Deflationary Realism
This is a second outgrowth of @Marchesk 's "What is the best realist response to this?" thread.
Per usual, "deflationary realism" does not necessarily have a single, authoritative definition. That said, I am going to define deflationary realism as any approach to realism that attempts to undercut the terms of the modern realism/idealism debate by deflating the word "real", while yet rejecting the stereotypical idealistic claim that "all is thought". Below I’ll briefly review the modern origins of the debate, and then I’ll present one possible away of taking a deflationary approach with regard to it.
So what are the terms of the modern debate? Descartes had argued that the existence of matter could not possibly depend on the existence of thought because "extension" and "thought" are mutually exclusive ideas (i.e. they can be understood clearly and distinctly without reference to the other) and therefore it is literally unthinkable that the one should reduce to the other. Locke had maintained that we could not dispose of the notion of mind-independent objects because then there'd be no causal explanation for ideas themselves. In response to Descartes, Berkeley would argue that a distinction between ideas does not necessarily imply any existence beyond those ideas. In response to Locke he would argue that no one seems to have any clue how the causal interactions of bodies generally might come to produce such things as ideas, nor why any such particular interaction should cause any particular idea. Basically, the debate originally turned (in the modern context) on the question of whether or not material substances really exist, where "really exists" means "existing independently of our ideas".
The deflationist comes in and says the very question of whether or not material substances “really exist” independently of our ideas is nonsense as stated, because it presupposes that there is more to the concept of “real existence” than, say, existential quantification. The question of whether or not something “really exists” thus deflates to the question of whether or not any true, existentially quantified statements can be made of it. The deflationist might then push even further here. A realm of discourse is truth-apt just in case it follows the normative rules of rationality, for instance, that statements must be (and can be) justified by reasons when challenged, etc. Thus, to say that something “really exists” means nothing more than to say that it is the subject of a true claim made within a discourse respecting the rules of rational justification.
On this view “the world” necessarily becomes a kind-of mirror image of thought. For example, since claims are structured by subjects and predicates the world must be structured by some appropriate correlates (e.g. objects and properties). There is obviously a dependency between thought and world here, but what is the nature of that dependency? Robert Brandom distinguishes two types of dependency: sense dependency and reference dependency and claims that the world is only sense-dependent on thought, but not reference dependent on thought. In other words, you cannot understand the world without also understanding thought, but you can refer to the world (or parts of it) without referring to thought, and there is nothing more to ontological dependence than reference dependence. Therefore, the world is not ontologically dependent on thought.
Does it work? Why or why not?
Per usual, "deflationary realism" does not necessarily have a single, authoritative definition. That said, I am going to define deflationary realism as any approach to realism that attempts to undercut the terms of the modern realism/idealism debate by deflating the word "real", while yet rejecting the stereotypical idealistic claim that "all is thought". Below I’ll briefly review the modern origins of the debate, and then I’ll present one possible away of taking a deflationary approach with regard to it.
So what are the terms of the modern debate? Descartes had argued that the existence of matter could not possibly depend on the existence of thought because "extension" and "thought" are mutually exclusive ideas (i.e. they can be understood clearly and distinctly without reference to the other) and therefore it is literally unthinkable that the one should reduce to the other. Locke had maintained that we could not dispose of the notion of mind-independent objects because then there'd be no causal explanation for ideas themselves. In response to Descartes, Berkeley would argue that a distinction between ideas does not necessarily imply any existence beyond those ideas. In response to Locke he would argue that no one seems to have any clue how the causal interactions of bodies generally might come to produce such things as ideas, nor why any such particular interaction should cause any particular idea. Basically, the debate originally turned (in the modern context) on the question of whether or not material substances really exist, where "really exists" means "existing independently of our ideas".
The deflationist comes in and says the very question of whether or not material substances “really exist” independently of our ideas is nonsense as stated, because it presupposes that there is more to the concept of “real existence” than, say, existential quantification. The question of whether or not something “really exists” thus deflates to the question of whether or not any true, existentially quantified statements can be made of it. The deflationist might then push even further here. A realm of discourse is truth-apt just in case it follows the normative rules of rationality, for instance, that statements must be (and can be) justified by reasons when challenged, etc. Thus, to say that something “really exists” means nothing more than to say that it is the subject of a true claim made within a discourse respecting the rules of rational justification.
