Randomness, Preferences and Free Will
[quote=Arthur Schopenhauer]A man can do what he wants, but not want what he wants[/quote]
The above quote encapsulates an argument against free will for if we didn't chose our preferences (likes and dislikes) and all our actions are determined by our preferences then it follows that we're not free; we are automatons, each with its own preprogrammed set of dispositions that will ultimately determine every course of action that we'll ever choose in the course of our lives.
I recall another member of the forum whose name I forget (sorry) say something to the following effect:
Consider the possibility that we do have a "choice" in the matter and can select a set of dispositions before we're born i.e. we could select our personality, assuming it is our personality that determines our actions, and become a painter, an accountant, a scientist, a philosopher, etc.
How would we choose our personality traits?
It can't be that we'd have a preexisting set of preferences because then, to have free will, it would be necessary to choose these preexisting preferences as well. The problem then shifts one level up since to choose the preexisting preferences there would be another set of pre-preexisting preferences and so on: an infinite regress results. Ergo, choosing our personality has to be a random process because the moment the probability of choosing a particular personality rises above the random value of 50%, it indicates a preference and that leads to an infinite regress. However, a random selection of preferences isn't the same as choosing freely is it since, after all, you're not choosing at all.
So, the choice is between an infinite regress or randomness and both are incompatible with free will. Therefore, free will is impossible in principle.
The above quote encapsulates an argument against free will for if we didn't chose our preferences (likes and dislikes) and all our actions are determined by our preferences then it follows that we're not free; we are automatons, each with its own preprogrammed set of dispositions that will ultimately determine every course of action that we'll ever choose in the course of our lives.
I recall another member of the forum whose name I forget (sorry) say something to the following effect:
Consider the possibility that we do have a "choice" in the matter and can select a set of dispositions before we're born i.e. we could select our personality, assuming it is our personality that determines our actions, and become a painter, an accountant, a scientist, a philosopher, etc.
How would we choose our personality traits?
It can't be that we'd have a preexisting set of preferences because then, to have free will, it would be necessary to choose these preexisting preferences as well. The problem then shifts one level up since to choose the preexisting preferences there would be another set of pre-preexisting preferences and so on: an infinite regress results. Ergo, choosing our personality has to be a random process because the moment the probability of choosing a particular personality rises above the random value of 50%, it indicates a preference and that leads to an infinite regress. However, a random selection of preferences isn't the same as choosing freely is it since, after all, you're not choosing at all.
So, the choice is between an infinite regress or randomness and both are incompatible with free will. Therefore, free will is impossible in principle.
Comments (71)
My first suggestion is that we should not conflate preferences with wants or desires. It’s a pretty common practice to do this in philosophy and I really cannot blame OP or anyone else for assuming that preferences and desires are synonymous. But, it seems like desires are more like urges and impulses while preferences are more like value judgements or beliefs about what’s better and what’s worse. To give a clear example of what I mean, imagine a drug addict who recognizes that he has a problem with drugs. It seems like this drug addict desires to do drugs but has a preference to not be doing drugs. If you asked the drug addict to make a pros and cons list involving the decision to do drugs, they would argue that doing drugs has more disadvantages than advantages. Nonetheless, they may lack an urge to actually stop doing drugs and they may have a severe urge to continue doing them. So, there is a conflict between preferences and desires here.
The believer of libertarian free will could take advantage of this conflict—they may ask: what determines whether the drug addict chooses to act on his desires or act on his preferences? A skeptic of free will would likely respond that the personality trait of conscientiousness determines whether or not someone has a tendency of having desires that align with their preferences. People who are more conscientious will tend to have an urge to do the thing that they think is the right thing to do which is the thing that aligns with their preferences. While people who are low in conscientiousness would be more driven by their irrational impulses which are contradictory to their preferences. The skeptic of free will would then state that your level of conscientiousness is determined by gene-environment interactions.
The believer of libertarian free will might argue back that one could be born with a low level of conscientiousness and improve his consciousness across time with hard work and dedication. They might point out that sometimes someone has a low level of conscientiousness as a young adult but becomes very conscientious as he gets older.
But, there seems to be something paradoxical about claiming that one could essentially become hardworking in the future through hard work and dedication. After all, what determines whether or not someone is capable of working hard at developing an ability to work hard? It seems like a more plausible explanation for why some people become more hardworking over time is that they simply experienced a sort of growth spurt of conscientiousness kinda like a growth spurt that one might have with their height or an event in their life that was triggered by the environment triggered a sudden improvement in conscientiousness. So, I think ultimately we should reject this argument for free will. But, I figured that it was worth mentioning since free will is often associated with a mystical notion of “willpower” which basically a kind of strange non-deterministic change in conscientiousness.
Not directly on the spot, of course, but certainly through extensive conditioning over time, yes.
Willpower is basically reflexive parenting. Present you is partially conditioned by past you. Future you is partially conditioned by present you. If you want to want something other than you want, you can take actions to condition future you to want that thing that present you wants to want but doesn't. That wanting to want something is your will, and the effectiveness of that self-conditioning is the freedom of your will; freedom from the other influences that would condition you otherwise, your own self-conditioning prevailing over those other influences.
Our preferences grow and alter with the rest of us. If our actions are determined by our preferences, then our actions are determined by us. I don’t understand how our “preferences” are not a part of us, as if foreign. Each of us determine the course of our own lives by the simple fact that nothing else does.
Quoting TheHedoMinimalist
I see. Your example of the junkie who wants drugs but prefers not to take them is interesting. However, I fail to see the distinction between "want" and "prefer" as used herein. Do you mean preference is a judgement and a want is, well, more visceral, if you will? However, the junkie's (is this word still in use?) preference is actually based on another want is it not? I mean though he wants to take drugs he would prefer not to because other wants get in the way e.g. the junkie wants to live longer, live healthier, have friends, family, avoid jail, etc. and these wants are again not of his choosing right?
Basically, preferences as defined by you - judgements rather than just desires - are just cases where wants play off against each other.
Quoting Pfhorrest
Correct. However, if I have preferences or more accurately wants, then every choice I make is tainted by these wants and since I never chose them, I remain trapped within the walls of my wants.
Quoting NOS4A2
You did not choose them. Nobody asked me whether I wanted to like philosophy. I just do and in the same breath there are others who wouldn't do philosophy even if their life depended on it.
But no one and nothing else determined your affinity for philosophy but yourself.
When you choose a lottery ticket number 'at random' it is not really random. Your choice is through some unconscious bias.
This is an interesting way to put it. We are ever-changing organisms as a result of our experiences, but the changes aren't evident until some point in the future.
