not in the strictest sense. Once again, do you have a counter example or perhaps you can use my example and show that is doesn't prove that there are absolute positions in space. Believe it or not but i am being very open minded about this.

As for McTaggart, i guess i'll have to read a 10 page essay to see how i feel about that paradox and then one month later, hypothetically me and you might (might) have a conversation about this subject.

Quoting aletheist

I lean toward the latter; if there were no time, how could there be any change? We can imagine an unchanging state of things persisting through time--in fact, we routinely identify prolonged states of things by attributing properties to substances that persist through time--which suggests that time is more fundamental than change.

This is confusing. You were saying on the one hand change is subordinate to time, yet on the other hand you are saying time is an arbitrary construct. So which is more real, change or time?

And I'm saying time is subordinate to change. Meaning, change occurs naturally in the phenomenal world we just arbitrarily project the human construct of time measurement to it. And of course you agreed with the notion of arbitrary time measurement in the phone call-time zone example. Do you see where the confusion is?

Quoting christian2017

for McTaggart, i guess i'll have to read a 10 page essay to see how i feel about that paradox and then one month later,

This is just a 3-min. synopsis of the illusion/paradox particularly related to past present and future/ McTaggart Example: is the present really real.

https://youtu.be/vh-IW9Y1htA

Reply to 3017amen

And I'm saying time is subordinate to change.

Problem is that it is not saying much, if anything at all. I could say time and change are two sides of the same coin. And now what? Can either be proven, or does it anyhow actually matter, at all? What is the purpose of making such a statement?

Reply to Zelebg

It would infer the likelihood that time is more arbitrary than not, no?

Reply to 3017amen

It would infer the likelihood that time is more arbitrary than not, no?

So many ways to look at one single question when each word can have so many different meanings, it looks different from different perspectives, pulls different conclusions depending on different goals or worldviews. Language is our enemy if we are not specific and do not use the same dictionary.

Therefore, every argument should have an example to go along, to specify the context and make clear what is the angle, what kind of answer is being expected, what kind of question is being asked.

I can both agree and disagree, but now I will agree with the following example. The patient has an open skull and is reading a book. Doctor sends a stream of magnetic pulses to a certain area and the patient freezes. After several seconds magnetic stimulation is turned off and the patient continues to read from the middle of a sentence as if nothing happened.

Reply to Zelebg
Conveniently, Peirce specifically addressed the Achilles paradox:
Quoting Peirce, 1902

... we should have to admit that Achilles could never overtake the tortoise if he had to resolve to run to where the tortoise then was, and having arrived there, to form a new resolution to run to the point at which the tortoise had then attained. This would involve the assumption that Achilles could not run unless he saw the tortoise ahead of him.

Put another way, Zeno's assumption is that Achilles must complete an infinite series of discrete steps, each of which consists of traversing a smaller and smaller distance in a smaller and smaller interval of time, in order to overtake the tortoise--which is obviously false. Recognizing continuous motion as the fundamental reality, rather than discrete and sequential positions and instants, dissolves the paradox because Achilles merely has to achieve an average speed that is greater than the tortoise's average speed.

Quoting christian2017

Did you see the example, how does that not prove that discrete positions in space are not a reality?

Sorry, I do not see how it does prove this. As I said, we artificially mark discrete positions for a particular purpose, such as measurement.

Quoting 3017amen

You were saying on the one hand change is subordinate to time, yet on the other hand you are saying time is an arbitrary construct.

Why do you keep putting words in my mouth? I said that time seems more fundamental than change, and how we mark and measure time is an arbitrary construct--not time itself. Do you see the difference? Likewise, how we mark and measure space is an arbitrary construct--not space itself--which is why we can use different systems of units (e.g., inch/foot/mile vs. mm/m/km).

Quoting 3017amen

And I'm saying time is subordinate to change. Meaning, change occurs naturally in the phenomenal world we just arbitrarily project the human construct of time measurement to it.

I find it impossible to conceive of real change without real time. It would require contradictory states of things to be realized simultaneously.

Reply to aletheist

Put another way, Zeno's assumption is that Achilles must complete an infinite series of discrete steps, each of which consists of traversing a smaller and smaller distance in a smaller and smaller interval of time, in order to overtake the tortoise--which is obviously false.

It's not assumption as if used to conclude something else, it's the subject of the paradox, hypothesis being tested. You agree it’s false, produces paradox, therefore you agree time is not infinitely divisible, you agree time is not continuous, and instead you are convinced that time advances at certain discrete intervals, or refresh rate, just like the universe of Pacman and Donkey Kong, or any video game.

Recognizing continuous motion as the fundamental reality, rather than discrete and sequential positions and instants, dissolves the paradox because Achilles merely has to achieve an average speed that is greater than the tortoise's average speed.

Infinitely divisible does not actually imply “infinite parts”, it’s only the most essential aspect of continuity, the most specific definition. One second of time is either infinitely divisible or not, there is no third option, so whatever you are trying to say must be just an awkward way to say one of those two things.

Continuity is the subject of the paradox, it can not be the solution to its own paradoxicality just like a question is not an answer to itself. You are talking about square-circles, self-refuting gibberish, may robot gods have mercy on your memory circuits.

Quoting aletheist

Do you see the difference?

Unfortunately I don't. That's okay we'll just agree to disagree.

Quoting aletheist

I find it impossible to conceive of real change without real time. It would require contradictory states of things to be realized simultaneously.

I think that's a bit absurd. That's like saying mathematic's came before the Giza pyramids. Or music theory came before the sounds of music.

If you're unable to see that the phenomenon of change relates to why we figured out how to measure it, then it would make any arguments about the concept of time irrelevant. Time relates to change in nature.

We didn't invent change we invented time.

Quoting Zelebg

You agree it’s false, produces paradox, therefore you agree time is not infinitely divisible, you agree time is not continuous, and instead you are convinced that time advances at certain discrete intervals, or refresh rate, just like the universe of Pacman and Donkey Kong, or any video game.

No, that is exactly backwards. Zeno's false assumption is that continuous motion requires an infinite series of discrete steps, which is precisely what I deny--there is no need to divide space or time infinitely in order to traverse a finite distance during a finite lapse.

Quoting Zelebg

One second of time is either infinitely divisible or not, there is no third option, so whatever you are trying to say must be just an awkward way to say one of those two things.

I addressed this already:
Quoting Zelebg

Is one second of time infinitely divisible or not?

Quoting aletheist

Sure, but when you mark an instant to divide one second, you get two half-second lapses; and when you mark two more instants to divide those, you get four quarter-second lapses; and so on ad infinitum. In other words, we artificially insert discrete instants to create the parts, which are always continuous lapses.

Quoting Zelebg

Continuity is the subject of the paradox, it can not be the solution to its own paradoxicality just like a question is not an answer to itself.

Again, the paradox is based on an incorrect concept of continuity as merely infinite divisibility. Time is not isomorphic to the rational numbers, or even the real numbers in my view.

Quoting aletheist

I find it impossible to conceive of real change without real time. It would require contradictory states of things to be realized simultaneously.

Quoting 3017amen

I think that's a bit absurd. That's like saying mathematic's came before the Giza pyramids. Or music theory came before the sounds of music.

No, your examples are more like saying that the philosophy of time came before anyone's experience of time, which would indeed be absurd. But that is not what I am saying. Please explain how there could be any change in a timeless reality without violating the principle of contradiction.

Quoting 3017amen

If you're unable to see that the phenomenon of change relates to why we figured out how to measure it, then it would make any arguments about the concept of time irrelevant. Time relates to change in nature.

You seem to be suggesting that we invented time in order to mark and measure change. I obviously disagree; in my view, we invented calendars and clocks in order to mark and measure time, which is real independently of them. Maybe we should indeed just recognize the impasse and move on.

Reply to aletheist

Sure, but when you mark an instant to divide one second, you get two half-second lapses; and when you mark two more instants to divide those, you get four quarter-second lapses; and so on ad infinitum. In other words, we artificially insert discrete instants to create the parts, which are always continuous lapses.

Yes, that is what "infinitely divisible" means. And you say one second of time is infinitely divisible. That is all we need, everything else follows.

Again, the paradox is based on an incorrect concept of continuity as merely infinite divisibility. Time is not isomorphic to the rational numbers, or even the real numbers in my view.

Numbers have nothing to do with this, especially not the way you look at them. There is a line from point A to point B representing either segment in space or time interval. And this line is then either continuous or discrete, i.e. it is either not composed of any parts and thus potentially infinitely divisible, or it is composed of unit parts and thus is further indivisible. Got it?

Quoting Zelebg

Numbers have nothing to do with this, especially not the way you look at them.

The rational numbers are infinitely divisible--e.g., 1, 1/2, 1/4, 1/8, etc.--yet obviously not continuous. Therefore, continuity is not reducible to infinite divisibility. Got it?

Reply to aletheist

There is a line from point A to point B representing either segment in space or time interval. And this line is then either continuous or discrete, i.e. it is either not composed of any parts and thus potentially infinitely divisible, or it is composed of unit parts and thus is further indivisible.

What part is confusing you?

Reply to Zelebg
The line is not composed of parts and thus potentially infinitely divisible, but that by itself is not sufficient to make something truly continuous. What part is confusing you?

Reply to aletheist

The line is not composed of parts and thus potentially infinitely divisible, but that by itself is not sufficient to make something truly continuous. What part is confusing you?

The part where you forgot to explain your point. True continuity!? It's really confusing why would you fabricate nonsense out of thin air, and how you disagree but forget to explain your assertion. Will you ever tell us about that special one true continuity and the secret of the missing ingredient?

Quoting Zelebg

Will you ever tell us about that special one true continuity and the secret of the missing ingredient?

I guess you forgot that I defined five properties that are jointly necessary and sufficient here.

Reply to aletheist

I guess you forgot that I defined five properties that are jointly necessary and sufficient here.

You are still not explaining how any of that has anything to do with infinite divisibility or Zeno's paradox.

Quoting Zelebg

You are still not explaining how any of that has anything to do with infinite divisibility or Zeno's paradox.

I already did, but I guess you forgot that, too. May we please get back to the thread topic now?

Reply to aletheist

Zeno said “by the time Achilles reaches the tortoise it would have crawled to a new place, again and again”, where do you see an assumption? And how is the question of infinite divisibility of time different from the thread topic?

Quoting Zelebg

Zeno said “by the time Achilles reaches the tortoise it would have crawled to a new place, again and again”, where do you see an assumption?

The false assumption is that Achilles must make an infinite series of discrete moves, in each case advancing only to the tortoise's position at the beginning of that move, rather than simply running faster than the tortoise and overtaking it accordingly. Again:

Peirce, 1902:... we should have to admit that Achilles could never overtake the tortoise if he had to resolve to run to where the tortoise then was, and having arrived there, to form a new resolution to run to the point at which the tortoise had then attained. This would involve the assumption that Achilles could not run unless he saw the tortoise ahead of him.

Suppose instead that Achilles and the tortoise are riding in trains on parallel tracks. The tortoise is initially 100 feet ahead and proceeding at 20 feet per second, while Achilles is going 40 feet per second. After 2.5 seconds, Achilles is where the tortoise started, while the tortoise is now 50 feet farther along. Nevertheless, after another 2.5 seconds, Achilles overtakes the tortoise.

Quoting Zelebg

And how is the question of infinite divisibility of time different from the thread topic?

The thread topic is not the infinite divisibility of time, or even the continuity of time, but the reality of time.

Reply to aletheist

Zeno's false assumption is that continuous motion requires an infinite series of discrete steps, which is precisely what I deny--there is no need to divide space or time infinitely in order to traverse a finite distance during a finite lapse.

That it is not assumption, that is the conclusion, you already agreed with, by the way.

Reply to aletheist

Suppose instead that Achilles and the tortoise are riding in trains on parallel tracks. The tortoise is initially 100 feet ahead and proceeding at 20 feet per second, while Achilles is going 40 feet per second. After 2.5 seconds, Achilles is where the tortoise started, while the tortoise is now 50 feet farther along. Nevertheless, after another 2.5 seconds, Achilles overtakes the tortoise.

You are reinterpreting the situation so to obfuscate the problem and then conclude there is no problem. I think that view is too naive to even be considered as a possible solution. Are you the only person alive who believes that is a reasonable answer to the paradox?

Reply to aletheist

The thread topic is not the infinite divisibility of time, or even the continuity of time, but the reality of time

Then you should care how real is virtual time, because discrete simulated time explains Zeno and Planck scale limits, while continuous time only makes no sense and is self-contradicting paradox.

