What do non-philosophers make of philosophy?
What do non-philosophers make of philosophy?
Do they consider it to be:
Relevant?
Important?
A guide to life?
True?
Interesting?
What do you think?
Do they consider it to be:
Relevant?
Important?
A guide to life?
True?
Interesting?
What do you think?
Comments (102)
That’s all just my impression though. I recently started a similar thread to find out what other people think most people think philosophy is about.
What do you mean by "philosophers" and "non-philosophers"? If by philosopher you mean professional or academic philosopher versus the rest of humanity... well, there's a pretty broad range from people who are technically amateurs, but love love love to engage with philosophy to those people who think it's a joke, if they ever think about it at all.
But, on this forum I've noticed that even among people who like philosophy, there are those who think it's dead/a joke/ all just "opinions." Cue eyeroll.
Among people who don't engage philosophy much at all ever... I've personally noticed this funny cognitive dissonance where they want on the one hand to maintain that "oh, all that philosophy stuff is too hard and heady for me!" but then also don't want to think that professional philosophers know anything more than they do or could have more nuanced/educated/researched ideas about all sorts of things (i.e., they also belong in the camp of "it's just everyone's opinion. Cue eyeroll).
With everything going on in the world (and, to be honest, people in my personal circles) right now, I've been fostering some serious pessimism about the abilities of most people to do even basic logic. I'm fairly certain that it's a dispositional disability, as there is nothing about a=a and a=/=~a that is outside the theoretical brain power of any human being of average intelligence.... but then it does pose an interesting question: does being dispositionally unable to do X make you actually unable to do X?
This is pretty in line with what I find too.
To OP: At the end of the day, ideas matter. You can't just choose to "not do" philosophy because it's unavoidable. Some ideas are a hell of a lot more destructive than others and lend themselves to certain types of extremely murderous behavior.
I didn't use the word 'philosopher'.
By 'non-philosopher' I mean people who do not engage in any serious or formal way with philosophy.
Nevertheless, such people might have use for philosophy, perhaps politicians, social workers, teachers and so on.
I think that current philosophy is accessible only to a narrow range of people. It takes a certain level of intelligence to appreciate philosophical concepts, so that's a good portion of the population excluded right there. Of those who are smart enough to understand philosophy, much less have the time, patience, or the interest to engage in philosophy. And of those who show interest and are intelligent enough to study philosophy, fewer of them are actual readers who would open a philosophy book.
The question: What do most people think about philosophy?
Answer: "Not for me."
They don't 'think about thinking' so those who do must seem strange to them to the point of stupidity. They just don't know, maybe can't understand. Fools are fools because they're blind to their own folly. Don't wake a sleepwalker for her sake; don't gadfly a fool for your sake! From the vantage of ubiquitous, rampant vidiocy within this encompassing moral circus, philosophers - intellectual rodeo-clowns - seem to them just 3rd rate fools & failed jesters because our clowning, apparently, lacks conviction! Enthusiasm! They think we're morons who need to loosen-up and get laid! Well ... no doubt. :sweat:
[quote=Freddy Zarathustra!]... of what account are the rest?—The rest are merely humanity.—One must make one’s self superior to humanity, in power, in loftiness of soul,—in contempt.[/quote]
It can't matter (much) what they think of those of us who 'think about thinking' if they themselves don't also 'think about thinking'.
[quote=Freddy Zarathustra!]To live alone one must be a beast or a god, says Aristotle. Leaving out the third case: one must be both — a philosopher.[/quote]
:death: :flower:
Not explicitly, but non-philosopher implies some idea of philosopher. ~A can only be understood in terms of A.
Quoting A Seagull
In theory, every human being in every occupation does. But they neither recognize it usually, nor are interested. See my above comment re:disposition.
That said, I believe that philosophy is relevant to non-philosophers, but in somewhat subtle and indirect ways.
I think all people are philosophers. Some people just have better things to do with their time.
This is not a dissonating position to hold. Advanced chess is too hard and heady for many, but those expert at it do not "know" anything more about "all sorts of things". They've simply invented a game, the full impliations of which are quite complex and so understanding them is 'hard and heady'. They still know nothing more about anything outside of chess. A computer can be programmed to understand chess, I wouldn't ask it any advice on other matters.
Yes, but certainly you would defer to their expertise on all matters chess, or at least recognize that they probably know better than you about the best way to move the rook.
