The simplest things
I think it is demonstrably true that the ultimate constituents of reality are simple, immaterial objects. Furthermore, we ourselves are objects of such a kind.
Here is the first argument:
Argument A:
A1. If all actual events are caused by other events, then there is an actual infinity of events
A2. There is not an actual infinity of events
A3. Therefore not all actual events are caused by other events
A4. Any actual event is either caused by another event (event-causation), or it is caused by an object that has not itself been caused to do the causing ('substance-causation').
A5. Therefore, some actual events are caused by objects that have not themselves been caused to do the causing
Here is the second argument:
Argument B
B1. If all existent objects are complex, then there will be an actual infinity of objects
B2. There is no actual infinity of objects
B3. Therefore some existent objects are not complex (that is, some existent objects are simple)
Here is the third argument:
Argument C
C1. If an existent object is simple, then it has not been caused to exist (for there is nothing more basic from which it could be constructed)
C2. There are some existent simple objects (see argument B above)
C3. Therefore, the simple objects that exist have not been caused to exist
C4. All existent objects have either been caused to exist, or exist by their own nature
C5. Therefore, the simple objects that exist, have not been caused to exist
Here is the fourth argument:
Argument D
D1. If an object is material (extended in space), then it is divisible
D2. Simple objects are indivisible
D3. Therefore, the simple objects that exist are not material objects
Clearly the objects that are ultimately responsible for all the events that occur - the objects described in A5 - will be objects that have not been caused to exist, for otherwise the causes of their existence will themselves have been caused to exist (which will once more create an actual infinity of objects or causes). So, the objects described in A5 will be among the objects described in B3 (which are also the objects described in C5 and D3). That is, the objects that are ultimately responsible for all the events that occur are simple, uncreated, immaterial objects.
We ourselves appear to be objects of precisely this kind, as this argument (and many others) shows:
Argument E.
E1. If an object is indivisible, then it is simple, immaterial and has not been caused to exist
E2. My mind is indivisible.
E3. Therefore, my mind is a simple, immaterial object that has not been caused to exist
It does not follow from this that 'we' are the ultimate causes of every event that occurs, or even that the ultimate causes of all events are minds (for though all minds appear to be simple things, it does not follow that all simple things are minds). But it does mean that we have, in ourselves, an example of the kind of things that are, in fact, responsible for every event that occurs.
Anyway, at the moment each of those arguments appears to be both valid and sound, for in each case the premises seem better supported by reason than their opposites.
Here is the first argument:
Argument A:
A1. If all actual events are caused by other events, then there is an actual infinity of events
A2. There is not an actual infinity of events
A3. Therefore not all actual events are caused by other events
A4. Any actual event is either caused by another event (event-causation), or it is caused by an object that has not itself been caused to do the causing ('substance-causation').
A5. Therefore, some actual events are caused by objects that have not themselves been caused to do the causing
Here is the second argument:
Argument B
B1. If all existent objects are complex, then there will be an actual infinity of objects
B2. There is no actual infinity of objects
B3. Therefore some existent objects are not complex (that is, some existent objects are simple)
Here is the third argument:
Argument C
C1. If an existent object is simple, then it has not been caused to exist (for there is nothing more basic from which it could be constructed)
C2. There are some existent simple objects (see argument B above)
C3. Therefore, the simple objects that exist have not been caused to exist
C4. All existent objects have either been caused to exist, or exist by their own nature
C5. Therefore, the simple objects that exist, have not been caused to exist
Here is the fourth argument:
Argument D
D1. If an object is material (extended in space), then it is divisible
D2. Simple objects are indivisible
D3. Therefore, the simple objects that exist are not material objects
Clearly the objects that are ultimately responsible for all the events that occur - the objects described in A5 - will be objects that have not been caused to exist, for otherwise the causes of their existence will themselves have been caused to exist (which will once more create an actual infinity of objects or causes). So, the objects described in A5 will be among the objects described in B3 (which are also the objects described in C5 and D3). That is, the objects that are ultimately responsible for all the events that occur are simple, uncreated, immaterial objects.
We ourselves appear to be objects of precisely this kind, as this argument (and many others) shows:
Argument E.
E1. If an object is indivisible, then it is simple, immaterial and has not been caused to exist
E2. My mind is indivisible.
E3. Therefore, my mind is a simple, immaterial object that has not been caused to exist
It does not follow from this that 'we' are the ultimate causes of every event that occurs, or even that the ultimate causes of all events are minds (for though all minds appear to be simple things, it does not follow that all simple things are minds). But it does mean that we have, in ourselves, an example of the kind of things that are, in fact, responsible for every event that occurs.
