"Chunks of sense"
Reading much of the newer metaphysics and epistemology posts (especially Bartricks') I find they go around in circles forever.
What is A
A is when you put B and C together
What are B and C
B is a D E and C is a slightly F G
Etc
Seems to be how arguments progress there. It got me wondering how we can ever even have well defined concepts in a language when every word is supposedly replaceable by a combination of other words. At what point do we cease defining and start understanding.
"Philosophy in the flesh" (great book imo) and my recent reading of Eastern philosophy gave me a new perspective which is "chunks of sense". I believe there are certain concepts we're born knowing such as: time, space, shape, etc. Even if you didn't know the word for those you'd understand them. You can usually tell if a word represents one of these "primal concepts" by how hard it is to define. Example: Try to define shape. That's the hardest one I've found so far and I've utterly failed to define shape without just using a synonym. Google defines it as the "outline" of an object but is literally just a synonym
While there are other words such as "Horse" which you cannot hope to conceptualize before seeing one. You aren't born knowing what a horse is and a horse can be defined in other ways such as "The furless four legged animal with hooves that humans usually ride on" (not a perfect definition but one can reach a perfect definition at least). Notice how nothing resembling a synonym of horse appears in the description. Additionally, all the things that do are "non primal words" such as hooves, fur, humans, ride, etc.
I noticed that most of the time "primal" and "non primal" words act as groups (in set theory) where non primal words can only be defined by other non primal words and primal words can only be defined by primal words.
Example: triangle: the space between 3 lines intersecting at 3 points
Space, line, point and triangle are all primal. You can know what all of them are without any sensory evidence (you know them when you're born)
So my hypothesis is: non primal words can only be defined by other non primal words and primal words can only be defined by primal words.
What do you think?
What is A
A is when you put B and C together
What are B and C
B is a D E and C is a slightly F G
Etc
Seems to be how arguments progress there. It got me wondering how we can ever even have well defined concepts in a language when every word is supposedly replaceable by a combination of other words. At what point do we cease defining and start understanding.
"Philosophy in the flesh" (great book imo) and my recent reading of Eastern philosophy gave me a new perspective which is "chunks of sense". I believe there are certain concepts we're born knowing such as: time, space, shape, etc. Even if you didn't know the word for those you'd understand them. You can usually tell if a word represents one of these "primal concepts" by how hard it is to define. Example: Try to define shape. That's the hardest one I've found so far and I've utterly failed to define shape without just using a synonym. Google defines it as the "outline" of an object but is literally just a synonym
While there are other words such as "Horse" which you cannot hope to conceptualize before seeing one. You aren't born knowing what a horse is and a horse can be defined in other ways such as "The furless four legged animal with hooves that humans usually ride on" (not a perfect definition but one can reach a perfect definition at least). Notice how nothing resembling a synonym of horse appears in the description. Additionally, all the things that do are "non primal words" such as hooves, fur, humans, ride, etc.
I noticed that most of the time "primal" and "non primal" words act as groups (in set theory) where non primal words can only be defined by other non primal words and primal words can only be defined by primal words.
Example: triangle: the space between 3 lines intersecting at 3 points
Space, line, point and triangle are all primal. You can know what all of them are without any sensory evidence (you know them when you're born)
So my hypothesis is: non primal words can only be defined by other non primal words and primal words can only be defined by primal words.
What do you think?
Comments (38)
I can explain what ‘shape’ means to someone easily enough in numerous ways - by example, by reference, with the use of synonyms or antonyms, etc.,. Words, primarily, act to communicate concepts. Of course, once we’re equipped with a lexicon we can explore possibilities internally.
Quoting khaled
A ‘line’ is necessarily defined by both ‘point’ and ‘space’. I can also say ‘edge’ or the form made when the shortest distance between two positions is traversed (note: ‘point’ is very like ‘position’ but no the same thing). I can also define ‘line’ as the boundary between two different areas - real or existent. In any case I must necessarily refer to experience to understand ‘line’ and may use any day to day object as a means of describing ‘line’ by referring to the straight edge of a book or rock (not that a ‘line’ has to be straight; I just assumed you meant straight line).
Quoting khaled
Yet we’re born able to recognise a face. If the face happens to be a horse face we can recognise it as a horse face. We cannot ‘conceptualise’ ANYTHING a priori. That is not the same as saying we don’t have the capacity for experience only that we’re open to given experiences and filter our experience based on repetition and use.
By ‘evidence’ I assume you mean ‘experience’? If not you’ll have to explain further. If so you’re wrong because we can never ‘feel’ without experiencing ‘feeling’. Or more simply put, without sensory input sensibility is mute.
This is a profound question. What is it that we tend to call understanding? We tell our child that it's bedtime, and the child 'understands' by switching off their light. If we try to describe understanding as something internal, aren't we in an awkward position? In the beginning was the [s]deed[/s] coordinated action? How old are we when we start believing that there are 'physical' objects? In the play pen or when we learn how one uses 'physical'?