Quoting aletheist

Did you see the example, how does that not prove that discrete positions in space are not a reality?
— christian2017
Sorry, I do not see how it does prove this. As I said, we artificially mark discrete positions for a particular purpose, such as measurement.

If two objects with velocities both move away from a given position that proves there are discrete positions. No where in the book a "brief history of time" nor in Newtonian Physics is the idea of discrete positions refuted. If a galaxy moves away from where it was a million years ago and then two million years later is even further away, all that can be measured.

Quoting Zelebg

Imagine a single photograph represents your conscious instant of visual perception. You put your finger in front and left of your nose and move it to the right. Say, during that motion you were conscious 5 times, so there are 5 of those photographs or frames, but you are only ever aware of a single one at any of those conscious instants, so how do you perceive motion / time?

First frame shows the finger on the left. Time passes until the next frame and this first picture fades, say 50%. Second frame then shows the finger a bit to the right, but “underneath” is still visible that first frame. Time passes, picture fades, third frame shows three fingers, and so on...

Your description is not really consistent. If the first instant only fades to 50% by the time the conscious person is aware of the second instant, then you can't really say that "a single photograph represents your conscious instant", because the person is conscious of part of the first, and the second, at one conscious instant.

Quoting aletheist

No, the principle of contradiction is that they cannot both be true at the same determination of time. However, each can be true at different determinations of time, as long as there is a determination of time in between--what I have been calling an event-lapse--at which neither is true.

The point is that if a moment of time is composed of an event, then within that event there is both S is P, and S is not-P because change occurs within the event. So, if "the moment" as an event-lapse, takes the place of "the instant", as the real "now", then "at the present time", "now", refers to a moment in which contradictory propositions are true. And since "now", or "at the present time" is the only valid or sound determination of time, the law of non-contradiction is violated.

If you proceed, as you do, by saying that there is a time period in which neither is true, then we have a time period, what you call an "event-lapse", which cannot be related to S is P. That duration of time cannot be described in these terms, because neither is applicable. Furthermore, since all time would consist of such event-lapses, S is P would not refer to anything real. This is evident also from the fact that S is P refers to a static state, so it requires an instant in time, when nothing is changing, to be true.

So what you are saying is that S is P, and S is not-P, along with terms like true and false, are not sound ways of describing the world, because the world consists of passing time, and it has no instants when such propositions could be true or false. The issue of course, is that we use such propositions, and they are very useful, so now we need to determine how such statements might relate to the real, changing world. To give soundness to S is P, we need to assume a duration, time-lapse, in which something is not changing, that something which remains the same over a period of time, constitutes S is P. This forms the basis of Aristotelian dualism, there are two aspects of reality. One aspect (form) is actively changing as time is passing, and the other (matter) is passive and does not change as time passes.

Quoting aletheist

No, before the event-lapse one is true, and after the event-lapse the other is true. Again, during the event-lapse neither is true.

These expressions, "before" and "after" the event-lapse, are not valid in this model. They require an instant, a boundary, to separate the event-lapse from the rest of time. But no such instant is allowed. Therefore the time period which is designated as the event-lapse is completely arbitrary. If you impose, and inject, such an arbitrary division into time, it has no real meaning as signifying anything true. So if you say "S is P" was true before a particular event-lapse this has no real meaning, because the designation of that event-lapse is completely arbitrary. Notice, that in reality we identify a particular time period by referring to S is P. We talk about the time when such and such is the case. If we can only identify a particular event-lapse period by referring to when S is P becomes false, then there is no need for the time lapse. And if we identify the time-lapse period by referring to when we are unsure as to whether S is P is true or false, then the beginning and end of the event-lapse is an arbitrary designation.

Quoting aletheist

Yes, but all empirical observation is ultimately phenomenological observation that is always and only happening at the present.

This is the false premise, which you propose, and I've gone through great effort to demonstrate to you that it is false. So I'll provide to you another indication that it is false. The human body has senses and a brain. Observations are made by the brain. Empirical information is received by the senses. It requires time for the brain to process empirical information. Therefore empirical observation is always of things in the past, not of things happening at the present. By the time the information is received by the brain, to make the observation, the thing being observed is in the past. So to say observation is "only happening at the present" is false and misleading, because a critical aspect of the observation, the thing being observed, is always in the past.

As I explained earlier, you need to dismiss this faulty representation of "the present" which you employ. doing such would greatly increase your capacity to understand the nature of time.

Quoting aletheist

No, I hold that the "real objective boundary between future and past" is a continuous portion of time (lapse), rather than a discrete limit in time (instant).

Do you not understand, that a "portion" requires that the piece which is portioned be separated from the rest of the thing which is portioned? Therefore to say that time is continuous, and also that there is a "portion" of time which represents "the present" is blatant contradiction.

So, I say that the present consists of one boundary which separates future from past. You say that the present consists of two boundaries, which separate out a "portion of time". You have introduced a complication by demanding two boundaries instead of one, to create a "portion" which is the present. The only reason I can see, for you to request two boundaries, is to create the illusion of a continuous time. But this is surely wrong, because you still need boundaries to support the claim of "a portion" and therefore time is not continuous.

Quoting aletheist

Yes, but I never claimed that reality consists of individual events; that is essentially McTaggart's view, contributing to his assessment that time is unreal. Instead, reality consists of states of things--both facts and events realized at continuous lapses of time--which we abstract from it when we signify them with propositions:

This is why I am trying to get you to recognize the contradiction inherent within what you say. Look, in the first sentence you claim to have never said that reality consists of events, and in the second sentence you say instead, reality consists of events and other things. See the contradiction? Either an individual event is real, (which would require boundaries to separate it from other events, meaning time is not continuous), or it is not, (which would mean that it is false to speak of reality consisting of events in any way).

Quoting aletheist

No, your examples are more like saying that the philosophy of time came before anyone's experience of time, which would indeed be absurd. But that is not what I am saying. Please explain how there could be any change in a timeless reality without violating the principle of contradiction.

No. that's what you are saying. Just to clear this up once and for all, you tell me where you stand on the following question:

1. Change in nature came first, then human's figured out how to measure it using sun dials, analog clocks, digital clocks, Planck time, etc.
2. Clocks and said measuring devices came first, then change in nature.

Now if I'm mistaken please provide correction. You have been arguing #2, is that correct?

As far as your last question, I'm not arguing 'change in a timeless reality' as you say. I'm suggesting that time and change are mutually exclusive . And you seem to be saying that change and time are not mutually exclusive, hence:

Quoting aletheist

I find it impossible to conceive of real change without real time. It would require contradictory states of things to be realized simultaneously.

Just to one-o-one it, here are the common definitions for your convenience:

1. Time: the indefinite continued progress of existence and events in the past, present, and future regarded as a whole.
2. Change: the act or instance of making or becoming different.

Reply to Metaphysician Undercover

Your description is not really consistent. If the first instant only fades to 50% by the time the conscious person is aware of the second instant, then you can't really say that "a single photograph represents your conscious instant", because the person is conscious of part of the first, and the second, at one conscious instant.

That a single image can hold multiple scenes using transparency does not contradict the claim we are only ever visually aware of a single image. It’s not inconsistency, it’s a genius insight to explain what you thought before was impossible.

Quoting Zelebg

That a single image can hold multiple scenes using transparency...

I think I know what you mean, but if this is the case, then it is false to call it a "conscious instant". There are numerous instants within what appears to be a "conscious instant". Therefore it only appears to be an instant, and that it is an instant is really an illusion. What you have called the "conscious instant" is really being conscious of numerous instants at the same (in that qualified sense of "at the same time"), and should not be called an "instant" at all.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

The point is that if a moment of time is composed of an event, then within that event there is both S is P, and S is not-P because change occurs within the event ... the law of non-contradiction is violated.

No, a moment of time is not composed of an event, an event is realized at a lapse of time. During that lapse, neither "S is P" nor "S is not-P" is true, so the principle of excluded middle is false; but there is never a moment at which both "S is P" and "S is not-P" are true, so the principle of contradiction is preserved. Please stop claiming otherwise.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

If you proceed, as you do, by saying that there is a time period in which neither is true, then we have a time period, what you call an "event-lapse", which cannot be related to S is P.

Yes, but only from the standpoint that neither P nor its negation not-P can be truly predicated of the existential subject S during that lapse of time. S continues to exist, it just has a lower mode of being in the sense that it is not determinately P or not-P when it is in the real and continuous process of changing from one to the other.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

Furthermore, since all time would consist of such event-lapses, S is P would not refer to anything real. This is evident also from the fact that S is P refers to a static state, so it requires an instant in time, when nothing is changing, to be true.

No, this indicates a misunderstanding. Recall that a fact as signified by a true proposition is only an abstract constituent part of reality; the existential subject S is always changing with respect to some of its qualities and relations, but not all of them. When "S is P" is true, it signifies a real prolonged state of things with respect to that individual existential subject and that general character or relation; likewise for "S is not-P."

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

So what you are saying is that S is P, and S is not-P, along with terms like true and false, are not sound ways of describing the world, because the world consists of passing time, and it has no instants when such propositions could be true or false.

No, that is not what I am saying.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

To give soundness to S is P, we need to assume a duration, time-lapse, in which something is not changing, that something which remains the same over a period of time, constitutes S is P.

Yes, "S is P" or "S is not-P" is indeed a sound way of describing the world in most cases, because they signify prolonged states of things that are realized at any instant that we arbitrarily designate within a lapse of time during which the existential subject S is not in an indefinitely gradual state of change from P to not-P, or vice-versa. In other words, it is only during certain events that the principle of excluded middle is false of the relevant proposition; between those events, it remains true. Again, any existential subject is always changing in some respects, but unchanging in others.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

These expressions, "before" and "after" the event-lapse, are not valid in this model. They require an instant, a boundary, to separate the event-lapse from the rest of time. But no such instant is allowed. Therefore the time period which is designated as the event-lapse is completely arbitrary.

No, it is not completely arbitrary. You make a valid point about the need for an instant to serve as the limit between any two adjacent lapses, but it is not the case that "no such instant is allowed"; just that no such instant is a determination of time at which any state of things is realized to the exclusion of all other instants. Instead, for any instant whatsoever that we actualize by designating it, there are potential instants beyond all multitude within its immediate neighborhood--the surrounding indefinite moment--at which the same state of things is realized. With that in mind, there is some leeway for marking two particular instants as the commencement and completion of an event-lapse. Again, the main idea is that the earlier prolonged state of things is realized at one and the later (incompatible) prolonged state of things is realized at the other, so that the principle of contradiction is not violated; and there is an indefinitely gradual (i.e., continuous) state of change between those two instants.

Peirce, 1908:But this common-sense notion of time implies that every state of things that does not endure through a lapse of time is absolutely definite, that is, that two states, one the negation of the other, cannot exist at the same instant ... Accepting the common-sense notion, then, I say that it conflicts with that to suppose that there is ever any discontinuity in change. That is to say, between any two instantaneous states there must be a lapse of time during which the change is continuous, not merely in that false continuity which the calculus recognizes but in a much stricter sense.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

The human body has senses and a brain. Observations are made by the brain. Empirical information is received by the senses. It requires time for the brain to process empirical information. Therefore empirical observation is always of things in the past, not of things happening at the present. By the time the information is received by the brain, to make the observation, the thing being observed is in the past.

Yes, this is another point with some validity. However, I deny that phenomenological observations are made by the brain; instead, they are made by the mind, which is not reducible to the brain. That is why I define the present as not only the indefinite lapse of time between the past and the future, but also the indefinite lapse of time at which anything is present to the mind; again, in my view these are one and the same.

Peirce, 1895:The past is that part of time with which memory is concerned ... The future is that part of time with which the will is concerned ... We immediately know only the present moment, which alone immediately exists. The future we only conjecture; the past we remember, or think we remember. What do we remember? Our own experienced thoughts and feelings ... Thus, all we know is memory. We cannot go behind it: Its dicta must be accepted, except where self-refuted. But one of the things memory most enjoins upon our faith is that it reports a direct and immediate knowledge which existed in the past. Our memory is that we remember nothing except such things as have been present to us ... Events past are recalled by memory supposing they acted on our sense; events to come are anticipated supposing they are subject to our will.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

Do you not understand, that a "portion" requires that the piece which is portioned be separated from the rest of the thing which is portioned?