On this view “the world” necessarily becomes a kind-of mirror image of thought. For example, since claims are structured by subjects and predicates the world must be structured by some appropriate correlates (e.g. objects and properties). There is obviously a dependency between thought and world here, but what is the nature of that dependency? Robert Brandom distinguishes two types of dependency: sense dependency and reference dependency and claims that the world is only sense-dependent on thought, but not reference dependent on thought. In other words, you cannot understand the world without also understanding thought, but you can refer to the world (or parts of it) without referring to thought, and there is nothing more to ontological dependence than reference dependence. Therefore, the world is not ontologically dependent on thought.
Does it work? Why or why not?
Comments (32)
You can refer to Harry Potter without referring to words written in a book, or pictures on a screen, or ideas in my head, but it would still be a mistake to be a realist about Harry Potter.
1. A is sense dependent on B iff one cannot count as having grasped A unless one counts as having grasped B.
2. A is reference dependent on B iff B cannot apply to something unless A applies to it.
Brandom claims that "thought" and "world" are reciprocally sense-dependent, meaning that one can't understand one without also understanding the other. For concrete example, he would say that we can't understand what a fact is without understanding what a true sentence is (and vice versa). But he also thinks that this does not imply that there could be no facts without true sentences.
So for the Harry Potter example, Brandom's going to argue that "Harry Potter" is reference-dependent on "thought" because the concept "Harry Potter" applies to something iff the concept "thought" applies to it as well. But the concept "hammer" does not apply to something iff the concept "thought" applies, therefore "hammer" is not reference dependent on "thought".
What does it mean for a concept to apply to something?
And in the case of me dressing up as Harry Potter, how do thoughts apply (in a way that they don't when I dress up as Obama)?
As my own take on deflationary realism, I think it just amounts to rejecting the metaphysics of realism but nonetheless insisting on talking about things as if metaphysical realism is true.
Is this just gearing up to support ordinary existence claims? If so, there are no ontological issues on the table. I'm not quite sure how that escapes essentially being anti-realism. Why else would one ignore ontological existence claims unless it's because they aren't considered to be truth-apt?
Deflationary realism whatever the details of its claims (or lack of claims), is basically an extrapolation from the logic of the ways we think of things, to the ways we therefore must be committed to thinking things are, without really thinking that things are like that in the strong metaphysical sense.
I think this is right; anti-realism and deflationary realism can readily be interpreted to be coterminous.
I wouldn't say that that's what "mutually exclusive" refers to, by the way. Mutual exclusivity obtains when insofar as we have A, we can't have B, and vice versa.
Quoting Aaron R
That part I certainly do not agree with. For one, I don't really agree with there being normative rules of rationality.
Quoting Aaron R
And this part seems to be positing the same old realist view rather than there being anything "deflationary" about it. Of course, the standard realist view isn't that the world is a mirror image of thought, but this seems to be saying that there's the world in the traditional realist sense, and then there's how we're going to think about the world "deflationarily."
Quoting Aaron R
I don't buy that the world in general is structured like thought, though--if that's what that is effectively saying.
Makes sense to me.
I do like Quine's joke about Plato's beard dulling many of Occam's razors.
Or whatever entities are endorsed by our best scientific theories. I think of him as being pretty externalist, though.. which comes at a cost of a theory of meaning that slides toward behaviorism.. right?
The alternative is to be more internalist, which at first glance, a realist has to be.
What draws you to his view?
As stated in OP
[quote=OP]Therefore, the world is not ontologically dependent on thought[/quote]
But this sentence would be true even if one holds that the world is immaterial... for instance if I think the world is an abstract object because it's a set, it isn't thought dependent. I think that's right.
Maybe Nagase will zoom by again.
I think his concept of sense dependence is meant to keep his epistemological notion from collapsing into Idealism. The concept of the world is not possible without the concept of thought and the concept of thought is not possible without the world.
No, two aspects of the same reality, as far as I can figure...not a dualism. The subject-predicate structure of propositions means the world must be comprised of objects and properties.
Anyway.. sounds like a fascinating read. Hope you'll keep us updated.
In Brandom's account reference to objects is cashed out in terms of the semantics of singular terms, which is cashed out in terms of the semantics of claims, which is cashed out in terms of his score-keeping pragmatics*. So what it means for a concept to apply to something is that a rational actor is using singular terms in accordance with the communal rules of rationality.
That seems like smoke and mirrors, right? Doesn't Brandom's system "lose the world" if reference amounts to nothing more than correctly making inferential moves within the communal "game of giving and asking for reasons"?