Quoting Pfhorrest
I think it's problematic to use will as part of the premise and the conclusion. It leads to circular reasoning. The things you want are your will and your will is the things you want. It also seems to contradict the point made about conditioning; even conditioning that is designed by the person himself.
Quoting NOS4A2
Couldn't the selective effects of past consequences on behavior explain why one wants to do something at a given time? The interactive effects of myriad experiences of the past impinging on present circumstances to bring about (not coerce) determined thoughts and actions.
I suppose it could explain why one wants to do something at a given time, but I don't see why one would bother. Each "effects of past consequences" and "experience of the past impinging on present circumstances" occurs at the level our own being and nowhere besides. So I think it's somewhat redundant to say our past selves determine our future selves.
Except, entropy. Why do you remember the past but not the future?
Sorry, I've never understood this argument; it has always sounded a bit off to me. Let me overly simplify determinism just for illustration... we'll suppose states are contiguous, and presume "temporal locality", which is at least fair. So, for example, we have some state S8, that leads to S9; and S9 will lead to S10.
To me, this sounds like a kind of bait and switch; as if one is arguing: "(1) S8 leads to S9, inevitably. (2) And S9 leads to S10, inevitably. (3) By 1 and 2, S8 leads to S10, inevitably. (4) Therefore, S10 is not the result of S9, but of S8." ...with the bait-and-switch being (4) which to me seems to flatly contradict (2). I'm perfectly fine, mind you, with 3; that's not a problem for me. But the suggestion that S10 is "predetermined" (here, "preprogrammed") sounds like saying 4... that S10 does not in fact occur due to S9; otherwise, why bother with the word "predetermined"? To me it sounds very off... e.g., if there were multiple ways to S9... say, S8a, S8b, ..., S8n; then I would say how the state evolved to S9 doesn't matter... merely the fact that it did leads to S10, because S10 follows from S9. Likewise, I would say that S8k leads to S10 by virtue of it leading to S9 from which S10 follows. I don't know how to swallow the notion that S8k leads to S10 regardless of S9, or how to interpret "predetermined" (/preprogrammed) otherwise.
(Full disclosure; I'm agnostic on the question of free will; this point here is solely about determinism to me).
Quoting TheMadFool
It's not so clear to me where the separation here is; let's hypothetically suppose John's parents consider a procedure that would affect their baby. If they opt for it, John grows up to like chocolate. If they opt out, he grows up to prefer vanilla. So what is it that this procedure does... does it affect what flavor John will prefer? Or does it pick which John his parents would give birth to? Or is there a difference? How would you reconcile it?
Quoting Enrique
Volition primarily is about goal driven behavior; you set about some intention to attain, then act to attain it. When I wash my hands and find no towels, I shake my hands to get water off; I'm setting about a goal, and acting to attain it. If my hands shake due to a tick, nothing is setting about the goal of their shaking. I don't think that conflicts with determinism at all; you can program robots to do something similar.
I suppose because the past has occurred. But remembering occurs in the present, as does everything else. There are no anterior states.
That S8 leads to S10 AND S9 leads to S10 is not a contradiction because S9 is an intermediate step to S10. If someone were to say, given the causal chan S8 > S9 > S10, that S8 directly causes S10 then that would be a contradiction because s/he would be forgetting and contradicting the fact that S9 is a required step before S10 occurs. Anyway, I don't see the relevance to the argument in the OP.
Quoting InPitzotl
I don't see the relevance to my argument in the OP. All I'm saying is that we all come with a predetermined, as in decided without our choice being considered, set of preferences (likes and dislikes). Ergo, it follows that we don't have free will because everything and anything we do proceeds from these preferences and we had no hand in acquiring them. If we're given the hypothetical opportunity to choose our personality, the set of our preferences determining that, then either these choices will be made according to some other set of preferences (preferences for preferences) or it must be necessarily random. If the former then we must be able to choose these preferences for preferences too and so on ad infinitum. If the latter then random selection is not really a choice is it? Either way there is no free will because one path regresses to infinity; when do we stop an select our preferences freely? And the other path is akin to rolling a dice, again no free choice.
Yes, I would say that’s a pretty accurate representation of the distinction that I was going for.
Quoting TheMadFool
Well, I would say that preferences are not only necessarily based on other wants in many cases. Rather, I would say that they could also be based on certain beliefs about what is truly better or worse or they could be those beliefs as well. Regarding the junkie case, the junkie not only wants to avoid the negative consequences of using drugs but he also believes that those negative consequences are truly bad. This belief might be independent of his desire for those things or at least I think that there could be desire independent beliefs(some philosophers may disagree). On the other hand, the junkie only wishes to use drugs but he may lack the belief that those drugs have any intrinsic benefit for him(again that’s actually a controversial premise but I think few would challenge it.) The believer in libertarian free will might argue that we choose our beliefs about what is good or bad for us or they may argue that we choose to either prioritize our desires or prioritize our beliefs about what is good or bad. I actually think that we don’t choose what we believe about goodness and badness. I also don’t think we choose to prioritize our value beliefs over our desires or vice versa. If you agree with me, then you would have no reason to believe in libertarian free will. But, if you think I’m wrong about assuming that we don’t choose what we believe about value or what we prioritize, then I would say that you have reason to accept libertarian free will. Of course, you might also disagree with my topology of desires, preferences, and beliefs and that might give you a different reason to reject libertarian free will that are somewhat unrelated to my reasons for rejecting it. I was mostly trying to make an argument regarding the concept analysis of desires and preferences rather than object to your position on free will which I consider plausible.
Let's stick to your junkie example. I understand the want for drugs; after all he's addicted. As you said though he may, after careful consideration, prefer not to want drugs. I suggested that that could be explained with another want, say the want to live healthier, opposing his want for drugs. You seem to disagree. You say Quoting TheHedoMinimalist
Quoting TheHedoMinimalist
What is the nature of these "certain beliefs"? In the case of the junkie what would just one of these beliefs, unrelated to any want as you claim, be? I'd like to know.
The issue here is free will and it's defined in terms of unimpeded choosing of available alternatives in our worldline.
In the junkie example you so kindly put forth I found your claim that the kinds of beliefs one may have may be an alternative to wants in re the way we make choices.