I'm talking about laypersons who specifically won't defer or acknowledge the expertise of the...,yknow, experts on philosophical matters.
Yes, but if one of these hypothetical chess experts claims that his expertise on bishops extends to, say, real bishops, we aren't obliged to simply take his word for it. It is not an expert in chess who determines the extension of propositions about chess, it it experts in other fields making more satisfactory claims about the contested area.
The trouble with Philosophy in this context is that experts in other fields compete over almost all areas.
That would be an amphiboly....so obviously. That example doesn't therefore pertain to the discussion.
The fact that philosophers disagree on any given subject doesn't mean a layperson can claim to have equal say in the matter.
For example, there is disagreement among quantum scientists about whether the implications lead to a determinist or non-determinist view of quantum behavior. I personally side with the determinists, but realize that I don't know enough to actually participate in the debate or to try and convince a scientist of my view. Most non-philosophers do not show the same humility toward philosophy.
The wise man collective.
Necessary for prosperity.
A secular core.
The amphiboly is the point. Simply declaring a subject matter does not confer a field of expertise, its just a name. Actual competition of theories determines fields.
Quoting Artemis
I'm not talking about philosophers disagreeing. I'm talking about philosophers making theoretical claims in areas where there are competing claims by psychologists, physicists, neuroscientists, linguists, historians, anthropologists etc... In a field, say consciousness, where both a philosopher and a neuroscientist make a claim, who judges who has strayed into whose territory? It clearly can't be either expert (they have competing claims).
Quoting Artemis
It depends very much on the topic at hand. The reason why you could not participate in the quantum physics debate is, as you say, that you "do not know enough". But in the matter under debate, there is no 'knowledge' otherwise it would not be up for debate would it? So what we're referring to by not 'knowing' enough is the already agreed on body of knowledge on which both parties base their competing theories.
In philosophy, there is no such agreed upon body of knowledge in the widest sense. Only within specialised fields might you have a similar situation to the physicists, where a considerable body of axioms are agreed by both parties, but these are rarely the debates in which lay people become involved.
Philosophy spans across all fields.
As it's own field, it's pretty much redundant where societial growth is concerned.
Let's just say we were wise, if creating a philosophy free reality is our objective.
It's more for the toil of the thinking man.
Since philosophers don't just do that, this is a dead end.
Quoting Isaac
Ideally, they would not debate but share their respective insights whilst acknowledging the expertise of the other.
Quoting Isaac
Of course it would be. People debate over matters of knowledge all the time.
Quoting Isaac
That's just pretty inaccurate.
But is it the same game they are playing?
Take the field of ethics for example; is the rather theoretical ethics that philosophers discuss the same
domain as that empirically experienced by non-philosophers? And perhaps more importantly do the non-philosophers consider it to be the same domain? For if they don't consider it to be the same domain and thus not relevant, they will not acknowledge the expertise of philosophers on the matter.
Depends.
Yes. Just with more knowledge and at a different level. The difference between chess world championships and amateur chess at home.
Agents.
So, are you suggesting that, for example, epistemology has a pre-existing set of criteria determining what constitutes the field? That it's not defined by its practitioners?
Quoting Artemis
This just begs the question. You're presupposing that the neuroscientist is deficient in some knowledge or skill which the philosopher of consciousness can supply. Many do not consider that to be the case. I'm asking you to present the argument that it is, not just presume it.
Quoting Artemis
Knowledge as justified true belief. People debate over what might become knowledge were it to turn out to be true, or about the acceptability of justification. Absolutely no scientist I've ever encountered has argued with another about some matter they consider to be absolutely settled knowledge (ie true), they argue about theories, speculations which may, in time, end up sufficiently agreed upon to be classed as knowledge.
Quoting Artemis
OK, well then simply provide me with an example proposition from philosophy which is agreed upon across the fields.
No. Because a right move in chess is agreed upon by every single chess player in the world. There is no equivalent agreed upon 'right move' in ethics.
Morality is a widely accepted theory that is against you. There can be good, as is good.
'Morality' is a theory? In what form?
That there is good and evil.
What, you saying that good is not defined
I know what good is, is more sensory phenomena, but it is improperly defined by word, though you can word the concept, it's not the particulars which lead to the resolution. It is ineffable.
