Does (not "did") a mathematical truth obtaining depend on any mind?
Yes, it depended on a mind to be produced, written on the paper, and without a mind to read and interpret it in the future, it is just symbols on the paper. Even if we assume that there is meaning inherent within the symbols on the paper, there is no truth there unless a mind judges that meaning for correctness.
What would happen to mathematical truths if there were no longer any minds?
if there were no longer any minds, there would be just symbols on the paper. There is no truth to these symbols without a mind to interpret them, hence there'd be no mathematical truths without any minds.
Saying that some math principles persist through time sidesteps the fact that the vast majority of established math principles persist, and will continue to persist. That new math knowledge such as zero, calculus, non-euclidian geometries, etc are added to the math corpus is not the same phenomenon as the demonstrable evolution of moral conventions (such as slavery, divine right of kings, stoning adulterers and homosexuals, burning heretics at the stake ... .)
I don't see the difference which you are claiming. Mathematical principles come into existence, they have in the past come into existence, and from the point that they come into existence, they spread from acceptance amongst a small group of people to a large more widespread group, then they may persist, onward into the future. Moral principles, such as the abolishment of slavery, and the abolishment of stoning adulterers and homosexuals, have come into existence in the past, they start from a small group of people, then spread to a larger group, and may persist onward into the future. Where is the basis for your claim of a "false equivalency"?
Because the ability to make distinctions is fundamental to being able to argue a case.
Your neglecting the fact that the ability to establish similarities (identify), is even more fundamental. Focusing on differences while neglecting similarities cannot produce an adequate understanding.
Yes, it depended on a mind to be produced, written on the paper, and without a mind to read and interpret it in the future, it is just symbols on the paper.
Didn't I make it clear that, in this context, the past is irrelevant? I thought I made that clear enough. Yet your reply begins by speaking in past tense! So, I will disregard that first part of your reply.
Yes, [s]it depended on a mind to be produced, written on the paper, and[/s] without a mind to read and interpret it in the future, it is just symbols on the paper.
These debates get very tedious unless you stick to the point or spell out your conclusions. So, you say that it can't be read or interpreted and is just symbols on paper. But that wasn't the question, was it? No, the question was whether it would be true.
A statement can be true or false. A statement is composed of symbols. A statement can be on paper. And a statement doesn't need to be read or interpreted for it to be truth-apt, and for it to be true (or false).
Each one of those statements is demonstrably true.
So, you'd need to explain why it would be any different in the hypothetical scenario.
Even if we assume that there is meaning inherent within the symbols on the paper, there is no truth there unless a mind judges that meaning for correctness.
That needs to be justified. I see no good reason to accept that.
And wasn't it you who made the point earlier that these kind of things are rule-based and dependent on convention? (I could go back and check if need be, so bear that in mind before you think about denying it). Once this has been set or established, why would there need to be a mind there to judge whether or not it accords?
If there were no longer any minds, there would be just symbols on the paper. There is no truth to these symbols without a mind to interpret them, hence there'd be no mathematical truths without any minds.
Begging the question. That's what the debate is about. You can't just assume it.
Metaphysician UndercoverNovember 18, 2016 at 03:40#335910 likes
Similarity is a combination of sameness and difference; it cannot be derived just from sameness.
That's true, but what I was pointing to was the importance of sameness, as the basis of equality, as a moral principle. Sameness is an assumed absolute. Similarity is the recognition that only the perfect One is the same, and all other cases of individuals partake of difference.
I gave a firm answer to that. No, it would not be true, and gave reasons for that answer. You dismissed my reasons, which refer to both past and future, by claiming that my reasons just refer to the past. Then you proceeded to claim that I did not answer the question.
A statement can be true or false. A statement is composed of symbols.
If a statement is just a bunch of symbols, how can it be true or false without an interpretation? Where do the symbols derive a meaning from?
There are two very distinct meanings for the word "statement". One is the expression in words, which you refer to here, the second is the thing stated, which is the assumed meaning of those words. It appears like you are trying to equivocate.
You dismissed my reasons, which refer to both past and future, by claiming that my reasons just refer to the past.
That isn't true, as everyone can see. I only dismissed the part about the past - not out of hand, but because it isn't relevant to the question, which, as I clearly stated, is about the present or a hypothetical future.
Then you proceeded to claim that I did not answer the question.
I'll add this to the wealth of evidence which suggests that your preference is to attack a watered down misrepresentation.
[I]Some[/I] of the things that you raised in response to the question don't answer the question, [i]unless[/I], perhaps, there is one or more implicit premise. They do not answer the question [I]per se[/I]. That is what I was getting at when I said that these debates get very tedious unless you stick to the point or spell out your conclusions.
And [i]some[/I] of what you said [i]does[/I] answer the question, [i]but requires justification[/I].
If a statement is just a bunch of symbols, how can it be true or false without an interpretation?
Why would it need to be interpreted, at the time, for it to be true? That is demonstrably not the case now, so why would it be any different in the hypothetical future scenario?
I have made countless statements on here, and elsewhere, and they are either true or false, as the case may be - even when no one is interpreting them. There obviously isn't someone or other there constantly interpreting every statement that I've made. Yet, nevertheless, they are true or false, in correspondence with what is or isn't the case.
Your additional condition seems unnecessary and unreflective of reality. It requires justification.
That's a better question. But a related question, which matters even more than that, since it is closer to what the debate is about, is whether or not the meaningfulness of the symbols can be, or is, independent of that from which it was originally derived.
There are two very distinct meanings for the word "statement". One is the expression in words, which you refer to here, the second is the thing stated, which is the assumed meaning of those words.
Yes, one can distinguish between a statement and its meaning. I was well aware of that.
An answer isn't the same as an argument, whether it's firm or not.
You asked me to answer the question, that I did. I also gave you the reasons for my answer. if you wanted an argument you should have asked for it. That's what I do, I ask you to justify your numerous assertions, which you very seldom are capable of doing.
Why would it need to be interpreted, at the time, for it to be true? That is demonstrably not the case now, so why would it be any different in the hypothetical future scenario?
A bunch of symbols on a paper is neither true nor false without an interpretation. How many different ways must I spell this out?
I have made countless statements on here, and elsewhere, and they are either true or false, as the case may be - even when no one is interpreting them. There obviously isn't someone or other there constantly interpreting every statement that I've made. Yet, nevertheless, they are true or false, in correspondence with what is or isn't the case.
These statements that you've made here and elsewhere, consist of symbols. Why do you believe that these symbols correspond to anything without a mind to judge what they correspond to? Can you justify this? Does this symbol "to", automatically correspond to something without a mind to determine what it corresponds to?
You seem to have an overactive imagination. No, actually, I did not. The original question was just an example question, as I made quite clear. But you chose to answer it of your own accord. And, since then, I have criticised your answer.
If you wanted an argument you should have asked for it.
I didn't bring up the question with the expectation of an answer of any kind, let alone an argument. But, since you took it upon yourself to answer it, I thought I'd analyse your answer, and point out the parts of it which would, in the context of a realism vs. anti-realism debate, need to be argued for, rather than merely asserted.
A bunch of symbols on a paper is neither true nor false without an interpretation. How many different ways must I spell this out?
No, that's begging the question again, which is not at all what I'm interested in. I'm interested in an explanation or an argument. It's either that or don't bother to reply.
And don't think I haven't noticed your sly wording, taking advantage of the ambiguity in "without an interpretation". What does that mean? If there being an interpretation means there being a correct way for it to be interpreted, then I don't see why that would actually need a mind there interpreting it.
Why do you believe that these symbols correspond to anything without a mind to judge what they correspond to?
No, the burden is on you to explain why that would be necessary, not on me to explain why it isn't. I don't know why you would think that to be necessary, unless you also believe some false idealist premise which would [i]make[/I] that necessary.
What's annoying about these debates, from my experience, is that that is sometimes kept implicit, when it should be made explicit from the start. And at other times, it is simply plucked out of the hat, as if it were a self-evident truth, and not something highly controversial which the whole debate hinges on.
Can you justify this? Does this symbol "to", automatically correspond to something without a mind to determine what it corresponds to?
That's a very naive attack on the correspondence theory of truth. No, it doesn't work like that. Perhaps you should look it up. It's about a certain sort of statement, not a word.
Why would there need to be a mind to [i]determine[/I] correspondence for there [i]to be[/I] correspondence? That just doesn't make sense, unless, perhaps, you assume idealism, which would be begging the question.
TheWillowOfDarknessNovember 18, 2016 at 23:05#337370 likes
Metaphysician Undercover:Why do you believe that these symbols correspond to anything without a mind to judge what they correspond to?
I want to know how there can't be mathematical truths without a mind, yet it remains truth there is paper with symbols on it. The presence of paper and symbols in experience/judgement/concept requires no less mind than mathematics.
Metaphysician UndercoverNovember 19, 2016 at 01:05#337520 likes
The original question was just an example question, as I made quite clear. But you chose to answer it of your own accord.
...
I'm interested in an explanation or an argument.
OK, I gave you my explanation, concerning the nature of statements and symbols. What more do you want?
One meaning of the word "statement" is to use it to refer to the symbols themselves as they exist. Another meaning of the word "statement" is to use it to refer to what the symbols mean. We should not conflate these two or equivocate.
All you are doing is conflating the two and equivocating. Look:
That's a very naive attack on the correspondence theory of truth. No, it doesn't work like that. Perhaps you should look it up. It's about a certain sort of statement, not a word.
Then to my claim that that statements are composed of symbols, you said:
OK, I gave you my explanation, concerning the nature of statements and symbols. What more do you want?
You said that it can be neither true nor false "without an interpretation". I asked you to clarify what that means, and to explain why you think that there would need to be a mind there interpreting it, if that is what you're implying. If that's not what you're implying, then what function would a mind being there serve? It would then seem redundant, unnecessary, irrelevant.
As far as I'm aware, you haven't done that so far.
One meaning of the word "statement" is to use it to refer to the symbols themselves as they exist. Another meaning of the word "statement" is to use it to refer to what the symbols mean. We should not conflate these two or equivocate.
All you are doing is conflating the two and equivocating.
No, I'm not. I'm asking you why the statement, or the symbols on the piece of paper, can't be true or false. The whole issue here is whether or not they would be meaningful, so I'm not assuming anything about that. Rather, I am asking whether you can explain why you think that they wouldn't be so, and critising what you've said thus far. One such criticism is that what you've said doesn't explain anything, but is only a question begging assertion.
So, which are we talking about, a statement as a bunch of symbols, or a statement as the meaning, such that we can have "a certain sort of statement"
I have not, in this discussion, used the word "statement" to refer to just the meaning. I made a distinction earlier between a statement and its meaning (if it has one). You should pay closer attention to what I've said before jumping to the conclusion that I'm equivocating. The question is whether or not the statement, as minimally a bunch of symbols, would be such that it could be true.
You're suggesting, if I've understood you correctly, that it would have to "have an interpretation" or "be meaningful". But what does that mean or entail? And why would there being at least one mind there be necessary for that?
I've outlined an alternative theory which can explain that without the need of positing any mind being there.
Occam's razor.
Metaphysician UndercoverNovember 19, 2016 at 17:58#339910 likes
As far as I'm aware, you haven't done that so far.
Let me explain very slowly and carefully then. There's a bunch of symbols written on a piece of paper. These symbols could mean absolutely anything. For them to state a "truth" requires that the symbols have a determinate meaning, which corresponds to reality. For the symbols to have a determinate meaning requires a mind to determine that meaning. Therefore without a mind there is no truth to those symbols.
Here's another way of looking at it. There's something written on the paper. Whatever it is which is on the paper cannot be a "truth" unless it means something. It only means something to a mind. Therefore, only from the perspective of a mind, can what is on the paper be a "truth".
Let me explain very slowly and carefully then. There's a bunch of symbols written on a piece of paper. These symbols could mean absolutely anything.
Why? I mean, it seems to me that they could or they couldn't.
If they were just randomly written, or written in a purposefully vague and ambiguous manner, with no strict meaning, open to interpretation... then yes.
But if the writer wrote them in a certain way, with a certain meaning, then, I mean, [i]that[/I] would be their meaning, right? And if you or anyone else interpreted them in any other way, then that would be assigning them a [i]different[/I] meaning. It would be to [i]misinterpret[/I] them. And if the writer and everyone else died, then wouldn't it remain to be the case that there is - or would be - a correct way, as well as, by implication, incorrect ways, to interpret them? This would be what the writer meant when he or she wrote them - and this seems to be just as true today, even after the writer has ceased to exist, as it would be in the hypothetical scenario, when the writer, as well as everyone else, has ceased to exist. Of course, in the hypothetical scenario, there wouldn't be anyone there to do the interpreting - [i]but why would there need to be?[/I]
I find this idealist way of thinking to be logically unsound and rather bizarre. It's like there's a school, and the school has rules, but the idealist thinks that whether or not the kids break the rules depends on whether or not there is a teacher there watching over them, rather than simply whether or not the kids break the rules. I mean, sure, you can add premises to make that a logically valid argument, but you'd be doing so at the cost of logical soundness.
For them to state a "truth" requires that the symbols have a determinate meaning, which corresponds to reality.
[I][B]Note[/b]: for the following, I take "to be determined" to serve the same function as "to be known", "to be figured out", or, the classic, "to be perceived". According to my theory, the meaning is predetermined, and subsequent to that determination, it becomes a matter of discovery.[/I]
For them to state a truth requires that the symbols have a meaning which corresponds to reality. [I]Why would it need to be determinate?[/I]
And even if it does, then for the symbols to have a determinate meaning is for the symbols to have a meaning which is capable, in principle, of being determined. Which is to say that if they were interpreted, [i]then[/I] there would be a meaning to be determined. [I]Which doesn't necessitate any interpreter or determiner[/I]. So, the question would then be: [I]why are you adding this unnecessary condition that there be an interpreter or determiner?[/I]
For the symbols to have a determinate meaning requires a mind to determine that meaning.
I have demonstrated that that need not be so. Just as there need not be a teacher to watch over the kids, there need not be a mind to determine that meaning.
Here's another way of looking at it. There's something written on the paper. Whatever it is which is on the paper cannot be a "truth" unless it means something.
Okay, I'm willing to assume this much. Let's see where you take this.
Why? The burden would be on you to justify that. It [i]would[/I] mean something to a mind, [i]if[/I] a mind was there, doing whatever it does for it to mean something to it. [I]But whether or not it means something need not depend on a mind actually being there[/I]. If you're a realist, then [i]it doesn't[/I]. If you're an idealist, then you say that it does. You posit this [i]additional[/I] condition [i]which Occam's razor can cut out[/I]. The burden would be on you.
Therefore, only from the perspective of a mind, can what is on the paper be a "truth".
And here we have another conclusion which we need not accept, unless we accept your premises (assuming validity). But because one or more of your premises is (arguably) false, we need not accept your argument.
But if the writer wrote them in a certain way, with a certain meaning, then, I mean, that would be their meaning, right?
That's not their meaning though, that the writer wrote the symbols in a certain way. The meaning is not the "way" that they are written, because this just refers to the specific symbols used, and the patterns formed with them. The "meaning" is what is intended by the author, and this is something other than the symbols themselves, and the patterns, it is what they refer to.
And if you or anyone else interpreted them in any other way, then that would be assigning them a different meaning. It would be to misinterpret them. And if the writer and everyone else died, then wouldn't it remain to be the case that there is - or would be - a correct way, as well as, by implication, incorrect ways, to interpret them? This would be what the writer meant when he or she wrote them - and this seems to be just as true today, even after the writer has ceased to exist, as it would be in the hypothetical scenario, when the writer, as well as everyone else, has ceased to exist. Of course, in the hypothetical scenario, there wouldn't be anyone there to do the interpreting - but why would there need to be?
So I agree with all of this, that there is a correct "what the writer meant" etc., with one fundamental difference. "What was meant" is something other than the symbols themselves, and the pattern itself. And so, as much as we can assume that there is a "what was meant", it's really not there in the symbols themselves, it's in the assumption of the mind which apprehends the symbols. A mind apprehends the symbols and assumes that there is a "what was meant". There is no "what was meant" within the symbols themselves, there is an assumption in the mind which apprehends the symbols, that there is a "what was meant". Therefore there is no "what was meant", without a mind which assumes that there is a "what was meant". The "what was meant" is only an assumption.
I find this idealist way of thinking to be logically unsound and rather bizarre. It's like there's a school, and the school has rules, but the idealist thinks that whether or not the kids break the rules depends on whether or not there is a teacher there watching over them, rather than simply whether or not the kids break the rules. I mean, sure, you can add premises to make that a logically valid argument, but you'd be doing so at the cost of logical soundness.
Where would these rules exist? Let's say that they are written somewhere in a book or something. Whether or not a kid breaks a rule requires that someone interprets what is written in that book, and interprets what the kids do, and draws a comparison. It is your argument which is unsound. You think that you can make a conclusion about whether or not any kids broke any rules without a statement of what the kids did, and a statement of what the rules are.
Don't you realize that whether or not someone breaks a rule is something which is subject to interpretation? That is why we have trial by jury, to give the defendant a fair trial. It is not a case of either the person broke the law or did not, it is a case of how the person's actions are interpreted in comparison to how the laws are interpreted.
For them to state a truth requires that the symbols have a meaning which corresponds to reality. Why would it need to be determinate?
And even if it does, then for the symbols to have a determinate meaning is for the symbols to have a meaning which is capable, in principle, of being determined. Which is to say that if they were interpreted, then there would be a meaning to be determined. Which doesn't necessitate any interpreter or determiner. So, the question would then be: why are you adding this unnecessary condition that there be an interpreter or determiner?
OK, for the sake of argument, let's say that "determinate" implies "capable, in principle, of being determined". It actually means definite, and let's assume that definite necessitates that it is possible to determine it, and therefore determinable. The problem is that we have nothing more than an assumption that the symbols have determinate meaning. In order for them to state a truth, they must actually have a determinate meaning. How do we get beyond this gap, from assuming that the symbols have a determinate meaning, to them actually having a determinate meaning? We might say, that the author, gave the symbols a determinate meaning through intention, as what was meant. But how is this something which is actually determinate, rather than just us assuming that the author gave them a determinate meaning?
Why? The burden would be on you to justify that. It would mean something to a mind, if a mind was there, doing whatever it does for it to mean something to it.
Do you understand the meaning of "meaning"? It is what is meant. And what is meant refers to what is intended. It is only minds which have intention. Therefore meaning only exists in relation to minds. We can go back, and insist that the meaning was put there, in those symbols, through the intention of the author, but this is just an assumption. And assumptions only exist in minds. So, that there is meaning within the symbols, put there by a mind, is just an assumption, so even this meaning relies on a mind, because it is just an assumed meaning.
That's not their meaning though, that the writer wrote the symbols in a certain way. The meaning is not the "way" that they are written, because this just refers to the specific symbols used, and the patterns formed with them. The "meaning" is what is intended by the author, and this is something other than the symbols themselves, and the patterns, it is what they refer to.
Yes and no. If we assume that what the author meant is what they mean, then yes. And that is what I was assuming, so that's not a problem. The author intended to write them in a certain way, with a certain meaning.
I have to call you out on your use of present-tense here, though. You say that the meaning is what is intended by the author. But that isn't necessary, and, as a necessity, is demonstrably false. The meaning can be what was intended by the author. It is demonstrably the case that the author doesn't need to constantly intend that meaning. What would happen when the author dies, and can no longer intend anything, let alone the meaning of what he wrote? What he wrote would instantly become meaningless, and remain meaningless ever after? That is absurd.
So I agree with all of this, that there is a correct "what the writer meant" etc., with one fundamental difference. "What was meant" is something other than the symbols themselves, and the pattern itself.
I don't think that that's a fundamental difference in terms of this realism vs. idealism debate, since it seems to me that a realist can accept that without contradiction or conceding idealism.
And so, as much as we can assume that there is a "what was meant", it's really not there in the symbols themselves, it's in the assumption of the mind which apprehends the symbols. A mind apprehends the symbols and assumes that there is a "what was meant". There is no "what was meant" within the symbols themselves, there is an assumption in the mind which apprehends the symbols, that there is a "what was meant". Therefore there is no "what was meant", without a mind which assumes that there is a "what was meant". The "what was meant" is only an assumption.
The problem here isn't so much in what you've taken issue with. The problem here is that the above contains more tense errors. If, in key parts of your text, you were to speak in past tense ("was"), or in conditional tense ("would", "were", "could"), where appropriate, then that would remove the controversy. Your failure to do so basically means that you're begging the question again. So, you'd still need to provide an argument.
There was a mind that intended a meaning. That meaning is the meaning of the symbols that were written. If there were a mind, then it could interpret a meaning. Although that meaning might not be [i]the[/I] meaning. But, in the hypothetical scenario, there wouldn't be a mind. Yet it doesn't follow from any of this that there would need to be a mind for the symbols to have a meaning. So, that is what you'd need to support.
What was meant doesn't have to be in the symbols. It is a fact that the author intended a meaning. It is a fact that the author meant something with the symbols. When talking about this, one shouldn't use scare quotes. But if you're talking about what another mind guesses to be what the author meant, then yes, use scare quotes. That way one can distinguish between what was meant and "what was meant". What was meant isn't only an assumption, but "what was meant" might be.
Whether or not a kid breaks a rule requires that someone interprets what is written in that book, and interprets what the kids do, and draws a comparison.
Nonsense. If, for example, one of the rules is not to speak, and a kid speaks, then that kid has broken that rule. There doesn't need to be an interpreter.
It is your argument which is unsound. You think that you can make a conclusion about whether or not any kids broke any rules without a statement of what the kids did, and a statement of what the rules are.
Straw man. No, I don't. I just gave an example of that. I think that there doesn't need to be a teacher there for the kids to break the rules. What happens when the teacher leaves the room and the kids go wild? They don't break any rules until a teacher comes along? Poppycock! The rules are the rules. We're talking about rules, not guidelines for the teacher.
Don't you realize that whether or not someone breaks a rule is something which is subject to interpretation?
Yes, I do, but there is a correct interpretation, and incorrect interpretations, as we've agreed. The correct interpretion is predetermined. It was what was the author meant. You don't need a teacher there to interpret anything or to check whether or not the kids have broken the rule in order for the kids to have broken the rule. But you might need a teacher there doing that for other reasons not relevant to the analogy.
That is why we have trial by jury, to give the defendant a fair trial. It is not a case of either the person broke the law or did not, it is a case of how the person's actions are interpreted in comparison to how the laws are interpreted.
Yes, our legal system is about how the laws are interpreted. We have judges who have some authority to determine outcomes. Metaphysics and logic don't really work like that.
The logic of it is that either P or -P. And if P, then Q. And if -P, then -Q.
The metaphysics of it is that that kid spoke (P). The rest logically follows. The rule was broken (Q).
Then you come along and say "Oh, and there must be a teacher to interpret stuff!". - Wrong.
OK, for the sake of argument, let's say that "determinate" implies "capable, in principle, of being determined". It actually means definite, and let's assume that definite necessitates that it is possible to determine it, and therefore determinable. The problem is that we have nothing more than an assumption that the symbols have determinate meaning. In order for them to state a truth, they must actually have a determinate meaning.
I'm not sure what you mean. It isn't an assumption that, in principle, the meaning - what the author meant - could be discovered. You can't rule that out. If it would be the case that [i]if there were a mind, then it could be discovered[/I], then the symbols have a discoverable meaning.
I think I'm going to try to avoid using the term "determinable", because I think that it's problematic. The meaning is predetermined, so strictly speaking, it can't be determined after that, unless you mean something else. So, I think that your talk about the meaning being determined, or the meaning being determinable, [i]subsequent to that determination[/I] is false or misleading.
[i]A[/I] meaning could be determined. And that could be anything. But, strictly speaking, [I]the[/I] meaning can't be determined, because it is predetermined. Whether it can be known, understood, or discovered is a different issue.
How do we get beyond this gap, from assuming that the symbols have a determinate meaning, to them actually having a determinate meaning? We might say, that the author, gave the symbols a determinate meaning through intention, as what was meant. But how is this something which is actually determinate, rather than just us assuming that the author gave them a determinate meaning?
Your meaning isn't clear to me, and the problem is this term you're using: "determinate".
If the author meant something, then the author meant something. That would be a fact, not merely something that we're saying, or an assumption. So, I don't get your point. Or it's just wrong.
Therefore meaning only exists in relation to minds.
I haven't denied that, and nor is a realist required to do so. The meaning relates to a mind - the author's, for example. But the realist is saying that neither this mind nor any other needs to be there. That it [i]was[/I] there is sufficient. It's about independence.
Yes and no. If we assume that what the author meant is what they mean, then yes. And that is what I was assuming, so that's not a problem. The author intended to write them in a certain way, with a certain meaning.
Here's the difficulty right here. Let's say that the author intended to write all the symbols exactly as they appear on the paper. That is exactly what the author meant, to produce exactly those symbols in that exact pattern or order. We still assume that there is something which was meant, beyond this expression of symbols. We assume that there is something which was meant by the author, which is represented by the symbols, that the symbols represent something. Therefore we attribute "what was meant by the author" not directly to the pattern of symbols, but to that which lies beyond, what is represented by the symbols.
I have to call you out on your use of present-tense here, though. You say that the meaning is what is intended by the author. But that isn't necessary, and, as a necessity, is demonstrably false. The meaning can be what was intended by the author. It is demonstrably the case that the author doesn't need to constantly intend that meaning. What would happen when the author dies, and can no longer intend anything, let alone the meaning of what he wrote? What he wrote would instantly become meaningless, and remain meaningless ever after? That is absurd.
I have no issue with this problem of tense. I can replace "meaning" with "what was meant", as in the paragraph above, if that makes it easier to understand. We still have to deal with the distinction between "the author meant to write down these symbols", and what the author meant to represent with these symbols. These two are distinct, but related intentions. Following from what you argue here, what this phrase refers to, "what the author meant to represent" never had any existence. That's fine, and not at all absurd as you would claim here. As per my last post, that there is such a thing as "what the author meant to represent", is just an assumption held by the reader. Without this assumption, all the symbols on the paper are meaningless, as you say, but contrary to your claim, there is nothing absurd about that.
The problem here isn't so much in what you've taken issue with. The problem here is that the above contains more tense errors. If, in key parts of your text, you were to speak in past tense ("was"), or in conditional tense ("would", "were", "could"), where appropriate, then that would remove the controversy. Your failure to do so basically means that you're begging the question again. So, you'd still need to provide an argument.
As I said, I'll adhere to proper tense use, replacing "meaning" with "what was meant". The point I'm trying to make though, is that there is nothing real, which exists as "what was meant", other than a pattern of symbols. But this pattern of symbols does not constitute meaning for a reader. The reader must assume that there is a "what was meant" beyond the pattern of symbols, what the symbols represent. So the symbols have no meaning without a reader to assume that there is a "what was meant".
Yet it doesn't follow from any of this that there would need to be a mind for the symbols to have a meaning. So, that is what you'd need to support.
It is you who is making the tense errors. There is only "what was meant", at the time which the author wrote the symbols. You, for some reason, assume that this continues in time as "meaning", such that the symbols have meaning at the present time. This is what needs to be justified. "What was meant" is in the past, "meaning" is in the present. The difference between these two, past and present, justifies my claim that the symbols have no meaning. What you need to do is to show how "what was meant" continues to exist at the present, as meaning. First, you need to justify that there is such a thing as "what was meant".
Following your stated principles, as I explained, the symbols have absolutely no meaning unless there is a mind which assumes that there is a "what was meant". If we remove your conditions, and allow that there is a real "what was meant by the author", and this "what was meant" is not restricted to the past, but continues to exist as "meaning", within the statement, then we can dispose of the need for a mind to assume that there is a "what was meant". However, doing this produces a temporal absurdity, which must be dealt with. An intention at a particular time in the past, "what was meant", is assumed to continue in the present, as "meaning". I know that intention has an odd sort of relation to time, but how do we validate this claim? How do we justify that what was meant, at a particular point of time in the past, when the author writes the symbols, exists as meaning today, without a mind to assume that there is a what was meant?
What was meant doesn't have to be in the symbols. It is a fact that the author intended a meaning. It is a fact that the author meant something with the symbols. When talking about this, one shouldn't use scare quotes. But if you're talking about what another mind guesses to be what the author meant, then yes, use scare quotes. That way one can distinguish between what was meant and "what was meant". What was meant isn't only an assumption, but "what was meant" might be.
Even if we assume that it is a fact that the author intended a meaning, that act is in the past. How does the act of having intended a meaning, in the past, ensure that a meaning exists now at the present. I use quotes on "what was meant", because these words refer to something conceptual only, something within the mind, as intention. There is the intent itself, "what was meant" and this was only in the mind of the author, at that time of writing, in the past. There is also an interpretation of "what was meant", and this is in the mind of the reader. You seem to assume that there is such a thing as "what was meant", in order to claim objective meaning, but that's just an assumption.
Nonsense. If, for example, one of the rules is not to speak, and a kid speaks, then that kid has broken that rule. There doesn't need to be an interpreter.
Actually, your claim is what is nonsense. Of course there needs to be an interpretation, otherwise your supposed rule, "not to speak" is just symbols. Who interprets what it means "to speak" and "not to speak", in order to determine whether the kid has actually broken the rule? If the kid hums or starts making all kinds of unintelligible gibberish noises, has the rule been broken?
Reply to Sapientia If truth is here understood by you as some kind of correspondence between mind and world, then it seems hard to avoid the conclusion that truth is mind-dependent (in the sense that there could not be any truths if there were no minds).
That said, I haven't fully digested the above discussion, so please excuse me if this has already been addressed by you.
If truth is here understood by you as some kind of correspondence between mind and world, then it seems hard to avoid the conclusion that truth is mind-dependent (in the sense that there could not be any truths if there were no minds).
That said, I haven't fully digested the above discussion, so please excuse me if this has already been addressed by you.
No, that's not my understanding. What are you basing that on?
Facts, statements, truth, the world... none of that seems mind-dependent in the relevant sense, namely that there can't be one without the other.
If you think that you can show that anything I've actually said leads to that conclusion, then be my guest.
Sapientia: Facts, statements, truth, the world... none of that seems mind-dependent in the relevant sense, namely that there can't be one without the other.
I don’t yet know how you define any of those terms ("fact", "statement", "truth", "world") so it’s hard to evaluate your claim at this point, but at face value I’d tend to take issue with the claim that statements (for instance) are mind-independent, so perhaps we can start there. To bring this intuition out more clearly I’ll pose the following question and see where it takes us:
1. Were any statements ever made prior to the emergence of intelligent life in the universe?
The way in which you answer this question should help provide some insight into your theory of statements and, hopefully, help drive the discussion forward.
I actually might have triggered that debate in an aside that came up in that thread.
My view: truth is mind-dependent, because it is the predicate of a proposition. Propositions are true, or not true, and whether they are, or are not, is a matter of judgement, and judgement is by a mind. In this respect, I don't agree with Sapientia's argument. But there's another point - a mathematical proof, for example, may be 'mind-independent' in one sense - that is, it is not dependent on being grasped by this or that mind; it's not a matter of convention as to whether it is true or no; so in that sense, it is 'mind-independent'.
But consider that any rational proposition, whether mathematical or otherwise, can only be grasped by a rational mind. So in that sense, it's not 'mind-independent'. This type of understanding actually tends towards 'objective idealism', that there is a rational or intelligible order, which is grasped though the intellect ('nous'); which I think is a strong underlying strain in the history of Western philosophy, until Hegel, but it's objective reality is now contested, due to the fact that physicalism generally rejects the idea of an 'intelligible order' (which is, however, still preserved in schools such as Feser's 'Aristotlean-Thomism'.)
My view of the idea of 'mind-independence', is that when it is turned into a philosophical tenet, as distinct from a methodological step, it is based on the missapplication of the scientific attitude. This is the subject of Thomas Nagel's critique in his most recent (and controversial) book, Mind and Cosmos, where he says in regards to modern thinking, generally:
Thomas Nagel:
Galileo and Descartes made the crucial conceptual division by proposing that physical science should provide a mathematically precise quantitative description of an external reality extended in space and time, a description limited to spatiotemporal primary qualities such as shape, size, and motion, and to laws governing the relations among them. Subjective appearances, on the other hand -- how this physical world appears to human perception -- were assigned to the mind, and the secondary qualities like color, sound, and smell were to be analyzed relationally, in terms of the power of physical things, acting on the senses, to produce those appearances in the minds of observers. It was essential to leave out or subtract subjective appearances and the human mind -- as well as human intentions and purposes -- from the physical world in order to permit this powerful but austere spatiotemporal conception of objective physical reality to develop.
This was the basis of Descartes' conception of a 'universal science' which could be applied to any subject whatever, using algebraic geometry and quantification. And of course it is manifestly obvious that it has been extraordinarily successful in terms of material outcomes. But it is philosophically problematical in my view.
This discussion was created with comments split from Religious experience has rendered atheism null and void to me
I didn't look at that thread, so if my comment is wonky.. sorry. The question of whether anything at all is mind-independent is one that can be debated. Those who say nothing is (mind-independent) are positing that the average person is deluded. But independently of that situation, we frequently use the concept of truth to speak of the unknown.
"No one knew who killed the butler. The detective sought to reveal the truth."
This implies some proposition regarding the butler's killer which is true, but unknown. In this case, it's clear that "truth" does not indicate a mind-dependent property.
And don't think I haven't noticed your sly wording, taking advantage of the ambiguity in "without an interpretation". What does that mean? If there being an interpretation means there being a correct way for it to be interpreted, then I don't see why that would actually need a mind there interpreting it.
Truth arises as a property of a relation between mind and world. So MU is in the right here, but needs to take it a step further.
The crucial thing is that minds form maps of the territory for themselves. So truth becomes an interpretation of the map having some definite reliable meaning. Thus a triadic relationship is formed where we deal with the signs of what we think exists, rather than the noumenal things-in-themselves.
So it is right that a bunch of symbols on a paper don't have an inherent interpretation. The interpretation is a habit that has developed. A mind comes to recognise the map as saying something truthful about a territory.
The territory is then understood to "really exist" in the way it has been imagined. The map is presumed to describe it well. It must do because the map can be used reliably to get places we want to go.
But then - if we stop to think about it more carefully - all we really "know" is that these are the signs we interpret in such and such a way. So we can ascribe truth to that habit of interpretation. We can point to the robustness of a relation. But the territory itself stands beyond the map. And we might not really "know" it at all. It is only our particular habit of relation that is ever actually tested, and so has its "truth" demonstrated, by some act of interpretation.
But carry on with the usual useless idealism vs realism debate....
I agree with Reply to Mongrel, there is an actuality which is independent of any and all minds. It could be argued that actuality is not independent of mind as such, but in this connection I would prefer to say it is not independent of spirit as such. The term 'mind' is too much specifically associated with the idea of analysis, proposition and judgement.
The relation between mind and world is an expression of spirit; so, more primordially, truth is of the spirit.
But is that statement true beyond some particular mapping relation?
In talking about "spirit", you are speaking about the topological features on a map you have constructed. You know what "spirit" means to you because you believe you can recognise it in terms of phenomenology. If particular things happen in experience, you can successfully interpret them as an "expression of spirit".
Yet the next step for you and your map has to be to show you can and do actually use it to navigate a terrain in a way that meets some definite purpose.
I would say that "spirit" here sounds too vague in its ontic commitments. It's literal meaning is so ambiguous that it can be taken to mean pretty well anything one likes. It is the equivalent of a message scrawled on wet blotting paper with a fat felt-tip.
There may be some directions lurking in the putative map, but one could never really be sure that one was not merely getting lucky in eventually stumbling towards any actual destination.
So your response demonstrates how truth in terms of "maps of reality" is both model-centric - fundamentally epistemic - and yet also pragmatically comparable.
We can't transcend our epistemic conditions to inspect the world as it actually is. We are stuck with the internal signs we form as part of a modelling relation.
And yet there are objective features to this mapping - or at least features that we can socially share through language and agreement. That is, society is also a "mind" that makes maps.
The objective features would be the familiar ones of "crisp purposes" and "crisp counterfactuality". A map is true in terms of the purpose it is meant to serve (which can be either very general, or highly restricted). And for a map to be truth-apt, it must eliminate vagueness. It must render the world in as binary fashion as possible.
(And again, these are both good mapping qualities which we have plenty of reason to suspect reality itself to possibly lack. So that is how we arrive at the conundrum of how to remove ourselves - the interested mappers - from our view of reality. What does reality look like if reality were to "map itself"?)
And again, these are both good mapping qualities which we have plenty of reason to suspect reality itself to possibly lack. So that is how we arrive at the conundrum of how to remove ourselves - the interested mappers - from our view of reality. What does reality look like if reality were to "map itself"?)
I think this is really the point; that Reality is spirit; which cannot be mapped, but which does the mapping and which the maps are expressions of. The empirical world is what is mapped, so it is a symbolic, or you would probably prefer to say, semiotic, expression of spirit.
Of course you probably don't think of reality as purposive, intentional or teleological as spirit is thought; you would probably think of it as a virtual chaos or something like that. But when you get down to this level it is a matter of faith, or personal preference, as to how you think about the Real. A person will think about it in the way that seems to them to be most contributive to flourishing. So it really comes down to an ethical and not an epistemological question after all. Kant got it just right even you don't agree with his CI.
Apokrisis:We can't transcend our epistemic conditions to inspect the world as it actually is. We are stuck with the internal signs we form as part of a modelling relation.
That is true, within the domain of discursive reason, but there is also a domain beyond reason, which is what I would think 'spirit' is supposed to denote. That is probably not something you're prepared to recognise or accept, but I think it is understood in the Western philosophical tradition and that it provides a context for and a limit to the claims of reason. That said, 'spirit' is a problematical word, as it has many meanings - not least the obvious one of 'alchoholic liquor'. But in the Western philosophical tradition, there is at least a kind of recognised use of the term 'spirit' in either philosophical or theological terms as the 'ground of being' or 'first cause' or even one element of the Trinity. And I think the German idealists recognised that domain, as does the Thomist tradition in a different way. Whereas now the naturalistic project is to understand the principle of origination in terms of 'self-organisation'.
But for those who don't accept the primacy of naturalism, 'seeing things as they actually are' amounts to acknowledgement of more than what naturalism is prepared to acknowledge. There is an element required of revelation, illumination, or transcendent insight, which is generally not recognised by naturalism. It's a fault line in the culture-wars.
I think the value and the beauty of the term 'spirit' lies precisely in its ambiguity and, for instance, the fact that we can speak of the spirit of an art work, a text, music, love, friendship, unity and so on and know very well what we are speaking about. These are all connections in which the term 'mind' does not work.
We should be very careful, though, not to do what seems so easy and natural to us; that is we should take care not to fall into Hegel's mistake of objectifying spirit, because that way lies totalization, even fundamentalism.
The crucial thing is that minds form maps of the territory for themselves
Do you mean that we construct & share a worldview, the fact that it is shared, gives it reliable meaning, it has pragmatic use.
The triadic relationship. The noumena does not appear, but what does appear we symbolize into shared language which gives us its interpretation We have consciousness of an existent object, a tree for example, and we have a claim to knowledge of how it appears & how trees appear is part of our concept of a tree. So two separate claims: a) the thing is(we understand it is separate from us) & b) what that things is (how its concept epistemologically ties into its appearance).
The world exists separately from us, this is its facticity. What happens in the world happens regardless of our presence. Sure we can learn about it, study fossils, the cosmos, learn how the world works, but since we are also part of the world, our viewpoint has to be circular.
Numbers, some of the particles physicists presuppose, our concepts or ideas, are also part of reality, they are in the world in sofar as we too are in the world, but they are not factual part of it in the same manner as a tree. Part of the problem is that in saying 'a tree' we are using a general term (b) to specify a fact, a particular, which necessarily only points to the appearance and not (a), which is presupposed but not known, and we have no guarantee of the correctness of the correspondence between a & b except pragmatically.
Reply to John It's more than Hegel. Since Descartes' time, the world was divided into 'matter' and 'spirit', abstractions that were subsequently reified (for which see this blog post). Hence the importance of 'non-objectifying' which is what 'cultivating spiritual awareness' does. It literally re-programmes the way your brain processes the world. But that is a radically different way of thinking to Western analytical philosophy.
I think this is really the point; that Reality is spirit; which cannot be mapped, but which does the mapping and which the maps are expressions of.
Yet still, what is "spirit" such that I can understand it to be doing mapping?
If you make it clearer you are talking about final cause in some fashion - the general purpose which acts as an "internal" constraint on mapping - then I could agree with you perhaps. It is a key point of the semiotic view of modelling relations that the autonomous self arises as the generic habit encoding some set of guiding self-interests.
But talking about "spirit" instead suggests a theistic reading. And this is why both Hegel, with his Geist, and Peirce, with his objective idealism, can be confusing because they seem to offer themselves equally to theistic interpretations and physicalist interpretations.
Of course you probably don't think of reality as purposive, intentional or teleological as spirit is thought; you would probably think of it as a virtual chaos or something like that
No. I've probably said it hundreds of times that I believe in the natural systems view and so finality is a real cause in the world. That is why the second law of thermodynamics stands out as the Cosmos's most generic constraint.
So I am cool with teleology. But I see it as immanent and naturalistic, not transcendent and theistic.
Do you mean that we construct & share a worldview, the fact that it is shared, gives it reliable meaning, it has pragmatic use.
Yeah. But that construction of a worldview (or umwelt in semiotic jargon) is both biological and cultural. So because we have a shared history of neural evolution - the same kind of eyes and ears - we can already rely on some basic level of shared experience or phenomenology. So I am not arguing extreme social constructionism. However when it comes to an intellectually conceived worldview - the product of collective human enquiry - then it is still just that ... the collective view which develops and survives because it somehow works for us all in a generic way.
We have consciousness of an existent object, a tree for example, and we have a claim to knowledge of how it appears & how trees appear is part of our concept of a tree. So two separate claims: a) the thing is(we understand it is separate from us) & b) what that things is (how its concept epistemologically ties into its appearance).
Not sure if this is what you mean, but I am saying there would be two levels of semiosis here. There would be the neuropsychology of perception - the way our brains are already designed to force us to construct the perception of a bound object like "a tree".
The naive view is we see what is there - a tree with colours, movements, shapes. Yet psychology tells us this is an elaborate process of interpretation. A tree won't even be seen if the mind finds it more meaningful to be acting in terms of there being a wood.
And then on top of that we construct our social reality where oak trees are gods, or someone's property, or a thing of natural beauty.
The point is that it is signs all the way down. If we focus on the greenness of some leaf, that is still a psychological sign rather than a physical reality. And when we say the physical reality is some wavelength of light, that is sign heaped upon sign. It is reading numbers off dials and saying, look!, there's your true reality.
Or not. My argument is that it is about models that demonstrably work. It is about conceptions expressed clearly enough for evidence to falsify them.
Faith and preference are the weakest possible basis for truth pretty much by definition.
But I think that is actually the salient point. How we think our beliefs concerning the Real work for us is precisely how we think they do or do not contribute to our flourishing.
When it comes to the nature of the Real, there can be no empirical evidence, and our decision therefore cannot be an epistemic, but must be an ethical, one.
Faith and personal preference are not blind but are based on what we think works best for us.
Apokrisis: I've probably said it hundreds of times that I believe in the natural systems view and so finality is a real cause in the world. That is why the second law of thermodynamics stands out as the Cosmos's most generic constraint.
But that also sees life as being just a way that the Universe 'dissipates energy', culminating in 'maximum entropy', i.e. the 'heat death' of the Universe. It might be a scientifically accurate depiction of physical processes, but as a philosophy...?
My view is that human beings are in some real sense intrinsic to the Universe. We're not accidental byproducts of a random process, but the means by which the Universe discovers itself. That is not really articulated in a lot of Western philosophy or science, although you can find it in some of the underground or esoteric movements.
My view is that human beings are in some real sense intrinsic to the Universe. We're not accidental byproducts of a random process, but the means by which the Universe discovers itself.
I'm not completely against such an idea as you know. But also, I could only truly believe in it to the extent I could at least sketch out some plausible way of quantifying it as a metaphysical hypothesis.
So I would rephrase it in terms of the inexorable growth of semiotic complexity (within entropic limits). And "ascendency" - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ascendency - is an ecological concept, cashed out in actual equations, which for instance gets at the notion of organised power.
But mystical proclamations recast in emprical form seem to loose their allure very quickly for many.
Reply to apokrisisYeah, I was forgetting. Philosophy relies on scientific inaccuracy. :-}
From the perspective of 'the natural sciences', then you have to account for phenomena in terms of causes that naturalism can deal with. But that doesn't make it comprehensive or complete. If I got your total medical history, or a DNA sample, I could find out a lot about you, in one sense - but how much would I know about your biography? Little or nothing, I would say; and that is an exact analogy.
And the kind of model I'm thinking of is nearer to Maslow's hierarchy of needs and values; but I would go further and say that the process of self-realisation is something other than, and greater than, what current naturalism is able to imagine. Part of the consequences of the history of ideas is that such perspectives have generally been forgotten, although you do find them, as I said, in alternative and counter-cultural philosophies.
From the perspective of 'the natural sciences', then you have to account for phenomena in terms of causes that naturalism can deal with. But that doesn't make it comprehensive or complete. If I got your total medical history, or a DNA sample, I could find out a lot about you, in one sense - but how much would I know about your biography? Little or nothing, I would say; and that is an exact analogy.
If that is an exact analogy, then you have only said you would need more empirical facts. You have not yet abandoned naturalism if you feel you need to inquire about my specific social and cultural development too.
but I would go further and say that the process of self-realisation is something other than, and greater than, what current naturalism is able to imagine.
Talk is cheap. Maslow, as a scientist, did a pretty good job on humanising psychology. If you can go one better, let's hear how.
Cavacava:The world exists separately from us, this is its facticity. What happens in the world happens regardless of our presence. Sure we can learn about it, study fossils, the cosmos, learn how the world works, but since we are also part of the world, our viewpoint has to be circular.
Big subject! I think the sense of self-consciousness, of being individual subjects in a domain of objects, forces and people, is actually one of the distinguishing characteristics of modernity. I say that because in the pre-modern world, I think humans felt instinctively related to the Cosmos through their religious belief and their sense of place in the social order; it provided a sense of relatedness to the divine and social order of things. That is part of what has changed in the transition to modernity and individualism If you look at the epistemology of the medievals, they have various forms of the notion that ideas are 'absorbed by the soul'. Also the Platonic view of logic is that what we really know are the 'objects of the rational mind', of which ordinary objects are mere instantiations; but the 'real intelligibles' are known by exactly that process of the intellect 'being united' with them.
So I think part of the modern attitude is this sense that the scientific timeline which we now know, but which our predecessors didn't, is 'the real world'. But it has to be remembered that a very important part of arriving at that conception was the transition to the modern attitude which sees 'what is real' in terms of what can be represented via mathematical values - by that I mean, scientific materialism, and not in any crude sense, but as an over-arching assumption of modern Western culture. And that entails a kind of existential stance - which I think you've picked up, with reference to the 'circularity' involved in the process.
Cavacava: Numbers, some of the particles physicists presuppose, our concepts or ideas, are also part of reality, they are in the world insofar as we too are in the world, but they are not factual part of it in the same manner as a tree. Part of the problem is that in saying 'a tree' we are using a general term (b) to specify a fact, a particular, which necessarily only points to the appearance and not (a), which is presupposed but not known, and we have no guarantee of the correctness of the correspondence between a & b except pragmatically.
Also a big topic! The ontological status of number is a big unanswered question. If you look at the article on Philosophy of Mathematics on Wikipedia, you will notice it is very large, and has an enormous number of references. I think the 'nature of number' is something that we all feel must be intuitively obvious, but really is a very difficult question. After all, Russell's effort to ground mathematics in logic, Principia Mathematica, was never completed.
Then the other point you're touching on is universals. The word 'tree' is a concept and is determinative in some respects - you and I will know what we're referring to, but that constitutes a very wide range of very different kinds. That illustrates something important about the nature of conceptualisation.
My sympathies are generally Platonist, i.e. I am inclined to accept the reality of numbers and universals. I see them as being in an important sense 'constitutive of the operations of the mind', i.e., they're neither 'in here' or 'out there', but are the means by which we are able to think rationally and mathematically at all. There's an interesting article on Aeon, The mathematical world, James Franklin, which considers some of these perspectives from an Aristotelean perspective.
Apokrisis:You have not yet abandoned naturalism if you feel you need to inquire about my specific social and cultural development too.
Do you think of biography as a type of naturalism? I would have thought it more a literary undertaking.
But then - if we stop to think about it more carefully - all we really "know" is that these are the signs we interpret in such and such a way. So we can ascribe truth to that habit of interpretation. We can point to the robustness of a relation. But the territory itself stands beyond the map. And we might not really "know" it at all. It is only our particular habit of relation that is ever actually tested, and so has its "truth" demonstrated, by some act of interpretation.
Don't you think that we mostly assume that there is some kind of "truth" which is beyond our interpretations? So despite the way we interpret things, we assume that there is a truth of the matter, which our interpretations cannot grasp the entirety of. And as much as we might use 'truth" to refer to consistency in our interpretations, between multiple individuals, we still assume a 'truth' which is beyond this, standing in relation to the territory itself.
The world exists separately from us, this is its facticity. What happens in the world happens regardless of our presence. Sure we can learn about it, study fossils, the cosmos, learn how the world works, but since we are also part of the world, our viewpoint has to be circular.
But "the world" is a construct, and the idea that what happens in the world happens regardless of our presence is a construct as well. So it's really not useful to take this type of realist position because it lacks in what we would call "truth". And once you dismiss this position as ill-founded, something which is commonly believed but not true, you no longer will see yourself as part of the world, but the world as part of yourself. The true territory is not external.
Don't you think that we mostly assume that there is some kind of "truth" which is beyond our interpretations?
But that is implicit in acknowledging we are limited to interpretations. So there is always going to be uncertainty about what is left out.