I fully comprehend, at least I think I do, that a belief can influence choice; for instance the belief in equality can make you condemn slavery and sans that belief we either wouldn't care or may even support slavery. However, a belief such as that I mentioned just now must have a basis of some sort, right? A belief in equality is founded on the difficulty we face with suffering, which slavery entails and also on the happiness that equality will bring. Suffering and happiness, the disliking the former and liking the latter, were not choices we ever made; we came preprogrammed as hedonists. Ergo, even if preferences are based on beliefs, beliefs themselves trace their origins to a point when and where it's impossible to make choices, let alone free choices. Similarly, other beliefs, at least those that influence our choices, have origins of the same nature - one that precludes any choice at all.
Consider "The Popeye Argument" (because "I yam what I yam and that's all that I yam"). The idea here is that I am free if I'm the one that decides my course of actions. The argument (TPA) is that this is entailed when the thing that decides my course of actions is me; aka, "what I yam".
Quoting TheMadFool
Of course. That's point 3.
Quoting TheMadFool
Of course. That's point 4, and point 4 is the one with the contradiction.
Quoting TheMadFool
So against TPA, this has no teeth unless you're trying to make point 4. From this perspective, analogously, (a) is something like part of S9; and the argument is that (b), something like S8, is what (c) determines (d) my courses of actions, which is to say, S8>S10. To say that this refutes something like TPA is to say that it refutes that "what I yam" is determining my actions; aka, that it refutes that S9>S10. But that refutation would require the contradiction that is point 4.
I'm not sure you're claiming that you're arguing against TPA. But you're certainly arguing against something. And I can easily reverse engineer what you're arguing against based on what you're arguing... that would be that we cannot be something like "original causes" of what we are. What I'm curious about is how many people argue that to be free means that we're original causes of what we are.
Quoting TheMadFool
It's a similar point to TPA. Under deterministic assumptions, something causes our actions. The question, under TPA, is whether that thing is us or not. That's a matter of perspective, which to me, implies it's simply a language game. To say that priors "force us" to do something is to say that we aren't states in the universe, but rather, are enslaved by them; something akin to "my brain made me do it". To say that we "yam what we yam" is to say that we are states in the universe, and if that's the case, there's no distinction between our doing something and the universe evolving that way; something akin to "I have a soul, it's made of flesh". If we're states in the universe, then some other state wouldn't be us; it'd be some other soul, made of some "other" flesh ("other" meaning simply flesh in a different state).
(And FTR, I think it's a bit more complex than this; qualitatively it may be abbreviated as a matter of what our dispositions are, but in terms of determinism as an explanation of the world we live in, we're agents; as agents, we both affect and are affected by both "mere" world states and other individuals... so it's really more like a whole world state being a certain way evolving to the next world state, as opposed to merely "our predispositions" determining the thing we do).
So what is it that impedes this faculty? First of all, it’s ignorance of the existence of alternatives at all. Secondly, it’s isolation from these alternatives, rendering them unavailable. And thirdly it’s exclusion, leaving us unable to choose the alternatives that would otherwise be available.
This doesn’t mean, however, that there is no such thing as ‘free will’. The will has a capacity to be free insofar as we increase awareness, connection and collaboration with a diversity of alternatives.
Let’s look at this example of the drug addict or ‘junkie’ already offered.
Quoting TheHedoMinimalist
What if, instead of assuming a conscious decision has been made to ‘do drugs’ and asking them to make a list of pros and cons to that decision, you ask them to list alternatives to doing drugs, describe the perceived availability of those alternatives and what capacity they perceive in themselves to choose those alternatives - then I think you’ll get a clearer picture of this ‘decision’ to do drugs.
It isn’t so much about conflict between preferences and desires: it’s about awareness of, connection to and collaboration with diverse possibilities, or the perceived value and potential of alternatives. Whether you’re able to directly increase the value and potential of this diversity from the drug addict’s conscious perspective, or do so by corralling the causal conditions of their unconscious actions, the freedom of the will is more complex than simply ‘wanting what he wants’.
Quoting InPitzotl
I see what you mean. S9 would be the preferences we're born with that determines the course of our actions, S10. S8 would be the preferences for our preferences and for that too there would be another set of preferences S7 and so on. However, my position is that S8 determines S9 and S9 in turn determines S10 and you can continue the chain of causation backwards to infinity. Nothing that I've said comes to close to the claim that S8 causes S10 directly. There's an intermediate step, S9; the whole point of an infinite regress being the existence of an infinite number of links in the chain.
Ignorance and awareness have a role in the variety of choices of available and the effectiveness of our decisions but our decisions will still depend on our wants/preferences which, as you already know, were not of our own choosing.
Well, the junkie may believe that living a longer life would be better for him. Nonetheless, he may actually be suicidal and desire to die soon because of his drug addiction. The junkie may also desire to do drugs but proclaim that drugs caused him nothing but trouble and provided him with no benefit whatsoever. It’s worth remembering that if the junkie is a hardcore addict then he probably doesn’t even experience pleasure from taking drugs anymore; rather drugs only alleviate his withdrawal symptoms. In addition, the drug addict may believe that he’s better off not being in jail but can become apathetic towards the prospect of his own arrest despite this. So, it’s seems like these are some examples of the drug addict having beliefs about value that don’t correspond to his desires and vice versa.
Quoting TheMadFool
I’m not sure if it is defined in those terms actually. There seems to be a diversity of ways of understanding and defining free will. I suppose that what you mean by free will in the OP is that it is an unimpeded choosing of available alternatives in our worldline. If you are claiming nothing more than that in the OP than I agree with you that there isn’t an unimpeded choosing of available alternatives in our worldline. If you are claiming that this is the only proper way of understanding free will, then I’m not sure if I agree.
Quoting TheMadFool
I agree that there is usually a basis for a belief. But, I’m not sure why that basis necessary has to be a want instead of something else. Maybe they are simply based on intuitions or introspective observations.
Quoting TheMadFool
Well, it seems like the belief in equality could be based on a variety of things which may be unrelated to wants. For example, one might believe in equality simply because they are persuaded by John Locke’s arguments for it. I think one could accept Locke’s argument for natural rights without necessarily having a desire for natural rights to exist. Though, I think most people who are persuaded by Locke’s argument probably do simply wish to live in a world with natural rights.
Quoting TheMadFool
I agree with the first sentence of this post to an extent. I think everyone was pre-programmed to like pleasure and to dislike suffering. But, I’m not sure how this entails that no one could have a choice motivating belief that is not hedonistically motivated. Do you think that all human motivations are influenced by pleasure and suffering?
However, consider the following: Beliefs seem to come in two flavors viz. 1)those that we have no choice over e.g. those based on brute facts of the world and 2) those we can choose and the reason for this being either that we haven't discovered their truth/falsehood or it's impossible to do so or there's some other reasons I'm unaware of.