Yes, I understand that this is required by your peculiar definitions; but as has happened before in other threads, I disagree with them. The portions of whatever is continuous are also continuous, both internally and with each other, including lapses of time.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

So, I say that the present consists of one boundary which separates future from past. You say that the present consists of two boundaries, which separate out a "portion of time". You have introduced a complication by demanding two boundaries instead of one, to create a "portion" which is the present.

Yes, but two boundaries are necessary because events are constantly being realized at the present, which is why we directly perceive the flow of time and the motion of physical bodies. If the present were itself a single boundary--i.e., an instant--then whenever something changed, two incompatible states of things would be realized at that same instant, violating the principle of contradiction.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

Look, in the first sentence you claim to have never said that reality consists of events, and in the second sentence you say instead, reality consists of events and other things. See the contradiction?

No, in the first sentence I denied saying that reality consists of individual events, which would have to be realized at individual determinations of time; i.e., instants. I just explained why that is impossible, and I affirm instead that events are only realized at general determinations of time; i.e., lapses.

Quoting 3017amen

1. Change in nature came first, then human's figured out how to measure it using sun dials, analog clocks, digital clocks, etc.
2. Clocks and said measuring devices came first, then change in nature.
Now if I'm mistaken please provide correction. You have been arguing that #2 is that correct?

Good grief, of course not! As I said before:
Quoting aletheist

You seem to be suggesting that we invented time in order to mark and measure change. I obviously disagree; in my view, we invented calendars and clocks in order to mark and measure time, which is real independently of them.

Again, in my view time is more fundamental than change in nature; if there were no time, then there could be no change.

Quoting 3017amen

Just to one-o-one it, here are the common definitions for your convenience:
1. Time: the indefinite continued progress of existence and events in the past, present, and future regarded as a whole.
2. Change: the act or instance of making or becoming different.

I would not necessarily define time that way, but even if I did, it would be perfectly consistent with what I just said--if there were no progress of existence and events from past to present to future, then there could be no acts or instances of making or becoming different.

Reply to aletheist

Ok great. Now let's come full circle to something we discussed earlier. I'm not understanding, so forgive my interpretations.

When I asked you about the paradox of time zones viz placing a phone call and/or simple time travel from west to east, you said that the measurement of time was arbitrary and a man-made invention.. This then would support the notion that there is an element of illusion (and of course paradox) there. And that is because we cannot relive the hours that we lost and vise versa.

This would suggest that change is more fundamental than time, no?

Quoting 3017amen

When I asked you about the paradox of time zones viz placing a phone call and/or simple time travel from west to east ...

There is no paradox here. The phone call does not really take place three hours later on the east coast than on the west coast. Traveling from west to east is not "time travel" any more that staying in one place; if it takes you five hours to make the trip, then five hours will also have elapsed back where you started.

Quoting 3017amen

And that is because we cannot relive the hours that we lost and vise versa.

How many times do I have to repeat that there are no "lost" or "relived" hours? No matter where you travel on earth, your age in hours is exactly the same as it would be if you stayed where you were born.

Reply to aletheist

Reply to 3017amen :roll:

Reply to aletheist

I take that as acquiescence by silence? LOL

Quoting aletheist

Yes, but only from the standpoint that neither P nor its negation not-P can be truly predicated of the existential subject S during that lapse of time. S continues to exist, it just has a lower mode of being in the sense that it is not determinately P or not-P when it is in the real and continuous process of changing from one to the other.

Not only that, but it doesn't make sense to ever speak of whether P can be predicated of S, in this case, because it doesn't make sense to say S is P is true at one time, then at a later time S is P is not true, because neither S is P nor S is not-P is true. Saying that S is P is no longer true is equivalent to saying S is not-P. Therefore, at that time after S is P was true we'd have to say S is not-P at that time. But what is being claimed is that S is neither P nor is not-P. Therefore it doesn't make sense to speak of S in terms of P, at any time, if at any time S is neither P nor not P

Quoting aletheist

No, this indicates a misunderstanding. Recall that a fact as signified by a true proposition is only an abstract constituent part of reality; the existential subject S is always changing with respect to some of its qualities and relations, but not all of them. When "S is P" is true, it signifies a real prolonged state of things with respect to that individual existential subject and that general character or relation; likewise for "S is not-P."

As explained above, it doesn't make sense to speak of a time when S is P is true, if at a later time S is P is neither true nor false. This would mean that S is P would cease being true at that time, yet we cannot say that S is not P at that time when S ceases to be P, which is incoherent. Therefore we must maintain the categorical separation. To say S is neither P nor not-P implies that it is a category mistake to say that P might be predicated of S.

Quoting aletheist

Yes, "S is P" or "S is not-P" is indeed a sound way of describing the world in most cases, because they signify prolonged states of things that are realized at any instant that we arbitrarily designate within a lapse of time during which the existential subject S is not in an indefinitely gradual state of change from P to not-P, or vice-versa. In other words, it is only during certain events that the principle of excluded middle is false of the relevant proposition; between those events, it remains true. Again, any existential subject is always changing in some respects, but unchanging in others.

It's incoherent to say that there is a subject S, and sometimes S is either P or not-P, but at other times S is neither P nor not-P. If S is either P or not-P at sometimes, then what is it about S which would make it suddenly be neither P nor not-P? If S can be either P or not-P, then it is no longer S, but something completely different than S which can be neither P nor not-P.

Quoting aletheist

With that in mind, there is some leeway for marking two particular instants as the commencement and completion of an event-lapse.

I don't see how the marking is anything other than completely arbitrary. We could choose any physical indication whatsoever to mark the beginning or end of a time period. The only thing not arbitrary would be that the beginning must be before the end. Care to explain how you think marking could be other than arbitrary?

Quoting aletheist

That is why I define the present as not only the indefinite lapse of time between the past and the future, but also the indefinite lapse of time at which anything is present to the mind; again, in my view these are one and the same.

If the present is an "indefinite lapse of time", then that length, or time period which comprises the present is completely arbitrary. The present might be a nanosecond or it might be a billion years. Each of these is "present to the human mind". What would make one of these more "the real present" than the other? That's what I mean when I say that when you have nothing other than "the human mind" to determine the "lapse of time" the determination is arbitrary. The human mind needs a principle, based in something real, by which to determine the lapse of time which comprises the present, in order that the determination of "the present" is other than arbitrary.

Quoting aletheist

Yes, but two boundaries are necessary because events are constantly being realized at the present, which is why we directly perceive the flow of time and the motion of physical bodies.

If there are boundaries within a thing, then the thing which has boundaries within it (time in this case), is not continuous. I don't see why you have so much trouble understanding this fact. I used to think that you simply denied this in order to support your metaphysical position, but now I think that you really believe that a continuous thing can have boundaries within it. Do you not recognize that a boundary is the end of one thing and the beginning of another, and therefore, necessarily, a discontinuity?

Quoting aletheist

If the present were itself a single boundary--i.e., an instant--then whenever something changed, two incompatible states of things would be realized at that same instant, violating the principle of contradiction.

This is not true. Under this assumption, at one moment S is P is true, and at the next moment, S is P is false. The "instant" acts as a boundary of separation between these two such that one is before and the other is after, and the law of non-contradiction is not violated. The problem, as Aristotle demonstrated is that this does not allow for the existence of "becoming", or "change", because "becoming" is a temporal concept which cannot occur at an instant. Furthermore, if we replace the instant between S is P and S is not-P, with something like S is O, at that intermediate moment to account for becoming, then we'd have to suppose something like S is N to account for the moment of change between S is P and S is O, and so on ad infinitum. So when we talk about "becoming", the activity which is change in the world, it makes no sense to use propositions like S is P, because we are talking about something which is categorically different from "being", which is the type of thing that S is P refers to.

Here's a thought. These arguments about the nature of time go on interminably without clarification, repeated over and over. Why not try a different approach:

Momentum, from physics, is defined as mass times velocity: momentum=mass x ds/dt.
Why not try to define "momentum" and "mass" and "distance" for the evolution of ongoing events, then define an increment of time by: dt=mass x ds/mom? :chin:

Don't ask me how. Someway define the process of multiplication and division in the equation.

Or return to formal logic and proceed.

Reply to jgill
What does "ds/dt" mean?

Reply to Metaphysician Undercover

What does "ds/dt" mean?

Velocity, p=mv. But we don't need momentum and mass. Velocity = distance / time is sufficient. In either case I think the point is that there is no point of imagining any other concept of time but the one that fits this equation, and I don't see there is much room for interpretation.

Reply to jgill

Good thought! Any practical examples ?

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

Saying that S is P is no longer true is equivalent to saying S is not-P.

Only when the principle of excluded middle is true. Again, it is false during an indefinitely gradual state of change, when S is in the process of becoming not-P after previously being P, or vice-versa.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

Therefore it doesn't make sense to speak of S in terms of P, at any time, if at any time S is neither P nor not P

This does not follow, since existential subjects undeniably have different qualities and relations at different determinations of time. If "S is P" is true at an earlier determination of time, and "S is not-P" is true at a later determination of time, and both propositions cannot be true at the same determination of time (principle of contradiction), then there must a determination of time in between at which neither is true.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

To say S is neither P nor not-P implies that it is a category mistake to say that P might be predicated of S.

This mixes up the modalities of actuality and possibility. To say that neither "S is P" nor "S is not-P" is true does not entail that "S may be P" is false.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

If S is either P or not-P at some times, then what is it about S which would make it suddenly be neither P nor not-P?

The fact that S is in the process of changing from being P to being not-P, or vice-versa. The only alternative is to claim that such negation is instantaneous, which requires S to be both P and not-P at the same determination of time, thus violating the principle of contradiction.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

Care to explain how you think marking could be other than arbitrary?

I already did--it is not completely arbitrary, given our purpose of distinguishing the lapses of time at which two incompatible prolonged states of things are realized by marking off a lapse of time between them, during which an indefinitely gradual state of change is realized. There is some leeway, since whatever is realized at any given instant is also realized at other instants beyond all multitude that are "near" it, within its immediate neighborhood or "whenabouts."

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

If the present is an "indefinite lapse of time", then that length, or time period which comprises the present is completely arbitrary.

"Indefinite" is not synonymous with "arbitrary."

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

The present might be a nanosecond or it might be a billion years. Each of these is "present to the human mind". What would make one of these more "the real present" than the other?

This is a valid point from a strictly mathematical standpoint, which comes into play as soon as we introduce measurement. According to Peirce, Josiah Royce suggests in The World and the Individual that the present is a "time-span" of two seconds for humans, and "points out that a consciousness for which the events of a millionth of a second should exceed the time-span and another consciousness for which the events of a million years should be present at a glance would both be so utterly unlike our own that we should not easily recognize them as conscious beings at all." However, Peirce himself takes a very different approach. On the one hand, the present cannot mathematically be an instant with zero duration:

Peirce, 1873:The true conception is, that ideas which succeed one another during an interval of time, become present to the mind through the successive presence of the ideas which occupy the parts of that time. So that the ideas which are present in each of these parts are more immediately present, or rather less mediately present than those of the whole time. And this division may be carried to any extent. But you never reach an idea which is quite immediately present to the mind, and is not made present by the ideas which occupy the parts of the time that it occupies. Accordingly, it takes time for ideas to be present to the mind. They are present during a time. And they are present by means of the presence of the ideas which are in the parts of that time. Nothing is therefore present to the mind at an instant, but only during a time. The events of a day are less mediately present to the mind than the events of a year; the events of a second less mediately present than the events of a day.

On the other hand, the present also cannot mathematically be a lapse with finite duration:

Peirce, 1892:It has already been suggested by psychologists that consciousness necessarily embraces an interval of time. But if a finite time be meant, the opinion is not tenable. If the sensation that precedes the present by half a second were still immediately before me, then, on the same principle, the sensation preceding that would be immediately present, and so on ad infinitum. Now, since there is a time, say a year, at the end of which an idea is no longer ipso facto present, it follows that this is true of any finite interval, however short.

Instead, the present must mathematically be a moment with infinitesimal duration:

Peirce, 1892:But yet consciousness must essentially cover an interval of time; for if it did not, we could gain no knowledge of time, and not merely no veracious cognition of it, but no conception whatever. We are, therefore, forced to say that we are immediately conscious through an infinitesimal interval of time.

The problem is that the mathematical term "infinitesimal" implies "too small to be measured," while our phenomenological experience is such that the present moment is not amenable to measurement at all. Measurement requires comparison with an established standard, and there is obviously nothing else with which we can compare our ongoing experience of the present, since it is sui generis. That is why it is better to characterize it as "indefinite"--a qualitative description, rather than a quantitative one.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

If there are boundaries within a thing, then the thing which has boundaries within it (time in this case), is not continuous. I don't see why you have so much trouble understanding this fact.