And yet also - at least for pragmatist accounts of truth - it is an important point that we are also only trying to serve our own purposes. We can afford to be indifferent about "the Truth" in some grand ontic totalising sense.
Of course I, like anyone with a deep interest in metaphysics, want the whole story. I make that completeness a purpose. But I also recognise the way inquiry is in fact limited and so that informs my approach too.
My view: truth is mind-dependent, because it is the predicate of a proposition. Propositions are true, or not true, and whether they are, or are not, is a matter of judgement, and judgement is by a mind.
But there's another point - a mathematical proof, for example, may be 'mind-independent' in one sense - that is, it is not dependent on being grasped by this or that mind; it's not a matter of convention as to whether it is true or no; so in that sense, it is 'mind-independent'.
Right. Basically (and as you rightly point out) mathematics is objective and public while yet remaining entirely in the order of intelligible being. This conclusion will seem counter-intuitive to the modern sensibility, but if we reject the Cartesian division of being into the mutually exclusive categories of res cogitans (subjective) and res extensa (objective) along with the Lockean analysis of sense perception it perhaps becomes bit more tractable.
This type of understanding actually tends towards 'objective idealism', that there is a rational or intelligible order, which is grasped though the intellect ('nous'); which I think is a strong underlying strain in the history of Western philosophy, until Hegel, but it's objective reality is now contested, due to the fact that physicalism generally rejects the idea of an 'intelligible order' (which is, however, still preserved in schools such as Feser's 'Aristotlean-Thomism'.)
Agreed, though I'm not sure it's entirely fair to lay the blame at the feet of "physicalism". It's one thing to point out the failures of physicalism, quite another to propose a viable alternative. Critics of physicalism (such as Nagel, Chalmers, et al.) are notorious for coming up short in regards to the latter. But to your point in regards Feser, I think we are starting to see a bit of a resurgence of classical Aristotelian thought within the academic community, both within metaphysics and within the sciences. I think that the realization that Aristotle's hylemorphic metaphysics can (more or less) be cleanly separated from his erroneous physics is finally starting to take root within the modern mind. It will be interesting to see what happens in the coming decades.
Terrapin StationNovember 23, 2016 at 05:22#347040 likes
I'll explain it in more detail if you need me to but the nutshell version is that truth is a judgment that individuals make about the relationship between a proposition and other things (such as states of affairs if the individual is using correspondence theory).
Reply to apokrisis Do you get to make the facts up or do you have to report them?
Well, biography (and history, for that matter) requires the telling of a story, in addition to the reporting of facts. You can't disregard the facts, but in a biography, you're also concerned with their meaning, which requires qualitative judgement.
The Great WhateverNovember 23, 2016 at 05:24#347060 likes
Whether any particular proposition a sentence might express is true isn't mind-dependent unless that proposition is specifically about or involves minds essentially.
But whether a certain sentence expresses a proposition, and so whether a certain sentence is true, is probably mind-dependent, in the sense that whether something counts as a sentence, and what a sentence expresses, is dependent on a linguistic practices in turn dependent on minds in some way. To deny this would be to say that for any arrangement of things in the world that logically or conceivably could be interpreted, according to some imaginary linguistic system, in a certain way, in fact already is: and so you'd be forced to say that basically everything is a sentence, and everything expresses every conceivable proposition, always (since there will always be a logically conceivable linguistic convention that could be so arranged). But this is false, so the assumption underlying it has to be; and so whether a sentence is true is mind-dependent, because what it means is mind-dependent, even though the truth it expresses isn't.
To deny this would be to say that for any arrangement of things in the world that logically or conceivably could be interpreted, according to some imaginary linguistic system, in a certain way, in fact already is: and so you'd be forced to say that basically everything is a sentence, and everything expresses every conceivable proposition, always (since there will always be a logically conceivable linguistic convention that could be so arranged).
No sentence (even imaginary ones) express propositions. Speakers express propositions by the utterance of sentences. Propositions can also be expressed by utterances which do not strictly speaking contain sentences.
Where sentences are identified as the primary truth-bearers, it's probably some artificial system like Tarski's. Using propositions as the primary truth-bearer may get us closer to ordinary language use, where the same proposition can be expressed by the utterance of a multitude of sentences.
The Great WhateverNovember 23, 2016 at 09:26#347140 likes
Reply to Mongrel It really doesn't matter. If a sentence has a conventional semantic content that can be modeled as a proposition, the sentence can express the proposition in that any utterance of it will express that proposition. You're just defining the relation arbitrarily narrowly.
I don’t yet know how you define any of those terms ("fact", "statement", "truth", "world") so it’s hard to evaluate your claim at this point, but at face value I’d tend to take issue with the claim that statements (for instance) are mind-independent, so perhaps we can start there. To bring this intuition out more clearly I’ll pose the following question and see where it takes us:
1. Were any statements ever made prior to the emergence of intelligent life in the universe?
The way in which you answer this question should help provide some insight into your theory of statements and, hopefully, help drive the discussion forward.
No, there weren't. But that there [i]needed[/I] to be intelligent life doesn't mean that there [i]needs[/I] to be. And it's only the latter which is relevant. Do you think that there needs to be? If so, I wonder why. There certainly wouldn't be any [i]new[/I] statements if all intelligent life were to cease indefinitely.
Just please try to make sure that you're addressing the relevant claim before you get too carried away. I think that I have already made that clear in this discussion, but I suppose I can clarify for you if need be.
My view: truth is mind-dependent, because it is the predicate of a proposition. Propositions are true, or not true, and whether they are, or are not, is a matter of judgement, and judgement is by a mind.
It seems I could accept your first premise, but reject the second.
Why do you think that whether a proposition is true or false is a matter of judgement? That would have logical consequences which I find implausible or even absurd, and, because of that, I reject your second premise.
It just doesn't make sense to me, and seems unbelievable, that all of these facts, all of these events, which can be - and can have been - stated, would not, as statements, have a corresponding truth-value for that reason alone, but would instead require a mind there judging them to be true or false.
Are facts and events even relevant in your metaphysics? Because you didn't even mention them above.
Your second premise leads to a sort of relativism which I think is untenable.
If Person A judges Proposition P to be true, and Person B judges P to be false, then either P is true and false, which is a contradiction, or P is true relative to A and false relative to B. But that isn't truth, that is merely judgement, which you are calling "truth".
Also, there is good reason to believe that we can make errors of judgement with regards to the truth or falsity of a proposition, which, under this sort of relativism, simply wouldn't be possible in the way in which that is normally understood. An individual could never simply be wrong on account of contradiction with what is or is not the case, but only "wrong" relative to the judgement of those who contradict him. Whether he really is right or wrong wouldn't matter.
And he could never be wrong by his own judgement, i.e. he would always be right relative to his own judgement, since if he judges something to be true, then it is true relative to his judgement, and likewise with regards to falsity. But I think (or judge) that my judgement is fallible. So what would that entail? Seems to lead to contradiction.
But there's another point - a mathematical proof, for example, may be 'mind-independent' in one sense - that is, it is not dependent on being grasped by this or that mind; it's not a matter of convention as to whether it is true or no; so in that sense, it is 'mind-independent'.
But consider that any rational proposition, whether mathematical or otherwise, can only be grasped by a rational mind. So in that sense, it's not 'mind-independent'.
But that is [I]not[/I] the sense of independence relevant to realism - at least, not the realism that I'm talking about.
This type of understanding actually tends towards 'objective idealism', that there is a rational or intelligible order, which is grasped though the intellect ('nous'); which I think is a strong underlying strain in the history of Western philosophy, until Hegel, but it's objective reality is now contested, due to the fact that physicalism generally rejects the idea of an 'intelligible order' (which is, however, still preserved in schools such as Feser's 'Aristotlean-Thomism'.)
No, I don't think that that understanding (assuming you were referring to what I quoted just before the above quote) does lead to that. I think that a realist can straightforwardly acknowledge that any rational proposition, whether mathematical or otherwise, can only be grasped by a rational mind, and is not independent in that sense. That's because it isn't about independence in that sense. Of course you'd need a rational mind to grasp it! You don't think that realists deny that, do you? And even if some do deny that, I don't. A realist might deny that it would need to be grasped [i]to be true[/I], and [i]that[/I] would be relevant to this discussion.
My view of the idea of 'mind-independence', is that when it is turned into a philosophical tenet, as distinct from a methodological step, it is based on the missapplication of the scientific attitude.
I doubt that.
I think that those who make mind-independence claims and those who make mind-dependence claims, in the context of this philosophical debate, tend to be in the same metaphysical boat, which differs from science in that it makes claims which transcend it.
Sapientia:Why do you think that whether a proposition is true or false is a matter of judgement?
How can it be otherwise? Propositions don't float around in the ether, they are not natural forms, but only exist in the minds of rational beings who are capable of making statements, which may be true or false. So you and I will judge something to be true or false - apart from that, there is nothing inherently true or false in nature, is there? 'Things are neither good nor bad, but thinking makes it so', said the bard.
You say, in the top section:
It just doesn't make sense to me, and seems unbelievable, that all of these facts, all of these events, which can be - and can have been - stated, would not, as statements, have a corresponding truth-value for that reason alone, but would instead require a mind there judging them to be true or false.
But then you say, further down:
I think that a realist can straightforwardly acknowledge that any rational proposition, whether mathematical or otherwise, can only be grasped by a rational mind, and is not independent in that sense.
Those two statements seem in conflict to me.
Sapientia:If Person A judges Proposition P to be true, and Person B judges P to be false, then either P is true and false, which is a contradiction, or P is true relative to A and false relative to B. But that isn't truth, that is merely judgement, which you are calling "truth".
Well, it's very complicated. In some cases, Person A might be factually mistaken, and Person B not, which is pretty straightforward. But in other cases, it can be very hard to adjudicate. That doesn't rule against the fact that judgements are still undertaken by intelligent subjects. It also doesn't rule against the fact that people can be wrong - often large numbers of people, about very important matters of fact, as I think we have seen in the news at least a couple of times recently.
Sapientia:And he could never be wrong by his own judgement, i.e. he would always be right relative to his own judgement, since if he judges something to be true, then it is true relative to his judgement, and likewise with regards to falsity.
I know, or rather fear, that there are things I'm likely to be wrong about, and that there are many other things I don't know. I have had to change my view, in fact I've often changed it after discussions such as these.
Sapientia: A realist might deny that it would need to be grasped to be true, and that would be relevant to this discussion.
But if that realist wanted to understand what was being talked about, they would have to grasp it. There are any number of propositions that may or may not be true, that you or I will never know about.
I think 'the realism you're talking about' is what I call 'there anyway' realism - that the big wide world is 'there anyway', regardless of whether anyone's in it, regardless whether you're thinking about it or not. Pragmatically that is true, but on another level, the world you think is 'there anyway' still relies on a perspective, namely yours. That is because the mind organises perceptions, judgements, sensations, and so on, so as to form the very concept of 'there anyway'; that is a volitional act, or, in some sense, a mental construction, in the Kantian sense. But again, it's not something in your mind or my mind alone, it is an inter-subjective reality, very similar to what Husserl called an 'umwelt' or 'lebenswelt', namely, a world that is imbued with judgement and meaning. That is what the ''there anyway' realist actually believes in, whilst at the same time pretending that they have no part in it.
But independently of that situation, we frequently use the concept of truth to speak of the unknown.
"No one knew who killed the butler. The detective sought to reveal the truth."
This implies some proposition regarding the butler's killer which is true, but unknown. In this case, it's clear that "truth" does not indicate a mind-dependent property.
Yes, I agree. The other position has to go against the way in which this language is usually used.
But "the world" is a construct, and the idea that what happens in the world happens regardless of our presence is a construct as well. So it's really not useful to take this type of realist position because it lacks in what we would call "truth". And once you dismiss this position as ill-founded, something which is commonly believed but not true, you no longer will see yourself as part of the world, but the world as part of yourself. The true territory is not external.
The world exists without us, we have the remains of previous life forms that inhabited the world for millions of years. The world does not contain truth in itself, it is factual. We construct 'a world', a view we share with others that is comprised of what we and others have learned.
The point is that this facticity, what is in-it-self, is different from what is for us. The existence of thought is contingent, the world exists without it. The factual world must have a structure which is independent of us, which exists even if we do not.
Truth is not in the factual world as such, it is a constuct we lay over the world to make it intelligible, but clearly there is no guarantee that our maps correspond to what the world is in itself.
It really doesn't matter. If a sentence has a conventional semantic content that can be modeled as a proposition, the sentence can express the proposition in that any utterance of it will express that proposition. You're just defining the relation arbitrarily narrowly.
The question, then, is whether or not propositions are sentence-dependent. If so, and if sentences are mind-dependent, then propositions are mind-dependent. And if truth is proposition-dependent then truth is mind-dependent.
Yes, I agree. The other position has to go against the way in which this language is usually used.
But I think it's a bit of a leap to go from "we talk about truth as if it's mind-independent" to "truth is mind-independent". Maybe something akin to fictionalism or quasi realism is correct.
Metaphysician UndercoverNovember 23, 2016 at 12:52#347300 likes
But that is implicit in acknowledging we are limited to interpretations. So there is always going to be uncertainty about what is left out.
I don't think that it is the case that "interpretation" implies necessarily that there is a truth to that which is interpreted. Since we live in a world of change and motion, it may well be the case, that what is, depends on perspective, such as what is indicated by the relativity of simultaneity. If the truth is perspective dependent, and each perspective is capable of producing an interpretation, then how can there be such a thing as "the truth' which is beyond our interpretations?
And yet also - at least for pragmatist accounts of truth - it is an important point that we are also only trying to serve our own purposes. We can afford to be indifferent about "the Truth" in some grand ontic totalising sense.
Now you introduce a temporal aspect to the interpretation itself, suggesting that when we interpret, now, we have a view toward the future, and this may influence one's interpretation. This really complicates matters with respect to 'the truth", because now judgements concern what will be, or ought to be, just as much as what is. And if we extend this toward the past as well, we have judgements about what was as well as what is.
If there is a radical difference between what was (that it cannot be changed), and what will be (that it may or may not occur), how could we reconcile these two distinct aspects of reality with a "truth" which concerns what is.
Whether any particular proposition a sentence might express is true isn't mind-dependent unless that proposition is specifically about or involves minds essentially.
...and what a sentence expresses, is dependent on a linguistic practices in turn dependent on minds in some way.
Aren't these two statements somewhat contradictory? How can it be the case that "what a sentence expresses" is mind dependent, but whether or not "what the sentence expresses" is true, isn't mind dependent. If there is no such thing as "what the sentence expresses" without a mind, then how could there be a truth or falsity concerning "what the statement expresses" without a mind?
Metaphysician UndercoverNovember 23, 2016 at 13:26#347320 likes
The world exists without us, we have the remains of previous life forms that inhabited the world for millions of years. The world does not contain truth in itself, it is factual. We construct 'a world', a view we share with others that is comprised of what we and others have learned.
The point was, that this "the world" is something which is produced, and assumed by us. We assume that there is something out there which exists independently of us, and we call it "the world". So "the world" refers to that which is assumed to be independent, through the means of a concept, which is how we presently understand this assumed entity.
So we have a constructed "world", which is conceptual. There is also an assumption, that there is a real world which "world" refers to, an assumption that "world" is not just a fictitious, fantasy concept. We justify this assumption by referring to the remains of previous life forms and other scientific beliefs.
But this is all backwards. We should really deny this assumption of "the world", until it is justified, and produced as a logical conclusion, rather than taken as an assumed premise. This means that we should go through all the evidence from all the various fields of science, and other forms of knowledge such as theological knowledge, then we can start to make conclusions about mind-independence. If this evidence produces a conclusion that there is a "world", then the assumption is justified. if not, then we move on to a new conception.
The point is that this facticity, what is in-it-self, is different from what is for us. The existence of thought is contingent, the world exists without it. The factual world must have a structure which is independent of us, which exists even if we do not.
Even this statement which you make here, acts as evidence that there is no such thing as the world. You say "what is in-it-self is different from what is for us". So for us, there is such a thing as the world. If, what is in-it-self, is different from this, shouldn't we conclude that in reality there is not a world?
Truth is not in the factual world as such, it is a constuct we lay over the world to make it intelligible, but clearly there is no guarantee that our maps correspond to what the world is in itself.
When we are so convinced, that there is a good possibility that our maps do not adequately represent what is in itself, that our constructed "world", and the things which we believe as truths concerning this world, don't adequately correspond to the assumed independent reality, then why not drop this assumption until it can be justified?
It really doesn't matter. If a sentence has a conventional semantic content that can be modeled as a proposition, the sentence can express the proposition in that any utterance of it will express that proposition.
This is wrong because determining what proposition is expressed by the utterance of a sentence requires knowing something about the context of utterance.
Say you walk in a library and you see a poster pinned to the wall that reads "Physicists are imported." As you contemplate the meaning, a host of fascinating insights open up for you. You subsequently find that the poster is part of an art installation in which the artist is having posters made from computer generated sentences. This is one of them.
You think to yourself: "See! The sentence expressed a proposition all on its own.. without any help from a human mind."
No. It didn't. You derived a proposition from it by projecting a context of utterance. You were the speaker. As I told you: some sort of shenanigans will be required to take sentences as primary truth-bearers.
The Great Whatever:You're just defining the relation arbitrarily narrowly
Also the Platonic view of logic is that what we really know are the 'objects of the rational mind', of which ordinary objects are mere instantiations; but the 'real intelligibles' are known by exactly that process of the intellect 'being united' with them.
I think Plato's Dialogues are some of the most sublime works ever crafted. I am not totally in agreement with what has been described as his Theory of Forms. He spends very little time in his 35 dialogues discussing them and in his Theaetetus where, if anywhere, one would expect the theory showcased, they are not mentioned. The problem with his depth of his thought lies in Socratic irony, a form of dissimulation. I think Plato was afraid that what happened to Socrates & Protagoras could happen to him as well, so he framed his thought in his dialogues to make it correspond to several possible levels of interpretation.
The circularity concerns our position with the world. We are particulars, contingent beings existing in a real, existing world, our ability to think is factually contingent in the world, it could have been otherwise.
This ability to think of ourself separately from the world, our ability to make the world our object enables us to construct a world that is meaningful, which contains truths. However, we have no objective position in this process, only a subjective (relative) position, and any truths we decide upon are for us (the circularity), since there is no guarantee that what is for us corresponds to what is in itself.
No, there weren't. But that there needed to be intelligent life doesn't mean that there needs to be.
Correct me if I am wrong, but you seem to be admitting (at least) that there could not have been any statements had there not been any intelligent life, but why? In your view, what is it exactly about intelligent life that makes the existence of statements possible?
Do you think that there needs to be? If so, I wonder why.
Yes I do, mostly because I subscribe to the notion that statements are sign relations that require one or more minds as fundament in order to be instantiated.
Metaphysician UndercoverNovember 23, 2016 at 15:45#347420 likes
If Person A judges Proposition P to be true, and Person B judges P to be false, then either P is true and false, which is a contradiction, or P is true relative to A and false relative to B. But that isn't truth, that is merely judgement, which you are calling "truth".
Ever heard of God? Human judgements are fallible, God's are not. What your example here demonstrates, is that there is no truth without God. There may not be any God, and there may not be any truth. Would that thought influence the way you live your life?
Yes I do, mostly because I subscribe to the notion that statements are sign relations that require one or more minds as fundament in order to be instantiated.
We should really deny this assumption of "the world", until it is justified, and produced as a logical conclusion, rather than taken as an assumed premise. This means that we should go through all the evidence from all the various fields of science, and other forms of knowledge such as theological knowledge, then we can start to make conclusions about mind-independence. If this evidence produces a conclusion that there is a "world", then the assumption is justified. if not, then we move on to a new conception.
To deny the fact that there is a world that is the cause of what appears, which exist separate from us is not logical. You cannot treat the lion charging you as an assumed premise, it's real and it is about to kick your butt. You admit that we don't have complete knowledge of the world as it is, which is my point. We make a claim that the world is, but we have no, & logically cannot have, any direct unmediated knowledge of what the world is as it is, only what appears. The truths we derive from what appears are our best effort to say what could possibly be the case to allow for such appearances, but there is no guarantee that what we derive on this basis is what actually is.
Here's the difficulty right here. Let's say that the author intended to write all the symbols exactly as they appear on the paper. That is exactly what the author meant, to produce exactly those symbols in that exact pattern or order. We still assume that there is something which was meant, beyond this expression of symbols. We assume that there is something which was meant by the author, which is represented by the symbols, that the symbols represent something. Therefore we attribute "what was meant by the author" not directly to the pattern of symbols, but to that which lies beyond, what is represented by the symbols.
So, what's the problem then? That in itself needn't be a problem. None of that necessitates a mind being there. It necessities that there [i]was[/I] a mind there. It means that there [I]had to have been[/I] a mind there doing that - which I haven't denied, and need not deny. The dependence relation isn't about the past, as I've already said.
I can replace "meaning" with "what was meant", as in the paragraph above, if that makes it easier to understand.
You can do, but I don't see how that would resolve the problem. I'm not sure how I can be any clearer, but I'll give it go.
The problem with the following sentence is the part that I've bolded:
"The meaning is what is intended by the author".
That differs importantly from the statement:
"The meaning is what was intended by the author"
The former has the logical consequence that if no meaning is intended by the author, then there is no meaning. No meaning would be intended, so there would be no meaning.
The latter entails that so long as there was a meaning intended by the author, then there is a meaning. The meaning would have been intended, so there would be a meaning.
See the difference and how important it is in terms of logical consequence?
We still have to deal with the distinction between "the author meant to write down these symbols", and what the author meant to represent with these symbols. These two are distinct, but related intentions.
Following from what you argue here, what this phrase refers to, "what the author meant to represent" never had any existence.
No, that doesn't follow from what I argued. Show me. It might follow if you fuck up what I said by altering the meaning by replacing terms and such. But then that wouldn't be addressing my argument or anything that I've said. It would be addressing your own creation.
As per my last post, that there is such a thing as "what the author meant to represent", is just an assumption held by the reader.
It is an assumption for argument's sake, for the sake of the hypothetical scenario that we've discussed. But [i]in[/I] the hypothetical scenario, no, it isn't an assumption. The author meant something with those symbols. That is a given if you're going to properly engage in this thought experiment. It also need not be an assumption outside of the context of our discussion, since, obviously, there really are - and have been - authors who meant something with a bunch of symbols. I am one of them, as are you, and as is everyone else in this discussion, so, that obviously isn't an assumption. It's a fact. And there's a big difference between the two.
Without this assumption, all the symbols on the paper are meaningless, as you say, but contrary to your claim, there is nothing absurd about that.
Without [i]that fact[/I] the symbols would be meaningless. And I haven't claimed that [i]that[/I] would be absurd. Stop attacking a straw man and come at me bro.
There is only "what was meant", at the time which the author wrote the symbols.
Why do you keep using scare quotes like that?! It isn't necessary.
I'm not sure what you mean. That the author meant something with the symbols is a present fact about the past. It is now the case that the author meant something with the symbols, and it would remain to be the case in the hypothetical future scenario. Nothing could stop that from being the case, with the exception of time travel.
You, for some reason, assume that this continues in time as "meaning", such that the symbols have meaning at the present time.
Do you have a better suggestion for what we call the meaning of the symbols than what the author meant with them? If so, do share.
The author meant something with the symbols. That is a fact which continues to be factual over time. This shouldn't be difficult to grasp or accept.
If, in the hypothetical scenario, it is the case that the author meant something with the symbols, and if this is what we mean when we talk about their meaning, then the symbols would have meaning.
"What was meant" is in the past, "meaning" is in the present.
I can't help but be a little amused at your confusion. "What was meant" is [I]about[/I] the past. It is (presently) the case that something was meant.
Yes, meaning is in the present. That is true. The present meaning in the future scenario would be the same as that which was meant. Why would it have changed?
What you need to do is to show how "what was meant" continues to exist at the present, as meaning. First, you need to justify that there is such a thing as "what was meant".
Firstly, no I don't. If nothing was meant, and that is what we mean by "meaning", then they wouldn't mean anything, and there would be no disagreement between us. To make it interesting, let's make it a given in the thought experiment that the author meant something, which is a perfectly reasonable assumption, and quite possible.
Secondly, anyone who has even a basic grasp of the nature of facts and time will know that what I've said is true. It's possible that you lack this understanding. My question to you would be: why the heck would it stop being a fact that something was meant?
Following your stated principles, as I explained, the symbols have absolutely no meaning unless there is a mind which assumes that there is a "what was meant".
No, that doesn't follow from anything I've said. What principles are you even referring to? If you think that it follows from something I've said, then show me by constructing a valid argument (assuming you're capable of doing so). Then the argument can be checked to see whether 1) it represents what I said (and I don't have much confidence in your abilities to represent what I say), and 2) whether the argument is valid (and I don't have much confidence in your abilities in that regard, either, truth be told).
Following from what I actually said, and not what you've imagined I said, the symbols would have no meaning unless there was a mind which meant something with the symbols. But there was, so they have.
If we remove your conditions, and allow that there is a real "what was meant by the author", and this "what was meant" is not restricted to the past, but continues to exist as "meaning", within the statement, then we can dispose of the need for a mind to assume that there is a "what was meant".
What you imagine to be my conditions don't seem to be my conditions. So be careful what you call my conditions.
You should indeed allow that something was meant by the author. Otherwise you'd miss the point. The controversy only arises once we've assumed for argument's sake that something was meant. The thought experiment is about what would happen next in a particular scenario.
And, like I said, this wouldn't be a wild and unrealistic assumption, like "Let's assume that an evil demon took control of humanity!". It's quite possible that the author did indeed mean something. This shit happens all the time, every day. It's happening now! I am the author of these meaningful statements. I meant something with the symbols that constitute them. And that will be a fact tomorrow, and the next day, and the next, and the one after that, and the one after that, and so on, and so forth. Why [i]on earth[/I] would it not be? Sometimes it's like you're from another world. Is that why you're undercover?
This post is so long, and has taken up so much of my time, that I think I'm just going to leave it here - for now at least. Sorry for missing the last part out. Maybe I'll come back to it and continue where I left off.
I have to say I have little faith in any notions of "re-programming". I see the tendency to objectification as merely a bad habit we have picked up. Once we learn not to take as read the ideas that support it we can come to see beyond it. Until then, we cannot enjoy genuine faith. By faith I just mean openness to our own experience. That is the first real step. Self-cultivation prior to that is just that, I think; a cult of the self. I've been through that and seen so much of that for so many years!
Metaphysician UndercoverNovember 23, 2016 at 20:20#347820 likes
To deny the fact that there is a world that is the cause of what appears, which exist separate from us is not logical. You cannot treat the lion charging you as an assumed premise, it's real and it is about to kick your butt.
The appearance of a thing charging me is the appearance of a thing charging me. It could kill me. This thing affects me, how does that produce the logical conclusion that there is a world separate from us?
The truths we derive from what appears are our best effort to say what could possibly be the case to allow for such appearances, but there is no guarantee that what we derive on this basis is what actually is.
Yes, this is exactly the problem I am pointing to. The so-called "truths" are derived from what appears, and we have no way of confirming that this is "what actually is". How do we know that there is such a thing as "what actually is". And the basis of the assumption of "a world" relies on this assumption.
So, what's the problem then? That in itself needn't be a problem. None of that necessitates a mind being there. It necessities that there was a mind there. It means that there had to have been a mind there doing that - which I haven't denied, and need not deny. The dependence relation isn't about the past, as I've already said.
You seem to have missed a key point Sapientia: "we assume that there is something which was meant". Minds are the things which make assumptions, so "we assume" implies minds. This is not concerning the past, this is right now, when we look at the symbols, we assume that there was something meant. If there are no minds, there is no assuming that there was something meant.
The latter entails that so long as there was a meaning intended by the author, then there is a meaning. The meaning would have been intended, so there would be a meaning.
See, you're mixing up the tenses, like you accused me of doing. That there was a meaning intended by the author indicates that something was meant by the author, at that time, in the past. You have provided no premise whereby you can say that because there was something meant, at that time in the past, this, "what was meant", persists today as meaning. You seem to have an undeclared premise, that once something was intended at a particular time, this persists indefinitely in time, as meaning Quoting Sapientia
It is an assumption for argument's sake, for the sake of the hypothetical scenario that we've discussed. But in the hypothetical scenario, no, it isn't an assumption. The author meant something with those symbols. That is a given if you're going to properly engage in this thought experiment. It also need not be an assumption outside of the context of our discussion, since, obviously, there really are - and have been - authors who meant something with a bunch of symbols. I am one of them, as are you, and as is everyone else in this discussion, so, that obviously isn't an assumption. It's a fact. And there's a big difference between the two.
I have no problem with saying that the author meant something. The assumption which I disagree with is your assumption that what the author meant, at that particular moment in time, persists indefinitely through time, as meaning. You assume that there is a real "what is meant" by the words, right now, as "meaning", and you support this with the claim that there is a real "what was meant" by the author. What I want to know is how you establish a temporal continuity between the two. Unless you can do that, then "what was meant" by the author at that time, and "what is meant" by the words now, are completely distinct, unconnected. If they are distinct, then you cannot use what was meant by the author, to justify the claim that the words have meaning now. So we must turn to a mind which interprets, to give meaning to the words now.
Why do you keep using scare quotes like that?! It isn't necessary.
I use quotes when the words I use refer to a thing which is conceptual only. So, above I refer to "what was meant", and "what is meant". "what is meant" is the supposed meaning which the words have. These are two distinct concepts, and unless you can show how the two are connected, we do not have a relationship between them. So far, your claim is that the author meant something at a particular moment in time, and this persists infinitely, or eternally through time, as 'the meaning". how do you justify this claim?
To make it interesting, let's make it a given in the thought experiment that the author meant something, which is a perfectly reasonable assumption, and quite possible.
Right, let's assume as a given, that the author meant something. This is what occurred at that particular moment, in the past when the author wrote the words. At that time, there was meaning, because at that time, the author meant something. The question for you, is how does this necessitate that there is meaning now, or at some future time?
You should indeed allow that something was meant be the author. Otherwise you'd miss the point. The controversy only arises once we've assumed for argument's sake that something was meant. The thought experiment is about what would happen next in a particular scenario.
Again, I'll reiterate, I have no problem accepting that the author meant something. This was an occurrence in the past. What I have a problem with is your claim that this occurrence in the past, continues to exist today as meaning. How do you support this claim?
The Great WhateverNovember 23, 2016 at 21:24#347930 likes
Reply to Mongrel It doesn't matter. Then you can just define the relation with an argument for context, and have truth of a sentence relative to a context. This isn't important to the point.
The Great WhateverNovember 23, 2016 at 21:27#347940 likes
Reply to Michael Propositions aren't sentence-dependent, no. It can be true that p even if there's no sentence acting as a vehicle to express p.
Then you can just define the relation with an argument for context, and have truth of a sentence relative to a context. This isn't important to the point.
I still don't know why you're using the word "relation." But yes, we can persist in trying to have sentences act as primary truth-bearers and pin them to context of utterance. If that's your cup-a-tea, great.
Propositions aren't sentence-dependent, no. It can be true that p even if there's no sentence acting as a vehicle to express p.
So what exactly is the ontology of a proposition such that there can be such a thing even if there isn't a
sentence to express it? Is the proposition that the cup is red the same thing as the red cup? If so then to say that the proposition that the cup is red is true is to say that the red cup is true, and this seems grammatically incorrect. But if not then as well as the proposed mind-independence of physical things like red cups there's also a proposed mind-independence of non-physical things (unless the proposition that the cup is red is a physical thing but just something other than the red cup). Is this Platonism?
The way I see it is that the sentence "it is true that p" is equivalent to the sentence "'p' is true", so I understand your claim that it can be true that p even if there isn't a sentence as the claim that 'p' can be true even if there isn't a sentence. But there can't be a true sentence if there isn't a sentence.
I think this is a case of being bewitched by language. That we can talk about a thing being true without having to mention a sentence isn't that truth doesn't depend on there being a sentence.
The Great WhateverNovember 23, 2016 at 22:19#348010 likes
Reply to Michael Classically, a proposition is a mapping from world-states to truth values. You can model this as a function from a set of objects to {0, 1}.
The Great WhateverNovember 23, 2016 at 22:22#348020 likes
I still don't know why you're using the word "relation."
A relation contains tuples of objects or maps tuples of objects to truth values. So 'true' could be defined as a relation between sentences and contexts.
I never claimed sentences have to be primary truth-bearers, and it's irrelevant to the discussion anyway.
How do we justify that what was meant, at a particular point of time in the past, when the author writes the symbols, exists as meaning today, without a mind to assume that there is a what was meant?
With regards to the last part, I simply ask: why would there need to be a mind to assume that something was meant? Either it would or would not be the case that something was meant. It would be the case that something was meant if something was meant. As a thought experiment, we can assume either one possibility or the other as an actuality, and explore what the consequences would be. The consequences of assuming that nothing was meant are uncontroversial, so we can set that aside. That would leave only one possibility worth exploring via the thought experiment, as that is where the controversy lies. That is where there is disagreement between realist and idealist relating to the mind-dependence/independence of truth - which is what this discussion is about.
Even if we assume that it is a fact that the author intended a meaning, that act is in the past.
But that doesn't matter. That [i]fact[/I] is in the present. It meant something then, and unless that meaning has somehow changed, it would mean the same thing now. A meaning doesn't cease to exist just because the author of that meaning has stopped doing what he did at the time. The author can even cease to exist whilst the meaning stays the same.
You really need to actually answer my previous questions to you about this, regarding what I [i]actually[/I] claimed is absurd:
The meaning can be what was intended by the author. It is demonstrably the case that the author doesn't need to constantly intend that meaning. What would happen when the author dies, and can no longer intend anything, let alone the meaning of what he wrote? What he wrote would instantly become meaningless, and remain meaningless ever after? That is absurd.
It is absurd because it is demonstrably false. Do you think that statements made by authors who are now dead are meaningless? Do you think that whether the authors meant something is just a questionable assumption? Well, let me tell you, if you think that, or if you think something which has that as a logical consequence, then you're simply and obviously wrong. Countless statements made by authors who are now dead [i]do[/I] have a meaning, which can be exactly what they meant at the time. And this need not be an assumption. It can be known. If you reject that, then you'd have a problem with plausibly explaining how a [i]whole load of stuff[/I] makes sense.
How does the act of having intended a meaning, in the past, ensure that a meaning exists now at the present.
It depends what is meant by having a meaning. I think it makes sense to say that it has a meaning, and that this is what the author meant. Otherwise it wouldn't have a meaning. But there is good reason to go with the former, since that is what we currently do when we talk about meaning. We say that something has a meaning when the author meant something with that something. And that's how we talk and think about meaning, even when the author has died.
I use quotes on "what was meant", because these words refer to something conceptual only, something within the mind, as intention.
Meanings and intentions are real, not conceptual. But they do originate in the the mind, and require a mind to bring them about. Once they are expressed, they become independent. The author himself can confirm his meaning, and we can acknowledge it as the meaning. The author can then go away and do something else, without having to worry that if he is not around to constantly mean what he meant, his statement will become meaningless. He can die without his meaning dying with him, and everyone else being left clueless as to what he meant, and having to resort to guesswork. Once expressed in the form of the sort of statement that can be true or false, these expressions can of course be true or false.
And none of that needs a mind being there doing anything. Ergo realism.
There is the intent itself, "what was meant" and this was only in the mind of the author, at that time of writing, in the past.
It was. But then it was expressed, and became public and known. And the fact that something was meant continues to be factual. And if we normally talk about the meaning of this expression in terms of what the author meant, then why should that be any different in the thought experiment? Why should we change that? Just so you can posit mind-dependence and reach an idealist conclusion? I don't think so, sonny Jim.
There is also an interpretation of "what was meant", and this is in the mind of the reader.
Yes, there often is. But that needn't be relevant. It wouldn't be so if we talk about meaning in terms of what the author meant, as it makes sense to do. And, of course, in the hypothetical scenario, there wouldn't be any mind or reader to interpret or misinterpret any meaning. And there needn't be. Hence realism.
You seem to assume that there is such a thing as "what was meant", in order to claim objective meaning, but that's just an assumption.
There [i]is[/I] generally such a thing, and I [i]do[/I] make the assumption [I]for the sake of the thought experiment[/I] that something was meant. But it [I]isn't[/I] an assumption [i]in[/I] the thought experiment. In the thought experiment, it's a fact. That's where we begin, and we then think about what that would entail.
Of course there needs to be an interpretation, otherwise your supposed rule, "not to speak" is just symbols.
That reply is fallacious in more than one way ([I]ignoratio elenchi[/I] and [I]non sequitur[/I]). I said that there doesn't need to be an interpreter, not that there doesn't need to be an interpretation. But there doesn't need to be an interpretation, either. It just needs to be such that there would be a correct way for it to be interpreted - which implies that it would need a meaning. Interpretation is about what people do afterwards. There would already be a meaning and a correct way to interpret it if it were to be interpreted - which it needn't be. So it doesn't follow that it'd just be meaningless symbols.
Who interprets what it means "to speak" and "not to speak", in order to determine whether the kid has actually broken the rule?
It already has a meaning. It is predetermined. It doesn't need to be interpreted. The teacher doesn't need to figure out whether the rules have or have not been broken for the rules to have been broken. The teacher needs to figure it out for other reasons, as part of his or her job, but that isn't relevant to the analogy.
If the kid hums or starts making all kinds of unintelligible gibberish noises, has the rule been broken?
Whether the kid hums or starts making all kinds of unintelligible gibberish noises doesn't matter unless it follows from that that the kid spoke. Did the kid speak? Does that count as speaking? [U]What does the rulebook say[/u]? That is what matters, not what you or I think. If the kid spoke, then the rule was broken. It doesn't matter what the criteria are. If those criteria have been broken, then the rule has been broken.
What justification do you have to claim that the DNA encoding does not refer to anything?
Well, I didn't make that claim, so none.
I don't deny that DNA can act as a sign-vehicle of sorts, analogous to how markings on a page can act as sign-vehicles for statements. But whereas a statement is what it is in virtue of expressing a propositional content which, in turn, is what it is in virtue of being inferentially related to other such contents, DNA is not. So while DNA sequences and statement-tokens are alike in acting as sign-vehicles, they are yet essentially different respecting the types of sign-systems they participate in.
Reply to Theorem This is a bit tangential to the topic, but isn't the idea of DNA as language somewhat analogical - DNA is language-like, rather than language per se. It's more that the manner in which cells are replicated are better understood through the analogy of language, than through the analogy of mechanism.
I haven't been following the whole discussion, but I think that @Michael is a logical chap, so it will be interesting to see whether he is on my side - assuming he has shown his cards.
The Great WhateverNovember 23, 2016 at 23:40#348140 likes
Consider the following situation: it's 4 million years ago, so there aren't any sentences. Yet at that time, the Earth existed, so was true that the Earth existed (that proposition was true). But the sentence "the Earth exists" wasn't. So they don't mean the same thing. One predicates truth of a linguistic object, the other maintains that a state of affairs holds. These claims being materially equivalent depends on a linguistic system in which the sentence in question expresses that proposition, but since this need not be, they're not counterfactually coextensive, and their truth conditions can come apart. Since one can be true while the other is false, they can't be synonymous.
The Great WhateverNovember 23, 2016 at 23:41#348150 likes
A mapping from world states to truth values? Isn't that just saying that a world-state is either true or false?
No, it's a mapping from world-states to truth values. A world-state isn't the sort of thing that's true or false. A proposition is something that has truth conditions: that is, the proposition is what's true or false, relative to a world-state (or perhaps absolutely, if you think the actual world is privileged, and alternate possibilities are defined in terms of it). So if you like the proposition 'looks at' what the world is like, and spits out true or false accordingly, and the cases in which it says 'true' are its truth conditions, which are roughly what the sentence expressing such a proposition means. Truth isn't predicated of the state of affairs.
The Great WhateverNovember 23, 2016 at 23:47#348170 likes
The Great WhateverNovember 23, 2016 at 23:49#348190 likes
Reply to Mongrel I think we're talking past each other. To say truth is a relation between sentences and contexts is no more to go against Frege or any notion of the 'unanalyzability of truth' than to say it's a property of propositions or of anything else, which we must say because it is (some things are true, whether statements, sentences, propositions or whatever). So there's a misunderstanding here about what claiming it's such a relation amounts to.
Second, defining truth in this way is, as I've already said, not relevant to the point of what I was saying to begin with.
Second, defining truth in this way is, as I've already said, not relevant to the point of what I was saying to begin with.
I would be interested if you'd want to explain it again. You were saying that there's an aspect of truth that is mind-dependent and an aspect that isn't?
The Great WhateverNovember 23, 2016 at 23:59#348220 likes
Reply to Mongrel What's not mind-dependent is whether a proposition is true. That's just to say it's not mind-dependent whether something is so or not, unless that thing has specifically to do with minds.
But what's probably mind-dependent is whether something is a sentence, or whether a sentence expresses a certain proposition. So, if you were to define a notion of sentence truth, it would be mind-dependent whether a sentence is true, in virtue of its being mind-dependent what proposition it expressed.
Consider the following situation: it's 4 million years ago, so there aren't any sentences. Yet at that time, the Earth existed, so was true that the Earth existed (that proposition was true).
It's not that it was true that the Earth existed; it's that it is true that the Earth existed. To say that it was true that the Earth existed is to say that "the Earth existed" was true, but as you say, the sentence "the Earth existed" wasn't there 4 million years ago.
Since one can be true while the other is false, they can't be synonymous.
Consider the following:
1. The cup is red.
2. The above is true.
According you, it's possible for one to be true but the other to be false, because the first is about a cup but the second is about a sentence. But this is wrong. If the first is true then ipso facto the second is true and vice versa, and if the first is false then ipso facto the second is false and vice versa.
Otherwise you can end up in the absurd situation where you say that the cup is red and then I respond by saying that the cup is red but that what you said was false. That's a straightforward contradiction.
Which is why iff the cup is red then "the cup is red" is true.
Just to drive this home, let p = "the Earth exists."
1. It was true that the Earth existed.
2. The Earth existed. The previous sentence was true.
3. "The Earth existed" was true.
Notice that 3 doesn't follow, since ex hypothesi there was no such sentence, so a fortiori it wasn't true. This is because the second sentence in 2) is clearly false, and doesn't follow from the fact that the Earth existed.
Because 3. is false, 1. and 2. are false. It should be:
1. It is true that the Earth existed.
2. The Earth existed. The previous sentence is true.
3. "The Earth existed" is true.
The Great WhateverNovember 24, 2016 at 00:08#348240 likes
(For any p, in all situations), p iff "p" is true.
Substituting "the Earth exists" for p, we get the following:
(In all situations), The Earth exists iff "the Earth exists" is true.
From this it follows that (for all situations), if the Earth exists, then "the Earth exists" is true.
So, if one counterexample can be shown to this conditional, it follows that the instance of the biconditional schema is false, and therefore so is the whole schema stated as a universal.
So, it must be, for your claim to be correct, that there is no possible situation in which the Earth exists, but "the Earth exists" is not true.
Now, "the Earth exists" is a sentence. It follows that if there are no sentences, it cannot be true. So to find a situation in which it's not true, we suppose that the planet in this situaiton is as it was before the advent of language. Since there are no languages, there are no sentences, and a fortiori no true sentences. So, in this situation, "the Earth exists" is not true.
Yet ex hypothesi the Earth exists in this situation.
So, there is a situation in which the Earth exists, but "the Earth exists" is not true, viz. the situation I just presented to you.
So, your claim is false.
Metaphysician UndercoverNovember 24, 2016 at 00:09#348250 likes
With regards to the last part, I simply ask: why would there need to be a mind to assume that something was meant? Either it would or would not be the case that something was meant.
Maybe something was meant, or maybe there wasn't something meant. But if we assume that something was meant (and that requires this assumption I referred to), we still do not have the means to say that what was meant at that time, exists as meaning today.
It meant something then, and unless that meaning has somehow changed, it would mean the same thing now.
Here's your mistake. The author meant something, not "it meant something". You've somehow transferred what the author meant, into the words, to say that the words meant something, and therefore still mean something.
It depends what is meant by having a meaning. I think it makes sense to say that it has a meaning, and that this is what the author meant.
I already went through this. The author meant to write down the words. The author also meant for those words to signify something. These are two distinct intentions of the author. They must be distinct so that we can account for the existence of misleading, and deception. The intention of the author is within the mind of the author at the time of the writing. How do you propose that the author's intention gets into the written words, to exist there as what the author meant, or meaning?
Did the kid speak? Does that count as speaking? What does the rulebook say? That is what matters, not what you or I think. If the kid spoke, then the rule was broken.
Exactly, these questions need to be answered before there's any truth about whether or not the kid broke the rule. Who's going to answer those questions? If they are unanswerable, there is no truth. If there is no mind, they are unanswerable. Therefore without a mind there is no truth.
How do I respond to this? By saying that the Earth exists in this situation or by saying that what you say is true? Can I say that the Earth exists in this situation but that what you say is false or that the Earth doesn't exist in this situation but that what you say is true? No, I can't.
Iff the Earth exists in this situation then the above sentence ("the Earth exists in this situation") is true. That's the biconditional.
What you've done is addressed this fallacious biconditional:
The Earth exists in this situation iff "the Earth exists" is true in this situation.
The way I see it, the mind is like a car you need to get from A to B. You need it to start the journey, but you don't depend upon it. You could get out and walk the rest of the way. The map is language, the territory is the world, and when the former rightly depicts the latter, then they correspond. And that correspondence is between statement and fact. That correspondence is what entails truth.
Interpretation isn't necessary. Interpretation won't determine whether the map rightly or wrongly depicts the territory. Interpretation is just what we do to try to figure things out, and the world doesn't care whether or not we figure things out. The world is unaffected. [I]We[/I] care whether or not we figure things out.
Truth doesn't "become" an interpretation. The interpretation is what we judge to be true or false, what we categorise as such. Truth is distinguishable from interpretation, and transcends it.
Yes, we do deal with what we [i]think[/I] exists, or is true, or is the case... but so what? What we think can be right or wrong. If what we think is right, and we express it as a statement, then it is true - even if nobody knows it to be true. Does there need to be a mind there, once it has been expressed as a statement, and is either true or false? No. It is like the car. It was needed to enable the thought and the expression of the thought in language, which therefore enables truth, but it is no longer needed. The one is independent from the other. We don't need to drive the rest of the way. Likewise with the mind.
A bunch of symbols on a piece of paper don't [i]need[/I] an inherent interpretation, so whether they have one or not is beside the point. An inherent interpretation strikes me as an oxymoron, anyway. They just need to be such that [i]if[/I] there were an interpretation, [i]then[/I] it could be correct or incorrect.
But then - if we stop to think about it more carefully - all we really "know" is that these are the signs we interpret in such and such a way. So we can ascribe truth to that habit of interpretation. We can point to the robustness of a relation. But the territory itself stands beyond the map. And we might not really "know" it at all. It is only our particular habit of relation that is ever actually tested, and so has its "truth" demonstrated, by some act of interpretation.
No, we know that the author meant something with the symbols. That is at least possible, so, as a thought experiment, that's what we're assuming. That being the case, it wouldn't matter whether the meaning, i.e. what the author meant, is known. Nor would it matter whether or how they are interpreted.
Ascribing truth doesn't matter either, I'm afraid. Not in the context of this discussion. Ascribing truth doesn't entail truth. It entails nothing other than that truth has been ascribed. Correspondence between statement and reality entails truth. Ascribing it is just what we do when we think that something is true. You aren't talking about truth, you're talking about ascribing truth. You can conflate the two, but they're distinct.
Metaphysician UndercoverNovember 24, 2016 at 00:24#348300 likes
So, there is a situation in which the Earth exists, but "the Earth exists" is not true, viz. the situation I just presented to you.
As Michael explained, the proper way to phrase this is that the statement today, "the Earth existed at that time", is true. But at that time, millions of years ago, the statement "the Earth exists" did not exist. So at that time, it was not the case that "the Earth exists" was not true, nor was it true, "the Earth exists" did not itself exist. So to speculate about whether or not "the Earth exists" was true at that time, is nonsense, because there was no such thing as "the Earth exists" at that time.
The Great WhateverNovember 24, 2016 at 00:26#348310 likes
The Earth exists in this situation iff "the Earth exists" is true in this situation.
But that is what the biconditional requires. Your 'iff' formula does not offer a material equivalence, but must be universally quantified to all possible situations, or else it has no force. To see why, note that the following biconditional, construed as a mere material equivalence:
Trump wins the 2016 election iff America exists
is true, since both sides of it are true. As a universally quantified statement, however, it's false, since we can conceive of a situation in which the truth values of the two arguments don't match.
So, in order for your claim to hold weight, it must be that in any situation, it must be that in that situation the Earth exists iff "the Earth exists" is true. Since as you admit, in the situation I outlined, the Earth exists, yet "the Earth exists" is not true, this falsifies your biconditional by showing a situation in which it doesn't hold.
The Great WhateverNovember 24, 2016 at 00:27#348320 likes
Iff the Earth exists in this situation then that sentence of yours ("the Earth exists in this situation") is true. The biconditional is there.
But notice that wasn't what you were asked. It's true that "The Earth exists in this situation" is true and the Earth exists in this situation: but the question is not whether "The Earth exists in this situation" is true, but whether "the Earth exists" is true in this situation. Since there are no sentences in this situation, a fortiori it isn't.
In the situation I presented:
1) The Earth exists
2) It's not the case that "the Earth exists" is true, since there aren't any sentences.
Is it a mind dependent truth that truth is mind dependent? Say there were no minds, would truth therefore be mind-independent instead, or truth just wouldn't exist at all? If it didn't exist at all, wouldn't that therefore be a mind-independent truth ("truth does not exist at all", is true).
