Chomsky & Gradualism
There were years when I was convinced that our capacity for language must have evolved gradually as a complex form of communication, in accordance with the widely-held belief in evolutionary biology that organisms change slowly and incrementally via natural selection (with some exceptions, Steve Gould being an obvious example).
After reading Chomsky, I now lean much more towards the idea that not only did language not evolve gradually as a form of communication, but that language isn't communication at all.
I'm interested to hear if others, who have specialized in the evolution of language or are well versed in its literature, have considered Chomsky's ideas on this matter. I haven't seen much in this forum so far, although I am new to it.
After reading Chomsky, I now lean much more towards the idea that not only did language not evolve gradually as a form of communication, but that language isn't communication at all.
I'm interested to hear if others, who have specialized in the evolution of language or are well versed in its literature, have considered Chomsky's ideas on this matter. I haven't seen much in this forum so far, although I am new to it.
Comments (217)
Language is a system of thought. It's communicated very rarely, whether by sign or through speech. So it's communicative properties aren't what's essential. One can communicate with a hairstyle, bees with a waggle dance, etc. There are all kinds of ways to communicate, down through the insects. So language certainly isn't that.
Quoting Xtrix
Do you mean thought is communicated very rarely? And very rarely, does that mean not very often or not very accurately?
Quoting Xtrix
Can you direct me to his thoughts on this?
I wouldn't say language is thought. But it does seem to be related to thinking. This is up for debate, of course, and an interesting question.
By "very rarely" I mean not very often, yes.
Quoting Xtrix
Sure. But you’re feeling is that thought is communicated very rarely, and language is doing something else, except on those rare occasions.
I'm saying language is a system of thought. Not the only system. So in that sense, yes, this system of thought gets communicated very rarely.
What thoughts get expressed through the language faculty is almost always expressed to ourselves, internally. Just introspect for a while: you're constantly talking to yourself. How much of that gets communicated to others--through speech, or sign, or writing, or whatever-- is very rare indeed -- maybe 1%?
If talking to yourself isn't considered part of thinking, then I have no idea what thinking is. However, I wouldn't say language is synonymous with thought. I can imagine a scene without a verbal commentary, for example. But again, I've had friends who argue that language is thinking. Although I've never been fully convinced.
So language as a system of thought is only used rarely because it’s only required on those rare occasions when needed, and that other communication methods do what they do best? What I trying to establish is whether language as a system of thought is used rarely because it has a specific role among other systems, or it’s used rarely because it’s inadequate for communication? Or it appears to be used rarely because it’s not communication?
I'm probably hopelessly naive.
I'll preface this by saying that this topic actually fascinates me to no end, but I'm not well read in this type of rocky terrain (mixed metaphor; what do you have to say about those? Do they "communicate"?), so I'm just tossing out a few informal thoughts for informal consideration.
What do you mean by system of thought? Are there multiple systems of thought, language being one? It looks like you're trying to distinguish between a "system of thought" and "communication". Is that correct or no?
Because I don't understand what "system of thought" is supposed to mean, I'm not clear on how it differs from communication. So, for instance, when you say "Language is a system of thought. It's communicated very rarely..." is "it's" referring to language, or to a system of thought? If language, then to say that language is communicated very rarely sounds like a non sequitur; language communicates various meanings with success all the time: "I'm replying to your post here on TPF because I find it interesting". Is that not a sufficient communicational use of language? Did you receive no communication from me when you read that sentence? Or, if "it's" refers to "system of thought" then I can't really imagine what you would be trying to say there.
Evolutionary endowed language capacities evolved very slowly. (Chomsky can offer no real insights there...)...
Languages themselves (accumulated and shared sets of signs) evolve less slowly, and can in fact emerge relatively rapidly (in the order of a single generation; see: creoles and twin-speak).
Language capacity and use in an individual is what develops rapidly... Like snowballs gathering more snow, more language lets you accumulate more language more quickly, and there is a very lengthy learning curve before useful returns start to diminish.
I'm not sure what Chomsky meant, but I'm sure he didn't mean that ancestral hominids suddenly started using their words.
It helps to make a distinction between ‘worded language’ and ‘language’ (ie. a bee’s waggle-dance). There is a focused use of the term ‘language’ (regarding syntax and grammar) and the broader use of ‘language’ (body language and unconscious ‘signals’). We don’t need the former to think, but the former appears to be extremely beneficial for both communicating thoughts, passing on knowledge and long term planning.
Quoting I like sushi
What sort of things?
Quoting I like sushi
But it feels like that. How can that be proven?
Can I think of something that I don't have a word for?
Like I said, I'm not well read on this topic, and I hold a provisional view of Chomsky at best, so I'd be curious to hear a specific argument from you about why you find him so "diametrically opposite" to what you seem to think is reality? This is an honest question and I welcome any ideas.
Here and here [both pdfs] are some easy reading if you're interested in some rather straightforward critiques of the Chomskian paradigm. The long and short of it for me is that Chomsky's approach to language is evolutionary nonsense. Not only does Chomksy and his ilk almost entirely divorce language from function, but so too does he universalize utterly contingent aspects of language while at the same time making those aspects 'innate'. It's a Platonism of language that is, for me, indistinguishable from a theism. No one who takes evolution seriously can take Chomsky seriously.
Edit: A popular article by Vyvyan Evans, a summary of his book on the utter and complete waste of time that is Chomskian linguistics, can be found here, if you'd prefer some lighter reading: https://aeon.co/essays/the-evidence-is-in-there-is-no-language-instinct
Cool, much appreciated. :up:
If we look at new borns in the wild they walk almost as soon as they drop. Humans are effectively born ‘prematurely’ in comparison to many other animals.
Aphasia is also another point here. Various different form of aphasia are quite specific to certain ‘grammatical’ features. This is probably the hardest evidence there is to back up the idea of universal grammar. Keep in mind Chomsky original put forward the position in opposition to some tabla rasa view of brain development that was persisting (through behaviorism).
Today most sensible people understand that the distinction between ‘nature and nurture’ is merely a convenient (yet essentially fuzzy) boundary between two equally applicable approaches. The reductionist approach toward genetics in this area has been a dead end for the most part as the ‘mechanisms’ of evolution are more complex than this - but huge immediate jumps can be made within one generation due to previous little tweaks being turned on (ironically in a Lamarcian way).
Now it may be that what we call 'thought' is highly dependent on the surface structure of human language (the Sapir Whorf hypothesis) including concepts like 'self', but on the other hand, cognitive deflationists (Behaviourists) would argue that there is nothing special about 'languaging' which amounts to no more than a complex behaviour which enhances social co-ordination.
Over and above such discussions of species comparison there is still the problem that such discussion is inevitably constrained by its very subject matter, 'language' itself. That observation has implications for religions, which tend to put 'Man' and 'The Word' on a pedestal, and even for what we call 'philosophy', which might amount to no more than a form of 'social dancing'. Indeed, attempts by would be philosophers to escape to a linguistic vantage point has often given rise to the proliferation of neologisms.
Quoting fresco
But their “language” would not be connected to thought but to behavioural instincts. So to me it’s not so common. Is that a fair statement?
Both are true genetically. It has to be taken into account that several non-phenotypical iterations of the genetic code over generations can then become highly affective in phenotypical presentations due to one singular mutation - consider the so-called ‘junk DNA’ which is basically sitting there doing nothing. If another gene changes somewhere else in the sequence this can then create proteins that unlock previously ‘junk’ items that have a domino effect on other protein synthesis.
It helps to view the inner workings of any organism as an ‘environment’. This is why sensible people are loath to make a delineation between ‘nature’ and ‘nurture’ in any real sense.
We have legs to walk and language to speak. The question is do you view ‘walking’ as a ‘cultural development’ or as a genetic predisposition? If no, then what exactly is different in terms of a capacity for language acquisition? The argument is basically held around the misrepresentation/disagreement around what is being proposed. The hardliners against this or that idea are usually at the poles of the argument or misrepresenting the argument.
As for Everett arguement against this ‘walk’ and ‘crawl’ idea ... feral children walking on all fours due to being brought up by wolves. Then there is ‘The Man with no Language’ who learn language from scratch at 27 years of age (that contradicts the argument in the article link posted above). Everett does make some good points though. The main argument over ‘recursion’ is another term people cannot agree over. It seems people misunderstand something then rile against it, then when told ‘I didn’t mean that!’ they refuse to say ‘okay’, instead claiming the term to mean what they thought it meant in opposition to the original proposition put forward.
Chomsky brought linguistics into a more scientific realm of analysis - regardless of whether you agree with all his ideas he as/is an extremely important contributor to modern linguistic theory.
The Piraha is the most controversial language. There is FAR too much to go into there, but it is looked at as being the main component in the disagreements around Chomsky’s theories/ideas.
One thing is for sure, we, all "higher" animals in fact, have specialized and dedicated organs for sound, our ears and that too as a pair. To the contrary, vocalization is always associated with the one mouth animals possess which has the primary function of eating. Our vocalization apparatus is just a secondary ability acquired through modifications of organs such as the trachea and esophagus as if it was a part-time job and not like a steady job one expects it to be if it was a priority.
That means hearing is more important and that can only be because there is vital information travelling in sound waves - prey/predator/water/shelter/etc. Doesn't this show that sound-based communication was critical to survival?
if so then language would initially have to complement the function of the ear i.e. it would be communication-oriented to capture prey and escape predators. Thinking would come later, much much later I believe.
I don't know what 'that' in 'that argument' refers to. In any case, there's little to no use in simply pitting terms like 'nature' and 'nuture', 'culture' and 'innateness' against one another. They are too general and unspecific to do any interesting or useful conceptual work. One of the few bright spots of the Chomskian program is at least to (try) and give specific content to what constitutes 'innateness', which is cashed out specifically as 'universal grammar'. Except that what exactly that supposed to be has been so muddled and diluted that the only thing that seemed to be able to count as 'universal' is 'recursion'. Except it turns out that not only is recursion not universal (famously though not-uncontroversially lacking in the Piraha language), it even occurs in other animal communication (see Evans's book for more on this). And this to say nothing about the generality of recursion as something that supposed to be so 'specific' to language - it's two steps away form saying 'Ah ha, turns out words are really the key to language'.
There's lots of details that could be gone into, but the basic point is that if you leave the conversation at the level of 'nature and nurture', 'innate or culture', then you may as well be talking into the wind. They are useless terms unless cashed out in particular and specific ways. And it turns out that when they are, nothing of use there can be said either.
As for the neurological evidence, I'll simply quote Evans' article: "In his book The Language Instinct (1994), Steven Pinker examined various suggestive language pathologies in order to make the case for just such a dissociation. For example, some children suffer from what is known as Specific Language Impairment (SLI) – their general intellect seems normal but they struggle with particular verbal tasks, stumbling on certain grammar rules and so on. That seems like a convincing smoking gun – or it would, if it hadn’t turned out that SLI is really just an inability to process fine auditory details. It is a consequence of a motor deficit, in other words, rather than a specifically linguistic one. Similar stories can be told about each of Pinker’s other alleged dissociations: the verbal problems always turn out to be rooted in something other than language." More detail in Evans book, where aphasia is similarly dealt with.
Finally, exactly how all of this is even meant to be evolutionarily substantiated is similarly so thinly cashed out as to be effectively indistinguishable from pseudo-science. On the evolutionary front, it basically boils down to: "Well, evolution sometimes happens quite fast, so [something something promissory note] language probably happened that way too". As for exactly what underwent evolution, and more importantly how this mysterious X contributed to language and the deep structure that Chomsky supposed isolates - well, that goes entirely left unsaid. Were we talking about literally any other biological function, the very idea that 'something happened at some point in the past that made us do X good' ought to be taken seriously as a thesis would be laughed out of the room so fast as to leave any actual scientist censured from the discipline for the rest of their life. The entire Chomskian program is unscientific bunkum. Quick quote from Coolidge on this front:
"First, Chomsky’s contention has little or no genetic support. One gene does not suddenly cause hierarchically structured language. But that is one of their clever and slippery arguments: It is possible that some genetic mutation altered FLB at that time, but these authors rarely, if ever, invoke anyone else’s cognitive theory (e.g., working memory, a predominant cognitive model for over the past 4 decades). Further, because Chomsky has pronounced that language did not evolve, then it logically follows that it could not have been subject to natural selection. Note well that Chomsky has not elaborated upon why language was not subject to natural selection, and further, he proffers the cryptic argument it did not evolve for communication purposes. Chomsky and his colleagues do propose that it might have developed for spatial navigation but with little or no elaboration." (source).
If one good thing comes out of the new decade, it might hopefully be the wholesale forgetting of anything Chomsky wrote about language, ever.
From Evans:
Claimed being the key word. I’ve already pointed out that people are not exactly in agreement over what does or doesn’t constitute ‘recursion’ - and even less likely to adhere to another’s definition.
More from Evans (a hidden contradiction):
Yet just as there is an argument against comparing ‘walking’ with ‘language’ it is here deemed perfectly okay to use the same technique to cover up items like a 27 year old deaf man acquiring language. The capacity was already there it was just awoken at a much later date due to deafness - basically either the argument for ‘walking’ and ‘language’ is valid as this argument is, or both are pointless? Which is it?
Plus, do we assume that all our ancestors could ‘walk’ and that only at a later date did this become non-instinctual?
My main gripe is your rather blasé dismissal of Chomsky’s views as being completely wrong in every way shape and form regarding linguistic theory. Such a statement is clearly coming from some extreme bias of opinion - maybe based on his political views perhaps? Any interest in linguistics that ignores Chomsky is plain silly, just as it would be daft to ignore/dismiss Skinner or Saussure because they’ve been shown to be wrong in some areas of their thinking. Again, Lamarck was dismissed, yet today his general idea has more weight and it turns out he was partially right in his assumptions - same goes for Mc... what’s her name who was laughed at for her conclusions about genetics ‘leaping’ (McClintock).
Quoting StreetlightX
If you’re living in the past, yeah. Today, absolutely not. There is nothing to say that evolution in terms of genetics is a ‘gradual’ process when it comes to considerable ‘leaps’ in function. As I’ve laid out already we know that many tiny incremental alterations in the genetic structure can lie untapped before another minute change in the genetic codes literally ‘turns on’ several other previously dormant genes. The mistake, is again, to assume one polar idea is 100% true over the other. Evolution is both a gradual and immediate process - in terms of translation (a more Lamarcian view).
I’m unsure what you’re opinion would be regarding the neuroscience of memory, social ability or spatiotemporal perception in terms of physiology. This doesn’t mean I am suggesting we’re born with the ‘innate ability to fashion clothing’ though. The problem, as I see it, is distinguishing what we each mean and weighing up the limitations of theories not the outright dismissal of theories we either don’t like the sound of, or that we lack a large body of evidence for. We don’t throw away Newtonian mechanics simply because Einstein refined our view of ‘physical motion’.
I find it strange to hold such a string opinion in complete opposition to anyone who has helped develop the field. Perhaps many dislike what he says as it is too analytic/theoretical?