I understand it just fine, but it is not a fact, unless we define a boundary in this context as a discontinuity--which you evidently do, but I do not. Again, there are no real boundaries within a true continuum; we artificially introduce them for various purposes, including marking and measuring.

Peirce, c. 1906:... I conceive that a Continuum has, IN ITSELF, no definite parts, although to endow it with definite parts of no matter what multitude, and even parts of lesser dimensionality down to absolute simplicity, it is only necessary that these should be marked off, and although even the operation of thought suffices to impart an approach to definiteness of parts of any multitude we please.*
*This indubitably proves that the possession of parts by a continuum is not a real character of it. For the real is that whose being one way or another does not depend upon how individual persons may imagine it to be. It shows, too, that Continuity is of a Rational nature.

Specifically, real time has no boundaries (instants) or parts (lapses) except those that we create, and we can mark off as many such limits and corresponding portions as we want or need. For some purposes, those boundaries and parts are quite arbitrary; examples include designating one particular revolution of the earth around the sun as year 1, designating one particular rotation of the earth about its axis as January 1, dividing the lapse required for each rotation into 24 hours, designating one particular hour as 1:00, dividing each hour into 60 minutes, and dividing each minute into 60 seconds. For other purposes, there are constraints.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

Under this assumption, at one moment S is P is true, and at the next moment, S is P is false. The "instant" acts as a boundary of separation between these two such that one is before and the other is after, and the law of non-contradiction is not violated.

Under this assumption, which proposition is true at that instant? If only "S is P" is true or only "S is not-P" is true, then that instant is obviously not the boundary between the two moments; it is within one or the other. If both "S is P" and "S is not-P" must be true--as I maintain, since I understand a limit to be what two adjacent portions have in common; an immediate connection, rather than a discontinuity--then the principle of contradiction is violated. But you deny this; is it your view, then, that neither "S is P" nor "S is not-P" is true at that boundary-instant? This would amount to McTaggart's assumption--events/changes are only realized at discrete instants, rather than continuous lapses--which (he argues) entails the conclusion that time is self-contradictory, and thus unreal.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

So when we talk about "becoming", the activity which is change in the world, it makes no sense to use propositions like S is P, because we are talking about something which is categorically different from "being", which is the type of thing that S is P refers to.

On the contrary:

Peirce, c. 1904-5:... we may speak of the state of different things at the same time as well as of the states of the same thing at different times and, of course, of different things at different times and of the same thing at the same time. At different times a proposition concerning the same things may be true and false; just as a predicate may at any one time be true and false of different things.

Peirce, 1908:[Time] is certainly a law. It is simply a unidimensional continuum of sorts of states of things and that these have an antitypy is shown by the fact that a sort of state of things and a different one cannot both be at the same time.

The principle of contradiction is indispensable, but the principle of excluded middle is not. Because classical logic insists on enforcing the latter, it indeed cannot handle the reality of temporal change (becoming).

Quoting aletheist

Only when the principle of excluded middle is true. Again, it is false during an indefinitely gradual state of change, when S is in the process of becoming not-P after previously being P, or vice-versa.

But that's arbitrary. All change all the time is "an indefinitely gradual state of change", so it doesn't make sense to say that S is P or S is not-P are applicable in any real way.

Quoting aletheist

This does not follow, since existential subjects undeniably have different qualities and relations at different determinations of time. If "S is P" is true at an earlier determination of time, and "S is not-P" is true at a later determination of time, and both propositions cannot be true at the same determination of time (principle of contradiction), then there must a determination of time in between at which neither is true.

This is clearly illogical. If "S is P" is true at some time, and then ceases to be true, then "S is not- P" is true at this time. You might posit a time in between, during which the human being is incapable of determining which of these is true, but this is not the same as saying neither is true, it's a case of saying that we haven't the capacity to determine it.

The problem with your position is your claim that "S is P", and "S is not-P" are sound propositions at some times, but are not sound at other times. This is inconsistency. And, it creates the following problem. If at some time, people cannot determine whether S is P or S is not-P is true, they will be inclined to just accept your proposal that neither is true instead of making the effort to determine which is true. This proposal propagates intellectual laziness. Instead of working to determine the truth of the matter we just assume there is not truth to it.

Quoting aletheist

The only alternative is to claim that such negation is instantaneous, which requires S to be both P and not-P at the same determination of time, thus violating the principle of contradiction.

As I just explained, last post, which your post was a reply to, instantaneous change does not imply contradiction. S is not P follows directly in time, after S is P. They are separated by the same boundary which separates one instant in time from the next. It is only if you deny the reality of these divisions, as you do, when you attempt to model time as continuous, that the law of non-contradiction is violated.

However, your attempt to model time as continuous is faulty, because you still impose instants as boundaries to separate the periods of time which you have called "event lapses". There is a necessary boundary, an instant, when "S is P" ceases to be true, and neither "S is P" nor "S is not-P" starts to be true.

Therefore your model doesn't solve any of the real problems with the nature of time. You simply replace the one boundary between S is P, and S is not P, the moment of instantaneous change, with two boundaries, one between S is P and S is neither P nor not-P, and another boundary between S is neither P nor not-P, and S is not P. Each of these two boundaries must itself still be a moment of instantaneous change or else you have the infinite regress which Aristotle elucidated.

Any time you replace the instantaneous boundary with an intermediary description, you still have the boundary which marks the end of S is P and the beginning of the intermediary, so you need to posit another intermediary at that boundary, and so on ad infinitum. This cannot be avoided so Aristotle's proposal was that S is P, and S is not-P are applicable to one aspect of reality which is completely distinct from the aspect of reality which neither S is P nor S is not-P is applicable. "Being" and "becoming" are distinct and incompatible aspects of reality, and this is the basis of Aristotelian dualism.

Quoting aletheist

On the one hand, the present cannot mathematically be an instant with zero duration:

It is only if you define "the present" in relation to the subjective experience of human consciousness, as you do, that this proposition is true. If you release your desire to define "the present" in this less than adequate way, you will see that it is possible to define "the present" as an instantaneous division between past and future. I realize that this definition does not match up exactly with the way that the human being experiences the present, but the human being is always experiencing a part of the future along with a part of the past, and we may not be capable of apprehending the instantaneous division.

Quoting aletheist

Instead, the present must mathematically be a moment with infinitesimal duration:

This is only derived from the faulty definition of "the present" explained above. If we abstract our thoughts from the subjective experience of time, to think about time as it really is, independent from this subjective experience, this conclusion can be seen as completely unwarranted.

Peirce's conclusion is based on this observation, which I accept: "consciousness must essentially cover an interval of time". It is where each of us goes from here which constitutes the difference between us. I say consciousness straddles the division between future and past, and contains part of each. And, I say consciousness has not apprehended the true boundary which is "the present". You insist that "the present" must be defined by this interval of time which constitutes the subjective experience of the present. Your pathway forward is misleading because you have assumed a subjective present, while I am seeking to understand the objective present.

Quoting aletheist

Under this assumption, which proposition is true at that instant? If only "S is P" is true or only "S is not-P" is true, then that instant is obviously not the boundary between the two moments; it is within one or the other.

I don't see why you say this. In one period of time S is P is true, and in the next period of time S is not-P is true. The "instant" is the boundary between the two periods of time. There is no time at that "instant", it has no temporal extension, like a dimensionless point in space, except in time, or a line with no breadth, separating one side from the other. You yourself allow that we can impose arbitrary divisions into time, as divisors, so we simply assume that such divisors really exist within time, so that there is a real point in time when S is P ceases to be true, and S is not-P starts to be true. You simply refuse to admit the reality of such divisors, because the human consciousness has not yet been able to determine them. But it makes no sense for you to ask about anything existing at that instant, because it is non-temporal, so there is nothing existing there.

Quoting aletheist

... I understand a limit to be what two adjacent portions have in common

Then you simply misunderstand what a limit is. When my glass is the limit which separates the water inside, from the air outside, it is not the place which the air and the water have in common. When the wall of my house is the boundary between the inside and outside, it is not the place that the inside and outside have in common. A limit is a point, or line, beyond which a thing cannot extend. It is distinct from the thing which is limited, so it is not what they have in common.

The future is substantially different from the past, they are completely distinct. Let's say that future and past form a dichotomy, all time must be either future or past, but it is impossible that any time is both future and past. What the "two adjacent portions have in common" is that they are each a distinct part of time. What they have in common is what allows us to class them together, as "time", but what makes them distinct is the separation between them. Since they are distinct, we must posit something which separates them, which forms the boundary. This is the present. Since there is no mixing of future and past, the present must be distinct and therefore non-temporal.

This is the case with the similar opposing terms, up and down, front and back, right and left, etc.. What they have in common is what allows us to class them together. However, there is necessarily a boundary, or limit between them, such that the two opposing things do not mix. To say 'I understand a limit as the place where two opposing portions mix', which is what you are saying when you say that the two have this place in common, is to misunderstand what a limit is. A limit is precisely what prevents the two portions from having that place in common.

Reply to Metaphysician Undercover

This is only derived from the faulty definition of "the present" explained above. If we abstract our thoughts from the subjective experience of time, to think about time as it really is, independent from this subjective experience, this conclusion can be seen as completely unwarranted.

It's a logical conclusion implicit in continuous time, regardless of subjective experience. Present time is interval of time between past and future time, and if time is continuous this interval is not interval but an instant, i.e. infinitely small point in time. This is paradox in itself and one more reason to think time is not continuous, i.e. it is not infinitely divisible, and the present time is interval of unit time with actual defined non-zero duration.

By the way, you're talking to a guy who does not see the paradox in Zeno's paradoxes, so obviously there is a problem in fundamental understanding, not something that can be argued as practically you're two are just not speaking the same language.

Quoting Zelebg

It's a logical conclusion implicit in continuous time, regardless of subjective experience. Present time is interval of time between past and future time, and if time is continuous this interval is not interval but an instant, i.e. infinitely small point in time. This is paradox in itself and one more reason to think time is not continuous, i.e. it is not infinitely divisible, and the present time is interval of unit time with actual defined non-zero duration.

To get rid of the paradox, you need only to assume that time is not continuous. And that time is not continuous is supported by the recognition that the past is substantially different from the future. Once the future is recognized as different from the past, the present must be understood as something other than the continuity of future/past, it must be understood as a divisor between them. Then we are left with three distinct things, past, present, and future.

Reply to Metaphysician Undercover

To get rid of the paradox, you need only to assume that time is not continuous.

That's what I said. But you have Aletheist here who thinks continuity is the solution to the paradox, whatever then is the paradox supposed to be.

And that time is not continuous is supported by the recognition that the past is substantially different from the future. Once the future is recognized as different from the past, the present must be understood as something other than the continuity of future/past, it must be understood as a divisor between them. Then we are left with three distinct things, past, present, and future.

Where did you get that? Continuity of time is just about infinite divisibility and nothing else, nothing more, nothing less.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

All change all the time is "an indefinitely gradual state of change", so it doesn't make sense to say that S is P or S is not-P are applicable in any real way.

Again, any particular existential subject (S) is always changing with respect to some of its qualities and relations (P), but not all.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

If "S is P" is true at some time, and then ceases to be true, then "S is not-P" is true at this time.

Only if one assumes that the principle of excluded middle is always true.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

You might posit a time in between, during which the human being is incapable of determining which of these is true, but this is not the same as saying neither is true, it's a case of saying that we haven't the capacity to determine it.

No, I am positing that a state of things is realized during an event-lapse that is objectively indeterminate, such that the existential subject S neither determinately possesses the quality or relation P, nor determinately does not possess the quality or relation P. Consistent with the definition of "real," it has nothing to do with human capabilities.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

The problem with your position is your claim that "S is P", and "S is not-P" are sound propositions at some times, but are not sound at other times.

There are no sound propositions, only sound (or unsound) arguments and true (or false) propositions. Again, "S is P" and "S is not-P" can each be true at different determinations of time, but neither can be true at a determination of time when S is changing from possessing P to not possessing P. If this change is not realized at some determination of time, then it cannot be realized at all.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

S is not P follows directly in time, after S is P. They are separated by the same boundary which separates one instant in time from the next.

As you know, I deny that time is composed of instants; but even if it were, there could be no "next" instant after any given instant, just as there is no "next" rational or real number after any given rational or real number. Otherwise, there would have to be an arbitrary and finite number of instants within any measured interval of time.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

There is a necessary boundary, an instant, when "S is P" ceases to be true, and neither "S is P" nor "S is not-P" starts to be true.