Anyway, at the moment each of those arguments appears to be both valid and sound, for in each case the premises seem better supported by reason than their opposites.
Comments (86)
That's one point I'd contest if I were a psychiatrist-philosopher.
Simple objects are not capable to function. They are simple; they don't have component parts, as per being a simple, indivisible thing. Only those things can function (I.e. respond with different responses to different causation) that are not simple. My mind (please, don't accuse me of speaking for you, Bartricks) is capable to function in different ways in different circumstances of impressions. Therefore my mind is not simple, and therefore it is not indivisible.
This is a point of contention; we have no data of an observed infinity of objects, but it is not inconceivable that there is an actual infinity of objects.
To challenge my argument you need to claim that there is an actual infinity of something - and provide evidence in support of it.
If a theory generates an infinite regress, presumably you accept that this is a problem - that is, it provides a reasonable ground for thinking the theory is false.
Why? Surely it is because an infinite regress is no more or less than an actual infinity - which our reason tells us is something that does not exist in reality. Thus a theory that commits itself to the existence of an actual infinity is not a theory about reality.
No. If you think a premise is false, why not just say and explain why - given your definition of the term - it is false. Otherwise I think you're just being tedious, as I think you know full well what the terms mean.
I have no definition of an event. An event is an event. A happening. What's the definition of a happening? Why, a happening is an event. An occurrence. What's the definition of an occurrence? It's an event. And on and on.
This is why dictionaries don't solve philosophical problems.
Anyway, whatever an event is, is there an actual infinity of them? No. There's no actual infinity of anything, is there? So, there's no actual infinity of events.
What does 'actual' mean, you ask. Well, have you actually had an extra-marital affair? If you know what I've just asked you, then you know what 'actually' means.
So, stop being tedious or I'll ask you to define every. single. word. you. use. Including, of course, any and all you use in any definition you give.
Er, why?
I don't know what you mean - do you mean they're not capable of causing anything?
That's question begging. They must be, beause otherwise nothing happens - and something is clearly happening.
Another way to illustrate the falsity of what you've said: clearly you think this does not apply to complex objects (unless, that is, you think nothing at all ever happens). That is, complex objections can cause things. But how can a complex object cause anything if the simple objects from which it is composed are unable to cause anything? I mean, how could the simple objects composing any complex objects causally interact if they're causally impotent?
Argument A
1a. If all objects are caused then infinity exists
2a. Infinity doesn't exist
Ergo
3a. Some objects are not caused
Argument B
1b. If all objects are complex then infinity exists
2b. Infinity doesn't exist
So
3b. Some objects are simple
Argument C
1c. If a simple thing is material then simple things must be divisible
2c. Simple things aren't divisible
So,
3c. Simple things are immaterial
Argument D
1d. If a simple thing is caused then there must something simpler to cause it
2d. There is nothing simpler than a simple thing
So,
3d. A simple thing is uncaused
Argument E
1e. If the mind is indivisible then it is simple, uncaused & immaterial
2e. The mind is indivisible
So,
3e. The mind is simple, uncaused & immaterial
Well, you haven't proved any of the premises in your final argument, E. A survey of your preceding arguments have the following conclusions:
3a. Some objects are uncaused
3b. Some objects are simple
3c. Simple things are immaterial
3d. A simple thing is uncaused
Where's 1e and 2e in them???
You should've tried to prove that the mind is a simple thing, from which would follow that it's immaterial and uncaused.
Also, you rely heavily on infinity, specifically that it doesn't exist. I guess you're referring to an actual physical infinity here and if you are no one really knows whether actual infinities exist or not.
What do you mean by "You"? And "Apparently"? And "Think"? And then you say "you" again, without defining it.
Dictionaries - why oh why have philosophers been arguing over things for millennia, when the answers were all in dictionaries? Where have you been all this time, Tim?
Note, pointing out that my arguments have undefended premises is a point you can make about any. argument. whatever.
er, that's precisely - precisely - what I did!!
Well, what's your proof that the mind is indivisible?
For example, you attribute a mind to me - yes? You can't attribute 'half' a mind to me though, can you? I mean, that makes no sense (apart from the colloquial use of 'half a mind' - when it means 'half a desire-to').
For that to work you'll have to prove that the mind is immaterial. I don't think you've done that.
You're just ignoring the arguments I gave. If an object is indivisible, then it is simple. If it is simple it is immaterial. So, evidence that my mind is indivisible is, eo ipso, evidence that it is immaterial.