Anyway, what confuses me is that the "world-state/state-of-affairs" is itself linguistic. As in,
("The earth existed 1083987 years ago", is a statement. The earth existing 1083987 years ago is not a statement it's a state of affairs, but everything within these brackets is language).
Propositions are either true or false depending on whether they 'express' the state of affairs correctly. But what's actually being expressed? It seems like the state of affairs is just the proposition without quote marks. "Donald Trump is the president elect of USA" is a true statement. Why is it true? Because Donald Trump is the president elect of USA. The state of affairs here is just the propisition but without quote marks.
So what's going on here? Truth is when the quote marks around a proposition can be removed and nobody objects to the state of affairs being expressed that way? I say "expressed" because we express propisitions sure, but the state of affairs is also expressed, it's still linguistic, but it's being expressed in a way that doesn't bring attention to that it itself being expressed (whereas a proposition does). It's an expression which doesn't indicate it's own nature as an expression.
The state of affairs is just a particular way of speaking?
You might object that the expression of the state of affairs (Donald Trump being president elect, without quotes) matches up to something beyond language, it isn't literally the world being expressed. But that would make it a propisition. Donald Trump being president elect is not a propisition. The state of affairs doesn't correspond with anything, it is itself that which our propositions correspond to.
Now, "the Earth exists" is a sentence. It follows that if there are no sentences, it cannot be true. So to find a situation in which it's not true, we suppose that the planet in this situaiton is as it was before thre advent of language. Since there are no languages, there are no sentences, and a fortiori no true sentences. So, in this situation, "the Earth exists" is not true.
I don't think it would be correct to say "the earth exists" is not true. Because a non existent proposition can't have a truth value. It's more like, "so, in this situation, "the earth exists" doesn't exist." There can't be a world with no propositions and also false propositions.
The Great WhateverNovember 24, 2016 at 00:39#348350 likes
Reply to dukkha I see what you're saying, but the sentence not existing isn't crucial to the example. If we need to complicate it we can to make the same point, but where the sentence exists but is false (in virtue of meaning in that situation the opposite of what it means here). We can go there if needed, but Michael is disagreeing on a far more fundamental point, so I'd like to see what he has to say about that first.
But what's probably mind-dependent is whether something is a sentence, or whether a sentence expresses a certain proposition. So, if you were to define a notion of sentence truth, it would be mind-dependent whether a sentence is true, in virtue of its being mind-dependent what proposition it expressed.
Yea. But there's another category of objects: abstract ones. Numbers are abstract objects, not mental objects. That distinction is supposed to express the otherness of such entities. But maybe the assumption is that minds reside in skulls. My mind is separate from yours, so the number seven transcends both our skulls.
A proposition, being an abstract object, doesn't need to be expressed.
Reply to Sapientia I transcended your epistemic conditions, Sapientia. I discovered that you're a lot better off than you think you are.
The Great WhateverNovember 24, 2016 at 01:01#348400 likes
Reply to Mongrel What I am saying is that whether something is a sentence, and whether it expresses a proposition, and if so what proposition it expresses, are dependent on linguistic systems which in turn probably can't be maintained absent minds, at least as things stand now, and so they are in that sense mind-dependent. Propositions themselves, as I said, are not.
Don't you think that we mostly assume that there is some kind of "truth" which is beyond our interpretations? So despite the way we interpret things, we assume that there is a truth of the matter, which our interpretations cannot grasp the entirety of. And as much as we might use 'truth" to refer to consistency in our interpretations, between multiple individuals, we still assume a 'truth' which is beyond this, standing in relation to the territory itself.
Well, I for one, do. (If that wasn't already as clear as day). And I think that most others do as well. It's only when these [i]philosophers[/I] come along that things get twisted and warped out of proportion.
Yet we don't just invent things to say, out of nowhere, for maintaining them in a linguistic system. We also discover reasons to invent and say them. Perhaps in some sense statements exist as reasons to say them, regardless of whether they are ever said or maintained by minds. Likewise their truths might exist as certain relations to what they refer to, regardless of whether minds discover them.
I'll explain it in more detail if you need me to but the nutshell version is that truth is a judgment that individuals make about the relationship between a proposition and other things (such as states of affairs if the individual is using correspondence theory).
There's nothing stopping you from defining it that way, but that isn't what is typically meant.
Truth isn't a judgement, it's a property. We judge propositions as either having or not having this property. The judgement is just that: a judgement.
Interpretation won't determine whether the map rightly or wrongly depicts the territory.
It doesn't need to. In the semiotic model of truth, a habit of interpretance is concerned with establishing a reliable system of signs. So I can look at a thermometer and see that it reads 14 degrees C. That is a measurement which tells me "the truth" of "the weather".
So as I say, it is about the wholeness of a triadic relation. You can't make sense of any one part in isolation.
The usual approaches to truth are dydaic or dualistic. That is why they founder. There is the mind and there is the world. Somehow they seem to connect, but no one can explain the mystery of how.
Semiotics replaces that mind~world dualism with a symbol~world relation. And the sign is what mediates in being Janus faced. It can have a foot in both camps in being both physical and mental, syntactical and semantic.
That's the point about sentences expressing propositions.
One could take the view that p is true even if p is never said (or is even unsayable?). Semantics can be taken to have its own mentalistic, reified, Platonic existence that transcends any actual saying and acting upon a belief. But that kind of dualistic divide offers no way of then reconnecting meaning to the world.
Yet it is just as much a problem to say some physical pattern carries its meaning or interpretation inherently. We can imagine the infinite number of randomly typing monkeys who cannot help but bash out every possible true statement without ever a hint of understanding. So siding with the physicality of the signs cannot help either.
That is why you have to understand what is going on as a complete relation. And a counter-intuitive outcome of that is that efficient mapping is deliberately unrealistic. The system of signs that makes a habit of interpretance most effective is the one that reduces the physical "truth" of the world to the barest play of symbols. A good map is flat and uncluttered with just a few sharp indicative marks. It leaves out everything that can be left out. It is meaningful to the degree that it suppresses information about reality - the degree to which it filters signal from noise.
That is why propositions have the binary form of being true/false. Give the relevant box a tick or a cross.
Naive realism expects the opposite. The map corresponds to the world as indeed a "mapping" - a re-presentation of what actually exists out there.
But maps are a reduction of reality to what is understood as meaningful in terms of certain expectable signs. So truth judgments track measurements, not existence. The less we actually need to concern ourselves with the messy actuality, the "truthier" our conceptions become.
Again that is why binary tick-box propositional logic is so highly valued. It stands as the ultimate limit of this desire to detach from the physics and live in a self-made realm of sign. We are telling the world, just nod yes or no to our question, we can take it from there.
A bunch of symbols on a piece of paper don't need an inherent interpretation, so whether they have one or not is beside the point. An inherent interpretation strikes me as an oxymoron, anyway. They just need to be such that if there were an interpretation, then it could be correct or incorrect.
Yes. But in the usual course of things (barring these rogue monkey infinite typing pools), a bunch of symbols only appears in the physical world when there is someone with an intent to state something meaningful.
Again, one could imagine that occasionally a rock face would wear in such a way that some moving poem or grave epitaph might just appear. But really, the infinite unlikelihood of such a physical act is evidence that all such physical manifestations are the product of some mind (or system of interpretance that employs signs).
No, we know that the author meant something with the symbols. That is at least possible, so, as a thought experiment, that's what we're assuming. That being the case, it wouldn't matter whether the meaning, i.e. what the author meant, is known. Nor would it matter whether or how they are interpreted.
What do you mean? The author at least has to "know" what he meant. He would have to understand himself. And it is he who can't in fact transcend what is only a reasonable-seeming structure of belief.
So you are focusing again on transmissible signs - words that get spoken or written. But words are still signs when they are thought.
But that is merely to re-assert naive realism. You are claiming there is the claim, and then the proof of the claim, and then beyond that, the claim's truth. You want to put truth out there in the world with all the physics.
That doesn't work, which is why naive realists usually wind up talking Platonically about p being true as if propositions exist as abstract objects.
So again, the pragmatic/semiotic approach to truth instead proceeds by making reasonable hypotheses and then testing them in terms of acts of measurement. We form signs of what to expect if some idea is indeed "true".
And that approach to truth then understands that the ascriptions are essentially self-interested. Propositions are intrinsically an expression of some grounding purpose. And that also means an indifference to "physical reality" gets built in. It is a feature rather than a bug.
Success is always being able to filter signal from noise in terms of selfish interest.
Is the state of affairs anything other than the sum total of all the propositions the linguistic community hold to be true?
What actuay is the "state-of-affairs" that our propositions correspond with? Does correspondence even make sense? As if our propositions fly out of our mouths into the world and try and match themselves to how the world is, and get imbued with the property of truth if they match the world correctly, or false if they don't?
The proposition doesn't actually do this, I mean the whole notion of reference is kind of nonsensical. Like our mouth is a bow which fires out words like arrows which fly around the world and hit things. "Eiffel Tower" refers to the Eiffel Tower in France, but my words don't fly there and highlight the tower in order to gain it's meaning.
I think what's happening with propositions is they don't *themsves* correspond with the world/state-of-affairs. Rather it's us humans which decide that the proposition is a correct way of "expressing the world." A community of language users come together and form a consensus of the state of affairs, eg that the Eiffel Tower is in France. The proposition that, "the Eiffel Tower is in France" is then judged to be correct/true because when the quotes are removed it becomes the state of affairs which the community of language users have agreed upon (the Eiffel Tower is in France). When the quotes around "the Eiffel Tower is in Antarctica" is removed, this state of affairs is not something which the language community has agreed upon so it's then deemed to be false.
If we understand truth to work like this then we don't need to think of reference as our words matching themselves in some unexplained manner with the external world, like arrows hitting heir targets.
Reply to Sapientia One other thought. My case has already been tested and demonstrated in the field.
Back in the 1970s, computer scientists hope to build intelligent machines using symbol processing. Recreate the syntax and the semantics would surely follow. We know what a dismal dualistic failure that exercise was.
But these days any realistic approach to machine intelligence - such as forward modelling or Baysesian neural nets - is an attempt to replicate a semiotic modelling relation.
So a particular theory of truth has been tried and tested. We are going with the one that works.
But whereas a statement is what it is in virtue of expressing a propositional content which, in turn, is what it is in virtue of being inferentially related to other such contents, DNA is not.
But the information content of DNA can't be anything other than a proposition, whose truth content in objectively measured by comparison with variants of that proposition.
And all this without a mind.
Terrapin StationNovember 24, 2016 at 04:06#348770 likes
Dukkha:If we understand truth to work like this then we don't need to think of reference as our words matching themselves in some unexplained manner with the external world, like arrows hitting heir targets.
Right! That is roughly the difference between 'coherence' and 'correspondence' in respect of truth-values.
Correspondence sounds like common sense, until you ask the question, what corresponds to what? How do words 'correspond' with 'states'? And also, how could you validate such correspondence?
According to this theory (correspondence), truth consists in the agreement of our thought with reality. This view ... seems to conform rather closely to our ordinary common sense usage when we speak of truth. The flaws in the definition arise when we ask what is meant by "agreement" or "correspondence" of ideas and objects, beliefs and facts, thought and reality. In order to test the truth of an idea or belief we must presumably compare it with the reality in some sense.
1- In order to make the comparison, we must know what it is that we are comparing, namely, the belief on the one hand and the reality on the other. But if we already know the reality, why do we need to make a comparison? And if we don't know the reality, how can we make a comparison?
2- The making of the comparison is itself a fact about which we have a belief. We have to believe that the belief about the comparison is true. How do we know that our belief in this agreement is "true"? This leads to an infinite regress, leaving us with no assurance of true belief.
Randall, J. & Buchler, J.; Philosophy: An Introduction. p133
But notice that wasn't what you were asked. It's true that "The Earth exists in this situation" is true and the Earth exists in this situation: but the question is not whether "The Earth exists in this situation" is true, but whether "the Earth exists" is true in this situation. Since there are no sentences in this situation, a fortiori it isn't.
In the situation I presented:
1) The Earth exists
2) It's not the case that "the Earth exists" is true, since there aren't any sentences.
I'm not saying that the Earth exists in this situation iff "the Earth exists" is true in this situation. That's a fallacious bi-conditional, as I said. What I'm saying is that the Earth exists in this situation iff "the Earth exists in this situation" is true.
So it doesn't matter if you say that the Earth exists in this situation or if you say that it is true that the Earth exists in this situation or if I say that it is true that the Earth exists in this situation and you say that what I'm saying is true or if you say that "the Earth exists in this situation" is true. It's all the same thing.
And you still haven't clarified how I'm to respond to you. Do I have to say that the Earth exists in this situation or do I have to say that your claim is true? Can I do one but not the other?
The Great WhateverNovember 24, 2016 at 07:43#349030 likes
Reply to Michael Your reply doesn't make sense to me. There's no such thing as a fallacious biconditional. Your proposed biconditional truth is also not what's at issue, as I explained.
There's no such thing as a fallacious biconditional.
By that I mean a proposed biconditional which is actually false, e.g. it is raining iff I am a man.
Your reply doesn't make sense to me.
Which part? My claim that the following are not equivalent:
1. the Earth exists in this situation iff "the Earth exists" is true in this situation
2. the Earth exists in this situation iff "the Earth exists in this situation" is true
Or the part where I asked you to clarify how I am to respond to you? Consider this again:
1. The cup is red
2. The above is true
According to you, there's a difference between asserting that the cup is red and asserting that "the cup is red" is true. So if you assert 1 and if I agree with you, do I have to assert 1 or do I have to assert 2? Does it make sense for me to assert 1 but to deny 2? It seems quite obvious to me that to assert 1 but to deny 2 is a contradiction.
If you assert that the cup is red and if I accept that your assertion is true then ipso facto I accept that the cup is red, and if I accept that the cup is red then ipso facto I accept that your assertion is true.
So facts don't matter? If I judge a factually incorrect statement as true, then it's true? And even if it's a fact that P, "P" wouldn't be true if no one judged it to be?
The world exists separately from us, this is its facticity. What happens in the world happens regardless of our presence. Sure we can learn about it, study fossils, the cosmos, learn how the world works, but since we are also part of the world, our viewpoint has to be circular.
The world doesn't exist separately from us, it just exists independently of us. We live in the world, and it is all around us. We are part of it, as you say. But we can't be both separate from it and part of it.
Much of what happens in the world does indeed happen regardless of our presence, and it would continue to do so without our presence. That's why idealism is wrong.
Not sure what you mean when you say that our viewpoint must be circular.
And once you dismiss this position as ill-founded, something which is commonly believed but not true, you no longer will see yourself as part of the world, but the world as part of yourself.
But you are part of the world, regardless of how you see yourself. That's so inward-looking, ignorant, and oblivious. I might see myself as a pony, but that doesn't mean that I am one.
Much of what happens in the world does indeed happen regardless of our presence, and it would continue to do so without our presence. That's why idealism is wrong.
Just to split hairs, but objective idealism allows for things to happen regardless of our presence.
Just to split hairs, but objective idealism allows for things to happen regardless of our presence.
Can you remind me what that is, and how it allows that? I get the objective part. Is "objective idealism" the most appropriate term for such a position? In the context of this discussion, idealism posits the mind-dependence of truth (although, admittedly, I did stray from that definition), so idealism can't allow for things to be independent of the presence of mind if that would entail corresponding truths which are likewise independent. But it need not entail that, I suppose.
Can you remind me what that is, and how it allows that? Is "objective idealism" the most appropriate term for such a position? In the context of this discussion, idealism posits the mind-dependence of truth, so idealism can't allow for things to be independent of the presence of mind if that would entail corresponding truths which are likewise independent. But it need not entail that, I suppose.
The world itself is one big mental thing (à la pantheism or even panpsychism, I guess), so even though things are dependent on the presence of mind, they're not dependent on the presence of human minds (or the minds of any other intelligent life).
The world itself is one big mental thing (à la panpsychism or pantheism, I guess), so even though things are dependent on the presence of mind, they're not dependent on the presence of human minds (or the minds any other intelligent life).
Oh! I thought you had a bigger point to make. I have no problem talking about minds in general rather than human minds. I just adopted the language of my interlocutor.
Reply to Michael And yeah, maybe "objective idealism" isn't the best name for that position, but I can't think of a better one right now. "Non-intelligent-life-dependent idealism" is a bit of a mouthful.
If I judge a factually incorrect statement as true, then it's true?
"That statement is factually incorrect" is a judgment that someone makes (if they're using correspondence theory that is) about the relationship of the proposition in question to facts. It doesn't obtain that a statement is factually correct or incorrect in lieu of the judgment. One person might judge that P is true (where they're using correspondence theory and they're judging that P is factually correct) while another person judges that P is false (where they're using correspondence theory and they're judging that P is factually incorrect). And actually, all that it functionally refers to to judge that P is true or false under correspondence theory is that P is factually correct or incorrect.
So this answers your second question, too. Propositions are not true or false in lieu of a judgment about whether they're true or false. One major reason for this is that meaning doesn't obtain in lieu of someone explicitly thinking about specific things semantically, so propositions do not even exist in lieu of someone thinking about them (this last part follows from the conventional analysis of what propositions are--namely, that they're the meaning of particular sentential expressions; they're not identical to the sentential expressions per se--"snow is white" is not identical, as a sentential expression, to "schnee ist weiss," since one is in English and contains the word "snow" where the other doesn't, while the other is in German and contains the word "schnee" where the other doesn't, but they are identical as a proposition (although on my account, that's only in case an individual assigns the same meaning to both)).
Metaphysician UndercoverNovember 24, 2016 at 12:05#349400 likes
Sure, "the world" is a construct, but the world isn't. The world is not "the world". The world is the world.
Let me phrase that another way then. You can use "the world" all you want, but I do not know what this refers to, other than something imaginary, in your mind, like a unicorn. You can say the unicorn is not "the unicorn" all you want, but that doesn't resolve anything.
But you are part of the world, regardless of how you see yourself.
OK, so that tells me a little bit, the world is something I'm part of, whether I like it or not. I suppose it will punish me if I don't pay attention to it? That would appear like it is separate from me. What makes you think that I am part of it? Why would it hurt me, if I am part of it, then it would be hurting itself? Does "the world" refer to the same thing as "God"? Quoting Sapientia
If you say so... :-d
And what you say is somehow better than what I say?
Is it that time again? Irrelevant idealist truism time?
OK, I see you at least understand what I'm saying. You're doing better at understanding what I am saying than I am doing at understanding what you are saying. Now tell me where I can find this thing called the world. I want to see if it's really there, to see if you know what you're talking about.
But whether a certain sentence expresses a proposition, and so whether a certain sentence is true, is probably mind-dependent, in the sense that whether something counts as a sentence, and what a sentence expresses, is dependent on a linguistic practices in turn dependent on minds in some way.
In some way...
Sure, in some way, but are they dependent in the relevant way? If there were never any minds, then there would never have been any linguistic practices. That is one way in which the latter is dependent on the former, the latter can only arise as a consequence of the former. But that isn't the issue.
There were minds, and linguistic practices have since arisen. It is now about whether the one depends on the other, going forward.
What do you mean by "linguistic practices"? Because if you mean something like a set of rules, then I don't think that that does depend on any mind in the relevant way. It depended on a mind or minds, but now that the rules have been set, they don't depend on any mind.
Yet, it's possible you might mean something other than that, or something more than that. There don't actually have to be minds applying these rules in practice. They've already been set and applied, and that is sufficient.
To deny this would be to say that for any arrangement of things in the world that logically or conceivably could be interpreted, according to some imaginary linguistic system, in a certain way, in fact already is
In a certain way...
I'm not yet sure whether or not I've denied what you meant, because I'm not yet sure what you meant. But if I have, then no, I don't think so. Interpreting always requires an interpreter and the act of interpretation. If that hasn't happened, then it hasn't already been interpreted.
In the case of the author who no longer exists, along with all other minds, he did in fact mean something with those symbols. This implies that there was some sort of rule that was set up, such that these symbols mean this and not that. If that counts as an interpretation, then they had one. Why would this rule or interpretation no longer apply? It has already been applied. Why would that somehow be reversed just because the author, along with all other minds, ceased to exist?
...and so you'd be forced to say that basically everything is a sentence, and everything expresses every conceivable proposition, always (since there will always be a logically conceivable linguistic convention that could be so arranged).
But what about that it has meaning? Can a string of symbols written on a page have meaning even when it isn't being read? Although we might argue that physical things like ink and paper continue to exist even when we're not around, can we say the same about meaning? Is meaning a physical thing? Is it a particular arrangement of atoms? If not then what is its ontology? Something neither physical nor mental?
By that I mean a proposed biconditional which is actually false, e.g. it is raining iff I am a man.
This biconditional is not 'false' simpliciter if interpreted materially; it is true or false depending on the situation applied to. Applied to the situation I'm in right now, it's false because I'm a man, but it's not raining (where I am) [although even this is complicated by using 'I,' which technically since you used it refers to you and not me, but we can ignore that]. But if I were not a man, or if it were raining, it would be true. A material biconditional only says that in a certain situation, the truth values of the statements flanking the iff match.
What you need is something stronger, a strict biconditional, i.e. by your iff you must mean some sort of universal quantification over situations, such that for each situation, the truth values of the statements flanking the iff match in that situation.
Which part? My claim that the following are not equivalent:
1. the Earth exists in this situation iff "the Earth exists" is true in this situation
2. the Earth exists in this situation iff "the Earth exists in this situation" is true
I agree – that was my entire point. The point is that 1) is false, where 'this situation' refers to the situation I presented to you. This is therefore a counterexample situation to your strict biconditional, and therefore it's false. That 2) is true does not help you, because this is not what you need; you need 1).
According to you, there's a difference between asserting that the cup is red and asserting that "the cup is red" is true
Yes. One predicates something of a cup, the other predicates something of a sentence. In cases where the sentence "the cup is red" does not mean that the cup is red, but something else, their truth conditions clearly come apart.
So if you assert 1 and if I agree with you, do I have to assert 1 or do I have to assert 2? Does it make sense for me to assert 1 but to deny 2?
It would be inconsistent for you to assert 1) and deny 2), but what this shows is that the two statements are materially equivalent in the current situation, not that the strict biconditional holds, which is what you need.
So, given that "the cup is red" means that the cup is red in the current situation, the material biconditional "the cup is red iff 'the cup is red' is true" holds in this situation, since whatever 'the cup' refers to, the two statements flanking the iff must have the same truth value. But again, material equivalence is not what you're after, since if you go by material equivalence, a claim like "Donald Trump wins the 2016 U.S. election iff America exists" is also materially true by the same standards; but it is not true as a strict biconditional since the truth values of the two statements won't match in every conceivable situation.
The same holds for the red cup case, which the way you're presenting the example, by forcing yourself to ask whether they're both true or not in this situation, is obscuring. This is because the point is precisely that there are other situations in which their truth conditions will come apart, viz; those situations in which "the cup is red" does not mean that the cup is red, but something else. For instance, if "red" meant what "blue" does now, then in such a situation "the cup is red" would be true just in case the cup was blue, in that situation.
Because it isn't impossible that one of the alternative theories is correct, and your theory is incorrect. It is possible that whether a proposition is true or false is a matter of correspondence, and judgement is merely what we do when we think that something is true or false.
You seem to be confusing judgement of the truth with truth itself, which is a category error. Do you also confuse sight with what is seen? The act of talking with what we talk about?
Propositions [s]don't float around in the ether, they are not natural forms, but[/s] only exist in the minds of rational beings who are capable of making statements, which may be true or false.
That's not true. A proposition is a meaningful statement, right? Well, we can [i]produce[/I] meaningful statements. They depend on a mind for their production, not for their existence. This production is an act which makes the internal external. If it hasn't been stated, then it isn't a statement at all. And if a proposition is a meaningful statement, and statements are external, then propositions cannot be internal, and therefore cannot exist in the mind.
So, not only is it [i]not[/I] the case that propositions [i]only[/I] exist in the minds of rational beings who are capable of making statements. It [i]cannot[/I] be the case that propositions exist in [i]any[/I] mind.
If the mind making the statement meant something with the statement, then it has meaning, yes? You know that that makes sense. You normally think along those lines all the time.
Let's say an author wrote a book, as many have done. That book isn't meaningless. It is actually full of meaning. That is because the author meant something with the book. He didn't just close his eyes, think about something else, and randomly press buttons on the keyboard. He meant something. And that is its meaning. That it might mean something completely different or nothing at all to someone else doesn't matter, because it doesn't change that. It doesn't have to mean anything to anyone, because that wouldn't change that.
So, we can talk about it sensibly in this way, or we can say that there must be a mind there for it to mean something to - which might seem plausible at first, but can lead to implausible logical consequences.
So you and I will judge something to be true or false - apart from that, there is nothing [s]inherently[/s] true or false [s]in nature[/s], is there?
You tell me. How would you know that there is nothing true or false? You don't actually know that. Pointing to our judgement doesn't do anything. We both agree that we judge things to be true or false, but, for all you know, any of those judgements may well actually be correct.
'Things are neither good nor bad, but thinking makes it so', said the bard.
Yes, so said the bard. He said many things. And meant certain things with the things that he said, regardless of what you or I or anyone thinks, and regardless of whether anyone thinks at all or even exists. You can't change the past.
But, anyway, we're talking about truth here, and that reasoning would lead to absurd logical consequences. The bard was a playwright, not a logician.
To be continued.
The Great WhateverNovember 24, 2016 at 15:53#349660 likes
This is what I'm disputing. Sentence meaning depends on linguistic practice, which in turn, at least as far as we're familiar with it, depends on minds.
This is what I'm disputing. Sentence meaning depends on linguistic practice, which in turn, at least as far as we're familiar with it, depends on minds.
I said more than that one comment, and which addresses the above.
The Great WhateverNovember 24, 2016 at 15:56#349680 likes
I agree – that was my entire point. The point is that 1) is false, where 'this situation' refers to the situation I presented to you. This is therefore a counterexample situation to your strict biconditional, and therefore it's false.
But I haven't asserted 1. I've only asserted 2.
My claim is that the following assertions are equivalent:
1. It is true that the Earth existed in a situation where there were no linguistic practices
2. The above is true
3. "The Earth existed in a situation where there were no linguistic practices" is true
In cases where the sentence "the cup is red" does not mean that the cup is red, but something else, their truth conditions clearly come apart.
But that's not the case I'm considering. I'm considering the following:
The cup is red iff the first part of this sentence is true.
It is implicit in the T-schema that the meaning of the sentence mentioned on the left hand side is the same as the meaning of the sentence used on the right hand side. Which is why we can also say that "Schnee ist weiß" is true iff snow is white.
For instance, if "red" meant what "blue" does now, then in such a situation "the cup is red" would be true just in case the cup was blue, in that situation.
Yet it is still the case that for any assertion "it is true that p" there is an equivalent assertion "'q' is true". That's the point I'm making. It doesn't matter if the actual letters (or sounds) used in the sentence are the same or not.
The Great WhateverNovember 24, 2016 at 16:18#349750 likes
My claim is that the following assertions are equivalent:
1. It is true that the Earth existed in a situation where there were no linguistic practices
2. The above is true
3. "The Earth existed in a situation where there were no linguistic practices" is true
OK, but this doesn't get you what you want. What you need for the biconditional to hold is:
In the situation in which there are no linguistic practices, materially "The Earth existed" is true iff the Earth existed. But as I've shown this isn't so, and this serves as a counterexample to the strict biconditional.
It is implicit in the T-schema that the meaning of the sentence mentioned on the left hand side is the same as the meaning of the sentence used on the right hand side.
Yet it is still the case that for any assertion "it is true that p" there is an equivalent assertion "'q' is true". That's the point I'm making. It doesn't matter if the actual letters (or sounds) used in the sentence are the same or not.
Then you should not phrase your claims in terms of the sort of biconditional you have been all along, nor make arguments based on this, if it is not what you mean.
Besides, what you say here is still false. It's not true that these assertions are (ever) equivalent, as I've already shown, since their truth conditions are different.
An assertion of "It is true that the cup is red" is not equivalent to an assertion of
" 'The cup is red' is true",
Since these two mean different things; one says a cup is a certain color, the other says a certain sentence is true. In the current situation, they are materially equivalent in virtue of what the sentence happens to mean, but counterfactually one might be true and the other false. So their truth conditions are distinct.
The world doesn't exist separately from us, it just exists independently of us. We live in the world, and it is all around us. We are part of it, as you say. But we can't be both separate from it and part of it.
Much of what happens in the world does indeed happen regardless of our presence, and it would continue to do so without our presence. That's why idealism is wrong.
Not sure what you mean when you say that our viewpoint must be circular.
Well your phrasing is better than mine, yes we live in the world. It must be circular because we have no immediately knowable criterion, no way of standing outside the world. The problem is that in order to know the world we must know ourselves, in order to know ourselves, we must know the world.....
It has been tacit in my application of the T-schema that the meanings are the same. Obviously I'm aware that the same syntax can be used to mean different things and that different syntaxes can be used to mean the same thing.
Then you should not phrase your claims in terms of the sort of biconditional you have been all along, nor make arguments based on this, if it is now what you mean.
The way I see it is that the sentence "it is true that p" is equivalent to the sentence "'p' is true"
And, again, it was tacit in this claim that the "p" used and the "p" mentioned mean the same thing (rather than have the same syntax) – which is why it's consistent with "it is true that I am a bachelor" being equivalent to "'I am an unmarried man' is true".
Besides, what you say here is still false. It's not true that these assertions are (ever) equivalent, as I've already shown, since their truth conditions are different.
The truth conditions of the following are the same:
1. It is true that the cup is red.
2. The above sentence is true.
Since these two mean different things; one says a cup is a certain color, the other says a certain sentence is true. In the current situation, they are materially equivalent in virtue of what the sentence happens to mean, but counterfactually one might be true and the other false. So their truth conditions are distinct.
When I say that the cup is red iff "the cup is red" is true I'm not saying that the cup is red iff any sentence which has exactly the string of symbols "the cup is red" is true, irrespective of what this sentence means. So to say that the T-schema fails because in some counterfactual situation the string of symbols "the cup is red" might mean that the cup is blue is a non sequitur.
You might as well say that 1 + 1 doesn't equal 2 because in some counterfactual situation I might be doing binary mathematics in which case 1 + 1 equals 10. The fact that I can use the same symbols in different ways is irrelevant. When I'm using them in this way, 1 + 1 equals 2, and the cup is red iff "the cup is red" is true.
The Great WhateverNovember 24, 2016 at 16:51#349830 likes
The truth conditions of the following are the same:
1. It is true that the cup is red.
2. The above sentence is true.
No, they are not. For the truth conditions of two sentences to be the same, it must be that the proposition they express has the same truth value evaluated relative to all possible situations.
But this isn't so, since evaluated relative to situations in which "the cup is red" means the cup is blue, the proposition expressed by 1) can be true, while that expressed by 2) will be false.
So to say that the T-schema fails because in some counterfactual situation the string of symbols "the cup is red" might mean that the cup is blue is a non sequitur.
It is not a non sequitur in any way. The whole point of stating a strict biconditional is that it holds in counterfactual situations.
You might as well say that 1 + 1 doesn't equal 2 because in some counterfactual situation I might be doing binary mathematics in which case 1 + 1 equals 10. The fact that I can use the same symbols in different ways is irrelevant. When I'm using them in this way, 1 + 1 equals 2, and the cup is red iff "the cup is red" is true.
Not at all. 1 + 1 will still equal 2, even if say, you use the symbol '5' to refer to 1. In such a situation, the equation (read: 'sentence') '1 + 1 = 10' would be true, but nonetheless it would still be true that 1 + 1 = 2.
---
What you can say is that for any assertion "p" in a situation there is an assertion materially equivalent to it in that situation of " 'p' is true," but this is not what the biconditional you're stating means, and none of the heavy metaphysical theses you typically martial as a result of it follow from this.
No, they are not. For the truth conditions of two sentences to be the same, it must be that the proposition they express has the same truth value evaluated relative to all possible situations.
But this isn't so, since evaluated relative to situations in which "the cup is red" means the cup is blue, the proposition expressed by 1) can be true, while that expressed by 2) will be false.
In such a situation both 1) and 2) will be true (assuming that the cup is blue, of course; if it isn't then both will be false).
It is not a non sequitur in any way. The whole point of stating a strict biconditional is that it holds in counterfactual situations.
As I've said, the bi-conditional is to be understood as "the cup is red iff the first part of this sentence is true". You misrepresent the bi-conditional by changing the meaning of the sentence mentioned but not the meaning of the sentence used.
You might as well say that the following is false:
She kicked the bucket iff she kicked the bucket
Because, after all, in some counterfactual situation the first part of the sentence might mean that she died and the second part of the sentence might mean that she struck a bucket with her foot. It's a strawman interpretation of what is being said.
Not at all. 1 + 1 will still equal 2, even if say, you use the symbol '5' to refer to 1. In such a situation, the equation (read: 'sentence') '1 + 1 = 10' would be true, but nonetheless it would still be true that 1 + 1 = 2.
You miss the point. Both of the following are true:
1. 1 + 1 = 2
2. 1 + 1 = 10
The first is true using decimal numbers (among others) and the second is true using binary numbers. Your claim that the T-schema is false because in some counterfactual situation a sentence with that same syntax would be false is akin to saying that 1) fails because in some counterfactual situation (e.g. binary mathematics) an equation with that same syntax would be false (or, rather, nonsense).
What you can say is that for any assertion "p" in a situation there is an assertion materially equivalent to it in that situation of " 'p' is true," but this is not what the biconditional you're stating means, and none of the heavy metaphysical theses you typically martial as a result of it follow from this.
Again, all I said is that I understand the sentence "it is true that p" to be equivalent to the sentence "'p' is true" (where both ps mean the same thing rather than just have the same syntax). If this then entails a particular metaphysics, then so be it.
The Great WhateverNovember 24, 2016 at 17:16#349880 likes
In such a situation both 1) and 2) will be true (assuming that the cup is blue, of course; if it isn't then both will be false).
Not at all. 1) will be true just in case the cup is red in that situation; 2) will be true just in case the cup is blue in that situation. Now, an utterance of 1) in that situation would be true in that situation just in case the cup is blue in that situation; but that is not what's at stake. What's at stake is whether 1), as uttered here, is true evaluated relative to that situation.
You might as well say that the following is false:
She kicked the bucket iff she kicked the bucket
Because, after all, in some counterfactual situation the first part of the sentence might mean that she died and the second part of the sentence might mean that she struck a bucket with her foot. It's a strawman interpretation of what is being said.
Not at all. In order for the biconditional here to say anything, we must first resolve whether you are using the phrase on the left idiomatically or not. If you are, then everything is fixed; she kicked the bucket iff she died, regardless of what the words mean in a counterfactual situation. You are confusing resolution of ambiguity in your use of the words now with possible counterfactual differences in word meaning.
Your claim that the T-schema is false because in some counterfactual situation a sentence with that same syntax would be false is akin to saying that 1) fails because in some counterfactual situation (e.g. binary mathematics) an equation with that same syntax would be false (or, rather, nonsense).
Not at all. 1 + 1 would still be 2 in that situation, but the equation, i.e. the sentence, "1 + 1 = 2" would be false, precisely because in such a situation that sentence would not mean that 1 + 1 = 2.
You seem to be confusing judgement of the truth with truth itself, which is a category error
It's not a 'category error'. How do you separate truth from judgement? Can you point out anything which you hold to be true, whilst not judging it? Can you stand outside of judgement, and see things as they are without making it a matter of judgement?
The 'absurd logical consequences' that concern you, are on account of my argument undermining your innate notion of realism. And that notion is, as I explained, 'there anyway' realism - that the Universe is 'there anyway', while people, and minds, come into it and go out of it. So what I'm arguing turns that kind of realism on its head, but it does so on the basis of a reasoned analysis. That form of realism is what is bred into us nowadays as 'scientific realism' - that there's the big wide world, and we come into it, our minds are the consequence of the processes in it, those processes are what is real, what is 'there anyway', but the mind is just a product of that, and only has a kind of secondary reality.
That attitude is a consequence of Locke's representative realism and the native scientific empiricism of Western secular culture. My view of philosophy is that it ought to subvert this sense of reality; my philosophy is, in that sense, counter-cultural. Philosophy, as I understand it, causes you to question your sense of the solidity of the so-called 'external world', by making you aware of the sense in which the world is a mental construction, or, the way in which the mind contributes to what we generally regard as an 'independent reality'.
In what way is the state of affairs any different to the proposition which expresses it?
State of affairs: the cup is red
Proposition: "the cup is red"
What makes the proposition true or not is whether it expresses the state of affairs correctly (or you could say, corresponds correctly to the state of affairs).
The proposition is mind dependent, right. So, what makes the state of affairs any different when all it is is the proposition absent quotes?
It seems to me that the state of affairs is just a particular kind of language use/way of speaking. We 'say the world' and also say propositions.
Ok let's say the state of affairs that the propositions expresses is not mind-dependent. "The cup is red" is true or not independent of mind.
But then what's even the point of positing this mind independence? Whether the proposition is true or not, isn't contained within the proposition. So by that I mean, "the cup is red" doesn't seem to posesses some sort of invisible truth value. How is it that we ourselves come to know the truh value? Well we actually have to find out whether the cup is red or not. This process of finding out is mind dependent, and if you're an idealist so is the cup. So here we have an entire mind-dependent analyses of how it is that we come to know a propositions truth value. But you'd have to then hold that there's a separate mind-independent matching of the proposition to the state of affairs going on, for truth to be mind independent. The proposition, independent of mind would either match the state of affairs true or false, and it would have this truth value. But the truth value would be invisible to us, likewise the way in which the proposition matches itself to the state of affairs. We don't know how this happens. And both of these are entirely irrelevant to how it is that we ourselves actually find the truh value of a proposition, which is we do our own matching.
So what's then the point of saying "but also the proposition was true or not independent of us looking at the cup and deciding whether it's true." Isn't that just totally irrelevant to us? We could never acces this mind independent truth value, it's not present to us in the proposition itself. It really has no bearing on how it is that we ourselves find out the truth value of a proposition. So why posit it? Does it have any explanatory value?
It seems totally unnecessary.
You might say the cup is red independent of mind. But don't we then get into an argument over theories of perception? You'd be arguing for direct realism, the 'redness' of the cup existing out in the world. How would we even know that the state of affairs is mind-independent?
1 and 1 make 2 in decimal notation. 1 and 1 make 10 in binary notion. Given that 1) is written in decimal and 2) is written in binary, both 1) and 2) are true.
Compare with:
1. Snow is white
2. Schnee ist weiß
Two different sentences in two different languages.
Not at all. In order for the biconditional here to say anything, we must first resolve whether you are using the phrase on the left idiomatically or not. If you are, then everything is fixed; she kicked the bucket iff she died, regardless of what the words mean in a counterfactual situation. You are confusing resolution of ambiguity in your use of the words now with possible counterfactual differences in word meaning.
And in order for the T-schema to say anything, we must first resolve whether the sentence mentioned on the one side means the same thing as the sentence used on the other side. If it is then everything is fixed; the cup is red iff "the cup is red" is true.
You're being inconsistent.
Not at all. 1) will be true just in case the cup is red in that situation; 2) will be true just in case the cup is blue in that situation. Now, an utterance of 1) in that situation would be true in that situation just in case the cup is blue in that situation; but that is not what's at stake. What's at stake is whether 1), as uttered here, is true evaluated relative to that situation.
The truth of both sentences must be evaluated as uttered in the same situation. Iff 1) is true when uttered in situation X then 2) is true when uttered in situation X. In situation X (where "the cup is red" means that the cup is blue), the sentence "the cup is red" as uttered in that situation is true iff the cup is blue, and the sentence "the previous sentence is true" (referring to the sentence "the cup is red" as uttered in that situation) as uttered in that situation is true iff the cup is blue.
Not at all. 1 + 1 would still be 2 in that situation, but the equation, i.e. the sentence, "1 + 1 = 2" would be false, precisely because in such a situation that sentence would not mean that 1 + 1 = 2.
Again, you're being inconsistent. You say that 1 + 1 = 2 even if "1 + 1 = 2" is false when uttered in that situation because the former claim must be evaluated according to what it means to us now (in decimal notation) rather than what it means in this hypothetical situation, but then don't apply the same reasoning to the T-schema. Even if "p iff 'p' is true" is false when uttered in that situation, it is still the case that p iff "p" is true, because this latter claim must be evaluated according to what it means to us now rather than what it means in this hypothetical situation.
The Great WhateverNovember 24, 2016 at 19:44#350030 likes
1 and 1 do not make 2 'in a notation.' 1 and 1 make 2, period. The equation or sentence '1 + 1 = 2' might be true or false, depending on how you disambiguate it relative to a notation, or depending on linguistic facts about the meaning of the symbols contained in it.
And in order for the T-schema to say anything, we must first resolve whether the sentence mentioned on the one side means the same thing as the sentence used on the other side.
No. A biconditional is a biconditional and states whatever it states.
If it is then everything is fixed; the cup is red iff "the cup is red" is true.
Again, you're confusing resolving ambiguity during the use of a sentence with evaluating the proposition a sentence expresses, whose value is already set after ambiguity is resolved, against a counterfactual situation in which different linguistic facts obtain.
The truth of both sentences must be evaluated as uttered in the same situation.
There is some confusion here over situation of utterance and situation of evaluation. The situation of utterance determines which proposition a sentence expresses; that situation is this one, since you're actually uttering these sentences here. Once that proposition is fixed, it is a further question whether that proposition is true as evaluated relative to some situation or not. So it can be that a certain sentence, as uttered in this situation, is false as evaluated relative to another.
So, for instance, 'I am hungry,' as uttered by me, expresses the proposition that TGW is hungry; we can then evaluate whether that proposition is true in some situation or not.
In situation X (where "the cup is red" means that the cup is blue), the sentence "the cup is red" as uttered in that situation is true iff the cup is blue, and the sentence "the previous sentence is true" (referring to the sentence "the cup is red" as uttered in that situation) as uttered in that situation is true iff the cup is blue.
This is not how it works,. though. It doesn't matter what the sentence would mean as uttered in that situation, because this is not where it was uttered. It was uttered by you, in the actual world, just now, and so expresses the proposition that the cup is red. It would have expressed the proposition that the cup is blue if it had been uttered in the alternate situation, but it was not, it was uttered here.
So the sentence expresses a proposition, that the cup is red, which evaluated relative to an alternate situation in which it's blue, is false. And relative to this situation of utterance as well, the other sentence expresses the proposition that a certain sentence, viz. "the cup is red" is true, which evaluated relative to that same alternate situation is false, since in that situation, the proposition expressed by this sentence is false, since in that situation the sentence means the cup is blue, which it is not.
The Great WhateverNovember 24, 2016 at 19:47#350040 likes
Again, you're being inconsistent. You say that 1 + 1 = 2 even if "1 + 1 = 2" is false when uttered in that situation because the former claim must be evaluated according to what it means to us now (in decimal notation) rather than what it means in this hypothetical situation,
No, the proposition which it expresses is tied to its use now, because now is when you actually used it. It's another question whether that proposition is true or false relative to some counterfactual situation.
So 1 + 1 is always 2, period, regardless of what's up with the language. But in a counterfactual situation, '1 + 1 = 2' might very well be false, because the symbol '1' might mean 5, for example.
but then don't apply the same reasoning to the T-schema. Even if "p iff 'p' is true" is false when uttered in that situation, it is still the case that p iff "p" is true, because this latter claim must be evaluated according to what it means to us now rather than what it means in this hypothetical situation.
The biconditional is something you're using now, so what it expresses it tied to the meaning of the words as they are now. Whether what it expresses is true relative to another situation is a different story. And relative to a situation which the sentence "the cup is red" means something else, the material equivalence doesn't hold, and so the biconditional as you use it now is false.
Only if you're not using the base-2 number system.
No. A biconditional is a biconditional and states whatever it states.
Yes, and it states what it states in the English language as we currently understand it. To then try to interpret it by switching in a different language is to misinterpret it. I'm not using some hypothetical English where the words mean something other than what they do now. Every word I'm using (and mentioning) is everyday English. And using everyday English, the statements "it is true that the cup is red" and "'the cup is red' is true" have the same truth conditions.
Again, you're confusing resolving ambiguity during the use of a sentence with evaluating the proposition a sentence expresses, whose value is already set after ambiguity is resolved, against a counterfactual situation in which different linguistic facts obtain.
I'm not confusing it. I'm pointing out that just as the sentence must be understood as not being ambiguous, it must also be understood as not having some counterfactual meaning. Using the actual non-ambiguous meaning of everyday English words, the statements "it is true that the cup is red" and "'the cup is red' is true" have the same truth conditions.
This is not how it works,. though. It doesn't matter what the sentence would mean as uttered in that situation, because this is not where it was uttered. It was uttered by you, in the actual world, just now, and so expresses the proposition that the cup is red. It would have expressed the proposition that the cup is blue if it had been uttered in the alternate situation, but it was not, it was uttered here.
So the sentence expresses a proposition, that the cup is red, which evaluated relative to an alternate situation in which it's blue, is false. And relative to this situation of utterance as well, the other sentence expresses the proposition that a certain sentence, viz. "the cup is red" is true, which evaluated relative to that same alternate situation is false, since in that situation, the proposition expressed by this sentence is false, since in that situation the sentence means the cup is blue, which it is not.
This is just nonsense. If we have the two sentences 1) the cup is red and 2) the previous sentence is true then 2) is true iff 1) is true. It's that simple.
So 1 + 1 is always 2, period, regardless of what's up with the language.
It just doesn't make sense to me, and seems unbelievable, that all of these facts, all of these events, which can be - and can have been - stated, would not, as statements, have a corresponding truth-value for that reason alone, but would instead require a mind there judging them to be true or false.
But then you say, further down:
I think that a realist can straightforwardly acknowledge that any rational proposition, whether mathematical or otherwise, can only be grasped by a rational mind, and is not independent in that sense.
Those two statements seem in conflict to me.
There isn't much I have to say about that. You haven't even stated what you think the conflict seems to be. They don't seem in conflict to me.
In some cases, Person A might be factually mistaken, and Person B not, which is pretty straightforward.
That's what [i]I[/I] think. But how can that be what [i]you[/I] think? Your earlier comment seems to imply subjective relativism. You said that whether a proposition is true or false is a matter of judgement. How do you square that with your above comment? Would you like to qualify your original comment? Because it seems to follow from your original comment that if Person A judges the proposition to be true, then the proposition is true, and anything else, including whether or not he is factually mistaken, is irrelevant. And likewise with regards to Person B.
Is that what you meant when you said that whether a proposition is true or false is a matter of judgement? If not, then what did you mean? You didn't directly address this the last time, so can you please do so this time?
But in other cases, it can be very hard to adjudicate.
And how is that relevant?
We're not talking about epistemology. I can see how that would be relevant in epistemology, where the focus would be:
[i]Do we know who is right and who is wrong? If so, how? How do we adjudicate between them? What do we need to take into account? How should we go about deciding?[/I]
But I don't see how that is relevant in the context of this discussion.
It also doesn't rule against the fact that people can be wrong - often large numbers of people, about very important matters of fact, as I think we have seen in the news at least a couple of times recently.
Yes, people can be wrong. But how do you account for that, given what you've said? That's the reason I brought it up.
I know, or rather fear, that there are things I'm likely to be wrong about, and that there are many other things I don't know. I have had to change my view, in fact I've often changed it after discussions such as these.
Right, so we both judge that we are fallible. But my argument attempted to show that given what you've already claimed, that results in contradiction. Do you have anything to say about that? With all due respect, I'm not just bringing these topics up as talking points.
I think 'the realism you're talking about' is what I call 'there anyway' realism - that the big wide world is 'there anyway', regardless of whether anyone's in it, regardless whether you're thinking about it or not.
I am indeed a realist of that kind. Although the realism in this discussion is more specific, and has focused on truth and meaning.
Pragmatically that is true, but on another level, the world you think is 'there anyway' still relies on a perspective, namely yours.
You seem to be changing the subject again, whether you mean to or not.
I don't care about what is "pragmatically true" if that is anything other than what is true. And I don't agree that the world depends on any perspective, whether mine or someone else's.
That is because the mind organises perceptions, judgements, sensations, and so on, so as to form the very concept of 'there anyway'; that is a volitional act, or, in some sense, a mental construction, in the Kantian sense. But again, it's not something in your mind or my mind alone, it is an inter-subjective reality, very similar to what Husserl called an 'umwelt' or 'lebenswelt', namely, a world that is imbued with judgement and meaning. That is what the ''there anyway' realist actually believes in, whilst at the same time pretending that they have no part in it.
As interesting as that may be, can you bring it back to truth and mind-dependence? If you're leading up to something that pertains to that, can you get there sometime soon? You might need to spell it out. I would like to avoid digression.
Are you denying objective reality? Or are you just denying the knowledge of it or perceptual access to it? The former may well be relevant, whereas I'm not so sure about the latter. It's the difference between metaphysics and epistemology again.
Terrapin StationNovember 24, 2016 at 23:38#350560 likes
Let me phrase that another way then. You can use "the world" all you want, but I do not know what this refers to
Often when someone says something like that I just think that it's not worth bothering to even attempt communication with them. It always strikes me as akin to, say, if I owned a cab company, and someone were to approach me about a job, but then they say, "I don't even know what a car is." Sometimes it's just not worth bothering.
Terrapin StationNovember 24, 2016 at 23:42#350590 likes
It depended on a mind or minds, but now that the rules have been set, they don't depend on any mind.
How would they not still depend on minds? At best, sans minds, we're talking about something like a set of marks on a piece of paper or a computer screen, or a set of recorded sounds or something like that.
If rules apply, they apply regardless of whether anyone is around to observe. The tree that falls in the middle of the forest makes a sound even if no one is around to hear it.
Terrapin StationNovember 24, 2016 at 23:53#350620 likes
In other words, how could something even be a rule without someone thinking about it as such? How do rules apply without mentality involved? Explain how that would work.