Type 1 beliefs don't figure in the issue and so can be set aside for they automatically preclude free will since we, perforce, must believe in them. In case you say that we still have a choice regarding such beliefs, the choices we make would be influenced by our wants which we already agreed preclude free will.
With type 2 beliefs we have choice insofar as believing them is concerned but the choice we make would be based on our wants and that, at the risk of repeating myself, we already know leads us back to what we agreed upon - we didn't choose our wants.
I can post pictures :up: :smile:
I agree with this. I don’t think we choose our beliefs either. I only disagreed with the claim that beliefs that concern choices are only determined or influenced by wants.
The important point here is that they WERE not of our own choosing. But I would argue that we DO have a choice regarding those wants and preferences. Type 1 beliefs aren’t based on the ‘brute facts’ of the world, but only on our perception of them, which has been limited up to the point that we are aware of it, yet far from fixed.
Awareness of our wants and preferences are derived from introspection: we acquire this value and potential information from the response of internal systems to stimulus, and each of these systems in their response have a limited perspective of the organism, the universe and what it means to be ‘human’. When we take this into account, why do we prioritise the value of internal affect? The more we understand how these internal systems ‘perceive’ the limited information they receive, the more discerning we can be about the value and significance of their contributions to our thoughts, motives and actions.
Can you tell me how we form beliefs that are not, in some way, tied to our wants?
The essence of what you've said can be expressed in the desire for freedom: awareness of factors that influence us are important insofar as we can resist them in order to gain control over our destiny so to speak. This is nothing other than a manifestation of our desire for freedom and that, it appears to me, isn't something we picked voluntarily. We are programmed to desire freedom and to the extent that is true, paradoxically, we are not free. Note that there is a choice between wanting freedom and not wanting freedom and ergo to be free we should have had a say in deciding whether we want to be free or not.
What does it mean to even have this ‘freedom’ that you desire? For every individual to be naturally unimpeded in their worldline, they must be a universe unto themselves. But without interaction there is no awareness of alternatives to even want. There is no worldline, no existence to speak of. This ‘freedom’ you desire is tantamount to non-existence. You do have the capacity to choose that. So is it really this ‘freedom’ that you want, or something else?
For me, it isn’t a matter of resisting influential factors, but of understanding them in order to connect and collaborate. Control is an illusion generated by ignorance, and destiny is a limited perception of potential. We are not isolated individuals, but possible manifestations of one unlimited will. Freedom as I understand it comes from maximum awareness of, connection to and collaboration with the possibilities of the universe. It’s not something we can just be given prior to achieving this. Our capacity for freedom IS there. We simply need to understand how to exercise it in light of our particular manifestation and perception of potential - recognising that, where we are limited, it is our awareness, connection and collaboration beyond that limitation that ultimately sets us free.
You said that awareness of our wants and preferences give us freedom. Consider a little thought experiment. Imagine a person X who's not "aware" in your terms and so is like a slave to his wants and being thus his personality, here being considered as determined by his wants, is of type P. He then becomes aware and he consciously alters the landscape of his wants, transforming into another personality, type Q. The problem is that we can't say for sure that X wasn't of type Q right from the beginning, simply defaulting to a type P because he wasn't aware of what his real wants are. It's a similar situation to a person who at a point in his past liked Coke but then, after becoming aware of other fizzy drinks, changes his brand to Pepsi. There's no way of knowing that he actually liked Pepsi from the start but was making do with Coke as a substitute and when Pepsi became available made the switch. If you notice, there's no alteration in his wants at all; in fact his want was just waiting to be satisfied. Ergo, any change in our wants/preferences, even if it resulted from what you call awareness, can't be taken as evidence that we have free will.
I would like to answer that question with another question if you don’t mind. How did you form your belief that the Earth revolves around the Sun? Did you simply want that to be the case? Though, I’m guessing you meant to ask me how choice-oriented beliefs could be formed instead of just ordinary beliefs. I think those beliefs could be formed the same way. Just like you might have been taught in school that the Earth revolves around the Sun, you might have also been taught by your parents or society that the disadvantages of drug use are greater than the advantages. This doesn’t seem to necessarily imply that you wish that either beliefs were the case, but rather you simply believe the information that is provided to you. Nonetheless, I think you might still have wants that contradict that information which you may still genuinely believe. I think we could be indoctrinated into holding value beliefs that are contradictory to our wants.
I don't know if you would consider my version of free will as radical but it appears to me that if we are to call ourselves free then there should be no force, from torture to logic, that should have an influence over us. I think I touched on this in some other thread; the basic idea being that if we are free, in the truest sense, we should be able to deny every possible influence over the choices we make. So, the answer to the question I asked you, "how do we form beliefs?" is pointless if an explanation involves a process of belief-formation that has a forced nature to it, even if that force is logic itself.
So, we must, in order to be free, be able to reject every want we have but if you'll notice this situation arises because we want to be free and that want - to be free - is programmed into us, without our consent as it were. Please note there is a choice between wanting freedom and not wanting it and ergo, true freedom would necessitate a free choice but since we never chose to want freedom, we're not free.
If one is influenced then one is not free even if one understands the influence. The essence of choice, itself the essence of free will, is not affirmation but negation. We need to be able to say "no" to something that's pulling the strings of our mind's decision center. Think of it. Your notion of awareness only makes sense if through it we can negate a previous pre-awareness state.
I seek your opinion on the following:
What does it mean to make a completely free choice with regard to free will?
I mean, the way I seem to be suggesting, a completely free choice necessarily must arise from a want that must be causally isolated from any and all things that can force the choice upon us.
Now consider the idea of choice. For simplicity consider a situation that has two options. Making a choice in this situation can't be done randomly for that would automatically preclude free will; choosing randomly is not a personal choice. So, we have to make a personal selection, meaning here that randomness is excluded, between the two options. This calls for an evaluation of the pros and cons of the two available alternatives. We all know that our wants are critical to what we consider pros and cons. These wants are preprogrammed and so, no choice we ever make can be free. So far so good.
However, there's the "problem" of beliefs (TheHedoMinimalist) and awareness (Possibility), both conditions that can result in us making choices contrary to our wants, suggesting that we may act in defiance, like rebellious robots, of our programming (wants) and that flings the door wide open to the possibility of free will.
First, let's consider beliefs. Belief, if free will exists, must also be a choice. The notion of being forced to accept a belief, even if that force be logic, is incompatible with free will. Since beliefs have to be optional and our choices are decided by our wants and our wants were not of our choosing, it follows that beliefs that oppose our wants are simply instances of differing wants, one want against another want manifested as a belief, clashing with each other.