Have you tried the advanced search tool?
Quoting Xtrix
I am unfamiliar with Chomsky, and my interest in language is from a psychological, rather than biological, level of abstraction. So, in terms of semiotics, information theory, and information philosophy:
1) Language is a code (specific and structured data) consisting of a set of symbols having paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations, hence; semantic content.
2) Communication is data encoding, messaging, and decoding.
Obviously, I agree that language is not communication.
Language encoding and decoding are syntactic mental actions which are part of verbal communication. Thoughts and affect may also be communicated non-verbally.
It's important to recognise a distinction between nonverbal communication using vocalisations (signals) and verbal communication using language. A vocalisation is not necessarily a phoneme (speech sound, or symbol).
Based on anthropological evidence of skull capacity (probable brain volume), semiotician Thomas Sebeok thinks that language developed as a mute (unable to encode speech) mental modelling system (an evolutionary adaptation) in Homo habilis, and that speech derived from language (an evolutionary exaptation) in Homo sapiens.
Quoting Sebeok, Thomas Albert. 2001. Signs: An Introduction To Semiotics. Canada: University of Toronto Press. p.136.
Maybe leave your armchair psychoanalysing in the bin by the door where it belongs? No, my animus against Chomsky is simply that he's set the field of linguistics backwards by an order of literal decades, and we're only just beginning to emerge from the choking haze from which he conjured. I see no reason to pussyfoot around with niceties when more than 30 years of misdirected research has lead to utter intellectual disaster. We would not have left the Chomskian paradigm behind early enough if we started from tomorrow. As for politics, I have nothing but sheer admiration for him on that score, so you can bin your ruminations on that front too.
I have nothing to say about the continual comparison between walking and talking that you keep bringing up insofar as it bears precisely on nothing of importance here; again, the question is not about innateness or not, but over the mechanisms by which 'innateness' is cashed out. If you're incapable of having a discussion at that level, then we've nothing to discuss. And the analogizing to Larmack and so on are not worth engaging either; the issues involved are empirical and technical, and have nothing to do with superficial comparisons over personalities. And anyone who thinks that the sheer fact of punctuated equilibrium offers any licence at all to the otherwise utterly evidence-lacking idea that language just popped-out whole cloth from a misty period of anthropogenic history has forfeit their right to speak about the evolution of anything whatsoever.
Language, as a system of thought, is used all the time. We're always talking to ourselves, as I mentioned.
Quoting Brett
When did I say it's "used rarely"? Communication is used rarely, yes. In my view, language and communication are not the same thing.
Yes, that's correct. What I mean by "system of thought" is one aspect of what we call "thinking." As I mentioned, we talk to ourselves constantly. Are you not thinking when you talk to yourself? I would say you are, but I wouldn't say that's the only form of thinking.
Quoting Noble Dust
You're right, "system of thought" is rather vague, but that's because we understand very little about "thought" in general. Rotating an object in your mind's eye, which we can all do, doesn't necessarily involve language, for example. I know of some people who claim language and thought are the same thing, but almost no one who claims language (manifested in this case in just "talking to oneself") is entirely separate from thinking. So I say that language is one system of thought, one expression of thought.
Communication is something done with the sensorimotor system and is secondary.
I think commands, exclamations, etc. are social actions. Propositional language is a fusion of vocalization and just plain navigation through the world and the learning that follows. When you ask a question, your behavior is like looking or trying to hear. If you answer a question, you're taking the role the surrounding environment would to a seeker, whether that seeker is a tetrapod or a single-celled creature whose "seeking" is equivalent to chemical reactions.
Those chemical reactions evolved into propositional language that might have seemed to earlier humans as the voice of the divine. Some study (can't remember where I saw this) showed that the language centers of the brain become active when a person is experiencing things like the sight of objects.
The time frame Chomsky is pointing to coincides with an episode of dramatic change in human culture. There have been efforts to find a genetic change to explain it (unrelated to Chomsky or language). I don't think to date a genetic change has been discovered. All we know is that something happened that changed us from something not much more sophisticated than our neanderthal cousins into what we are now. It's not bizarre to expect that linguistic changes happened at the same time, maybe from a preceding proto language?
I disagree. In fact, it's very hard to see how the capacity for language -- a digital infinite system -- could have evolved slowly. You don't go from one word to an infinite number of words in gradual steps. The language capacity evolved through some sort of rewiring of the brain, no doubt, but it's more likely this happened in an individual 200,000 or so years ago.
I don't agree with that. A bees waggle dance is in no way "language," unless, as I stated earlier, you adhere to the belief that language is communication. I'm in no way convinced by that.
That's fine. I'd be interested in hearing why you think that then.
What utterly contingent aspects of language? What Chomsky is referring to with universal grammar is almost trivial, and should be uncontroversial, but has been consistently misunderstood. He's saying there's a genetic component to the language capacity, on par with the mammalian visual capacity. That's not an amazing insight.
I agree there are aspects of Platonism involved, which Chomsky himself acknowledges as "Plato's problem" and discussed in the Meno. I don't see what's theistic about that.
Unfortunately, much of what you cite gets Chomsky completely wrong. To take one example:
"Further, because Chomsky has pronounced that language did not evolve"
Just this alone goes to show they've never read a word of Chomsky. Of course language evolved. It's difficult to see, however, how it evolved incrementally. So yes, it's possible that it appeared in one human a couple of hundred thousand years ago. Hence the sudden explosion of creativity that's seen at this time.
I would suggest reading anything by Chomsky rather than taking the word of these authors. I can't see how anyone remotely familiar with Chomsky believes this nonsense. For example:
"Talk of linguistic universals has given cognitive scientists the impression that languages are all built to a common pattern. In fact, there are vanishingly few universals of language in the direct sense that all languages exhibit them. Instead, diversity can be found at almost every level of linguistic organization. This fundamentally changes the object of enquiry from a cognitive science perspective."
This has nothing to do with UG. Absolutely nothing. Of course there's an enormous range of language diversity.
More:
"A widespread assumption among cognitive scientists, growing out of the generative tradition in linguistics, is that all languages are English-like, but with different sound systems and vocabularies. "
Utter nonsense.
"The claims of Universal Grammar, we will argue, are either empirically false, unfalsifiable, or misleading in that they refer to tendencies rather than strict universals."
If the language capacity is shared by all human beings -- in fact essentially defines human beings as a property -- and no other organism has this capacity, then there is certainly a unique genetic structure underlying it. How this can even be disputed or controversial is mind-boggling.
As far as the Piraha language: here's a good response:
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/362672
You misunderstand - Chomsky et. al. effectively say that the FLN ('faculty of language in the narrow sense', which includes only recursion and nothing else) should not be considered to be adaptive. They want instead to insist that it is exaptive - it evolved for some other, entirely unspecified, entirely speculative, and entirely theoretically unsubstantiated purpose. Literally, they throw out a few half-hearted guesses ("If, however, one entertains the hypothesis that recursion evolved to solve other computational problems such as navigation, number quantification, or social relationships, then it is possible that other animals have such abilities") without providing a single rationale whatsoever for why it would have done so in any of these cases. Not even an undergraduate would get away with such a hand-wavy, completely unargued-for line of reasoning. And these guys supposed to be world-class experts. It's embarrassing. But they're not done. But that's just the first ridiculous line of non-argument.
The next utterly incredulous step they make is to say that having evolved for something else (who knows what or why?), this adaptation (which was decidedly not for language) became harnessed by humans for the purposes of language. How and why? Not. a. single. attempt. at. an. answer. Instead we get this shit: "During evolution, the modular and highly domain-specific system of recursion may have become penetrable and domain-general. This opened the way for humans, perhaps uniquely, to apply the power of recursion to other problems. This change from domain-specific to domain-general may have been guided by particular selective pressures, unique to our evolutionary past, or as a consequence (by-product) of other kinds of neural reorganization." (Quotes from "The Faculty of Language", Chomsky et. al.).
That's it. Literally this is a bunch of speculative conditionals stung together: "maybe this happened (how? no idea), and then once that happened, this other thing happened (how? No idea), and ta da! language." The linguist Daniel Dor comments: "Well, this is really not a solution. Not even a tentative one. There is nothing here but a weary and desperate attempt to keep the essence of language (whatever is left of it) in the realm of mystery—away from the domain of evolutionary explanation. Of course, capacities may evolve for one function and then be adapted for others, and they may also be by-products of other “kinds of neural reorganizations,” but in such processes the capacities evolve and change to fit their new functional contexts: they do not simply stay the same. What is even more problematic is the capacity itself that is thus salvaged from explanation." (Dor, The Instruction of the Imagination)
Or, to quote the evolutionary biologists Jablonka and Lamb: "There is no reason to doubt that combining several different preexisting faculties can lead to important and surprising evolutionary novelties. ... However, it is difficult to accept that an exquisite adaptive specialization like language is the result of emergence alone, without subsequent elaboration by natural selection. It is much more reasonable to adopt the traditional adaptive Darwinian explanation, which is that recruiting an existing system (such as the computational capacity of FLN) into a new functional framework (locomotion or communication) is followed by its gradual evolutionary refinement and adjustment within this new framework. One would expect the properties of FLN to become more adapted to the conceptual system, which would mean they would not be abstract and meaning-blind, as Chomsky’s UG theory says they are". (J&L, Evolution in Four Dimensions)
Like I said. Anyone who is takes science and evolution seriously simply cannot in the same breath take Chomsky seriously. That's the stark choice to be made - either Chomsky, or evolutionary science. To quote Dor once again: "After fifty years of research, all that is left is the original assumption of infinite generativity... This is a philosophical assumption, actually a religious assumption, that goes against the very idea of science. In this sense, the series of articles by Hauser, Chomsky, and Fitch might be more favorably read as joint statements of resignation: we have tried to find common ground between linguistics and evolutionary science; as far as the periphery of language is concerned, we believe there is no real problem; at its core, however, language still seems to defy the mode of explanation that is at the core of evolutionary theory; maybe, only maybe, what we believe about the core of language might be reconciled with something at the periphery of evolutionary theory; but beyond that, we really have nothing to offer."
Less vitriol may help back up your position. I’m extremely suspicious when someone wholeheartedly dismisses an extremely prominent figure in any field. Anyway, I’ll read the papers when I have time.
In terms of genetics what I’ve stated is true. That is not ‘evidence’ merely a possibility. Many people laughed at and mocked McClintock, then several decades later handed her a Nobel Prize for precisely what her colleagues refused to take seriously.
I’m not denying that many assumptions based on Chomsky’s ideas have been brought into serious question. It is not the case that his ideas haven’t profited the field of linguistics though - that isn’t something I can get my head around. He wasn’t doing alchemy.
“The language is “unique” because of the publicity it has received and the extravagant claims that have been made about it. Apart from that, it is very much like many other languages, as has been shown by careful scholarship. As a matter of simple logic, it would be impossible for the language to contradict any theory of mine, even if the claims about the language were true. The reason is simple: these theories have to do with the faculty of language, the basis for acquiring and using individual languages. That has always been clear, explicit, and unambiguous. The speakers of Pirahã share the common human language faculty; they are fluent speakers of Portuguese. That ends the discussion.
The primary claim of “uniqueness” is that Pirahã lacks recursion, which is, plainly, a core property of the human faculty of language. Suppose that the claim about Pirahã were true (apparently not). That would be a curiosity, but nothing more. Similarly, if some tribe were found in which people wear a patch over one eye and hence do not use binocular vision, it would tell us nothing at all about the human faculty of vision.”
https://www.lavocedinewyork.com/en/2016/10/04/chomsky-we-are-not-apes-our-language-faculty-is-innate/
For anyone curious.
Yes. He took one step forward beyond Skinner's rightly pilloried behaviorist approach and rather immediately 50 steps backwards by devising a pseudo-solution (UG) so incredulous that it's a mark of shame on anyone who takes it seriously. A cognitive (asocial), ahistorical, and evolutionarily incompatible theory of language? Like, it's basically UFOlogy.
I’ll read those papers carefully. If you have any other suggestions I’d appreciate any other links you’d care to provide - if you’re so adamant about this I’m intrigued.
Of course it was adaptive. Who's arguing the FLN isn't adaptive? How else would we be here speaking right now?
Quoting StreetlightX
Which they're not making. Chomsky has never claimed the FLN is not adaptive. There were obvious evolutionary benefits, hence why it spread in the population. What you're arguing against is the fact that neither Chomsky nor myself believes the current property we have, the language faculty, evolved gradually. True, that is a dogma in evolutionary biology. But there's little evidence to suggest it happened with language, and it's hard to see how.
Quoting StreetlightX
True, but that's because the premise is so incoherent as to be embarrassing. It's also, of course, a figment of your imagination. Please cite some passages - you have not earned the benefit of the doubt as interpreter.
Quoting StreetlightX
Which is, not surprisingly, completely out of context. What Chomsky attributes to the "FLN" is Merge, in his most recent work, and that's what is being claimed here as well in the "Faculty of Language" Science article. I quote the abstract:
"We hypothesize that FLN only includes recursion and is the only uniquely human component of the faculty of language. We further argue that FLN may have evolved for reasons other than language, hence comparative studies might look for evidence of such computations outside of the domain of communication (for example, number, navigation, and social relations)."
Notice the "may have evolved" part. Yes, that's a proposal for further hypothesizing and research. They go on for a number of pages explaining just what is meant. You seem to have ignored that.
I'm not sure where your hostility towards Chomsky's ideas comes from, but regardless, it's unfortunately clouding your judgment. Even if he's completely wrong, so what? Then show it and move on. To say he's kept the field back is a complete joke. His views on how language evolved -- which is what seems to be especially troubling you--are, by his own admission, minority views in the field of linguistics and evolutionary biology.
Er, Chomsky: "If FLN is indeed this restricted, this hypothesis has the interesting effect of nullifying the argument from design, and thus rendering the status of FLN as an adaptation open to question. Proponents of the idea that FLN is an adaptation would thus need to supply additional data or arguments to support this viewpoint.” Direct quote from the FoL paper, accessable here. [pdf]
If the only operation in FLN is the operation that appears in every computational system ["Merge"], and if it's a fact at some point in evolutionary history humans got the capacity for unbounded computation, then at the very least they had to have this minimal computational operation (Merge), and if they only have this (and the general principle of keeping computation efficient), then the story of acquisition is already over.
I would argue those are certainly outliers and use rather thoroughly debunked arguments.
Paraphrased: "FLN must have been evolutionarily acquired because FLN must have been evolutionarily acquired".
Adaptation in the sense of a property that's gradually evolved through natural selection, yes. But that's different from the claim this property isn't adaptive in the sense that it provides an evolutionary advantage, which seems to be what you were saying.
Not at all. We already have this property. You would agree, I think, that it did come from somewhere, correct?
Notice the "if" in my statement. What part is controversial? We have language, language has x property, and thus at some point in time we acquired x. That's not tautological.