Reply to Terrapin Station
Gravity works, its always worked, even though it was not conceptualized until 1687. A rule describes what we experience in the world, and it works regardless of whether or not anyone is available to witness it.
Terrapin StationNovember 24, 2016 at 23:58#350660 likes
Reply to Sapientia I didn't change the subject, it's more that I am 'joining the dots' in a way you're not expecting.
Regarding the two statements which I said were in conflict: the first says 'I can't believe all of these facts ... require a mind there judging them to be true or false' but the next paragraph acknowledges that 'a realist can straightforwardly acknowledge that any rational proposition, whether mathematical or otherwise, can only be grasped by a rational mind, and is not independent in that sense.'
So first you say, you can't believe that there needs to be a mind to judge facts, but then in the second, you acknowledge that a rational proposition can only be grasped by a mind. That is what I said 'appeared to be a contradiction'.
At any rate, this point is very close to the nub of the argument. I will try and illustrate it with the example below:
I believe, for instance, that the Pythagorean theorem in geometry states something that is approximately true, independent of the existence of man.
So what I'm arguing is that, even though this is true in one sense, the Pythagorean theorem can nevertheless only be grasped by a rational intelligence. And the same can be said for much of the 'furniture of reason' - logical laws, natural numbers, and the like, which are only perceptible to a rational mind. So whatever we know is underpinned by the rational (intuitive, symbolic, and other) aspects of mind, and is not truly 'mind-independent' in the sense that Einstein's scientific realism depicts it.
Now my view is that modern philosophy, since Descartes, Newton, etc, has lost sight of the fundamental role of mind in the apprehension of reality. This is because the way mind was construed as 'res cogitans', the 'invisible thinking substance', then negated by philosophical materialism, and subsequently 'explained' in terms of molecular and evolutionary biology. In all of this, 'mind' was relegated to a secondary degree of reality - relegated to the subjective. But it is only by virtue of the mind that we have any knowledge of the world at all.
Through scientific measurements and conventions, regularities are identified and exploited which provide the great powers that science possesses. Those are quantifiable and objective in a relative sense, but the idea that such knowledge is or can be absolute is the error of scientism.
So when you ask:
Are you denying objective reality?
What I'm denying is that 'objective reality' exists in its own right, separately to any subjective knowledge, experience and perception of it. But I'm not arguing that the world exists 'in the mind'. The objective and subjective are poles within experience - they are not absolutes, but are mutually dependent (much as anticipated by Kant's Critique of Pure Reason).
The Great WhateverNovember 25, 2016 at 04:35#351040 likes
Yes, and it states what it states in the English language as we currently understand it. To then try to interpret it by switching in a different language is to misinterpret it.
I'm doing no such thing. The sentences as you express them now in English are not equivalent, because they do not express equivalent propositions. This is shown by the fact that their truth conditions come apart in different worlds of evaluation.
This is just nonsense. If we have the two sentences 1) the cup is red and 2) the previous sentence is true then 2) is true iff 1) is true. It's that simple.
I can't help you if you're going to hold onto this. I have explained, patiently and in depth and detail, why this is not so. You are free to review the arguments again, since they are catalogued here. You are also free to continue to believe 'it's that simple,' but you are wrong.
The question, then, is whether or not propositions are sentence-dependent. If so, and if sentences are mind-dependent, then propositions are mind-dependent. And if truth is proposition-dependent then truth is mind-dependent.
Why would sentences be mind-dependent in any sense relevant to the debate? If I write a sentence on a piece of paper, then there is a sentence which doesn't depend on my mind or anyone else's. We (minds, that is) could all suddenly cease to exist, and the sentence would still be there.
Why would sentences be mind-dependent in any sense relevant to the debate? If I write a sentence on a piece of paper, then there is a sentence which doesn't depend on my mind or anyone else's. We (minds, that is) could all suddenly cease to exist, and the sentence would still be there.
Well, I might say that a sentence isn't simply a pattern of ink but a pattern of ink that expresses a proposition. And expressing a proposition isn't the sort of thing that ink can do when it isn't being read.
Well, I might say that a sentence isn't simply a pattern of ink but a pattern of ink that expresses a proposition. And expressing a proposition isn't the sort of thing that ink can do when it isn't being read.
I might also say that a sentence isn't simply a pattern of ink but a pattern of ink that expresses a proposition. But reading it and it expressing a proposition are not necessarily connected such that only by reading it, does it express a proposition.
I might also say that a sentence isn't simply a pattern of ink but a pattern of ink that expresses a proposition. But reading it has nothing to do with it expressing a proposition.
And I disagree. That a pattern of ink expresses a proposition just is that we have a particular kind of conceptual attitude towards that pattern of ink.
What is expressing a proposition to you? Is it a physical process that can occur in the absence of any kind of mental activity? What particles are involved, and in what way do they behave?
Or is it some non-physical (and non-mental) process? Then what is its ontology, and where's the evidence of such a thing?
Metaphysician UndercoverNovember 25, 2016 at 11:44#351370 likes
Often when someone says something like that I just think that it's not worth bothering to even attempt communication with them. It always strikes me as akin to, say, if I owned a cab company, and someone were to approach me about a job, but then they say, "I don't even know what a car is." Sometimes it's just not worth bothering.
This is philosophy, and it's customary ask others to explain and justify the concepts they use. That's how we learn what the others are talking about, and what the others believe. If you're not interested ...
And I disagree. That a pattern of ink expresses a proposition just is that we have a particular kind of conceptual attitude towards that pattern of ink.
I don't think that the "have", which denotes the present, is necessary. I think that it would be sufficient that we [i]had[/I] a particular kind of conceptual attitude towards that pattern of ink, and I think that this can be used to answer the question of whether it expresses a proposition. If it is the case that it expressed a proposition, then why would it no longer do so? For there to be propositions, it is required that they be produced, which requires producers. But once they have been produced, the producers are no longer needed. What has been produced is independent from that which produced it. We do not need to read them or maintain them in any way. What's done is done. We can pack our bags, go home, and die, and there will still be a sentence on a piece of paper that we turned into something meaningful. Something would have to change that for it to be otherwise, but what would - or could - that be?
Unfortunately, a lot of people think that philosophy amounts to "playing stupid." (I can explain why a lot of people misinterpret it that way.) Philosophy really isn't playing stupid though. This is a case where either you're playing stupid or you effectively really are.
I don't think that the "have", which denotes the present, is necessary. I think that it would be sufficient that we had a particular kind of conceptual attitude towards that pattern of ink, and that this can be used to answer the question of whether it expresses a proposition. If it is the case that it expressed a proposition, then why would it no longer be the case? For there to be propositions, it is required that they be produced, which requires producers. But once they have been produced, the producers are no longer needed. What has been produced is independent from that which produced it. We do not need to read them or maintain them in any way. What's done is done. We can pack our bags, go home, and die, and there will still be a sentence on a piece of paper that we turned into something mraningful. Something would have to change that for it to be otherwise, but what would - or could - that be?
But what is the ontology of expressing a proposition? Is it a physical process that occurs in the absence of mental activity? It seems to me that your position requires that it is (unless you want to argue for mind-independent non-physical processes, but again, what is the nature of such a thing, and where's the evidence?).
If it is the case that it expressed a proposition, then why would it no longer be the case?
You wouldn't say that because the ball fell then it's still falling even after it lands. So why would you say that because the ink expressed a proposition then it's still expressing a proposition even after it's no longer being read?
It is what a sentence does when it has meaning. And a sentence can have meaning if it has been given meaning.
And what does it mean for ink to have meaning? What is the ontology of having meaning? Is it a physical process that occurs even in the absence of mental activity?
I say it isn't. That ink has meaning just is that we have a particular cognitive attitude towards that ink. Meaning isn't some mind-independent physical (or mystical) substance that attaches itself to carbon (or whatever it is that ink is made of), and nor is it a kind of physical (or mystical) behaviour that carbon engages in.
This is wrong because determining what proposition is expressed by the utterance of a sentence requires knowing something about the context of utterance.
What do you mean here? Do you mean that [i]knowing[/I] what proposition is expressed by the utterance of a sentence requires knowing something about the context of utterance? Or do you mean something else? Perhaps something more than just that.
You seem to either be 1) thinking about this from the perspective of someone else, and assuming that it is [i]they[/I] who determine what proposition is expressed; or 2) using "determining" as a synonym for "knowing".
Say you walk in a library and you see a poster pinned to the wall that reads "Physicists are imported." As you contemplate the meaning, a host of fascinating insights open up for you. You subsequently find that the poster is part of an art installation in which the artist is having posters made from computer generated sentences. This is one of them.
You think to yourself: "See! The sentence expressed a proposition all on its own... without any help from a human mind."
No. It didn't. You derived a proposition from it by projecting a context of utterance.
So it was meaningless, in the sense that it was never given a meaning. It [i]can[/I] mean something [i]to[/I] someone, but that wouldn't be it's meaning. Although that would be [i]a[/I] meaning, and it would be it's meaning [i]for[/I] that someone.
Correct me if I am wrong, but you seem to be admitting (at least) that there could not have been any statements had there not been any intelligent life, but why? In your view, what is it exactly about intelligent life that makes the existence of statements possible?
How else do you think that there could have been statements? Are there any other realistic alternatives that you can think of? It'd surely require someone or something capable of making statements, and intelligent life forms such as us fit that description.
But how is this line of inquiry even relevant? What matters is whether they [i]would be[/I] mind-dependent. I don't have to play along with your Socratic line of enquiry, you know. Please state the supposed relevance of this line of enquiry before we continue.
Yes I do, mostly because I subscribe to the notion that statements are sign relations that require one or more minds as fundament in order to be instantiated.
What does [i]that[/I] mean? And [I]why[/I] would that be required?
Unfortunately, a lot of people think that philosophy amounts to "playing stupid." (I can explain why a lot of people misinterpret it that way.) Philosophy really isn't playing stupid though. This is a case where either you're playing stupid or you effectively really are.
Well, I'm involved in the "Many Worlds Interpretation" thread. What makes you think that your assumption of "the world" is the correct one, and these speculative physicists who believe in many worlds are wrong?
If you believe in "the world", and they believe in "many worlds", then why should I believe in any "world" until someone explains to me what it means to be a world.
Terrapin StationNovember 25, 2016 at 23:38#352270 likes
You can't talk about whether some definition or another is correct if you don't even have any idea what the term refers to.
Exactly! How can you know what the word refers to if there are multiple definitions to choose from and none of them can be considered to be the correct one?
That's what I am asking. I'm not the one claiming the reality of "the world", I'm the one asking what that means.
In what context?
Metaphysician UndercoverNovember 26, 2016 at 01:18#352420 likes
It was suggested that the world is something which exists independent of minds, and also that I am a part of this world. To begin with, that appears contradictory to me, unless I don't have a mind.
Also, what I observe is many objects independent from me. They are separate from me, and I am not part of them. I am "part" of many things, groups and organizations, mostly by choice, though I am part of my family, and part of the greater society, not by choice. What is this "world" which I am supposed to be part of?.
It was suggested that the world is something which exists independent of minds, and also that I am a part of this world. To begin with, that appears contradictory to me, unless I don't have a mind.
A bit of hay may adhere to the fleece. It doesn't mean the fleece is hay-dependent. (I'm shopping for a spinning wheel. Woo Hoo!)
What is this "world" which I am supposed to be part of?.
I'm not overly fond of your wording here. Partitioning the world invites questions about whether its boundaries are finite or infinite. World here means a domain and I believe it's an abstract object because it's a set.
Metaphysician UndercoverNovember 26, 2016 at 02:48#352560 likes
A bit of hay may adhere to the fleece. It doesn't mean the fleece is hay-dependent. (I'm shopping for a spinning wheel. Woo Hoo!)
What part of the word "part" do you not understand? To say that the hay adheres to the fleece is not the same as saying that the hay is part of the fleece. How could the fleece be hay-independent if the hay is part of the fleece.
I'm not overly fond of your wording here. Partitioning the world invites questions about whether its boundaries are finite or infinite. World here means a domain and I believe it's an abstract object because it's a set.
I was just stating my observations. Things which I observe to be independent from me are independent things. By the same principle that I hold them to be independent from me, I also hold them to be independent from each other. What makes one thing a "part" of another? If I am supposed to be a part of this thing, "the world", is this thing not independent at all?
There was no suggestion that the world is a domain, and I don't know what you mean. Is "the world" just meant to signify a domain name? I don't get it.
If the fleece could persist beyond the removal of the hay. It's not the definition of "world" you should be preoccupied with here. It's "dependent."
I don't see how that's relevant. That something could persist in time (the fleece), beyond the point in time in which something was a part of it (the hay), does not negate the fact that this thing is a part of that thing's existence. Existence necessarily has temporal extension. If your original claim is that the hay is a part of the fleece, you can only remove this fact by limiting the temporal extension of the existence of the fleece to a time when the hay is not a part of the fleece. You would claim that the temporal part of the fleece's existence, during which the hay is a part of the fleece, is not actually part of the fleece's existence. But then you contradict the original claim that the hay is a part of the fleece.
Back to the original point. If I am part of the world, how is it possible that the world exists independently of me? That is the explanation I am waiting for, in order that I can understand what is meant by "the world". As far as I can see, either the world is completely independent from me (in which case I am not a part of it), or I am part of the world (in which case it is nonsense to speak of the world as something independent from me). Otherwise I need a firm definition of what "part" means.
Metaphysician Undercover:f I am part of the world, how is it possible that the world exists independently of me? That is the explanation I am waiting for, in order that I can understand what is meant by "the world".
Paradoxes often occur in respect of this question. A paradox might arise when there are two apparently contradictory statements, both of which appear to be true. And this is a case in point. It is true that we are 'part of the world', but it is also true that 'the world is different to us'.
The latter statement is based on the obvious fact that as a being, an organism, we have to differentiate ourselves from what is not ourselves. That is not an ability that we're born with, but is learned in very early stages of infancy. But once learned it forms an essential part of the ability to negotiate our way in the world. Part of the developmental cycle is learning that things do indeed exist separately to us. I recall when I was in infants school, playing hide-and-seek in the playground, I was convinced that if I couldn't see the person that was looking for me, then they couldn't see me either. I learned very quickly that I was wrong, and from that began to understand how I would appear to another person. In hindsight, that ability to see things from an apparently external perspective, is a normal and important part of mental development. (I wonder if kids with autism disorders ever develop that?) Something similar occured when I noticed, aged about 6, that my own drawings lacked perspective - I suddenly saw the faults in all the drawings I had done of airplanes and the like. Basically, I realised that I couldn't draw; whereas previously, I couldn't tell the difference between what I drew, and other drawings. That too was a small milestone in cognitive development.
All of this is part of normal psychology and not controversial. From the realist point of view that one arrives at as a part of the process of maturation, the world just carries on, and I am only one person in it, born at such and such a date, one day to die.
But I don't think the issue of 'mind independence' can be resolved on the common-sense or realist level. What the 'mind-dependence' problem requires is an analysis of the role of the mind in what we understand as reality. And that, I think, is a very difficult question, because it requires something more than a common-sense analysis. My beef with a lot of what is said about it, is that most people just regard the common-sense attitude as being definitive; as if common sense really constitutes a philosophical analysis, when the role of philosophy is precisely to question what most people think of as 'common-sense'.
Metaphysician UndercoverNovember 27, 2016 at 04:33#354640 likes
The latter statement is based on the obvious fact that as a being, an organism, we have to differentiate ourselves from what is not ourselves. That is not an ability that we're born with, but is learned in very early stages of infancy.
The differentiating of ourselves, to see oneself as a thing separate from other things, is not the real problem I am having here, this seems to come naturally. As you describe, it is a sort of learnt thing, but it is highly intuitive as we deal with individual objects, and see ourselves as individuals, separate from others. The real issue is the assumption that I am part of something, "the world", some larger whole.
To be a part of something implies that I have a role, a function, or purpose. Why should I assume that such is the case with respect to my relationship to this thing called the world? I can justify the notion that I am a part of a larger thing called my family, because I can understand real relationships here. My siblings have the same mother and father as I do, my cousins have shared grandparents, etc.. If I extrapolate, I can extend this such that I am part of the local society, the human race in general, and I can even say that I am part of life on earth. How does "the world" fit into this though? That's where I find difficulty. I can see myself as part of life on earth, because I can see a certain relationship between myself and other living things, in the fact that we are all alive, but I'm really not sure how I'm supposed to conceive of myself as part of the world.
Whenever I think of the world, I seem to be faced with this division, this separation. "The world" seems to signify all that is other from me, and I cannot seem to force it to signify something that I am a part of.. Whenever I try to establish a conceptual relationship between myself and the world, I do so by means of the relationships described above. But I don't ever get to "the world" because there is a disjoint at the end of the living, which causes the world to loom on the other side, as the other.
How do I get beyond those particular relationships which justify the notion that I am part of something bigger, life on earth, to the conclusion of a most general relationship, that each and every thing animate or inanimate, is a part of the same thing which I am a part of, the world? This is so completely counter-intuitive to what comes naturally, and what we learn, to differentiate and separate individual things, as if things really have separate existence. Why would we be learning to differentiate and separate individual things, as if individual things each have their own separate existence, if they were really all part of one, the world? .
Whenever I think of the world, I seem to be faced with this division, this separation. "The world" seems to signify all that is other from me, and I cannot seem to force it to signify something that I am a part of.
That is the fundamental existential problem of life. Overcoming or healing that sense of otherness or separation is the goal of all philosophy in my view.
Metaphysician UndercoverNovember 27, 2016 at 13:04#354940 likes
Reply to Wayfarer
But this "sense of otherness" appears to be very real. In fact I think it is real. If it is, then to overcome it simply by assuming the existence of a unity called "the world" is to create an illusion, a fiction. It would be like if, when you wish that something isn't so, you simply assume that it is otherwise, in order to avoid facing the facts. If that is the case, then the only real way to overcome otherness is to actually create the relationships necessary to produce the world. It requires real effort to bring about what we want to be the case. Simply assuming that it is the case does not suffice.
Metaphysician UndercoverNovember 27, 2016 at 13:20#354960 likes
We could start a thread to explore different sorts of ontological dependence.
I think that might be a good idea. Here's an issue I've come across a number of times already in the philosophy forums. It is the idea of co-dependence, and the claim is that one thing is dependent on another, while the other is dependent on the first. It is used to put an end to analysis.
"We cannot analyze these things further, because there is a co-dependence here which prevents us from separating these two things."
So for instance, the claim would be that we cannot analyze space and time separately because there is a co-dependence between them which prevents us from separating them, even in theory. The insistence would be that "space" and "time" really do not refer to separate things, so it would be a faulty analysis to separate them.
My opinion is that there is no such thing as a real co-dependence, and the term is simply used to disguise circular logic, or to make circular logic appear to be acceptable.
Reply to Metaphysician Undercover I wouldn't call it co-dependence because that term has a significant psychological meaning. Interdependence... yes. I disagree with you there. Probably best to get regular ontological dependence under control first, though.
Metaphysician UndercoverNovember 27, 2016 at 14:56#355340 likes
Reply to Mongrel "Co-dependent" is the term I've actually encountered here at tpf. To me, it is used in a way which differs from "interdependence". Interdependence implies two distinct things with some type of reciprocating relationship between the two. "Co-dependent" is used to signify something stronger than that, such that the two named things are really just two aspects of one and the same thing, inseparable in principle. There is no "bond", or "relationship" binding the two, as they are one and the same thing. In other words, it is claimed that analysis has determined that the two named things are not actually two named things, but two different facades, or perhaps "dimensions" of the same thing.
It is claimed that special relativity demonstrates that time and space are really one and the same thing. The problem there though, is that this is produced by synthesis rather than analysis. However, you could consider wave/particle duality as such a co-dependence produced by analysis, two distinct names with two distinct descriptions, which are believed to be two facades of the same thing.
By the way, what do you even mean by ontological dependence?
Metaphysician UndercoverNovember 27, 2016 at 18:16#355820 likes
A quick glance of that article reveals that "ontological dependence" appears to be all smoke and mirrors. They define it as something other than a causal dependency or a logical dependency. But the examples given seem to all be understandable in terms of either causal or logical dependency
So just be aware that although you may not like the concept of ontological dependence, that may be the concept in play in someone else's thoughts. I'm sure you wouldn't intentionally cause confusion. People who do that are cursed souls.
Metaphysician UndercoverNovember 27, 2016 at 21:48#356890 likes
I don't use "ontological dependence", that's why I asked you what you meant by this? So how would I be the one causing confusion? If someone else thinks that I said what I didn't say, that's not me causing the confusion.
I suppose you could say that Q would not be true if there were no minds, since there would be no truths. But now we've got these two statements:
Q1: "Q would not be true in the absence of minds." (note that this does not come out to "Q would be false."
Q2: "If there were no minds, there would be no truths."
R1: "If there were no minds, there would be no truths."
R2 "If there are no minds, then there are no truths."
These two look to be logically equivalent, inasmuch as both say that a world without minds also lacks truth. Recalling that Q = "There are no truths," we have R2 as: "If there are no minds, then Q."
Let W be a world without minds. Q lacks a truth value in W, but "There are no truths in W" is true in the actual world.
It looks like our theory of truth comes into play here. On a deflationary account, we're in trouble because "Q" = "Q is true" in deflationary theories, i.e. "There are no truths in W" = "It is true that there are no truths in W." Maybe we should adjust our theory to say "Q" = "Q is true in the actual world." This lets us say that "It is true in the actual world that there are no truths in W."
So the best way to phrase it is that a world lacking minds also lacks truths. Now, why would we want to say that? Presumably, because sentences are the things with truth values. Worlds without minds lack sentences, so they lack truth.
Here's where it gets interesting: what does it mean for a world to contain sentences? We can imagine that W contains a scrap of paper with this post written on it. Does W then contain truth, despite lacking any minds?
I am not sure how to make a conclusive argument here, but the whole position looks more shaky - the presence of a piece of paper with some letters on it ought not to bring truth into a world.
I am not sure how to make a conclusive argument here, but the whole position looks more shaky - the presence of a piece of paper with some letters on it ought not to bring truth into a world.
It's a piece of paper with markings on it that in the actual world are treated as words.
Reply to Michael No dice. Does the paper have words on it or not? Keep in mind that we want to know if there are sentences in a world here. How do you put sentences in a world?
You can't make mind dependent claims about the truth of worlds if truth is mind dependent.
That makes no sense.
Truth is mind-dependent.
So when we make a claim about anything, we're saying something mind-dependent, right?
So when we make a claim about "the truth of worlds," we're making a mind-dependent claim.
There's nothing at all contradictory about that. If truth is mind-dependent, then any truth claim we make is mind-dependent. So it's not contradictory that we're making a mind-dependent claim about the "truth of worlds." It would only be contradictory if we were to say, "It's a mind-INdependent truth that such and such." But no one said that.
Reply to Terrapin Station
The contradiction is that in the statement "There is no truth because there are no minds" is not a truth about the world absent of minds if truth if mind dependent.
Terrapin StationDecember 24, 2016 at 18:11#409100 likes
Not to be patronising, but just in case you need an explanation regarding what I'm talking about:
"p" is a variable for a proposition. Just to keep this simple for now, a proposition is the same thing as a statement or a claim. Let's consider "The cat is on the mat"--that will be our "p" for this example.
Contradictions obtain when someone (unequivocally) both asserts and denies the same proposition. So for "The cat is on the mat," our "p" for this example, we only have a contradiction if someone asserts both "The cat is on the mat" and "The cat is not on the mat." That's p and ~p ("~" is one common symbol for negation).
So I was asking you what p is in this example. What proposition are we both asserting and denying?
Terrapin StationDecember 24, 2016 at 18:26#409130 likes
Reply to Terrapin Station
So to say that truth is mind dependent is true means that it cannot be a truth in a world absent of minds.
So where there are no minds there are no truths.
But this is a contradiction.
In the absence of mind/truth, it is not true that there are no truths without contradiction.
So to say that truth is mind dependent is true means that it cannot be a truth in a world absent of minds.
So where there are no minds there are no truths.
But this is a contradiction.
In the absence of mind/truth, it is not true that there are no truths without contradiction.
It seems like there's something else that you're confusing here.
Say that at time T1 there are minds, including my own.
At time T2, there are no minds.
At time T1, I say, "In a world with no minds, nothing is true or false." (And let's call that "q.")
Q has a truth-value (for at least some minds) at T1, because there are minds at T1, and at least some minds make a judgment about q's truth-value at T1.
At time T2, "In a world without minds, nothing is true or false" occurs however it does (maybe it's just printed in a book or something like that).
Q has no truth value at T2, because there are no minds at T2.
It seems like you're insisting that Q must be read as if it's occurring at T2.
But we can state q at T1, and at T1, it has a mind-dependent truth-value.
Reply to Terrapin Station
At no T absent of minds is it true that there are no truths.
If it is true that there are not truths at T then this is a contradiction.
The point is the statement "Truth is mind dependent" is not a truth about any world.
No dice. Does the paper have words on it or not? Keep in mind that we want to know if there are sentences in a world here. How do you put sentences in a world
They're words to us. So, dice.
Terrapin StationDecember 24, 2016 at 18:42#409220 likes
Reply to Terrapin Station
No that is a truth about minds, because truth is mind dependent not world dependent.
It cannot be that the statement "Truth is mind dependent" is a world dependent statement.
Terrapin StationDecember 24, 2016 at 18:45#409260 likes
Reply to Terrapin Station
Making sharp distinction by pointing out that the statement "The truth is mind dependent" is not a truth, without contradiction, about the world.
Terrapin StationDecember 24, 2016 at 18:54#409320 likes
Reply to Terrapin Station
Ok.
But then we have the statement "Truth is mind dependent and world dependent."
You can't have the statement "Truth is exclusively mind dependent" and then claim that the truth of this statement is world dependent, that too is a contradiction.
Terrapin StationDecember 24, 2016 at 19:17#409400 likes
Reply to Terrapin Station
Except saying "truth is exclusively mind dependent" and "truth is mind dependent and world dependent" are not the same thing.
They are actually different.
(2) Everest's peak is exclusively Everest-dependent.
That's not contradictory. Everest is part of the world.
If Everest is part of the world, then the peak of Everest is NOT exclusively Everest depedent, because Everest is part of the world, then Everests peak will be world depedent as well.
Note the logical operator AND that I have used.
It is a contradiction to say "The peak of Everest is exclusively Everest dependent and world dependent"
Terrapin StationDecember 24, 2016 at 19:59#409480 likes
Reply to Michael Ok. So how do you put sentences into a world? Truth appears not only to be mind-dependent, but linguistically-capable-mind-dependent.
In that case: presumably, Julius Caesar believed that the sun rose in the East. But he didn't speak English, because English didn't exist then, so he didn't believe the sentence, "The sun rises in the East." Looks like sentences can't be your truth-bearers.
Terrapin StationDecember 24, 2016 at 20:00#409520 likes
Terrapin StationDecember 24, 2016 at 20:21#409570 likes
Right. So "That man is Barack Obama and that man is the president of the United States" is a sentence that denotes two different things extensionally as a "rule of logic" in your view.
In that case: presumably, Julius Caesar believed that the sun rose in the East. But he didn't speak English, because English didn't exist then, so he didn't believe the sentence, "The sun rises in the East." Looks like sentences can't be your truth-bearers.
He believed the appropriate Latin sentence to be true.
Except saying "truth is exclusively mind dependent" and "truth is mind dependent and world dependent" are not the same thing.
They are actually different
If I were to say that this product is exclusively for women then it wouldn't be a contradiction to then say that it's for people. The latter would just be imprecise, and when said together with the former, redundant.
Reply to Terrapin Station
Yes.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logical_conjunction
Note the truth table
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logical_conjunction#Truth_table
So "that man" must be both Barrack Obama AND the potus.
If one or the other is not true, then the entire statement is regarded as false.
Reply to m-theory I'm not saying that it's equivalent. I'm saying that it isn't a contradiction to say "this product is for women (only) and people (only)".
Reply to Michael
Ok but it would be a contradiction to say that it is both.
"This product is exclusively for women and this product is for people."
The set of people also contains men.
Reply to Michael Ah! So was that sentence appropriate because it would eventually translate into the English "The sun rises in the East," or for some other reason? Also, what makes those two sentences bearers of the same truth?
I pointed out that the statement
"Truth is exclusively dependent upon minds"
is not logically equivalent to
"Truth is dependent upon minds and truth is dependent upon the world"
As long is no one claiming this then ignore my posts.
I also pointed out that it is in fact a contradiction to say that
"Truth is exclusively dependent upon minds and truth is also dependent on the world"
As long as no one is claiming that this would not be a contradiction you can ignore my posts.
So the statement "Truth is dependent upon the mind and truth is dependent upon the world" looks like this.
The Venn diagram for "truth is dependent upon the mind" (by itself) is identical to your diagram, except that the portion of the circle for "World" that is outside the circle for "Mind" is omitted. Hence the conjunction does not set up a contradiction; both statements can indeed be true. If we say instead (as you did above) that "truth is exclusively dependent upon minds," and then add the premiss (as suggested by Reply to Terrapin Station) that "minds are part of the world," we get his diagram (Gs=World, Fs=Mind, phi=Truth). In this case, "truth is dependent upon the world" is necessarily true; more precisely, "truth is exclusively dependent upon part of the world." The only way I can see to make the two statements genuinely contradictory is to say that "truth is exclusively dependent upon minds" and "minds are not part of the world."
There is also no contradiction between "this product is exclusively for women" and "this product is for people." This becomes clearer if we change the second premiss to "this product is for some people." There would only be a contradiction if the second premiss instead was (as you rewrote it above) "this product is for all people."
The Venn diagram for "truth is dependent upon the mind" (by itself) is identical to your diagram, except that the portion of the circle for "World" that is outside the circle for "Mind" is omitted. Hence the conjunction does not set up a contradiction; both statements can indeed be true. If we say instead (as you did above) that "truth is exclusively dependent upon minds," and then add the premiss (as suggested by ?Terrapin Station) that "minds are part of the world," we get his diagram (Gs=World, Fs=Mind, phi=Truth). In this case, "truth is dependent upon the world" is necessarily true; more precisely, "truth is exclusively dependent upon part of the world." The only way I can see to make the two statements genuinely contradictory is to say that "truth is exclusively dependent upon minds" and "minds are not part of the world."
Again 'Truth is exclusively dependent upon minds"
Is not logically equivalent to the statement
"Truth is dependent upon mind and upon the world"
One has a logical connective and the other does not.
So if in the diagram it were that
? = "truth is exclusively mind dependent"
this leads to a contradiction because
? is itself dependent upon F, which in Turn is dependent upon G.
That is to say if there is no F and/or no G, then there is no ? by definition.
So the diagram above cannot hope to illustrate that ?="truth is exclusively mind dependent" without also being in contradiction because as you should notice that ? is dependent upon F, which is dependent upon G.
Let us say you hope to redeem the diagram and state that ?=any and all truth
Then it is not true that "Some G's are not F's" without arriving at a contradiction.
The statement "Some G's are not F's" cannot be true(found only in set F). If Some G's are not F's this is only true if it also true that not all ? are F dependent.
If all ? are F dependent then it is not true that some G's are not F's.
Or in other words some G's (those which are not F's) have the property ?.
Hence the diagram is wrong/contradictory with the labels you have applied to the variables used in the diagram.
There is also no contradiction between "this product is exclusively for women" and "this product is for people." This becomes clearer if we change the second premiss to "this product is for some people." There would only be a contradiction if the second premiss instead was (as you rewrote it above) "this product is for all people."
The only way to avoid contradiction is to say
"This product is exclusively for women and the product is for SOME people"
Using the term people denotes the set containing both men and women which leads to contradiction.
Again 'Truth is exclusively dependent upon minds"
Is not logically equivalent to the statement
"Truth is dependent upon mind and upon the world"
One has a logical connective and the other does not.
No one is claiming that they are logically equivalent. You seem to think that they are contradictory, but they are not. "All dogs are exclusively mammals" and "All dogs are mammals and animals" are not logically equivalent, and also not contradictory, given the additional premiss, "All mammals are animals." Again, the only way that your two propositions are contradictory is if we add the premiss, "No minds are part of the world."
Hence the diagram is wrong/contradictory with the labels you have applied to the variables used in the diagram.
The labels that I applied were G=World, F=Minds, and phi=Truth. All truth is exclusively mind-dependent, and all minds are part of the world; i.e., world-dependent. Therefore, all truth is (also) world-dependent.
Using the term people denotes the set containing both men and women which leads to contradiction.
"This product is for people" is vague regarding the quantification of "people." I read it more naturally as implying "This product is for some people," which does not contradict "This product is exclusively for women." As I said, it was only when you changed it to "This product is for all people" that it did create a contradiction.
The labels that I applied were G=World, F=Minds, and phi=Truth. All truth is exclusively mind-dependent, and all minds are part of the world; i.e., world-dependent. Therefore, all truth is (also) world-dependent.
Then it is not a truth (? is only in F) that some G's are not F's.
Which contradicts what is depicted in the diagram, the diagram illustrates that some G's are not F's is true.
If it is true that some G's are not F's then that means not all ? are in F.
Also that diagram does not depict any conjunction like
"Truth is mind dependent AND world dependent"
To depict that you would have to use this diagram that includes the conjunction.
\
Which is not identical to this diagram in any way.
Please provide the diagram for "All truth is exclusively mind-dependent." In particular, please clarify the particular significance that you are attaching to the word "exclusively." Be sure to include the world in the diagram so that I understand how you are thinking it relates to truth and minds.
So you'd say you're depicting a contradiction there?
I don't see a contradiction here.
Perhaps you could point it out if there is one.
I do see a contradiction here
I pointed out that it is a contradiction to say that ? is exclusive to F
Because the statement
Some G's are not F's is true about the world, not minds.
I also pointed out that if ? means truth is exclusively dependent upon F, this is a contradiction in the depiction because F's are dependent upon G's which means that ? is also dependent upon G's.
So it can't be that ? means exclusively dependent upon F
Reply to aletheist
???
I do not claim that truth is exclusively mind dependent so I do not have to provide the diagram of that claim.
I provided the diagram from my claim.
Because I claim a conjunction that "truth is mind dependent and truth is world dependent" I provided the corresponding diagram.
Reply to aletheist
I am claiming that it the statement "truth is exclusively mind dependent and truth is world dependent" is a contradiction.
If truth is also world dependent, then truth does not have exclusive mind dependence.
1.excluding or not admitting other things.
"my exclusive focus is on San Antonio issues"
2.restricted or limited to the person, group, or area concerned.
"the couple had exclusive possession of the condo"
synonyms: sole, unshared, unique, only, individual, personal, private
"a room for your exclusive use"
noun
1.
an item or story published or broadcast by only one source.
synonyms: scoop, exposé, special
"a six-page exclusive"
So if it is true that truth has no dependency other than the mind.
Then it can not also be true that truth also has dependency upon the world.
Reply to aletheist
It is not true of any world that "All truth depends on the mind"
If that was true about the world it would be a contradiction.
So it is not a truth about any world that "All truths depend upon the mind."
Sorry, you lost me again. What is contradictory about "All truth depends on the mind" being true about the world? What happened to your key word "exclusively"?
Reply to aletheist
Sigh
It can't be a truth about the world because then it would be a truth that depends upon the world and would contradict "all truth depends on minds."
By saying "no truth depends on the world" you have indicated that "all truth exclusively depends on minds."
Which cannot, without contradiction, be a truth that is dependent/about any world.
Look you want to claim "all truth depends upon minds"
Go for it.
That is no problem for me because I don't have to accept that as a truth about the world as, by definition, it is not a truth about/dependent upon the world.
What bothers me is when people want it both ways.
They want it to be a truth about the world that "all truth is mind dependent"
But of course this cannot be a truth about the world, because if it was then that truth would then also be world dependent which would render the claim self refuting.
I am not as interested in the content of your argument as I am in trying to sort out its logic. What you seem to be saying is that any truth about the world is necessarily a truth that depends on the world. You may be right, but you have yet to offer an argument to demonstrate it, since this is the first time (as far as I can tell) that you have clearly articulated this additional premiss.
In addition, I am not sure that anyone seriously claims that all truth is exclusively mind-dependent in the way that you have sought to establish here. As a couple of us have pointed out, if all minds are world-dependent, and all truth is mind-dependent, then there is no contradiction in acknowledging that all truth is (also) world-dependent.
any truth about the world is necessarily a truth that depends on the world. You may be right, but you have yet to offer an argument to demonstrate it
A statement is only true about the world if the world is a certain way, and thus depends on the world. "The world contains elephants" is true iff there are elephants in the world, and false otherwise.
I am not as interested in the content of your argument as I am in trying to sort out its logic. What you seem to be saying is that any truth about the world is necessarily a truth that depends on the world. You may be right, but you have yet to offer an argument to demonstrate it...
I did make the case that truth about worlds are world dependent and not mind dependent.
I used a proof by contradiction.
If it is true about the world that all truth depends on minds.
Then we can imagine a world without minds.
In which case it is not true about the world that there is no truth.
For were it is true that there is no truth, then that contradicts the claim that there is no truth.
I am not sure but it seems to me you could prove with contradiction in each case, however I will concede your point, perhaps, if you had some counterexample of a truth about something that does not depend upon that thing?
In addition, I am not sure that anyone seriously claims that all truth is exclusively mind-dependent in the way that you have sought to establish here. As a couple of us have pointed out, if all minds are world-dependent, and all truth is mind-dependent, then there is no contradiction in acknowledging that all truth is (also) world-dependent.
I agree it is absolutely reasonable to say truth is mind dependent and world dependent.
Terrapin StationDecember 25, 2016 at 10:38#410590 likes
m-theory, again, that diagram was in response to you saying this:
* ? is a property of Fs
* ? is ONLY a property of Fs; ? is not found elsewhere
* Fs are Gs
* The class of Gs includes things that are not Fs as well
Then we can't say "? is exclusively a property of Fs and ? is a property of some Gs" without stating something contradictory?
If my extended if-then statement--everything following my "What you're apparently saying here is that" wasn't what you were in fact saying, then you had the opportunity to clarify.
Re your diagram, one thing I disagree with about it is that you have part of mind that's not part of the world. I don't think any part of mind is not part of the world. Maybe someone above would have said that--I haven't read every post in the thread, and I certainly don't recall every post in the thread that I did read, but I certainly wasn't saying that.
I pointed out that it is a contradiction to say that ? is exclusive to F
Because the statement
Some G's are not F's is true about the world, not minds.
Again, that's not what my diagram was about. It was about what you were apparently saying in the triangle example. Now, we could say that the triangle example was an analogy for the mind statement--maybe that works; I'd agree that my diagram at least works for that even though that wasn't really the idea there, but your comment above makes no sense in either case. There's some weird confusion there either about the temporal context as I explained earlier, about what aboutness is as I explained before, maybe about both, and there might be other confusions that maybe I haven't specified yet--those might become clear as we continue to talk about this.
Later edit: Another confusion that's apparent below that's similar to the temporal example is that you seem to be confusing possible world contexts. We can say in the possible (a fortiori because actualized) world where there are minds that such and such is true or false, including when we imagine possible worlds without minds. We can say things about that other possible world, including making truth-value judgments about it, from the context of our actual world. You seem to be confusing that with saying that something would be true or false from within the context of the possible world in question where there are no minds.
Terrapin StationDecember 25, 2016 at 10:58#410610 likes
If it is true about the world that all truth depends on minds.
Right--for example, I'd say that's true. What makes it true to me is that I'm making a judgment about a proposition. That's what truth is. All truth is to someone by the way.
Then we can imagine a world without minds.
In which case it is not true about the world that there is no truth.
Correct, because there's no one in that case to make the judgment that is what truth is.
For were it is true that there is no truth
No one is saying that there is no truth (unqualified) by the way. What we'd say is that if in world x there are no minds, then in world x there is no truth, and in world x, it's neither true nor false that there's no truth. However, with us in world y where we do have minds, we could say in world y that there is no truth in world x, and we could say this is true in world y (about world x), because in world y we're judging it to be true.
This might be clearer to you if you change it so that it's about a term that's uncontroversially something mental--for example, desires:
"There are no desires if there are no minds. We could imagine a world with no minds, and in that world, there would be no desires. In our world, we could desire a world without minds, but in the world without minds, we couldn't desire a world without minds, because in that world without minds, there are no minds to desire anything."
We could just as well say the same thing about judgments:
"There are no judgments if there are no minds. We could imagine a world with no minds, and in that world, there would be no judgments. In our world, we could make judgments about a world without minds, but in the world without minds, we couldn't make judgments, because in that world without minds, there are no minds to judge anything."
Well, (particular sorts of) judgments is all that truth is on my view. So all I'm saying is what I said just above about judgments.
Terrapin StationDecember 25, 2016 at 11:02#410620 likes
A statement is only true about the world if the world is a certain way, and thus depends on the world. "The world contains elephants" is true iff there are elephants in the world, and false otherwise.
On my view we have to add "if someone judges that a proposition has the right relation to (other things in) the world."
, I am not sure that anyone seriously claims that all truth is exclusively mind-dependent in the way that you have sought to establish here.
I say it's exclusively mind-dependent, although I'm not sure about the "in the way he has sought to establish here" part. He's confused about at least a couple things, but clearing up what I've tried to clear up for him hasn't helped him understand the claim and why it's not contradictory yet, so I'm not sure I understand how he's thinking about this yet.
Reply to m-theory That diagram of yours doesn't work. No part of the mind isn't also part of the world. The mind circle must be fully inside the world circle.
Do that and you'll see that there's no contradiction. To say that truth is exclusively mind-dependent and world-dependent is just to say that the truth colouring is inside both the mind and the world circles. (Although, this is also true of your diagram, so I don't know why you keep insisting that it's a contradiction).
It seems to me that some things could be otherwise but others must always be as the are. The facts of the matter don't change, they cannot be anything but what they are. If truth is a judgement by the mind then it must be based on facts.
Reply to Terrapin Station
Been over this already, I have contributed all I care to on this subject, and you can review my previous posts where I have discussed the issues of contradiction in your diagram.
I will accept that my diagram does not depict what you view as accurate about the world and minds, but again I pointed out that my diagram does depict a logical conjunction and yours does not.
No one is saying that there is no truth (unqualified) by the way. What we'd say is that if in world x there are no minds, then in world x there is no truth, and in world x, it's neither true nor false that there's no truth. However, with us in world y where we do have minds, we could say in world y that there is no truth in world x, and we could say this is true in world y (about world x), because in world y we're judging it to be true.
Ok.
I would say if you can't know there is no truth in world x, then you can't say for sure that truth depends exclusively on minds, it may well be that it also depends on worlds.
You just can't know.
Adding "exclusively" to "mind-dependent" just says that there's no part of the world that's not mind that is a part where truth obtains.
Again if you can't know if there is or is not truth in world x, then you can't claim to know that truth is exclusively dependent upon minds, that claim is not true or false.
Terrapin StationDecember 26, 2016 at 00:09#411500 likes
Reply to Terrapin Station You are claiming it is neither true or false that there is no truth in world x.
As a consequence it is then neither true or false that truth is exclusively mind dependent.
If you can't know the truth about whether there are truths or not truths in some world (x,y, it doesn't matter), then you can't know the truth of your claim either.
Well that is not entirely true, as you can see the truth of your claim still depends on world x, witch means truth is world dependent as well as mind dependent.
But I will concede anyway and give the benefit of the doubt that it just can't be known.
Terrapin StationDecember 26, 2016 at 02:36#411740 likes
To make this clearer, let's restate this as being about judgments:
As a consequence it is then neither true or false that truth is exclusively mind dependent.
So this would be saying that (in world x?) there are no judgments that judgments are exclusively mind-dependent. That's a fact of world x as a fortiori, there are no judgments in world x.
If you can't know the truth about whether there are truths or not truths in some world (x,y, it doesn't matter) , then you can't know the truth of your claim either.
But it does matter what world we're talking about making judgments from. We can make judgments from worlds where there are persons with minds that judge. We can't make judgments from worlds where there are not persons with minds that judge. So I'm not sure why you'd say the world we're talking about being located in doesn't matter. We're located in a world where we can make judgments and where we can know things, including making judgements about and knowing about worlds where there are no creatures to make judgments and to know things.
Well that is not entirely true, as you can see the truth of your claim still depends on world x, witch means truth is world dependent as well as mind dependent.
Ah--here is yet another confusion to clear up. When. I say something about truth being x-dependent, I'm talking about where truth obtains ontologically, what it's an ontological phenomenon of. I'm not saying something like, "People do not make judgments about the non-mental world." I'm saying that truths are a mental phenomenon. Namely, it's a judgment.
In other words, there are no judgments in world x.
That depends on world x.
So judgments depend on minds, and worlds.
Which contradicts the notion that judgement depend exclusively on minds. Quoting Terrapin Station
But it does matter what world we're talking about making judgments from. We can make judgments from worlds where there are persons with minds that judge. We can't make judgments from worlds where there are not persons with minds that judge. So I'm not sure why you'd say the world we're talking about being located in doesn't matter. We're located in a world where we can make judgments and where we can know things, including making judgements about and knowing about worlds where there are no creatures to make judgments and to know things.
Whether there are judgments in world x or not judgments in world x, depends on the facts about world x, not the judgments of world y.
Ah--here is yet another confusion to clear up. When. I say something about truth being x-dependent, I'm talking about where truth obtains ontologically, what it's an ontological phenomenon of. I'm not saying something like, "People do not make judgments about the non-mental world." I'm saying that truths are a mental phenomenon. Namely, it's a judgment.
That is fine, you can believe what you like.
I have no issue with you believing that truths are exclusively mind dependent, but we can demonstrate that the truth of claims are not exclusively mind dependent, so you don't get to claim that what you believe applies to any world.
Terrapin StationDecember 26, 2016 at 02:44#411780 likes
If there are no judgments in world x because there are no minds in world x, that means there is truth in world x even though there are no minds or judgments in world x.
Which means existence of minds, truths, and judgments depends on world x, and not on minds in world y.
Terrapin StationDecember 26, 2016 at 02:52#411810 likes
IF there are no judgments in world x because there are no minds in world x, that means there is truth in world x even though there are no minds in world x.
If truth-value is a judgment, and there are no judgments in world x, then there is no truth-value in world x.
Reply to Terrapin Station
Truth value is not equal to a judgment and truth does not depend on judgment.
If it is true that there are no judgments on world x, then truth value is not equal to judgment and does not depend on judgment, but instead it depends on world x.
Terrapin StationDecember 26, 2016 at 02:59#411830 likes
Reply to Terrapin Station
If truth value is a judgment there is a contradiction.
It would be the case that there is a truth value in world x when there are no minds, which would mean either that judgments are not dependent on minds, or truth values are not equal to judgments.
Terrapin StationDecember 26, 2016 at 03:58#412020 likes
Reply to Terrapin Station
If there are then that means that judgments are not dependent upon minds.
If there are not then that means judgments are not equal to truth values.
Terrapin StationDecember 26, 2016 at 04:00#412040 likes
Reply to Terrapin Station
If that answer is yes, your position is contradicted, if the answer is no, your position has been contradicted.
I pointed this out, and that was my only concern.
We can demonstrate that if the answer is no, this contradicts the claim that truth value is equal to judgments and that this truth value of yes is dependent on world x not minds.
If the answer is yes we can demonstrate that judgments depend also on world x, which contradicts the claim that judgments are exclusively mind dependent.
Terrapin StationDecember 26, 2016 at 04:12#412090 likes
I'm seeing if it's possible for us to tackle a simple yes or no question, or if we've gotten to a point where even such basic conversational interaction is no longer feasible.
Reply to Terrapin Station
We are not conversing about simple yes or no questions.
We were debating a very particular yes or no question that is not so simple as you would like it to be, as I pointed out to you.
Terrapin StationDecember 26, 2016 at 04:20#412180 likes
I asked you a simple yes or no question. "Are there judgments in world x?" I don't want to approach anything as a debate. I want to have a conversation where you're interested in understanding different points of view.
If it's that you feel that you cannot answer yes or no for some reason, then simply explain why that is in your view--"I cannot answer yes or no because . . ."
Again, it would have to start with, "The reason that I cannot answer yes or no is because . . . " for there to be a chance that I'd count it as an explanation why you feel that you can't answer yes or no.
No. Because I wasn't asking you why you thought it mattered or not. If you have a view on it where your answer is yes or no, you should answer yes or no--simply because I asked and we're supposedly having a conversation. Otherwise if you feel that you can't answer yes or no--not that "it doesn't matter," but that it's not possible for you to answer yes or no, then you should explain why it's not possible.
Is there some issue you have related to the topic?
For one, I'd like to explain a point of view that you don't understand, but you'd need to be able to have a conversation where you can answer simple questions in a straightforward way where you don't assume that you're lecturing instead.
Reply to Terrapin Station
I would say that it is not that I don't understand the point view you have expressed here, it is more that I don't agree that it is logically valid.
I pointed out the reason why, namely your position leads to contradictions.
We are discussing a topic.
Simple questions like whether or not my screen name is m-theoryrules or not are not related to the thread topic and I regard them as irrelevant.
If I do not see your point in asking this simple question this is not my fault, you failed to do anything to illustrate that it was in fact related to the topic of the thread.
The other question you asked is not as simple as you would have liked it to be and I pointed that out.
If you insist that I can only explore the logical consequences of the answer in one of two ways, then that is an example of a false dichotomy.
There is in fact a third option, the one I choose, which is to explore the logical consequences of BOTH answers.
Terrapin StationDecember 26, 2016 at 06:06#412640 likes
Reply to Terrapin Station
You claim that truth is exclusively mind dependent and you stated that in your view that truth value is logically equivalent to Judgments.
.
Is there something I am missing?
Terrapin StationDecember 26, 2016 at 06:27#412680 likes
So far so good if "logically equivalent to" is "is identical to."
But yeah, you're missing something. Why isn't it contradictory on my view to say from world y (as defined earlier) that it's true that in world x (as defined earlier) there is no truth-value?
