Harold Joachim & the Jigsaw of Lies

For instance, in favor of the theory, the truth of the claim, "god doesn't exist" fits quite well with the proposition, "there's too much evil in the world".

However, in my humble opinion, a web of lies can also be made to cohere.

1) True and truth are so always with respect to, and within, some standard, and not otherwise. No standard, no truth.

Sounds like the truth of any set of propositions being equated to the mutual validity of the propositions. I'm pretty open to that, although it seems to reduce the meaning of 'truth' to the meaning of other words like 'validity'.

But the beauty of it is that you could never tell that it was 'false'.

Instead one has to rely on a more pragmatic test.. ie does it work? or at least does it work for you?

So to flesh it out just a little, the idea is that one has a world view, that is fairly stable - fire burns, shit smells, Trump is an idiot. I am a philosopher, this is the inter web. And these things have to be compatible with each other, and to the extent that they are they 'cohere'. So if you tell me that Trump can tie his own shoe laces, I will say 'that cannot be true, the man is an idiot.' Tying one's own shoelaces does not cohere with being an idiot.

And the theory allows that given further evidence, I might have to concede that after all, Trump can tie his shoelaces and therefore I must stop thinking he is an idiot and upgrade him too imbecile.

And as a general rule, it seems fairly reasonable as far as it goes. Miracles are incoherent; don't believe in them.

I don't exactly know the why of bringing up Godel; but, suppose we have a theory that is such and such, it seems to me that as long as the theory is incomplete; whilst remaining coherent, then there's pragmatically no problem, is there?

Many, many posts and threads on "true" and "truth." I offer this as brief summation for consideration.
1) True and truth are so always with respect to, and within, some standard, and not otherwise. No standard, no truth.

2) Always there is confusion between a truth, something being true, and the truth, the latter being a chimera.

3) As general terms, both true and truth are generic abstract references to whatever, by whatever standard, just is true. And nothing whatsoever more than that. That is, in themelves and absent context, true and truth are either meaningless or at best expressions of wishful thinking.

Or... setting deliberately misrepresenting one's own thought and belief(lies) aside... A web of falsehoods can be quite coherent.

The 'lowdown' on the beautiful theory can be found in my book 'The pattern paradigm', but you won't like it. lol.

Well enjoy! :)

Depends. Whatever works in context

Sure. Ants. Bumblebees. Are you sure their beliefs are criteria free?

I guess you are saying some religions might be a well devised set of fallacies phrased in such a way to be coherent? Due to site guide lines I can't name the Holy book but there are atleast one very long book in a particular Holy book that is written in such a way that would make me think this is not written by a crazy man just venting his anger.

No wrong answer, if you feel inclined i can privately send you the name of that book in that Holy book. I'm sure you have better things to do though.

But yes Lawyers do this all the time. You can take 10 coherently written fallacies and present a pretty good argument that can manipulate others to benefit you or I or that guy over there.

The way you've written your question I do not understand it. If a proposition is true, [u[it is true by reference to something[/u], somehow. And there are enough different kinds of somethings and somehows such that the general question of truth becomes unanswerable, in the sense that one and only one reference, or test, or standard will answer for all propositions. Once a proposition is determined to be true, then it can be called true. But the label "true" or "truth" is altogether agnostic as to the standard by which the proposition is tested to be true.

With reference to the common sense of the matter. There exist true :smile: propositions. Taken one-by-one and demonstrated, it becomes apparent that the manner of demonstration is not the same in every case, but rather differs depending on the case. Each manner, then, constitutes a species - a kind - of proof. All the propositions thus proved, or demonstrated, can reasonably be said to be true; i.e., to share in a quality called true, or truth. But that usage is the name not of of a species of truth, but of the genus that gathers them all as true, or truths. As such, the genus tells us nothing at all about any proposition other than it is true. Nothing at all about the manner or the method of the demonstration.

The truth of this is self-evident, self-proving. If it be false, then its contradiction must be true. I.e., that there must be one test for truth, applicable for all propositions. That this cannot be is left as an exercise for the reader.

Sorry, I'm not interested in pulling all the oars. Go back and read.

True and truth are not univocal terms. A proposition can be true and it can be said of that proposition 1) that it's true, and that it has a quality called truth, namely that it's true.

There is also the abstract term truth. We might, for example, say that this set of propositions all share - have in common - the quality of truth. Well, just what is that quality?

Let's try answering this last question from a different angle. You have, let's imagine, a number of sets of integers. Each set of integers can be summed. That is, to each set is assignable another integer which just is the sum of the integers in the set. Let us now say that the sets share the quality of being summable. Now we look at summable and ask what, exactly, this quality tells us about the sum in any of the sets? Answer: absolutely nothing.

In the same way, truth-as-quality, the quality of being true, says nothing about the particular true in question, or the how or why of it.

That is, the general term says nothing about the particular characteristics of the particular term. It does stand as naming something - an abstract(ed) quality - that they share.

Your turn to pull: can you improve on or add in any substantive way to the meaning of the general term truth beyond what has been already said? Can you even say what it means, beyond being a label for a quality? Or, can you even give any substantial/substantive meaning of its own, at all? Failing this, I call it a term meaningless in itself. Perhaps like a road sign. It points or labels, but itself means nothing.

Sure, the appropriate test theory. And that's this or that or whatever it happens to be. Can you do better?

The apodeictic seems right.