"All approaches agree that a core property of FLN is recursion, attributed to narrow syntax in the conception just outlined. FLN takes a finite set of elements and yields a potentially infinite array of discrete expressions. This capacity of FLN yields discrete infinity (a property that also characterizes the natural numbers)."
Is this where the problem lies? I don't see anything unclear or slippery about this proposal.
It's worth noting that Chomsky's response here is a straightforward admission of unfalsifiability. Quite literally, not a single piece of empirical evidence - of language-as-actually-spoken - would be able to contradict his theories. Insofar as he's dealing with the 'faculty' and hence potential for language, no actual use of language could, even in principle, bring the theory into question. This is the very definition of unscientific. The choice again remains: either Chomsky, or science.
I understand that you’re saying we’re able to pick up language and that is ‘proof’ enough. I guess the counter argument is that ‘language’ isn’t as much an item as we assume it to be and that overtime we ‘created’ language via other innate capacities (yet such capacities are apparently not ‘language’ merely innate capacities - which takes me back to legs and walking).
This takes me back to an item that seems to have been willfully ignored. How is it that a 27 year old man with no ‘language’ managed to acquire language? He lived in human society, had a job and functioned without a language. He was deaf and his friends would play out stories physically - miming - and each would take turns and add a little more on to the previous performance. They had no language but they could exchange snippets of memories and information.
Another thing to consider is how language affects our sense of time. People in Sicily were considered more ‘childish’ due to living more or less for the day - lack of long term planning. A linguist noted that the dialect of Sicilians made sparse use of future tense. Does planned action create more complex grammar or does some ‘innate grammar’ create the ability for more planned action? Is they any real distinction here or are we asking the wrong kind of questions?
Nonsense. It's a matter, as he points out, of logic. Let's read it again in its entirety (italics mine):
“The [Piraha] language is “unique” because of the publicity it has received and the extravagant claims that have been made about it. Apart from that, it is very much like many other languages, as has been shown by careful scholarship. As a matter of simple logic, it would be impossible for the language to contradict any theory of mine, even if the claims about the language were true. The reason is simple: these theories have to do with the faculty of language, the basis for acquiring and using individual languages. That has always been clear, explicit, and unambiguous. The speakers of Pirahã share the common human language faculty; they are fluent speakers of Portuguese. That ends the discussion."
So "not a single piece of empirical evidence of language-as-actually-spoken" already assumes a language. Furthermore, it doesn't have to be "spoken" at all. Wherever there's language, then theories about language applies. Where there isn't language -- like say the how trees "communicate" to one another, or about plate tectonics, then Chomsky's ideas don't apply. Or to make it more concrete: theories of the visual systems don't apply to creatures lacking such a system (in this case, eyes). That's a simple matter of logic, not an empirical claim that's "unfalsifiable." If you can find a human being, or any other animal, that can do what we're doing right now -- that would falsify the claim that language is uniquely human, which is indeed an empirical claim and one Chomsky has made for 70 years.
Lastly:
"The primary claim of “uniqueness” is that Pirahã lacks recursion, which is, plainly, a core property of the human faculty of language. Suppose that the claim about Pirahã were true (apparently not). That would be a curiosity, but nothing more. Similarly, if some tribe were found in which people wear a patch over one eye and hence do not use binocular vision, it would tell us nothing at all about the human faculty of vision."
We have the ability to either create language from some faculty or we’re born with a faculty to create language - what’s the difference? If we’re to define language as necessarily requiring ‘syntax and grammar’ then we have our answer (or rather, the question then becomes ‘what is syntax and grammar’?)
Maybe we just need to rethink how we define ‘language’?
Agreed.
Quoting I like sushi
What do you mean by "isn't as much an item"?
Quoting I like sushi
Of course he had language. Who's saying he had "no language" and then, at 27, acquired it? That's in fact extremely rare, if not impossible. There does seem to be a certain formative period for language acquisition in early development.
To say people that sign, or mime, don't have language is just misguided. Quoting I like sushi
How language effects thought and our views of the world is, of course, a well known area of discussion. I don't think the questions are wrong, but the answers so far have been trivial.
It blew my mind when I heard about this too. It’s no joke. Have a look, just search The Man with no Language.
It’s tough to know what’s what, and then question said ‘knowing’ :D
I just had a brief look, but I can tell already that it's not rigorous enough. Studying human beings without language is very interesting, but we have to be very careful before we throw out a widely held idea (for good reasons). One case study doesn't doesn't quite cut it. But I'll take a look at it. Maybe it does show that there's no critical period -- I'm not married to the idea, just very cautious, as it tends to make good sense.
Some criticism just from a Wikipedia search: "The process of Ildefonso's language acquisition and his lingusitic skills are described unsystematically and anecdotally, if at all. Instead of data, [Schaller] presents many emotional intuitions and wild guesses about Ildefonso's 'languageless' mental word. Thus the claims made by the author in relation to language (acquisition) in Ildefonso do not have a sound empirical basis. [...] given the poor documentation of Ildefonso's language skills and the contradictory information on his linguistic, social, and communicative background, there is no other choice than to treat [Schaller's] book with a maximum of caution." Language Vol. 68, No. 3 (Sep., 1992), pp. 664-665
And many dogmas too, yes.
Also, are you familiar with the tadoma method for there deafblind? People can get a complex understanding of language from this. It's never been shown to work for those who lost sight and hearing before the age of about 18 months. Indirect evidence like this is persuasive.
What are you basing this on?
Firstly, our capacity for language is not infinite. The number of possible sequences of sounds we can make is infinite, but we cannot sounds indefinitely. We acquire shared language at a limited rate, and we have a limited capacity to store information pertaining to language (the idea-symbol relationships encoded in the brain).
Secondly, words and language as we know them aren't the only kind of communication. As evolving social animals, our distant ancestors (the tree of hominids we're related to, and beyond) have been refining language capacity for eons. The cortical language centers of the brain don't need auditory information to do language processing, it's just a quicker and easier way to make more language signs than hand movements. This is why deaf people have sign languages that have nothing to do with sound or spoken words whatsoever (their brains repurpose the unused cortical space to do more visual processing (along with other sensory data).
Canines also have language processing centers in their brains; they're less powerful versions of us, and they cannot do vocalizations like us, but if they could you would be surprised how coherent they can be.
We've been eugenically selecting dogs that are able to understand us (at least to some extent), so it's not surprising that they're capable of performing basic feats of language.
You may want to conclude that if we can set dogs down the vocal language road in just a few thousand years of artificial selection, this is evidence of the sudden emergence of communication skills in our ancestral homonids, but we could also interpret this as evidence that the basic language and communication structures are far more ancient (and have been cooking for far longer) than Chomsky wants to reckon.
A sudden "re-wiring of the brain in an individual" is incredibly fantastical. It's entirely possible that a small adaptation which enhanced language capacity snowballed as the mutation spread and refined, but this optimization would be gradual (and is in fact still occurring to this day). Some people are born with cognitive profiles that are better or worse at language processing (for example, Autism has been linked with topological brain differences, and plausibly corresponding differences in cognitive profile, such as the trend of increased spatial reasoning capacity, and reduced social and linguistic capacities).
There is no miraculous infinite language capacity, just a varying spectra of complex learning structures, all of which take ages to emerge, optimize, and evolve. The emergence of dynamic vocal chords probably played a role in the rapid optimization of preexisting communication faculties (toward,for example, increased vocabulary capacity), but this too would have occurred gradually.
I also want to caution that the speculative side of Chomsky's linguistics is only part of it – the part that's been most influential in linguistics is the application of new (in the mid-20th c.) mathematical tools to the practice of writing explicit 'generative' grammars, which is more like a formal science and has been enormously fruitful.
I'm also not sure that thinking about language in terms of its 'purpose,' communication or otherwise, is helpful. There is probably no well-defined 'purpose' for which it arose.
I have no particular sympathy with Chomsky on this line (I don't study this, or much care one way or the other), but to demand just-so stories at this stage, and reject a hypothesis on account of having agnostic elements seems to me not to be a good idea. What details we demand depends on the state of our knowledge, which at present is too poor to demand fully worked-out stories.
I don't know how many times I have to say this: this is not a debate over whether or not we inherit certain predispositions for language. That we do is, I agree, undeniable. But this is not what is at issue. The relevant question is what is inherited, and how this inheritance (which magically evolved) functions to underpin the FLN. Chomsky offers not a single biological mechanism that would meet these two criteria, other than to handwave some kind of evolutionary exaptation as a promissory note in its place. This is like trying to say that we've inherited the ability to walk without talking about legs and gravity, and then, to add insult to injury, further speculating that we may never know what allows us to walk, other than to note that we possess 'the faculty' for it. It's so incredibly stupid that anyone who who even feels a jot of sympathy for Chomsky should feel their intelligence insulted.
It should further be noted that the 'faculty' in question is quite precisely defined by Chomsky as the FLN, which "comprises only the core computational mechanisms of recursion as they appear in narrow syntax and the mappings to the interfaces". That's it. If you're wondering out loud if the faulty is some manner of ability to utilize 'syntax and grammar', you're not discussing Chomsky but something else totally irrelevant. Chomsky's proposal is at once very specific (it's the FLN, which is comprised of recursion, exclusively), and entirely undertheorized (how is it inherited, and how does it function?: NFI). If you're not dealing with that specificity, you're not dealing with Chomsky.
Yes. That is basically why I am baffled by Streetlight’s comment.
What are you even talking about? Fuel? Coffee? Engines? Be specific, or don't bother. The charge of unfalsifiability in response to Chomsky's own response to the Pirahã is not mine alone, but well acknowledged among those who follow this stuff. Here are Tomasello and Ibbotson: "Chomsky tried to define the components of the essential tool kit of language—the kinds of mental machinery that allow human language to happen. Where counterexamples have been found, some Chomsky defenders have responded that just because a language lacks a certain tool—recursion, for example—does not mean hat it is not in the tool kit. In the same way, just because a culture lacks salt to season food does not mean salty is not in its basic taste repertoire. Unfortunately, this line of reasoning makes Chomsky’s proposals difficult to test in practice, and in places they verge on the unfalsifiable".
But the claims about Pirahã are false anyway.
Except it's far from merely 'agnostic'. It's committed to a particular view in which evolutionary gradualism is ruled out in favour of a kind of linguistic evolutionary catastrophism. And of course, what motivates this is not a shred of empirical evidence (other than the mere possibility of sharp evolutionary breaks as demonstrated in other wholly unrelated domains) but an a priori theoretical commitment to cutting langauge off from all history and all society so as to make it a wholly cognitive phenomenon. History, evolution, and society are all incredibly inconvenient for the thesis, so they get nothing but the most cursory and mind-bogglingly parsed-down treatment as could be possible.
Quoting Snakes Alive
This is hilarious. Insofar as Chomsky's program is so disconnected from reality that is only deals with postulated potentials, the only apparent way to falsify it is to show that a potential does not exist. And of course, if never manifests in actual fact, the Chomskite simply falls back on the completely convenient idea that because it's just a potential, you wouldn't be able to observe it anyway. Self-insulating, pseudo-scientific trash.
Well guess what. I have the potential to turn anything I touch into gold. Only, the only way for you to falsify this, is to prove that this potential does not exist. Until then, you're just going to have to assume that I can do exactly this.
Finally, you'll understand if I take unsubstantiated claims from internet randos that 'claims about Pirahã are false anyway' with a grain of salt.
Sure, I agree. It's a substantive speculative hypothesis. Maybe it's crazy – but I think crazy hypotheses are still fair game, while the field is open.
Quoting StreetlightX
When you don't know what's happened, you often start off by fielding possibilities, and asking what would have to be true for them to hold up. Later, when you know more, you can see how the speculations hold up. Refusing to entertain the possibilities off the bat isn't a good idea.
Quoting StreetlightX
Can you reexplain in your own words what Chomsky's objection was, or can you repeat back to me my construal of it? I ask because I can't tell from this post whether you understand the objection. If you don't, then your anger may be due to a misunderstanding.
It is when the price to pay for it is so incredibly high. Hewing to Chomsky's linguistic program means disregarding history, society, child development, evolution, anthropology, and all the rest of it. This follows from his construal of language as a wholly cognitive phenomenon, utterly disconnected from function. It's like saying that intelligent design ought to be entertained as a research program because hey, let a thousand theoretical flowers bloom. Well sure, but relegate it to a basement where cranks can do as they like.
The funny thing is that as it's become clearer and clearer just how ridiculous Chomsky's ideas have been - even to Chomsky himself - it's actual content has become thinner and thinner as all the various proposals for what once counted as 'universal' have been dropped, one by one, by Chomsky himself. The whole principles and parameters framework? Gone. To the point where the only thing left standing is the thin gruel of 'recursion', which itself is utterly controversial. Hence the so called 'minimalist program', which is nothing but an admission of total defeat and an attempt to salvage the wreck that is the generative grammar program.
Quoting Snakes Alive
I've made my point twice, and even quoted other authors on it. If you still don't get it, then the problem lies elsewhere.
Chomsky does not claim that language is disconnected from these things. He thinks it has a different relation to them, to be sure, but the idea that being a Chomskyan involves wholesale 'disregarding' them is not plausible. Or at least, it would take a huge amount of argument not present in this thread.
Quoting StreetlightX
I don't understand – is the Chomskyan program non-empirical and unfalsifiable, or is it controversial and flying the face of empirical evidence? Surely it can't be both? This is the problem, when we don't stop to clarify what it is we take ourselves to be attacking.
Quoting StreetlightX
I don't want to know what you said – I want to know what Chomsky said. What, in your own words, is Chomsky's objection? Not a criticism of it – a statement of the position itself.
It seems you're simply not familiar with what you're talking about, which of course, you admitted, but this is where it starts to matter: the whole point of the generative grammar program is to discover the principles of linguistic competence - these principles are meant to be transhistoric and transcultural, so much so that, as our friend the threadstarter seems to celebrate, not even communication ought to be taken into account. In fact the principles are meant to be so abstract, that they are meant to have no relation to meaning at all. They are meant to be entirely syntactical, shorn of any semantic relevance. I mean, this is simply built-in to the program. To the degree that there have been Comskities who try to bring history and culture back into it - and there have been - it's largely been an exercise in retro-fitting and hand-waving; not unlike intelligent design arguments in the face of evolutionary ones.
So no, I don't take your ignorance on the matter as an index of what Chomsky's program entails.
Quoting Snakes Alive
I'm not restating shit. If you have an issue with what I said, tell me what it is. I'm not here to entertain you.
I've already told you what my issue is, though, twice – I can't tell from what you've written whether you understand Chomsky's objection, and so I can't address what you say until I know whether you do, and if you don't understand it, what you don't understand.
That's why I've asked you to tell me, in your own words, what it is Chomsky is objecting to with the Pirahã case, and why.