Reply to Terrapin Station
To be honest I am getting kind of tired of repeating myself here.
I was hoping you had something new to contribute?
Again I pointed out, that if there is no truth value in world x, then the claim "truth is mind dependent" is refuted because truth value still depends on world x and not a minds in world y..
Which means there is a truth value in world y, and that truth value is false.
But I also conceded this point, you can claim it cannot be known what is the truth value in world x, in which case the truth value of the claim "truth is mind dependent" cannot be known either.
Which is not a contradiction, it simply means we can't (for some unnamed reason) know what whether or not truth is mind dependent or not.
I conceded this point because I understand how you are trying to justify your views.
Your view is that if ever there is a mind we can simply say that truth depends on that mind regardless of what world that mind inhabits.
But we can imagine that there was some state such that there are no minds in any worlds.
In such a state is it true that there are no mind?
If it is true then truth does not depend on minds.
You might argue that it is not true or false in that example.
So that is why I conceded your point.
But again you don't get to claim that you know it is true that truth depends on minds.
Your position is basically if there are no minds then there are no truths.
I pointed out this leads to a contradiction because we can imagine the case where there are no minds, and then point out if it is true that there are no truths, then there is at least one truth, which contradicts that there are no truths.
You rebut saying, yes but right now literally there are minds that is why we have truths.
But it isn't so that this proves truth is dependent upon the mind, it proves rather that there are minds at this time.
These two are not one in the same thing.
However let's assume, by some feat of mental gymnastics, you have decided that because there are minds this proves that truth is mind dependent
Well then the problem now becomes that you are left with a circular argument.
A circular argument is not valid reasoning.
Note this point because it is critical.
You still don't get to claim that if there were no minds there would be no truths, that still leads to contradiction or amounts to circular argumentation.
Well I suppose you can claim that if you like, but that claim has no logical force that compels me to accept it as valid.
What you could claim instead is that if there were no minds we could not know if there were truths or not.
That is not a contradictory or circular position and I will not challenge that claim.
Terrapin StationDecember 26, 2016 at 12:39#412940 likes
To be honest I am getting kind of tired of repeating myself here.
I was hoping you had something new to contribute?
That super-cliched move at this point does not count as understanding my view. So do you not know why it isn't contradictory on my view to say from world y (as defined earlier) that it's true that in world x (as defined earlier) there is no truth-value? (And why we do know that it's true (from world y) that in world x there is no truth value?)
It's fine if you don't know. It doesn't mean that you're inferior or anything. It also wouldn't imply that you agree with me if you're able to relay my view so that I'd agree with it. You can still be superior and eventually play the role of teacher where you assume I'm only fit to be your student. But how about slowing down and trying to understand a view you're not familiar with? That's what I'd be interested in us doing. I can explain my view so that you'd understand it, but you'd have to play along and answer questions when I ask them and so on--I'd be going slow, one step at a time. It wouldn't work if you just keep impatiently going back to why you're right and I'm wrong. You need to understand my view in the first place to be able to say why I'm wrong.
That's what I'd be interested in us doing. I can explain my view so that you'd understand it, but you'd have to play along and answer questions when I ask them and so on--I'd be going slow, one step at a time. It wouldn't work if you just keep impatiently going back to why you're right and I'm wrong.
From what you describe here, you don't need me at all, you need someone to follow along and take cues from you and answer how you want when you want.
You can do that for yourself.
Also I never said you were wrong or that I was right, I said that there are logical issues with your claims.
Terrapin StationDecember 27, 2016 at 11:11#414830 likes
What I know, so far, is that you have not put forth a view that does not lead to contradiction.
Sure, that's your opinion.
But re MY view, explain in a way that I'd agree with why it's not a contradiction. That would show that you understand my view, which is important for critiquing it.
Reply to Terrapin Station
lol
I just reread this.
You are basically saying that unless I agree with you, I don't understand and can't critique your view.
lol
That is not very reasonable.
How old are you?
Terrapin StationDecember 27, 2016 at 12:42#414880 likes
No, I'm not saying anything about you agreeing with me.
I'm saying something about whether you even understand the view you're critiquing. If you understand it, you should be able to state it so that the person whose view it is would agree with the paraphrase.
In other words, this is no different than, say, a teacher asking on an exam, "Give a summary, primarily in your own words, of Descartes' argument in the Second Meditation, Part 1." They're checking to make sure that you understand Descartes' argument. You can think that his argument sucks, that Descartes is wrong, etc., but that's different than knowing what his argument is in the first place, understanding it, and being able to paraphrase it in a way that Descartes would agree with.
Reply to Terrapin Station
I am glad you understand that it is not reasonable to insist that some one must agree with you first, before what you claim can be understood.
However...
It is not my duty to paraphrase you such that your arguments are not claiming something which is contradictory.
That is your duty.
I understand, from what you have posted so far, that your claims have logical issues and I have pointed those issues out already.
Either address the issues I have raised and/or provide further information to clarify your position.
If you fail to do this in the next post I will consider our discussion to be stagnant and will pursue it no further.
Terrapin StationDecember 27, 2016 at 12:57#414920 likes
I would say that it is not that I don't understand the point view you have expressed here,
I'm challenging that. I believe that you don't at all understand my point of view on this (well, at least not beyond the rudimentary start you made above). But you have an opportunity to show that I'm wrong and that you weren't just talking shit there, that you do in fact understand it.
The importance of this is that you can't "understand my claims to have logical issues" if you don't even understand just what my claims are in the first place.
Please identify at least one specific view put forth in this thread by @Terrapin Station that leads to contradiction. Even if you believe that you have already done so, this might help clarify where things stand at this point. Do not explain (yet) why you think it leads to contradiction, just restate what you perceive to be his position.
Reply to aletheist
Terrapin's view is that truth is entirely and exclusively dependent upon minds such that if there were no minds there would be no truths.
This leads to a contradiction.
If there were no minds then it could not be true that there were no truths.
Notice that I use the word if here.
Terrapin does not see this as an issue because there are minds now, so the condition in which there would be a contradiction is not met.
However in logic we do not have to meet the condition of the argument to see that it is contradictory.
I also pointed out another possible issue with Terrapin's views.
Terrapin might hope to argue that we can be sure that truth is entirely and exclusively dependent upon minds, because minds exist now and thus the truth of what is said about anything depends entirely and exclusively upon them and there is no issue because as of now those minds do exist.
This would be circular argumentation.
That minds exist now proves only that there are minds now, it does not prove that truth is entirely and exclusively dependent upon those minds and these are not logically equivalent things.
Terrapin StationDecember 27, 2016 at 15:15#415350 likes
Reply to Terrapin Station
You said there were no truths in world x, which does not deal with the issue, it is still a contradiction that it cannot be true that there are no truths.
Terrapin StationDecember 27, 2016 at 15:29#415400 likes
Would I say that in world x, where there are no minds, it's true in world x that there are no truths?
That's a yes or no question. Either I would say that or I wouldn't (and I'll give you a 50/50 chance--either yes or no is correct here). At the moment, I'm only interested in your answer to this yes or no question. You should be able to answer this easily, because I explained it all in detail earlier in the thread, in responses to you that you responded back to.
It seems to me that the disagreement here is over the very definition of truth, which is tied to the nature of propositions. On your (mind-independent) view, there are truths in a world without minds, including the proposition that there are no minds. On @Terrapin Station's (mind-dependent) view, there are no truths in a world without minds, because (I gather) there are no propositions (true or false) in such a world. The latter is only a contradiction given your definition of truth; it is not a contradiction given @Terrapin Station's definition. In other words, you cannot simply refute his definition by presupposing yours.
Answering his yes-or-no question will reveal whether you fully understand his position, so I encourage you to do so. Admitting that his view is not self-contradictory does not entail that it is correct; you can still reasonably disagree with it (as I do), but on other grounds.
Terrapin StationDecember 27, 2016 at 15:47#415460 likes
It seems to me that the disagreement here is over the very definition of truth,
Yes I pointed out a contradiction with Terrapins view that truths were logically equivalent to judgments.
We imagined a world x where there were no minds.
The dilemma then becomes is it true in world x that there are no judgments?
If it is true then truths do not depend on minds and judgments are not equal to truths.
If it is not true then judgments do not depend on minds and judgments are not equal to truths..
Our disagreement about what truth ought to mean does not resolve the logical issues associated with Terrapins position I am afraid.
there are no truths in a world without minds, because (I gather) there are no propositions (true or false) in such a world.
I conceded this point, but it has a consequence, if there is no truth value in a world without minds, then we cannot know the truth value of the claim that truth value is exclusively and entirely dependent upon minds.
The proposition that truth depends on minds cannot be validated even if it avoids invalidation from contradiction.
Answering his yes-or-no question will reveal whether you fully understand his position, so I encourage you to do so. Admitting that his view is not self-contradictory does not entail that it is correct; you can still reasonably disagree with it (as I do), but on other grounds.
No, I will not have him dictate to me how I can post to the forum.
I can answer his questions how I choose.
That I fail to follow his desires in my answering does not prove that I don't understand his position.
That does not follow.
Terrapin StationDecember 27, 2016 at 16:00#415510 likes
The dilemma then becomes is it true in world x that there are no judgments?
Would I say that inside of possible world x, that is, limiting it to what's inside of that circle above marked as "Possible World X," it's true or false that there are no judgments?
Reply to Terrapin Station
Again as I have pointed out already.
Claiming that there is no truth value will mean, as a consequence that the claim that truth is equal to judgments has no truth value either.
Terrapin StationDecember 27, 2016 at 16:06#415550 likes
Claiming that there is no truth value will mean, as a consequence that the claim that truth is equal to judgments has no truth value either.
As stated, that's not at all a consequence. You'd have to spell out the implication, because as it stands it's a non-sequitur. You're simply claiming that it's a consequence of it.
If you're talking about immediately above where you wrote:
Reply to Terrapin Station
If there is no truth value in a world without minds, then it does not obtain that it is false that truth value is world dependent.
Similarly with your claim that truth and judgment are logically equivalent.
If it does not obtain because there is no truth value in a world without minds, it does not obtain that it is true that judgments are logically equivalent to truth.
Terrapin StationDecember 27, 2016 at 16:12#415590 likes
Ah--you're saying inside of world x? Yeah, inside of world x, nothing has any truth value. That has no implication on whether truths are judgments though.
For one, I want to be clear that you're not conflating truth value and facts. You're not doing that are you?
I can't really make sense out of that last post: "I'm saying (that via?) logic your claims do not (possess?) truth value because they are claims that (depend?) upon things (what things?) without truth value"??
Reply to Terrapin Station Yes I realize that you don't understand.
But there is nothing more I can do.
I have explained it as clearly as I can.
I am pointing out the contrapositive consequence of your claims about the absence of truth value.
Terrapin StationDecember 27, 2016 at 16:47#415740 likes
I am pointing out the contrapositive consequence of your claims about the absence of truth value.
???
What conditional are we referring to, first off?--"If there are no judgments, there is no truth-value"? The contrapositive of that is, "If there is truth-value, then there are judgments."
Reply to Terrapin Station
If there is no judgments = P (Which has no truth value because truth value is equal to judgement)
then there are no truth values (which cannot be considered true or false)
Q(there is no truth value to negate) therefor P (again no truth value to negate)
Terrapin StationDecember 27, 2016 at 16:54#415780 likes
You think that truth is mind-independent. Therefore, you think that there is truth in a world without minds. @Terrapin Station thinks that truth is mind-dependent. Therefore, he thinks that there is no truth in a world without minds. You think that this is a contradiction, because it would have to be a truth in a world without minds that there is no truth in that world. But that is not what @Terrapin Station is claiming; he is merely saying that in the actual world, where there are minds, it is a (mind-dependent) truth that there would be no truth in a world without minds.
Right, that's what I've been trying to make clear to him via clearing up what seems to be confusion about context with respect to possible worlds. (And hence my illustration above.)
I can't tell at all if he understands any of that stuff or if he's even paying any attention to it.
Terrapin StationDecember 27, 2016 at 16:56#415820 likes
No, it's not. There are a couple possible reasons for this, depending on just what we have in mind contextually re the possible worlds in question:
Rather than drawing, because that's time consuming, I'll just do headings:
Either
(1) IN POSSIBLE WORLD X
"I'm talking about . . ."
which isn't possible because there is no one in possible world x to talk about anything.
Or
(2) IN POSSIBLE WORLD Y
"I'm talking about:"
IN POSSIBLE WORLD X
contrapositives (in world x)
But that's not possible, because there are no contrapositives in world x, because there is no logic in world x (aside from something like a book in world x that might have "logic" written on the cover etc.)
Of course, you could mean something like:
(3)
IN POSSIBLE WORLD Y
"I'm talking about contrapositives that I'm imagining would be in world X, or I'm referring to something in world X that we'd call a 'contrapositive' and assign truth values to in this world (world y) etc." but that's really talking about world y, things you're imagining about x from world y, etc.
I am talking contrapositives where there is no truth value.
What does this have to do with my summary? We are having this discussion in the actual world, where there are minds. Obviously we could not be having it in a world without minds - it would be impossible.
Terrapin StationDecember 27, 2016 at 17:07#415920 likes
How could it be true that there is no logic in world x if there is no logic in world x?
It's true in possible world y that there's no logic in world x.
In possible world x, nothing is true or false. It's simply a fact that there is no logic in possible world x. AGAIN, I want to make sure that you're not conflating facts and truth values. You're not doing that, are you?
In other words:
IN POSSIBLE WORLD Y
"There is no logic in possible world x" -- and then I assign "T" to that propostiion.
IN POSSIBLE WORLD X
"There is no logic in possible world x" --maybe that's text in a book that still exists in possible world x or something, but it's not true or false in this world.
I also pointed out another possible issue with Terrapin's views.
Terrapin might hope to argue that we can be sure that truth is entirely and exclusively dependent upon minds, because minds exist now and thus the truth of what is said about anything depends entirely and exclusively upon them and there is no issue because as of now those minds do exist.
This would be circular argumentation.
That minds exist now proves only that there are minds now, it does not prove that truth is entirely and exclusively dependent upon those minds and these are not logically equivalent things.
Terrapin might hope to argue that we can be sure . . .
??? I'm not and I wouldn't be arguing anything about certainty. That doesn't imply that I'm not (psychologically) certain about something. But certainty for empirical claims is just a completely misplaced concern in my view.
Terrapin StationDecember 27, 2016 at 17:13#415990 likes
Reply to Terrapin Station
I think that is where we disagree most when it comes to truth.
You believe that where you lack any doubt then there is truth.
That is not my view of truth.
I think that is where we disagree most when it comes to truth.
You believe that where you lack any doubt then there is truth.
That is not my view of truth.
Seriously, what the fuck? I'm not saying anything about doubt or certainty. PERIOD.
Terrapin StationDecember 27, 2016 at 17:15#416030 likes
Reply to aletheist
Yes, the conditions of a conditional statement that leads to contradiction do not have to be met in actuality.
The argument is still a contradiction, even if the conditions of the argument are not met.
Reply to Terrapin Station
The reason there is no truth value to obtain is because of logic, the logic in world y would not permit you to simply obtain a truth value where there is none.
Terrapin StationDecember 27, 2016 at 17:23#416130 likes
I disagree with the premise that logic is what "permits" or "doesn't permit" truth values. (A fortiori because I'd say that logic isn't in the permissions business.)
We are talking about world x within world y (our actual world), where there are minds, truths, logic, etc. Obviously no one would be talking about world x within world x, where there are no minds.
But I am merely pointing out why I do not accept your beliefs as logically valid.
The only place where logical validity enters the picture is that if one accepts the premises that truth values are identical to judgments about propositions, and one accepts that judgments only obtain when there are creatures with minds, then inside of world x, it validly follows that there are no truth values.
That would simply be (semi-)formalized like this:
a is identical to b
b only occurs when there are Fs.
In domain x, there are no Fs.
Therefore, in domain x, a doesn't occur.
Terrapin StationDecember 27, 2016 at 17:33#416200 likes
This cannot be true in logic without contradiction.
There is no logic in world x. There is logic in our actual world, and thus we can assert in our actual world that nothing is true in world x. The only way to contradict this is to assert in our actual world that something is true in world x. @Terrapin Station is not asserting this, so his view is not self-contradictory - which, again, is not to say that it is correct.
In fact, you are the only one asserting that something is true in world x, because you believe that truth is mind-independent; i.e., there are truths in all possible worlds. That is why you see a contradiction - you are (perhaps unconsciously) imposing your own view as a hidden premiss, rather than sticking to what @Terrapin Station is actually advocating.
Reply to aletheist Yes you can assert that, but it is still a contradiction in world y.
There are no contradictions in world x.
But in world y to say that there is no truths in world x still leads to a contradiction in world y because the contradiction is being caused by the logic in world y.
So in world y it can't true about world x that in world x there are no truths, that would be a contradiction about world x.
Also I never claimed truth is mind-idependent.
I claimed it is reasonable to say truth is mind dependent and world dependent.
So far nothing I have encountered in this thread has caused me to doubt this view..
I also agreed that it maybe that we can't know if there is or is not truth in a world without minds because it may be the case that there are no truth values in a world without minds.
The only thing I am advocating, my only hiden premise, is that perhaps you guys should consider the possibility that you cannot prove the things that you believe with logic. At least so far you have not done so without issues.
There is no shame in that I don't think.
Terrapin StationDecember 27, 2016 at 17:51#416250 likes
Well, then "x can not be true in logic without contradiction" is just nonsense, unless we're talking about some weird paraconsistent logic with necessary contradictions.
perhaps you guys should consider the possibility that you cannot prove the things that you believe with logic.
Empirical claims are not provable period. I'm not at all talking about proofs, I'm not at all claiming that anything empirical I believe is proved or has anything to do with proofs, etc.
Also, even with proofs, they're only relative to particular systems of logic.
Terrapin StationDecember 27, 2016 at 17:54#416280 likes
So in world y it can't true about world x that in world x there are no truths, that would be a contradiction about world x.
Why would that be a contradiction?
P = In world x there are no truths.
not-P = In world x there are some truths.
@Terrapin Station is asserting P. He is not asserting not-P. Therefore, there is no contradiction. To get one, you have to add another premiss; for example, "If there are no truths within world x, then there are no truths (in any possible world) about world x."
(1) You have no idea what a and b are. They're variables. I'm not asking you to plug anything into the variables. That's why they're presented as variables.
(2) I'm asking whether you think the argument, as presented, with variables, is a valid argument or not. Whether premises are false has nothing to do with whether it's a valid argument.
Only if I claim that it is true in world y that there are no truths. There is no contradiction when I claim (within world y) that it is true in world x that there are no truths.
The fact that a proposition has no truth value in world x does not entail that it also has no truth value in all other possible worlds. Likewise, the fact that a proposition is true in world y does not entail that it is true in all other possible worlds. The whole point of positing possible worlds at all is that the truth values for the same proposition can be different in different worlds.
(1) You have no idea what a and b are. They're variables. I'm not asking you to plug anything into the variables. That's why they're presented as variables.
(2) I'm asking whether you think the argument, as presented, with variables, is a valid argument or not. Whether premises are false has nothing to do with whether it's a valid argument.
To be honest I can't tell, you are not using a notation convention, and I don't want to transcribe it.
Reply to aletheist
No if you claim it is true about world world x that there are no truths that is a contradiction because it is the case about world x that there are no truths.
Terrapin StationDecember 27, 2016 at 18:22#416480 likes
No if you claim it is true about world world x that there are no truths that is a contradiction because it is the case about world x that there are no truths.
Here, you're conflating about world x and in(side of) world x.
We're in world y, of course. Any claims we make about world x are made from within world y. Those claims can be about world x. But you're getting confused about the difference between that and what's IN world x.
Reply to Terrapin Station
It is true that at one point in this world there were no minds, so world x is just a reference to that point in time in this world.
No if you claim it is true about world world x that there are no truths that is a contradiction because it is the case about world x that there are no truths.
I do not understand this sentence. Let P = "there are no truths in world x." What you seem to be saying is, "If you claim it is true that P, that is a contradiction because it is the case that P." This looks like exactly the opposite of a contradiction to me.
It is true that at one point in this world there were no minds, so world x is just a reference to that point in time in this world.
And according to @Terrapin Station, at that point in time in this world, there were no truths. But he is asserting that now, when there are minds and truths. Obviously no one asserted it back then.
Terrapin StationDecember 27, 2016 at 18:32#416570 likes
Sure, we could talk about Time T1 versus T2. I pointed out the confusions you were making with that earlier.
In that context, the problem wout be this:
"Here, you're conflating about T1 and at T1."
"We're at time T2, of course. Any claims we make about T1 are made at T2. Those claims can be about T1. But you're getting confused about the difference between that (claims made at T2 about T1) and what's at T1. "
Reply to aletheist Let say world x is a set.
You are saying there is set such that the set is empty and such that the set does not contain itself which we will call x.
You then proceed to say that set y contains the set x that is empty but that set x contains itself.
That is a contradiction..
And according to Terrapin Station, at that point in time in this world, there were no truths. But he is asserting that now, when there are minds and truths. Obviously no one asserted it back then.
Yes this is circular, truth depends on minds, because there are minds now therefor truth depends upon them..
.
Let say world x is a set.
You are saying there is set such that the set is empty and such that the set does not contain itself which we will call x.
You then proceed to say that set y contains the set x that is empty but that set x contains itself.
That is a contradiction..
I'm not saying anything about sets containing themselves.
What in the world? No. I'm not saying anything like that. Again, maybe try understanding what I'm saying rather than being so obsessed with "disproving" it. You're disproving things that are not at all what I'm saying, because you're not that interested in what I'm actually saying.
No one is saying this. You are now claiming that any propositions about world x can only be asserted in a world that contains world x. This is not how possible worlds work.
Maybe we should try formulating a straightforward counterfactual claim, rather than talking about possible worlds. This is what I understand @Terrapin Station to be advocating:
If there were no minds in our actual world, then there would be no truths in our actual world.
The only way that an if-then statement can be self-contradictory is if the antecedent is P and the consequent is not-P. That is not the case here, so there is no self-contradiction.
Reply to aletheist
As far as I can tell there is no possible world argument such that it is necessarily true that truth depends upon minds and only minds.
I can't even make out a modal argument that this is the possible case.
The only way that an if-then statement can be self-contradictory is if the antecedent is P and the consequent is not-P. That is not the case here, so there is no self-contradiction.
If there are no minds = P
Then there are no truths =Q (self refuting)
Terrapin StationDecember 27, 2016 at 19:12#416700 likes
Reply to aletheist
~P = if there were not minds in our actual world
then
~Q = there would not be truths in our actual world
Is the inverse of
P = If there are minds in the actual world
then
Q = there are truths in the actual world
But this part in particular is self refuting in my view
"There are no truths".
I can make no sense of the notion that it can be true that there are no truths.
I can make sense of this as false.
Terrapin StationDecember 27, 2016 at 19:28#416810 likes
But this part in particular is self refuting in my view
"There are no truths".
That would indeed be self-refuting ... but it is not what I said. My statement did not assert anything about what actually is the case, but rather about what would be the case under a certain condition - IF there were no minds, THEN there would be no truths. There is simply no way to construe this as self-contradictory.
You changed the statement. We agree that "there are no truths" is self-refuting. The statement was, "If there were no minds, then there would be no truths." Here the consequent, "there would be no truths," is NOT self-refuting. Consider this statement:
If there were no truths, then there would be no truths.
This is necessarily true - if P, then P - and thus obviously not self-contradictory.
Sure that seems reasonable, if it were that judgments and truths were the same thing.
Okay, but understanding that on my view, truth values are simply judgments, when we put the word "truth" back into the statement, I'm saying the exact same thing. So that's why it's not contradictory on my view.
Reply to Terrapin Station
Yes except it is contradictory to say it would be true that there would be no truths for example.
In logic at least that is contradictory in the sense that it is self refuting.
Terrapin StationDecember 27, 2016 at 19:59#417140 likes
Yes except it is contradictory to say it would be true that there would be no truths for example.
That is certainly the case when the context isn't different between "it's true" and "there are no truths."
However, ALL that I'm saying is that it's my judgment that there are no judgments in some particular context--some other time, some possible world, etc.
i don't think that you're disagreeing with logical form. I think you're disagreeing, at least intuitively, with what "truth" denotes. You don't buy that truth is just a judgment that particular individuals make, and you're having trouble reading "truth" so that it would denote that and only that. You're intuitively thinking that there are going to be things true or false in worlds where no persons are around to make judgments.
I gave an honest answer in the first place. If you want a particular (kind of) answer, either specify your limitations better or just have a conversation with yourself (since you'd be supplying the answer anyway).
It was a straightforward question that could be answered 'yes' or 'no' and you did not answer it. And I suspect I know very well why you didn't answer it
Terrapin StationDecember 27, 2016 at 22:55#417820 likes
It was a straightforward question that could be answered 'yes' or 'no' and you did not answer it. And I suspect I know very well why you didn't answer it
Actually, your comment above made me realize I misread your question (because at first I was like "It was a yes or no question? Wha??) I read your question as Quoting John
Why would there be any actuality; that is, why would anything at all be the case in a world that contained no percipients?
Re the simple yes/no question you actually asked, my answer is "Yes." The reason why I think that is that obviously I'm not an idealist. I'm a realist. I don't believe that the existence of anything but a very unusual possible world would depend on the existence of persons.
"It is the case that" denotes a fact. Facts are states of affairs. "Ways the world is" in other words.
Truth-value is a judgment about the relationship of a proposition to something else--the something else being dependent on just what truth theory someone subscribes to. It could be correspondence (so that truth-value is a judgment about the relationship of a proposition to facts), it could be coherence (so that truth-value is a judgment about the relationship of a proposition to the rest of the propositions the person assigns "T" to), it could be consensus (so that truth-value is a judgment about the relationship of a proposition to propositions that are assigned "T" by consensus of relevant populations), and so on.
So then are you saying facts are propositions. Propositions that describe states of affairs. They are not, at least ostensively judgements, just statements of fact, so neither true nor false (I initially thought why not all true, since they can't be other than what they are, but I think ascription of truth to these statements gives them a valuation that they don't warrant, facts just are).
Facts exist separately from mind, they describe the world, current and in the past. Truths are made up of facts. So, if no mind then no truth, just facts.
Terrapin StationDecember 28, 2016 at 13:41#418890 likes
I haven't the faintest idea how you'd get that from what I just wrote. I'm not saying anything like that. Facts and propositions are two different things.
The received view in analytic philosophy, at least, is that truth-value is a property of propositions. The view that truth-value is actually a judgment, or in other words, that the way the property of propositions in question obtains is via a judgment we make about propositions, is my own idiosyncratic view.
At any rate, clearly you've gone from asking for clarification on my view to giving your own, highly idiosyncratic view.
That I agree with (obviously--given everything I wrote about it above), but if on your view, truths are made up of facts, I have no idea how you'd get to "If no mind then no truth, just facts."
Well, what is it that you're describing when you utter a description? You're describing how the world is, right? That "how the world is" is what facts are. Facts aren't the descriptions. They're what you're describing.
Ok, then what you are saying is that the word "fact" has two senses,
a) as actuality, reality, the world
b) as a statement about what is comprised in "a"
"a" isn't beholding to us, except in so far as we fit into it
"b" assumes the ability to conceptualize what is sensed in "a" to give it a place in our construction of the world. Judgement takes facts, as we understand them and relates them to other facts & conclusions, which yield truths. Only humans do this cognitively, so if no mind, no truths, just facts, just the world.
Terrapin StationDecember 28, 2016 at 15:37#419190 likes
If Facts, states of affairs, the world are not us, then how do we connect to them? I think we connect immediately and mediately with sensually, conceptually, and linguistically.
Terrapin StationDecember 28, 2016 at 16:06#419320 likes
Can we say that facts are the objects of true propositions - i.e., that which they represent? I guess this gets tricky on the view that truth is a subjective judgment. What other word can we substitute for true? Correct? Accurate?
We connect to facts that are not us via our abilities to move, to manipulate things, etc., as well as via perception.
So by sensation, we become aware of what is apparent, what is sensed, which we attempt to fit into our conception of what is in the world. The straight stick looks bent in the jar of water only apparently, conceptually we understand the optics, we understand that in order for something to seem the way it is there must be something behind it, something which may not be as it seems.
Can we say that facts are the objects of true propositions - i.e., that which they represent? I
I'd say that it's what they're taken to represent, and add "just in case someone is using correspondence theory." What they're taken to represent is an important distinction in my view, because a major aspect of my view is that I'm rejecting the idea that propositions represent anything "on their own" so to speak. And a fortiori, I'd reject the idea that anything represents anything else non-mentally. Representation is a way of thinking about things. Representation is not a feature of non-mental existents.
So by sensation, we become aware of what is apparent, what is sensed, which we attempt to fit into our conception of what is in the world. The straight stick looks bent in the jar of water only apparently, conceptually we understand the optics, we understand that in order for something to seem the way it is there must be something behind it, something which may not be as it seems.
I don't want to get into a philosophy of perception debate yet again, at least not just yet. We did it in what seemed to be tens of different threads within the past few months. Anyway, I'm a naive/direct realist. I think that representationalism is incoherent.
I don't want to get into a philosophy of perception debate yet again, at least not just yet. We did it in what seemed to be tens of different threads within the past few months. Anyway, I'm a naive/direct realist. I think that representationalism is incoherent.
Ok we have run into an impasse regarding both what and how reality is constituted, yet we both agree that without mind there is no truth, even though we disagree on what constitutes that judgement. I think we also agree that what is, is...even if we differ about what reality entails for us and how it can be known (we are not idealists).
If a mind-independent world can consist in "states of affairs", and in facts about those states of affairs, then why would there not be truths about those states of affairs?
For example, say that after humanity has become extinct, the Sun is now twenty times its 2016 size, and the average temperature of Earth is much hotter, wouldn't you say that it will then be fact that the Sun is twenty times its 2016 size and the temperature is thus much hotter on Earth, and that there will be an enormous number of other attendant facts besides? And wouldn't you say that it will then be true that the Sun is twenty times its 2016 size and the temperature is thus much hotter on Earth and that there will be an enormous number of other attendant truths?
Otherwise explain what is the difference between the facts that will then obtain that the Sun is twenty times its present diameter and the temperature is much hotter, and it being true at that time that the Sun is twenty times its present? To me it seems to be perfectly in accordance with ordinary usage to say that they are the same.
You say truth-value is a judgement about the relation between a proposition and "something else". If truth-value is conceptual and it relates to the "something else", does that mean that the relationship between truth and the "something else" is also conceptual? Wouldn't that entail that the "something else" is also conceptual, at least in part? If not then how could there be a relation between a conceptual thing (the proposition), a relation which is itself conceptual (the truth-relation can't be physical so what else could it be but conceptual?) and something entirely non-conceptual; the presumably purely physical 'something else'?
Terrapin StationDecember 28, 2016 at 21:17#419750 likes
I want to just address this part first, because I want to clarify what you're asking here:
Otherwise explain what is the difference between the facts that will then obtain that the Sun is twenty times its present diameter and the temperature is much hotter, and it being true at that time that the Sun is twenty times its present? To me it seems to be perfectly in accordance with ordinary usage to say that they are the same.
Are you wondering why truths wouldn't be the same thing as facts?
That's really a side issue. There are at least two senses of 'fact'. There are ostensive facts and there are semantic facts. The former are more like actualities or states of affairs and the latter are more like truths.
"It is a fact that the Sun is a certain distance from the Earth" expresses the semantic sense of 'fact', and is conceptually no different than saying "it is true that the Sun is a certain distance from the Earth".
"The distance form the Sun to the Earth is a fact" expresses the ostensive sense of 'fact'.
I am not claiming there is a truly coherent demarcation between ostensive and semantic senses of 'fact', either, and if there is not such a clear demarcation it is even more problematic for your position.
In any case, ostensive facts cannot be brutely physical entities, because if you claim they are then the difficulty of how there could be a truth relation to them arises. In fact the difficulty of how there could be any semantic relation to them at all would need to be explained if you want assert that facts in the ostensive sense are utterly non-semantic; which you would need to assent to if you want to claim that facts can be in the total absence of percipients that employ conceptualizing language.
Terrapin StationDecember 28, 2016 at 23:05#419800 likes
If a mind-independent world can consist in "states of affairs", and in facts about those states of affairs, then why would there not be truths about those states of affairs?
Because truths, as I noted above, are judgments about the relation of propositions to other things (again, just what other things depends on the truth theory someone employs). There are no minds to make judgments in a mind-independent world.
For example, say that after humanity has become extinct, the Sun is now twenty times its 2016 size, and the average temperature of Earth is much hotter, wouldn't you say that it will then be fact that the Sun is twenty times its 2016 size and the temperature is thus much hotter on Earth, and that there will be an enormous number of other attendant facts besides?
And wouldn't you say that it will then be true that the Sun is twenty times its 2016 size and the temperature is thus much hotter on Earth and that there will be an enormous number of other attendant truths?
No, I wouldn't say that, since truth is a judgment about the relation of propositions. There would be no one to make such judgments.
Wouldn't that entail that the "something else" is also conceptual, at least in part?
That depends on the truth theory in question. If we're talking about a relationship to facts--so if we're talking about correspondence theory, no. If we're talking about coherence theory, then yes.
If not then how could there be a relation between a conceptual thing (the proposition), a relation which is itself conceptual (the truth-relation can't be physical so what else could it be but conceptual?)
Everything is physical. So I obviously don't agree with "the truth-relation can't be physical." Concepts are physical. Beyond that, I can't say I understand you being perplexed by how there can be a relation between propositions and other things. The way that obtains in this case is via an individual assigning meanings and, for example (if we're talking about correspondence), observing facts.
"It is a fact that the Sun is a certain distance from the Earth" expresses the semantic sense of 'fact',
If you're talking about the part in quotation marks as a statement, that's a proposition, not a fact (well, besides the fact that it's that proposition for example). I agree that people call true propositions "facts," but that's based on a misunderstanding of the terms. It's a bit similar to how folks conflate, say, speed and velocity. That's not to suggest that my analysis of truth is the received view, but that there's a difference between facts and propositions, and that truth-value is a property of propositions, is certainly the received view in analytic philosophy.
In fact the difficulty of how there could be any semantic relation to them at all would need to be explained if you want assert that facts in the ostensive sense are utterly non-semantic; which you would need to assent to if you want to claim that facts can be in the total absence of percipients that employ conceptualizing language.
Again, the relation is a matter of how meanings (which are subjective, assigned by individuals, and not literally shareable) correlate to facts, or one's other propositions that have been assigned "T," etc.--that's one what is making a judgment about with truth-value.
We were talking about possible worlds, or you could just say we were talking about counterfactuals.
HIstorically, of course, we had a mind-independent world, and we might have one again in the future. I wouldn't say there are any actual mind-independent worlds at present though. Of course, I'd say there's just one actual world at present.
HIstorically, of course, we had a mind-independent world, and we might have one again in the future.
Again, you're picturing 'a world in which there are no mind' - the early earth, drifting silently through the empty void. But that is still a concept, an idea, ordered according to the intuitions of space and time. The point about realism - whether scientific or naive - is that it supplies that human perspective, situates the concept in a temporal and spatial matrix - and then doesn't realise it is doing so. Whatever we say about 'reality' assumes a perspective, but then forgets that it is actually supplying the perspective. It is analogous to wearing a pair of spectacles, without which nothing can be seen, and then looking through them, and demanding 'show me where in this picture there are spectacles'.
Here's a passage in Magee's book on Schopenhauer which explains this exact point:
'Everyone knows that the earth, and a fortiori the universe, existed for a long time before there were any living beings, and therefore any perceiving subjects. But according to Kant ... that is impossible.'
Schopenhauer's defence of Kant on this score was twofold. First, the objector has not understood to the very bottom the Kantian demonstration that time is one of the forms of our sensibility. The earth, say, as it was before there was life, is a field of empirical enquiry in which we have come to know a great deal; its reality is no more being denied than is the reality of perceived objects in the same room.
The point is, the whole of the empirical world in space and time is the creation of our understanding, which apprehends all the objects of empirical knowledge within it as being in some part of that space and at some part of that time: and this is as true of the earth before there was life as it is of the pen I am now holding a few inches in front of my face and seeing slightly out of focus as it moves across the paper.
This, incidentally, illustrates a difficulty in the way of understanding which transcendental idealism has permanently to contend with: the assumptions of 'the inborn realism which arises from the original disposition of the intellect' enter unawares into the way in which the statements of transcendental idealism are understood [what I am referring to above as the 'unseen spectacles'].
Such realistic assumptions so pervade our normal use of concepts that the claims of transcendental idealism disclose their own non-absurdity only after difficult consideration, whereas criticisms of them at first appear cogent which on examination are seen to rest on confusion. We have to raise almost impossibly deep levels of presupposition in our own thinking and imagination to the level of self-consciousness before we are able to achieve a critical awareness of all our realistic assumptions, and thus achieve an understanding of transcendental idealism which is untainted by them.
But you say you don't buy the distinction. So that means that you must think people are speaking nonsense when they say "It is a fact that X".
But the real weakness of your position is that you seem to be unable to offer any explanation at all as to:
In what sense it could be said that truth is "physical". Physical things can be seen, touched, heard smelled, tasted and felt, quantified and modeled and so on; can any of these be done with truth?
In what sense what is normally thought as a semantic entity such as the content of a proposition, could be both a physical and a semantic entity (as opposed to merely being a semantic entity which is expressed in physical forms). And for that matter how is it possible for a semantic entity to be expressed in physical form at all, according to you? And lastly how is it possible for a semantic entity such as a proposition, to correspond with something that is not semantic at all? You say that truth is physical; does that mean you deny that there is anything truly semantic at all; and say the semantic is just a semblance of some kind?
Again, you're picturing 'a world in which there are no mind' - the early earth, drifting silently through the empty void. But that is still a concept, an idea, ordered according to the intuitions of space and time.
Yeah, my picturing it is a concept, etc. but the facts in question aren't a concept.
The point about realism - whether scientific or naive - is that it supplies that human perspective, situates the concept in a temporal and spatial matrix - and then doesn't realise it is doing so.
Realism is an ontological stance. I'm not sure what the heck "it supplies that human perspective" is saying exactly, however. And you're saying the ontological stance "situates the concept in a temporal and spatial 'matrix'"?? What the heck does that amount to? "And then doesn't realize it is doing so"--as if an ontological stance is itself conscious or something?
Whatever we say about 'reality' assumes a perspective,
Over and over again, you conflate concepts and what they're concepts of, what we say and what we're talking about, etc.
But yeah, we have a perspective in saying something. A perspective is a type of reference point. And reference points can't be "gotten free of," whether we're talking about sentient beings or not.
Anyway, I don't really know what you're on about overall, but apparently per the Magee passage, you're arguing for idealism somehow. That's just what we need, because we haven't done that over and over enough in tons of different threads.
Terrapin StationDecember 28, 2016 at 23:54#419900 likes
In what sense it could be said that truth is "physical".
My analysis of truth in no way hinges on some meta analysis of what it is ontologically in terms of physical versus nonphysical. You brought up that issue, so I commented on it.
You seem to be wanting to argue about physicalism rather than understanding the analysis of truth versus facts, etc.
Realism is an ontological stance. I'm not sure what the heck "it supplies that human perspective" is saying exactly, however. And you're saying the ontological stance "situates the concept in a temporal and spatial 'matrix'"?? What the heck does that amount to? "And then doesn't realize it is doing so"--as if an ontological stance is itself conscious or something?
Kant's is an ontological argument. Read that passage I quoted again. This is the exact point it's making. You're simply assuming 'the reality of the world'. What that passage is doing, calling it into question, and you respond with 'what the heck'.
I don't know why you refer to "post #2000", nor why you think that what is a really just common sense critical objection to Terrapin's hopelessly incoherent position is a "rehash of Hegel". If you know your German Idealism you should be well aware that Kant made the point before Hegel.
My analysis of truth in no way hinges on some meta analysis of what it is ontologically in terms of physical versus nonphysical. You brought up that issue, so I commented on it.
This is obviously not true, since it was you that claimed that truth is "physical" as a way of wriggling out of the conceptual difficulties involved in your position. If that is not an ontological claim then what kind of claim is it? All I am asking for is an explanation as to how truth can be understood to be physical; and if you can't offer one then your assertion is as empty as can be.
intrapersonaDecember 29, 2016 at 00:18#420030 likes
By physical do you think he means external instead? Physical substance isn't really physical afaik and doesn't exist how we think it does, so how could anyone say it has truth if all it is is a misunderstood system in/of existence?
Terrapin StationDecember 29, 2016 at 01:41#420130 likes
It is the observation that you can't ultimately separate facts and concepts, reality and perception.
There are facts about concepts of course, but in general, it's not an "observation," it's simply a conflation. You always talk about ideas like picturing something as if picturing is identical to what we're picturing. That's a simple conflation, as confused as if you were to say that a painting of a building is identical to the building. You could say, "It's an observation that you can't separate the painting and the building," but that wouldn't make it not a conflation where you simply do not understand that the painting and what it's a painting of are not the same thing.
Good! Please parcel me one up, and ship it. But first, weigh it and measure it.
Is that from Idiotic Arguments 101?
Yeah, I'll place it in a box made of neutrinos for you. Oh wait--you couldn't receive a neutrino in a box, so they must not be physical per that script from your Stupid Arguments 101 course.
This is obviously not true, since it was you that claimed that truth is "physical" as a way of wriggling out of the conceptual difficulties involved in your position.
I don't know if everyone has the same amount of posts per page, but I'm set up so that I see 26 pages of posts at the moment in this thread. If you go back to page 20, say, and search for occurrences of the word "physical," the first occurrence is on page 25, when you said this:
If not then how could there be a relation between a conceptual thing (the proposition), a relation which is itself conceptual (the truth-relation can't be physical so what else could it be but conceptual?)
So once again, I only mentioned the word "physical" because you brought it up in your post. I was responding to what you typed. My truth analysis has NOTHING to do with whether truth, facts, etc. are physical or not.
If that is not an ontological claim then what kind of claim is it?
Jesus Christ, dude--learn how to read if you're going to attempt to have a big boy discussion. I wrote this: "in no way hinges on some meta analysis of what it is ontologically in terms of physical versus nonphysical.." You can't just bail on the sentence after you read the word "ontologically." There are six other words there that qualify the term "ontologically." (Not to mention that "meta analysis" qualifies it, too.)
All I am asking for is an explanation as to how truth can be understood to be physical;
Okay, but that's changing the topic. What does it have to do with whether truth is mind-dependent? I'd rather we didn't keep steering everything to talk about folks' pet topics. Let's try to have some discussions about something different every once in awhile.
You always talk about ideas like picturing something as if picturing is identical to what we're picturing. That's a simple conflation, as confused as if you were to say that a painting of a building is identical to the building. You could say, "It's an observation that you can't separate the painting and the building," but that wouldn't make it not a conflation where you simply do not understand that the painting and what it's a painting of are not the same thing.
This thread is about that very point, and nothing you have written in it demonstrates that you understand it. I notice also your non-response to the 'very well written passage' from Magee.
Terrapin StationDecember 29, 2016 at 01:52#420180 likes
I wouldn't say that anything you write demonstrates that you can understand or communicate anything. In fact, every single thing you write seems to demonstrate that you have zero understanding of everything you read. You did that repeatedly in your post to me above, too, which is why I responded with sarcasm about it a number of times.
Reply to Terrapin Station Well, as a matter of fact, I have written quite a few essays on the subject of philosophy, including a master's dissertation on Buddhist philosophy, which received high distinctions from actual academics - you know, the kind you find in those places called 'universities'. But apparently I still haven't learned the basic art of not wasting my time on those who don't understand the first thing about the subject.
Terrapin StationDecember 29, 2016 at 01:57#420200 likes
You certainly write a lot--you do here as well. That in no way implies that you understand anything you read or that you can write coherently, of course. Re whether you have an educational background in philosophy, those of us who do can tell if you do independently of what you say about yourself.
Reply to Terrapin Station Well, some people seem to think so. But, anyway, back to the point, which is the notion of 'mind-independence'. I think that the passage quoted from Magee, about 'Schopenahuer's defense of Kant', is quite relevant to the topic of 'mind-independence'. I would be interested to hear any actual arguments for or against that actual point, as distinct from invective and hyperbole.
Terrapin StationDecember 29, 2016 at 02:03#420240 likes
We haven't had enough threads already focused on a general realism vs idealism debate?
Why not focus on whether truth is mind-dependent separately from that? Unless one is an ontological idealist, in which case one likely thinks that truth isn't mind-independent a fortiori because nothing is, we could make this topic a lot more interesting than yet another realism vs. idealism debate on the most general level.
When someone says "It is a fact that x," they are claiming that states of affairs are such and such. Why would that be nonsense?
I presume you're familiar with A J Ayer's Language Truth and Logic, which was based around the
principle of verification, very similar in import to this point you're making here? Do you recall what about 'the principle of verification', as described by Ayer in that book, eventually caused it to fall from favour?
Terrapin StationDecember 29, 2016 at 02:04#420260 likes
Yet another example of you not being able to comprehend anything you read. I'm not saying anything about verification in what you're quoting from me. You should concentrate on trying to tackle basic reading comprehension instead of concentrating on quoting and name-dropping. I don't think the latter fools anyone into believing that you're an expert on anything, especially when you continually do it so that it doesn't really have anything to do with what anyone was saying. Try understanding what you're reading, try to write coherently rather than "impressively" (advice that would go for a few others around here, too), try directly answering questions and objections about your comments instead, and try treating others with a bit more respect and maybe you'll receive some in turn.
I'm not saying anything about verification in what you're quoting from me.
Well, I think you are. I think at many points in this thread, you claim that there are the facts, X, and here our concept of them, as if facts and our concepts of them are clearly separable. But the whole point of arguments about 'mind-independence' is to analyse this very supposition. So to simply assume that separability of facts and concepts is to beg the question - to assume what it is that requires proof.
These are very similar to the ideas Ayer explores in 'Language Truth and Logic' - this is not not 'name dropping' but referring to the literature of the subject so as to situate the debate in terms of philosophy.
Terrapin StationDecember 29, 2016 at 02:16#420290 likes
I think at many points in this post, you claim that there are the facts, X, and here our concept of them, as if facts and our concepts of them are clearly separable.
Even if the two comments were related, as if what you describe above had something to do with verification(ism).
These are very similar to the ideas Ayer explores in 'Language Truth and Logic' -
Again, even if so, that (definition of "fact") has nothing to do with verification(ism). You're just digging a bigger hole for yourself. It's almost as if you can't simply read something and comprehend it for what it is.
If not then how could there be a relation between a conceptual thing (the proposition), a relation which is itself conceptual (the truth-relation can't be physical so what else could it be but conceptual?) — John
So once again, I only mentioned the word "physical" because you brought it up in your post. I was responding to what you typed. My truth analysis has NOTHING to do with whether truth, facts, etc. are physical or not.
I actually said this ; "If not then how could there be a relation between a conceptual thing (the proposition), a relation which is itself conceptual (the truth-relation can't be physical so what else could it be but conceptual?) and something entirely non-conceptual; the presumably purely physical 'something else'?"
Note how you left you the part where I said the "presumably physical something else", since you have long on these forums claimed to be a physicalist, and you also earlier said, as quoted: Quoting Terrapin Station
Concepts are physical.
Apparently your "big boy" truth analysis has nothing to do with anything at all since it seems you are unable to give any account of it, other than to make vacuous assertions about what you will and won't "buy" as if anyone could be care less about that if it does not come with any accompanying explanation.
Your "position" is an absolute joke, dude if you not only cannot provide any argument for it, but cannot even give a cogent account of it. :-} :-d
Jesus Christ, dude--learn how to read if you're going to attempt to have a big boy discussion. I wrote this: "in no way hinges on some meta analysis of what it is ontologically in terms of physical versus nonphysical.." You can't just bail on the sentence after you read the word "ontologically." There are six other words there that qualify the term "ontologically." (Not to mention that "meta analysis" qualifies it, too.)
This is obviously not true, since it was you that claimed that truth is "physical" as a way of wriggling out of the conceptual difficulties involved in your position. If that is not an ontological claim then what kind of claim is it? All I am asking for is an explanation as to how truth can be understood to be physical; and if you can't offer one then your assertion is as empty as can be.
You did claim that concepts and by extension truth are physical; it doesn't matter who mentioned the word "physical' first; that is just another of your red herrings. When you are asked for an account of how that works, you respond defensively as above, which indicates to me that it is likely there is no substance to your position.
Okay, but that's changing the topic. What does it have to do with whether truth is mind-dependent? I'd rather we didn't keep steering everything to talk about folks' pet topics. Let's try to have some discussions about something different every once in awhile.
Again this is a laughably lame evasion. It has nothing to do with pet topics and everything to do with whether truth is mind-dependent.The logic of the operation of minds is semantic, logical not physical. The very reason you can claim there is no truth absent minds is that the truth relation is understandable only as a semantic relation. You are left with two options. First: collapse the semantic into the physical; but if you are going to do that you should be able to give a better account of the truth relation than the semantic one. Or second, explain how there can be a relation between the semantic and the non-semantic. f you want to merely claim that concepts and by extension truth are really physical in order to merely feign explaining how the truth relation works in physicalist terms then I doubt anyone will take you seriously.
I agree with you that we have no really coherent notion of "physical' other than something like 'what can be sensed, measured and so on'. I don't know if Terrapin means "external'. I doubt it because he claims that everything is physical; that nothing is real except the physical. That is what it means to be a physicalist. It is a deeply incoherent, self-refuting position in my view, but people like Terrapin continue to assert it without being able to provide any cogent argument for why they hold to it. I think it really is a case of 'head-retracted turtles all the way down'.