Not really. Begging the question. The proposition that needs to be proved is that the mind is indivisible for your argument to work. To do that you need to prove that the mind is immaterial. You can't use indivisibility as evidence of immaterialness because that would be circular.
Evidence that the mind is indivisible: it appears to be.
Evidence that the mind is immaterial: it is indivisible.
Now, perhaps you think that for something to be evidence, there needs to be evidence that it is evidence.
In that case your view generates an infinite regress and thus amounts to the belief that nothing is evidence for anything. Which is stupid.
Quoting Bartricks
What I'm trying to say is that you should first prove the mind is simple because being immaterial and being uncaused follows from being simple, not from indivisibility. Instead you straightaway claim that the mind is indivisible and none of your preceding arguments have a proposition that allows you to take the necessary step to the proposition that the mind is simple, immaterial object that has not been caused to exist.
If something is simple it is indivisible. And if something is indivisible, it is simple.
So, if my mind is indivisible - and the evidence is that it is - then it is simple.
Simple.
Again, just obviously false.
First, every argument has premises. So, if every premise in an argument has to have an argument in its favour, then proofs would require infinite premises, infinite arguments. That's stupid.
One of my premises is that my mind is indivisible.
What's my evidence that my mind is indivisible?
My evidence is that my reason represents it to be.
Now, if something is indivisible, it is simple. Why? Because if it was complex then we could divide it into its parts.
So, if something is indivisible, it has no parts, and thus is simple.
If something is material, it is divisible. Why? Because something material occupies some space, and if something occupies some space it can be divided (for any region of space can be divided)
Thus if something is indivisible it is not material. And if something is simple - which it will be if it is indivisible - then it is not material.
Thus, my mind is simple and immaterial. And as something simple is not caused to exist, my mind - being simple - has not been caused to exist.
An (admittedly imperfect, but sufficiently illustrative) analogy is the way you're looking at this webpage right now. It appears to be some boxes, with some text, icons, a few buttons. Relatively simple. You can even think of it as one thing in your mind: "a webpage."
But in reality it is the product of many lines of html, css, and javascript code, which are themselves a summary of many, many lines of lower-level machine code. Not only that, this whole thing results from a dynamic process of information transfer via the internet (with its own complexities of how that all works), as well as physical hardware processing by your individual computer (binary switches on circuitboards, etc. etc.).
None of that do you perceive. Your perception of the webpage is "simple" because it is the simplified outcome, the result, of a vastly complex process. Just as it would be a mistake to confidently make assertions about the nature of webpages based on your perception of the webpage, I contend that it is a mistake to make assertions about the nature of "mind" based on your own experience of "the mind."
"That's all well and good," you may respond, "but what reason do we have to think that minds are, in fact, simplified outputs resulting from complex processes?" And there I would point you toward neuroscience and psychology. I could expand on this further, but I'll leave it there for now.
That's not how the word is traditionally used and it is not how I am using it. It means 'that which bears our conscious experiences".
So, it refers to an 'object' not a 'process'.
If there are percepts, there is a thing that is doing the perceiving. If there are thoughts, there is a thinker. If there are desires, there is a desirer.
It is that thing - whatever it may be - the thinker, the desirer, the perceiver - that I am using the word 'mind' to refer to.
Thinking is a process. But the thinker is not. The thinker is the one who is engaging in the process known as thinking.
And it is that thing that my reason represents to be indivisible, and thus simple and immaterial and uncaused.
I'm not advicing you. Sorry if it seemed that way. Your argument was complex.
Nothing too is simple, indivisible, immaterial and uncaused according to you.
Therefore, since the mind hasn't been identified in a unique sense (it's exactly the same as nothing), we can't decide whether you're talking about nothing or the mind.
You claim that an actual infinity does not exist. Does an actual mind exist?
Thinking is a brain process. No brain => no thinking. Fact.
But even if nothing were a thing - and it isn't - and an indivisible thing, what would follow from that is that 'nothing' (the thing that is nothing) is simple and immaterial.
This would do nothing to challenge my case, however, as I have not argued that all simple, immaterial, uncaused things are minds (so my case is consistent with 'nothing' - if nothing is a thing, which it isn't - also being indivisible and thus simple). I have argued that simple, immaterial uncaused things are causally responsible for everything else that exists, and I have argued that our minds are simple, immaterial uncaused things. But I have not concluded that therefore simple, immaterial uncaused things are minds, or that our minds are responsible for all else that exists. I said explicitly that this did not follow, only that they are candidates for that role.
Whether minds and brains are one and the same kind of object is a philosophical question.
I have argued that minds are not brains, because minds are indivisible and something indivisible is simple and something simple is immaterial, whereas minds, being divisible, are material.