––––
So let's suppose you're not willing to do this – I don't know why, or why you're so angry at me. I'll give it a shot as to what I think, based on what you've said, you don't understand. Chomsky's hypothesis is about a language faculty present in human beings, not about the features of a particular language. Therefore, a particular language lacking a certain quality cannot, in principle, act as evidence against it. This is, in my own words, what I think Chomsky was saying.
Now, you've said this renders the theory unfalsifiable. But that is not right – it does rule out a specific kind of data as irrelevant to it, but this is true of all theories! They are relevant to some things, and not to others. The target of falsification has therefore been misunderstood. What would have been relevant to falsifying it would have been facts about Pirahã speakers, and their inability to learn a recursive language, not facts about the Pirahã language. This doesn't make the hypothesis unfalsifiable – it just clarifies what it is about. The reason that I wanted you to restate Chomsky's position to me, before saying this, is that perhaps you already understand this, and don't need to be told. But I can't tell from what you've said whether this is so, because your criticisms do not unambiguously evince an understanding of this point.
–––––
I also need to stress, again – the Pirahã claims are not even true! The language does have recursive structures, some of which are documented in Everett's own work. It's important to keep that in mind.
Sure, and this is what I addressed: by so sharply demarcating the 'faculty' of language (as a 'basis for acquiring and using individual languages') from actual language use, evidence now has to bear on a potential (a 'faculty'). But by doing this, by 'changing the target of falsification' from actual language use to a sheer potential, this effectively translates to unfalsifiability. Why? Because you can't test for the absence of potential (/of a faculty), only a presence. Both the absence and presence of a potential 'look' exactly the same. The only thing you can test for is actual language use, and all that can confirm, trivially, is that the potential for something is there (just in case where the actual capacity is manifested). And of course, if recursion does not show in actual language-use, one simply says: 'ah but the potential is there, what actually happens is irrelavent'. This is Chomsky's 'rebuttal'.
Like I said, it's as if I were to claim that I have the 'faculty' for my touch to turn things into gold, but that, just because you don't see me turning things into gold, this doesn't mean I don't have the potential to. I simply have the faculty to turn things into gold ('the basis for turning things into gold with my touch') - your empirical evidence be damned.
Sounds like that is almost a reductive scientific approach. Limited, yes. Redundant?
Gradualism or otherwise isn’t really an issue for me tbh as I don’t see a meaning of determining one over the other, nor do I believe there is necessarily one over the other and it’s likely down to how we currently delineate between items of interest. I’m not one for applying Occam’s Razor to highly complex phenomena.
Is your view VERY basically that language is a more or less a circumstance of other human facilities?
But this is just not true. For example, exposing a chimp to Portuguese will not result in the chimp learning it; but exposing a Pirahã person to it does result in them learning it in the normal way. The presence or absence of a potential is revealed when, under the hypothesized conditions, it actualizes or fails to actualize.
What conditions? That's the nub: Chomsky's 'conditions' amount to 'is human + has evolved'. Why and how? No answer. It's arbitrary, unscientific nonsense.
What you quoted was just the more general point, though – clearly the issue can't be that something appeals to potentials or dispositions. There would be little science without such appeals.
That would be a great answer if Chomsky was not famous for entirely disregading linguisitc development in children, because that's precisely the kind of thing GG is designed to exclude from relevance.
Again, it really helps to actually know the position you're meant to be defending.
Generative grammar has always had an interest in linguistic acquisition. Chomsky's whole schtick has always been explanatory adequacy, that is that grammars should reflect the way languages develop in children (not only that they reflect the empirical facts of adult language use). In fact the entire point of postulating UG to begin with was as a means to explain child language acquisition.
And in fact looking only at 'actual language use' prevents one from talking about this explanatory adequacy, because actual use will be consistent with any number of grammars, and the actual use of the language in its developed state is consistent with any number of hypotheses about how that state comes to be in the child.
Chomsky's interest in developmental studies have always been limited to confirming his a priori theories, which of course, they consistently fail to do, requiring all sorts of curve-fitting to make them hold up:
"A key flaw in Chomsky’s theories is that when applied to language learning, they stipulate that young children come equipped with the capacity to form sentences using abstract grammatical rules. (The precise ones depend on which version of the theory is invoked.) Yet much research now shows that language acquisition does not take place this way. Rather young children begin by learning simple grammatical patterns; then, gradually, they intuit the rules behind them bit by bit.
...The main response of universal grammarians to such findings is that children have the competence with grammar but that other factors can impede their performance and thus both hide the true nature of their grammar and get in the way of studying the “pure” grammar posited by Chomsky’s linguistics. Among the factors that mask the underlying grammar, they say, include immature memory, attention and social capacities.
As with the retreat from the cross-linguistic data and the tool-kit argument, the idea of performance masking competence is also pretty much unfalsifiable. Retreats to this type of claim are common in declining scientific paradigms that lack a strong empirical base—consider, for instance, Freudian psychology and Marxist interpretations of history.
... Even beyond these empirical challenges to universal grammar, psycholinguists who work with children have difficulty conceiving theoretically of a process in which children start with the same algebraic grammatical rules for all languages and then proceed to figure out how a particular language - whether English or Swahili— connects with that rule scheme. Linguists call this conundrum the linking problem, and a rare systematic attempt to solve it in the context of universal grammar was made by Harvard University psychologist Steven Pinker for sentence subjects. Pinker’s account, however, turned out not to agree with data from child development studies or to be applicable to grammatical categories other than subjects. And so the linking problem—which should be the central problem in applying universal grammar to language learning—has never been solved or even seriously confronted." (source)
Seriously, the Chomskian response to reality not fitting the theories has been to claim that reality is not good enough. Bullshit at every turn.
The article you linked to is...well, embarrassing, frankly. It seems to imply, early on, that Chomskyans thought that a universal grammar literally meant that all the world's languages had a structure similar to the European languages the researchers spoke (not only is this not true, but Chomsky was a scholar of Hebrew, a Semitic language, and generativists were early on studying languages like Japanese – that languages existed in a wide variety was utterly common knowledge, of which everyone was aware, including him and the other generativists!) The article also repeats the myth about Pirahã.
You should know you're not getting a good depiction of your purported ideological opponent, and you should know this because if you want to criticize something, you have an interest that it's represented accurately to you.
:up:
Yes. Chomsky developed his views at a time when computational reductionism was all the rage, and when AI was thought to be just around the corner, and that intelligence would yield if we just learnt how to manipulate symbols better. It was outdated at the time of its incipience, and it's the equivalent of an intellectual zombie as it stands today.
Quoting I like sushi
I don't know what 'human facilities' are meant to be, but I do believe that language must be studied in the context of it's history, development, and socio-cultural specificities, along with it's biological and cognitive aspects. I believe in a kind of wholism and embeddedness of language, if it could be put that way. The exact opposite, that is, of the Chomskian program which seeks to isolate, dehistoricize, desocialize, and place language under the air-tight seal of a hermeticism for nothing more than ideological prejudice.
Of course. I’ve never read her book and she openly admits that her method wasn’t scientific and that she is no linguist. Nevertheless I have looked at various accounts of this and I don’t believe this is a made up story at all - too many people verify the account. The main critique I’ve seen is some kind of attempt to parcel off ‘deafness’ as some contributor to this? Something also done in regard to the language created by deaf Nicaraguan children.
When it comes to language I’m much more interested in more obscure ideas and thoughts involving comparisons with various seemingly unconnected fields of interest. How/Why human languages evolved the way they evolved is interesting to speculate over, but I don’t find it anywhere near as interesting as several other items of neurogenesis (my opinion is that the question over such distinctions is too simplistically formed).
I mostly agree with this, and I'm sympathetic with the idea that patterns seen across the world's languages can't be explained without reference to historical facts – it seems to me that a lot of the distribution of grammatical structures is a historical accident, albeit often a 'deep' one rooted thousands of years in the past. Why do so many Austronesian languages have a certain article system, for example? Yes, a synchronic psychological account can tell us how it is possible, or plausible, for a language to adopt such a thing, but the sample of languages we have is just a 'random' historical sample that happened upon a bunch of clusters of features in different families, decided some thousands of years ago – and we do not know what an 'alternate history' would look like, and what it would tell us about human language capacity.
But as it stands, this is just a heuristic dislike of the flavor of a research program, based on (it looks like, inaccurate) reports about it from its ideological opponents (ideological opponents, in general, cannot be trusted to report the theories of their adversaries!). Flavors and heuristics are just not what we decide these things based off, and what one 'favors' is not particularly interesting in the long run.
I agree. I imagine we disagree about the use of parcelling off certain areas for focus study. The major problem above is how we then distinguish between terms like ‘socio-cultural’ and ‘biological’.
At the end of the day we need people like yourself and hardcore ‘Chomskyans’ - I just feel, like Pinker stated in the article above, it’s a lot of noise over nothing much at all.
Hey, don't take its word for it. Here it is from the horse's mouth: "According to Chomsky, a visiting Martian scientist would surely conclude that aside from their mutually unintelligible vocabularies, Earthlings speak a single language" (Pinker). Like, this is simply a preposterous statement on the face of it, and the only way to understand how anyone could hold such a view is to recognise the grip of ideology at work. This is the kind of rubbish one can come up with when one hews to Chomskian views on language, one that requires one to ignore an ocean of cognitive dissonance. In the face of this kind of tripe, one has to wonder, who exactly is being hyperbolic?
And you really need to drop the idea that Chomskian linguistics is scientific. It's simply not. It's self-immunizing against all counter-evidence, and its empirical basis is limited to nothing other than sheer speculation. It's creationism in the realm of linguistic theory.
This is just an ideological screed.
You.
Quoting fresco
Quoting fresco
If what we call “ language” in other species is really instinctive behaviour, then could this not mean that thought is also an instinct of humans and language the evidence of that, just as the behaviour of bees is evidence of an instinctive behaviour towards a threat or building a hive.
Why is all thinking in humans not equal, why Einstein and those who produce concepts and thought experiments? Is it a big assumption and error to think that those thoughts are the same as the thoughts that go on all the time in our heads throughout the day? In those circumstances are we choosing to think or just responding instinctively like bees.
So our communication is no more special than that of bees. What I’d call “common thought” produces very little of significance, and our language just as limited in its use. So there’s nothing special about thought or language. I’m not even sure, as an instinct, that thought does us much good, or as much good as we expect from it.
So then, maybe language isn’t communication, that it’s not the way we should be communicating, that we have not evolved in the way we imagine we have.
Tim white asked if language is not communication then what is it? But isn’t the question then if language is not communication then what is the way we really communicate? Or are we really communicating at all?
If we could really communicate wouldn’t the world be a different place?
Language is a digital infinite system. Like the number system. You can create infinite expressions. This is so obvious to even point it out is stating a truism. Language is not sounds, nor did I ever claim that.
Quoting VagabondSpectre
When did I say language is the only form of communication? Quite the contrary.
Our species have not been refining "language capacity" at all. Our ancestors acquired this capacity at some point, of course. But there's no evidence to suggest it's changed since (and which you wouldn't expect given the short time scale). If you mean to say that forms of communication have changed over time, then yes that's obviously true. So what?
Quoting VagabondSpectre
Dogs do not have language. No one is arguing dogs have language. Yes, you can teach birds and dogs to vocalize in ways that sound like words, and you can teach chimps a few signs -- but none of them are capable of acquiring language. This has been tried in the case of chimps, and has failed. If it succeeded, it would have completely falsified Chomsky's claims.
Language is a human property and a "species property" in the sense that it's completely unique among living things. This is not a difficult or profound statement. It was acquired at some point in the past. Whether gradually or suddenly is up or debate and involves a lot of speculation which we can discuss. But let's at least be clear about what it is we're talking about.
I'll repeat once again: if you're defining language as simply another form of communication, then we're talking at cross purposes. Language, as a system of thought, can be communicated in various ways -- of course. But if it were simply a complex form of communication, there's very little reason why a primate couldn't learn to do what we're doing right now. They can't. Nor can any other species on earth. Furthermore, most of our "speaking" is, in a sense, to ourselves -- hence the notion of an "I-language." When I say "most," just introspect for a while: we're talking to ourselves all the time. How much of this gets communicated through speech, or sign, or writing, etc? Very little.
Yes, that's the dogma. But it's not true. The story of a "small adaptation" spreading and being refined is just as fantastical. It's like saying arithmetic developed by gradual steps. That's not the case. Either you have it or you don't. You don't go from 1 to the concept of infinity in a step-by-step manner. If one is a "just-so" story, or fantastical, so is the other. But given evidence for a burst in creativity a couple hundred thousand years or so ago, and given how small a timeframe that really is, it's hard to believe we gradually acquired our current capacity for language. To suggest it's "still occurring to this day" is absurd. I suppose our capacity for arithmetic is also evolving?
Before throwing around insults, try to demonstrate that you understand what you're discussing. What you've just described is such a strawman that anyone familiar with Chomsky or linguistics generally would consider it completely embarrassing.
You keep throwing around the "FLN" but then wonder about "what's inherited" and "how," which is perplexing. I'm almost certain that at this point your only contact with anything related to Chomsky is that one article in Science (yet it seems you've deemed the so-called "criticisms" of UG much more worthy of consumption). That's fine. But to feel entitled to throw around insults on this basis makes me think I'm completely wasting my time. Regardless, I'll respond more with other readers in mind.
The language faculty in the narrow sense. The core property here that Chomsky is proposing is Merge. That's what is uniquely human. This is, of course, a biological property on par with the visual system. It didn't "magically evolve." Any neurological reorganization that took place did so genetically, most likely through mutation. This involves the brain. Straightforward enough. Now compare your statement: "This is like trying to say that we've inherited the ability to walk without talking about legs and gravity". Yes, Chomsky and his adherents are so stupid as to believe humans' capacity for language is a miracle of God, or due to some other magic. Please shoot him an e-mail and inform him of his errors, by all means.
(2) Quoting StreetlightX
To quote the (apparently) one article you've deigned to read:
"The empirical study of the evolution of language is be set with difficulties. Linguistic behavior does not fossilize, and a long tradition of analysis of fossil skull shape and cranial endocasts has led to little consensus about the evolution of language (7, 9). A more tractable and, we think, powerful approach to problems of language evolution is provided by the comparative method, which uses empirical data from living species to draw detailed inferences about extinct ancestors (3, 10 –12). The comparative method was the primary tool used by Darwin (13, 14) to analyze evolutionary phenomena and continues to play a central role throughout modern evolutionary biology."
If the problem you're having is with the speculative aspects of how language evolved, fine. But neither Chomsky nor myself claim anything other than speculation. Your emotional response to this does show, indeed, how dogmatic gradualism has become. That's a shame.
Good advice. Although a simple understanding of what you're criticizing is good start too. So far I see no understanding whatsoever. I wouldn't mind the denunciations, but the complete ignorance is comedic. Although when someone is so emotional about an issue, it's usually a good sign they haven't a clue about what they're talking about. I see it a lot with climate change deniers and creationists as well. Lots of emotion, zero understanding.
Actually, yes we did...