At any given moment, there is beneficent qualia concerning the sensory data.
Philosophy forum --> Philosophy is a good idea to post. Post good joke. Don't post.
Not a definition I'm aware of. Perhaps you could enlighten me.
At any given moment, there is beneficent qualia concerning the sensory data.
Philosophy forum --> Philosophy is a good idea to post. Post good joke. Don't post.
What do you call that?
I'm afraid I have no idea what you're talking about.
Well that's your ineptitude.
It's something to do with world, there is the black standard but there are good things which would be quite a confusing topic to explain. When world is included with consciousness, there are good things and truthfully good things it can do.
Well, I'll just have to take your word for it. I've recently been entreated to trust experts in the field, perhaps this would be a good place to start. I shall henceforth earnestly attempt to do good things by the black standard.
The answer is like the opening of a womb. It's quite a complex shape to register afterward.
I'll be sure to bear that in mind.
Before we continue this no doubt highly fascinating discussion, I ought to point out that we've strayed far from my original point and that this discussion has little to do with it.
The philosophically engaged and interested laypersons that are suggested by your objections are not the same as the people I was mentioning. I was talking about people who want to simultaneously maintain that philosophy is both too hard/heady for them (therefore inaccessible) but also just a matter of opinion (therefore infinitely accessible). Clearly these positions cannot be maintained simultaneously.
Yes, that is the exact point I'm disputing. It is possible to create a set of rules, the inclusion of each member of that set being nothing but opinion, whose full modalities are nonetheless too complex for a person of only moderate intelligence to grasp.
In which case they cannot have an opinion thereof.
Indeed. But that doesn't prevent them from having an informed and valid opinion about the origin or scope of those rules, that's the point.
I am not well versed enough to have anything but the most superficial understanding of the full modalities of the rules of chess. I am nonetheless quite sure, and justifiably so, that the rules of chess are entirely someone's opinion.
They cannot both maintain that they cannot have an informed opinion and think they have an informed opinion.
Rules of chess =/= someone's opinion?
Not in the present tense.
When someone create chess, they use rules of square-form and other mathematics.
Much better board games could be made using the element of mysticism.
Yes they can. One is an opinion about the modalities of the rule set and the other is an opinion about the meta data. Two different areas of knowledge/opinion.
a: What is your opinion on the Jabberwocky?
b: Pretty negative.
a: Do you know what the Jabberwocky is?
b: Not a clue.
a: That means you have no idea what you have a negative opinion about or what it even means to have a negative opinion thereof. Basically, your opinion is not really an opinion at all, because it is about nothing and means nothing.
No.
What is your opinion about the deeper meaning in the poem 'the jabberwocky'?
Don't know, I've never read it.
What is your opinion about the contribution the jabberwocky has made to astrophysics?
I'm almost certain it's made no contribution at all. I've never read it, but I do know that it's a poem, not a theory of astrophysics.
Data - the meaning, metre, syncopation of the poem.
Meta data - the fact that it is a poem.
It takes expertise in poetry to know the data, it does not take such expertise to know the meta data.
What you are talking about here is internal self-consistency, which is certainly an important criteria for any philosophy or system. . But that is not the only criteria that is required for a meaningful philosophy; it must be explicitly connected, presumably empirically, to the real world. If it is not, then it is only of interest to people who want to explore those ideas and worry about its relevance later, ie philosophers.
For non-philosophers it may appear no more than an academic exercise. and a meaningless one at that.
Way to miss the point.
I think there's a couple of false assumptions implicitly wrapped up in here.
For one, there are philosophical debates that don't seem to have "real world" applications (I'll get back to that in a moment), and sure that means that the layperson may not have much interest in them. But A) that does not mean they are not important topics, and B) that doesn't really matter in the context of what a layperson can and simultaneously cannot contribute to.
Back to the "seem" part. I think most, if not all philosophy is useful in ways for "real world" problems. That's usually why these questions are posed in the first place. Philosophers start from some real world issue, like abortion, get into discussions about God's existence, and suddenly they're debating how many angels fit on a needle head. Taken out of context, the debate seems to have no real world relation, but really it's turns out to be one of the fundamental questions that needs to be answered before we can settle the larger, real world issue. (And, yeah, I totally just pulled that example from thin air for humor's sake.)