This is a clever bit of sophistry, because it distracts from the primary issue of when states of things are realized (at determinations of time) to the subordinate issue of how states of things are represented (by propositions).

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

Any time you replace the instantaneous boundary with an intermediary description, you still have the boundary which marks the end of S is P and the beginning of the intermediary, so you need to posit another intermediary at that boundary, and so on ad infinitum.

No, the only real boundary is between the lapse of time at which a particular determinate state of things (signified by "S is P") is realized and the lapse of time at which an incompatible determinate state of things (signified by "S is not-P") is realized. Our disagreement boils down to whether that real boundary can be an individual determination of time (instant) or must always be another general determination of time (lapse). In other words, is instantaneous change really possible, or does real change always require a lapse of time?

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

"Being" and "becoming" are distinct and incompatible aspects of reality, and this is the basis of Aristotelian dualism.

What you call "being" and "becoming" are simply two different classes of states of things (prolonged vs. gradual) that are realized at different determinations of time, involving the same enduring existential subject (denoted by S) and one of its innumerable qualities and relations (denoted by P). Paraphrasing Peirce, the being of the quality/relation as form lies wholly in itself, the being of the existential subject as matter lies in its opposition to other things, and the being of the fact as entelechy lies in its bringing qualities/relations and existential subjects together.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

I realize that this definition does not match up exactly with the way that the human being experiences the present, but the human being is always experiencing a part of the future along with a part of the past, and we may not be capable of apprehending the instantaneous division.

It is precisely because "the human being is always experiencing a part of the future along with part of the past" that the present cannot be an "instantaneous division" between them. Anything that we are experiencing (present progressive tense) is, by definition, in the present.

Peirce, c. 1894:Now there are great difficulties in the way of supposing that we are immediately conscious of time, and therefore of the past and future, unless we suppose it to possess ... continuity, so that we can be immediately conscious of all that is within an infinitesimal interval from any instant of which we are immediately conscious, without its thereby following that we are immediately conscious of all instants.

Peirce, 1899:The consciousness of the present, as the boundary between past and future, involves them both.

Peirce, c. 1900:The only important thing here is our metaphysical phenomenon, or familiar notion, that the past is a matter for knowledge but not for endeavor, that the future is an object that we may hope to influence, but which cannot affect us except through our anticipations, and that the present is a moment immeasurably small through which, as their limit, past and future can alone act upon one another.

Peirce, 1903:Of course, if there is no such thing as an absolute instant, there is nothing absolutely present either temporarily or in the sense of confrontation ... The present moment will be a lapse of time, highly confrontitial, when looked at as a whole, seeming absolutely so, but when regarded closely, seen not to be absolutely so, its earlier parts being somewhat of the nature of memory, a little vague, and its later parts somewhat of the nature of anticipation, a little generalized. It contains a central part which is still more present, still more confrontitial, but which presents the same features. There is nothing at all that is absolutely confrontitial; although it is quite true that the confrontitial is continually flowing in upon us ...
Another plain deliverance of the percipuum is that moment melts into moment. That is to say, moments may be so related as not to be entirely separate and yet not be the same. Obviously, this would be so according to our interpretation. But if time consists of instants, each instant is exactly what it is and is absolutely not any other.

Peirce, c. 1904:It is logically impossible for a state of things to be realized in the present instant and not to be at all so in the past and future. Were the instants independently actual, as they are in the Time of the analysts, memory would be a perpetual miracle.

An event is a gradual state things involving change, so it is logically impossible for it to be realized in the present instant and not be at all so in the past and future. The minimum of time at which any possible state of things can be realized is an indefinite (mathematically infinitesimal) moment.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

Your pathway forward is misleading because you have assumed a subjective present, while I am seeking to understand the objective present.

Your paragraph summarizing our disagreement is basically accurate, except this last sentence that sets up a false dichotomy. Our phenomenological experience of the present is what calls for an explanation in the first place, and only a hypothesis that adequately accounts for our observations of both its internal ("subjective") and external ("objective") aspects should be considered plausible.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

In one period of time S is P is true, and in the next period of time S is not-P is true. The "instant" is the boundary between the two periods of time. There is no time at that "instant", it has no temporal extension, like a dimensionless point in space, except in time, or a line with no breadth, separating one side from the other.

This is the fundamental problem with your model. Since there is no time at an instant, an instant is not a real part of time; since there is no space at a point, a point is not a real part of space. We artificially introduce discrete and dimensionless instants and points into continuous time and space for purposes such as marking and measuring.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

Then you simply misunderstand what a limit is.

No, as usual we just have different technical definitions of a particular term.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

Let's say that future and past form a dichotomy, all time must be either future or past ...

This is precisely what I deny. The present is neither future nor past; time is a trichotomy, not a dichotomy.

Quoting aletheist

There is no paradox here.

Simple relativity will take care of this. Australia is roughly ten hours ahead of London - that is, it is ten hours in London's future. Information traveling from London to Australia travels forward in time by ten hours, and when it travels from Australia to London, it also goes back in time by ten hours. So, this post will go back ten hours in time to be read by a Londoner; and their reply will go forward ten hours to be read by an Australian; giving the perfect illusion of instantaneous communication.

Of course, an Australian cannot tell a Londoner what will happen in London in ten hours time, because it takes ten hours for the news from London to get to Australia.

Quoting Zelebg

Continuity of time is just about infinite divisibility and nothing else, nothing more, nothing less.

If you think that continuity is defined by infinite divisibility, then you misunderstand continuity. What is really the case, is that infinite divisibility is proposed as a defining attribute of continuity. The problem though, is that division in itself is contrary to continuity, and this produces its own sort of paradox. "Divisibility" implies possible to divide, but not actually divided. A continuity is proposed as being divisible anywhere, and that's what supports "infinite divisibility". But if it were actually divided anywhere, it would not be a continuity. So the continuity, in theory is divisible anywhere (infinitely divisible), but in practise (in reality) it cannot be divided anywhere or else it would not be a continuity.

Quoting aletheist

There are no sound propositions, only sound (or unsound) arguments and true (or false) propositions. Again, "S is P" and "S is not-P" can each be true at different determinations of time, but neither can be true at a determination of time when S is changing from possessing P to not possessing P. If this change is not realized at some determination of time, then it cannot be realized at all.

I can't believe that you do not see the problem with this; saying that there is a time when S is P ceases to be true, but we cannot say S is not-P at this time, and that this is an objective property of S. "S is P", and "S is not-P" are human determinations, propositions, they are judgements made by us, and these fundamental laws of logic are there to guide us in those judgements.

Therefore, when there is a time when it appears like S is neither P nor not-P, this is a time when we do not have the capacity to make that judgement. To make the assertion that there is something about the object which we are judging, rather than accepting the likelihood that there is something deficient in our capacity to make the judgement, which is responsible for this situation, is not only completely unwarranted, but it also kills the desire and inspiration required for further analysis of the object to determine the precise time when S is P becomes S is not-P, through the assertion that there is no such precise time. Therefore it kills our desire to improve our capacity to make a judgement of whether S is P or S is not-P in these situations, by saying that this capacity cannot be improved. But this claim of yours, that our capacity to make the judgement cannot be improved, can never be justified, because no matter how hard we try and fail to make that judgement, this does not prove that we haven't just been trying the wrong approach.

Quoting aletheist

As you know, I deny that time is composed of instants; but even if it were, there could be no "next" instant after any given instant, just as there is no "next" rational or real number after any given rational or real number. Otherwise, there would have to be an arbitrary and finite number of instants within any measured interval of time.

You misunderstand my use of "instant". An instant divides two portions of time, and as I said, it is non-temporal, just like a point divides two line segments, but in no way is that point a segment of line, it is non-linear. Therefore it is impossible that time is composed of instants.

Quoting aletheist

This is a clever bit of sophistry, because it distracts from the primary issue of when states of things are realized (at determinations of time) to the subordinate issue of how states of things are represented (by propositions).

It's not sophistry, but an attempt to get you to recognize the failure of your proposition. So you clearly recognize the difference between the real state of things, and the representation. Do you accept that "S is P", and "S is not-P" are terms of representation? If so, then let's proceed to look at the problem in this way. You seem to think that these terms make acceptable representations sometimes, but at other times they do not. So we need to establish a principle of separation between which times the terms make acceptable representation, and at which times they do not.

The Aristotelean proposal is that at future times, these terms of representation are unacceptable. This is because future events have not yet been determined. It doesn't make sense to say of S, that S is P, or that S is not-P, at a future time, because this has not yet been determined. We speak of future things as possibilities, and his famous example is the possibility of a sea battle tomorrow. That future event is dependent on free will choices, which have not yet been decided, so it doesn't make sense to use those terms of representation, therefore the law of excluded middle is inapplicable to these future events.

Now we have a distinction between past events, where the law of excluded middle applies, and future events, where the law of excluded middle does not apply. Notice the difference between what "S" refers to when "S" is a representation of the past, and when "S" is a representation of the future. The future event has no real existence. In between these two very distinct aspects of reality we have the present.

Quoting aletheist

No, the only real boundary is between the lapse of time at which a particular determinate state of things (signified by "S is P") is realized and the lapse of time at which an incompatible determinate state of things (signified by "S is not-P") is realized. Our disagreement boils down to whether that real boundary can be an individual determination of time (instant) or must always be another general determination of time (lapse). In other words, is instantaneous change really possible, or does real change always require a lapse of time?

We both agree that real change requires a lapse of time. Where we disagree is in how the representations of states "S is P" etc., are related to "change", which occurs over a time lapse. As I've explained already, the only problem with a representation that consists of a time line with a point when S is P is replaced by S is not-P, is that this model cannot represent change. Furthermore, as Aristotle demonstrated, we cannot represent change with these terms at all. However, this does not lead to the conclusion you suggest. Since there is always things remaining the same, represented by "S is P", and there is always things changing, not representable by "S is P", then the proper conclusion is that we need two distinct representations, to represent these two distinct aspects of reality (dualism).

So where we disagree is in how these two distinct aspects of reality relate to each other. I am arguing, that the aspect of reality referred to by "S" as a past object or event, is always describable in the terms of "is P", and "is not P". But there is another aspect of reality which is not describable in those terms, and we cannot refer to this as "S", in the same way, because what "S" signifies has no real existence, only possible existence. You want to say that the same "S" is sometimes describable by these terms, and sometimes not. But I think that this is irrational, because "S" signifies an intelligible object, a subject, it does not signify a physical object. And, to say that neither P nor not-P is applicable to S is to render S as unintelligible, which is inherently contradictory.

Quoting aletheist

What you call "being" and "becoming" are simply two different classes of states of things (prolonged vs. gradual) that are realized at different determinations of time, involving the same enduring existential subject (denoted by S) and one of its innumerable qualities and relations (denoted by P). Paraphrasing Peirce, the being of the quality/relation as form lies wholly in itself, the being of the existential subject as matter lies in its opposition to other things, and the being of the fact as entelechy lies in its bringing qualities/relations and existential subjects together.

This is exactly what I'm talking about as the problem with your proposal. Instead of upholding the division, or distinction between the aspects of reality which can be described as "is P", and "is not P", which we refer to with "S" (subject), and the aspects of reality which cannot be described as "is P" and "is not P", which when referred to as "S" (subject), give "S" a different meaning, you want to talk about some sort of "existential subject". That is fundamentally irrational, because "S" as subject refers to something different when talking about a past object, from what it refers to when talking about a future object. There is a need to separate two distinct types of subject, rather than conflating them as "existential subject".

Quoting aletheist

This is the fundamental problem with your model. Since there is no time at an instant, an instant is not a real part of time; since there is no space at a point, a point is not a real part of space. We artificially introduce discrete and dimensionless instants and points into continuous time and space for purposes such as marking and measuring.

Right, an "instant" is not a real part of time, and that is why time cannot be continuous. There is something which breaks the continuity, which is called the "instant". You however, start with an unjustified premise, that time is continuous, and conclude that instants cannot be real, therefore you argue that all instants are unreal. But just because the human being has not yet developed the means to determine the real instants in time, does not mean that there are not such real instants. So your argued position is nothing but a vicious circle. Human beings have not been able to determine real instants in time, therefore there are no real instants, and time is continuous. Since time is continuous, there are no real instants, therefore human beings ought not seek to determine the real instants in time. I think they call that argument a fallacy of reification, or misplaced concreteness.