Primitive number systems are very basic. They go something like "One, Two, Three, more than three, more than all my fingers and toes". Depending on our need for precision and high quantity arithmetic, it's not necessarily obvious at all, from the conceptual systems we use to perform it, that all the numbers between one and infinity exist..
Mathematics has evolved relatively slowly, as have our number systems. Children aren't born with inherent comprehension of arithmetic, and if we did not teach them our number system and the operations associated with it, they would likely have very limited capacity to perform arithmetic.
Quoting Xtrix
There's no creativity burst 100k years ago that I'm aware of...
But yes, we're still evolving, and yes, if there are selection forces favoring math or language skills, then the underlying genetic markers which yield those inherent capacities are still being optimized by the exploratory genetic algorithm that is sexual reproduction.
Given how much more important language and maths have suddenly become in our society, we really ought to expect that this strong change in selective forces is going to have ramifications on our genetic-adaptive trajectory in the near future. I could go into a lot more detail about neuro-diversity, and why it's an important adaptive component, but the fact that we're still evolving (including our mental faculties) is strictly factual.
Every human being has the capacity for arithmetic. There's little evidence that many primitive societies use it. The Babylonians had a sexagesimal number system - does this prove something about arithmetic? Having words or symbols is not the same thing as having the capacity to learn such things.
To argue that we gradually acquired the property of the infinite numeration by gradual steps is a contradiction. Not having words for "more than three, more than my fingers and toes" is not the point -- that's already an infinite system.
Quoting VagabondSpectre
There's no reason to believe we did, given what we have.
Quoting VagabondSpectre
Children are certainly born with a capacity for arithmetic. If not, how would you "teach them our number system" in the first place? It's like saying without learning the rules of grammar, children wouldn't learn language. It's absurd.
Humans are born with a capacity for arithmetic. They're born with a capacity for music. They're born with a capacity for language. They're born with the capacity to see and walk. There's something in our genetic endowment that allows for this. This is not controversial. This is precisely why they can learn calculus, music, and language - and other primates cannot. To argue otherwise is basically arguing we're tabula rasa, which isn't very convincing to say the least.
There's data involved, of course. Just as there is with light stimulation in early visual development. That's trivial.
Quoting VagabondSpectre
Well it's worth looking into.
Quoting VagabondSpectre
Utter nonsense, I'm afraid. In your sense the visual system is still evolving. Fine- maybe in a few million years it'll result in something radically different from what we have now. To argue our inherent genetic capacities for language is currently being changed from "selection forces" is on equal footing. And pretty embarrassing.
Unless you can get into our genome and find a way to manipulate it to our ends, the "selection pressures" of our modern world will not change our genetic capacities.
Except its not. The problem is that anyone who understands just how insane Chomsky's take on language is would be able to see the evolutionary problem for it coming from a mile away - by decoupling language from communication and making it a wholly cognitive faculty, Chomsky can't, by way of design - that is to say, prior and unemprically to any consideration of evidence - he can't have it so that language was in any way evolved by means natural selection. Which is of course exactly the position he is committed to.
Quite literally, he has to be committed, on pain of incoherence, to the insane idea that language initially evolved for means other than language. Which would be fine for a great deal of other exaptations, except that language is so incredibly specialized that the suggestion is pure madness. Not to mention that all exaptations that we are aware of were further subject to refinement by natural selection after that change in function - something else that Chomsky has to, and does in fact, deny. So we end up in this evolutionarily-nonsense position: language did not evolve via natural selection for any language- specific task, and once it came to be used for those tasks, it could not be subject to natural selection then either. It just popped into existence one fine day, and will remain the same forevermore.
If that isn't magic, I don't know what is. So yes, Chomsky and his adherents are so stupid as to believe humans' capacity for language is a miracle of God, or due to some other magic. And I don't need to write Chomsky a letter about this. Plenty of people have pointed out the madness to him already. I'm just relaying rather well established points.
And that's the thing: this is a problem specific to Chomsky's position, and not one facing evolutionary accounts of language in general. This insofar as most other, sane accounts, are not so idiotic as to make language nothing but a cognitive faculty unconnected with it's use, as language, among humans. And it should further be noted that those other accounts - I have in mind the work of Jablonka and Dor, Michael Tomasello, Terrance Deacon, Merlin Donald, and others - do and more importantly can say a great deal more than the trash that 'language popped into existence somehow somewhen because of totally unspecified changes to something somewhere probably genetic but we really have no idea, and then somehow somewhen probably started to be used by humans because no idea', because they are not theory-bound by utterly ridiculous ideas on language that make no evolutionary sense.
Chomsky's evolutionary incoherence is a feature, not a bug, of his position. It is purpose-built to be unamenable to any normal evolutionary account. Also, given that Chomsky basically forswore any discussion of the evolution of language up until his recent papers with Fitch and Hauser, it is littler wonder that I'm actually quoting the pitiful little he actually does have to say on the topic.
I don't understand why this is insane. Exaptation is normal. The exception clause that language is special makes no sense to me – it's 'specialized?' Huh?
To my recollection, Chomsky’s, Pinker’s, et al.’s hypothesis concerns neither language nor communication (where differentiated) but the grammatical syntax to these - which is found only in Homo Sapiens.
In which case, it would be correct to say, "the occurrence of syntax to language initially evolved by means other than syntax to language (via some adaptive mutation(s))"
Be this as it may.
Quoting StreetlightX
Are you ridiculing as stupid the position of punctuated equilibrium?
Were grammatical syntax to have rapidly evolved in some evolutionary ancestors followed by a period of evolutionary stasis that persists to this day, this is nothing else but the position of punctuated equilibrium – which holds application to evolution in general. There’s a plethora of empirical evidence in support of this view, be the view taken as antagonistic to the hypothesis of phyletic gradualism or not (they need not be antagonistic hypotheses of evolution). Phyletic gradualism, for example, fails to explain what are sometimes referred to as living fossils - the common example being the horseshoe crab - while punctuated equilibrium can easily account for these.
No, I'm not. That Chomsky's thin gruel speculation on language amounts to "language popped into existence somehow somewhen because of totally unspecified changes to something somewhere probably genetic but we really have no idea, and then somehow somewhen probably started to be used by humans because no idea" has nothing to do with the reality of PE. The gradualism vs. PE 'debate' when it comes to Chomsky is a side-show, but it's one that it's adherents would prefer to make it about in order to distract from the gaping holes elsewhere.
I'll grant your first point.
I get the sarcasm and your dislike, but I don't yet get why. About the same account could be given for our bipedalism. We don't yet know the specifics of why our species' ancestors became bipedal, but it happened - evolutionary speaking, this overnight, and this aspect of us has remained in stasis. Although there are known cases of feral children that did not walk bipedally (with possible reasons for this being numerous), we do furthermore tend to assume that this inclination toward bipedalism is genetically inherited.
Placed in proper context, Chomsky's argument was against BF Skinner's behaviorist approach to language acquisition. In brief, operant behavior (and its conditioning) cannot account for human language acquisition, given the latter's complexity and variety.
BTW, this, to my mind, doesn't in any way deny that operant behavior has actual application. It only specifies that there must first be innate, general cognitive abilities that can facilitate species-specific operant behavior. For example, both a dog and a pigeon can be operantly conditioned, but each will so be in different species-specific manners due to (not behaviorist conditioning itself but, rather) the innate generalized cognitive faculties of each particular type of animal. This being where cognitive science holds sway over behaviorism - the former acknowledges the importance of innate mental predispositions whereas the latter does not.
To not be presumptuous, are you proposing that Skinner had the correct hypothesis?
If not, and the syntax to language is not acquired strictly via behaviorist means, I don't understand why you find fault with the arguments proposed by Chomsky and others of the same perspective? After all, punctuated equilibrium would account for a cognitive know-how of grammar that is genetically inherited rather than behavioristically learned - one used to acquire specific human language(s) - which has since its genetic acquisition by our species remained in a state of evolutionary stasis.
More to say later.
A quick word on this (I'm out right now and don't have access to my usual stuff): this cannot possibly be the case. PE is a theory of evolutionary temporality. It speaks to the rapidity, or not, of evolutionary change. That is what it is an 'account' of. It cannot, even in priciple, be an account of any particular evolutionary trait. Not a single one, let alone a "cognitive know-how of grammar that is genetically inherited rather than behavioristically learned". To confuse a thesis about evolutionary temporality with any one of its particular outcomes is a category mistake through and through. It's not even wrong. It's mistake at the level of sense-making.
PE is used as nothing more than an excuse by Chomskyites to simply ignore and keep entirely mum on the question of how UE is supposed to make evolutionary sense. It's a case of: "well it happened real quick so yeah of course there's no possible way we could have evidence for it, which in any case our theory rules out to begin with because language cannot possibly be adaptive because it's all cognitive so how very convenient for us lets move on and not talk about it anymore OK haha".
At least the instances in which PE is invoked has a rich fossil record to back it up. The Chomskian recourse to PE is literally fabricated from out of thin air. Not a single thread of evidence, nor even a plausable conceptual narrative reconstruction that would or would not be corroborated by any forthcoming evidence. The flippancy of what is offered ('it was probably for navigation or some shit') is so intellectually poverty-stricken as to be legitimately insulting.
Chomsky isn't saying natural selection doesn't happen, nor is he calling evolution into doubt in any way whatsoever. He's saying, and has said for years, that it's hard to see -- based on the properties of language -- how it could have evolved gradually. Perhaps it did, but it's hard to imagine given his conception of language. Now maybe his conception of language is radically off base. You, however, haven't made the slightest attempt at refuting his work in this respect. You've instead cited some highly questionable sources.
Quoting StreetlightX
I agree that this doesn't mean anything at all. Nor does Chomsky believe it. It's another figment of your imagination I'm afraid.
Quoting StreetlightX
No, he doesn't. Again, you're showing your ignorance. Reading a few third-hand accounts of what someone thought someone who knew Chomsky might have said isn't interesting. Please cite some sources.
Quoting StreetlightX
This is a fairytale created by you. A complete fabrication, which you would know if you deigned to read anything besides what you want to hear. But it must feel good to believe you're so much more brilliant than the father of modern linguistics.
You're kind of a joke, sir.
He doesn't show he understands Chomsky at all, repeatedly. He's cited a number of articles by Chomsky's detractors, and one article from Science -- which he doesn't understand.
Combine that with insults and sarcasm, and the feeling of superiority from believing he's outwitted a famous linguistic, and it's fairly obvious what's going on. Comical, and not worth taking too serious. If he starts sounding like an adult, I'll maybe give it more time. But he hasn't said anything serious yet. I wouldn't waste too much time on it.
Free advice.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=068Id3Grjp0&t=4637s
Skip to about an hour in for specific discussions from linguistics in the audience. Some of it is technical.
Chomsky's framework is the most fruitful and influential one around today. So it's worth the effort. He goes through the dogmas of "language is communication" and "everything evolves gradually" -- which some here hold as well -- in this video too.
"Thus, a basic and logically ineliminable role for comparative research on language evolution is this simple and essentially negative one: A trait present in nonhuman animals did not evolve specifically for human language ... [W]e suggest that by considering the possibility that FLN evolved for reasons other than language, the comparative door has been opened in a new and (we think) exciting way ... One possibility, consistent with current thinking in the cognitive sciences, is that recursion in animals represents a modular system designed for a particular function (e.g., navigation) and impenetrable with respect to other systems. During evolution, the modular and highly domain-specific system of recursion may have become penetrable and domain-general. This opened the way for humans, perhaps uniquely, to apply the power of recursion to other problems". (my bolding)
Read: Language evolved for reasons other than language. About as clear-cut as you can get.
"According to recent linguistic theory, the computations underlying FLN may be quite limited. In fact, we propose in this hypothesis that FLN comprises only the core computational mechanisms of recursion as they appear in narrow syntax and the mappings to the interfaces. If FLN is indeed this restricted, this hypothesis has the interesting effect of nullifying the argument from design, and thus rendering the status of FLN as an adaptation open to question. Proponents of the idea that FLN is an adaptation would thus need to supply additional data or arguments to support this viewpoint."
Read: FLN was not an adaptation. The 'argument from design' referred to above refers to nothing other than natural selection, which is clarified earlier in the paper: "Because natural selection is the only
known biological mechanism capable of generating such functional complexes [the argument from design], proponents of this view conclude... [etc]".
These 'figments of my imagination' are printed in ink and signed by Chomsky.
I’ not specifically interested in Chomsky or any other view as a stand alone account of language so maybe another thread? Let me know if you wish this split off (or inform a mod).
I’m very interested in how we distinguish between general communication and language. I’ve always been intrigued by how our cognitive abilities manifest as we grow and how these abilities develop in other species too - as a means of singling out different stages of progression from ‘basic communication’ to a full-blown ‘language’.
Note: Using ‘language’ here in terms of this here written/signed/spoken structure.
I mentioned the ‘baby babbling’ early (or maybe in another thread?) as it seems inherent to be part of language development - there is also ‘signed babbling’ too so it appears to be apparent in language. It is also a property of ‘song birds’ too.
Also, although it seems kind of obvious that ‘language’ evolved for ‘language’, that is actually not necessarily the case. For instance the idea of biological spandrels may be one counter example, but there is a lot about language in our early development that plays into giving people a sense of identity - it could be that ‘language’ is a spin-off of other cognitive functions that just happened to evolve alongside each other with the capacity for complex vocalisation.
Bees communicate locations of nectar and ignore other bees if the source doesn’t coincide with their ‘mental picture’ - the example of this is that in an experiment a source was floated in the middle of a lake, the bee returned to the hive and gave a waggle-dance signal that the other bees ignored. This suggests that the bees have a clear world map that they adjust to their requirements. If more bees keep returning with nectar from the lake then they adjust their map. I am not suggesting the bees are having a ‘conversation’ here, but they are clearly using given information to judge their world view - not that this is ‘identity’.
Furthermore, when it comes to looking at cognitive capacities in terms of ‘world view’ researchers returned to Nicaragua and look at how the language had developed. What is fascinating is they found something they previously missed, the original speakers were unable to to combine abstract concepts (ie. ‘to the right of the blue box’, not being able to hold both ‘blue’ and ‘right’ together to distinguish where the person meant - the same capacity of a 5 yr old I believe, or a rat). This may be due to ‘language’ being a learned tool rather than an innate ability - keep in mind when the younger generations began to mix with the older speakers they picked up this ability to distinguish items in the real world (the learned language helped them ‘refine’ their experience to equate more readily with reality).
Note: I don’t believe there is any true dividing line only that there are areas that are more or less distinct than others.
Yes, specialized. Language - or rather languages - are chock full of various constraints on syntactical construction. One of the aims of early Chomskyian linguistics was to try and pick out a few universals that would be stable across all languages (after which via imaginitive leap they could be designated 'innate'), only the project was such a miserable empirical failure that it ended up with a postulated single universal, recursion, which itself became nothing but a capacity which, even when totally absent from any one actually-existing-language, could unfalsifiably be claimed to constitute the single trans-linguistic universal regardless.