So it would seem that our minds are demonstrably not our brains and that mental processes are not physical processes in the brain.
Mental processes occur in brains. Again, no brain => no mental processes. Fact.
No. Science refuted you.
The less they know, the less they know it.
You have no proof that the mind is anything but a concept. Unless you can prove it beyond its existence as a concept.
There's a stack of evidence that the mind is not the brain - I presented one piece, there's plenty more - and none whatever that the mind is the brain.
If nothing, is not a thing and the mind is a thing then observe they are exactly identical with respect to the properties you listed. You'll have to provide me with a property that distinguishes the two and demonstrate how the category error is apt to the issue.
Nothing is not a thing - there's no serious dispute about that. I mean, it is there in the word itself - 'no-thing'. Nothing. Not a thing. Nothing.
They are not identical. For one thing, my mind is a thing and nothing is not. Big difference. Doesn't actually get bigger than that.
Also, my mind thinks. That's one of its properties - it thinks things. Nothing doesn't. And so on.
I suggest that you are confusing 'immaterial' with 'non-existent' and 'material' with 'existent'. Not the same.
An argument that the mind (something not proven) is not the brain, is not evidence of what the mind is. You've said what the mind isn't, now inform us about what it is and how you came upon that revelation. Otherwise, all of the conclusions connected to that premise of mind would be baseless conjecture.
Scientific endeavours have connected thinking and mental processes with the brain. How have you arrived at the mind instead?
You - you - need to engage with one of my arguments. Until or unless you can provide reason to believe one of the premises of one of them is false, you're not doing that.
Thanks for the response, and for that clarification. But I would still contend that my basic approach still applies. I'm basically arguing for a form of nominalism with respect to the mind/body problem. The brain is the "noumena," if you will, and the mind is the "phenomena." The mind is your own subjective experience of what the brain is doing, but it is not a thing that exists in itself, objectively. Much like how the color is your experience of a wavelength of light in the visible spectrum.
Where I see this fitting into the current discussion is that your argument for the mind's simplicity is "the mind is simple because I experience it to be so." And this is certainly a valid observation. However, this experience - the experience of a mind - can be subsumed by a nominalistic interpretation as well. This means that your argument of loses quite a bit of its punch, because now we have an alternate explanation for the evidence you are presenting.
None of your arguments inform as to what the mind is. They just report that it's not the brain and that mental processes and thinking take place in it. However, you clearly fail to define or delineate its identity.
Science has a clear definition of the brain and its functions, and among them are the mental processes.
You claim humans have a mind. Where is it in humans? How is it perceived?
For instance, let's say I say "banks are financial institutions; all financial institutions are corrupt; therefore banks are corrupt" and you reply "one meaning of the world 'bank' is 'turn'".
I reply "that's not what I meant by 'bank' - I mean by a 'bank' a 'financial institution').
You counter-reply "I still think my point stands. Banks are turnings. And understood as such, they are not corrupt"
It's to refuse to engage with my argument.
Now, call it whatever you want - call it a mind, call it a bank, call it a flibbertigibbet - but conscious experiences are borne by something. They are called 'mental states' - states are always 'states of something'.
That thing - the thing that mental states are the states of - is what I am calling 'the mind'. That's orthodox usage. But by all means use another term if you want.
For the simple fact is that that object -the mind, the flibbertigibbet, the bank, whatever label you want to put on it - is indivisible, and thus simple, and thus immaterial and uncaused.
Quoting tomatohorse
You have put quote marks around that, yet that is not a quote from me. I did not say it. I said that my mind is represented to be indivisible by my reason. That's quite different. I don't know what it means to 'experience indivisibility'. It isn't, I think, an object of experience. No, my reason 'tells me' - that is, 'represents' my mind to be indivisible. And it is from its indivisibility that I infer its simplicity.
I think that's the point. It seems that you're making a thing out of nothing. BrianW reminded me of the brain - the organ that has been proved to be that which thinks.
Nothing is not a thing. My mind is. Big difference. So, my mind is not nothing.
My mind thinks. Nothing doesn't. Big difference. So my mind is not nothing.
And on and on.
But don't let a proof get in the way of a conviction. Good job!
:lol: :up:
Firstly, modern science has proved, beyond a shadow of a doubt, that it's the brain that thinks. We've even mapped out the regions of the brain concerned with specific mental activity. Ergo, you must realize that you will have to move your business into the immaterial and your arguments on the mind being immaterial rest on 1) indivisibility and that I've brought to your notice is insufficient to make a clear distinction between the mind, considered immaterial and nothing. That's why in my humble opinion, you're trying to make a thing of nothing.