Why do we assume so readily that pure meaning is just there to be gazed on by a pure subject in a kind of obscure 'mental' realm? And doesn't the construction of this mental realm depend on metaphors grabbed from the exterior of this mental realm? 'The mind is a box of thoughts.'
This isn't to deny 'mental' experience (for which we already have a useful phrase) but only to question the absoluteness of this 'I' gazing at pure meaning as a starting point. Note, for instance, that 'mental' and 'meaning' and 'concept' are caught up in the same system of language. As you say, we define one word in terms of others. But then we learn language in order to only then become doubting subjects. I can't doubt the very language in which I express my doubt. The 'mystery' of language (intelligibility) seems central to human being. And human being is (I'd say) social being. Even if Robinson Crusoe is alone on an island, he takes his language with him. To be fully human it is necessary to know a language?
The alternative I'm sketching is anything but mine. I connect it to Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Derrida, Saussure, and others. The Cartesian subject has IMV been demolished as a good starting point for philosophy, even if it was good as a kind of fire that burned everything down to make space.
It's one of the 'dogmas of empiricism' that humans are born 'tabula rasa' i.e. blank slate, onto which ideas are inscribed by experience. However, the fallacy of this is that human are born primed for language, reason, and much else besides. That can be understood in some ways through genetics and evolution, in that these capacities evolved, but, having evolved, they also open up capabilities which are far beyond the (merely) biological.
Noam Chomsky (whom I have not studied in depth) has a theory of universal grammar, which are a set of universal rules for manipulating concepts, independently of a sensory experience. So that seems to undercut the empiricist dogma. But even before that, Kant showed that the mind has innate capacities - the categories of the understanding, and so on - which are amongst the fundamental constituents of knowledge.
And the results from trying to teach non-human primates to speak have overall been dismal. Apart from the lack of anatomical specifics, such as a well-developed larynx, animals also have apparently not much capacity for forming abstract ideas and especially for grasping relationships between abstract ideas, which is fundamental to language and reason.
So what you're describing as 'primal words' actually goes a lot deeper than simply words. The triangle, which you mention as an example, is a concept - a plane bounded by three intersecting straight lines. Knowing that concept, you can then recognise any form of triangle, even if they vary hugely in other respects.
Your 'chunks of sense' is somewhat reminiscent of Bertrand Russell's 'logical atomism', which is that language depends on invariable units of meaning (or something). But I don't really think it has much of a following.
Overall, this topic is central to, not only philosophy, but also semiotics (theory of signs) and linguistics. But good luck with finding some foundational collection of 'primal words' in terms of which everything else can be understood.
@Bartricks arguments are particularly poorly formed. So that the ensuing discussion does not progress should not be a surprise. But that one, two or even most posters hereabouts cannot mount a coherent, worthwhile discussion should not lead you to conclude that there can never be such a thing.
And pleasingly there are examples here of useful discussions - and by that I mean where the subject progresses, new approaches are found, disagreements are resolved or otherwise settled.
Perhaps you've started one here.
- ouch
- mamma
- dodo
- poopoo
- kaka
- yummy
- pipi (or peepee)
These are the first words a baby hears, repeatedly hears, and later understands by way of visual and other sensory verification of the phonymal string's cognitive image.
It seems to me that what you call "primal words" aren't hard to define as you put it but rather they're the simplest of words, their meanings graspable without recourse to other words, thus are left undefined. Perhaps such words are ostensively defined through an act of pointing out the set of objects you want to name.
If that's true then you're correct in that the meaning "primal words" can only be conveyed through synonyms and not with an explicit definiens as is usually done for words which you call "non primal words". With each synonym we hope that a person will grasp the essence of what the "primal word" means because with more options available the likelihood that a person has come across one of them increases, with an overall improvement in the chances that s/he will understand the "primal word".
"Non primal words", as you pointed out, depend on other words of the same type and all that needs to be added is that the lineage of all words, "primal and non primal", can be traced to undefined, simplest, "primal words".
I also feel that insofar as "primal words" are concerned it isn't actually about defining them; rather, being the simplest possible unit of meaning, it's a matter of naming. For instance we don't define a point. We name it.
One could say, as you have, that we're born with "primal words/concepts" but as I mentioned above "primal concepts" only involve assigning names to objects. I might have used the word "understand" somewhere above in re "primal words" as if there's a meaning there that needs to be understood but as it turns out "primal words" are meaningless and are only names we give to objects of interest. "Primal words" are like the straight lines and curves in letters, themselves devoid of meaning but in a certain pattern form letters of the alphabet and have meaning. Therefore, since "primal words" have no meaning, there is nothing that we're born with.
Read a book on geometry and you'll quickly find this isn't the case.