Second, we have awareness. It does seem that as the more aware we are, the more control we have over our behavior. Doesn't this then prove that we're free? After all we're able to do the opposite of what we want to do. Unfortunately no because this too is a clash between wants, one want being hidden from view and suddenly, with increased awareness, coming into view and then chosen over another. Basically, awareness doesn't change us in a free will sense as much as it exposes our other wants.
Well, I think we should discuss the usage of the word “free” as it applies to a variety of different things. For example, we might call Canada a free nation because people who live in Canada have more freedoms than they would in the vast majority of the world. I feel that it seems reasonable to call Canada a free nation despite the fact that there isn’t an unlimited freedom there. Similarly, we might say that Canada values free speech even if they support some restrictions on speech like ones that involve threats of violence. Given this, I think someone could reasonably say that we have free will in the same way that Canada is a free nation. We might be said to be free relative to animals and Canada might be said to be free relative to other nations.
Quoting TheMadFool
I’m not sure about that claim. Couldn’t we say that free will is like a mediator between beliefs and wants? What determines whether we act on our wants or our beliefs in any given instance? Some philosophers might say that nothing determines our prioritizations between beliefs and wants and it’s simply our free will.
Quoting TheMadFool
Something I just realized, perhaps misunderstood: if free will exists then every path to the future must have an alternative. If there is only one route to the future there can be no choice and where there is no choice, free will becomes meaningless as its definitional essence is choice.
Since we must have a choice and we all know choices are want-based, something we had no hand in acquiring, we must return to the original dilemma - infinite regress or randomness.
Let me start by clarifying what I’ve been saying: that it’s not awareness of our wants and preferences that give us freedom - it’s awareness of alternatives and of our capacity to choose from them.
Let’s take a closer look at ‘want’, to start with, which refers to awareness of an experience of lack. The implication seems to be here that each individual is born with an intrinsic and unique structure of lack that waits to be satisfied on an ongoing basis - their response to which forming part of their personality. So awareness, from your perspective, appears to be a matter of discovering this fixed structure of lack within ourselves, and altering our personality in a way that best serves to satisfy it on a daily basis.
This is not how I see it, but I understand how rational this perspective seems, given the confidence we tend to have in the conceptualisation of a four-dimensional, observable/measurable reality and Darwinian evolutionary theory. Lack is a fundamental experience of existence, but the reality is that we lack much more than we realise, and much more than we want at any one time. Our wants are limited not so much by our genetic makeup, but by our awareness, connection and collaboration with the potential and value of experiential possibilities.
We tend to understand awareness as discovering reality, but we also tend to assume that reality refers to objects in time. So when we talk about an awareness of wants and preferences, the assumption is that these wants and preferences are properties of who we are as objects in time. But we aren’t merely objects in time - our awareness of existence as human beings extends beyond the limits of four-dimensional reality, enabling us to develop awareness of, connection to and collaboration with potential and possible aspects of existence, from the Big Bang to a variety of Armageddon scenarios, for instance.
The awareness I’m referring to is the perceived potential and value of certain qualities of subjective experience, irrespective of objects in time. In this context, the awareness of Pepsi’s actual existence is arbitrary - it comes down to an awareness of qualitative alternatives in sweetness and flavour experience, subjective relations to brand identity, etc. In the same way, one can switch from Coke to Diet Coke based on perceived value that has nothing to do with the drink as an object in time, but with awareness of one’s potential, atemporal relation to the subjective experience of drinking cola.
So if we are aware of Pepsi but unaware of how the quality of our potential experience drinking Pepsi differs from that of Coke, then we are still not completely free to choose between these two alternatives. But my point is that the potential is there for greater freedom in our capacity to increase awareness.
Quoting TheMadFool
It isn’t just a matter of being able to do the opposite of what we previously wanted, but about being aware of alternatives and our capacity to choose from them. When we find that we want Pepsi instead of Coke, we don’t lose awareness of our capacity to choose Coke, and we don’t suppress our desire for Coke by preferring Pepsi. Rather our relation to the potential value of both are integrated into our conceptual reality, and we reduce that information - we collapse that potential - into a determined action to choose Pepsi.
You know very well that free will is defined in terms of choice; no choice, no free will. You spoke of alternatives and that's where I want to begin. I agree with you that awareness does one thing for sure - it reveals alternative pathways to the future. Awareness may also do other things but I'll leave that to you to find out.
For the moment let's stick to the multiplication of alternatives that awareness brings. So here is a person, awareness in hand, gazing fondly at the world of possibilities laid out before per. At one point fae has to choose and the way this is done is by weighing the pros and cons of each possibility (choice) and this, to me, requires a set of values which themselves must be chosen according to another value system and so on. Either that or we make a random selection. Both situations seem incompatible with free will; after all in one there's no beginning and in the other the choice isn't yours.
This is the problem I continue to see with discussions on the existence of ‘free will’: a fundamental misunderstanding of what ‘the will’ is on a metaphysical level. How quickly these discussions become wholly about the temporal ACT of choosing, and then we’ve lost the ability to discuss the freedom of ‘the will’, which refers to the CAPACITY to choose an option from available alternatives, NOT the act of choosing itself.
Prior to the act of choosing, the metaphysical will is entirely free. We are free to ‘choose’ between awareness/ignorance, connection/isolation and collaboration/exclusion on a metaphysical level in relation to the five-dimensional experience of choosing an option from available alternatives. This metaphysical ‘choice’ is made according to a conceptual system of interacting value structures in potentiality. It does not occur in time - so there is no beginning, and no infinite regress.
But aren't cases like gambling addicts curious in this framework of metaphysical freedom? Gambling addicts are one group of individuals where it seems difficult to say that a person's will is free such that the person is the agent making the choices about what to do next. Can a person be free at the same moment they feel compelled to do something where no external enforcing agent exists?
This is a distinction without a difference. The capacity to choose must include the act of choosing. How would I know if you had the capacity to eat? By eating, right? The capacity to do x is inferred from doing x. How else would I know you had the capacity to do x?
Quoting TheMadFool
Let's pause here. In mathematics, a definition is used to determine what you're talking about; for example, we define lines as parallel if they are coplanar and have no points in common. This is a prescriptive definition; the definition tells us how the term should be used. By contrast, in natural language, we start by using terms; a lexicographist creates dictionaries by looking at how terms are used, then writes the definition from that. This is a descriptive definition; here, the definition serves to document how terms are used.