The mind is divisible by the fact that when you die it will disintegrate. Unless you also want to prove existence of mind and thoughts beyond that, too.
Also, if the mind is indivisible, then it would be the building blocks of reality and everything within. Therefore, not only would mental processes take place in it, everything would exist in and through it. Reality would be mind. I have arrived at that by reasoning out, if the process of cause and effect were to be reversed for everything and anything existent, then the fundamental resultant (origin) MUST be that which is indivisible.
Me thinks you conflate concept of mind with actuality of mind and, consequently, doth protest too much.
No it hasn't! All science has shown - and this is hardly recent - is that events in the brain affect what goes on in the mind. If one thing affects another, that does not show they're the same thing! For instance, your responses are making me cross. That is, they are causing in me a certain mental state. Now, that doesn't show that I am your responses, does it! Or that your responses are my mental states. Yet by your logic it would.
Quoting TheMadFool
I don't know what you're talking about.
I like Sam Harris' account of the problem dualists face when they transfer consciousness to something immaterial. Harris states that damage to certain parts of the brain results in a specific loss of function corresponding to that part. So if your speech center is damaged, you lose the ability to speak. Now, if one thinks the mind survives death then it must mean that the entire brain shutting down is of no consequence for the mind. Yet, if neuroscience has proven anything it's that our mental functions are localized in the brain and if damage to parts of the brain result in loss of function, it follows that when the entire brain is damaged, as in death, the mind should cease existing.
Sorry for making your cross. You've been kind to be patient. I admire that. Thank you
I do not deny that doing things to the brain affects what goes on in the mind. That's not in dispute.
But it is fallacious to infer that from the fact X affects Y, X therefore 'is' Y. Yet that's exactly what you've done. If I stick a pin through my brain, that's likely to affect what goes on in my mind, yes? That does not mean that my brain 'is' my mind.
So what you're seeing as evidence that the brain is the mind is actually just evidence of fallacious thinking on Harris's part (which is understandable given that his only qualification in philosophy is a BA - yet he insists on writing about philosophical subjects as if he is an expert). And, of course, fallacious thinking on your part and on the part of all those who think that 'science' somehow proves the brain is the mind.
It doesn't.
No it won't. Disintegrate into what? You're assuming that the mind is the brain. But it isn't. The mind is indivisible, therefore simple, therefore immaterial.
Complex objects disintegrate. Simple ones do not.
If claiming that X is Y does not make it true despite the obvious connections, what makes your claim that mental processes occur in the mind have any validity in contrast to those made by scientists about the brain, especially since you haven't even offered a hint of empirical connection?
How does that follow? If the steering mechanism in my car fails, then I lose the ability to steer the car. That doesn't mean I am the car, does it? I am not the car. Yet if the steering mechanism fails, that's hardly of no consequence to me - I can't steer the car, and I'm in the car!
Likewise, if a certain region of my brain gets damaged, then I may lose the ability to speak. That doesn't mean I am my brain. I am not my brain, but I am at the moment stuck in one and without it I am unable to interact with the sensible world. So, if bits of my brain are damanged that's often of the first importance to me, even though I am not my brain.
No. If the steering mechanism fails, then it, the car, looses the 'ability' to be steered.
What mental processes would you be referring to that are not affected by damage to the corresponding brain centres and thus perpetuating your notion that the mind is still functional?
And, mind is what we, humans, refer to our awareness-response mechanism. So I guess you were right all along, consciousness is indivisible. :wink:
Sorry, I was a bit distracted.
Let's look at your main argument
1.The mind is indivisible
2. If the mind is indivisible then it's simple, immaterial and uncaused
So,
3. The mind is simple, immaterial and uncaused
The proof for premise 1, is according to you, "it appears to be" which, despite it being couched in a hedge, is easy to confirm through personal experience: I'm aware of my mental processes and also that I exist, distinct from others and actually consider myself to be quite like the driver of a vehicle, steering the body to do my bidding. Also, as you said, there's no sense in which I could talk of a half or a quarter of my mind.
However, notice something about your immaterial mind. It, based on being simple (indivisible), being immaterial AND being uncaused is exactly identical to nothing. So, now I present you an analogical argument:
Nothing is immaterial, simple and uncaused and doesn't think
(According to you) there's a mind that's immaterial, simple and uncaused
Ergo, by my analogy
this immaterial "mind" also doesn't think
:wink:
Er no. I never said "consciousness is indivisible". I said my 'mind' is indivisible. Mind. Not 'consciousness'. Consciousness is a 'state' of a thing, not a thing itself. I am conscious. I am not consciousness.