Of course, for those not labouring under the delusions of Chomskian Grammar, the sheer diversity of various syntactic constraints were not so much useless hay to sort though in order to look for the needle of universals, but the very stuff of linguistic theory itself. And when decoupled from the nonsense injunction to hermetically isolate evolutionary considerations to some mythical, unevidenced puntum long-lost in time (after which the whole question of evolution could be bracketed and effectively ignored), the study of evolution and language as co-developmental throws up incredibly rich sets of correlations and reasons to consider evolution not merely relevant, but foundational in shaping the various syantactical constraints that show up in languages. To quote Evans and Levinson:
"In short, there are evolutionarily stable strategies, local minima as it were, that are recurrent solutions across time and space, such as the tendency to distinguish noun and verb roots, to have a subject role, or mutually consistent approaches to the ordering of head and modifier, which underlie the Greenbergian statistical universals linking different features. These tendencies cannot plausibly be attributed to UG, since changes from one stable strategy to another take generations (sometimes millennia) to work through. Instead they result from myriad interactions between communicative, cognitive and processing constraints which reshape existing structures through use.
A major achievement of functionalist linguistics has been to map out, under the rubric of grammaticalization, the complex temporal subprocesses by which grammar emerges as frequently-used patterns sediment into conventionalized patterns. Cultural preoccupations may push some of these changes in particular directions, such as the evolution of kinship-specific pronouns in Australia. And social factors, most importantly the urge to identify with some groups by speaking like them, and to maximize distance from others by speaking differently (studied in fine-grained detail by Labov 1980), act as an amplifier on minor changes that have arisen in the reshaping process". (source, PDF)
The exaptation thesis has to ignore all of this, because it is utterly committed to the idea that language evolved for means other than language. It has to, on the basis of nothing other than a prior, theoretical and dogmatic commitment, entirely stuff all of the above under the bed and argue it away because it cannot, on pain of incoherence, admit any of it into it's theoretical remit. It's alternative? Some middling unsubstantiated, unargued for bullshit about how it probably developed from some other reason (unknown) than hopped the genetic barrier over to humans for, again, no reason given. Language is rich, full of rich features, many of which can, and have been tracked closely with the ways in which it has developed over time, among cultures, in addition to anthropogenesis. To condense this all into some unspecified 'genetic modification' is nothing less than waving a magic wand stamped 'science' and thinking this should be taken seriously by anyone with half a brain.
I don't understand this. What does it mean for language to be the means for which language evolved?
Or are you just, in a roundabout way, saying that language evolved for the purpose of communication? But this is just to repeat a take on the question the thread started with, without offering any interesting support for the idea. There isn't much content to the rest of the post.
It might be interesting to know how you think language and communication are "coupled" in a way which is coherent relative to Evolutionary Theory.
It seems intuitively obvious that language acquisition on a personal level requires the innate maturation of brain structures and mental functions used in language production and comprehension, and that the cause of this maturation is human nature (genetic predispositions) and human culture (specifically, social learning).
To conflate, rather than relate, "language" and "communication" would contradict how these words are used in Semiotics and Information Theory.
I have no problem "decoupling" these terms. For example: your use of language in this thread communicates misrepresentations of others' views, anger, hostility, and disdain.
One can't help wonder (as previously noted by another) whether your stance boils down to this attitude:
Quoting StreetlightX
Oh good, then you can follow up on some of the reading I suggested and get back to me.
Surely you are capable of a concise summary?
Seems I "parachuted in" on Page 1.
Any other excuses?
https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=cv66xFD7s7g
The OP is primarily concerned with:
Quoting Xtrix
Chomsky is mentioned incidentally as an influence on this idea.
So, my posts in this thread have been concerned with language and communication, not with Chomsky, or even with Chomsky's views on language and communication.
If langauge evolved, (which I don't believe it did) then it evolved as an aid to survival. If you could shout there is danger, that's an advantage. If you could shout there is danger in the shape of a tiger or in the shape of a landslide, that's even better. If you can shout to run to safety toward the mountain or toward the tree or toward the river (tigers don't like to get wet) then that's even better than that.
Little by little those things developed, that aided survival.
Eventually tribes would hold meetings on matters that affected the tribe; this would aid even better survival.
-----------
I think language evolution is a crappolo idea, anyway, much like evolution. I believe that the ancient man had access (or since stone age, with stone axes, he had axxess) to the Oxford Dictionary of Standard English Definitions, Synonyms and Antonyms. Therefore they could strive for world hegemony, since they had a lingua franca the English langauge; and the English spleaking world still hasn't given up that idea.
That's good.
Did you study under Philomena Cunk?
It’s a delightful short film/interview that focuses on language (including the question of acquisition). Take it or leave it :)
Cheers.
Not very charitable of you, but I've no intention to bicker.
Quoting StreetlightX
The suggestion that FLN (narrow faculty of language) – namely, universal grammar (UG) – was an exaptation (traditionally termed “pre-adaptation” - strictly speaking, not an adaptation) is not contradictory to mainstream knowledge concerning biological evolution.
It may or may not so be, but the idea that UG’s current functionality did not initially evolve for the purpose it currently has is not, of itself, absurd.
As far as I'm concerned, this post isn't about Chomsky but about what is and is not acceptable in relation to mainstream biological evolution.
"[W]e suggest that by considering the possibility that FLN evolved for reasons other than language"
This seems to be where you're confused. As I've repeated several times now, the FLN is the recursive operation, call it "Merge." This is not "language," but it's proposed to be a unique human property of language, as the essay states. Any recursive procedure -- any algorithm that's going to create a system of digital infinity -- is going to have embedded in it somewhere an operation that says take two units that have already been formed and make up a bigger unit. Somewhere in any system you're going to find that -- whether it's an axiom system or Fregian ancestral or whatever mode you have for generating an infinite number of objects. This is what's being claimed to have been provided by a mutation ("rewiring of the brain") to an ancestor. If you want to discuss evidence for this, fine. But let's keep to the real world, not fabrications.
So, to use your quote in its entirety:
"Thus, a basic and logically ineliminable role for comparative research on language evolution is this simple and essentially negative one: A trait present in nonhuman animals did not evolve specifically for human language, although it may be part of the language faculty and play an intimate role in language processing."
Which is what they're arguing. How one goes from "Merge (FLN) evolved for reasons other than language" to "Language evolved for reasons other than language" is perplexing, unless of course there's emotional reasons for misunderstanding and deliberately fabricating as to make it seem absurd. You've already demonstrated your emotional attachment to functional analysis.
Quoting StreetlightX
The entire quotation:
"Hypothesis 2: FLB is a derived, uniquely human adaptation for language. According to this hypothesis, FLB is a highly complex adaptation for language, on a par with the vertebrate eye, and many of its core compo- nents can be viewed as individual traits that have been subjected to selection and perfect- ed in recent human evolutionary history. This appears to represent the null hypothesis for many scholars who take the complexity of language seriously (27, 28). The argument starts with the assumption that FLB, as a whole, is highly complex, serves the function of communication with admirable effective- ness, and has an ineliminable genetic compo- nent. Because natural selection is the only known biological mechanism capable of gen- erating such functional complexes [the argu- ment from design (29)], proponents of this view conclude that natural selection has played a powerful role in shaping many as- pects of FLB, including FLN, and, further, that many of these are without parallel in nonhuman animals. Although homologous mechanisms may exist in other animals, the human versions have been modified by nat- ural selection to the extent that they can be reasonably seen as constituting novel traits, perhaps exapted from other contexts [e.g., social intelligence, tool-making (7, 30 –32)]."
Also helpful for context:
"At least three theoretical issues crosscut the debate on language evolution. One of the oldest problems among theorists is the “shared versus unique” distinction. Most current commentators agree that, although bees dance, birds sing, and chimpanzees grunt, these systems of communication differ qualitatively from human language. In particular, animal communication systems lack the rich expressive and open-ended power of human language (based on humans’ capacity for re- cursion). The evolutionary puzzle, therefore, lies in working out how we got from there to here, given this apparent discontinuity. A second issue revolves around whether the evolution of language was gradual versus saltational; this differs from the first issue because a qualitative discontinuity between extant species could have evolved gradually, involving no discontinuities during human evolution. Finally, the “continuity versus exaptation” issue revolves around the problem of whether human language evolved by gradual extension of preexisting communication systems, or whether important aspects of language have been exapted away from their previous adaptive function (e.g., spatial or numerical reasoning, Machiavellian social scheming, tool-making)." (emphasis mine)
You're (1) hung up on language being defined narrowly as the Merge function and (2) on this having evolved through mutation quickly in one individual. The rest you fabricate. But the evidence points in this direction, I'm afraid.
Yes, studying different cultures, base number systems, music, etc., is all very interesting and important as well. Studying various languages of the world, thousands of them in fact, already assumes a universality: you're studying human language. What's interesting is asking what properties make up that thing you're studying.
"The very stuff of linguistic theory itself" is a complete delusion. Similarly absurd: "The very stuff of physics is studying what's going on outside your window."
Quoting Xtrix
well taken by me. Thanks
Eh, more nonsense. You repeatedly quote the Evans article. So here's a response, for those interested: https://www.languagesoftheworld.info/generative-linguistics/does-universal-grammar-theory-imply-that-language-are-all-the-same-response-to-vyvyan-evans-part-2.html
Of course there is a wide diversity of language on Earth. Of course data (the culture in which one is raised, the sounds and words one hears, etc) is involved. Of course languages (English, Italian, Swahili) constantly change. To study all of this is indeed important.
None of this has anything to do whatsoever with UG, which is the name for the theory of the genetic component of language, nothing less. If you're denying any genetic component, then best of luck to you.
Either language is unique to humans, or it isn't. If it is, we want to study what the properties are that makes it unique.
Chomsky on UG:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vbKO-9n5qmc
"The only question is, what is it?"
And that can be discussed rationally.
This is all hard to see for some people, although it should be completely uncontroversial.
My experience in studying different languages has always been that the initial shock of diversity gives way to a feeling of familiarity as you begin to recognize the same several hundred elements all shuffled about in different ways, and that is what is so intriguing to the generativist. That may be due to the biased sample of what I've happened to learn and study, but the commonalities even across typologically unrelated languages are almost disturbing from a purely functionalist perspective – they aren't just similarities in function, but similarities in weird formal features, that do not have prima facie functional explanations.
In any case, if your 'feelings' are what you have to offer then I suppose we're done with any conversation worth anything at all.
Is this a joke? What exactly did he "disregard"? Carol Chomsky studied language acquisition in children for years, actually. I suppose that was all disregarded as well.
We all understand your feelings about Chomsky: you feel he's set linguistics back. Fine. It would be fun to have a conversation about the evidence. So far all you've offered is straw men.
So I'll ask directly: Besides the Science article, what of Chomsky's have you read or seen? Have you bothered to check whether your understanding of his position is accurate? If not, there's no sense pretending to have a rational discussion.
Great, because that's not what I claimed. Rather, the issue has to do with the specificities of language, and the total lack of any plausable account of how and why such exaptation could have occured. I explained this previously to Snakes, and you're more than welcome to read that response.
Further, like the rather useless appeals to PE, the mere fact that exaptation exists licences no claim to plausibility about any one specific trait at all. One may as well say that 'history exists, therefore this one very specific and contentious event could have happened'. It's vacuous and sophistic, and no one should take it seriously. Without specifics, there appeal to the mere existence of exaptation is as empty as it is stupid. And when the specifics amount to "it was probs for navigation or something", that's not science, that's beer room speculation over a bong.
Except it is, which you would know if you knew anything about the subject whatsoever.
Stop taking the bait? There has been four pages of hot air, and repetition dressed up as evidence. Some people just have a chip on their shoulder.
If there's something else that's been raised, let me know. Perhaps I missed it. But I'm not seeing anything else except his misunderstandings and various perplexed responses, mine included.
Long, angry ideological screeds are often less 'engaged' than brief Socratic questions, because they show a lack of seriousness in actually listening to the person you're talking to (and being willing to learn something).
Anyway, I'm leaving, but my advice would be: read another article.
Regarding your confusion about what is being discussed regarding navigation (quoting the one article you've half-read and completely failed to understand):
"The question is whether particular components of the functioning of FLN are adaptations for language, specifically acted upon by natural selection— or, even more broadly, whether FLN evolved for reasons other than communication. [...] Comparative work has generally focused on animal communication or the capacity to acquire a human-created language. If, however, one entertains the hypothesis that recursion evolved to solve other computational problems such as navigation, number quantification, or social relationships, then it is possible that other animals have such abilities, but our research efforts have been targeted at an overly narrow search space (Fig. 3)." (my emphasis)
"This discovery, in turn, would open the door to another suite of puzzles: Why did humans, but no other animal, take the power of recursion to create an open-ended and limitless system of communication? Why does our system of recursion operate over a broader range of elements or inputs (e.g., numbers, words) than other animals?[...] Either way, these are testable hypotheses, a refrain that highlights the importance of comparative approaches to the faculty of language."
Regarding your confusion about "adaptation":
"The question is not whether FLN in toto is adaptive. By allowing us to communicate an endless variety of thoughts, recursion is clearly an adaptive computation."
[...] "Hypothesis 3 raises the possibility that structural details of FLN may result from such preexisting constraints, rather than from direct shaping by natural selection targeted specifically at communication. Insofar as this proves to be true, such structural details are not, strictly speaking, adaptations at all."
Regarding your confusion that "language evolved for reasons other than language":
"Although many aspects of FLB very likely arose in this manner, the important issue for these hypotheses is whether a series of gradual modifications could lead eventually to the capacity of language for infinite generativity. Despite the inarguable existence of a broadly shared base of homologous mechanisms involved in FLB, minor modifications to this foundational system alone seem inadequate to generate the fundamental difference— discrete infinity— between language and all known forms of animal communication." (My emphasis)
"Discrete infinity and constraints on learning. The data summarized thus far, although far from complete, provide overall support for the position of continuity between humans and other animals in terms of FLB. However, we have not yet addressed one issue that many regard as lying at the heart of language: its capacity for limitless expressive power, captured by the notion of discrete infinity. It seems relatively clear, after nearly a century of intensive research on animal communication, that no species other than humans has a comparable capacity to recombine meaningful units into an unlimited variety of larger structures, each differing systematically in meaning."
It gets a little boring correcting (deliberate) mischaracterizations, but I'm reserving hope that there may eventually be something interesting that comes out of this.
So you're clueless. Fair enough.
"Language evolved for reasons other than language." LOL. Thanks for the laughs.
One way of distinguishing is to analyze a property of all human languages: that of recursive enumeration. The ability, as Von Humboldt noted, of using finite means for infinite ends -- shared with the number system -- appears to be a unique, innate property of human beings. Communication, on the other hand, is a broader conception and one that is indeed shared with many other species, down to insects.
You've done a decently impressive job of parrying @StreetlightX's flowery, loquacious, ideological and emotionally charged laughable bookworm bullshit, so I wouldn't worry too much. Welcome to the war.