You just described me. I don't have the answer to even one philosophical question. Many answers, yes, but not one, congruent, definitive answer.
The 'point' was you saying that people could not coherently hold a position that philosophy was really hard and yet simultaneously dismiss it as 'all opinions' - that philosopher's ideas are not based on a body of knowledge.
That is exactly the situation I described in my analogy - not knowing the full modalities of the content of a subject, but knowing what sort of proposition that subject contains.
I know that the rules of chess contain a series of made-up proscriptions, that none of them reflect the actual physical constraints on the movement of the pieces. I know this without having to actually know what the rules of chess are.
I know that the study of physics deals with the derivation and testing of theories corresponding to experiments on physical matter and forces. I can know this without knowing what any of those theories actually are, nor understanding a word of them. IF someone asks me if physics is 'just opinion' I can justifiable answer that it is not, on the basis of this meta data without needing to understand any of the actual data.
Likewise, if someone were of the opinion that subjects which have no intersubjective consensus do not have a body of knowledge, they could justifiably put philosophy into that category simply using the knowledge that philosophers do not use intersubjectivitiy to test their theories. They do not need to know what those theories actually are, not understand any of their internal complexity to justify this conclusion because it is not based on the content of the theories, it's based on the methodology by which they're derived and tested.
Navel-gazing, time wasted.
They may be right (it's up to the philosophers to decide that), but oh, how sweet this navel-gazing is.
If they only knew. It should be a part of early childhood education.
I'll start off by quoting myself to someone else on this forum just the other day:
"It helps when we do away with the need to "know with 100% certainty" and accept the fallibalistic realist position that "fairly confident" is the maximum anyone can be about most things in this world.
This is a tangent, but I see the demands for certainty over and over on this forum and elsewhere... I think it probably comes from a really naive understanding and application of science, where we think the answer has to be known with certainty to be true. But most of the time, even,in science (!) we're working with a theory which is just "to the best of our knowledge/understanding," and which is better or more plausible than any other theory.
All this is just to say, I think once you try to demand absolute certainty, you're asking the wrong questions"
But if you insist on comparing the certainty of philosophy versus physics, I'll just point you in the direction of the entire discipline of Logic. There is nothing in the universe we know with more certainty than that, because logic is the foundation upon which all coherent thought (including in Physics and Chess!) rests. You can question gravity before you can question a=a, and if you question the latter, you're simultaneously questioning the former.
Spend too much time with the eternal skeptics on a forum like this, and you might get the impression that logic is not certain, or that it is also just opinion... But apart from just being kind of silly, like I said it also does away with your holding up physics as some paragon of "known facts."
Interesting post but I'm afraid I'm at a loss to understand how it relates to anything I'm saying. I'm talking about the distinction between knowing the modalities of a subject and knowing it's scope - content vs methodology, if you like. You seem to be talking about certainty and the problems of scientism. I can't see the link between the two, perhaps you could join the dots for me.
By way of some reply, I agree that the search for certainty is misguided. I do, in fact, believe (silly or not) that logic is just a method of thinking, not a truth of the universe, and as such is very much open to question and improvement, as are all models in physics. It's just, as I say, I'm not sure how any of this relates to what we've been discussing.
This is all to counter the idea that you could call philosophy an opinion but not physics. As you suggested above.
Mode of thinking sounds just like another way of saying opinion, btw. But a=a is a fact of the universe. A law which all things abide by. A more certain law than any of the things physics could possibly point to.
I see, so this is hinging on what we mean by 'just opinion'? I mentioned my interpretation of that phrase in my earlier posts, but my writing is not always that clear I'm afraid. Given my belief in model dependent realism, there is no sense in which something is fact, as opposed to opinion, other than in degree. So for me (and I think colloquially many others) the degree of intersubjectivity determines the place on the fact-opinion scale.
Physics deals (mostly) with highly intersubjective data, the behaviour of matter and forces predicted by its theories are agreed upon by all observers, hence we're more likely to declare its results to be facts. Philosophy makes propositions which are not verifiable by reference to intersubjective observation. It appeals to intuition, elegance, adherence to rules of thought... Most are not widely agreed on and so we tend to declare the propositions 'opinion' rather than 'fact'.
My main point, contrary to what you'd written, is that one need not know the modalities of a field to know that it contains what they'd justifiably call 'opinion'. They only need know the methodology.