Oh, sorry, I forgot, you need to go check if 'science' confirms that.
It is not a 'proof', but 'evidence'. Appearances, whether sensible or rational, are prima facie evidence of the reality of what they represent to be the case. That's a principle of intellectual inquiry without which you'd be unable to argue for anything at all. For instance, it is on the basis of rational appearances that we recognise this argument form:
1. P
2. If P then Q
3. Therefore Q
to be valid.
Our reason represents us to be indivisible, which is prima facie evidence that we are. That 'prima facie' means not that it is a proof - we could discover that we have more powerful prima facie reason to discount these particular rational appearances (not 'all' rational appearances - that'd be self-undermining - but 'these' rational appearances). But it means that the burden of proof is on the person who wishes to deny that premise - they have to provide apparent countervailing evidence, otherwise they're just being dogmatic.
Quoting TheMadFool
I have twice now explained why this is obviously not so.
First, it is a conceptual truth that 'nothing' is not a thing. By contrast my mind is a thing.
Here's an argument for that (if one were needed):
1. If there are mental states, there is an object - a thing, called 'a mind' - that they are the states of
2. There are mental states
3. Therefore there is an object - a thing, called 'a mind' - that they are the states of.
And minds think, whereas 'nothing' does not.
That's no. 3. Three times now I have explained why minds are not 'nothing'. 3 times!
You're clearly just dogmatically assuming that if something is not material, it does not exist.
The evidence is that this is not so. The thing you're thinking with - the thing your reason tells you both exists and is indivisible, and thus simple and immaterial - is 'not material' yet 'is' existent
You're correct. My bad.
Quoting Bartricks
Here, you're trying to blur the line between the conventional meaning of "appearance" and truth. Appearances are deceptive and therefore we rely on rationality as you have. I could say that your "evidence" for the mind being indivisible is suspect because you claim that, quote, "it appears to be". Nevertheless, this appearance seems so common, everyone seems to have it, that I don't wish to dispute it for the moment. However, there is a possibility that this impression of the mind being indivisible is just an appearance - a mass delusion.
Quoting Bartricks
I could easily rephrase your argument as follows:
1. If there are mental states, there is an object - a material thing, called a brain - that they are the states of
2. There are mental states
3. Therefore there is an object - a material thing, called a brain - that they are states of
You have yet to prove that it's not the brain that's thinking and that the mind is not a brain-state and has an existence distinct from the physical. The only way you can say that the mind is distinct from the brain is to show that it's immaterial and that requires your indivisibility argument but that as we know applies to nothing too. Basically you'll have to admit that your immaterial mind is nothing.
No. Your ability still exists and can be easily realised by steering a different but fully functional car. Hence, your ability is not diminished
Quoting Bartricks
You call that which is indivisible, mind. I call it consciousness. Science calls it energy. Etc. Etc.
Like I said, you were right. Do you have a problem with that, too?
Or you can have it this way:
Consciousness is the state of indivisibility and indivisibility is the state of consciousness.
Consciousness <=> Indivisibility.
No, I am describing a principle known as 'the principle of phenomenal conservatism'. Like I say, it underpins all inquiry.
You the one confusing the distinction between appearance and truth. Strictly speaking appearances are not 'true' or 'false', but 'accurate' or 'inaccurate'. Truth and falsehood are properties of 'beliefs', rather than appearances.
Quoting TheMadFool
Now you're just stipulating - on the basis of no evidence whatsoever - that the principle of phenomenal conservatism is false.
No, appearances 'can' be deceptive. Not 'are'. 'Can be'. But the default is that they are accurate, not that they are inaccurate.
If you think otherwise, you won't be able to argue for your position.
Anyway, this is all by-the-by - if the only way you can attack my arguments is by trying to call into question the whole project of arguing - the whole project of reasoning about reality - then you are effectively admitting that my arguments are formidable.
What you need to do is attack a premise, not attack philosophy tout court.
No you couldn't! That's a 'different' argument because it has different premises!!
All you can conclude from the fact there are states, is that there is 'some thing' that they are the states of. Whether it is a material or immaterial thing is what needs to be shown, not assumed.
So that is not - absolutely not - my argument, but a completely different argument with a flagrantly question begging first premise!
Like I say, you don't know how to argue responsibly.
Er, yes, obviously I have a problem because it is false. Baby steps. Consciousness is a mental state. Mental 'state'. That means 'state of mind'. A 'state of mind' is a - ooo wait for it - a. state. of. a. mind. State of a mind, not a mind. State of a mind, not a mind. State of a mind. not a mind. State of a mind. Not a mind.
