Reconciling b-theory with Aristotelian causality

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The general notion upon which you have come to expound seems to me a correlative with the doctrine of Eternalism. Which, as can be expected, precludes the ability of change to become emergent, inasmuch as its object of application be that of timelessness, such that the distinctions between all tenses are obscured from view. Were the case otherwise, one would confront a broad and ever-reaching contradiction in terms, which must be reconciled with, as a matter of judgement, if what is expressed in thought, thusly, is to be regarded as having any merit. That which exemplifies even in modest degree, the Eternal, is bound by an unassailable continuity within its operation; the course at which it proceeds further, by way of action. For conflict to arise therein, with respect to which, and those conditions which inhere within the 'Model' in question; in the case of what it presupposes as axiomatic, and necessary for its procession, there must lie a great fault in how one conceives of it both as a particular form, and a lesser division of the whole to which it pertains. That is to say, if any conception derived from a principle that itself can be made applicable to the generality of its associated domain, and might thereby establish itself as an element of universal importance within the confines of such a field, remains contrary to what is anticipated in outcome by a rule of procedure of breadth, and significance, less than its own, there is reason to cast doubt upon whether the latter principle ought to be considered. This relation of which I have spoken being further illustrated through the following;

Within the sphere of traditional forms of interpretation of the manner in which time stands' to progress, as we hold it to be, there is a ceaseless shifting within its state, and a relative distinctness within each state that it may occupy. Whilst some have sought to demonstrate the fallibility of this conception, on the grounds that it appeals blindly to the precepts of mere intuition, those so concerning bear the ability to set forth an argument, in advocacy of the need for such simplicities of the understanding, to accord with all that is entrenched within the intuitive, and that by virtue of its content, may be apprehended readily, by any other. As it must conform to the basis of the experiential, and rendered intelligible with a faultless clarity by the faculties of mind, much value is evident in the case of its usage, if provided as an instrument in the exercise of cognition, for the understanding. A utility. Yet, one need recognize also, that these notions are in their nature, extraneous to the world, and thus without a sense of the objective in their appearance, and predication thereupon, in all instances.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-spacetime/

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/B-theory_of_time

Your difficulty in understanding arose from the substance of such notions as those described being fraught with many inconsistencies. When one is subject to the conflictive, and misconceived, for any great period, clearness in sight, and recognition of truth, is certain to faulter. I wish to implore you, for the sake of your own benefit, to ensure a greater depth of weariness of these things; lest your development of mind be stifled as well, in its entirety. For the insubstantial seldom proves conducive to growth, in any aspect of life.

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So then how does time work in a b theory and actualizing of potential, to simplify it?

Reply to jimmyjohns A precondition fundamental to what is defined in the present context as 'B-Theory', that being a sense of timelessness, is directly conflictive with what has been supposed as true, within your prior argument. The latter condition being the claim that change in tense, within a system of thought for which such a characteristic is wholly indistinct, or otherwise ill-defined, is itself permitted to become emergent. One cannot reconcile between that which lies in contradiction, unless the associated precepts of the argument from which it was first set forth, are altered in such a way as to resolve the given inconsistency.

I see no difficulty reconciling Aristotelian actualization of potential with eternalism (“b-theory”). It just means that things have more of their potential realized in the parts of them that are later in time than in the parts of them that are earlier in time.

So it’s not all entirely observer dependent then? The reason I come across as so confused is that numerous Aristotelian philosophers seem to be engaging in a debate on this, and I’m having trouble understanding how it can be held that no actualization exists whatsoever except for the actualization of the potential of the mind to see the events.

Quoting jimmyjohns

I’m trying to understand how exactly under a b-theory of time, causality still exists either in the Aristotelian sense of actualizing potential or in any other theory of change and causality.

First, I am not sure whether you are actually talking about the so-called B theory of time or about eternalism - these are not the same. According to the B theory of time, there is no objective matter of fact about the status of any particular moment of time as being past, present or future; objectively, there exist only relations between moments: prior to, simultaneous with and posterior to (setting aside relativistic complications for the time being...) According to eternalism, all things exist at all times (in some sense) - including things that are in our past or future at some given moment. These two claims are not convertible into each other, at least not without some additional assumptions. An A theorist (one who believes that past, present and future are objective properties of time) can very well be an eternalist, assuming they can make sense of things existing in the past or the future. It should be noted though that neither B theory nor eternalism are clearly defined with the glosses given above (nor would everyone agree that any clear definitions exist).

Second, I think that this potentiality vs. actuality business is peculiar to Aristotelian and Scholastic philosophy; you won't find much talk about "actualization of potential" in more modern accounts of causality (but I would welcome a correction). There may be tension between some modern theories of causality and eternalism and/or B theory, but I would hesitate to name one off hand.

Quoting jimmyjohns

How can something exist “ simpliciter” in space time if all time past present future is already actual? How is anything simpler and then not simple if time is not objectively present and potentials aren’t actualized?

I think you are misreading "simpliciter": here it just means "as is, without additional qualifications." In the context of the quoted text it means that B exists, but we are not saying that it specifically exists at time t1. For a presentist existence always implies existence in the present moment. An eternalist has to additionally index existence to a particular time. So for an eternalist saying "Socratest exists" (exists simpliciter) does not commit her to saying that Socrates exists now.