Quoting aletheist

This is precisely what I deny. The present is neither future nor past; time is a trichotomy, not a dichotomy.

You claim to deny it, but your definition of "limit" supports it. That is contradiction. You said a "limit" is "what two adjacent portions have in common". If time is truly a trichotomy, as you say, then "the present", as the limit, and a third distinct thing between future and past, would prevent the two adjacent portions, future and past, from having anything in common. And, time could not be continuous.

So, the problem with your proposal is that you want to inject a third distinct thing, into time, between future and past, a lapse of time when neither "S is P" nor "S is not-P" is true, and despite the positing of the intermediary, you want to claim that time is continuous. Clearly, if this third thing which separates future from past has real existence, then time is not continuous.

Reply to Metaphysician Undercover

If you think that continuity is defined by infinite divisibility, then you misunderstand continuity.

It’s not a matter of opinion, but of speaking the same language as the rest of the world. The defining and most relevant aspect of continuity when talking about space and time is infinite divisibility. You have the whole internet to see that for yoursel, where do you get your information?

So the continuity, in theory is divisible anywhere (infinitely divisible), but in practise (in reality) it cannot be divided anywhere or else it would not be a continuity.

Continuous / analog is defined by infinite divisibility, it means “composed of no parts”, it does not mean “composed of infinitely many parts”. Discrete / digital is defined by already being divided into unit parts which can not be further divided.

There is no theory / practice distinction here, we are talking about the most general logical categories to differentiate two possible ontologies - analog vs. digital. Then we test both via thought experiments such as Zeno’s paradoxes.

So yes, we can divide continuity and we get two continuities plus one paradox, but there is nothing “real” or practical about any of it, all is just a thought experiment and semantic / logical conclusions.

Once again I attempt to get the conversation about time moving in a slightly different direction:

Wiki: [i]"With an incomplete theory of quantum gravity, it is impossible to be certain what spacetime would look like at small scales. However, there is no reason that spacetime needs to be fundamentally smooth. It is possible that instead, in a quantum theory of gravity, spacetime would consist of many small, ever-changing regions in which space and time are not definite, but fluctuate in a foam-like manner.[3]

Wheeler suggested that the Heisenberg uncertainty principle might imply that over sufficiently small distances and sufficiently brief intervals of time, the "very geometry of spacetime fluctuates".[4] These fluctuations could be large enough to cause significant departures from the smooth spacetime seen at macroscopic scales, giving spacetime a "foamy" character."[/i]

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

"S is P", and "S is not-P" are human determinations, propositions, they are judgements made by us, and these fundamental laws of logic are there to guide us in those judgements.

There is an important difference between a proposition and a judgment. A true proposition signifies a real state of things--i.e., a fact--so it is true regardless of what anyone thinks about it. A judgment is one person's belief that a certain proposition is true, which is fallible.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

To make the assertion that there is something about the object which we are judging, rather than accepting the likelihood that there is something deficient in our capacity to make the judgement, which is responsible for this situation, is not only completely unwarranted, but it also kills the desire and inspiration required for further analysis of the object to determine the precise time when S is P becomes S is not-P, through the assertion that there is no such precise time.

This cuts both ways. To make the assertion that there is a precise time when S changes from being P to being not-P, rather than accepting the likelihood that a state of change is only ever realized at a lapse of time rather than at an instant, is not only completely unwarranted, but it also kills the desire and inspiration required for further analysis of the reality of time, through the assertion that there must be such a precise time.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

Therefore it is impossible that time is composed of instants.

Indeed, and if time is not composed of instants, then it must be continuous. Instants in time, like points on a line, are artificially imposed.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

Do you accept that "S is P", and "S is not-P" are terms of representation?

Of course, they signify two different prolonged states of things that are incompossible; i.e., they cannot be realized at the same determination of time.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

Notice the difference between what "S" refers to when "S" is a representation of the past, and when "S" is a representation of the future. The future event has no real existence.

No, "S" does not refer to an event at all, it denotes an existential subject; i.e., an enduring concrete thing. An event is the gradual state of things when a change is realized, which is signified by "S became not-P" (past) or "S is becoming not-P" (present) or "S would become not-P under such-and-such circumstances" (future). That is why neither "S is P" nor "S is not-P" is true during the lapse of time at which the event is realized.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

But I think that this is irrational, because "S" signifies an intelligible object, a subject, it does not signify a physical object.

On the contrary, it is an assertion like this that is irrational and unintelligible. "S" denotes an enduring concrete thing, which is an intelligible object.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

And, to say that neither P nor not-P is applicable to S is to render S as unintelligible, which is inherently contradictory.

It is perfectly intelligible once we recognize that the enduring concrete thing denoted by "S" is changing from possessing the quality or relation denoted by "P" to no longer possessing that quality or relation, or vice-versa.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

That is fundamentally irrational, because "S" as subject refers to something different when talking about a past object, from what it refers to when talking about a future object.

Nonsense, in this context "S" denotes the same enduring concrete thing. What changes over time are the qualities and relations that it possesses, such as the one denoted by "P."

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

Right, an "instant" is not a real part of time, and that is why time cannot be continuous.

This is backwards; time would only be discontinuous if a discrete instant were a real part of it.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

Human beings have not been able to determine real instants in time, therefore there are no real instants, and time is continuous. Since time is continuous, there are no real instants, therefore human beings ought not seek to determine the real instants in time.

The fallacy here is that of a straw man--neither of these sentences accurately expresses any assertion or argument that I have actually offered.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

If time is truly a trichotomy, as you say, then "the present", as the limit, and a third distinct thing between future and past, would prevent the two adjacent portions, future and past, from having anything in common.

No, my whole point is that the present is a third portion, not a limit at all. The past and present are not adjacent portions, because the present is another lapse of time between them, not an instant.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

So, the problem with your proposal is that you want to inject a third distinct thing, into time, between future and past, a lapse of time when neither "S is P" nor "S is not-P" is true, and despite the positing of the intermediary, you want to claim that time is continuous. Clearly, if this third thing which separates future from past has real existence, then time is not continuous.

In my terminology (and Peirce's), a determination of time is not a thing and it does not exist. Time is a real law that governs existents, like the enduring concrete thing denoted by "S." The present is not distinct from the past and the future, it is an indefinite moment such that we directly perceive the continuous flow of time.

Quoting aletheist

Indeed, and if time is not composed of instants, then it must be continuous.

Would that imply time is also "smooth?" Or space/time?

Quoting Zelebg

It’s not a matter of opinion, but of speaking the same language as the rest of the world. The defining and most relevant aspect of continuity when talking about space and time is infinite divisibility. You have the whole internet to see that for yoursel, where do you get your information?

I get my information from studying philosophy, where continuity is the feature of an undivided existence. So when mathematicians look at the divisibility of the undivided, it produces the paradox I described. The paradox is maybe easier to understand in Zeno's terms.

Quoting Zelebg

There is no theory / practice distinction here...

Are you familiar with Zeno's paradoxes. The substance of his paradoxes is that what is described in theory does not occur in practise. In theory Achilles cannot reach the tortoise in the race, in practise this is not so. The paradox is resolved by realizing that the theory is based in faulty premises, the infinite divisibility of space and time.

Quoting aletheist

There is an important difference between a proposition and a judgment. A true proposition signifies a real state of things--i.e., a fact--so it is true regardless of what anyone thinks about it. A judgment is one person's belief that a certain proposition is true, which is fallible.

This is irrelevant, because it is impossible to determine what "is true regardless of what anyone thinks". All determinations of truth are judgements, and judgements are human. So you are suggesting that there is a judgement independent of human judgements, which is somehow more reliable than human judgements. That there is a God may or may not be true, but it is irrelevant to this discussion because we are talking about human judgements concerning propositions.

Quoting aletheist

This cuts both ways. To make the assertion that there is a precise time when S changes from being P to being not-P, rather than accepting the likelihood that a state of change is only ever realized at a lapse of time rather than at an instant, is not only completely unwarranted, but it also kills the desire and inspiration required for further analysis of the reality of time, through the assertion that there must be such a precise time.

As I explained, what this assumption does, is force the necessary and proper conclusion that reality consists of two distinct and incompatible aspects, that which "being" refers to, and that which "becoming" refers to. It does not force us to exclude "becoming" as unreal, it simply encourages us along the pathway toward accepting as true, some propositions of dualism.

You, have come to the point of realizing that the fundamental laws of logic appear to be applicable at some times, but at other times not. However, you refuse to take the analysis further, to determine which aspects of reality they apply to, and which they do not. Instead, you say that the same aspect of reality, represented as "S", is subject to predication at some times, and at other times not. Then you insist that there is nothing real (no real markers in time, as "instants") to indicate when predication is valid and when it is not. So all we are left with is completely arbitrary decisions as to when predication is valid and when it is not.

If you would take the analysis further, you would see that what is referred to by "S", varies depending on the circumstances of use. Sometimes "S" is substantiated by a physical object, and sometimes "S" is substantiated by a rational principle, a possibility, or even something imaginary. Therefore we need two distinct types of substance (what validates "S" as referent). And, we find that the one type of substance, which validates the imaginary, but rational subject, is grounded in logical possibility, where the law of excluded middle is not applicable.

But you refuse to get out of the muddled mess you are in, holding that the same substance is both subject to the law of excluded middle, and not subject to the law of excluded middle, depending on what time you look at it, while insisting that there is no valid markers in time to determine the one time from the other. All you need to do, to escape from this mess, is to recognize that the substance of the past is completely distinct from the substance of the future (dualism), and the that present is a valid marker to separate the one part of time from the other.

Quoting aletheist

Indeed, and if time is not composed of instants, then it must be continuous. Instants in time, like points on a line, are artificially imposed.

This is a blatant conclusion by equivocation. You are not adhering to how I defined "instant". An instant separates one period of time from another, but consist of no time. Therefore the conclusion that time is not composed of instants does not force the conclusion that time is continuous. Your misunderstanding of the nature of a "limit" which you demonstrated earlier, is showing here again.

Quoting aletheist

No, "S" does not refer to an event at all, it denotes an existential subject; i.e., an enduring concrete thing. An event is the gradual state of things when a change is realized, which is signified by "S became not-P" (past) or "S is becoming not-P" (present) or "S would become not-P under such-and-such circumstances" (future). That is why neither "S is P" nor "S is not-P" is true during the lapse of time at which the event is realized.

I reject your notion of "existential subject" for the reasons given already. It does not account for the separation between the logical subject, and the object which is sometimes represented as a subject. The fact that only sometimes an object is represented, and sometimes an object is misrepresented, are sufficient evidence to exclude the notion of "existential subject". We cannot limit "subject" in the way you want. Furthermore, because of this conflation, you do not recognize the two distinct types of objects recognized in philosophy, material objects and immaterial objects. This refusal to distinguish between the two types of things which might be referenced by "the subject", insisting on an "existential subject" as a conflation of these two, appears to be at the root of your confusion.

Quoting aletheist

It is perfectly intelligible once we recognize that the enduring concrete thing denoted by "S" is changing from possessing the quality or relation denoted by "P" to no longer possessing that quality or relation, or vice-versa.

This is a blatant denial of the fact that "S' signifies a subject, and a subject is in no way defined as an "enduring concrete thing". You show complete disregard for disciplined philosophy, and blatant denial of fundamental principles.

Quoting aletheist

No, my whole point is that the present is a third portion, not a limit at all. The past and present are not adjacent portions, because the present is another lapse of time between them, not an instant.

Three portions of the same type of thing does not make a trichotomy, which requires three different types of things. So you are only trudging forward in denial of your own contradiction. Furthermore, you have already denied that there are any real divisors within that thing which is supposedly portioned, so you don't have any real portions at all.

Quoting aletheist

Time is a real law that governs existents...

Utter nonsense.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

So you are suggesting that there is a judgement independent of human judgements, which is somehow more reliable than human judgements.

No, there are states of things independent of human judgments--namely, facts. These are signified by true propositions, which are likewise independent of human judgments. Again, a judgment is a human decision to adopt a certain proposition as a belief.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

You, have come to the point of realizing that the fundamental laws of logic appear to be applicable at some times, but at other times not. However, you refuse to take the analysis further, to determine which aspects of reality they apply to, and which they do not.

On the contrary, I have consistently maintained that the principle of excluded middle applies to propositions signifying prolonged states of things (what you call "being"), but not to propositions signifying indefinitely gradual states of change (what you call "becoming"), both of which are only realized at lapses of time (not instants).