Despite that, you can trigger academics when not-even-wrong philosophical speculation crosses over into the science, like "Does Evolution have a purpose?" annoys researchers.
The combined effect on academics I think is it's either useless, error borne from lazy thinking and lack of education in their field, or not related to their research at all.
Of course there are exceptions, and you can find authors who bridge gaps; like Dennet, Metzinger, Rovelli, Merleau-Ponty, Rota and Priest.
Quoting Isaac
But before you said this:
Quoting Isaac
So please make up your mind what your position is.
You seem to be suggesting that 'a=a' is somehow fundamental to philosophy and hence not an opinion and hence philosophy is not opinion.
But what does 'a=a' actually mean?
I will tell you: It means that in a logical system 'a' can be substituted for 'a' without affecting the validity of the logical process. And also, by inference, that any string of symbols eg 'xyz' can be substituted for the same string of symbols 'xyz' without affecting the outcome of the logical process. In this way the substitution of 'xyz' for 'xyz' is a null operation, it changes nothing.
So 'a=a' is really nothing special, it can only be used within some logical system and hence cannot be foundational.
I'm not seeing the disparity you're drawing between those positions. One says that whether something is a fact or an opinion is a matter of the degree of intersubjectivity of its veracity measurements, the other states that physics is not at the 'opinion' end of this scale.
Indeed. Although a (thankfully) small number of researchers I've known have expressed a similar opinion of their statisticians, so researcher's judgement on the value of other fields is fickle to say the least, and not always to be trusted.
It may seem obvious, but it is foundational in that it is the first step toward any logical system. And it is a fact about the universe in the same way gravity is. Moreso even.
You cannot maintain both things at once.
This. Also even within the same field but different subfield. "What you're doing isn't history/anthropology/linguistics/psychology..."
Not following you. What prevents maintaining both these positions? I'm saying there's a scale, based on intersubjectivity, and physics is at one end of it (or near the end). It's quite a standard position after Quine.
Yes, and, just in my personal experience, it's not been a random trend, sub-fields seem to want to work up the Quinean scale. Clinical psychologists look down on social psychologists because they consider their field more rigorous. Physicists look down on material scientists for much the same reason.
Mathematicians, of course cannot even see any of us to look down on without the aid of ocular technology of some sort, which is entirely as it should be!
Without getting into your misinterpretation of Quine and how the word "opinion" is used in the context of empirical science as well as logic....
Quoting Isaac
If there was a spectrum (which I would debate) then anything at the far end with physics would no longer be "just opinion" now would it?
Let's have the correct interpretation of Quine then...
Quoting Artemis
Yes. Which is most certainlynnot the location of metaphysics, ethics, aesthetics, political philosophy, philosophy of mind, ontology, theology...
You're trying to tie a whole field, philosophy, to the merits of one small sub-field, logic.
I guess that's just your (unfounded) opinion then.
Quine doesn't put them on a spectrum. It doesn't make any sense to put them on a spectrum. They are not the same category of thing.
I suppose "they" make of it what the non-religious make of religion: not much (until it threatens their livelihoods or bad habits).
Uneducated - no.
Educated - not academically or professionally.
(See "Relevant?")
Religious - no.
Spiritual - it can be.
Secular - it should be.
Uneducated - yes.
Educated - n/a.
Uneducated - no.
Educated - usually boring.
Philosophy, for me, is mostly nonsense (Witty) - but, more often than not, important nonsense - consisting of reflective exercises, sort of like tai chi or martial arts, which attempt to cultivate intellectual hygiene, maintain metacognitive health, and promote lucidly living in recovery from being a fool (à la soberly living in recovery from being a junkie or drunk). Like art, philosophy is play, but primarily with (abstract) concepts & arguments rather than just with (stylized) images & fantasies - which "most" find neither interesting nor important (though "they" believe it (& art) should be either or both).
"Science is a continuum extending from History and Engineering at one end, to the more abstract pursuits like mathematics and philosophy at the other" - W.V.O. Quine
"Quine denies that there is a fundamental difference between the existence questions debated in the special sciences...and the existence questions posed by philosophers ... The difference between the scientific and the philosophical problems is one of degree, not of kind." - Hans Glock
What's your source for your conviction that Quine does not put them on a spectrum?
Where in either of those quotes does he say anything whatsoever about opinions???