Terrapin StationDecember 29, 2016 at 12:37#421360 likes
Because the whole point was who brought up "physical" first in our discussion in this thread. I wasn't talking about that in this thread. My view on truth, facts, etc. and whether they're mind-dependent do not have anything to do with my physicalism. I don't want to talk about the same things in every thread so that we can't even tell what the heck the topic of the thread started out as. This board has a tendency to do that, it has a tendency for people to keep getting into the same discussions over and over and over regardless of what the thread was ostensibly about.
our "position" is an absolute joke, dude if you not only cannot provide any argument for it,
Again with that stupid criticism. I might care about it if anyone were providing any arguments for anything here, where "argument" would amount to something I'm not doing; that is, if I were doing something significantly different than other folks rhetorically. But apparently, either (a) people believe that I believe that I'm providing arguments for things in some narrower sense, and so they're figuring that saying that I'm not providing an argument for something will sting as a comment, where they're also assuming that I consider their opinions as critics to hold water (which is probably not safe to assume), or (b) people believe that they're providing arguments for things in some narrower sense, and they believe that I'm doing something significantly different than they are in that regard. I don't know which option there is more amusing. But be sure to bring this up 50 more times in 50 different threads in the future.
it doesn't matter who mentioned the word "physical' first;
Yes, it does. The reason that matters is that my truth analysis has nothing to do with my physicalism. You were claiming that the two were importantly related, and you used the fact that I was making comments about physicalism as evidence for that. Well, the only reason I made any sort of comment about physicalism was because I was responding to you bringing up physicalism in your discussion with me.
When you are asked for an account of how that works,
An account of how what works? The relation between propositions and facts that we judge as truth-value? I explained that--we assign meanings to words, phrases, propositions and assess how those meanings correlate with facts (if correspondence theory), other propositions we've assigned "T" to (if coherence theory), what's commonly assigned "T" by relevant populations (if consensus theory), etc. If you still see something mysterious there, you'd need to better explain why you see it as mysterious.
And I said all of the above already.
If you were talking about something else instead (re an account of how "that" works--I'm not entirely sure what "that" is referring to), then please specify what "that" is.
It has nothing to do with pet topics and everything to do with whether truth is mind-dependent in their view.
Again, MY truth analysis, MY view on whether it's mind-dependent has nothing to do with my physicalism. Assume mind is nonphysical. Well, that doesn't at all change my truth analysis or my view on whether truth is mind dependent. That would be the case whether we assume that mind is nonphysical, whether we assume that the world is nonphysical, too, whether we assume that the world is nonphysical and the mind is physical--whatever we assume in that regard. It just has nothing to do with my truth analysis.
The very reason you can claim there is no truth absent minds is that the truth relation is understandable only as a semantic relation.
I don't agree with that. I don't agree that that's the only reason that someone could claim that there is no truth if there are no minds, but in any event, as I explained above, yes, the relation is a semantic one on my view.
First: collapse the semantic into the physical; but if you are going to do that you should be able to give a better account of the truth relation than the semantic one. Or second, explain how there can be a relation between the semantic and the non-semantic.
Not that I agree that those are the only two options, but the first option is irrelevant on my view, as I'm not saying anything that hinges on whether anything is physical or not, and re the second option, I did that already.
Although note in the first place that it's not necessarily the case that the relation is between the semantic and the nonsemantic. That's not the case with coherence theory for example. The relation there is purely in terms of the relation between the proposition in question and the other propositions the person assigns "T" to. It's also not the case with consensus theory, because again, the relation is purely to other propositions to which "T" is assigned. And I'd say it's not the case with pragmatism, either, as the relation is between the proposition in question and what the person considers useful, practically valuable, etc.
It's an issue with correspondence (and for some odd reason, by the way, folks on this board seem to assume that correspondence is the only available truth theory), but as I said, with correspondence, I explained this already. You're simply assessing the proposition in relation to facts of the world as you experience them. It doesn't matter for this what exactly is going on ontologically re that experience--whether physicalism is true, whether direct realism is true, whether solipsism is true, or anything in between--whatever is the case. It doesn't matter. In all of those cases, the answer is the same. You're assessing propositions with facts of the world as you experience them.
[Of course, for the question posed in this thread, we don't have to bother too much with (at least ontological) idealism, because an (ontological) idealist is going to think that the answer to the topic question is obviously "Yes," since a fortiori everything is mind-dependent in their view]
And for it not mattering, it would be a crappy functional analysis of truth if it were to only work on an assumption that physicalism is true. To be a worthwhile analysis of truth it needs to work for not only whatever general ontological assumptions someone makes, but whatever truth relation they employ--hence why it's not just a correspondence theory. It works just as well with the other truth theories. That's not to say that it's simply a reporting of how people think about truth, their beliefs about it, etc. It's a functional analysis of what they're doing in their truth (talk) behavior.
By the way, the relation isn't mysterious to you because you're thinking that all of the properties have to match or something to be a relation, are you? That is, you're not thinking something like "There can't be a relation between something with property p and something without property p. In order for there to be a relation, both things have to have the same properties", are you?
f you want to merely claim that concepts and by extension truth are really physical
For the umpteenth time, I only mentioned that I believe that concepts, truth, etc. are physical because you brought up that issue and I didn't want to ignore things that you'd said in my response to you. I definitely believe that concepts, truth--EVERYTHING--is physical, and I'm a direct realist and yada yada yada. None of that has anything to do with my truth analysis however.
I'm hardly the first or the last to do it, but I think we have to question the question. If we take the question seriously, it seems to throw us into the ancient mud of stating our linguistic preferences as if we were doing something like science. I'm just one voice, of course, but I'd say that pursuing this question in all of its ambiguity and possible uselessness is a waste of time better spent on more relevant issues. I don't want to come off here as anti-philosophical. Philosophy is at times the best genre. At other times it looks like the place where thinking goes to die alone, growling along the way of course at the "idiots" who refuse to agree with trivial preferences.
Comments (529)
Yes. Truth in general does.
There would be no mathematical truths in that case.
Yes, it depended on a mind to be produced, written on the paper, and without a mind to read and interpret it in the future, it is just symbols on the paper. Even if we assume that there is meaning inherent within the symbols on the paper, there is no truth there unless a mind judges that meaning for correctness.
Quoting Sapientia
if there were no longer any minds, there would be just symbols on the paper. There is no truth to these symbols without a mind to interpret them, hence there'd be no mathematical truths without any minds.
Quoting Brainglitch
I don't see the difference which you are claiming. Mathematical principles come into existence, they have in the past come into existence, and from the point that they come into existence, they spread from acceptance amongst a small group of people to a large more widespread group, then they may persist, onward into the future. Moral principles, such as the abolishment of slavery, and the abolishment of stoning adulterers and homosexuals, have come into existence in the past, they start from a small group of people, then spread to a larger group, and may persist onward into the future. Where is the basis for your claim of a "false equivalency"?
Quoting Wayfarer
Your neglecting the fact that the ability to establish similarities (identify), is even more fundamental. Focusing on differences while neglecting similarities cannot produce an adequate understanding.
Didn't I make it clear that, in this context, the past is irrelevant? I thought I made that clear enough. Yet your reply begins by speaking in past tense! So, I will disregard that first part of your reply.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
These debates get very tedious unless you stick to the point or spell out your conclusions. So, you say that it can't be read or interpreted and is just symbols on paper. But that wasn't the question, was it? No, the question was whether it would be true.
A statement can be true or false. A statement is composed of symbols. A statement can be on paper. And a statement doesn't need to be read or interpreted for it to be truth-apt, and for it to be true (or false).
Each one of those statements is demonstrably true.
So, you'd need to explain why it would be any different in the hypothetical scenario.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
That needs to be justified. I see no good reason to accept that.
And wasn't it you who made the point earlier that these kind of things are rule-based and dependent on convention? (I could go back and check if need be, so bear that in mind before you think about denying it). Once this has been set or established, why would there need to be a mind there to judge whether or not it accords?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Begging the question. That's what the debate is about. You can't just assume it.
That's true, but what I was pointing to was the importance of sameness, as the basis of equality, as a moral principle. Sameness is an assumed absolute. Similarity is the recognition that only the perfect One is the same, and all other cases of individuals partake of difference.
Quoting Sapientia
I gave a firm answer to that. No, it would not be true, and gave reasons for that answer. You dismissed my reasons, which refer to both past and future, by claiming that my reasons just refer to the past. Then you proceeded to claim that I did not answer the question.
Quoting Sapientia
If a statement is just a bunch of symbols, how can it be true or false without an interpretation? Where do the symbols derive a meaning from?
There are two very distinct meanings for the word "statement". One is the expression in words, which you refer to here, the second is the thing stated, which is the assumed meaning of those words. It appears like you are trying to equivocate.
An answer isn't the same as an argument, whether it's firm or not.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Which I criticised, and am awaiting a proper response.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
That isn't true, as everyone can see. I only dismissed the part about the past - not out of hand, but because it isn't relevant to the question, which, as I clearly stated, is about the present or a hypothetical future.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I'll add this to the wealth of evidence which suggests that your preference is to attack a watered down misrepresentation.
[I]Some[/I] of the things that you raised in response to the question don't answer the question, [i]unless[/I], perhaps, there is one or more implicit premise. They do not answer the question [I]per se[/I]. That is what I was getting at when I said that these debates get very tedious unless you stick to the point or spell out your conclusions.
And [i]some[/I] of what you said [i]does[/I] answer the question, [i]but requires justification[/I].
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Why would it need to be interpreted, at the time, for it to be true? That is demonstrably not the case now, so why would it be any different in the hypothetical future scenario?
I have made countless statements on here, and elsewhere, and they are either true or false, as the case may be - even when no one is interpreting them. There obviously isn't someone or other there constantly interpreting every statement that I've made. Yet, nevertheless, they are true or false, in correspondence with what is or isn't the case.
Your additional condition seems unnecessary and unreflective of reality. It requires justification.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
That's a better question. But a related question, which matters even more than that, since it is closer to what the debate is about, is whether or not the meaningfulness of the symbols can be, or is, independent of that from which it was originally derived.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Yes, one can distinguish between a statement and its meaning. I was well aware of that.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It appears like you are getting ahead of yourself. Less haste, more speed.
And don't forget, I am still awaiting a proper response to my last post.
You asked me to answer the question, that I did. I also gave you the reasons for my answer. if you wanted an argument you should have asked for it. That's what I do, I ask you to justify your numerous assertions, which you very seldom are capable of doing.
Quoting Sapientia
A bunch of symbols on a paper is neither true nor false without an interpretation. How many different ways must I spell this out?
Quoting Sapientia
These statements that you've made here and elsewhere, consist of symbols. Why do you believe that these symbols correspond to anything without a mind to judge what they correspond to? Can you justify this? Does this symbol "to", automatically correspond to something without a mind to determine what it corresponds to?
You seem to have an overactive imagination. No, actually, I did not. The original question was just an example question, as I made quite clear. But you chose to answer it of your own accord. And, since then, I have criticised your answer.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I didn't bring up the question with the expectation of an answer of any kind, let alone an argument. But, since you took it upon yourself to answer it, I thought I'd analyse your answer, and point out the parts of it which would, in the context of a realism vs. anti-realism debate, need to be argued for, rather than merely asserted.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
In your highly questionable judgement.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No, that's begging the question again, which is not at all what I'm interested in. I'm interested in an explanation or an argument. It's either that or don't bother to reply.
And don't think I haven't noticed your sly wording, taking advantage of the ambiguity in "without an interpretation". What does that mean? If there being an interpretation means there being a correct way for it to be interpreted, then I don't see why that would actually need a mind there interpreting it.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Yes...
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No, the burden is on you to explain why that would be necessary, not on me to explain why it isn't. I don't know why you would think that to be necessary, unless you also believe some false idealist premise which would [i]make[/I] that necessary.
What's annoying about these debates, from my experience, is that that is sometimes kept implicit, when it should be made explicit from the start. And at other times, it is simply plucked out of the hat, as if it were a self-evident truth, and not something highly controversial which the whole debate hinges on.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
That's a very naive attack on the correspondence theory of truth. No, it doesn't work like that. Perhaps you should look it up. It's about a certain sort of statement, not a word.
Why would there need to be a mind to [i]determine[/I] correspondence for there [i]to be[/I] correspondence? That just doesn't make sense, unless, perhaps, you assume idealism, which would be begging the question.
I want to know how there can't be mathematical truths without a mind, yet it remains truth there is paper with symbols on it. The presence of paper and symbols in experience/judgement/concept requires no less mind than mathematics.
OK, I gave you my explanation, concerning the nature of statements and symbols. What more do you want?
One meaning of the word "statement" is to use it to refer to the symbols themselves as they exist. Another meaning of the word "statement" is to use it to refer to what the symbols mean. We should not conflate these two or equivocate.
All you are doing is conflating the two and equivocating. Look:
Quoting Sapientia
Then to my claim that that statements are composed of symbols, you said:
Quoting Sapientia
So, which are we talking about, a statement as a bunch of symbols, or a statement as the meaning, such that we can have "a certain sort of statement"
Quoting TheWillowOfDarkness
It surely wouldn't be true. Did anything I said imply that it would be?
You said that it can be neither true nor false "without an interpretation". I asked you to clarify what that means, and to explain why you think that there would need to be a mind there interpreting it, if that is what you're implying. If that's not what you're implying, then what function would a mind being there serve? It would then seem redundant, unnecessary, irrelevant.
As far as I'm aware, you haven't done that so far.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No, I'm not. I'm asking you why the statement, or the symbols on the piece of paper, can't be true or false. The whole issue here is whether or not they would be meaningful, so I'm not assuming anything about that. Rather, I am asking whether you can explain why you think that they wouldn't be so, and critising what you've said thus far. One such criticism is that what you've said doesn't explain anything, but is only a question begging assertion.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I have not, in this discussion, used the word "statement" to refer to just the meaning. I made a distinction earlier between a statement and its meaning (if it has one). You should pay closer attention to what I've said before jumping to the conclusion that I'm equivocating. The question is whether or not the statement, as minimally a bunch of symbols, would be such that it could be true.
You're suggesting, if I've understood you correctly, that it would have to "have an interpretation" or "be meaningful". But what does that mean or entail? And why would there being at least one mind there be necessary for that?
I've outlined an alternative theory which can explain that without the need of positing any mind being there.
Occam's razor.
Let me explain very slowly and carefully then. There's a bunch of symbols written on a piece of paper. These symbols could mean absolutely anything. For them to state a "truth" requires that the symbols have a determinate meaning, which corresponds to reality. For the symbols to have a determinate meaning requires a mind to determine that meaning. Therefore without a mind there is no truth to those symbols.
Here's another way of looking at it. There's something written on the paper. Whatever it is which is on the paper cannot be a "truth" unless it means something. It only means something to a mind. Therefore, only from the perspective of a mind, can what is on the paper be a "truth".
Quoting Sapientia
I don't recall your alternative theory, I'd be interested in seeing it though.
Why? I mean, it seems to me that they could or they couldn't.
If they were just randomly written, or written in a purposefully vague and ambiguous manner, with no strict meaning, open to interpretation... then yes.
But if the writer wrote them in a certain way, with a certain meaning, then, I mean, [i]that[/I] would be their meaning, right? And if you or anyone else interpreted them in any other way, then that would be assigning them a [i]different[/I] meaning. It would be to [i]misinterpret[/I] them. And if the writer and everyone else died, then wouldn't it remain to be the case that there is - or would be - a correct way, as well as, by implication, incorrect ways, to interpret them? This would be what the writer meant when he or she wrote them - and this seems to be just as true today, even after the writer has ceased to exist, as it would be in the hypothetical scenario, when the writer, as well as everyone else, has ceased to exist. Of course, in the hypothetical scenario, there wouldn't be anyone there to do the interpreting - [i]but why would there need to be?[/I]
I find this idealist way of thinking to be logically unsound and rather bizarre. It's like there's a school, and the school has rules, but the idealist thinks that whether or not the kids break the rules depends on whether or not there is a teacher there watching over them, rather than simply whether or not the kids break the rules. I mean, sure, you can add premises to make that a logically valid argument, but you'd be doing so at the cost of logical soundness.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
[I][B]Note[/b]: for the following, I take "to be determined" to serve the same function as "to be known", "to be figured out", or, the classic, "to be perceived". According to my theory, the meaning is predetermined, and subsequent to that determination, it becomes a matter of discovery.[/I]
For them to state a truth requires that the symbols have a meaning which corresponds to reality. [I]Why would it need to be determinate?[/I]
And even if it does, then for the symbols to have a determinate meaning is for the symbols to have a meaning which is capable, in principle, of being determined. Which is to say that if they were interpreted, [i]then[/I] there would be a meaning to be determined. [I]Which doesn't necessitate any interpreter or determiner[/I]. So, the question would then be: [I]why are you adding this unnecessary condition that there be an interpreter or determiner?[/I]
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I have demonstrated that that need not be so. Just as there need not be a teacher to watch over the kids, there need not be a mind to determine that meaning.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
That conclusion follows from one or more false premises, so it cannot be true.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Okay, I'm willing to assume this much. Let's see where you take this.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Why? The burden would be on you to justify that. It [i]would[/I] mean something to a mind, [i]if[/I] a mind was there, doing whatever it does for it to mean something to it. [I]But whether or not it means something need not depend on a mind actually being there[/I]. If you're a realist, then [i]it doesn't[/I]. If you're an idealist, then you say that it does. You posit this [i]additional[/I] condition [i]which Occam's razor can cut out[/I]. The burden would be on you.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
And here we have another conclusion which we need not accept, unless we accept your premises (assuming validity). But because one or more of your premises is (arguably) false, we need not accept your argument.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Some of my earlier comments suggested it. I have now elaborated.
That's not their meaning though, that the writer wrote the symbols in a certain way. The meaning is not the "way" that they are written, because this just refers to the specific symbols used, and the patterns formed with them. The "meaning" is what is intended by the author, and this is something other than the symbols themselves, and the patterns, it is what they refer to.
Quoting Sapientia
So I agree with all of this, that there is a correct "what the writer meant" etc., with one fundamental difference. "What was meant" is something other than the symbols themselves, and the pattern itself. And so, as much as we can assume that there is a "what was meant", it's really not there in the symbols themselves, it's in the assumption of the mind which apprehends the symbols. A mind apprehends the symbols and assumes that there is a "what was meant". There is no "what was meant" within the symbols themselves, there is an assumption in the mind which apprehends the symbols, that there is a "what was meant". Therefore there is no "what was meant", without a mind which assumes that there is a "what was meant". The "what was meant" is only an assumption.
Quoting Sapientia
Where would these rules exist? Let's say that they are written somewhere in a book or something. Whether or not a kid breaks a rule requires that someone interprets what is written in that book, and interprets what the kids do, and draws a comparison. It is your argument which is unsound. You think that you can make a conclusion about whether or not any kids broke any rules without a statement of what the kids did, and a statement of what the rules are.
Don't you realize that whether or not someone breaks a rule is something which is subject to interpretation? That is why we have trial by jury, to give the defendant a fair trial. It is not a case of either the person broke the law or did not, it is a case of how the person's actions are interpreted in comparison to how the laws are interpreted.
Quoting Sapientia
OK, for the sake of argument, let's say that "determinate" implies "capable, in principle, of being determined". It actually means definite, and let's assume that definite necessitates that it is possible to determine it, and therefore determinable. The problem is that we have nothing more than an assumption that the symbols have determinate meaning. In order for them to state a truth, they must actually have a determinate meaning. How do we get beyond this gap, from assuming that the symbols have a determinate meaning, to them actually having a determinate meaning? We might say, that the author, gave the symbols a determinate meaning through intention, as what was meant. But how is this something which is actually determinate, rather than just us assuming that the author gave them a determinate meaning?
Quoting Sapientia
Do you understand the meaning of "meaning"? It is what is meant. And what is meant refers to what is intended. It is only minds which have intention. Therefore meaning only exists in relation to minds. We can go back, and insist that the meaning was put there, in those symbols, through the intention of the author, but this is just an assumption. And assumptions only exist in minds. So, that there is meaning within the symbols, put there by a mind, is just an assumption, so even this meaning relies on a mind, because it is just an assumed meaning.
Yes and no. If we assume that what the author meant is what they mean, then yes. And that is what I was assuming, so that's not a problem. The author intended to write them in a certain way, with a certain meaning.
I have to call you out on your use of present-tense here, though. You say that the meaning is what is intended by the author. But that isn't necessary, and, as a necessity, is demonstrably false. The meaning can be what was intended by the author. It is demonstrably the case that the author doesn't need to constantly intend that meaning. What would happen when the author dies, and can no longer intend anything, let alone the meaning of what he wrote? What he wrote would instantly become meaningless, and remain meaningless ever after? That is absurd.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I don't think that that's a fundamental difference in terms of this realism vs. idealism debate, since it seems to me that a realist can accept that without contradiction or conceding idealism.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
The problem here isn't so much in what you've taken issue with. The problem here is that the above contains more tense errors. If, in key parts of your text, you were to speak in past tense ("was"), or in conditional tense ("would", "were", "could"), where appropriate, then that would remove the controversy. Your failure to do so basically means that you're begging the question again. So, you'd still need to provide an argument.
There was a mind that intended a meaning. That meaning is the meaning of the symbols that were written. If there were a mind, then it could interpret a meaning. Although that meaning might not be [i]the[/I] meaning. But, in the hypothetical scenario, there wouldn't be a mind. Yet it doesn't follow from any of this that there would need to be a mind for the symbols to have a meaning. So, that is what you'd need to support.
What was meant doesn't have to be in the symbols. It is a fact that the author intended a meaning. It is a fact that the author meant something with the symbols. When talking about this, one shouldn't use scare quotes. But if you're talking about what another mind guesses to be what the author meant, then yes, use scare quotes. That way one can distinguish between what was meant and "what was meant". What was meant isn't only an assumption, but "what was meant" might be.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Ok.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Nonsense. If, for example, one of the rules is not to speak, and a kid speaks, then that kid has broken that rule. There doesn't need to be an interpreter.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Straw man. No, I don't. I just gave an example of that. I think that there doesn't need to be a teacher there for the kids to break the rules. What happens when the teacher leaves the room and the kids go wild? They don't break any rules until a teacher comes along? Poppycock! The rules are the rules. We're talking about rules, not guidelines for the teacher.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Yes, I do, but there is a correct interpretation, and incorrect interpretations, as we've agreed. The correct interpretion is predetermined. It was what was the author meant. You don't need a teacher there to interpret anything or to check whether or not the kids have broken the rule in order for the kids to have broken the rule. But you might need a teacher there doing that for other reasons not relevant to the analogy.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Yes, our legal system is about how the laws are interpreted. We have judges who have some authority to determine outcomes. Metaphysics and logic don't really work like that.
The logic of it is that either P or -P. And if P, then Q. And if -P, then -Q.
The metaphysics of it is that that kid spoke (P). The rest logically follows. The rule was broken (Q).
Then you come along and say "Oh, and there must be a teacher to interpret stuff!". - Wrong.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I'm not sure what you mean. It isn't an assumption that, in principle, the meaning - what the author meant - could be discovered. You can't rule that out. If it would be the case that [i]if there were a mind, then it could be discovered[/I], then the symbols have a discoverable meaning.
I think I'm going to try to avoid using the term "determinable", because I think that it's problematic. The meaning is predetermined, so strictly speaking, it can't be determined after that, unless you mean something else. So, I think that your talk about the meaning being determined, or the meaning being determinable, [i]subsequent to that determination[/I] is false or misleading.
[i]A[/I] meaning could be determined. And that could be anything. But, strictly speaking, [I]the[/I] meaning can't be determined, because it is predetermined. Whether it can be known, understood, or discovered is a different issue.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Your meaning isn't clear to me, and the problem is this term you're using: "determinate".
If the author meant something, then the author meant something. That would be a fact, not merely something that we're saying, or an assumption. So, I don't get your point. Or it's just wrong.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Present-tense error.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I haven't denied that, and nor is a realist required to do so. The meaning relates to a mind - the author's, for example. But the realist is saying that neither this mind nor any other needs to be there. That it [i]was[/I] there is sufficient. It's about independence.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It's not about this "in the symbols" straw man, and it isn't an assumption. It's a fact that the author meant something with the symbols.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Facts do not.
Here's the difficulty right here. Let's say that the author intended to write all the symbols exactly as they appear on the paper. That is exactly what the author meant, to produce exactly those symbols in that exact pattern or order. We still assume that there is something which was meant, beyond this expression of symbols. We assume that there is something which was meant by the author, which is represented by the symbols, that the symbols represent something. Therefore we attribute "what was meant by the author" not directly to the pattern of symbols, but to that which lies beyond, what is represented by the symbols.
Quoting Sapientia
I have no issue with this problem of tense. I can replace "meaning" with "what was meant", as in the paragraph above, if that makes it easier to understand. We still have to deal with the distinction between "the author meant to write down these symbols", and what the author meant to represent with these symbols. These two are distinct, but related intentions. Following from what you argue here, what this phrase refers to, "what the author meant to represent" never had any existence. That's fine, and not at all absurd as you would claim here. As per my last post, that there is such a thing as "what the author meant to represent", is just an assumption held by the reader. Without this assumption, all the symbols on the paper are meaningless, as you say, but contrary to your claim, there is nothing absurd about that.
Quoting Sapientia
As I said, I'll adhere to proper tense use, replacing "meaning" with "what was meant". The point I'm trying to make though, is that there is nothing real, which exists as "what was meant", other than a pattern of symbols. But this pattern of symbols does not constitute meaning for a reader. The reader must assume that there is a "what was meant" beyond the pattern of symbols, what the symbols represent. So the symbols have no meaning without a reader to assume that there is a "what was meant".
Quoting Sapientia
It is you who is making the tense errors. There is only "what was meant", at the time which the author wrote the symbols. You, for some reason, assume that this continues in time as "meaning", such that the symbols have meaning at the present time. This is what needs to be justified. "What was meant" is in the past, "meaning" is in the present. The difference between these two, past and present, justifies my claim that the symbols have no meaning. What you need to do is to show how "what was meant" continues to exist at the present, as meaning. First, you need to justify that there is such a thing as "what was meant".
Following your stated principles, as I explained, the symbols have absolutely no meaning unless there is a mind which assumes that there is a "what was meant". If we remove your conditions, and allow that there is a real "what was meant by the author", and this "what was meant" is not restricted to the past, but continues to exist as "meaning", within the statement, then we can dispose of the need for a mind to assume that there is a "what was meant". However, doing this produces a temporal absurdity, which must be dealt with. An intention at a particular time in the past, "what was meant", is assumed to continue in the present, as "meaning". I know that intention has an odd sort of relation to time, but how do we validate this claim? How do we justify that what was meant, at a particular point of time in the past, when the author writes the symbols, exists as meaning today, without a mind to assume that there is a what was meant?
Quoting Sapientia
Even if we assume that it is a fact that the author intended a meaning, that act is in the past. How does the act of having intended a meaning, in the past, ensure that a meaning exists now at the present. I use quotes on "what was meant", because these words refer to something conceptual only, something within the mind, as intention. There is the intent itself, "what was meant" and this was only in the mind of the author, at that time of writing, in the past. There is also an interpretation of "what was meant", and this is in the mind of the reader. You seem to assume that there is such a thing as "what was meant", in order to claim objective meaning, but that's just an assumption.
Quoting Sapientia
Actually, your claim is what is nonsense. Of course there needs to be an interpretation, otherwise your supposed rule, "not to speak" is just symbols. Who interprets what it means "to speak" and "not to speak", in order to determine whether the kid has actually broken the rule? If the kid hums or starts making all kinds of unintelligible gibberish noises, has the rule been broken?
So... care to elaborate?
That said, I haven't fully digested the above discussion, so please excuse me if this has already been addressed by you.
No, that's not my understanding. What are you basing that on?
Facts, statements, truth, the world... none of that seems mind-dependent in the relevant sense, namely that there can't be one without the other.
If you think that you can show that anything I've actually said leads to that conclusion, then be my guest.
Ok.
I don’t yet know how you define any of those terms ("fact", "statement", "truth", "world") so it’s hard to evaluate your claim at this point, but at face value I’d tend to take issue with the claim that statements (for instance) are mind-independent, so perhaps we can start there. To bring this intuition out more clearly I’ll pose the following question and see where it takes us:
1. Were any statements ever made prior to the emergence of intelligent life in the universe?
The way in which you answer this question should help provide some insight into your theory of statements and, hopefully, help drive the discussion forward.
My view: truth is mind-dependent, because it is the predicate of a proposition. Propositions are true, or not true, and whether they are, or are not, is a matter of judgement, and judgement is by a mind. In this respect, I don't agree with Sapientia's argument. But there's another point - a mathematical proof, for example, may be 'mind-independent' in one sense - that is, it is not dependent on being grasped by this or that mind; it's not a matter of convention as to whether it is true or no; so in that sense, it is 'mind-independent'.
But consider that any rational proposition, whether mathematical or otherwise, can only be grasped by a rational mind. So in that sense, it's not 'mind-independent'. This type of understanding actually tends towards 'objective idealism', that there is a rational or intelligible order, which is grasped though the intellect ('nous'); which I think is a strong underlying strain in the history of Western philosophy, until Hegel, but it's objective reality is now contested, due to the fact that physicalism generally rejects the idea of an 'intelligible order' (which is, however, still preserved in schools such as Feser's 'Aristotlean-Thomism'.)
My view of the idea of 'mind-independence', is that when it is turned into a philosophical tenet, as distinct from a methodological step, it is based on the missapplication of the scientific attitude. This is the subject of Thomas Nagel's critique in his most recent (and controversial) book, Mind and Cosmos, where he says in regards to modern thinking, generally:
This was the basis of Descartes' conception of a 'universal science' which could be applied to any subject whatever, using algebraic geometry and quantification. And of course it is manifestly obvious that it has been extraordinarily successful in terms of material outcomes. But it is philosophically problematical in my view.
Oh, and hi @theorem!
I didn't look at that thread, so if my comment is wonky.. sorry. The question of whether anything at all is mind-independent is one that can be debated. Those who say nothing is (mind-independent) are positing that the average person is deluded. But independently of that situation, we frequently use the concept of truth to speak of the unknown.
"No one knew who killed the butler. The detective sought to reveal the truth."
This implies some proposition regarding the butler's killer which is true, but unknown. In this case, it's clear that "truth" does not indicate a mind-dependent property.
Quoting Sapientia
Truth arises as a property of a relation between mind and world. So MU is in the right here, but needs to take it a step further.
The crucial thing is that minds form maps of the territory for themselves. So truth becomes an interpretation of the map having some definite reliable meaning. Thus a triadic relationship is formed where we deal with the signs of what we think exists, rather than the noumenal things-in-themselves.
So it is right that a bunch of symbols on a paper don't have an inherent interpretation. The interpretation is a habit that has developed. A mind comes to recognise the map as saying something truthful about a territory.
The territory is then understood to "really exist" in the way it has been imagined. The map is presumed to describe it well. It must do because the map can be used reliably to get places we want to go.
But then - if we stop to think about it more carefully - all we really "know" is that these are the signs we interpret in such and such a way. So we can ascribe truth to that habit of interpretation. We can point to the robustness of a relation. But the territory itself stands beyond the map. And we might not really "know" it at all. It is only our particular habit of relation that is ever actually tested, and so has its "truth" demonstrated, by some act of interpretation.
But carry on with the usual useless idealism vs realism debate....
The relation between mind and world is an expression of spirit; so, more primordially, truth is of the spirit.
But is that statement true beyond some particular mapping relation?
In talking about "spirit", you are speaking about the topological features on a map you have constructed. You know what "spirit" means to you because you believe you can recognise it in terms of phenomenology. If particular things happen in experience, you can successfully interpret them as an "expression of spirit".
Yet the next step for you and your map has to be to show you can and do actually use it to navigate a terrain in a way that meets some definite purpose.
I would say that "spirit" here sounds too vague in its ontic commitments. It's literal meaning is so ambiguous that it can be taken to mean pretty well anything one likes. It is the equivalent of a message scrawled on wet blotting paper with a fat felt-tip.
There may be some directions lurking in the putative map, but one could never really be sure that one was not merely getting lucky in eventually stumbling towards any actual destination.
So your response demonstrates how truth in terms of "maps of reality" is both model-centric - fundamentally epistemic - and yet also pragmatically comparable.
We can't transcend our epistemic conditions to inspect the world as it actually is. We are stuck with the internal signs we form as part of a modelling relation.
And yet there are objective features to this mapping - or at least features that we can socially share through language and agreement. That is, society is also a "mind" that makes maps.
The objective features would be the familiar ones of "crisp purposes" and "crisp counterfactuality". A map is true in terms of the purpose it is meant to serve (which can be either very general, or highly restricted). And for a map to be truth-apt, it must eliminate vagueness. It must render the world in as binary fashion as possible.
(And again, these are both good mapping qualities which we have plenty of reason to suspect reality itself to possibly lack. So that is how we arrive at the conundrum of how to remove ourselves - the interested mappers - from our view of reality. What does reality look like if reality were to "map itself"?)
I think this is really the point; that Reality is spirit; which cannot be mapped, but which does the mapping and which the maps are expressions of. The empirical world is what is mapped, so it is a symbolic, or you would probably prefer to say, semiotic, expression of spirit.
Of course you probably don't think of reality as purposive, intentional or teleological as spirit is thought; you would probably think of it as a virtual chaos or something like that. But when you get down to this level it is a matter of faith, or personal preference, as to how you think about the Real. A person will think about it in the way that seems to them to be most contributive to flourishing. So it really comes down to an ethical and not an epistemological question after all. Kant got it just right even you don't agree with his CI.
That is true, within the domain of discursive reason, but there is also a domain beyond reason, which is what I would think 'spirit' is supposed to denote. That is probably not something you're prepared to recognise or accept, but I think it is understood in the Western philosophical tradition and that it provides a context for and a limit to the claims of reason. That said, 'spirit' is a problematical word, as it has many meanings - not least the obvious one of 'alchoholic liquor'. But in the Western philosophical tradition, there is at least a kind of recognised use of the term 'spirit' in either philosophical or theological terms as the 'ground of being' or 'first cause' or even one element of the Trinity. And I think the German idealists recognised that domain, as does the Thomist tradition in a different way. Whereas now the naturalistic project is to understand the principle of origination in terms of 'self-organisation'.
But for those who don't accept the primacy of naturalism, 'seeing things as they actually are' amounts to acknowledgement of more than what naturalism is prepared to acknowledge. There is an element required of revelation, illumination, or transcendent insight, which is generally not recognised by naturalism. It's a fault line in the culture-wars.
We should be very careful, though, not to do what seems so easy and natural to us; that is we should take care not to fall into Hegel's mistake of objectifying spirit, because that way lies totalization, even fundamentalism.
Do you mean that we construct & share a worldview, the fact that it is shared, gives it reliable meaning, it has pragmatic use.
The triadic relationship. The noumena does not appear, but what does appear we symbolize into shared language which gives us its interpretation We have consciousness of an existent object, a tree for example, and we have a claim to knowledge of how it appears & how trees appear is part of our concept of a tree. So two separate claims: a) the thing is(we understand it is separate from us) & b) what that things is (how its concept epistemologically ties into its appearance).
The world exists separately from us, this is its facticity. What happens in the world happens regardless of our presence. Sure we can learn about it, study fossils, the cosmos, learn how the world works, but since we are also part of the world, our viewpoint has to be circular.
Numbers, some of the particles physicists presuppose, our concepts or ideas, are also part of reality, they are in the world in sofar as we too are in the world, but they are not factual part of it in the same manner as a tree. Part of the problem is that in saying 'a tree' we are using a general term (b) to specify a fact, a particular, which necessarily only points to the appearance and not (a), which is presupposed but not known, and we have no guarantee of the correctness of the correspondence between a & b except pragmatically.
Yet still, what is "spirit" such that I can understand it to be doing mapping?
If you make it clearer you are talking about final cause in some fashion - the general purpose which acts as an "internal" constraint on mapping - then I could agree with you perhaps. It is a key point of the semiotic view of modelling relations that the autonomous self arises as the generic habit encoding some set of guiding self-interests.
But talking about "spirit" instead suggests a theistic reading. And this is why both Hegel, with his Geist, and Peirce, with his objective idealism, can be confusing because they seem to offer themselves equally to theistic interpretations and physicalist interpretations.
Quoting John
No. I've probably said it hundreds of times that I believe in the natural systems view and so finality is a real cause in the world. That is why the second law of thermodynamics stands out as the Cosmos's most generic constraint.
So I am cool with teleology. But I see it as immanent and naturalistic, not transcendent and theistic.
Quoting John
Or not. My argument is that it is about models that demonstrably work. It is about conceptions expressed clearly enough for evidence to falsify them.
Faith and preference are the weakest possible basis for truth pretty much by definition.
Yeah. But that construction of a worldview (or umwelt in semiotic jargon) is both biological and cultural. So because we have a shared history of neural evolution - the same kind of eyes and ears - we can already rely on some basic level of shared experience or phenomenology. So I am not arguing extreme social constructionism. However when it comes to an intellectually conceived worldview - the product of collective human enquiry - then it is still just that ... the collective view which develops and survives because it somehow works for us all in a generic way.
Quoting Cavacava
Not sure if this is what you mean, but I am saying there would be two levels of semiosis here. There would be the neuropsychology of perception - the way our brains are already designed to force us to construct the perception of a bound object like "a tree".
The naive view is we see what is there - a tree with colours, movements, shapes. Yet psychology tells us this is an elaborate process of interpretation. A tree won't even be seen if the mind finds it more meaningful to be acting in terms of there being a wood.
And then on top of that we construct our social reality where oak trees are gods, or someone's property, or a thing of natural beauty.
The point is that it is signs all the way down. If we focus on the greenness of some leaf, that is still a psychological sign rather than a physical reality. And when we say the physical reality is some wavelength of light, that is sign heaped upon sign. It is reading numbers off dials and saying, look!, there's your true reality.
But I think that is actually the salient point. How we think our beliefs concerning the Real work for us is precisely how we think they do or do not contribute to our flourishing.
When it comes to the nature of the Real, there can be no empirical evidence, and our decision therefore cannot be an epistemic, but must be an ethical, one.
Faith and personal preference are not blind but are based on what we think works best for us.
But that also sees life as being just a way that the Universe 'dissipates energy', culminating in 'maximum entropy', i.e. the 'heat death' of the Universe. It might be a scientifically accurate depiction of physical processes, but as a philosophy...?
My view is that human beings are in some real sense intrinsic to the Universe. We're not accidental byproducts of a random process, but the means by which the Universe discovers itself. That is not really articulated in a lot of Western philosophy or science, although you can find it in some of the underground or esoteric movements.
Yeah, I was forgetting. Philosophy relies on scientific inaccuracy. :-}
Quoting Wayfarer
I'm not completely against such an idea as you know. But also, I could only truly believe in it to the extent I could at least sketch out some plausible way of quantifying it as a metaphysical hypothesis.
So I would rephrase it in terms of the inexorable growth of semiotic complexity (within entropic limits). And "ascendency" - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ascendency - is an ecological concept, cashed out in actual equations, which for instance gets at the notion of organised power.
But mystical proclamations recast in emprical form seem to loose their allure very quickly for many.
From the perspective of 'the natural sciences', then you have to account for phenomena in terms of causes that naturalism can deal with. But that doesn't make it comprehensive or complete. If I got your total medical history, or a DNA sample, I could find out a lot about you, in one sense - but how much would I know about your biography? Little or nothing, I would say; and that is an exact analogy.
And the kind of model I'm thinking of is nearer to Maslow's hierarchy of needs and values; but I would go further and say that the process of self-realisation is something other than, and greater than, what current naturalism is able to imagine. Part of the consequences of the history of ideas is that such perspectives have generally been forgotten, although you do find them, as I said, in alternative and counter-cultural philosophies.
If that is an exact analogy, then you have only said you would need more empirical facts. You have not yet abandoned naturalism if you feel you need to inquire about my specific social and cultural development too.
Quoting Wayfarer
Talk is cheap. Maslow, as a scientist, did a pretty good job on humanising psychology. If you can go one better, let's hear how.
Big subject! I think the sense of self-consciousness, of being individual subjects in a domain of objects, forces and people, is actually one of the distinguishing characteristics of modernity. I say that because in the pre-modern world, I think humans felt instinctively related to the Cosmos through their religious belief and their sense of place in the social order; it provided a sense of relatedness to the divine and social order of things. That is part of what has changed in the transition to modernity and individualism If you look at the epistemology of the medievals, they have various forms of the notion that ideas are 'absorbed by the soul'. Also the Platonic view of logic is that what we really know are the 'objects of the rational mind', of which ordinary objects are mere instantiations; but the 'real intelligibles' are known by exactly that process of the intellect 'being united' with them.
So I think part of the modern attitude is this sense that the scientific timeline which we now know, but which our predecessors didn't, is 'the real world'. But it has to be remembered that a very important part of arriving at that conception was the transition to the modern attitude which sees 'what is real' in terms of what can be represented via mathematical values - by that I mean, scientific materialism, and not in any crude sense, but as an over-arching assumption of modern Western culture. And that entails a kind of existential stance - which I think you've picked up, with reference to the 'circularity' involved in the process.
Also a big topic! The ontological status of number is a big unanswered question. If you look at the article on Philosophy of Mathematics on Wikipedia, you will notice it is very large, and has an enormous number of references. I think the 'nature of number' is something that we all feel must be intuitively obvious, but really is a very difficult question. After all, Russell's effort to ground mathematics in logic, Principia Mathematica, was never completed.
Then the other point you're touching on is universals. The word 'tree' is a concept and is determinative in some respects - you and I will know what we're referring to, but that constitutes a very wide range of very different kinds. That illustrates something important about the nature of conceptualisation.
My sympathies are generally Platonist, i.e. I am inclined to accept the reality of numbers and universals. I see them as being in an important sense 'constitutive of the operations of the mind', i.e., they're neither 'in here' or 'out there', but are the means by which we are able to think rationally and mathematically at all. There's an interesting article on Aeon, The mathematical world, James Franklin, which considers some of these perspectives from an Aristotelean perspective.
Do you think of biography as a type of naturalism? I would have thought it more a literary undertaking.
Do you get to make the facts up or do you have to report them?
Don't you think that we mostly assume that there is some kind of "truth" which is beyond our interpretations? So despite the way we interpret things, we assume that there is a truth of the matter, which our interpretations cannot grasp the entirety of. And as much as we might use 'truth" to refer to consistency in our interpretations, between multiple individuals, we still assume a 'truth' which is beyond this, standing in relation to the territory itself.
Quoting Cavacava
But "the world" is a construct, and the idea that what happens in the world happens regardless of our presence is a construct as well. So it's really not useful to take this type of realist position because it lacks in what we would call "truth". And once you dismiss this position as ill-founded, something which is commonly believed but not true, you no longer will see yourself as part of the world, but the world as part of yourself. The true territory is not external.
But that is implicit in acknowledging we are limited to interpretations. So there is always going to be uncertainty about what is left out.
And yet also - at least for pragmatist accounts of truth - it is an important point that we are also only trying to serve our own purposes. We can afford to be indifferent about "the Truth" in some grand ontic totalising sense.
Of course I, like anyone with a deep interest in metaphysics, want the whole story. I make that completeness a purpose. But I also recognise the way inquiry is in fact limited and so that informs my approach too.
Oh, and hi @theorem![/quote]
Hi!
Quoting Wayfarer
That's pretty much my view as well.
Quoting Wayfarer
Right. Basically (and as you rightly point out) mathematics is objective and public while yet remaining entirely in the order of intelligible being. This conclusion will seem counter-intuitive to the modern sensibility, but if we reject the Cartesian division of being into the mutually exclusive categories of res cogitans (subjective) and res extensa (objective) along with the Lockean analysis of sense perception it perhaps becomes bit more tractable.
Quoting Wayfarer
Agreed, though I'm not sure it's entirely fair to lay the blame at the feet of "physicalism". It's one thing to point out the failures of physicalism, quite another to propose a viable alternative. Critics of physicalism (such as Nagel, Chalmers, et al.) are notorious for coming up short in regards to the latter. But to your point in regards Feser, I think we are starting to see a bit of a resurgence of classical Aristotelian thought within the academic community, both within metaphysics and within the sciences. I think that the realization that Aristotle's hylemorphic metaphysics can (more or less) be cleanly separated from his erroneous physics is finally starting to take root within the modern mind. It will be interesting to see what happens in the coming decades.
I'll explain it in more detail if you need me to but the nutshell version is that truth is a judgment that individuals make about the relationship between a proposition and other things (such as states of affairs if the individual is using correspondence theory).
Do you get to make the facts up or do you have to report them?
Well, biography (and history, for that matter) requires the telling of a story, in addition to the reporting of facts. You can't disregard the facts, but in a biography, you're also concerned with their meaning, which requires qualitative judgement.
But whether a certain sentence expresses a proposition, and so whether a certain sentence is true, is probably mind-dependent, in the sense that whether something counts as a sentence, and what a sentence expresses, is dependent on a linguistic practices in turn dependent on minds in some way. To deny this would be to say that for any arrangement of things in the world that logically or conceivably could be interpreted, according to some imaginary linguistic system, in a certain way, in fact already is: and so you'd be forced to say that basically everything is a sentence, and everything expresses every conceivable proposition, always (since there will always be a logically conceivable linguistic convention that could be so arranged). But this is false, so the assumption underlying it has to be; and so whether a sentence is true is mind-dependent, because what it means is mind-dependent, even though the truth it expresses isn't.
No sentence (even imaginary ones) express propositions. Speakers express propositions by the utterance of sentences. Propositions can also be expressed by utterances which do not strictly speaking contain sentences.
Where sentences are identified as the primary truth-bearers, it's probably some artificial system like Tarski's. Using propositions as the primary truth-bearer may get us closer to ordinary language use, where the same proposition can be expressed by the utterance of a multitude of sentences.
No, there weren't. But that there [i]needed[/I] to be intelligent life doesn't mean that there [i]needs[/I] to be. And it's only the latter which is relevant. Do you think that there needs to be? If so, I wonder why. There certainly wouldn't be any [i]new[/I] statements if all intelligent life were to cease indefinitely.
Just please try to make sure that you're addressing the relevant claim before you get too carried away. I think that I have already made that clear in this discussion, but I suppose I can clarify for you if need be.
It seems I could accept your first premise, but reject the second.
Why do you think that whether a proposition is true or false is a matter of judgement? That would have logical consequences which I find implausible or even absurd, and, because of that, I reject your second premise.
It just doesn't make sense to me, and seems unbelievable, that all of these facts, all of these events, which can be - and can have been - stated, would not, as statements, have a corresponding truth-value for that reason alone, but would instead require a mind there judging them to be true or false.
Are facts and events even relevant in your metaphysics? Because you didn't even mention them above.
Your second premise leads to a sort of relativism which I think is untenable.
If Person A judges Proposition P to be true, and Person B judges P to be false, then either P is true and false, which is a contradiction, or P is true relative to A and false relative to B. But that isn't truth, that is merely judgement, which you are calling "truth".
Also, there is good reason to believe that we can make errors of judgement with regards to the truth or falsity of a proposition, which, under this sort of relativism, simply wouldn't be possible in the way in which that is normally understood. An individual could never simply be wrong on account of contradiction with what is or is not the case, but only "wrong" relative to the judgement of those who contradict him. Whether he really is right or wrong wouldn't matter.
And he could never be wrong by his own judgement, i.e. he would always be right relative to his own judgement, since if he judges something to be true, then it is true relative to his judgement, and likewise with regards to falsity. But I think (or judge) that my judgement is fallible. So what would that entail? Seems to lead to contradiction.
Quoting Wayfarer
Why would they be any different?
Quoting Wayfarer
But that is [I]not[/I] the sense of independence relevant to realism - at least, not the realism that I'm talking about.
Quoting Wayfarer
No, I don't think that that understanding (assuming you were referring to what I quoted just before the above quote) does lead to that. I think that a realist can straightforwardly acknowledge that any rational proposition, whether mathematical or otherwise, can only be grasped by a rational mind, and is not independent in that sense. That's because it isn't about independence in that sense. Of course you'd need a rational mind to grasp it! You don't think that realists deny that, do you? And even if some do deny that, I don't. A realist might deny that it would need to be grasped [i]to be true[/I], and [i]that[/I] would be relevant to this discussion.
Quoting Wayfarer
I doubt that.
I think that those who make mind-independence claims and those who make mind-dependence claims, in the context of this philosophical debate, tend to be in the same metaphysical boat, which differs from science in that it makes claims which transcend it.
How can it be otherwise? Propositions don't float around in the ether, they are not natural forms, but only exist in the minds of rational beings who are capable of making statements, which may be true or false. So you and I will judge something to be true or false - apart from that, there is nothing inherently true or false in nature, is there? 'Things are neither good nor bad, but thinking makes it so', said the bard.
You say, in the top section:
But then you say, further down:
Those two statements seem in conflict to me.
Well, it's very complicated. In some cases, Person A might be factually mistaken, and Person B not, which is pretty straightforward. But in other cases, it can be very hard to adjudicate. That doesn't rule against the fact that judgements are still undertaken by intelligent subjects. It also doesn't rule against the fact that people can be wrong - often large numbers of people, about very important matters of fact, as I think we have seen in the news at least a couple of times recently.
I know, or rather fear, that there are things I'm likely to be wrong about, and that there are many other things I don't know. I have had to change my view, in fact I've often changed it after discussions such as these.
But if that realist wanted to understand what was being talked about, they would have to grasp it. There are any number of propositions that may or may not be true, that you or I will never know about.
I think 'the realism you're talking about' is what I call 'there anyway' realism - that the big wide world is 'there anyway', regardless of whether anyone's in it, regardless whether you're thinking about it or not. Pragmatically that is true, but on another level, the world you think is 'there anyway' still relies on a perspective, namely yours. That is because the mind organises perceptions, judgements, sensations, and so on, so as to form the very concept of 'there anyway'; that is a volitional act, or, in some sense, a mental construction, in the Kantian sense. But again, it's not something in your mind or my mind alone, it is an inter-subjective reality, very similar to what Husserl called an 'umwelt' or 'lebenswelt', namely, a world that is imbued with judgement and meaning. That is what the ''there anyway' realist actually believes in, whilst at the same time pretending that they have no part in it.