When it comes to the general question of how free works, I think we need to appeal to descriptive definitions; because people seem to disagree about given definitions. Furthermore, people's definitions of free will often conflict with how they use the term, and it's here that I want to emphasize a problem.
Quoting TheMadFool
Quoting TheMadFool
A lot of people describe free will in this manner; this is essentially the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP). But people also say that it feels like they have free will; this includes both people who subscribe to PAP who believe they have free will and those who subscribe to PAP who believe they do not. It's as if they think these two things are identical.
But this is dubious; the thing we seem to have has nothing to do with alternate futures per se... there's kind of a "hidden theory" that connects the two, but that theory itself is questionable. Consider that at time T0, I deliberate between vanilla and chocolate. At time T1, I act to attain vanilla. And at T2, I'm actually eating vanilla. PAP would have us say that at T0, there are two T2's; say T2A where I'm eating vanilla, and T2B where I'm eating chocolate. Then at T1, I'm "picking future T2A". At T2, T2A attains, and T2B for lack of better terms "disappears". Now does it really feel like this is what's going on?
I would argue, no, it does not. We do not even feel, at time T0, that we mentally time travel to T2A, sniff it; then travel to T2B, and sniff that; then compare our mental time trips. We do not feel like prophets, prophesying potentialities T2A and T2B, nor is that part of our theory of mind for others. What we feel like is that at time T0, we are considering the potential T2A and T2B, as counterfactuals. The considerations feel more like something constrained by what we know and model; our theory of mind is consistent with this (consider playing poker, for example; we don't presume people know what hand we have when making their bets... we presume they have a type of perspective based lack of knowledge). In contrast to prophets, we feel like weathermen, forecasting potentialities. Having choices result from these forecasts does not require PAP; it requires only that the universe follows laws, that we can learn of those laws, and that we can apply that knowledge to make decisions.
So to answer your question here:
Quoting TheMadFool
...not necessarily, but in the case of eating per se, certainly. But we have eaten; we've eaten food countless times in our lives. Multiple times, we even agentively set about a goal of eating with a spoon, with a fork, with chopsticks, with fingers, and have multiple times managed to succeed in such eating. But also, we eat food, not bricks or nails. It's fair to use these past patterns to develop models of the world whereby we "forecast" that we can eat ice cream with a spoon, but not bowling balls with chopsticks; where said theories purport that the things we seem to be doing when we choose are actually real; without ever appealing to some future ontic potentiality, which doesn't really seem to have to do with the thing we do when we choose anyway. In other words, no, we don't require PAP; we simply require the universe follows laws, that we can learn them, that we can use this to formulate forecasts not prophecies, and that we can use these forecasts to drive a decision process to select one to enact.
They only ‘feel compelled’ because they are ignoring, isolating or excluding elements of ‘choice’ from their perceived potential, as either:
- the ACT of choosing;
- the variety/RANGE to choose from; or
- the specific ALTERNATIVES or options available to be chosen;
before they even determine their actions, let alone initiate them.
The metaphysical will is free - a person’s will is only free insofar as they are aware of, connected to and collaborating with all three aspects of choice. So a person’s will is potentially free. Every manifestation of that will in 4D (ie. determined and initiated action) is necessarily a reduction of that freedom in relation to perceived potential/value. Think of it as a collapsed potentiality wave.
The problem is that most people seem to conceptualise reality according to one primary value structure or system at a time as a four-dimensional ‘force’, which limits all the interacting values according to this one structure. @TheMadFool” describes the way this structure is often perceived:
#comment-389265" class="quote-link">Quoting TheMadFool
When this primary value system prioritises immediate and superficial reward for action such as gambling, their relation to internal affect assumes the highest value over long-term financial and social commitments for instance, and one can ‘feel compelled’ by the perceived value of this internal affect to do something where no ‘external enforcing agent’ exists.
This is a reduction of five-dimensional reality - of interrelating values - in much the same way as ‘time’ is a reduction of four-dimensional reality - of interrelating events. When we relate to a painting of a ball, the two-dimensional information is recognised as a meaningful reduction of three-dimensional reality. So too, our instincts, values and desires are reductions of five-dimensional reality - only we don’t recognise them as such. We tend to think of them as distinct four-dimensional ‘forces’ fighting for dominance over our actions, like ancient gods with petty ambitions.
But they point to a five-dimensional reality of interrelating values or potentiality, irrespective of time. It is how much we understand the five-dimensional irreducibility and relativity of these interrelations that impact on our freedom to choose from a range of available alternatives.
It has no observable/measurable difference in time, no. But capacity is a potential relation, as is knowledge. I infer your capacity to eat from the information I have regarding you in relation to the information I have regarding my capacity to eat, given subjective experience. I don’t need to observe you actually eating to be confident in your capacity to eat. This confidence has a degree of uncertainty, sure - but doesn’t everything?
I thought you might be headed that way and I agree with you that a capacity, to choose in this case, can be inferentially generalized from a sample to a population and so removing the necessity of direct observation in each individual case to decide whether the capacity of choice exists or not. Going back to my example of eating, you can infer my capacity to eat by relating me to you and your own capacity to do so. However, that doesn't solve the problem at all because your capacity to eat or the sample's capacity to make choices is still based on values/wants that they didn't choose and so, if anything is entailed through this exercise it's that yes we have a capacity to choose but these choices are not free in the sense that they were not influenced by things beyond our control.
Also note that in the process of forming the general belief that people have the capacity to choose, some of us had to be observed in the act of choosing. By the same token, imagining the population was reduced to one, just me, my capacity to choose can be inferred only from an act of choosing that I can demonstrate.
Influence at the level of potentiality is not control, it is simply potential to influence. If we are aware of this potential, if we are connected and collaborating (if we understand the conditions under which our relation to this value/potential influence is stronger/weaker), then we would recognise our capacity to alter these conditions and therefore its value/potential with regard to determining and initiating our actions. It need not actually influence us at all. To the extent that we are unaware/ignoring, isolating or excluding information regarding our relation to its potential, our act of choosing is not free.
At the risk of repeating myself and boring you to death, the essence of free will is choice. For free will to be a meaningful concept and for it to exist there must be at least two options available. Imagine this is the case and suppose we have 3 options. Now comes the actual process of making a choice. How is this done? As far as I can see the process of making a choice involves a value system by which we measure the pros and cons of each available option. All this value system is is a set of our preferences (likes/dislikes) and that, we know, leads to my argument that it's either an infinite regress of preferences or random selection of preferences, both incompatible with free will.