Brandom's response to this is equal parts Wittgenstein and Sellars. Like Wittgenstein, Brandom is going say that rationality is intrinsically world involving, and really can't be understood in any other way. Actors who are incapable of acknowledging the independent existence of the world literally won't be capable of playing the game, because playing the game involves recognizing the independent existence of other agent's who commitments are not your own, and yet who are able to play the game by a set of shared rules. So the world is "baked in" from the very start.
Furthermore, (and harkening back to Sellars) Brandom will say that human discourse is contingently wedded to the world in yet another way: through the empirical content of perception/observation. This post is getting really long so I'm not going to go into the details, but the basic idea is that empirical discourse is is inferentially grounded in a particular class of claims called "observations", and this helps cash out the sense in which the semantics of human discourse is causally constrained a mind-independent physical world.
*NOTE: As an aside, it is useful to note that Brandom's system basically inverts the typical order of explanation in the philosophy of language, which tries to explain the semantics of terms via an independent theory of representation and/or truth, and to explain the semantics of statements in terms of the semantics of terms, and to explain pragmatics in terms of the semantics of statements, etc. Brandom takes the opposite path, starting with pragmatics and working his way down from there.
[quote=Michael]
And in the case of me dressing up as Harry Potter, how do thoughts apply (in a way that they don't when I dress up as Obama)?[/quote]
The difference is that Obama is not a fictional character.
[quote=Michael]
As my own take on deflationary realism, I think it just amounts to rejecting the metaphysics of realism but nonetheless insisting on talking about things as if metaphysical realism is true.[/quote]
If by "metaphysics of realism" you mean "correspondence theory of truth" then, yes, I believe you're right.
To be fair, I am presenting Brandom's deflationary realism as a response to something more like Berkeleyan Idealism rather than to what Chalmers has called "Ontological Anti-Realism".
Yep. It attempts to be epistemologically "thick" while being ontologically "thin".
Is the "independent existence of the world" here to be understood in a deflationary sense or in a non-deflationary sense? If the latter then this deflationary realism isn't deflationary at all. And if the former then it is just "nothing more than correctly making inferential moves within the communal 'game of giving and asking for reasons'", and so amounts to smoke and mirrors as you say.
And here again is the apparent non-deflationary realism.
Could you explain what you, specifically, mean by "non-deflationary"? There's a few different things this could mean, so I just want to make sure I understand what you're saying before responding.
A sense other than the deflationary sense that you're trying to explain.
Hmm. Not sure that helps much.
Here's what I'll say, then: Brandom is not a correspondence-theorist with regard to truth or reference. When Brandom says the the world causally constrains rational discourse he's talking about the world qua conceptual content. The "trick" is that he thinks that conceptual content can be "objective", in the sense of existing independently of anyone's mind.
Well this just seems like traditional metaphysical realism.
The way I expressed it was misleading. For Descartes the concept of thought literally excludes the concept of extension (and vice versa). Nothing is ever both a thinking substance and an extended substance, as evidenced by his complete inability explain how mind and body interact.
Quoting Terrapin Station
That's interesting. Do you not hold people responsible for their claims, or tell people that they "ought" to believe A if they believe B? How do you interpret the meaning of these actions?
Quoting Terrapin Station
That's the same thing Michael is arguing, and it may very well be right. See my response to Michael here.
Sure. But I don't see the difference between saying that conceptual content exists independently of anyone's mind and saying that thoughts correspond to mind-independent facts.
By 'strong metaphysical sense' I am referring to something which cannot be coherently spelled out; the naive realist's imagining that objects really exist out there just as they are perceived. I think this natural assumption comes from the ancient idea that the eyes are the 'windows or doors of the soul' through which the soul 'looks', or 'goes', out into the world and brings back the objects into itself. This understanding has been supplanted by the scientific understanding of perception, but anyone who has not taken that scientific understanding on board will remain, absent some alternative sophisticated metaphysical account, in this naive form of realism.
I think in practice we all fall back into naive realism anyway and that is why the logic of our linguistic communication is permeated with it. Deflationary realism is the recognition of that permeation, and the realization that things are not as we naively imagine them, accompanied by the realization that we are, nonetheless, in a formal sense committed to the logic of our linguistic usages.
Also, it just seems that way as a matter of experience. It appears that I am looking out at the tree as I walk by it, not that light from the tree is hitting my retina in 2D, upside down, where my brain has to right it, infer the depth, and put me into a visual space that coincides with my walking motion, what I'm hearing, etc.
Yes, true that! I mean, the fact that it seems the way you outline probably explains why the idea of the eyes as windows of the soul arose. If it had seemed some other way, another kind of notion would have arisen instead.