The mind is the thing. Consciousness is a state of it. Write that out a thousand times. Then tattoo 'mind' on your left hand and 'state of mind' on your right so that you remember that they're distinct.
Long story short, it seems you have your own meanings for whatever you choose to express, while others have theirs. Current education has its own definitions of mind, mental states, consciousness, etc which you choose to ignore. I have no problem with that, I have done it and still do it, too. What matters is what is logical a.k.a the significance of what is being expressed and its right relations.
What I'm saying is, that which is indivisible, I name it, CONSCIOUSNESS.
The philosophical debate is over what kind of an object it is - material, or immaterial.
If you call 'concsiousness' 'mind' then a) you are using a well-known term in a misleading way and b) you are simply not talking about what I am talking about.
If I say "banks are financial institutions and they're corrupt" you are not even addressing me if you say "banks are the sides of rivers and they are wet".
I mean by 'mind' - the 'object that is bearing our conscious experiences'. If you mean something else, start up your own thread and use the word 'mind' there to mean 'butterscotch biscuits' or whatever. My arguments - the arguments here - do not apply to your meaning, but to mine.
Now, unless you think conscious states can exist absent any object that they are the state of - in which case you're very confused - you accept that there is an object that bears conscious states. Call it Rupert if you want. I call it 'the mind'. The debate - the philosophical debate - is over what kind of an object it is. IF you're not interested in that debate, go away.
So has the word consciousness, brain, thoughts, etc, etc. Convention does not make it absolute. What is convention on one's side of town is not so on others.
Quoting Bartricks
I have kept the relation to the significant factor, which is indivisibility. So, it's more like I said,
Quoting Bartricks
And, I mean by consciousness, that which is indivisible.
Quoting Bartricks
Everything is material to itself and can only be immaterial to something less subtle (tenuous) than itself. The materiality and immateriality of something cannot be a fundamental description of anything. For example, magnetic force is immaterial to our sensations, yet it is material to its own kind. If immateriality is based on any gradation of intangibility and inertness (unreactive-ness), then it is not necessarily derived from indivisibility.
Immateriality does not automatically infer indivisibility.
If you mean by 'consciousness' what I mean by 'mind', then you should use 'mind' not 'consciousness' as I'm the one who's made the argument. This is especially so given that I use 'consciousness' to refer to 'the state of consciousness' (like, you know, everyone else does).
Now, the mind - which is an object - is indivisible. And from that we can conclude that it is therefore simple and immaterial and uncaused.
You mean 'imply' not 'infer'.
And I did not claim that immateriality implies indivisibility. I argued that indivisibility entails immateriality.
If the meaning of indivisibility is identical, then banks and cornflakes are just synonymous names. Get it?
Quoting Bartricks
Not unless I had a point to make. If mind meant to everybody what you say it does, then the contrast in the various arguments in this thread and even beyond would not exist. I mean, just by googling mind I begin to get different definitions and explanations. Therefore, I don't 'buy' your conventionality idea.
Quoting Bartricks
No. I meant infer. I gave an example of my observation of certain phenomena and from it deduced that possibility.
Quoting Bartricks
Unless, immateriality here refers to subtlest or most tenuous. Otherwise, by being an existence (an object or 'thing'), it must have substantiality of some degree to be able to be interactive and for complexity to be able to arise from its simplicity. My point is immateriality implies a kind of relativity of conditioning and is often used to compare different states such as physical vs non-physical (spiritual) depending on context.
What I'm saying is, something can be indivisible and material. If indivisibility does not negate materiality, then that point about immateriality becomes moot.
Well, I get something from that, but what I get is about your intelligence, not about my argument. Have you been putting money in cornflake packets again?
Quoting BrianW
No, you meant 'imply', you just don't know that that's what you meant, because you don't know what a lot of words mean, such as 'bank', 'cornflake', 'indivisible', 'mind', 'imply' and 'infer'.
Why couldn't I? I presented to you a counter-argument with a contradictory conclusion and you don't accept it. I employed your modus ponens form and an argument form is necessarily universal in application and can appear in as many arguments on as many different topics as possible. In short your "couldn't" indicates I've done something impossible which is not the case.
The only similarity between your argument and mine is that your argument is valid (like mine) and it shares the same second premise.
You can construct valid arguments until the cows come home. What you need to do is construct one that is plausibly sound and not flagrantly question begging (that is, one that does not just stipulate on the contested issue as opposed to appealing to rational appearances).
So, here's a really rubbish argument.