I may be misreading you but I can make some kind of sense where you're coming from. Firstly we've structured our lives around the existence of free will and this reinforces our belief that we do have free will. Secondly, everyone has the experience of denying ourselves what we want e.g. a lover of wine may refuse a glass of the finest wine, etc. However, if we just dig a little deeper we come face to face with the fact that all instances where someone has denied faerself what fae wants there always is something fae wanted even more. For instance the wine lover refuses a glass of the finest wine not because fae exercised free will and went against faers wants but because fae wanted something else more; maybe faer refused the wine because fae wanted to maintain faers health and being a want it leads to the original dilemma I proposed.
Please correct me if I’m wrong, but it sounds like you view the fifth-dimensional aspect of metaphysical reality as something we’ve made up, something NOT real. You seem to dismiss it almost entirely, and focus on actual choice as the essence of ‘free will’. I’d like to clarify this aspect of your position before we get too much further along, because my understanding of ‘free will’ is that it operates irreducibly in this fifth-dimensional reality.
The freedom of the will exists ‘prior’ to the actual process of making a choice - the potentiality wave has already collapsed at the point you appear to be starting from. We have already effected a reduction of the will when we ascertain only three options. In my view, random selection is the same as ignorance, and there is no infinite regress because all value systems potentially interact in a timeless environment, so to speak.
So I agree with you that the wine lover probably wanted something else more,,, but I disagree that this leads to a dilemma in the way you have proposed, despite what we apparently ‘know’.
Well, this "capacity to restructure" must be observable right? Imagine that before the "restructuring" of our value system we had a particular set of wants, call it x. After the "restructuring" we should be in possession of a different set of wants, call it y. Now, if y is not different in the sense it contradicts or "goes against what one previously wants", x, then we wouldn't be able to call it "restructuring" right?
The lack of of free will is predicated on not being able to do the opposite of what we want, those wants that we're born with. Ergo, if free will is to exist, it must involve going against these congenital wants. This is a basic idea and I don't know why you insist the contrary.
As for the fifth-dimension I don't see its relevance. I can come to terms with time being the 4th dimension but what is the "fifth" dimension? Is it time? Is it space? Neither time nor space has significance insofar as my argument is concerned, I neither talked about time nor about space.
Quoting TheMadFool
No, a capacity is NOT observable, only perceivable. What is observable is evidence which points to that capacity, but is not capacity. Capacity refers to potential, not actual, existence. What you’re describing here is like pointing to a rendered drawing of a ball and insisting it’s a drawing of a circle that’s light on the top and darker on the bottom, nothing more.
In some situations, we refer largely to a logical value system; in others, a moral value system; others still, an aesthetic value system; etc - or a combination of several at once. All of these value systems interact within a broader conceptual system that represents our perspective of ‘reality’. What we refer to as ‘our value system’ is a reduction of those interactions in relation to a particular four-dimensional situation. What I mean by ‘restructuring our value systems’ - note the plural systems - refers to the way they interact in fifth-dimensional reality as our current conceptualisation of the world.
Quoting TheMadFool
No, the lack of free will (as you describe here) is predicated on the false assumption that we are born with a particular set of wants (as an ‘objective’ structure of lack) that is somehow intrinsic to who we are, such that we are compelled to pursue some semblance of ‘completion’, only to discover more wants, more apparent lack. If this is a basic idea of the argument against ‘free will’, then I maintain it is fundamentally misunderstood.
We develop our sense of lack from interactions with the unfolding universe - in relation to this universe, we will find that we lack far more than we could ever acquire. A sense of ‘completion’ is not found in eliminating or even overcoming our unique perspective of lack, but in recognising that what we lack in relation to the potential universe is awareness, connection and collaboration with it, and all our wants are a symptom of this.
Quoting TheMadFool
The fifth dimension is value/potential. This is why it is relevant, and why time and space have no real significance, except that you keep trying to reduce this value/potential to what is observable/measurable in spacetime.
Does this mean that the addict is the agent directing these psychological states? In other words, they are ignoring, isolating or excluding elements of choice, but could choose to attend to or include elements of choice?
If this is the case, why do they seek out various addiction recovery programs? There sure are a lot of addicts saying that they desire to quit their vice. They express guilt. They commit time going to programs. Some even commit suicide. 25% of alcoholics and 20% of gamblers.
One would think that the friends, family, and professionals in the lives of these people might point out the other options. Yet, addicts repeatedly fall off the wagon and report struggling against thoughts related to their vices. But they're the ones in control, right? They can choose a different path. They know the better choice. They desire the healthier choice. They do things consistent with a commitment to a healthier choice. And still they struggle. Where's the struggle coming from? And to kill oneself over the guilt of being too weak to quit? Does the one-armed bandit actually hold a gun to the addict and demand that its lever be pulled?
:smile: Thank you for the great discussion.
First of all, I tend not to define an ‘agent’, because I believe all agency derives from awareness, connection and collaboration - in that sense, we are never wholly the ‘agent’ as such, but always a member in collaboration. Control is an illusion - even when we think it’s all me, that ‘me’ consists of a bunch of connected and collaborating biological systems that nevertheless have a limited perspective. The more we understand their potential, the more capable we are of anticipating and arranging the causal conditions for more desirable responses.
The addict can choose to increase awareness, connection and collaboration with elements of choice - but it’s not an easy road. Think of it as being asked to collaborate with a race of aliens that just sent you a text message saying they know how to ‘fix the planet’ - that’s about how frightening and unreal these alternatives may seem from their perspective.
Awareness of and desire for available options is only part of the battle. There’s a significant amount of humility, pain and loss to come to terms with in increasing awareness of where you really are in relation to where you want to be. Friends, family and even professionals are not particularly helpful with this. We lack compassion (which is not the same as pity) - we tend to live our lives around addicts according to the belief that our own humility, pain and and loss should be avoided at all cost, but theirs is different because it’s necessary, self-inflicted or deserved. If they’re struggling with this immense humility, pain and loss and lash out, surely we can handle a little humility, pain or loss ourselves before we feel the need to strike back.
Addicts may certainly be aware of a better lifestyle, and they may desire to live a healthier life, but their struggle often comes from a lack of connection to this better, healthier lifestyle as a choice they perceive themselves capable of making. They seek out and commit to addiction recovery programs, but in many situations they’re looking to be fixed by a mechanic, without realising that they need to critically examine themselves how they think about and evaluate everything in relation to their addiction, and then actively seek awareness, connection to and collaboration with the alternatives available.
Some addiction recovery programs are designed to help the friends and family feel better. Others are designed to help the patient emerge feeling better, or saying and doing the ‘right’ things. A few are designed to facilitate the addict’s own re-evaluation.