If anything, these are proof that Quine precisely did not believe what you previously attributed to him. :rofl:
The position I attributed to Quine was "there's a scale, based on intersubjectivity, and physics is at one end of it (or near the end)".
The position you attributed to Quine which I asked for a citation to support was
"Quoting Artemis
I'm still waiting for your citation.
Or you can just exchange emojis, your choice.
Do you have another quote?
Note that the attitude attributed to Quine here is not about a general assessment of philosophy as it is. It's about Quine's beliefs about what it should be, IOW, Quine's philosophy. Quine's definition of philosophy hasn't become the common one, and doesn't appear to be headed for that status, so there's cause for confusion there.
Emojis are fine with me at this point, considering you just keep moving the target and pretending you didn't say what you did say.
Nor did I make that claim. Only that physics would be at one end (although I think Quine uses engineering as his example, which is better really in terms of intersubjectively verifiable results. The bridge either stays up or it doesn't. Quine doesn't put 'philosophy' anywhere on it because it's made up too much of sub-disciplines which themselves show these differences of kind. He does at one point mention mathematics and logic as being uniquely of the non-empirical kind and yet so widely agreed upon as to be unshakeable in most people's belief structures.
Quoting frank
Well, the first dogma in 'Two dogmas' is that there is a sharp distinction of type between analytic and synthetic facts. Unless you're thinking philosophy deals with propositions of synthetic fact then it's pretty clear that philosophy is at one end of the "difference in degree" he talks about. I don't know that anything would spell it out much clearer than that I'm afraid.
I suppose you could have... "The boundary between naturalistic philosophy and the rest of science is just a vague matter of degree". Here he's quite clear that the matter of degree is between philosophy at one end and science at the other, not between {philosophy and science} at one end and something else at the other.
What were my original goal posts, and what have I said which I later denied saying?
Right. I barged into the conversation because one of my few pet peeves is conflation of science and engineering. Science is a servant to engineering. Don't get me started.
But note that Quine uses "science" to mean knowledge. That ancient usage brings to mind the primordial days when science and philosophy were one. Socrates speculates about what clouds are one day and wonders if anybody really knows what justice is the next.
Some would like to somehow press a claim there, the results being that philosophy as we know it disappears. And philosophy goes on just fine in spite of this (no matter how irritating those who press the claim get.)
Quoting Isaac
I think you're smushing the two quotes together to get a spectrum. The quotes don't actually fit together in that way.
But what was the point you were originally making? That science and philosophy are kindred? Of course they are.
What makes you think that? They obviously seem quite clear to me, so I'd be interested to hear how you're reading them differently.
Quoting frank
No, the point I was originally making was that it is possible for someone to be of the view that philosophy is constituted of opinions simply by being aprised of its methodology, without having to know or understand the full modalities of its propositions.
That lead on to me saying that I did not hold to the fact/opinion dichotomy but rather used the terms to denote two ends of a spectrum of proposition taxonomy, based largely on the intersubjective agreement about measures of veracity. This I likened to Quine's 'difference in degree'.
Since I've already pointed a few of them out, and had you again try to move the target, it's clear that to point them out yet again would be a waste of everyone's time. Dead end here. Time to move on.
The first quote is:
Quoting Isaac
This is saying that knowledge pertains to particulars, abstractions, and combinations of the two.
History seeks to uncover knowledge about particular events. Engineering is knowledge about how to accomplish particular goals. Math and philosophy are about abstractions. Where is physics on this spectrum? Physics is about making predictions. However we might like to explain our ability to make predictions, in real life, it's about uncovering what we think of as principles or laws. Therefore, it belongs on the abstraction side.
Second quote:
Quoting Isaac
First note that the word "science" is being used differently here. Glock is using the contemporary meaning. We're talking about ontology (existence questions), and Quine is being recognized as an ontological anti-realist (in spite of his apparent claims to the contrary).
An ontological realist would say that philosophy's ontology is distinct from that of physics. I think Chalmers referred to it as the special "philosophy room" where we seek to say something beyond what physics would say about reality. Quine is rejecting that special room. We posit stuff via our theories.
Where would you say I'm off track?
Quoting Isaac
I see. I don't think philosophy is a body of propositions, but I agree with the rest (except I'm not seeing the Quine angle.)