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

If you would take the analysis further, you would see that what is referred to by "S", varies depending on the circumstances of use.

I stipulated from the very beginning that in my example, "S" denotes an existential subject, an enduring concrete thing; and "P" denotes one of the innumerable qualities or relations that it possesses at some determinations of time, but not at others. I have never been talking about any other possible referent of either term.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

But you refuse to get out of the muddled mess you are in, holding that the same substance is both subject to the law of excluded middle, and not subject to the law of excluded middle, depending on what time you look at it, while insisting that there is no valid markers in time to determine the one time from the other.

The principle of excluded middle does not apply to subjects at all, it applies to propositions; and what matters in this context is whether the state of things signified by a given proposition is prolonged (unchanging) or gradual (changing). These are necessarily realized at different determinations of time for the same subject.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

This is a blatant conclusion by equivocation. You are not adhering to how I defined "instant".

The pot is calling the kettle black.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

Utter nonsense.

I have the same opinion of your responses at this point, so maybe it is time (no pun intended) for us to call it quits.

Pierce:The event is the //W//existential junction of states//W// (that is, of that which in existence corresponds to a statement about a given subject in representation) whose combination in one subject would violate the logical law of contradiction. //W//The event, therefore, considered as a junction, is not a subject and does not inhere in a subject.//W// What is it, then? Its mode of being is existential quasi-existence, or that approach to existence where contraries can be united in one subject. Time is that diversity of existence whereby that which is existentially a subject is enabled to receive contrary determinations in existence.//W//

I've marked with //W// where I think Pierce is wrong, but time is real in my opinion, and Pierce supports the right argument.

(universe) Time is the 4th dimension generated by all mass(hence constellations) and the impartial speeds(hence solar systems) of primarily gravity and rotation, but of all matter.

Time is not 'diversity of existence', all universe phenomenon are related. Humans are related to stars. Even if just time-wise.

Why do electrons not form a single group - why are they separate?

Elemental mass, and all their relative speeds, determine the electron-locale; we do not crunch together because of harmonious mass and we all exist through the speed of primarily rotation and other spin.

Like being 'on' - the disc planet spinning.

Quoting jgill

Would that imply time is also "smooth?" Or space/time?

If by "smooth" you mean that any function with respect time is differentiable arbitrarily many times, then yes, that is my understanding (and Peirce's) of true continuity.

Peirce, 1908:Not only must any given instantaneous value, s, implied in the change be itself either absolutely unchanging or else always changing continuously, but also, denoting an instant of time by t, so likewise must, in the language of the calculus, ds/dt, d^2s/dt^2, d^3s/dt^3, and so on endlessly, be, each and all of them, either absolutely unchanging or always changing continuously.

Note that instants and instantaneous values are perfectly acceptable within mathematics as "the study of what is true of hypothetical states of things" (Peirce's definition, emphasis mine).

Quoting xyzmix

Time is not 'diversity of existence', all universe phenomenon are related. Humans are related to stars. Even if just time-wise.

This seems like a misinterpretation of what Peirce meant by "diversity of existence." Consider his other definition, which I also quoted in the OP.

Peirce, c. 1905:Time is a certain general respect relative to different determinations of which states of things otherwise impossible may be realized. Namely, if P and Q are two logically possible states of things, (abstraction being made of time) but are logically incompossible, they may be realized in respect to different determinations of time.

"Diversity of existence" simply refers to the reality that the same existential subject (enduring concrete thing) possesses different qualities and relations at different determinations of time.

Reply to Metaphysician Undercover

I get my information from studying philosophy, where continuity is the feature of an undivided existence. So when mathematicians look at the divisibility of the undivided, it produces the paradox I described. The paradox is maybe easier to understand in Zeno's terms.

We agree about Zeno and divisibility in that sense. The problem was you then started talk about divisibility in terms of past, present, and future - where did you get that, some reference?

Reply to Metaphysician Undercover

Are you familiar with Zeno's paradoxes. The substance of his paradoxes is that what is described in theory does not occur in practise. In theory Achilles cannot reach the tortoise in the race, in practise this is not so. The paradox is resolved by realizing that the theory is based in faulty premises, the infinite divisibility of space and time.

Explain that to Aletheist. That's where his confusion is, and anything else you two are talking about is beside that essential point.

Does fire exist in the same way a human exists?

How do elements exist?

Reply to aletheist

Time is a real law that governs existents

Can you translate that into English? What is "real law", how is it different than "not-real law", and how is it different from conteporary understanding of time?

Reply to aletheist

Indeed, and if time is not composed of instants, then it must be continuous.

True, which means "infinitely divisible", hence the paradox.

Reply to Metaphysician Undercover

Right, an "instant" is not a real part of time, and that is why time cannot be continuous. There is something which breaks the continuity, which is called the "instant".

You can not resolve the issue by not addressing the issue, so until you start talking about continuity in terms of infinite divisibility there is no distinction what is it you two are really talking about.

Reply to aletheist

The present is not distinct from the past and the future, it is an indefinite moment such that we directly perceive the continuous flow of time.

You can not argue with “indefinite”. It means you are unable to say anything specific about it, and using ignorance to claim knowledge is the funniest paradox here, so far.

Reply to Zelebg

I don't think aletheist can get past that time is an illusion, or at least subordinate to change in nature.

Some theoretical physicists like Carlo Rovelli say that reality is just a complex network of events onto which we project sequences of past, present and future. The whole Universe obeys the laws of quantum mechanics and thermodynamics, out of which time emerges.

Just like time is just a fourth dimension and that there is nothing special about ‘now’; even ‘past’ and ‘future’ are not always well defined. Hence:

"There are parallels with thermodynamics and Bayesian probability theory, which both rely on the concept of entropy, and might therefore be used to argue that the flow of time is a subjective feature of the Universe, not an objective part of the physical description."

Reply to aletheist

I believe that present, past and future are important but widely misconcieved.

They are actually a lot like 3017amen put but he was largely wrong.

What's past and future, is actually an element of the present(thrice versa) but by no means is time separated in this way.

"That had happened."

No, what happened incorporates that effect.

What we are doing is thinking past is only the cut off point of time, when it's a complex shape's back side.

Thinking back to memory is interaction with this back side.

Life is just a special effect with the story of the time.

Quoting aletheist

No, there are states of things independent of human judgments--namely, facts. These are signified by true propositions, which are likewise independent of human judgments. Again, a judgment is a human decision to adopt a certain proposition as a belief.

What we are talking about with "S is P" and "S is not-P," are human statements. "S" stands for a subject, which may or may not be, in some way associated to concrete things.

Quoting aletheist

On the contrary, I have consistently maintained that the principle of excluded middle applies to propositions signifying prolonged states of things (what you call "being"), but not to propositions signifying indefinitely gradual states of change (what you call "becoming"), both of which are only realized at lapses of time (not instants).

As I said, you've provided no principles by which we might distinguish a "prolonged state" from a "gradual state of change". Any such distinction appears completely arbitrary to me. How long is a "prolonged state", a Planck time length, a second, a year, a million years? And how would you know that what you thought was a prolonged state wasn't really just a gradual state of change? So if there is a "fact" of the matter, as you claim, how do we get beyond the arbitrary judgement of when the law of excluded middle does and does not apply?

Quoting aletheist

I stipulated from the very beginning that in my example, "S" denotes an existential subject, an enduring concrete thing; and "P" denotes one of the innumerable qualities or relations that it possesses at some determinations of time, but not at others. I have never been talking about any other possible referent of either term.

As I said, I don't accept your stipulation of an "existential subject". I believe "existential subject" to be undisciplined nonsense.

Quoting aletheist

I have the same opinion of your responses at this point, so maybe it is time (no pun intended) for us to call it quits.

Unless you can provide some principles to support what you call an "existential subject", I think it's time for you to call it quits. Drop that nonsense, and start to look at time in a realistic way.

Quoting Zelebg

The problem was you then started talk about divisibility in terms of past, present, and future - where did you get that, some reference?

I got that from my own experience. Do you not apprehend the past as different from the future? I see the past as determined events, having occurred and unchangeable, while the future consist of possible events which have not yet been determined. Therefore if time is supposed to consist of past and future, there must be something which separates these two, as they are distinct, clearly not the same. Do you agree that the future must be divided from the past, at the present, in order that the difference between the future and past, which we know from our experience to be real, could be real?

Here's another way of looking at it. Take a look at inertia, or what Newton called momentum. Let's say that a thing will "continue" to exist as it was, while time passes, unless a "force" interferes. Therefore existence would be continuous, except a force might break that continuity. In physics, a force is simply another source of momentum or energy. But in philosophy we have a concept of free will, which respects the fact that a free willing human being might act at any moment, in any given way, as a force. So a free willing human being might act to break the continuity of momentum or inertia, at any moment in time. Doesn't this indicate to you, that this supposed continuity of existence, is not a true continuity?

Quoting Zelebg

Explain that to Aletheist. That's where his confusion is, and anything else you two are talking about is beside that essential point.

I'm afraid aletheist is not prepared to uphold the distinction between theory and practise, claiming that a logical subject is a concrete thing.

Quoting Zelebg

You can not resolve the issue by not addressing the issue, so until you start talking about continuity in terms of infinite divisibility there is no distinction what is it you two are really talking about.

I already explained the paradox involved with assuming that continuity is divisible, but I'll try again. If something continuous is actually divided, then it is no longer continuous. Do you agree with this basic principle? If so, you'll see that "infinitely divisible" really means that it can be divided anywhere, in the sense of an infinity of possibilities for division. However, it cannot actually be divided anywhere or else it is not continuous.

Therefore we have that issue of the difference between theory and practise here. In theory, we say that the continuous thing can be divided, but in practise it couldn't really be divided because that would just prove that it's not really continuous. So the question is whether there really is such a thing as continuity, or is it just a fiction, a convenient principle made up by mathematicians, geometers, or some other philosophers, as a map, a guide to the possibility of dividing things anywhere. I think that in reality things cannot actually be divided anywhere. And that's an indication that things are not continuous. And time is already divided at the present, so the idea of continuity is just a fiction.

Reply to Metaphysician Undercover

However, it cannot actually be divided anywhere or else it is not continuous.

Continuous does not mean indivisible, it means “composed of no parts”, i.e infinitely divisible. Indivisible is what discrete means, it’s the opposite.

We draw a line from A to B. That line is either continuous in space / time or not, but we can divide it in either case by placing point C somewhere in between.

Quoting Zelebg

Continuous does not mean indivisible, it means “composed of no parts”

Right, so if something is divided anywhere, then it has parts, and is not continuous. The continuous is divisible, but it cannot actually be divided.

Quoting Zelebg

We draw a line from A to B. That line is either continuous in space / time or not, but we can divide it in either case by placing point C somewhere in between.

Do you agree, that if you divide that line at C, it then consists of the parts AC, CB, and is therefore not a continuous line from A to B?

I think the apparent flow of time that we experience can only be studied in relation to consciousness. All of space and time that has existed, exists, or will exist is part of reality. No events in the future can erase events that have occurred in the past. So everything that has happened, is happening, or will happen is part of what's true. Regardless of whether it's in the past, present, or future of a particular individual.

So as I see it, on the one hand we have the reality of space and time, or if you will, spacetime ... and on the other hand we have conscious beings who experience moving through spacetime along a curve that always has a positive velocity in the "time" direction. At least schematically.

The experience of the flow of time is a bit like how the wick of a candle burns down. It is this interaction of time and consciousness that seems to me the thing to focus on in order to try to understand what's going on.

Reply to Metaphysician Undercover

Do you agree, that if you divide that line at C, it then consists of the parts AC, CB, and is therefore not a continuous line from A to B?

That’s why I insist it should be referred to as “infinite divisibility” rather than “continuity”, it is far more specific and avoids this kind of misinterpretation.

Your logic is not wrong, just inadequate because you don’t get two logically opposite and mutually exclusive categories: continuous / divisible vs. discrete / indivisible.

So no, we divide a line and we do not get two parts, we get two lines, and if we supposed lines are continuous, then obviously we get two continuities. Think of it as analog vs. digital.

You keep insisting to put it in some literal or actual terms as if something really gets cut and divided. It’s all just a thought experiment, so instead of thinking about division as “cutting", think of it as how fine movement and precision you could theoretically achieve with an analog needle sliding over some gauge - then infinite divisibility, i.e. "continuous" is simply a claim there is always unique point C between any two points A and B, while "discrete" is naturally then the opposite claim of that.