When you’ve reduced your perceived potential to the extent that most addicts have, and then you realise what little potential/value that amounts to - without guidance or inspiration towards greater awareness of, connection to AND collaboration with a broader potential/value - it can be hard to perceive any value at all in your life going forward. Suicide looms large at this point.
An addict, more than anything, needs people to interact with their potential and value beyond the addiction - to perceive them as more than an addict, recovering or otherwise - and to treat them accordingly. That can be a challenge if they have come to embody this limited potential and little else. But we develop an awareness of our potential and value most readily through the eyes of those with whom we interact.
Quoting Possibility
You describe a problem of an addict failing to increase awareness, connection and collaboration with elements of choice, and you make a claim that the addict doesn't realize the need to critically examine oneself, but I do not see what is going on with the will. Where did the will go? The addict is not being coerced. Is the addict free to choose abstinence? If so, then why is the price so often death by suicide?
You say that as if it could be some other way that unfortunately just didn’t turn out to be the case. You say “freedom”, but you describe a multiple personality disorder.
The will is the faculty by which we determine and initiate action via three conceptual ‘gates’: ignorance/awareness, isolation/connection and exclusion/collaboration. So increasing awareness of, connection to and collaboration with the potentiality of alternatives available is essential to the freedom of the will. Without it, the will IS pre-determined according to awareness, connection and collaboration with information from past experiences as well as genetic, chemical, molecular and atomic structures, and the addict is NOT free.
When no potential alternatives are perceived as available, ‘abstinence’ is equal to non-existence.
Is anyone?
I'm taking your use of "essential" to mean "necessary". Addicts involved in recovery programs are routinely informed of alternative options. If awareness is freedom, then where is the freedom when there is awareness? Thanks
Not just awareness - also connection and collaboration. Being informed of alternative options is just the start. It’s all very well to tell someone they can take up a form of exercise as an alternative to drugs. They also need to connect with that potential information in some way that has meaning for them beyond their addiction. Addicts are no longer as diversely connected to the world as we might expect them to be. Their connections are often limited only to those that feed or enable their addiction. The isolation of recovery programs may help to decrease the value/potential of enabling connections, but those connections can never really be severed as such, so the effect is temporary at best. Addicts also need opportunities to build or rebuild more valuable connections with the world - ones that broaden and develop their perceived potential - otherwise it won’t be long before they seek out those addiction-enabling connections again, because they’re better than the alternative.
Addicts are especially limited in how they collaborate with the world, because they’ve been focused mainly on their own internal affect. Their collaborations are limited to those that feed their addiction. Collaboration is about working together to achieve something - the more broadly this achievement appears to benefit, the greater the perceived value. Addicts need opportunities to work with others on projects bigger than themselves, that actively appreciate and count on their involvement, whether it’s a family that needs them or a whole community.
If addicts recover, then they were aware, connected, and collaborative. If they do not recover, then any of the three systems might not have been functioning. Did I get that right?
To the extent that they’re failing or struggling to recover, they are likely unaware, isolated or excluded from a relation to their own potential, yes. You can’t force someone to be aware, to connect or to collaborate. But if we ignore, isolate or exclude them from these opportunities, then I’d say we’re part of the problem.
Also, forcing someone wouldn't be free will.
But if these are steps that individuals willingly and freely take. For those that feel guilt about hurting people they love and are connected to; for those that are aware of the options; for those that are participatory, willingly collaborating with others. What stops their will from resisting scratch tickets for example?
You are not talking about volition, but identity / personality. Instead of asking for independence and autonomy from what is not you, you want to be free from yourself.
I’m not sure what you’re asking here.
Actually there are two aspects of "free will", one is the will itself, and the other what is attributed to it, freedom. "Choice" defines the "free" part, but it doesn't define the "will". I think Possibility outlined this for you in the reply. "Will" is the actual motivator of the act, it causes the act to occur. So even when we make a choice according to preferences, an act is not necessitated, because one might act on that preference later, or something else. Therefore we say that someone with a "strong will", or with "will power", can resist acting in ways one is inclined toward acting by one's preferences, because an act is not necessitated.
This is why your op, which says that preferences determine the will, is wrong. Preferences are what are judged in a "free choice", but they do not necessarily cause action. That is the only way we can prioritize things, by judging that even though I prefer this to that, I prefer something else even more, so I do not choose that. Notice the preference does not cause an action, because will power causes me not to act, allowing me to create a hierarchy of preferences prior to acting..
Quoting TheMadFool
Your request here is unreasonable. You are asking to demonstrate the existence of the capacity to act, with an act itself, when the act will only demonstrate an act, not the capacity to act. The determinist will cease this demonstration to say you acted therefore you are determined.
The capacity to act is a power, the potential to act, and is therefore a withholding of the act, like a seed which is some sort of alive thing withholding its power to act, until the environment is right. Any energy withheld within a material object is a capacity to act, and that's what E=MC2 signifies. Nuclear energy demonstrates that a physical object contains the capacity to act. In the case of "will", what we have not identified is the thing which withholds the action, creating the potential (capacity to act), such that it can be directed towards a preference. This is what is called the agent. But notice that the agent creates the capacity to act by withholding activity, will power, just like the seed does.
If a person does not resist buying scratch tickets when the three conditions you mentioned (awareness of options, connectedness, and willingness to participate) are present, then where is the will?
Focusing on resisting a particular action is not demonstrating awareness, connection or collaboration with the range of alternatives available. Remember that choice is about the act of choosing, the range of alternatives to choose from and the perceived capacity to choose a particular alternative. A will that is free is operating in all three areas with awareness, connection and collaboration.
This is also where self-examination and interoception is important: awareness is not just of the alternatives, but of how we connect personally to them in the moment. Why do I want to buy a scratch ticket right now? Why do I prefer this action now to the other options available? How does it make me feel, and why is this feeling so important to me now? Being honest, critical (without judgement) and deeply interoceptive with our answers (not excuses) will dispel the assumption that our personality consists of intrinsic wants and preferences we’re organically compelled to satisfy.
Is this a model you've come up with to explain free will?
Demonstrating awareness
Demonstrating connection
Demonstrating collaboration
Not quite - I believe that the will is wholly a five-dimensional faculty, which determines and initiates all action according to ignorance/awareness, isolation/connection and exclusion/collaboration. But the freedom of the will is such that we can perceive our potential to determine each conceptual gate’s direction at the point of intention or motivation, express that intention as a demonstration (in potentiality) of each gate’s direction, and also evaluate the alternatives and their predicted outcomes - all prior to initiating the act of choosing.