I split all of the relevant comments from that discussion and moved them here, so you shouldn't need to look at the other discussion.
Quoting Mongrel
I think that there certainly [i]are[/I] things which are mind-dependent. The question is whether truth is one of them.
Quoting Mongrel
Yes, I agree. The other position has to go against the way in which this language is usually used.
The world exists without us, we have the remains of previous life forms that inhabited the world for millions of years. The world does not contain truth in itself, it is factual. We construct 'a world', a view we share with others that is comprised of what we and others have learned.
The point is that this facticity, what is in-it-self, is different from what is for us. The existence of thought is contingent, the world exists without it. The factual world must have a structure which is independent of us, which exists even if we do not.
Truth is not in the factual world as such, it is a constuct we lay over the world to make it intelligible, but clearly there is no guarantee that our maps correspond to what the world is in itself.
The question, then, is whether or not propositions are sentence-dependent. If so, and if sentences are mind-dependent, then propositions are mind-dependent. And if truth is proposition-dependent then truth is mind-dependent.
But I think it's a bit of a leap to go from "we talk about truth as if it's mind-independent" to "truth is mind-independent". Maybe something akin to fictionalism or quasi realism is correct.
I don't think that it is the case that "interpretation" implies necessarily that there is a truth to that which is interpreted. Since we live in a world of change and motion, it may well be the case, that what is, depends on perspective, such as what is indicated by the relativity of simultaneity. If the truth is perspective dependent, and each perspective is capable of producing an interpretation, then how can there be such a thing as "the truth' which is beyond our interpretations?
Quoting apokrisis
Now you introduce a temporal aspect to the interpretation itself, suggesting that when we interpret, now, we have a view toward the future, and this may influence one's interpretation. This really complicates matters with respect to 'the truth", because now judgements concern what will be, or ought to be, just as much as what is. And if we extend this toward the past as well, we have judgements about what was as well as what is.
If there is a radical difference between what was (that it cannot be changed), and what will be (that it may or may not occur), how could we reconcile these two distinct aspects of reality with a "truth" which concerns what is.
Quoting The Great Whatever
Aren't these two statements somewhat contradictory? How can it be the case that "what a sentence expresses" is mind dependent, but whether or not "what the sentence expresses" is true, isn't mind dependent. If there is no such thing as "what the sentence expresses" without a mind, then how could there be a truth or falsity concerning "what the statement expresses" without a mind?
The point was, that this "the world" is something which is produced, and assumed by us. We assume that there is something out there which exists independently of us, and we call it "the world". So "the world" refers to that which is assumed to be independent, through the means of a concept, which is how we presently understand this assumed entity.
So we have a constructed "world", which is conceptual. There is also an assumption, that there is a real world which "world" refers to, an assumption that "world" is not just a fictitious, fantasy concept. We justify this assumption by referring to the remains of previous life forms and other scientific beliefs.
But this is all backwards. We should really deny this assumption of "the world", until it is justified, and produced as a logical conclusion, rather than taken as an assumed premise. This means that we should go through all the evidence from all the various fields of science, and other forms of knowledge such as theological knowledge, then we can start to make conclusions about mind-independence. If this evidence produces a conclusion that there is a "world", then the assumption is justified. if not, then we move on to a new conception.
Quoting Cavacava
Even this statement which you make here, acts as evidence that there is no such thing as the world. You say "what is in-it-self is different from what is for us". So for us, there is such a thing as the world. If, what is in-it-self, is different from this, shouldn't we conclude that in reality there is not a world?
Quoting Cavacava
When we are so convinced, that there is a good possibility that our maps do not adequately represent what is in itself, that our constructed "world", and the things which we believe as truths concerning this world, don't adequately correspond to the assumed independent reality, then why not drop this assumption until it can be justified?
This is wrong because determining what proposition is expressed by the utterance of a sentence requires knowing something about the context of utterance.
Say you walk in a library and you see a poster pinned to the wall that reads "Physicists are imported." As you contemplate the meaning, a host of fascinating insights open up for you. You subsequently find that the poster is part of an art installation in which the artist is having posters made from computer generated sentences. This is one of them.
You think to yourself: "See! The sentence expressed a proposition all on its own.. without any help from a human mind."
No. It didn't. You derived a proposition from it by projecting a context of utterance. You were the speaker. As I told you: some sort of shenanigans will be required to take sentences as primary truth-bearers.
What relation?
I think Plato's Dialogues are some of the most sublime works ever crafted. I am not totally in agreement with what has been described as his Theory of Forms. He spends very little time in his 35 dialogues discussing them and in his Theaetetus where, if anywhere, one would expect the theory showcased, they are not mentioned. The problem with his depth of his thought lies in Socratic irony, a form of dissimulation. I think Plato was afraid that what happened to Socrates & Protagoras could happen to him as well, so he framed his thought in his dialogues to make it correspond to several possible levels of interpretation.
The circularity concerns our position with the world. We are particulars, contingent beings existing in a real, existing world, our ability to think is factually contingent in the world, it could have been otherwise.
This ability to think of ourself separately from the world, our ability to make the world our object enables us to construct a world that is meaningful, which contains truths. However, we have no objective position in this process, only a subjective (relative) position, and any truths we decide upon are for us (the circularity), since there is no guarantee that what is for us corresponds to what is in itself.
Correct me if I am wrong, but you seem to be admitting (at least) that there could not have been any statements had there not been any intelligent life, but why? In your view, what is it exactly about intelligent life that makes the existence of statements possible?
Quoting Sapientia
Yes I do, mostly because I subscribe to the notion that statements are sign relations that require one or more minds as fundament in order to be instantiated.
Ever heard of God? Human judgements are fallible, God's are not. What your example here demonstrates, is that there is no truth without God. There may not be any God, and there may not be any truth. Would that thought influence the way you live your life?
What is the DNA code a statement about?
To deny the fact that there is a world that is the cause of what appears, which exist separate from us is not logical. You cannot treat the lion charging you as an assumed premise, it's real and it is about to kick your butt. You admit that we don't have complete knowledge of the world as it is, which is my point. We make a claim that the world is, but we have no, & logically cannot have, any direct unmediated knowledge of what the world is as it is, only what appears. The truths we derive from what appears are our best effort to say what could possibly be the case to allow for such appearances, but there is no guarantee that what we derive on this basis is what actually is.
Statements (as signs) are essentially conceptual/inferential in nature, whereas DNA (even if it be a sign in some sense) is not.
So, what's the problem then? That in itself needn't be a problem. None of that necessitates a mind being there. It necessities that there [i]was[/I] a mind there. It means that there [I]had to have been[/I] a mind there doing that - which I haven't denied, and need not deny. The dependence relation isn't about the past, as I've already said.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Good. Then I expect not to see you make the same mistake. But, based on what you say next, I'm not sure whether you actually understand the problem.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You can do, but I don't see how that would resolve the problem. I'm not sure how I can be any clearer, but I'll give it go.
The problem with the following sentence is the part that I've bolded:
"The meaning is what is intended by the author".
That differs importantly from the statement:
"The meaning is what was intended by the author"
The former has the logical consequence that if no meaning is intended by the author, then there is no meaning. No meaning would be intended, so there would be no meaning.
The latter entails that so long as there was a meaning intended by the author, then there is a meaning. The meaning would have been intended, so there would be a meaning.
See the difference and how important it is in terms of logical consequence?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Yes. So what? I think you're missing the point.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No, that doesn't follow from what I argued. Show me. It might follow if you fuck up what I said by altering the meaning by replacing terms and such. But then that wouldn't be addressing my argument or anything that I've said. It would be addressing your own creation.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I wouldn't and I didn't. That isn't what I claimed is absurd. Don't twist my words, please.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It is an assumption for argument's sake, for the sake of the hypothetical scenario that we've discussed. But [i]in[/I] the hypothetical scenario, no, it isn't an assumption. The author meant something with those symbols. That is a given if you're going to properly engage in this thought experiment. It also need not be an assumption outside of the context of our discussion, since, obviously, there really are - and have been - authors who meant something with a bunch of symbols. I am one of them, as are you, and as is everyone else in this discussion, so, that obviously isn't an assumption. It's a fact. And there's a big difference between the two.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Without [i]that fact[/I] the symbols would be meaningless. And I haven't claimed that [i]that[/I] would be absurd. Stop attacking a straw man and come at me bro.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
For Christ's sake...
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
There would be a fact. It would be a fact that the author meant such and such. Do you disagree? And if so, why?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
There wouldn't be a reader, and even if there was, it wouldn't have to mean anything to them. None of that has any bearing on what the author meant.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
There wouldn't be a reader, and even if there was, they needn't assume anything. That would have no bearing on what the author meant.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
False.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No, I'm not.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Why do you keep using scare quotes like that?! It isn't necessary.
I'm not sure what you mean. That the author meant something with the symbols is a present fact about the past. It is now the case that the author meant something with the symbols, and it would remain to be the case in the hypothetical future scenario. Nothing could stop that from being the case, with the exception of time travel.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Do you have a better suggestion for what we call the meaning of the symbols than what the author meant with them? If so, do share.
The author meant something with the symbols. That is a fact which continues to be factual over time. This shouldn't be difficult to grasp or accept.
If, in the hypothetical scenario, it is the case that the author meant something with the symbols, and if this is what we mean when we talk about their meaning, then the symbols would have meaning.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I can't help but be a little amused at your confusion. "What was meant" is [I]about[/I] the past. It is (presently) the case that something was meant.
Yes, meaning is in the present. That is true. The present meaning in the future scenario would be the same as that which was meant. Why would it have changed?
Are you following all of this? I hope so.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No, it doesn't.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Firstly, no I don't. If nothing was meant, and that is what we mean by "meaning", then they wouldn't mean anything, and there would be no disagreement between us. To make it interesting, let's make it a given in the thought experiment that the author meant something, which is a perfectly reasonable assumption, and quite possible.
Secondly, anyone who has even a basic grasp of the nature of facts and time will know that what I've said is true. It's possible that you lack this understanding. My question to you would be: why the heck would it stop being a fact that something was meant?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No, that doesn't follow from anything I've said. What principles are you even referring to? If you think that it follows from something I've said, then show me by constructing a valid argument (assuming you're capable of doing so). Then the argument can be checked to see whether 1) it represents what I said (and I don't have much confidence in your abilities to represent what I say), and 2) whether the argument is valid (and I don't have much confidence in your abilities in that regard, either, truth be told).
Following from what I actually said, and not what you've imagined I said, the symbols would have no meaning unless there was a mind which meant something with the symbols. But there was, so they have.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
What you imagine to be my conditions don't seem to be my conditions. So be careful what you call my conditions.
You should indeed allow that something was meant by the author. Otherwise you'd miss the point. The controversy only arises once we've assumed for argument's sake that something was meant. The thought experiment is about what would happen next in a particular scenario.
And, like I said, this wouldn't be a wild and unrealistic assumption, like "Let's assume that an evil demon took control of humanity!". It's quite possible that the author did indeed mean something. This shit happens all the time, every day. It's happening now! I am the author of these meaningful statements. I meant something with the symbols that constitute them. And that will be a fact tomorrow, and the next day, and the next, and the one after that, and the one after that, and so on, and so forth. Why [i]on earth[/I] would it not be? Sometimes it's like you're from another world. Is that why you're undercover?
This post is so long, and has taken up so much of my time, that I think I'm just going to leave it here - for now at least. Sorry for missing the last part out. Maybe I'll come back to it and continue where I left off.
I have to say I have little faith in any notions of "re-programming". I see the tendency to objectification as merely a bad habit we have picked up. Once we learn not to take as read the ideas that support it we can come to see beyond it. Until then, we cannot enjoy genuine faith. By faith I just mean openness to our own experience. That is the first real step. Self-cultivation prior to that is just that, I think; a cult of the self. I've been through that and seen so much of that for so many years!
The appearance of a thing charging me is the appearance of a thing charging me. It could kill me. This thing affects me, how does that produce the logical conclusion that there is a world separate from us?
Quoting Cavacava
Yes, this is exactly the problem I am pointing to. The so-called "truths" are derived from what appears, and we have no way of confirming that this is "what actually is". How do we know that there is such a thing as "what actually is". And the basis of the assumption of "a world" relies on this assumption.
What justification do you have to claim that the DNA encoding does not refer to anything?
You seem to have missed a key point Sapientia: "we assume that there is something which was meant". Minds are the things which make assumptions, so "we assume" implies minds. This is not concerning the past, this is right now, when we look at the symbols, we assume that there was something meant. If there are no minds, there is no assuming that there was something meant.
Quoting Sapientia
See, you're mixing up the tenses, like you accused me of doing. That there was a meaning intended by the author indicates that something was meant by the author, at that time, in the past. You have provided no premise whereby you can say that because there was something meant, at that time in the past, this, "what was meant", persists today as meaning. You seem to have an undeclared premise, that once something was intended at a particular time, this persists indefinitely in time, as meaning Quoting Sapientia
I have no problem with saying that the author meant something. The assumption which I disagree with is your assumption that what the author meant, at that particular moment in time, persists indefinitely through time, as meaning. You assume that there is a real "what is meant" by the words, right now, as "meaning", and you support this with the claim that there is a real "what was meant" by the author. What I want to know is how you establish a temporal continuity between the two. Unless you can do that, then "what was meant" by the author at that time, and "what is meant" by the words now, are completely distinct, unconnected. If they are distinct, then you cannot use what was meant by the author, to justify the claim that the words have meaning now. So we must turn to a mind which interprets, to give meaning to the words now.
Quoting Sapientia
I use quotes when the words I use refer to a thing which is conceptual only. So, above I refer to "what was meant", and "what is meant". "what is meant" is the supposed meaning which the words have. These are two distinct concepts, and unless you can show how the two are connected, we do not have a relationship between them. So far, your claim is that the author meant something at a particular moment in time, and this persists infinitely, or eternally through time, as 'the meaning". how do you justify this claim?
Quoting Sapientia
Right, let's assume as a given, that the author meant something. This is what occurred at that particular moment, in the past when the author wrote the words. At that time, there was meaning, because at that time, the author meant something. The question for you, is how does this necessitate that there is meaning now, or at some future time?
Quoting Sapientia
Again, I'll reiterate, I have no problem accepting that the author meant something. This was an occurrence in the past. What I have a problem with is your claim that this occurrence in the past, continues to exist today as meaning. How do you support this claim?
I still don't know why you're using the word "relation." But yes, we can persist in trying to have sentences act as primary truth-bearers and pin them to context of utterance. If that's your cup-a-tea, great.
So what exactly is the ontology of a proposition such that there can be such a thing even if there isn't a
sentence to express it? Is the proposition that the cup is red the same thing as the red cup? If so then to say that the proposition that the cup is red is true is to say that the red cup is true, and this seems grammatically incorrect. But if not then as well as the proposed mind-independence of physical things like red cups there's also a proposed mind-independence of non-physical things (unless the proposition that the cup is red is a physical thing but just something other than the red cup). Is this Platonism?
The way I see it is that the sentence "it is true that p" is equivalent to the sentence "'p' is true", so I understand your claim that it can be true that p even if there isn't a sentence as the claim that 'p' can be true even if there isn't a sentence. But there can't be a true sentence if there isn't a sentence.
I think this is a case of being bewitched by language. That we can talk about a thing being true without having to mention a sentence isn't that truth doesn't depend on there being a sentence.
A relation contains tuples of objects or maps tuples of objects to truth values. So 'true' could be defined as a relation between sentences and contexts.
I never claimed sentences have to be primary truth-bearers, and it's irrelevant to the discussion anyway.
Quoting Michael
You're still wrong about this, though, they're not equivalent, for reasons I've explained to you at length in the past.
You should stop talking about language bewitchment until you figure out the use-mention distinction.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
With regards to the last part, I simply ask: why would there need to be a mind to assume that something was meant? Either it would or would not be the case that something was meant. It would be the case that something was meant if something was meant. As a thought experiment, we can assume either one possibility or the other as an actuality, and explore what the consequences would be. The consequences of assuming that nothing was meant are uncontroversial, so we can set that aside. That would leave only one possibility worth exploring via the thought experiment, as that is where the controversy lies. That is where there is disagreement between realist and idealist relating to the mind-dependence/independence of truth - which is what this discussion is about.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
But that doesn't matter. That [i]fact[/I] is in the present. It meant something then, and unless that meaning has somehow changed, it would mean the same thing now. A meaning doesn't cease to exist just because the author of that meaning has stopped doing what he did at the time. The author can even cease to exist whilst the meaning stays the same.
You really need to actually answer my previous questions to you about this, regarding what I [i]actually[/I] claimed is absurd:
Quoting Sapientia
It is absurd because it is demonstrably false. Do you think that statements made by authors who are now dead are meaningless? Do you think that whether the authors meant something is just a questionable assumption? Well, let me tell you, if you think that, or if you think something which has that as a logical consequence, then you're simply and obviously wrong. Countless statements made by authors who are now dead [i]do[/I] have a meaning, which can be exactly what they meant at the time. And this need not be an assumption. It can be known. If you reject that, then you'd have a problem with plausibly explaining how a [i]whole load of stuff[/I] makes sense.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It depends what is meant by having a meaning. I think it makes sense to say that it has a meaning, and that this is what the author meant. Otherwise it wouldn't have a meaning. But there is good reason to go with the former, since that is what we currently do when we talk about meaning. We say that something has a meaning when the author meant something with that something. And that's how we talk and think about meaning, even when the author has died.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Meanings and intentions are real, not conceptual. But they do originate in the the mind, and require a mind to bring them about. Once they are expressed, they become independent. The author himself can confirm his meaning, and we can acknowledge it as the meaning. The author can then go away and do something else, without having to worry that if he is not around to constantly mean what he meant, his statement will become meaningless. He can die without his meaning dying with him, and everyone else being left clueless as to what he meant, and having to resort to guesswork. Once expressed in the form of the sort of statement that can be true or false, these expressions can of course be true or false.
And none of that needs a mind being there doing anything. Ergo realism.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It was. But then it was expressed, and became public and known. And the fact that something was meant continues to be factual. And if we normally talk about the meaning of this expression in terms of what the author meant, then why should that be any different in the thought experiment? Why should we change that? Just so you can posit mind-dependence and reach an idealist conclusion? I don't think so, sonny Jim.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Yes, there often is. But that needn't be relevant. It wouldn't be so if we talk about meaning in terms of what the author meant, as it makes sense to do. And, of course, in the hypothetical scenario, there wouldn't be any mind or reader to interpret or misinterpret any meaning. And there needn't be. Hence realism.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
There [i]is[/I] generally such a thing, and I [i]do[/I] make the assumption [I]for the sake of the thought experiment[/I] that something was meant. But it [I]isn't[/I] an assumption [i]in[/I] the thought experiment. In the thought experiment, it's a fact. That's where we begin, and we then think about what that would entail.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Nonsense!
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
That reply is fallacious in more than one way ([I]ignoratio elenchi[/I] and [I]non sequitur[/I]). I said that there doesn't need to be an interpreter, not that there doesn't need to be an interpretation. But there doesn't need to be an interpretation, either. It just needs to be such that there would be a correct way for it to be interpreted - which implies that it would need a meaning. Interpretation is about what people do afterwards. There would already be a meaning and a correct way to interpret it if it were to be interpreted - which it needn't be. So it doesn't follow that it'd just be meaningless symbols.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It already has a meaning. It is predetermined. It doesn't need to be interpreted. The teacher doesn't need to figure out whether the rules have or have not been broken for the rules to have been broken. The teacher needs to figure it out for other reasons, as part of his or her job, but that isn't relevant to the analogy.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Whether the kid hums or starts making all kinds of unintelligible gibberish noises doesn't matter unless it follows from that that the kid spoke. Did the kid speak? Does that count as speaking? [U]What does the rulebook say[/u]? That is what matters, not what you or I think. If the kid spoke, then the rule was broken. It doesn't matter what the criteria are. If those criteria have been broken, then the rule has been broken.
Well, I didn't make that claim, so none.
I don't deny that DNA can act as a sign-vehicle of sorts, analogous to how markings on a page can act as sign-vehicles for statements. But whereas a statement is what it is in virtue of expressing a propositional content which, in turn, is what it is in virtue of being inferentially related to other such contents, DNA is not. So while DNA sequences and statement-tokens are alike in acting as sign-vehicles, they are yet essentially different respecting the types of sign-systems they participate in.
A mapping from world states to truth values? Isn't that just saying that a world-state is either true or false?
Truth is unanalyzable.
I understand the use-mention distinction. That's why I don't say that we eat "cake" or that cake has four letters.
And I don't think I'm wrong. The following all have the same truth conditions.
1. It is true that p.
2. p. The previous sentence is true.
3. "p" is true.
So iff it is true that p then "p" is true.
Consider the following situation: it's 4 million years ago, so there aren't any sentences. Yet at that time, the Earth existed, so was true that the Earth existed (that proposition was true). But the sentence "the Earth exists" wasn't. So they don't mean the same thing. One predicates truth of a linguistic object, the other maintains that a state of affairs holds. These claims being materially equivalent depends on a linguistic system in which the sentence in question expresses that proposition, but since this need not be, they're not counterfactually coextensive, and their truth conditions can come apart. Since one can be true while the other is false, they can't be synonymous.
No, it's a mapping from world-states to truth values. A world-state isn't the sort of thing that's true or false. A proposition is something that has truth conditions: that is, the proposition is what's true or false, relative to a world-state (or perhaps absolutely, if you think the actual world is privileged, and alternate possibilities are defined in terms of it). So if you like the proposition 'looks at' what the world is like, and spits out true or false accordingly, and the cases in which it says 'true' are its truth conditions, which are roughly what the sentence expressing such a proposition means. Truth isn't predicated of the state of affairs.
Just to drive this home, let p = "the Earth existed" and move 'is' to the past tense.
1. It was true that the Earth existed.
2. The Earth existed. The previous sentence was true.
3. "The Earth existed" was true.
Notice that the second sentence of 2) is now false, and so 3) doesn't follow.
Frege.. in a brick shithouse of an argument.
Second, defining truth in this way is, as I've already said, not relevant to the point of what I was saying to begin with.
I would be interested if you'd want to explain it again. You were saying that there's an aspect of truth that is mind-dependent and an aspect that isn't?
But what's probably mind-dependent is whether something is a sentence, or whether a sentence expresses a certain proposition. So, if you were to define a notion of sentence truth, it would be mind-dependent whether a sentence is true, in virtue of its being mind-dependent what proposition it expressed.
It's not that it was true that the Earth existed; it's that it is true that the Earth existed. To say that it was true that the Earth existed is to say that "the Earth existed" was true, but as you say, the sentence "the Earth existed" wasn't there 4 million years ago.
Consider the following:
1. The cup is red.
2. The above is true.
According you, it's possible for one to be true but the other to be false, because the first is about a cup but the second is about a sentence. But this is wrong. If the first is true then ipso facto the second is true and vice versa, and if the first is false then ipso facto the second is false and vice versa.
Otherwise you can end up in the absurd situation where you say that the cup is red and then I respond by saying that the cup is red but that what you said was false. That's a straightforward contradiction.
Which is why iff the cup is red then "the cup is red" is true.
Because 3. is false, 1. and 2. are false. It should be:
1. It is true that the Earth existed.
2. The Earth existed. The previous sentence is true.
3. "The Earth existed" is true.
You are asserting the following biconditional:
(For any p, in all situations), p iff "p" is true.
Substituting "the Earth exists" for p, we get the following:
(In all situations), The Earth exists iff "the Earth exists" is true.
From this it follows that (for all situations), if the Earth exists, then "the Earth exists" is true.
So, if one counterexample can be shown to this conditional, it follows that the instance of the biconditional schema is false, and therefore so is the whole schema stated as a universal.
So, it must be, for your claim to be correct, that there is no possible situation in which the Earth exists, but "the Earth exists" is not true.
Now, "the Earth exists" is a sentence. It follows that if there are no sentences, it cannot be true. So to find a situation in which it's not true, we suppose that the planet in this situaiton is as it was before the advent of language. Since there are no languages, there are no sentences, and a fortiori no true sentences. So, in this situation, "the Earth exists" is not true.
Yet ex hypothesi the Earth exists in this situation.
So, there is a situation in which the Earth exists, but "the Earth exists" is not true, viz. the situation I just presented to you.
So, your claim is false.
Maybe something was meant, or maybe there wasn't something meant. But if we assume that something was meant (and that requires this assumption I referred to), we still do not have the means to say that what was meant at that time, exists as meaning today.
Quoting Sapientia
Here's your mistake. The author meant something, not "it meant something". You've somehow transferred what the author meant, into the words, to say that the words meant something, and therefore still mean something.
Quoting Sapientia
I already went through this. The author meant to write down the words. The author also meant for those words to signify something. These are two distinct intentions of the author. They must be distinct so that we can account for the existence of misleading, and deception. The intention of the author is within the mind of the author at the time of the writing. How do you propose that the author's intention gets into the written words, to exist there as what the author meant, or meaning?
Quoting Sapientia
Exactly, these questions need to be answered before there's any truth about whether or not the kid broke the rule. Who's going to answer those questions? If they are unanswerable, there is no truth. If there is no mind, they are unanswerable. Therefore without a mind there is no truth.
How do I respond to this? By saying that the Earth exists in this situation or by saying that what you say is true? Can I say that the Earth exists in this situation but that what you say is false or that the Earth doesn't exist in this situation but that what you say is true? No, I can't.
Iff the Earth exists in this situation then the above sentence ("the Earth exists in this situation") is true. That's the biconditional.
What you've done is addressed this fallacious biconditional:
The Earth exists in this situation iff "the Earth exists" is true in this situation.
The way I see it, the mind is like a car you need to get from A to B. You need it to start the journey, but you don't depend upon it. You could get out and walk the rest of the way. The map is language, the territory is the world, and when the former rightly depicts the latter, then they correspond. And that correspondence is between statement and fact. That correspondence is what entails truth.
Interpretation isn't necessary. Interpretation won't determine whether the map rightly or wrongly depicts the territory. Interpretation is just what we do to try to figure things out, and the world doesn't care whether or not we figure things out. The world is unaffected. [I]We[/I] care whether or not we figure things out.
Truth doesn't "become" an interpretation. The interpretation is what we judge to be true or false, what we categorise as such. Truth is distinguishable from interpretation, and transcends it.
Yes, we do deal with what we [i]think[/I] exists, or is true, or is the case... but so what? What we think can be right or wrong. If what we think is right, and we express it as a statement, then it is true - even if nobody knows it to be true. Does there need to be a mind there, once it has been expressed as a statement, and is either true or false? No. It is like the car. It was needed to enable the thought and the expression of the thought in language, which therefore enables truth, but it is no longer needed. The one is independent from the other. We don't need to drive the rest of the way. Likewise with the mind.
A bunch of symbols on a piece of paper don't [i]need[/I] an inherent interpretation, so whether they have one or not is beside the point. An inherent interpretation strikes me as an oxymoron, anyway. They just need to be such that [i]if[/I] there were an interpretation, [i]then[/I] it could be correct or incorrect.
Quoting apokrisis
No, we know that the author meant something with the symbols. That is at least possible, so, as a thought experiment, that's what we're assuming. That being the case, it wouldn't matter whether the meaning, i.e. what the author meant, is known. Nor would it matter whether or how they are interpreted.
Ascribing truth doesn't matter either, I'm afraid. Not in the context of this discussion. Ascribing truth doesn't entail truth. It entails nothing other than that truth has been ascribed. Correspondence between statement and reality entails truth. Ascribing it is just what we do when we think that something is true. You aren't talking about truth, you're talking about ascribing truth. You can conflate the two, but they're distinct.
As Michael explained, the proper way to phrase this is that the statement today, "the Earth existed at that time", is true. But at that time, millions of years ago, the statement "the Earth exists" did not exist. So at that time, it was not the case that "the Earth exists" was not true, nor was it true, "the Earth exists" did not itself exist. So to speculate about whether or not "the Earth exists" was true at that time, is nonsense, because there was no such thing as "the Earth exists" at that time.
A biconditional can't be fallacious.
Quoting Michael
But that is what the biconditional requires. Your 'iff' formula does not offer a material equivalence, but must be universally quantified to all possible situations, or else it has no force. To see why, note that the following biconditional, construed as a mere material equivalence:
Trump wins the 2016 election iff America exists
is true, since both sides of it are true. As a universally quantified statement, however, it's false, since we can conceive of a situation in which the truth values of the two arguments don't match.
So, in order for your claim to hold weight, it must be that in any situation, it must be that in that situation the Earth exists iff "the Earth exists" is true. Since as you admit, in the situation I outlined, the Earth exists, yet "the Earth exists" is not true, this falsifies your biconditional by showing a situation in which it doesn't hold.
But notice that wasn't what you were asked. It's true that "The Earth exists in this situation" is true and the Earth exists in this situation: but the question is not whether "The Earth exists in this situation" is true, but whether "the Earth exists" is true in this situation. Since there are no sentences in this situation, a fortiori it isn't.
In the situation I presented:
1) The Earth exists
2) It's not the case that "the Earth exists" is true, since there aren't any sentences.
Anyway, what confuses me is that the "world-state/state-of-affairs" is itself linguistic. As in,
("The earth existed 1083987 years ago", is a statement. The earth existing 1083987 years ago is not a statement it's a state of affairs, but everything within these brackets is language).
Propositions are either true or false depending on whether they 'express' the state of affairs correctly. But what's actually being expressed? It seems like the state of affairs is just the proposition without quote marks. "Donald Trump is the president elect of USA" is a true statement. Why is it true? Because Donald Trump is the president elect of USA. The state of affairs here is just the propisition but without quote marks.
So what's going on here? Truth is when the quote marks around a proposition can be removed and nobody objects to the state of affairs being expressed that way? I say "expressed" because we express propisitions sure, but the state of affairs is also expressed, it's still linguistic, but it's being expressed in a way that doesn't bring attention to that it itself being expressed (whereas a proposition does). It's an expression which doesn't indicate it's own nature as an expression.
The state of affairs is just a particular way of speaking?
You might object that the expression of the state of affairs (Donald Trump being president elect, without quotes) matches up to something beyond language, it isn't literally the world being expressed. But that would make it a propisition. Donald Trump being president elect is not a propisition. The state of affairs doesn't correspond with anything, it is itself that which our propositions correspond to.
I don't think it would be correct to say "the earth exists" is not true. Because a non existent proposition can't have a truth value. It's more like, "so, in this situation, "the earth exists" doesn't exist." There can't be a world with no propositions and also false propositions.
Yea. But there's another category of objects: abstract ones. Numbers are abstract objects, not mental objects. That distinction is supposed to express the otherness of such entities. But maybe the assumption is that minds reside in skulls. My mind is separate from yours, so the number seven transcends both our skulls.
A proposition, being an abstract object, doesn't need to be expressed.
We wouldn't need to.
Well, I for one, do. (If that wasn't already as clear as day). And I think that most others do as well. It's only when these [i]philosophers[/I] come along that things get twisted and warped out of proportion.
Sweet. 8-)
There's nothing stopping you from defining it that way, but that isn't what is typically meant.
Truth isn't a judgement, it's a property. We judge propositions as either having or not having this property. The judgement is just that: a judgement.
You are asserting naive realism and ignoring the subtleties of my actual argument. But never mind.
Quoting Sapientia
It doesn't need to. In the semiotic model of truth, a habit of interpretance is concerned with establishing a reliable system of signs. So I can look at a thermometer and see that it reads 14 degrees C. That is a measurement which tells me "the truth" of "the weather".
So as I say, it is about the wholeness of a triadic relation. You can't make sense of any one part in isolation.
The usual approaches to truth are dydaic or dualistic. That is why they founder. There is the mind and there is the world. Somehow they seem to connect, but no one can explain the mystery of how.
Semiotics replaces that mind~world dualism with a symbol~world relation. And the sign is what mediates in being Janus faced. It can have a foot in both camps in being both physical and mental, syntactical and semantic.
That's the point about sentences expressing propositions.
One could take the view that p is true even if p is never said (or is even unsayable?). Semantics can be taken to have its own mentalistic, reified, Platonic existence that transcends any actual saying and acting upon a belief. But that kind of dualistic divide offers no way of then reconnecting meaning to the world.
Yet it is just as much a problem to say some physical pattern carries its meaning or interpretation inherently. We can imagine the infinite number of randomly typing monkeys who cannot help but bash out every possible true statement without ever a hint of understanding. So siding with the physicality of the signs cannot help either.
That is why you have to understand what is going on as a complete relation. And a counter-intuitive outcome of that is that efficient mapping is deliberately unrealistic. The system of signs that makes a habit of interpretance most effective is the one that reduces the physical "truth" of the world to the barest play of symbols. A good map is flat and uncluttered with just a few sharp indicative marks. It leaves out everything that can be left out. It is meaningful to the degree that it suppresses information about reality - the degree to which it filters signal from noise.
That is why propositions have the binary form of being true/false. Give the relevant box a tick or a cross.
Naive realism expects the opposite. The map corresponds to the world as indeed a "mapping" - a re-presentation of what actually exists out there.
But maps are a reduction of reality to what is understood as meaningful in terms of certain expectable signs. So truth judgments track measurements, not existence. The less we actually need to concern ourselves with the messy actuality, the "truthier" our conceptions become.
Again that is why binary tick-box propositional logic is so highly valued. It stands as the ultimate limit of this desire to detach from the physics and live in a self-made realm of sign. We are telling the world, just nod yes or no to our question, we can take it from there.
Quoting Sapientia
Yep. The infinite typing monkeys theory of truth. It sounds kind of plausible until you really start to think about it.
Quoting Sapientia
Yes. But in the usual course of things (barring these rogue monkey infinite typing pools), a bunch of symbols only appears in the physical world when there is someone with an intent to state something meaningful.
Again, one could imagine that occasionally a rock face would wear in such a way that some moving poem or grave epitaph might just appear. But really, the infinite unlikelihood of such a physical act is evidence that all such physical manifestations are the product of some mind (or system of interpretance that employs signs).
Quoting Sapientia
What do you mean? The author at least has to "know" what he meant. He would have to understand himself. And it is he who can't in fact transcend what is only a reasonable-seeming structure of belief.
So you are focusing again on transmissible signs - words that get spoken or written. But words are still signs when they are thought.
Quoting Sapientia
But that is merely to re-assert naive realism. You are claiming there is the claim, and then the proof of the claim, and then beyond that, the claim's truth. You want to put truth out there in the world with all the physics.
That doesn't work, which is why naive realists usually wind up talking Platonically about p being true as if propositions exist as abstract objects.
So again, the pragmatic/semiotic approach to truth instead proceeds by making reasonable hypotheses and then testing them in terms of acts of measurement. We form signs of what to expect if some idea is indeed "true".
And that approach to truth then understands that the ascriptions are essentially self-interested. Propositions are intrinsically an expression of some grounding purpose. And that also means an indifference to "physical reality" gets built in. It is a feature rather than a bug.
Success is always being able to filter signal from noise in terms of selfish interest.
What actuay is the "state-of-affairs" that our propositions correspond with? Does correspondence even make sense? As if our propositions fly out of our mouths into the world and try and match themselves to how the world is, and get imbued with the property of truth if they match the world correctly, or false if they don't?
The proposition doesn't actually do this, I mean the whole notion of reference is kind of nonsensical. Like our mouth is a bow which fires out words like arrows which fly around the world and hit things. "Eiffel Tower" refers to the Eiffel Tower in France, but my words don't fly there and highlight the tower in order to gain it's meaning.
I think what's happening with propositions is they don't *themsves* correspond with the world/state-of-affairs. Rather it's us humans which decide that the proposition is a correct way of "expressing the world." A community of language users come together and form a consensus of the state of affairs, eg that the Eiffel Tower is in France. The proposition that, "the Eiffel Tower is in France" is then judged to be correct/true because when the quotes are removed it becomes the state of affairs which the community of language users have agreed upon (the Eiffel Tower is in France). When the quotes around "the Eiffel Tower is in Antarctica" is removed, this state of affairs is not something which the language community has agreed upon so it's then deemed to be false.
If we understand truth to work like this then we don't need to think of reference as our words matching themselves in some unexplained manner with the external world, like arrows hitting heir targets.
Back in the 1970s, computer scientists hope to build intelligent machines using symbol processing. Recreate the syntax and the semantics would surely follow. We know what a dismal dualistic failure that exercise was.
But these days any realistic approach to machine intelligence - such as forward modelling or Baysesian neural nets - is an attempt to replicate a semiotic modelling relation.
So a particular theory of truth has been tried and tested. We are going with the one that works.
But the information content of DNA can't be anything other than a proposition, whose truth content in objectively measured by comparison with variants of that proposition.
And all this without a mind.
The property only obtains as a judgment.
Right! That is roughly the difference between 'coherence' and 'correspondence' in respect of truth-values.
Correspondence sounds like common sense, until you ask the question, what corresponds to what? How do words 'correspond' with 'states'? And also, how could you validate such correspondence?
Randall, J. & Buchler, J.; Philosophy: An Introduction. p133
I'm not saying that the Earth exists in this situation iff "the Earth exists" is true in this situation. That's a fallacious bi-conditional, as I said. What I'm saying is that the Earth exists in this situation iff "the Earth exists in this situation" is true.
So it doesn't matter if you say that the Earth exists in this situation or if you say that it is true that the Earth exists in this situation or if I say that it is true that the Earth exists in this situation and you say that what I'm saying is true or if you say that "the Earth exists in this situation" is true. It's all the same thing.
And you still haven't clarified how I'm to respond to you. Do I have to say that the Earth exists in this situation or do I have to say that your claim is true? Can I do one but not the other?
By that I mean a proposed biconditional which is actually false, e.g. it is raining iff I am a man.
Which part? My claim that the following are not equivalent:
1. the Earth exists in this situation iff "the Earth exists" is true in this situation
2. the Earth exists in this situation iff "the Earth exists in this situation" is true
Or the part where I asked you to clarify how I am to respond to you? Consider this again:
1. The cup is red
2. The above is true
According to you, there's a difference between asserting that the cup is red and asserting that "the cup is red" is true. So if you assert 1 and if I agree with you, do I have to assert 1 or do I have to assert 2? Does it make sense for me to assert 1 but to deny 2? It seems quite obvious to me that to assert 1 but to deny 2 is a contradiction.
If you assert that the cup is red and if I accept that your assertion is true then ipso facto I accept that the cup is red, and if I accept that the cup is red then ipso facto I accept that your assertion is true.
So facts don't matter? If I judge a factually incorrect statement as true, then it's true? And even if it's a fact that P, "P" wouldn't be true if no one judged it to be?
I think that that's obviously a problem.
The world doesn't exist separately from us, it just exists independently of us. We live in the world, and it is all around us. We are part of it, as you say. But we can't be both separate from it and part of it.
Much of what happens in the world does indeed happen regardless of our presence, and it would continue to do so without our presence. That's why idealism is wrong.
Not sure what you mean when you say that our viewpoint must be circular.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Sure, "the world" is a construct, but the world isn't. The world is not "the world". The world is the world.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Well, of course [i]the idea[/I] is a construct.
Is it that time again? Irrelevant idealist truism time?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Perhaps, but that doesn't follow from what you just said, so try again.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
But you are part of the world, regardless of how you see yourself. That's so inward-looking, ignorant, and oblivious. I might see myself as a pony, but that doesn't mean that I am one.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
If you say so... :-d
Just to split hairs, but objective idealism allows for things to happen regardless of our presence.
Can you remind me what that is, and how it allows that? I get the objective part. Is "objective idealism" the most appropriate term for such a position? In the context of this discussion, idealism posits the mind-dependence of truth (although, admittedly, I did stray from that definition), so idealism can't allow for things to be independent of the presence of mind if that would entail corresponding truths which are likewise independent. But it need not entail that, I suppose.
The world itself is one big mental thing (à la pantheism or even panpsychism, I guess), so even though things are dependent on the presence of mind, they're not dependent on the presence of human minds (or the minds of any other intelligent life).
Oh! I thought you had a bigger point to make. I have no problem talking about minds in general rather than human minds. I just adopted the language of my interlocutor.
No, like I said, just splitting hairs.
Maybe not, but it's the name it has. ;)
But I don't like that name, so I'm renaming it "Dave".
"That statement is factually incorrect" is a judgment that someone makes (if they're using correspondence theory that is) about the relationship of the proposition in question to facts. It doesn't obtain that a statement is factually correct or incorrect in lieu of the judgment. One person might judge that P is true (where they're using correspondence theory and they're judging that P is factually correct) while another person judges that P is false (where they're using correspondence theory and they're judging that P is factually incorrect). And actually, all that it functionally refers to to judge that P is true or false under correspondence theory is that P is factually correct or incorrect.
So this answers your second question, too. Propositions are not true or false in lieu of a judgment about whether they're true or false. One major reason for this is that meaning doesn't obtain in lieu of someone explicitly thinking about specific things semantically, so propositions do not even exist in lieu of someone thinking about them (this last part follows from the conventional analysis of what propositions are--namely, that they're the meaning of particular sentential expressions; they're not identical to the sentential expressions per se--"snow is white" is not identical, as a sentential expression, to "schnee ist weiss," since one is in English and contains the word "snow" where the other doesn't, while the other is in German and contains the word "schnee" where the other doesn't, but they are identical as a proposition (although on my account, that's only in case an individual assigns the same meaning to both)).
Let me phrase that another way then. You can use "the world" all you want, but I do not know what this refers to, other than something imaginary, in your mind, like a unicorn. You can say the unicorn is not "the unicorn" all you want, but that doesn't resolve anything.
Quoting Sapientia
OK, so that tells me a little bit, the world is something I'm part of, whether I like it or not. I suppose it will punish me if I don't pay attention to it? That would appear like it is separate from me. What makes you think that I am part of it? Why would it hurt me, if I am part of it, then it would be hurting itself? Does "the world" refer to the same thing as "God"?
Quoting Sapientia
And what you say is somehow better than what I say?
Quoting SapientiaOK, I see you at least understand what I'm saying. You're doing better at understanding what I am saying than I am doing at understanding what you are saying. Now tell me where I can find this thing called the world. I want to see if it's really there, to see if you know what you're talking about.
In some way...
Sure, in some way, but are they dependent in the relevant way? If there were never any minds, then there would never have been any linguistic practices. That is one way in which the latter is dependent on the former, the latter can only arise as a consequence of the former. But that isn't the issue.
There were minds, and linguistic practices have since arisen. It is now about whether the one depends on the other, going forward.
What do you mean by "linguistic practices"? Because if you mean something like a set of rules, then I don't think that that does depend on any mind in the relevant way. It depended on a mind or minds, but now that the rules have been set, they don't depend on any mind.
Yet, it's possible you might mean something other than that, or something more than that. There don't actually have to be minds applying these rules in practice. They've already been set and applied, and that is sufficient.
Quoting The Great Whatever
In a certain way...
I'm not yet sure whether or not I've denied what you meant, because I'm not yet sure what you meant. But if I have, then no, I don't think so. Interpreting always requires an interpreter and the act of interpretation. If that hasn't happened, then it hasn't already been interpreted.
In the case of the author who no longer exists, along with all other minds, he did in fact mean something with those symbols. This implies that there was some sort of rule that was set up, such that these symbols mean this and not that. If that counts as an interpretation, then they had one. Why would this rule or interpretation no longer apply? It has already been applied. Why would that somehow be reversed just because the author, along with all other minds, ceased to exist?
Quoting The Great Whatever
I am not forced to do any such thing.
Quoting The Great Whatever
What a sentence means is not mind-dependent. And whether it is true is also not mind-dependent. So, whence mind-dependence?
But what about that it has meaning? Can a string of symbols written on a page have meaning even when it isn't being read? Although we might argue that physical things like ink and paper continue to exist even when we're not around, can we say the same about meaning? Is meaning a physical thing? Is it a particular arrangement of atoms? If not then what is its ontology? Something neither physical nor mental?
This biconditional is not 'false' simpliciter if interpreted materially; it is true or false depending on the situation applied to. Applied to the situation I'm in right now, it's false because I'm a man, but it's not raining (where I am) [although even this is complicated by using 'I,' which technically since you used it refers to you and not me, but we can ignore that]. But if I were not a man, or if it were raining, it would be true. A material biconditional only says that in a certain situation, the truth values of the statements flanking the iff match.
What you need is something stronger, a strict biconditional, i.e. by your iff you must mean some sort of universal quantification over situations, such that for each situation, the truth values of the statements flanking the iff match in that situation.
Quoting Michael
I agree – that was my entire point. The point is that 1) is false, where 'this situation' refers to the situation I presented to you. This is therefore a counterexample situation to your strict biconditional, and therefore it's false. That 2) is true does not help you, because this is not what you need; you need 1).
Quoting Michael
Yes. One predicates something of a cup, the other predicates something of a sentence. In cases where the sentence "the cup is red" does not mean that the cup is red, but something else, their truth conditions clearly come apart.
Quoting Michael
It would be inconsistent for you to assert 1) and deny 2), but what this shows is that the two statements are materially equivalent in the current situation, not that the strict biconditional holds, which is what you need.
So, given that "the cup is red" means that the cup is red in the current situation, the material biconditional "the cup is red iff 'the cup is red' is true" holds in this situation, since whatever 'the cup' refers to, the two statements flanking the iff must have the same truth value. But again, material equivalence is not what you're after, since if you go by material equivalence, a claim like "Donald Trump wins the 2016 U.S. election iff America exists" is also materially true by the same standards; but it is not true as a strict biconditional since the truth values of the two statements won't match in every conceivable situation.
The same holds for the red cup case, which the way you're presenting the example, by forcing yourself to ask whether they're both true or not in this situation, is obscuring. This is because the point is precisely that there are other situations in which their truth conditions will come apart, viz; those situations in which "the cup is red" does not mean that the cup is red, but something else. For instance, if "red" meant what "blue" does now, then in such a situation "the cup is red" would be true just in case the cup was blue, in that situation.
Quoting Sapientia
Quoting Wayfarer
Because it isn't impossible that one of the alternative theories is correct, and your theory is incorrect. It is possible that whether a proposition is true or false is a matter of correspondence, and judgement is merely what we do when we think that something is true or false.
You seem to be confusing judgement of the truth with truth itself, which is a category error. Do you also confuse sight with what is seen? The act of talking with what we talk about?
Quoting Wayfarer
That's not true. A proposition is a meaningful statement, right? Well, we can [i]produce[/I] meaningful statements. They depend on a mind for their production, not for their existence. This production is an act which makes the internal external. If it hasn't been stated, then it isn't a statement at all. And if a proposition is a meaningful statement, and statements are external, then propositions cannot be internal, and therefore cannot exist in the mind.
So, not only is it [i]not[/I] the case that propositions [i]only[/I] exist in the minds of rational beings who are capable of making statements. It [i]cannot[/I] be the case that propositions exist in [i]any[/I] mind.
If the mind making the statement meant something with the statement, then it has meaning, yes? You know that that makes sense. You normally think along those lines all the time.
Let's say an author wrote a book, as many have done. That book isn't meaningless. It is actually full of meaning. That is because the author meant something with the book. He didn't just close his eyes, think about something else, and randomly press buttons on the keyboard. He meant something. And that is its meaning. That it might mean something completely different or nothing at all to someone else doesn't matter, because it doesn't change that. It doesn't have to mean anything to anyone, because that wouldn't change that.
So, we can talk about it sensibly in this way, or we can say that there must be a mind there for it to mean something to - which might seem plausible at first, but can lead to implausible logical consequences.
Quoting Wayfarer
You tell me. How would you know that there is nothing true or false? You don't actually know that. Pointing to our judgement doesn't do anything. We both agree that we judge things to be true or false, but, for all you know, any of those judgements may well actually be correct.
Quoting Wayfarer
Yes, so said the bard. He said many things. And meant certain things with the things that he said, regardless of what you or I or anyone thinks, and regardless of whether anyone thinks at all or even exists. You can't change the past.
But, anyway, we're talking about truth here, and that reasoning would lead to absurd logical consequences. The bard was a playwright, not a logician.
To be continued.
This is what I'm disputing. Sentence meaning depends on linguistic practice, which in turn, at least as far as we're familiar with it, depends on minds.
I said more than that one comment, and which addresses the above.
I already knew that.
But I haven't asserted 1. I've only asserted 2.
My claim is that the following assertions are equivalent:
1. It is true that the Earth existed in a situation where there were no linguistic practices
2. The above is true
3. "The Earth existed in a situation where there were no linguistic practices" is true
Quoting The Great Whatever
But that's not the case I'm considering. I'm considering the following:
The cup is red iff the first part of this sentence is true.
It is implicit in the T-schema that the meaning of the sentence mentioned on the left hand side is the same as the meaning of the sentence used on the right hand side. Which is why we can also say that "Schnee ist weiß" is true iff snow is white.
Yet it is still the case that for any assertion "it is true that p" there is an equivalent assertion "'q' is true". That's the point I'm making. It doesn't matter if the actual letters (or sounds) used in the sentence are the same or not.
OK, but this doesn't get you what you want. What you need for the biconditional to hold is:
In the situation in which there are no linguistic practices, materially "The Earth existed" is true iff the Earth existed. But as I've shown this isn't so, and this serves as a counterexample to the strict biconditional.
Quoting Michael
No, it isn't.
Quoting Michael
Then you should not phrase your claims in terms of the sort of biconditional you have been all along, nor make arguments based on this, if it is not what you mean.
Besides, what you say here is still false. It's not true that these assertions are (ever) equivalent, as I've already shown, since their truth conditions are different.