Thank you. Hardly a "war," though. (For it to be a war, you need an opponent of some kind. StreetlightX is still stuck in intellectual adolescence -- the type that'll call Aristotle an "idiot" for such-and-such a reason. I don't take that seriously.)
But I'm glad my responses prove interesting to the others who are reading this thread -- that was my hope.
To be fair, I don't think @StreetlightX is an intellectual adolescent, as much as I dislike the @apokrisis style of (non)argument.
Premises:
1) Language is not communication.
2) Only human beings have a capacity for language.
Implication: human beings dominate Earth.
Does the implication sound familiar?
Is anyone triggered by it?
Is anyone surprised that it generates controversy?
Who holds the majority opinion regarding soundness?
Does it boil down to belief?
I do find this debate fascinating. Language and the evolution of language specifically, has always been a fascinating subject to me. You defend the Chomskyean idea well as to what makes a language a language vs. simply a communication system. It seems Chomsky was trying to connect the idea that the FLN may have been an exaptation that allowed for a number of "mental" capabilities that carried over to language abilities. The implication is that tying the FLN to an origin just in communication would be an error and to "take the bait" of mistaking the consequence for its cause. Tool-making and better social awareness are good candidates to start as, based on the evidence, these two forces were most evident for focus in early humans. I had a thread awhile back about what the origin of human deliberation was. That is to say, our degree of freedom of choices as opposed to ironclad if/then responses (mostly seen in other animals). Deliberative thinking may also have something to do with FLN. What would cause a species to need such a high degree of deliberation, and what would cause such freedom of action? Well the cause might be something like a FLN and the reason for the FLN might be factors such as tool-making and more complex social awareness.
(1) The core element of language isn't communication. Communication is one aspect of language.
(2) So far as we know, only human beings have this capacity.
Human beings dominating Earth isn't really an implication, it's a fact. These days, a very unfortunate fact.
Quoting Galuchat
Anyone who refuses to read the very person he thinks he's criticizing, consumes nothing but second-hand interpretations, throws around insults, all with the airs of superiority -- is indeed intellectually adolescent. I was the same way when I was younger. I would read a few popular books and articles critical of some view, and then felt as if I acquired some special knowledge which those others -- those stupid teachers, professors, and other such followers of this view -- had failed to do.
Turns out, people like that are a dime a dozen.
Exactly right. And perhaps an exaptation not only language, but arithmetic, music, etc. All unique properties of humans, all with this property that defines FLN.
Take arithmetic. All humans have arithmetical capacity, for example. But it's almost never been used. Alfred Russel Wallace pointed this out.
If you take the core computational principle of language -- Merge -- and you restrict the lexicon to a single element, you get arithmetic. So it could be that it simply piggybacked off language -- which wouldn't be a big surprise, as it's another digital infinite system (which are very rare in nature).
Music -- same thing. There's gotta be a "UM" to this as well. Maybe it's a separate evolution, but maybe it just piggybacked off language.
Communication must have come much later in evolution by this perspective, as what evolved was a digital infinite system (an I-Language) which eventually spread genetically in the community and was mapped onto the sensorimotor system
Quoting schopenhauer1
Whatever happened, it had to be useful enough to spread in the community. That's a given, otherwise we wouldn't be here -- whatever the story. As to what selective advantage this had, yes those are all good suggestions.
I think this is very plausible. However, I can also envision a more social reason for language origins vs. the purely mental exaptation described by Chomsky. That is not to say I am stepping back completely with the idea of a FLN that is the genetic basis for language but rather that the origins of the FLN could be for social reasons (which translated easily to communication later). I have two scenarios here. The first is the non-exaptation (more amenable to social learning and later communication). The second is more Chomskyean in that it is more purely an exaptation that became selected for in its broad way that eventually led to language.
1) Learning strategies of cultural collaboration pushed language: It could be that goal-directedness is the primary cause for both better social awareness AND better tool-making skills. A chimp can observe, practice, and repeat it seems when making simple tools. Why can't they make more complex tools though? Well the tools they can produce are in the limit of this model of observe, practice, repeat. A capacity for something like Joint Attention (between primary caregiver, let's say or any socially anchored person in the infant's life), can allow for goal-directedness. That is to say, a better capacity for goal-directedness can lead to more complex tool-making. It can also help in understanding complex behaviors and Theory of Mind. Thus, various mutations, and allowances for epigenetic phenomena of interaction between genes/proteins and environment may have contributed to a more focused goal-directed behavior. This push for more goal-directed behavior favored a brain that can perform Merge functions such as in language, math, etc. because it allowed for more robust collaboration. Or conversely, the Merge function helped in creating goal-directedness and robust collaboration.
2) Pattern-recognition strategies: This is non-social specific. That is that somehow, the human animal needed to recognize patterns more easily (perhaps tool-making and social one-upsmanship). A series of quick genetic transitions occurred which allowed a sub-population to better manipulate the environment for complex tool and social awareness. This translated eventually to the linguistic abilities that generate recursion and Merge specifically. Also, with this pattern-recognition, perhaps it was better used for translating memory from working memory into explicit memory.
Again, all speculation here. The first approach would be more in-line with adaptationist approach rather than the strictly Chomskyean "mental space" that happened to translate to language later on. Both are somewhat indirect to the actual fact that language is now used to communicate amongst other things (internal dialogue that helps impose order on the environment).
Nevertheless there has been arguments over whether or not ‘recursion’ is exclusive to humans:
http://gentnerlab.ucsd.edu/publications/bloomfieldEtAl2011.pdf
I’m much more inclined to follow the Cognitive Linguistics approach as it provides a better overview of several combined fields of interest. A problem here is that we could find ourselves making false distinctions as some mental faculty requires several others. I suspect that in many circumstances a ‘faculty’ to do x is necessarily due to a combination of ’factors’, yet individually these ‘factors’ are cognitively useful in some minuscule way and only when combined with other ‘factors’ produce a unique ‘faculty’.
As a example of what I mean eyes that were disconnected from the the occipital lobes would still be of use for managing the circadian rhythm.
Another idea would be to consider the effects of emotion in language. Clearly the basic communication in nature results from matters of survival and reproduction. Even trees communicate about diseases, yet don’t exactly ‘scream’ (although some reports have suggested this for media effect). Cries for help, sexual posturing and general ‘danger’ calls come with certain spacial signals attached. It could be that humans have intricated their emotional ‘vocabulary’ more than other animals and thus had the need to express a greater range of ‘signs’.
Monkeys have calls for ‘danger below’ or ‘danger above’, but I think the true step is in abstraction when a system of communication has a singular instance that relates to an abstract concept cleaved from a several embedded instances - so once the term ‘above’ or ‘below’ is uttered we’re talking at a very special stage in ‘communication’/‘language’.
Then there is “Theory of Mind”. Clearly children can pick up a certain level of competence when it comes to communicating prior to having a fully established “Theory of Mind” - note that feral children miss out on this (sadly/luckily there are few cases of this reported and fewer still that have been studied extensively due to lack of information).
Personally I find the idea of an innate faculty of language to be a useful distinction for investigation. Both sides of the argument have weight, butI cannot see either as being exclusively ‘true’ unless it is framed in a very specific manner.
I guess we have to be forgiving for opposing opinions. My studies on this topic are, relatively speaking, outdated. The last time I looked into this in this specific area was around 4 years ago.
The most fascinating cases I have seen in this area is still ‘The Man with no Language’, feral children and Piraha. On the research side of things I feel that the Cognitive Sciences have done more for linguistics over the past few decades than psychology or linguistics in and of themselves. Before that computational models certainly had a good hold on the subject and lately people have become more open to different ideas due to misrepresenting neuroscientific or generic studies to back up any and every claim (that’s gotten old for most people who look beyond pop-science though).
Of course there's more. How language manifests itself is very complex. What I'm talking about is the uniquely human characteristic of language -- and clearly there is one, or else other animals could acquire language. Which, again, they can't do. So there's obviously something we have -- some genetically determined structure -- that allows us to pick out language from the environment, whereas a monkey or a songbird can't. That's not an easy question and we still don't know how it's done, but the point is learning something about the principles involved, and the only way to study this is to study what's acquired.
One property is that of recursive enumeration. Language is a digital infinite system, and any digital infinite system has embedded in it Merge. This is true for any language. The fact that language is structure-dependent is interesting as well -- and universal. Why don't we see linear-dependence?
Quoting I like sushi
There's no one serious out there that believes the faculty of language in humans isn't innate. No one. It's like arguing the visual system isn't innate. Of course there's a genetic component to language, unless we're angels. There isn't "both sides" to this argument any more than there's two sides to the whether the earth is spherical.
Quoting I like sushi
In what area?
I meant it may not be a faculty that is ‘language specific’. Meaning that ‘language’ may just be a spin-off of other systems.
Quoting Xtrix
Linguistics. What else?
That "it" may not be a faculty that is language specific: what's the "it" refer to? There's no question other systems are involved in language.
Quoting I like sushi
Well nothing you gave as examples is really linguistics. Linguistics is a science. What you cite -- feral children, Piraha, and a case study --is anthropology, maybe having some significance for the study of language (not much, it turns out). But it's at the periphery at best, and as discussed before the Piraha case and the "Man Without Words" case is rife with confusions and are remarkably unscientific.
If this is what's most fascinating to you, I'd recommend first learning something more about linguistics. It doesn't fascinate you that language is structure-dependent? It's not fascinating how quickly children acquire language? That we're the only species that can acquire language? That it's been attempted to teach primates sign language (remember Nim Chimpsky)?
This video is 8 minutes. Worth watching, straight from the horse's mouth, and gives a good overview:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MLk47AMBdTA
The point was that ‘language’ may not be the primary function. Chomsky himself practically admits this when he talks about Music or some other capacity. The neural basis maybe due to another primary faculty with ‘language’ piggybacking.
The case of the man with no language holds no interest for you? Not willing to speculate? It wasn’t a scientific study it was one woman ignoring (not knowing) that it was apparently ‘impossible’ to teach someone a language after adolescence - according to linguists. If the story isn’t fabricated then it backs up Chomsky’s position perhaps?
There have been plenty of studies into Piraha so to claim there is no science there is plain bloody-minded. Linguistics is a very young ‘science’. There is no conclusive evidence for a lack of ‘recursion’ within that language to date - that is the point of being scientific rather than dismissive.
I’m not willing to jump the gun. Chomsky in that clip using words like ‘seems’, ‘according to’ and ‘probably’ for good reason. When in comes cognitive anthropology Renfrew is a good place to begin.
Quoting Xtrix
You’re not talking to Streetlight anymore. I’m not here to debate Chomsky’s views. I wanted to expand the discussion beyond a boring is Chomsky right or wrong. I side with the view that language is at least mostly an innate faculty, but I’m not entirely convinced that language is really worth looking at as some ‘separate’ function of human cognition.
I’ve read more than enough to have a basic understanding of the field of linguistics. I’m mostly interested in cognitive linguistics and educational linguistics, but also have interest in formal linguistics and functional linguistics.
As I said before, music and arithmetic may have evolved separately, or they could be piggybacking off of language. There's a much more plausible reason for believing language evolved first and the others are derivative in some way. This is what Chomsky is saying when he discusses music and arithmetic.
True, Merge may have been used in other ways, as was discussed in the Science article.
Quoting I like sushi
It's interesting, sure. We can speculate all day long, but why pick out one strange case study to base your interest in linguistics? (So far, these are the examples you've mentioned.) They're not very sceintific or even really linguistics.
Quoting I like sushi
It doesn't really have much to say about Chomsky's position concerning UG, but his wife did a lot of study on language acquisition in children and he's held the position that there's a critical period for learning language, yes. So if it's possible to teach someone a language when they've been exposed to no language all their lives, then yes that's very interesting and would indicate that perhaps there is no critical period, depending on the level of sophistication a language gets acquired. But it's impossible to tell from this case study.
Much more serious work has been done that indicates the opposite, like the one I mentioned about the deafblind: it seems like the limit is roughly 18 months of age, after which it's impossible to acquire. I wonder: is THAT not fascinating? It should be, as there's much more evidence for it. The fact that you pick out these sensational cases indicates to me you're not very serious about learning much about the field of linguistics.
Quoting I like sushi
I agree, there is no conclusive evidence, yet it is often claimed that there is. And even if there was, it wouldn't matter to what Chomsky is talking about. So it's an interesting study in anthropology.
Quoting I like sushi
Well fine, but that's not saying much. Of course you agree language is something separate from, say, digestion. The visual system is separate from the circulatory system as an object of study. Are there overlaps and interactions? Yes, of course. I don't disagree with that. But we're trying to find out what language is and what the principles underlying it are.
The word "function" is used very loosely anyway, so we have to be careful. Is the function of our skeleton for motion or to keep our organs from falling down, for example? The function of language has always been thought to be for communication, as you know. I just think that's completely wrong, which is where this thread started. We could go into that a little more maybe, but otherwise I'm not seeing what the real issue is here, other than clearing away confusions.
Quoting Xtrix
I may have missed it (I’ve realised my reading of posts is a bit dodgy at times) but if it’s not communication then what is it?
Well when looking at the "function" of something, as vague as that notion is, what's usually done is to look at characteristic use to give you some insight in to the object's function. So let's do the same thing with language. What's the characteristic use?
Turns out we've discussed this before: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/364151
Quoting Xtrix
Yes, but I didn’t feel I’d made any ground.
Ok, so I'll repeat: What's the characteristic use of language?
Quoting Xtrix
It seems to have different uses: enquiring, confirming, emoting.
I'm not sure what "confirming" refers to here. "Emoting" is also vague -- one can emote without language. Animals can emote as well in this sense. Furthermore, one can communicate emotions without language -- through a hairstyle, by slamming doors, by mien, by gait, etc.
Regardless, to say these are characteristic uses of language is just a mistake. When looking at language's characteristic use, just statistically speaking, it's for thought, not communication. Very little gets externalized, and [most of] what does get externalized is only communication in a strange sense -- what's usually called "phatic" communication -- hardly exchanging information in any sense that's usually believed.
Quoting Xtrix
That’s true, but it doesn’t mean language isn’t also doing that.
But I’ll go along with the use of language being thought and that what does get externalised is a strange, inefficient or inaccurate, form of communication.
So language is inadequate for communication?
Edit: or there is only so much we wish to communicate through language.
Or language serves very primitive needs.
Or language is deception.
My sentence was misleading. I forgot to put "most of what gets externalized." Obviously of the small part of what does get externalized, there's exchange of information. But most of the externalization seems to be phatic communication rather than exchange of information. That's what I meant.
So no, language is not "inadequate for communication."
So not inadequate but mostly phatic in function and to a lesser degree information. What does the information consist of?
Edit: language then is a social function, cohesive and bonding.
Of what gets externalized in communication, most is phatic. The rest can be exchange of information. What "information" gets exchanged? There's an infinite amount of information that can be exchanged - I don't understand the relevance of that question. You can pick literally any example you'd like. Giving someone directions is exchanging information. Teaching physics is exchanging information. Etc etc etc.