1. If there are mental states, there is a million mile long crocodile that they are the states of
2. There are mental states
3. Therefore there is a million mile long crocodile that they are states of
What is that shit? It's valid. But it's shit because premise 1 is grossly implausible. It is not an a priori truth of reason - that is, it is not something that our reason says is true, independent of experience. And there seems no reason provided by any experiences we have had either. So it is just stupid.
By contrast, my first premise says only this: if there are mental states, there is an object that they are the states of.
Now that 'is' an a priori truth of reason. The idea of there being mental states existing by themselves doesn't make sense - it is akin to thinking that a physical object's shape can exist absent the object whose shape it is. Imagine going into a shop and seeing an object you like and asking how much it is. $40 you are told. Oh, I haven't got $40 on me - how much for the shape alone? You'd be asked to leave, yes? Because what you've asked is crazy - it makes no sense.
Why? Because 'shape' is a state of a physical object. Physical objects have shapes. Shapes are not things, even though many things are shaped.
Likewise, mental states are states of an object. They are not things in their own right - they are 'states of a thing'.
What kind of an object they are the states of is what subsequent reasoning about this can reveal. You can't just stipulate.
So again, your argument is a) not a version of mine; b) unsound; c) question begging.
Again, one of those - mine - is an a priori truth of reason. Or do you think that it makes sense that a mental state could exist absent an object that it is the state of?
As I explained at length, just as it makes no sense to think that an object's shape could exist absent the object whose shape it is, so too it makes no sense to think that a mental state can exist absent a mind that it is the state of.
Your premise is obviously 'not' an apriori truth of reason. You've just built into it an arbitrary stipulation about the kind of object in question.
So you haven't reasoned - you haven't constructed an argument made purely of apparent a priori truths and observations and then seen what conclusion you get to. No, you've just stipulated in one of your premises that minds are brains.
So, once more, your argument is question begging and implausible.
Consider two detectives. They're at a crime scene and they discover a red hair on the knife that was clearly used to kill Marjory. The first detective infers from this that Marjory's killer most likely had red hair. That's all he infers, because that's all that piece of evidence permits him to infer.
The other detective infers not just that Marjory's killer most likely had red hair, but that Marjory's killer is called Ken. The second detective is a bloody idiot, yes? The red hair does not licence that inference - it is an unreasonable inference. Yes, it is 'possible' the killer is called Ken, because Ken is a name and killers have names. But the discovery of the red hair does not give the detective any special reason to think the killer is called Ken.
You're reasoning like the second detective. If there are mental states, that licences us to conclude that there is an object that is bearing them, but it doesn't licence us to conclude that the object in question is a brain. It might be a brain, because a brain is an object. But the existence of mental states - like the red hair - does not licence you to draw that conclusion, only to infer that there is some kind of an object (an object whose precise nature we've yet to determine) that is bearing it.
Firstly, I'm more than a little concerned about you using the word "mind". Some people consider the mind to be a function of the brain, an emergent pheonomenon or something like that. You seem to speak of the mind as if it's distinct from brain processes - having an independent existence of itself.
As far as I can see, your only attempt to prove that the mind exists separately from the brain has been based on the indivisibility of the mind but now you run into the problem of being unable to differentiate the mind from nothing since nothing too is equally indivisible.
When I raised this concern you responded with the assertion that the mind thinks but nothing doesn't think. My question is how do you know that it's the mind and not the brain that does the thinking and that the mind is not just a brain process? Your response will probably be based on the indivisibility of the mind which is necessary to prove the mind is an indepedent immaterial thing but then that leads us back to the problem of the mind, in your terms, being exactly identical to nothingness.
You: The mind is indivisible. Therefore it's immaterial
Me: Nothing is also indivisible. So, nothing = mind
You: No. The mind thinks but nothing does not
Me: How do you know that it's not the brain that thinks?
You: The mind is indivisible. Therefore it's immaterial. Therefore it can't be the brain that thinks.
Me: Nothing is also indivisible. So, nothing = mind
You: No, the mind thinks but nothing does not
Me: Your whole argument rests on indivisibility and I've shown that your concept of mind based on it is identical to nothingness.
You can see the circularity right?
This is valid:
1. If p, then q
2. P
3. Therefore q
This (how you are reasoning) is not:
1. If p, then q
2. Q
3. Therefore p.
I think that makes two of us.
Do we draw from the structure of the universe - it's simulation - in some way? Or is it projected?
If yes, everything does boil down to something simple.
We also simplify the complex.
If an unknown theory becomes known, does it become simpler?
:ok: :up:
Thanks for staying with me so far. Really appreciate it