Quoting Zelebg

That’s why I insist it should be referred to as “infinite divisibility” rather than “continuity”, it is far more specific and avoids this kind of misinterpretation.

But "continuous" is the more descriptive word, it says more about the named property than "infinitely divisible". Infinitely divisible is the way that mathematicians treat the thing which is said to be continuous. Therefore the subject has been changed. Instead of "S is continuous" we now have "S (a continuity) is infinitely divisible. The subject is no longer the thing which is continuous, it is the attribute "continuous" itself. This is how mathematicians quantify, they turn the attribute, or property into the subject, and assign a scale of values, degrees of existence, of the attribute. So for example, when colour is the property we might say "S is red", or "S is Blue". But then we turn the colour itself into the subject and attempt to create a scale of wavelengths to define the different colours. The quantifying of the attribute is only as accurate as the understanding of the attribute which the scale is based on. So a specific scale of wavelengths is not a very accurate way to represent different colours because most real instances of colour are a mixture of wavelengths.

So, when we quantify the attribute, which is called "continuous", with "infinitely divisible", the quantification scale is only as accurate as our understanding of what it means to be continuous. For simplicity sake, the mathematician will say let's just define "continuous" as infinitely divisible and it doesn't matter whether there is such a thing as "real continuity", or even what is being referred to when people say "time is continuous", because this is mathematical continuity we are defining, and so long as we adhere to the definition there ought tot be no problem. However, there is a problem whenever we decide to apply that mathematical scaling to the natural thing which appears to have the attribute of being continuous. It was exemplified by Zeno. The problem arises because there is a discrepancy between what "continuous" means when we say "S (time or space for example) is continuous", and when we say "continuous is infinitely divisible". The thing referred to as continuous is not "continuous" as defined by mathematics. This is because the mathematical definition of "continuous" is adopted for the simplicity or eloquence of mathematical principles, and does reflect what is being referred to when "continuous" is predicated of a subject like time or space. If one is to assert, and insist that the thing which is said to be continuous must have the property as defined in mathematics, this indicates a misunderstanding. The misunderstanding is analogous to one who insists that a thing which is a particular colour, must have only a specific narrow range of wavelength (ignoring the fact that in reality colours are mixed wavelengths). The situation is that the "official", mathematical definition of the property does not match the perception which is named as that property.

Quoting Zelebg

Your logic is not wrong, just inadequate because you don’t get two logically opposite and mutually exclusive categories: continuous / divisible vs. discrete / indivisible.

The goal is to describe how things are in reality, not to produce mutually exclusive categories. The reality of categories is that they always overlap and envelope each other, more like sets. A human being is a mammal, is an animal, is a living thing, is an existing thing. The categories are not mutually exclusive.

However, within some categories we will establish extremes, like hot and cold, and scale according to those extremes. But it's not proper to say that they are mutually exclusive, because they are in the same category, and all the intermediates, can be said to be degrees of the two. So "divisible" and "indivisible" are better represented as the two extremes of the same category, like hot and cold. Then these two are the ideals, the perfect extremes, and all things in reality fall somewhere in between, as divisible in some ways, but not divisible in other ways.

Quoting Zelebg

So no, we divide a line and we do not get two parts, we get two lines, and if we supposed lines are continuous, then obviously we get two continuities. Think of it as analog vs. digital.

Right, we start with AB as one continuous line. Then we insert C to divide at C, so that AC and CB are distinct line segments. Therefore each of these two is a distinct continuity, but there is no continuity of AB anymore, because that line has been divided at C. However, AB still exists as something we can talk about, so we can say that it consists of two parts, AC and CB. Do you agree or not?

Perhaps your attempt to describe things in terms of a continuous/discrete dichotomy is confusing you. Let's determine what "continuous" means in application, and also what "discrete" means in application, to determine whether these two signify the extremes (ideals) of one category, or whether they signify distinct categories. There could be ambiguity such that sometimes they mean one, and other times they mean the other.

Reply to Metaphysician Undercover

The goal is to describe how things are in reality, not to produce mutually exclusive categories.

This is not physics, it’s ontology and metaphysics. So the first goal is to establish logical categories or else you end up contradicting yourself.

Do you agree or not?

Nothing gets cut, nothing gets divided, it’s a matter of speech and it can be expressed in different context with different terms, as I already explained, but you keep making the same mistake of being strangely literal about a hypothetical abstract concept.

It’s not a matter of opinion. Divisible is the opposite to indivisible, continuous is the opposite to discrete, and analog is the opposite to digital. That’s all.

Reply to aletheist Reply to Zelebg Reply to Metaphysician Undercover

Can I ask, on one summary point, has there been any consensus on the Reality of Time viz the bivalence/vagueness issue?

Quoting 3017amen

Can I ask, on one summary point, has there been any consensus on the Reality of Time viz the bivalence/vagueness issue?

There has not been much consensus about anything in this thread, but please clarify exactly what you mean by "the bivalence/vagueness issue."

Quoting aletheist

There has not been much consensus about anything in this thread, but please clarify exactly what you mean by "the bivalence/vagueness issue."

Sure. Whether the so-called reality of past, present, future are either continuous or discrete?

The bivalence issue , I thought, was in large part what you and MU were arguing relative to P and-P, generally speaking. And vagueness would suggest that language cannot capture the phenomenon of time. A common learn-ed example is the infamous red apple thus:

Consider the following statement in the circumstance of sorting apples on a moving belt:
This apple is red.
Upon observation, the apple is an undetermined color between yellow and red, or it is mottled both colors. Thus the color falls into neither category " red " nor " yellow ", but these are the only categories available to us as we sort the apples. We might say it is "50% red". This could be rephrased: it is 50% true that the apple is red. Therefore, P is 50% true, and 50% false. This apple is red and it is not-red.

And so, I thought one argument was that basically, time violated the laws of non-contradiction.

(Of course, I still consider time an illusion. And I also view time subordinate to change.)

Quoting 3017amen

Whether the so-called reality of past, present, future are either continuous or discrete?

I believe that time is real and continuous.

Quoting 3017amen

The bivalence issue , I thought, was in large part what you and MU were arguing relative to P and-P, generally speaking.

I believe that there are lapses of time during which a concrete thing (S) is changing from possessing an abstract quality or relation (P) to not possessing it, or vice-versa, such that neither "S is P" nor "S is not-P" is true; i.e., the principle of excluded middle is false with respect to the attribution of that predicate to that subject at that determination of time. Instead, either "S is becoming P" or "S is becoming not-P" is true.

Quoting 3017amen

And so, I thought one argument was that basically, time violated the laws of non-contradiction.

I believe that the principle of contradiction is maintained, because there is no instant or lapse of time at which both "S is P" and "S is not-P" are true.

Reply to 3017amen
We can make truthful 'is' and 'is not' statements concerning the past, because the past has already occurred and is therefore determinate. We cannot make truthful 'is' and 'is not' statements concerning the future because it is indeterminate, characterized by possibility. So statements concerning the future are predictions.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

e cannot make truthful 'is' and 'is not' statements concerning the future because it is indeterminate, characterized by possibility.

I would say that this is true relative to human understanding (only) — but not in an absolute sense. Because humans experience time one instant at a time and don't know the future with any certainty (needless to say).

But in an absolute sense, the future is just like the past or the present — something will have happened (regardless of whether we know what that is now).

Quoting Daz

I would say that this is true relative to human understanding (only) — but not in an absolute sense. Because humans experience time one instant at a time and don't know the future with any certainty (needless to say).

If you believe in free will, the future is not determined. So it is true in an absolute sense, if free will is true. If you think that "X will happen" is the same a "Y has happened", in an absolute sense, then you are a hard determinist.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

We can make truthful 'is' and 'is not' statements concerning the past, because the past has already occurred and is therefore determinate

Under what circumstances might the past be altered? The Grandfather Paradox? :chin:

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

If you believe in free will, the future is not determined.

I believe the future is determined regardless of what one believes.

Quoting jgill

Under what circumstances might the past be altered?

None, since the past is determinate.

Quoting Daz

I believe the future is determined regardless of what one believes.

Then you are indeed a hard determinist, as @Metaphysician Undercover stated; presumably also an eternalist, holding that the past, present, and future all exist. My view is more along the lines of the "growing block" theory, holding that the past and present exist, but not the future. The present is the indefinite lapse of time at which the indeterminate future is always becoming the determinate past.

Quoting aletheist

Under what circumstances might the past be altered? — jgill

None, since the past is determinate.

Wouldn't be too sure of that. Speculative notions like the multiple universe theory might have a bearing. If it were possible to somehow influence the past, changes might simply flow into an alternate universe, avoiding the Grandfather Paradox.

What we currently know of space and time may seem quaint and naive by future generations. :cool:

Reply to aletheist

Are you familiar with Calculus? The point at which a car is traveling down a road when it passes a stop sign is similar to a derivative. I feel you might be parsing words with the whole notion that there is not an exact position. 1 + 1 = 2 is stored in your mind and my mind somewhere. I'm not sure arguing against exact position adds anything to the conversation. The earth and our galaxy are flying through space but that doesn't mean something else isn't occupying the spot in space that your cat was at in your house 20 minutes ago. I do support special relativity as well as general relativity (as for the latter to the extent to which i understand it).

If we are constantly changing our opinions as to the facts of the past on the basis of new information, then why should we believe that the past is real and immutable?

Suppose that in 2030 society obtains decisive historical evidence concerning the identity of Jack The Ripper in 1888, whereby historians thereafter claim that the riddle regarding Jack the Ripper's identity was solved in 2030. Why should we believe that the actual facts regarding the identity of Jack the Ripper in 1888 existed before 2030? What does this assertion add to our calendar-indexed observations?

Quoting sime

If we are constantly changing our opinions as to the facts of the past on the basis of new information, then why should we believe that the past is real and immutable?

You ask why the past is immutable. But as a reason not to think of it that way, you mention only that our thoughts about the past can change. There is an important distinction to be drawn between a) a thing (the past), and b) our thoughts about it later.

We find ourselves perceiving and acting in a world characterized by ceaseless motion and change. That experience is organized according to an order of time, a dimension that runs from "before" to "after". We learn to generalize from the temporal order of our experience to understand and imagine the world in keeping with concepts of "past", "present", and "future".

Quoting aletheist

The state of things in the present is always one of indefinitely gradual change,

Our grasp of the state of things seems on some occasions and in some respects to change gradually and indefinitely, on other occasions and in other respects to change definitely and suddenly.

Quoting aletheist

as ongoing events bring different abstract qualities and concrete things together,

It seems reasonable to suppose that some events are or involve "appearances", and that other events are not and do not involve "appearances".

Quoting aletheist

such that the indeterminate possibilities and conditional necessities of the future become the determinate actualities of the past.

In what sense are possibilities "indeterminate"?

What are conditional necessities of the future?

If there are such things as conditional necessities of the future, might they imply conditional necessities of the past, not merely determinate actualities of the past?

Quoting aletheist

Time is real because this process and its results are as they are regardless of what any individual mind or finite group of minds thinks about them.

Objective matters of fact do not seem to depend on our thoughts about them.

But our thoughts about them do seem to depend on their availability in experience, as well as on our conceptual (e.g. linguistic) habits.

To all appearances, the temporal character of experience and of the world that appears to us in experience is an objective matter of fact.

Quoting Cabbage Farmer

Our grasp of the state of things seems on some occasions and in some respects to change gradually and indefinitely, on other occasions and in other respects to change definitely and suddenly.

In my view, a definite change is an event, which is always realized at a lapse of time during which the change is strictly continuous. Some events are more abrupt than others; i.e., the lapse of time at which they are realized has a shorter duration, causing them to be perceived as more forceful. However, no event is truly instantaneous.

Quoting Cabbage Farmer

In what sense are possibilities "indeterminate"?

They are states of things that may or may not be realized (in the future). Only facts that have been realized (in the past) are determinate.

Quoting Cabbage Farmer

What are conditional necessities of the future?

Facts signified by conditional propositions in the subjunctive mood; e.g., "If state of things X were to be realized, then state of things Y would be realized."

Quoting Cabbage Farmer

If there are such things as conditional necessities of the future, might they imply conditional necessities of the past, not merely determinate actualities of the past?

I suppose that "conditional necessities of the past" are facts signified by counterfactual propositions; e.g., "If state of things X had been realized, then state of things Y would have been realized."

Quoting Cabbage Farmer

Objective matters of fact do not seem to depend on our thoughts about them.

That is exactly what it means for something to be real--it is as it is regardless of what any individual mind or finite group of minds thinks about it.