Quoting Brett
No, language then is for thought.
Quoting Xtrix
Okay, I just wanted to confirm that.
Quoting Xtrix
Yes, but the thought expressed as phatic expression is essentially functional, in the sense of being socio-pragmatic, which is what I’m calling primitive because it’s purpose is ancient.
So there are two forms of language.
I'm not even sure phatic communication is an expression of thought, but let's say it is. It's certainly true that phatic means socio-pragmatic, and that social interactions/communication goes way back in time, from primates to whales to elephants. So what? All those pieces are correct. What's incorrect is the statement "language then is a social function." That's taking one aspect of communication (namely, phatic communication) and using this to define language generally. That's incorrect. The characteristic use of language is not communication, whether phatic or informational: its characteristic use is for thought.
Quoting Xtrix
Is this where posting gets tricky? I’m suggesting there are two modes of thought expressed through two modes of language. One, phatic, having a social function is what I’m calling primitive, and the other is for information: teaching, giving directions, etc.
Maybe, as you say, phatic expression is not an expression of thought, that it’s something similar but different.
Quoting Xtrix
I’m just leaving my trail of breadcrumbs.
Sure, and the suggestion is wrong because "two modes of language" is meaningless. It's two modes of communication -- phatic and informational. Communication and language are not synonymous. Communication is one aspect of language -- how language is externalized in various ways. Language itself appears to be a system of thought, as indicated by it's characteristic use (viz., you're talking to yourself all the time but rarely communicate those thoughts).
Quoting Xtrix
What would be an example of another aspect of language?
Thought. And not just a secondary aspect, like externalization. It seems to be the core "function" of language.
Thought uses language to formulate idea, theories, etc.
It certainly appears so.
Yes indeed.
Or can't have begun from zero.
I don't really understand this.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cv66xFD7s7g&t=1167s
Yes, language is innate.
Quoting Xtrix
This is just speculation as much as what I have mentioned regarding language acquisition in adulthood. Why dismiss instances of people who have difficulty in using language or who have been cut of from language (and human contact to some degree or other simply because the cases are in the low numbers). Anyway, there is no need to go back and forth over this ...
Something that is apparent from neurogenesis is the plasticity of the human brain. The acquisition of ‘communicative language’ (spoken/signed) shifts the activity fro the right hemisphere more into the left hemisphere - although some argue this is just a matter of motor function. Is the motor function necessary for language? It seems so on the surface but that may be too hasty to hold to.
Note: not interested in getting into semantics over the meaning of ‘function’ or ‘language’. It was apparent enough to me, before looking in to Chomsky, that ‘language’ is a loaded term and that linguistics - as a science - has many softer and harder edges in terms of psychology and computational analysis.
If we’re talking about evolution then I’m afraid you cannot ignore ‘anthropology’ and then make it out to be some can of non-science - it is a science, and like ‘linguistics’ it has softer and harder edges to it. The genetic factor has been pursued in term of ‘language genes’ but that whole endeavor has pretty much been dropped because the system is far too complex and there is very little evidence that singular genes act in isolation.
Let us take the example of ‘the man with no language’ and ask how we can identify some ‘innate’ capacity fro language. If, like you say, he always had the capacity for language there untapped then how come feral children cannot develop a language as fully as him? It seems obvious the telling factor is he lived in human society. This leads me to think that it is more a matter of associating abstract ideas with commonly lived features of the environment - as example if you show chimp faces to infants they develop the ability to distinguish monkey faces from each other, and it isn’t a huge leap to see that humans brought up without exposure to human features won’t find it easy to distinguish between different human faces (people to them will look fairly generic). This is a well known developmental feature of human’s (IOR - inhibition of return).
Let’s move onto other areas like the youngest language we know of developed by deaf children in Nicaragua. As I‘vepreviously mentioned the early stage of this language - its initial form - showed that fully grown adults were unable to hold both object colour and position in mind at once when asked where such and such an object was located (eg. near the blue box in the left corner). This is something a rat cannot do nor a 5 year old child - yet the adults were quite capable of solving other complex problems. The younger speakers had picked up more complex terms in language communication that dealt with this and many adults then learnt to apply this to their view of the world.
What is going on there? If the ability to perceive the objective world is shaped by word concepts in this way then does this mean it takes a huge cognitive leap to open up a more comprehensive amalgam of sensory data?
Let’s move onto other studies regarding ‘attention’. I’m sure you’ve heard of ‘blind-sightedness’ where subjects are consciously ‘blind’ yet they can navigate around obstacles. If we look at instances of stoke victims too who go through a recovery period they describe their lack of ability to ‘see’ one half of their body/face as more or less a lack of ‘attention’. In this respect we could suggest that language is more or less something like a mechanism of ‘attention’ - a mode of thought expression (not necessarily ‘external’ - meaning directed toward another individual). This would be where many Witty a fanboy would scream ‘there is no Private Language’ yet they are probably not quite aware of what Witty was saying and how he defined Language - he defined it in such a manner as to make any ‘Private Language’ impossible by way of how he framed the definition of “Language” ... nothing wrong with that, but I’m not going to misapply semantic value from one instance to another to suit my or anyone else’s purpose.
Then there are studies about split brain patients where we can see perfectly well that the separate hemispheres communicate with each other externally - one side of the brain guiding the other. In fact, when asked the same question each hemisphere gives a different answer and has different ‘attitudes’. It could be the ‘language’ faculty in question is nothing more than an externalised ‘communicative’ function between lobes/hemispheres.
Anyway, food for thought there (there are too many items to go into in detail in one post so thought I’d throw some out together). None of this is necessarily about Chomsky’s ideas or anyone else’s particular ideas of language. I just don’t look at this subject matter as self-contained or any position as writ in stone.
Now, back to the original quote from you above:
Maybe it isn’t really a ‘distinct’ item at all - other than in a communicative sense. I don’t look at a knife and fork and think ‘knife and fork’, the ‘and’ is not perceived in any manner at all. What I mentioned above about signed language and the ability to apply ‘and’ was down to ‘communicative language’ not some internalised thought - that is not to say I don’t view ‘language’ (in the broader sense of the term) as function of thought. If the underlying principles is ‘thought’ then why are we not asking what ‘thought’ is? I don’t need ‘words’ to think or solve complex problems, yet it is apparently the case that articulating thought (an explicit example being the ‘written word’) allows me to ‘view’ my thoughts consciously - which hints at ‘theory of mind’.
Piaget did some interesting studies on children and how the used monologues in their early years; many times without concern for other listeners. I guess you’re familiar with that too?
The developmental stages in childhood often show a speeded up version of human evolution, we crawl on all fours rather than stand and walk - if raised by wolves we’d continue to crawl on all fours and our anatomy would take the strain.
Mouth are for eating and lungs are for breathing. The underlying principles of language must then be ‘eating’ and ‘breathing’ - the brain on top of this mechanism combines this with locomotion (to find air to breath and food to eat) and a memory to map the world for more efficient sourcing of said ‘food’ and ‘air’. So why not just say language’s underlying principles originate in memory and environmental mapping, which then became a function of consciousness and through ‘theory of mind’ took on a communicative function for thought too that was established by way of vocalisation, motor ability and spacial awareness through an ability to direct attention via memories/mapping/models.
If you do a quick TEDtalk search for ‘my child’s first words’ you’ll see how ‘vocal signs’ are mapped out in a landscape - nothing to do with grammar but it’s interesting to see how thoughts and experiences are accumulated in space and remembered.
One of my general ideas is that ‘language’ is more of less about an emotional narrative function used to instill memories and develop a set of thoughts that led to free formed abstract concepts - the rest is a matter of externalising and exploring differences of thought in ever growing intricacy. Any kind of ‘recursion’ is a matter of memory so maybe ‘language’ is spandrel of ‘memory’. After all explicit memory (‘semantic’ and ‘episodic’) are far more important for thought than anything else (without them there is no ‘thought’). The ‘language’ thing looks to me to be something to do with ‘episodic’ memory, yet I don’t believe ‘language’ preceded ‘thought’, it only preceded ‘communicative language’.
No, it isn't. That other systems are involved in language is not speculation, it's fact. That the nervous system is involved in the visual system isn't speculation, it's fact.
Quoting I like sushi
Exploring subject matter is fine. But - and I say this without hostility - you haven't given me the impression that you're very well versed in this field. This entire post is rife with confusions and mischaracterizations, to the point it's difficult to follow or even know what you're driving at.
Quoting I like sushi
Odd that you say this and yet earlier you said you're not interested in debating the "semantics" of language.
Linguistics is the study of language. According to the evidence, language is a system of thought. We can talk about what thought is, we can talk about neurolinguistics, we can talk anthropology, etc. This all informs the study of language, no doubt.
Quoting I like sushi
The underlying principles of language must be eating and breathing? Is this supposed to be a serious statement? This is what I was saying about utter confusion from your posts.
Language is structure-dependent with recursive properties that nearly always is for thought, not communication. Given these basic facts, we can learn something about language and the principles involved in language, like computational efficiency. Everything else is uninteresting armchair speculation until evidence is presented.
Quoting I like sushi
Defining what language is apart from theory is a waste of time. We can define it any way you'd like. The question is whether it fits into an explanatory theory, what the evidence is for this theory, etc. This is how it's done in the sciences. So to say language is "more or less" about an "emotional narrative function" is incoherent unless it's explained and evidence is offered for this way of conceptualizing it.
Quoting I like sushi
Memory in the case of word retrieval in some cases, sure. There have been people who lost long term memory and still are able to speak perfectly well, however. Regardless, memory is certainly involved in language. The sensorimotor system is involved in language. Intentions are involved. Emotions are involved. Communication is involved. So what? Where are you going with this? You've yet to say anything meaningful.
If you want to simply speculate with "maybe it's this, maybe it's that" then you're welcome to but forgive me if I'm underwhelmed, given there's an entire field out there, called lingusitics, that has studied this seriously.
No, there's plenty of confusion - you just don't want to admit it. Go talk nonsense somewhere else.
Did thought exist without language, before language?
I found a review of Chomsky's book Why Only Us? which addresses this question, which says the following:
My belief is, language doesn't have a strictly scientific explanation. It's associated with intelligence, and I don't know if intelligence is something that can be understood through the evolutionary perspective; that once we become language-using, meaning-seeking beings, then we've escaped the gravitational pull of biology.
Quoting Wayfarer
I’m new to this myself. Would you use ‘thought’ instead of ‘intelligence’? I’m still trying to determine whether it’s true that ‘thoughts are "sentences in the head", meaning they take place within a mental language’. (Wikipedia.)
Gazzaniga, split brain patients. You’ll see the two hemispheres ‘communicating’ externally. The ‘thinking’ is externalised. What this means for non-split brain persons like ourselves is for you to ponder on. It seems very much like the same thing happens in us yet we’re not quite so aware of the ‘external’ interaction of the different cognitive capacities - likely because we’ve come to see our ‘thinking’ as internal rather than as being a partially external means of thinking.
Quoting Brett
We don’t need worded thought to solve complex problems. Chimps can do it and so can other humans with no ‘worded thought’. The use of ‘worded thought’ is taking the ’externalised world’ and bringing it to the ‘internal world’ so it can be modeled in more manageable ‘chunks’ of cognition.
Quoting Brett
This is where the confusion begins. In the sense of what you may mean here (this here spoken/written for of communication), no, it isn’t necessary for ‘thought’ - as marked above in the instances of chimps. If you’re asking about what Chomsky is referring to, and consciously felt authorship, then it’s a much harder question to answer as we don’t know because what is being referred to as ‘language’ may be nothing more than something laying atop several other cognitive systems. That was why I took the ridiculous journey of reduction to pose language as a spandrel of ‘eating’, ‘locomotion’, and ‘breathing’. I did this to show that it is perhaps misleading to suggest that the reason we breath is to speak, and that to equate ‘language’ with some innate capacity is kind of leaning in this direction too - as there is no hard physical evidence for some ‘language module’ anymore than there is for some ‘conscious module’.
If some innate ‘language module’ exists - there are no cases of a genetic disorders that does this (FOXP2 is the closest we’ve got in terms of genes: far too complex a matter to distinguish any singular gene as responsible though), but that is a poor argument as there is limited understanding about every other aspect of human physiology in terms of genetics! Even still, even if, then are we talking about a ‘language module’ or would it be better to call ‘language’ a mere phenomenon repercussion of some deeper ‘cognitive module’ that just so happens to branch out into thought and make itself known via syntactic structures and our means of ordering data?
StreetlightX was correct in pointing out what appears to be a game of shifting the goal posts. It isn’t though. Simply put, a theory was put forward and over time it’s been shown to be wanting in several ways and since then other theories have popped up and older theories have adjusted to the evidence. MERGE has several other theories surrounding it and if isn’t, by any means, the most ‘popular’.
Anyway, this is an interesting read that fleshes out some of the problems and related issues of this broad topic:
http://www.haskins.yale.edu/Reprints/hl1755.pdf
Doesn't have a "strictly" scientific explanation? How are you defining "science"? Language is certainly amenable to analysis, scientific or otherwise. True, language could be magic -- but I don't see any reason for taking that route.
Let's separate "thought" from "language." Thought can happen without language is my belief, and there's good evidence for that. Thinking is not merely restricted to "sentences in the head." I've had colleagues argue that thinking and language are the same thing; I'm just not convinced of it.
There has been talk in decent times of "mentalese," for example. Which is interesting, but we know very little about it.
What's misleading is the near universal belief that language is for communication and evolved as such.
Also, no one is talking about a language module in your sense. If one can't talk about language as a separate (though obviously interactive) system of an organism, then let's also throw out study of vision, digestion, circulation, the nervous system, etc. -- after all, they're not completely separate from the rest of the body either. It's a trivial semantic digression you're making, without any motivation other than to apparently hear yourself talk.
It would be well to recall that Einstein originally constructed his model of the universe out of nonverbal signs, 'of visual and some of muscular type.' As he wrote to a colleague in 1945: 'The words or the language, as they are written or spoken, do not seem to play any role in my mechanism of thought. The psychical entities which seem to serve as elements in thought are certain signs and more or less clear images which can be "voluntarily" reproduced and combined.' Later, 'only in a secondary stage,' after long and hard labour to transmute his nonverbal construct into 'conventional words and other signs,' was he able to communicate it to others.
Certainly worth bearing in mind, yes.
Quoting Galuchat
That’s very interesting. It’s like he’s accessing some sort of ‘pure thought’ that we probably have but are unconscious of.
My queries are driven by an interest I have in children around 18 months of age, who are beginning to speak, and how they think, what they know and how language develops. It seems to me they know more than they can say simply because it takes time to develop clear speech. I know there’s a lot of research on this but I like developing my own thoughts on it from observation and conversation with others and a bit of idle research, i.e. at some point I’d rather go for a swim.
Good luck with that.