I can see how you might have that interpretation in isolation, but in the context of Two Dogmas and Epistemology Naturalised, I think it's clear he's not talking only about the degree of abstraction. He talks about the analytic/synthetic divide, for example, just prior to distinguishing philosophy and science my matter of degree. The analytic/synthetic divide is about empiricism, not abstraction. I think Quine is more focused on this distinction than abstractness , but having said that, the message in Epistemology Naturalised is more holistic than that. It's not that there's one scale that constitutes the 'matter of degree' it's a multiplicity of differences.
Quoting frank
Agreed. But in this particular debate, the relevant fact is that he nonetheless maintains that there exists a difference. I realise the main importance of Quine is the extent to which he declares no difference (no difference in type), but here I'm referring to the difference he does acknowledge, the difference in degree.
True. Quine is killing empiricism in Two Dogmas by rejecting the analytic/synthetic divide. There's no "matter of degree" to it.
But its right there in the introduction "One effect of abandoning them is, as we: shall see, a blurring of the supposed boundary between speculative metaphysics and natural science"
Blurring... not removing entirely. It's practically the definition of 'a matter of degree' as opposed to either 'strictly divided' on the one hand, or 'identical in every way' on the other.
You're putting a lot of weight on the meaning of "blurring." The reason that's weird in reference to Quine is that he was a full-blown behaviorist. His indeterminacy of translation implies that meaning, reference, and belief all have to be replaced with behavior.
I get the feeling you're trying to sort grains of sand while Quine is a category 5 hurricane.
I don't think so. There's numerous other places, some of which I've given above, where Quine talks about differences between science and philosophy. At each of which he talks about matters of degree, not identicalness. You've not said what your textual support is for your view that there's no matter of degree in Quine's taxonomy of disciplines.
So you point to the word "blurring" and mention of a knowledge spectrum from particular to abstract. And further, you note that Quine seemed to understand some difference between science and philosophy, and therefore you conclude that Two Dogmas is about matters of degree of difference between analytic and synthetic statements.
Is this correct?
In my experience, those who have never studied it formally or for themselves in their free time are usually basing any opinion of the subject upon preconceived ideas about its definition. I have heard people moan 'but it's so boring'. However, if we put aside academic professionals, who has not philosophized on some level during their lifetime? As human beings we are capable of complex emotions and therefore forced to reflect. Even the 'non-philosophers' have been philosophers in a basic sense and so their opinion of the simplistic definition of the field is not what we should be examining, for it does not encapsulate everything within.
In my mind, such distinctions between philosophers and non-philosophers do not exist. We are all philosophers, though of varying degrees of study, capacity, knowledge and attainment.
Since when were we determining what Two Dogmas is "about"? I merely made the claim that Quine makes a distinction betweenpphilosophy and science and that he does so as a matter of degree. I never claimed it was the core message of his whole thesis. In fact I made specific note of the fact that this was not the main thrust of his work....
Quoting Isaac
... so why you would now think I'm making the exact opposite claim (that this is what Two Dogmas is all about) is beyond me.
I knew you didn't mean to say something that ridiculous. :up:
Rejecting (by undermining) the analytic/synthetic divide was a major part of Quine's disagreement with the logical positivists, spelled out in Two Dogmas. Quine makes reference to Carnap regarding the role this rejection plays in putting the questions of metaphysics on a level playing field with those of natural sciences.
Quine strongly rejecting the analytic/synthetic distinction and thus the (alleged) derived sharp divide between science and philosophy in Carnap's work does not immediately suggest that Quine advances a sharp divide between science and philosophy in Two Dogmas. Nor that he derives anything about the relationship of various sciences from this rejection.
The overall picture is that knowledge is a network of claims about posited entities related by links of logic and reason (that the links take a particular form in a particular network part is also part of what is posited), and only the exterior of this network need interface with our experiences by means of observation processes. The picture of ontology tracks the picture of what we know; what we stipulate to exist relates to our experiences sensorially and through observation and what else we stipulate to exist through propagating inferences. Despite this, epistemology and ontology remain distinct topics of inquiry. The work of epistemology consists of spelling out how entities are connected within the network: what the connections mean, how they are formed and their character; the work of ontology consists of furnishing the entities within the network with a general description technique in which they may be unambiguously expressed, and thereby delineating what form our ontological commitments take given our knowledge. [hide=*]Though Quine doesn't set out his visions for what epistemology and metaphysics are in general in Two Dogmas. [/hide]
In this regard, knowledge is web weaved of different fabrics supporting each other; stipulated entities within the web play the same role insofar as they function within the web in the same manner. Because of this, the web has ambiguous constituents and ambiguous propagation of effects from observation. Collections of stipulations which play the same explanatory role and interface with the web's periphery of observation in the same way may exist, and moreover if there is an observation which is startlingly inconsistent with our knowledge, a range of re-evaluations of what we know will be possible to bring our knowledge into accord with this startling observation.