. is location in space
a line is an infininte of the above (marked as .) that all are in line with two relatively "extreme" points
....A............B....
A and B are the supposed relatively extreme points
A geometry book would do a much better job.
If you read a book on geometry or just about any math book that systematically defines something then you'll quickly realize even basic concepts very often have elaborate definitions.
Kant would say time and space are intuitions we are born with, not concepts.
I don't see how 'shape' would be 'primal' in your terms as it preliminarily requires there to be 'space', and something occupying that space. It is the form things take in space, and I think philosophically 'form' is more 'primal', or fundamental, or whatever the word is. Plato and Wayfarer would agree I believe :)
Personally I'm wary of 'etc'. Just what is included and excluded by an 'etcetera', and how am I to know?
I suggest it may be a confusion to try to argue both about primal-ness and about words, as if such discussions can be merged. There are many ways of talking about both space and time using non-primal words. Time hath, my Lord, a wallet at his back, in which he keeps / Alms for oblivion.
No they don't - show me an argument of mine that is circular - they're just difficult questions to answer and you're clearly impatient. Note too, what you describe above is not a circle.
Not even a point in space? Or a triangle?
Quoting I like sushi
What "experience" did you refer to in your definitions? You only used points, shapes space, etc
Quoting I like sushi
See, you keep saying this but I disagree.
I've argued that morality is made of a god's - Reason's - attitudes and I've done that using deductively valid arguments that have premises no-one can reasonably deny. How's that 'going nowhere'?? Gone to a place you dislike, perhaps, but that's different.
I've argued that truth is what Reason asserts to be the case - that is, that truth is a performative of Reason. Again, that's not going nowhere.
I've argued that our minds are eternal souls. That's not nowhere.
I've argued that it is wrong to procreate. That's not nowhere.
I've argued that knowledge is an attitude or feeling that Reason has about some true beliefs.
I've argued that time can't possibly be a substance.
No argument that I have made is circular, and their conclusions are hardly insignificant.
So what you've said is patently false. Like so many others, you just dislike the conclusions and so have decided that there must be something wrong with 'philosophy' given that I've used it to arrive at them.
Yes and "primal words" are words describing concepts. Non primal words describe things, like a fridge
Quoting Wayfarer
I cannot. Because primal words only define other primal words. You cannot go from an understanding of shapes, space, lines and points to understanding what a fridge is
But all of those represent things that exist. Things the baby couldn't have known without seeing them. A baby knows what a "shape" or a "line" is though when he's born. The only problem is to relate those concepts to their words.
None of them are circular. They all go places. Good job!!
:up: you put it better
Quoting TheMadFool
I just don't like the language used here. By this language a triangle is meaningless amd cannot be understood
That's fighting talk. You said things about my arguments - mine explicitly - that are false.
"Location" and "Point" are synonyms. And notice how the definition of point only employs primal words
Quoting christian2017
Again, only uses primal words
Quoting christian2017
I'm not denying that, I'm just saying that these "primal words" define each other and don't need input from the outside
You want a fight, that's why you're seeing a fight. I don't mean to bash your posts but if you're going to insist I am then I see no point in replying
Anything defined by primal concepts is a primal concept, because you could've come up with the definition yourself without any sensory input
Quoting mcdoodle
Any words whose definitions yo could've come up with without sensory input
Even the greatest philosophers engaged in "fights".
The Poker incident
Wittgenstein insisted that there can never be a moral proposition and pointed a poker at Popper and asked him to give just one example.
To which Popper replied, " Such as not pointing poker at your guests " :grin:
Wittgenstein was :angry: :grimace:
He also stormed out of the room
Quoting khaled
Quoting khaled
I simply applied your principle. When we find things difficult to define, we may be dealing with entities that are undefinable but nameable.
i guess.
Yellow is the colour of a banana.
This is not a definition, it is an understanding, you have to see a banana to understand what it means.
Someone mention tabla rosa previously, that is probably a good place to start looking. Also, the history of behaviorism and the whole nature or nurture question may help outline the conditions for experience and knowledge better.
As an attempt to open the problem up consider what you knew about anything before you existed. That is basically what a priori means. Prior to experience there is no ‘knowledge’. Much like the concept of a ‘hat’ being nonexistent in the absence of ‘heads’.
Kant famously said, “Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind.”
Note: ‘Intuitions’ has a specific meaning beyond the colloquial use today.
No they're incapable of experiencing the experience that showed most of us what a "line" means. Aka seeing a line drawn and someone pointing to it and calling it "line." Which SHOULD mean they will never be able to do geometry because they cannot see lines or points by your argument
Tell me, what experience is needed to understand what a "line" is?
Nothing more to add, but I’m sure others here would be more willing to engage with you in depth.
Why do you call the categories 'primal' and 'non-primal'?
'Abstract' and 'real' would make better sense as there is a clear divide between the real world and the abstract worlds.