The overall role ontological commitments play here is a matter of efficiently coordinating our knowledge. They're like condensation nuclei for clouds of knowledge.
The difference between fields of inquiry becomes blurred, as often there are overlaps in what entities they are connected to, though observations related to one field may be more distantly connected to those in another, and a re-evaluation through startling observation may get to work on near connected knowledge items to the observation process rather than ones situated further from it.
In light of Two Dogmas, it looks more plausible that differences between science and philosophy are differences in degree, as they're extremely interconnected parts of the same network (as Quine sees them). Nevertheless, there's some hint of an abstraction hierarchy involved; if we posit that some fields of study are more closely connected to and thereby more tightly constrained by the observational exterior of the network, the perceived increase in rigour by being close to this observational exterior may be concordant with an idea of tighter constraints on the number of theories consistent with those observations; in other words, for example, developmental psychology may be more underdetermined by observation than materials science. Having more varied ontological commitments and general theories consistent with the same observations may give a flavour of arbitrarity to a domain of study. But I don't think any of this necessarily follows from the paper alone.
Ahh, I see. I'm sorry if this confusion was caused by any lack of clarity on my part. You're talking about Quine's rejection of analycity whilst I'm talking about the way in which a difference between philosophy and science remains despite that rejection. I'm saying that without the analytic/synthetic divide, the difference between posits of philosophy and posits of science is the inter-subjectivity of measures of veracity. Science deals with correspondence with observation (something we largely agree upon, especially when done by machine), whereas philosophy's veracity (for Quine) is measured by the degree to which posits satisfactorily fit within the web of beliefs (something on which we do not all generally agree - opinion).
But I should make clear that talking about 'philosophy' in general here is a very broad definition necessitated by the topic of the thread (and Artemis's comment about it, to which I responded). I wouldn't personally paint the whole subject with the same brush, as it were, because some aspects clearly play different roles in the web than others.
Hope that's clearer.
How does correspondence survive Quine's Word and Object?
Since Quine was a behaviorist, I think we enter into a shadow-world of equivocation when we talk about his view of whatever. For Quine, we don't communicate in the ordinary sense of the word. Further, there's a breakdown in the the concept of "ordinary sense."
Sense is like a myth we attach to various happenings between ourselves. Is this also how you see Quine?
Thanks
That's a very big topic. Have you read The Web of Belief? It has a really good section on how Quine treats observations as observations sentences and so brings them into his behaviourist stance on beliefs. The full text might answer your question better than my one sentence, but I don't want to get into if you have read the essay but just don't find it to be an answer.
I think philosophy can be seen as too primitive in some cases. It is obviously sophisticated depending on the thought process that goes into answering certain questions. It is primitive because it forces us to ask some questions that will be taken as a joke in our daily interaction. I can't even begin to imagine getting a serious answer from someone in the street if l ask him whether l exist or not. The moral questions will be received slightly positively but there are certain exceptions to this category too. Asking a random person whether moral statements can be even be called true or false will raise eyebrows.
It takes a certain amount of humbleness to engage in philosophy and also a feeling for wasting time. Wasting time is a big deal for people who can't bother thinking beyond what is neccessary to live an easy life. People just like getting things done and philosophy is more of an exploration.
I think we'll part ways here. I think we have the same impression of one another: "You're not understanding Quine."
Yet neither of us is invested enough to set out the details.
Adios.
Well, if you like. I don't think you don't understand Quine, I'm not even sure yet what your understanding of Quine is. You said he rejects analycity which I agree with, I haven't really had much else to go on. But since this thread is supposed to be about what non-philosohers think of philosophy, perhaps a full blown exposition of each other's understanding of Quine is not appropriate.
No, I didn't.
Quoting Isaac
:up:
I like that.