An assertion of "It is true that the cup is red" is not equivalent to an assertion of
" 'The cup is red' is true",
Since these two mean different things; one says a cup is a certain color, the other says a certain sentence is true. In the current situation, they are materially equivalent in virtue of what the sentence happens to mean, but counterfactually one might be true and the other false. So their truth conditions are distinct.
Well your phrasing is better than mine, yes we live in the world. It must be circular because we have no immediately knowable criterion, no way of standing outside the world. The problem is that in order to know the world we must know ourselves, in order to know ourselves, we must know the world.....
It has been tacit in my application of the T-schema that the meanings are the same. Obviously I'm aware that the same syntax can be used to mean different things and that different syntaxes can be used to mean the same thing.
It is what I said at the beginning:
Quoting Michael
And, again, it was tacit in this claim that the "p" used and the "p" mentioned mean the same thing (rather than have the same syntax) – which is why it's consistent with "it is true that I am a bachelor" being equivalent to "'I am an unmarried man' is true".
The truth conditions of the following are the same:
1. It is true that the cup is red.
2. The above sentence is true.
When I say that the cup is red iff "the cup is red" is true I'm not saying that the cup is red iff any sentence which has exactly the string of symbols "the cup is red" is true, irrespective of what this sentence means. So to say that the T-schema fails because in some counterfactual situation the string of symbols "the cup is red" might mean that the cup is blue is a non sequitur.
You might as well say that 1 + 1 doesn't equal 2 because in some counterfactual situation I might be doing binary mathematics in which case 1 + 1 equals 10. The fact that I can use the same symbols in different ways is irrelevant. When I'm using them in this way, 1 + 1 equals 2, and the cup is red iff "the cup is red" is true.
No, they are not. For the truth conditions of two sentences to be the same, it must be that the proposition they express has the same truth value evaluated relative to all possible situations.
But this isn't so, since evaluated relative to situations in which "the cup is red" means the cup is blue, the proposition expressed by 1) can be true, while that expressed by 2) will be false.
Quoting Michael
It is not a non sequitur in any way. The whole point of stating a strict biconditional is that it holds in counterfactual situations.
Quoting Michael
Not at all. 1 + 1 will still equal 2, even if say, you use the symbol '5' to refer to 1. In such a situation, the equation (read: 'sentence') '1 + 1 = 10' would be true, but nonetheless it would still be true that 1 + 1 = 2.
---
What you can say is that for any assertion "p" in a situation there is an assertion materially equivalent to it in that situation of " 'p' is true," but this is not what the biconditional you're stating means, and none of the heavy metaphysical theses you typically martial as a result of it follow from this.
In such a situation both 1) and 2) will be true (assuming that the cup is blue, of course; if it isn't then both will be false).
As I've said, the bi-conditional is to be understood as "the cup is red iff the first part of this sentence is true". You misrepresent the bi-conditional by changing the meaning of the sentence mentioned but not the meaning of the sentence used.
You might as well say that the following is false:
She kicked the bucket iff she kicked the bucket
Because, after all, in some counterfactual situation the first part of the sentence might mean that she died and the second part of the sentence might mean that she struck a bucket with her foot. It's a strawman interpretation of what is being said.
You miss the point. Both of the following are true:
1. 1 + 1 = 2
2. 1 + 1 = 10
The first is true using decimal numbers (among others) and the second is true using binary numbers. Your claim that the T-schema is false because in some counterfactual situation a sentence with that same syntax would be false is akin to saying that 1) fails because in some counterfactual situation (e.g. binary mathematics) an equation with that same syntax would be false (or, rather, nonsense).
Again, all I said is that I understand the sentence "it is true that p" to be equivalent to the sentence "'p' is true" (where both ps mean the same thing rather than just have the same syntax). If this then entails a particular metaphysics, then so be it.
Not at all. 1) will be true just in case the cup is red in that situation; 2) will be true just in case the cup is blue in that situation. Now, an utterance of 1) in that situation would be true in that situation just in case the cup is blue in that situation; but that is not what's at stake. What's at stake is whether 1), as uttered here, is true evaluated relative to that situation.
Quoting Michael
Not at all. In order for the biconditional here to say anything, we must first resolve whether you are using the phrase on the left idiomatically or not. If you are, then everything is fixed; she kicked the bucket iff she died, regardless of what the words mean in a counterfactual situation. You are confusing resolution of ambiguity in your use of the words now with possible counterfactual differences in word meaning.
Quoting Michael
1) is true, 2) is not; 1 and 1 make 2, not 10.
Quoting Michael
Not at all. 1 + 1 is 2, regardless of what symbols are used to represent the numbers.
Quoting Michael
Not at all. 1 + 1 would still be 2 in that situation, but the equation, i.e. the sentence, "1 + 1 = 2" would be false, precisely because in such a situation that sentence would not mean that 1 + 1 = 2.
It's not a 'category error'. How do you separate truth from judgement? Can you point out anything which you hold to be true, whilst not judging it? Can you stand outside of judgement, and see things as they are without making it a matter of judgement?
The 'absurd logical consequences' that concern you, are on account of my argument undermining your innate notion of realism. And that notion is, as I explained, 'there anyway' realism - that the Universe is 'there anyway', while people, and minds, come into it and go out of it. So what I'm arguing turns that kind of realism on its head, but it does so on the basis of a reasoned analysis. That form of realism is what is bred into us nowadays as 'scientific realism' - that there's the big wide world, and we come into it, our minds are the consequence of the processes in it, those processes are what is real, what is 'there anyway', but the mind is just a product of that, and only has a kind of secondary reality.
That attitude is a consequence of Locke's representative realism and the native scientific empiricism of Western secular culture. My view of philosophy is that it ought to subvert this sense of reality; my philosophy is, in that sense, counter-cultural. Philosophy, as I understand it, causes you to question your sense of the solidity of the so-called 'external world', by making you aware of the sense in which the world is a mental construction, or, the way in which the mind contributes to what we generally regard as an 'independent reality'.
State of affairs: the cup is red
Proposition: "the cup is red"
What makes the proposition true or not is whether it expresses the state of affairs correctly (or you could say, corresponds correctly to the state of affairs).
The proposition is mind dependent, right. So, what makes the state of affairs any different when all it is is the proposition absent quotes?
It seems to me that the state of affairs is just a particular kind of language use/way of speaking. We 'say the world' and also say propositions.
Ok let's say the state of affairs that the propositions expresses is not mind-dependent. "The cup is red" is true or not independent of mind.
But then what's even the point of positing this mind independence? Whether the proposition is true or not, isn't contained within the proposition. So by that I mean, "the cup is red" doesn't seem to posesses some sort of invisible truth value. How is it that we ourselves come to know the truh value? Well we actually have to find out whether the cup is red or not. This process of finding out is mind dependent, and if you're an idealist so is the cup. So here we have an entire mind-dependent analyses of how it is that we come to know a propositions truth value. But you'd have to then hold that there's a separate mind-independent matching of the proposition to the state of affairs going on, for truth to be mind independent. The proposition, independent of mind would either match the state of affairs true or false, and it would have this truth value. But the truth value would be invisible to us, likewise the way in which the proposition matches itself to the state of affairs. We don't know how this happens. And both of these are entirely irrelevant to how it is that we ourselves actually find the truh value of a proposition, which is we do our own matching.
So what's then the point of saying "but also the proposition was true or not independent of us looking at the cup and deciding whether it's true." Isn't that just totally irrelevant to us? We could never acces this mind independent truth value, it's not present to us in the proposition itself. It really has no bearing on how it is that we ourselves find out the truth value of a proposition. So why posit it? Does it have any explanatory value?
It seems totally unnecessary.
You might say the cup is red independent of mind. But don't we then get into an argument over theories of perception? You'd be arguing for direct realism, the 'redness' of the cup existing out in the world. How would we even know that the state of affairs is mind-independent?
1 and 1 make 2 in decimal notation. 1 and 1 make 10 in binary notion. Given that 1) is written in decimal and 2) is written in binary, both 1) and 2) are true.
Compare with:
1. Snow is white
2. Schnee ist weiß
Two different sentences in two different languages.
And in order for the T-schema to say anything, we must first resolve whether the sentence mentioned on the one side means the same thing as the sentence used on the other side. If it is then everything is fixed; the cup is red iff "the cup is red" is true.
You're being inconsistent.
The truth of both sentences must be evaluated as uttered in the same situation. Iff 1) is true when uttered in situation X then 2) is true when uttered in situation X. In situation X (where "the cup is red" means that the cup is blue), the sentence "the cup is red" as uttered in that situation is true iff the cup is blue, and the sentence "the previous sentence is true" (referring to the sentence "the cup is red" as uttered in that situation) as uttered in that situation is true iff the cup is blue.
Again, you're being inconsistent. You say that 1 + 1 = 2 even if "1 + 1 = 2" is false when uttered in that situation because the former claim must be evaluated according to what it means to us now (in decimal notation) rather than what it means in this hypothetical situation, but then don't apply the same reasoning to the T-schema. Even if "p iff 'p' is true" is false when uttered in that situation, it is still the case that p iff "p" is true, because this latter claim must be evaluated according to what it means to us now rather than what it means in this hypothetical situation.
1 and 1 do not make 2 'in a notation.' 1 and 1 make 2, period. The equation or sentence '1 + 1 = 2' might be true or false, depending on how you disambiguate it relative to a notation, or depending on linguistic facts about the meaning of the symbols contained in it.
Quoting Michael
No. A biconditional is a biconditional and states whatever it states.
Quoting Michael
Again, you're confusing resolving ambiguity during the use of a sentence with evaluating the proposition a sentence expresses, whose value is already set after ambiguity is resolved, against a counterfactual situation in which different linguistic facts obtain.
Quoting Michael
There is some confusion here over situation of utterance and situation of evaluation. The situation of utterance determines which proposition a sentence expresses; that situation is this one, since you're actually uttering these sentences here. Once that proposition is fixed, it is a further question whether that proposition is true as evaluated relative to some situation or not. So it can be that a certain sentence, as uttered in this situation, is false as evaluated relative to another.
So, for instance, 'I am hungry,' as uttered by me, expresses the proposition that TGW is hungry; we can then evaluate whether that proposition is true in some situation or not.
Quoting Michael
This is not how it works,. though. It doesn't matter what the sentence would mean as uttered in that situation, because this is not where it was uttered. It was uttered by you, in the actual world, just now, and so expresses the proposition that the cup is red. It would have expressed the proposition that the cup is blue if it had been uttered in the alternate situation, but it was not, it was uttered here.
So the sentence expresses a proposition, that the cup is red, which evaluated relative to an alternate situation in which it's blue, is false. And relative to this situation of utterance as well, the other sentence expresses the proposition that a certain sentence, viz. "the cup is red" is true, which evaluated relative to that same alternate situation is false, since in that situation, the proposition expressed by this sentence is false, since in that situation the sentence means the cup is blue, which it is not.
No, the proposition which it expresses is tied to its use now, because now is when you actually used it. It's another question whether that proposition is true or false relative to some counterfactual situation.
So 1 + 1 is always 2, period, regardless of what's up with the language. But in a counterfactual situation, '1 + 1 = 2' might very well be false, because the symbol '1' might mean 5, for example.
The biconditional is something you're using now, so what it expresses it tied to the meaning of the words as they are now. Whether what it expresses is true relative to another situation is a different story. And relative to a situation which the sentence "the cup is red" means something else, the material equivalence doesn't hold, and so the biconditional as you use it now is false.
Only if you're not using the base-2 number system.
Yes, and it states what it states in the English language as we currently understand it. To then try to interpret it by switching in a different language is to misinterpret it. I'm not using some hypothetical English where the words mean something other than what they do now. Every word I'm using (and mentioning) is everyday English. And using everyday English, the statements "it is true that the cup is red" and "'the cup is red' is true" have the same truth conditions.
I'm not confusing it. I'm pointing out that just as the sentence must be understood as not being ambiguous, it must also be understood as not having some counterfactual meaning. Using the actual non-ambiguous meaning of everyday English words, the statements "it is true that the cup is red" and "'the cup is red' is true" have the same truth conditions.
This is just nonsense. If we have the two sentences 1) the cup is red and 2) the previous sentence is true then 2) is true iff 1) is true. It's that simple.
1 + 1 is always 10, period.
Quoting Wayfarer
There isn't much I have to say about that. You haven't even stated what you think the conflict seems to be. They don't seem in conflict to me.
Quoting Wayfarer
That's what [i]I[/I] think. But how can that be what [i]you[/I] think? Your earlier comment seems to imply subjective relativism. You said that whether a proposition is true or false is a matter of judgement. How do you square that with your above comment? Would you like to qualify your original comment? Because it seems to follow from your original comment that if Person A judges the proposition to be true, then the proposition is true, and anything else, including whether or not he is factually mistaken, is irrelevant. And likewise with regards to Person B.
Is that what you meant when you said that whether a proposition is true or false is a matter of judgement? If not, then what did you mean? You didn't directly address this the last time, so can you please do so this time?
Quoting Wayfarer
And how is that relevant?
We're not talking about epistemology. I can see how that would be relevant in epistemology, where the focus would be:
[i]Do we know who is right and who is wrong? If so, how? How do we adjudicate between them? What do we need to take into account? How should we go about deciding?[/I]
But I don't see how that is relevant in the context of this discussion.
Quoting Wayfarer
Yes, judgements are undertaken by intelligent subjects. Relevance?
Quoting Wayfarer
Yes, people can be wrong. But how do you account for that, given what you've said? That's the reason I brought it up.
Quoting Wayfarer
Right, so we both judge that we are fallible. But my argument attempted to show that given what you've already claimed, that results in contradiction. Do you have anything to say about that? With all due respect, I'm not just bringing these topics up as talking points.
Quoting Wayfarer
Yes, of course they would. So what? That's a red herring. You can't just change the subject like that, jeeprs.
Quoting Wayfarer
That we will never know about them is not relevant, because this isn't an epistemological discussion.
What is relevant is whether there are - or can be - truths which do not depend on any mind to be truths.
Quoting Wayfarer
I am indeed a realist of that kind. Although the realism in this discussion is more specific, and has focused on truth and meaning.
Quoting Wayfarer
You seem to be changing the subject again, whether you mean to or not.
I don't care about what is "pragmatically true" if that is anything other than what is true. And I don't agree that the world depends on any perspective, whether mine or someone else's.
Quoting Wayfarer
As interesting as that may be, can you bring it back to truth and mind-dependence? If you're leading up to something that pertains to that, can you get there sometime soon? You might need to spell it out. I would like to avoid digression.
Are you denying objective reality? Or are you just denying the knowledge of it or perceptual access to it? The former may well be relevant, whereas I'm not so sure about the latter. It's the difference between metaphysics and epistemology again.
Often when someone says something like that I just think that it's not worth bothering to even attempt communication with them. It always strikes me as akin to, say, if I owned a cab company, and someone were to approach me about a job, but then they say, "I don't even know what a car is." Sometimes it's just not worth bothering.
How would they not still depend on minds? At best, sans minds, we're talking about something like a set of marks on a piece of paper or a computer screen, or a set of recorded sounds or something like that.
If rules apply, they apply regardless of whether anyone is around to observe. The tree that falls in the middle of the forest makes a sound even if no one is around to hear it.
In other words, how could something even be a rule without someone thinking about it as such? How do rules apply without mentality involved? Explain how that would work.
Gravity works, its always worked, even though it was not conceptualized until 1687. A rule describes what we experience in the world, and it works regardless of whether or not anyone is available to witness it.
So you're not making any distinction between linguistic rules and physical laws?
But that's what the conversation was about. That's what Sapentia was responding about, and what I responded to him about.
Gota ya, my bad.
Regarding the two statements which I said were in conflict: the first says 'I can't believe all of these facts ... require a mind there judging them to be true or false' but the next paragraph acknowledges that 'a realist can straightforwardly acknowledge that any rational proposition, whether mathematical or otherwise, can only be grasped by a rational mind, and is not independent in that sense.'
So first you say, you can't believe that there needs to be a mind to judge facts, but then in the second, you acknowledge that a rational proposition can only be grasped by a mind. That is what I said 'appeared to be a contradiction'.
At any rate, this point is very close to the nub of the argument. I will try and illustrate it with the example below:
There is a passage in an interesting account of the encounter between Tagore (Indian mystic) and Einstein (Western scientist). Einstein says, at one point:
So what I'm arguing is that, even though this is true in one sense, the Pythagorean theorem can nevertheless only be grasped by a rational intelligence. And the same can be said for much of the 'furniture of reason' - logical laws, natural numbers, and the like, which are only perceptible to a rational mind. So whatever we know is underpinned by the rational (intuitive, symbolic, and other) aspects of mind, and is not truly 'mind-independent' in the sense that Einstein's scientific realism depicts it.
Now my view is that modern philosophy, since Descartes, Newton, etc, has lost sight of the fundamental role of mind in the apprehension of reality. This is because the way mind was construed as 'res cogitans', the 'invisible thinking substance', then negated by philosophical materialism, and subsequently 'explained' in terms of molecular and evolutionary biology. In all of this, 'mind' was relegated to a secondary degree of reality - relegated to the subjective. But it is only by virtue of the mind that we have any knowledge of the world at all.
Through scientific measurements and conventions, regularities are identified and exploited which provide the great powers that science possesses. Those are quantifiable and objective in a relative sense, but the idea that such knowledge is or can be absolute is the error of scientism.
So when you ask:
What I'm denying is that 'objective reality' exists in its own right, separately to any subjective knowledge, experience and perception of it. But I'm not arguing that the world exists 'in the mind'. The objective and subjective are poles within experience - they are not absolutes, but are mutually dependent (much as anticipated by Kant's Critique of Pure Reason).
No. Base is just a matter of notation.
Quoting Michael
I'm doing no such thing. The sentences as you express them now in English are not equivalent, because they do not express equivalent propositions. This is shown by the fact that their truth conditions come apart in different worlds of evaluation.
Quoting Michael
They do not, as I have repeatedly demonstrated.
Quoting Michael
I can't help you if you're going to hold onto this. I have explained, patiently and in depth and detail, why this is not so. You are free to review the arguments again, since they are catalogued here. You are also free to continue to believe 'it's that simple,' but you are wrong.
Why would sentences be mind-dependent in any sense relevant to the debate? If I write a sentence on a piece of paper, then there is a sentence which doesn't depend on my mind or anyone else's. We (minds, that is) could all suddenly cease to exist, and the sentence would still be there.
Well, I might say that a sentence isn't simply a pattern of ink but a pattern of ink that expresses a proposition. And expressing a proposition isn't the sort of thing that ink can do when it isn't being read.
Yes, it would be. That wasn't my intention. It's just that what is meant by "truth" is important, since it can determine the logical consequences.
Quoting Michael
Maybe.
I might also say that a sentence isn't simply a pattern of ink but a pattern of ink that expresses a proposition. But reading it and it expressing a proposition are not necessarily connected such that only by reading it, does it express a proposition.
And I disagree. That a pattern of ink expresses a proposition just is that we have a particular kind of conceptual attitude towards that pattern of ink.
What is expressing a proposition to you? Is it a physical process that can occur in the absence of any kind of mental activity? What particles are involved, and in what way do they behave?
Or is it some non-physical (and non-mental) process? Then what is its ontology, and where's the evidence of such a thing?
This is philosophy, and it's customary ask others to explain and justify the concepts they use. That's how we learn what the others are talking about, and what the others believe. If you're not interested ...
I don't think that the "have", which denotes the present, is necessary. I think that it would be sufficient that we [i]had[/I] a particular kind of conceptual attitude towards that pattern of ink, and I think that this can be used to answer the question of whether it expresses a proposition. If it is the case that it expressed a proposition, then why would it no longer do so? For there to be propositions, it is required that they be produced, which requires producers. But once they have been produced, the producers are no longer needed. What has been produced is independent from that which produced it. We do not need to read them or maintain them in any way. What's done is done. We can pack our bags, go home, and die, and there will still be a sentence on a piece of paper that we turned into something meaningful. Something would have to change that for it to be otherwise, but what would - or could - that be?
Quoting Michael
It is what a sentence does when it has meaning. And a sentence can have meaning if it has been given meaning.
Unfortunately, a lot of people think that philosophy amounts to "playing stupid." (I can explain why a lot of people misinterpret it that way.) Philosophy really isn't playing stupid though. This is a case where either you're playing stupid or you effectively really are.
No such thing as the world! That's a good one. >:O
But what is the ontology of expressing a proposition? Is it a physical process that occurs in the absence of mental activity? It seems to me that your position requires that it is (unless you want to argue for mind-independent non-physical processes, but again, what is the nature of such a thing, and where's the evidence?).
You wouldn't say that because the ball fell then it's still falling even after it lands. So why would you say that because the ink expressed a proposition then it's still expressing a proposition even after it's no longer being read?
And what does it mean for ink to have meaning? What is the ontology of having meaning? Is it a physical process that occurs even in the absence of mental activity?
I say it isn't. That ink has meaning just is that we have a particular cognitive attitude towards that ink. Meaning isn't some mind-independent physical (or mystical) substance that attaches itself to carbon (or whatever it is that ink is made of), and nor is it a kind of physical (or mystical) behaviour that carbon engages in.
What do you mean here? Do you mean that [i]knowing[/I] what proposition is expressed by the utterance of a sentence requires knowing something about the context of utterance? Or do you mean something else? Perhaps something more than just that.
You seem to either be 1) thinking about this from the perspective of someone else, and assuming that it is [i]they[/I] who determine what proposition is expressed; or 2) using "determining" as a synonym for "knowing".
Quoting Mongrel
So it was meaningless, in the sense that it was never given a meaning. It [i]can[/I] mean something [i]to[/I] someone, but that wouldn't be it's meaning. Although that would be [i]a[/I] meaning, and it would be it's meaning [i]for[/I] that someone.
Note that this claim is part of the "New realist" ontology of philosopher Markus Gabriel, so I'd say it's quite respectable.
Philosophers can come up with clever arguments for just about anything. That's what they do. I try to bring things back down to earth.
How else do you think that there could have been statements? Are there any other realistic alternatives that you can think of? It'd surely require someone or something capable of making statements, and intelligent life forms such as us fit that description.
But how is this line of inquiry even relevant? What matters is whether they [i]would be[/I] mind-dependent. I don't have to play along with your Socratic line of enquiry, you know. Please state the supposed relevance of this line of enquiry before we continue.
Quoting Theorem
What does [i]that[/I] mean? And [I]why[/I] would that be required?
Maybe I will.
'There anyway'.
Quoting Sapientia
Well, I'm involved in the "Many Worlds Interpretation" thread. What makes you think that your assumption of "the world" is the correct one, and these speculative physicists who believe in many worlds are wrong?
If you believe in "the world", and they believe in "many worlds", then why should I believe in any "world" until someone explains to me what it means to be a world.
Who is talking about "correct"?
You said:
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You can't talk about whether some definition or another is correct if you don't even have any idea what the term refers to.
Exactly! How can you know what the word refers to if there are multiple definitions to choose from and none of them can be considered to be the correct one?
In what context?
Also, what I observe is many objects independent from me. They are separate from me, and I am not part of them. I am "part" of many things, groups and organizations, mostly by choice, though I am part of my family, and part of the greater society, not by choice. What is this "world" which I am supposed to be part of?.
A bit of hay may adhere to the fleece. It doesn't mean the fleece is hay-dependent. (I'm shopping for a spinning wheel. Woo Hoo!)
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I'm not overly fond of your wording here. Partitioning the world invites questions about whether its boundaries are finite or infinite. World here means a domain and I believe it's an abstract object because it's a set.
What part of the word "part" do you not understand? To say that the hay adheres to the fleece is not the same as saying that the hay is part of the fleece. How could the fleece be hay-independent if the hay is part of the fleece.
Quoting Mongrel
I was just stating my observations. Things which I observe to be independent from me are independent things. By the same principle that I hold them to be independent from me, I also hold them to be independent from each other. What makes one thing a "part" of another? If I am supposed to be a part of this thing, "the world", is this thing not independent at all?
There was no suggestion that the world is a domain, and I don't know what you mean. Is "the world" just meant to signify a domain name? I don't get it.
If the fleece could persist beyond the removal of the hay. It's not the definition of "world" you should be preoccupied with here. It's "dependent."
Yeah, man, let's continue to play stupid. That's some quality philosophizing.
I don't see how that's relevant. That something could persist in time (the fleece), beyond the point in time in which something was a part of it (the hay), does not negate the fact that this thing is a part of that thing's existence. Existence necessarily has temporal extension. If your original claim is that the hay is a part of the fleece, you can only remove this fact by limiting the temporal extension of the existence of the fleece to a time when the hay is not a part of the fleece. You would claim that the temporal part of the fleece's existence, during which the hay is a part of the fleece, is not actually part of the fleece's existence. But then you contradict the original claim that the hay is a part of the fleece.
Back to the original point. If I am part of the world, how is it possible that the world exists independently of me? That is the explanation I am waiting for, in order that I can understand what is meant by "the world". As far as I can see, either the world is completely independent from me (in which case I am not a part of it), or I am part of the world (in which case it is nonsense to speak of the world as something independent from me). Otherwise I need a firm definition of what "part" means.
Paradoxes often occur in respect of this question. A paradox might arise when there are two apparently contradictory statements, both of which appear to be true. And this is a case in point. It is true that we are 'part of the world', but it is also true that 'the world is different to us'.
The latter statement is based on the obvious fact that as a being, an organism, we have to differentiate ourselves from what is not ourselves. That is not an ability that we're born with, but is learned in very early stages of infancy. But once learned it forms an essential part of the ability to negotiate our way in the world. Part of the developmental cycle is learning that things do indeed exist separately to us. I recall when I was in infants school, playing hide-and-seek in the playground, I was convinced that if I couldn't see the person that was looking for me, then they couldn't see me either. I learned very quickly that I was wrong, and from that began to understand how I would appear to another person. In hindsight, that ability to see things from an apparently external perspective, is a normal and important part of mental development. (I wonder if kids with autism disorders ever develop that?) Something similar occured when I noticed, aged about 6, that my own drawings lacked perspective - I suddenly saw the faults in all the drawings I had done of airplanes and the like. Basically, I realised that I couldn't draw; whereas previously, I couldn't tell the difference between what I drew, and other drawings. That too was a small milestone in cognitive development.
All of this is part of normal psychology and not controversial. From the realist point of view that one arrives at as a part of the process of maturation, the world just carries on, and I am only one person in it, born at such and such a date, one day to die.
But I don't think the issue of 'mind independence' can be resolved on the common-sense or realist level. What the 'mind-dependence' problem requires is an analysis of the role of the mind in what we understand as reality. And that, I think, is a very difficult question, because it requires something more than a common-sense analysis. My beef with a lot of what is said about it, is that most people just regard the common-sense attitude as being definitive; as if common sense really constitutes a philosophical analysis, when the role of philosophy is precisely to question what most people think of as 'common-sense'.
The differentiating of ourselves, to see oneself as a thing separate from other things, is not the real problem I am having here, this seems to come naturally. As you describe, it is a sort of learnt thing, but it is highly intuitive as we deal with individual objects, and see ourselves as individuals, separate from others. The real issue is the assumption that I am part of something, "the world", some larger whole.
To be a part of something implies that I have a role, a function, or purpose. Why should I assume that such is the case with respect to my relationship to this thing called the world? I can justify the notion that I am a part of a larger thing called my family, because I can understand real relationships here. My siblings have the same mother and father as I do, my cousins have shared grandparents, etc.. If I extrapolate, I can extend this such that I am part of the local society, the human race in general, and I can even say that I am part of life on earth. How does "the world" fit into this though? That's where I find difficulty. I can see myself as part of life on earth, because I can see a certain relationship between myself and other living things, in the fact that we are all alive, but I'm really not sure how I'm supposed to conceive of myself as part of the world.
Whenever I think of the world, I seem to be faced with this division, this separation. "The world" seems to signify all that is other from me, and I cannot seem to force it to signify something that I am a part of.. Whenever I try to establish a conceptual relationship between myself and the world, I do so by means of the relationships described above. But I don't ever get to "the world" because there is a disjoint at the end of the living, which causes the world to loom on the other side, as the other.
How do I get beyond those particular relationships which justify the notion that I am part of something bigger, life on earth, to the conclusion of a most general relationship, that each and every thing animate or inanimate, is a part of the same thing which I am a part of, the world? This is so completely counter-intuitive to what comes naturally, and what we learn, to differentiate and separate individual things, as if things really have separate existence. Why would we be learning to differentiate and separate individual things, as if individual things each have their own separate existence, if they were really all part of one, the world? .
That is the fundamental existential problem of life. Overcoming or healing that sense of otherness or separation is the goal of all philosophy in my view.
But this "sense of otherness" appears to be very real. In fact I think it is real. If it is, then to overcome it simply by assuming the existence of a unity called "the world" is to create an illusion, a fiction. It would be like if, when you wish that something isn't so, you simply assume that it is otherwise, in order to avoid facing the facts. If that is the case, then the only real way to overcome otherness is to actually create the relationships necessary to produce the world. It requires real effort to bring about what we want to be the case. Simply assuming that it is the case does not suffice.
I think that might be a good idea. Here's an issue I've come across a number of times already in the philosophy forums. It is the idea of co-dependence, and the claim is that one thing is dependent on another, while the other is dependent on the first. It is used to put an end to analysis.
"We cannot analyze these things further, because there is a co-dependence here which prevents us from separating these two things."
So for instance, the claim would be that we cannot analyze space and time separately because there is a co-dependence between them which prevents us from separating them, even in theory. The insistence would be that "space" and "time" really do not refer to separate things, so it would be a faulty analysis to separate them.
My opinion is that there is no such thing as a real co-dependence, and the term is simply used to disguise circular logic, or to make circular logic appear to be acceptable.
It is claimed that special relativity demonstrates that time and space are really one and the same thing. The problem there though, is that this is produced by synthesis rather than analysis. However, you could consider wave/particle duality as such a co-dependence produced by analysis, two distinct names with two distinct descriptions, which are believed to be two facades of the same thing.
By the way, what do you even mean by ontological dependence?
Would Q be true, in the absence of minds?
This isn't a recoil argument. I want to look at the relationship between counterfactuals here.
Q1: "Q would not be true in the absence of minds." (note that this does not come out to "Q would be false."
Q2: "If there were no minds, there would be no truths."
Two more statements:
R1: "If there were no minds, there would be no truths."
R2 "If there are no minds, then there are no truths."
These two look to be logically equivalent, inasmuch as both say that a world without minds also lacks truth. Recalling that Q = "There are no truths," we have R2 as: "If there are no minds, then Q."
Let W be a world without minds. Q lacks a truth value in W, but "There are no truths in W" is true in the actual world.
It looks like our theory of truth comes into play here. On a deflationary account, we're in trouble because "Q" = "Q is true" in deflationary theories, i.e. "There are no truths in W" = "It is true that there are no truths in W." Maybe we should adjust our theory to say "Q" = "Q is true in the actual world." This lets us say that "It is true in the actual world that there are no truths in W."
So the best way to phrase it is that a world lacking minds also lacks truths. Now, why would we want to say that? Presumably, because sentences are the things with truth values. Worlds without minds lack sentences, so they lack truth.
Here's where it gets interesting: what does it mean for a world to contain sentences? We can imagine that W contains a scrap of paper with this post written on it. Does W then contain truth, despite lacking any minds?
I am not sure how to make a conclusive argument here, but the whole position looks more shaky - the presence of a piece of paper with some letters on it ought not to bring truth into a world.
It's a piece of paper with markings on it that in the actual world are treated as words.
The problem is this cannot be a truth about the world without minds by definition.
Although why is it a problem that it cannot be a truth about the world without minds?
If truth is mind dependent, and there are no minds in the world, then there are no truths about that world.
Right. And why is that a problem?
This is also a contradiction you might notice.
It cannot be a truth about that world that there are no truths
It's not a mind-independent truth about the world that there are no mind-independent truths.
What you quoted made no claim to being a mind-independent truth though.
(On my view, as well, which I probably expressed earlier in this thread, I'd also say there are no mind-independent truths, by the way.)
You can't make mind dependent claims about the truth of worlds if truth is mind dependent.
At least not without arriving at a contradiction.
That makes no sense.
Truth is mind-dependent.
So when we make a claim about anything, we're saying something mind-dependent, right?
So when we make a claim about "the truth of worlds," we're making a mind-dependent claim.
There's nothing at all contradictory about that. If truth is mind-dependent, then any truth claim we make is mind-dependent. So it's not contradictory that we're making a mind-dependent claim about the "truth of worlds." It would only be contradictory if we were to say, "It's a mind-INdependent truth that such and such." But no one said that.
So it is not a truth about the world, that truth is mind dependent.
If the statement "truth is mind dependent" is true, it is not a truth about any world.
It's not a mind-independent truth about the world. It's a mind-dependent truth about the world.
This isn't a matter of you reading "about" as "a property of," is it?
A book about Mars isn't a property of Mars, for example. The book is ABOUT Mars. It's not itself part of Mars.
You can't have truths about the world if truth is mind dependent, that leads to contradiction.
What's p in the contradiction? (Contradictions being instances of p & ~p)
The contradiction is that in the statement "There is no truth because there are no minds" is not a truth about the world absent of minds if truth if mind dependent.
All of that is p?
P = Truth is mind dependent
~P = The world is absent of minds
Not to be patronising, but just in case you need an explanation regarding what I'm talking about:
"p" is a variable for a proposition. Just to keep this simple for now, a proposition is the same thing as a statement or a claim. Let's consider "The cat is on the mat"--that will be our "p" for this example.
Contradictions obtain when someone (unequivocally) both asserts and denies the same proposition. So for "The cat is on the mat," our "p" for this example, we only have a contradiction if someone asserts both "The cat is on the mat" and "The cat is not on the mat." That's p and ~p ("~" is one common symbol for negation).
So I was asking you what p is in this example. What proposition are we both asserting and denying?
P can't change. You'd have to say that we're either asserting and denying either "Truth is mind-dependent" OR "The world is absent of minds."
So to say that truth is mind dependent is true means that it cannot be a truth in a world absent of minds.
So where there are no minds there are no truths.
But this is a contradiction.
In the absence of mind/truth, it is not true that there are no truths without contradiction.
Saying that there are no minds is equal to saying P is not true.
It seems like there's something else that you're confusing here.
Say that at time T1 there are minds, including my own.
At time T2, there are no minds.
At time T1, I say, "In a world with no minds, nothing is true or false." (And let's call that "q.")
Q has a truth-value (for at least some minds) at T1, because there are minds at T1, and at least some minds make a judgment about q's truth-value at T1.
At time T2, "In a world without minds, nothing is true or false" occurs however it does (maybe it's just printed in a book or something like that).
Q has no truth value at T2, because there are no minds at T2.
It seems like you're insisting that Q must be read as if it's occurring at T2.
But we can state q at T1, and at T1, it has a mind-dependent truth-value.
At no T absent of minds is it true that there are no truths.
If it is true that there are not truths at T then this is a contradiction.
The point is the statement "Truth is mind dependent" is not a truth about any world.
They're words to us. So, dice.
Correct, and I do not believe that anyone claimed otherwise.
Quoting m-theory
That, however, is incorrect, because we can state it at T1.
No that is a truth about minds, because truth is mind dependent not world dependent.
It cannot be that the statement "Truth is mind dependent" is a world dependent statement.
You mean a la making a sharp distinction between minds and worlds so that minds are necessarily not part of the world?
Making sharp distinction by pointing out that the statement "The truth is mind dependent" is not a truth, without contradiction, about the world.
Because you don't consider minds to be part of the world, right?
I don't care about minds.
I am pointing out that the truth of the statement "Truth is mind dependent" is not a world dependent truth by definition.
Regardless if the mind is part of the world or not part of the world.
If minds are part of the world, and truths are dependent on minds, then aren't truths world-dependent (on the part of the world that is minds)?
Ok.
But then we have the statement "Truth is mind dependent and world dependent."
You can't have the statement "Truth is exclusively mind dependent" and then claim that the truth of this statement is world dependent, that too is a contradiction.
They'd be the same. Truth is exclusively mind-dependent. Mind is part of the world.
It would be like saying
(1) Everest's peak is Everest-dependent and world-dependent
and
(2) Everest's peak is exclusively Everest-dependent.
That's not contradictory. Everest is part of the world.
Except saying "truth is exclusively mind dependent" and "truth is mind dependent and world dependent" are not the same thing.
They are actually different.
If Everest is part of the world, then the peak of Everest is NOT exclusively Everest depedent, because Everest is part of the world, then Everests peak will be world depedent as well.
Note the logical operator AND that I have used.
It is a contradiction to say "The peak of Everest is exclusively Everest dependent and world dependent"
They're the same thing if something is world-dependent solely by virtue of being mind-dependent, where minds are part of the world.
No, they are not.
In that case: presumably, Julius Caesar believed that the sun rose in the East. But he didn't speak English, because English didn't exist then, so he didn't believe the sentence, "The sun rises in the East." Looks like sentences can't be your truth-bearers.
Explain what the difference would be then.
I did explain the difference.
The logical operator AND is the difference.
So "and" necessarily denotes a difference of extension in your view?
Not in my view, it is a rule of logic.
He believed the appropriate Latin sentence to be true.
If I were to say that this product is exclusively for women then it wouldn't be a contradiction to then say that it's for people. The latter would just be imprecise, and when said together with the former, redundant.
Yes.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logical_conjunction
Note the truth table
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logical_conjunction#Truth_table
So "that man" must be both Barrack Obama AND the potus.
If one or the other is not true, then the entire statement is regarded as false.
Is not logically equivalent to
"This product is for people"
Ok but it would be a contradiction to say that it is both.
"This product is exclusively for women and this product is for people."
The set of people also contains men.
Or for another example, "this is a triangle and a shape".
So by the same token, "truth is mind-dependant and world-dependant".
"This product is exclusively for women and this product is for all people" because some people are not women.
This is not equivalent to my example.
So if you say "This is exclusively a triangle and it is also a shape"
It does not have set membership of exclusively triangles, it also has set membership of shapes.
What you're apparently saying here is that
IF:
* ? is a property of Fs
* ? is ONLY a property of Fs; ? is not found elsewhere
* Fs are Gs
* The class of Gs includes things that are not Fs as well
Then we can't say "? is exclusively a property of Fs and ? is a property of some Gs" without stating something contradictory?
A Venn diagram for that, by the way, would simply be this:
What's contradictory about that?
No.
I am saying that if some G's are F, and some G's not F.
Then you cannot say that All G's have Quoting Terrapin Station
But no one was saying that truth is dependent on everything in the world. Rather, truth is just dependent on one part of the world, namely minds.
I pointed out that the statement
"Truth is exclusively dependent upon minds"
is not logically equivalent to
"Truth is dependent upon minds and truth is dependent upon the world"
As long is no one claiming this then ignore my posts.
I also pointed out that it is in fact a contradiction to say that
"Truth is exclusively dependent upon minds and truth is also dependent on the world"
As long as no one is claiming that this would not be a contradiction you can ignore my posts.
Note the venn diagram for a conjunction.
So the statement "Truth is dependent upon the mind and truth is dependent upon the world" looks like this.
And not like this
The Venn diagram for "truth is dependent upon the mind" (by itself) is identical to your diagram, except that the portion of the circle for "World" that is outside the circle for "Mind" is omitted. Hence the conjunction does not set up a contradiction; both statements can indeed be true. If we say instead (as you did above) that "truth is exclusively dependent upon minds," and then add the premiss (as suggested by ) that "minds are part of the world," we get his diagram (Gs=World, Fs=Mind, phi=Truth). In this case, "truth is dependent upon the world" is necessarily true; more precisely, "truth is exclusively dependent upon part of the world." The only way I can see to make the two statements genuinely contradictory is to say that "truth is exclusively dependent upon minds" and "minds are not part of the world."
There is also no contradiction between "this product is exclusively for women" and "this product is for people." This becomes clearer if we change the second premiss to "this product is for some people." There would only be a contradiction if the second premiss instead was (as you rewrote it above) "this product is for all people."
Again 'Truth is exclusively dependent upon minds"
Is not logically equivalent to the statement
"Truth is dependent upon mind and upon the world"
One has a logical connective and the other does not.
So if in the diagram it were that
? = "truth is exclusively mind dependent"
this leads to a contradiction because
? is itself dependent upon F, which in Turn is dependent upon G.
That is to say if there is no F and/or no G, then there is no ? by definition.
So the diagram above cannot hope to illustrate that ?="truth is exclusively mind dependent" without also being in contradiction because as you should notice that ? is dependent upon F, which is dependent upon G.
Let us say you hope to redeem the diagram and state that ?=any and all truth
Then it is not true that "Some G's are not F's" without arriving at a contradiction.
The statement "Some G's are not F's" cannot be true(found only in set F). If Some G's are not F's this is only true if it also true that not all ? are F dependent.
If all ? are F dependent then it is not true that some G's are not F's.
Or in other words some G's (those which are not F's) have the property ?.
Hence the diagram is wrong/contradictory with the labels you have applied to the variables used in the diagram.
Quoting aletheist
The only way to avoid contradiction is to say
"This product is exclusively for women and the product is for SOME people"
Using the term people denotes the set containing both men and women which leads to contradiction.
No one is claiming that they are logically equivalent. You seem to think that they are contradictory, but they are not. "All dogs are exclusively mammals" and "All dogs are mammals and animals" are not logically equivalent, and also not contradictory, given the additional premiss, "All mammals are animals." Again, the only way that your two propositions are contradictory is if we add the premiss, "No minds are part of the world."
Quoting m-theory
The labels that I applied were G=World, F=Minds, and phi=Truth. All truth is exclusively mind-dependent, and all minds are part of the world; i.e., world-dependent. Therefore, all truth is (also) world-dependent.
Quoting m-theory
"This product is for people" is vague regarding the quantification of "people." I read it more naturally as implying "This product is for some people," which does not contradict "This product is exclusively for women." As I said, it was only when you changed it to "This product is for all people" that it did create a contradiction.
Then it is not a truth (? is only in F) that some G's are not F's.
Which contradicts what is depicted in the diagram, the diagram illustrates that some G's are not F's is true.
If it is true that some G's are not F's then that means not all ? are in F.
Also that diagram does not depict any conjunction like
"Truth is mind dependent AND world dependent"
To depict that you would have to use this diagram that includes the conjunction.
Which is not identical to this diagram in any way.
As this diagram does not depict any conjunction.
Not in this diagram.
In that diagram truth is NOT exclusively mind dependent.
That would be a contradiction.
So you'd say you're depicting a contradiction there?
Quoting m-theory
Why would you think it was supposed to be? I specified what that diagram was.
Please provide the diagram for "All truth is exclusively mind-dependent." In particular, please clarify the particular significance that you are attaching to the word "exclusively." Be sure to include the world in the diagram so that I understand how you are thinking it relates to truth and minds.
I don't see a contradiction here.
Perhaps you could point it out if there is one.
I do see a contradiction here
I pointed out that it is a contradiction to say that ? is exclusive to F
Because the statement
Some G's are not F's is true about the world, not minds.
I also pointed out that if ? means truth is exclusively dependent upon F, this is a contradiction in the depiction because F's are dependent upon G's which means that ? is also dependent upon G's.
So it can't be that ? means exclusively dependent upon F
???
I do not claim that truth is exclusively mind dependent so I do not have to provide the diagram of that claim.
I provided the diagram from my claim.
Because I claim a conjunction that "truth is mind dependent and truth is world dependent" I provided the corresponding diagram.
You lost me. What two propositions are you claiming to be contradictory?
I am claiming that it the statement "truth is exclusively mind dependent and truth is world dependent" is a contradiction.
If truth is also world dependent, then truth does not have exclusive mind dependence.
Again, what exactly do you mean by "exclusively"? How could there be minds that are not world-dependent?
Exclusive
1.excluding or not admitting other things.
"my exclusive focus is on San Antonio issues"
2.restricted or limited to the person, group, or area concerned.
"the couple had exclusive possession of the condo"
synonyms: sole, unshared, unique, only, individual, personal, private
"a room for your exclusive use"
noun
1.
an item or story published or broadcast by only one source.
synonyms: scoop, exposé, special
"a six-page exclusive"
So if it is true that truth has no dependency other than the mind.
Then it can not also be true that truth also has dependency upon the world.
Okay, got it. All truth depends on the mind. No truth depends on the world. Therefore, some mind does not depend on the world.
It is not true of any world that "All truth depends on the mind"
If that was true about the world it would be a contradiction.
So it is not a truth about any world that "All truths depend upon the mind."
Sorry, you lost me again. What is contradictory about "All truth depends on the mind" being true about the world? What happened to your key word "exclusively"?
Sigh
It can't be a truth about the world because then it would be a truth that depends upon the world and would contradict "all truth depends on minds."
By saying "no truth depends on the world" you have indicated that "all truth exclusively depends on minds."
Which cannot, without contradiction, be a truth that is dependent/about any world.
Look you want to claim "all truth depends upon minds"
Go for it.
That is no problem for me because I don't have to accept that as a truth about the world as, by definition, it is not a truth about/dependent upon the world.
What bothers me is when people want it both ways.
They want it to be a truth about the world that "all truth is mind dependent"
But of course this cannot be a truth about the world, because if it was then that truth would then also be world dependent which would render the claim self refuting.
I am not as interested in the content of your argument as I am in trying to sort out its logic. What you seem to be saying is that any truth about the world is necessarily a truth that depends on the world. You may be right, but you have yet to offer an argument to demonstrate it, since this is the first time (as far as I can tell) that you have clearly articulated this additional premiss.
In addition, I am not sure that anyone seriously claims that all truth is exclusively mind-dependent in the way that you have sought to establish here. As a couple of us have pointed out, if all minds are world-dependent, and all truth is mind-dependent, then there is no contradiction in acknowledging that all truth is (also) world-dependent.
A statement is only true about the world if the world is a certain way, and thus depends on the world. "The world contains elephants" is true iff there are elephants in the world, and false otherwise.
I did make the case that truth about worlds are world dependent and not mind dependent.
I used a proof by contradiction.
If it is true about the world that all truth depends on minds.
Then we can imagine a world without minds.
In which case it is not true about the world that there is no truth.
For were it is true that there is no truth, then that contradicts the claim that there is no truth.
I am not sure but it seems to me you could prove with contradiction in each case, however I will concede your point, perhaps, if you had some counterexample of a truth about something that does not depend upon that thing?
Quoting aletheist
This is not the first time I have articulated my grievance, in fact I set out with this quibble from the start in my very first post to this thread.
Quoting aletheist
I agree it is absolutely reasonable to say truth is mind dependent and world dependent.
Quoting m-theory
And the explanation for it was this. Also note the word "apparently," by the way:
Quoting Terrapin Station
If my extended if-then statement--everything following my "What you're apparently saying here is that" wasn't what you were in fact saying, then you had the opportunity to clarify.
Re your diagram, one thing I disagree with about it is that you have part of mind that's not part of the world. I don't think any part of mind is not part of the world. Maybe someone above would have said that--I haven't read every post in the thread, and I certainly don't recall every post in the thread that I did read, but I certainly wasn't saying that.
Quoting m-theory
Again, that's not what my diagram was about. It was about what you were apparently saying in the triangle example. Now, we could say that the triangle example was an analogy for the mind statement--maybe that works; I'd agree that my diagram at least works for that even though that wasn't really the idea there, but your comment above makes no sense in either case. There's some weird confusion there either about the temporal context as I explained earlier, about what aboutness is as I explained before, maybe about both, and there might be other confusions that maybe I haven't specified yet--those might become clear as we continue to talk about this.
Later edit: Another confusion that's apparent below that's similar to the temporal example is that you seem to be confusing possible world contexts. We can say in the possible (a fortiori because actualized) world where there are minds that such and such is true or false, including when we imagine possible worlds without minds. We can say things about that other possible world, including making truth-value judgments about it, from the context of our actual world. You seem to be confusing that with saying that something would be true or false from within the context of the possible world in question where there are no minds.
Right--for example, I'd say that's true. What makes it true to me is that I'm making a judgment about a proposition. That's what truth is. All truth is to someone by the way.
Correct, because there's no one in that case to make the judgment that is what truth is.
No one is saying that there is no truth (unqualified) by the way. What we'd say is that if in world x there are no minds, then in world x there is no truth, and in world x, it's neither true nor false that there's no truth. However, with us in world y where we do have minds, we could say in world y that there is no truth in world x, and we could say this is true in world y (about world x), because in world y we're judging it to be true.
This might be clearer to you if you change it so that it's about a term that's uncontroversially something mental--for example, desires:
"There are no desires if there are no minds. We could imagine a world with no minds, and in that world, there would be no desires. In our world, we could desire a world without minds, but in the world without minds, we couldn't desire a world without minds, because in that world without minds, there are no minds to desire anything."
We could just as well say the same thing about judgments:
"There are no judgments if there are no minds. We could imagine a world with no minds, and in that world, there would be no judgments. In our world, we could make judgments about a world without minds, but in the world without minds, we couldn't make judgments, because in that world without minds, there are no minds to judge anything."
Well, (particular sorts of) judgments is all that truth is on my view. So all I'm saying is what I said just above about judgments.
Adding "exclusively" to "mind-dependent" just says that there's no part of the world that's not mind that is a part where truth obtains.
On my view we have to add "if someone judges that a proposition has the right relation to (other things in) the world."
Quoting aletheist
I say it's exclusively mind-dependent, although I'm not sure about the "in the way he has sought to establish here" part. He's confused about at least a couple things, but clearing up what I've tried to clear up for him hasn't helped him understand the claim and why it's not contradictory yet, so I'm not sure I understand how he's thinking about this yet.
Do that and you'll see that there's no contradiction. To say that truth is exclusively mind-dependent and world-dependent is just to say that the truth colouring is inside both the mind and the world circles. (Although, this is also true of your diagram, so I don't know why you keep insisting that it's a contradiction).
Then prior to mind no truth.
It seems to me that some things could be otherwise but others must always be as the are. The facts of the matter don't change, they cannot be anything but what they are. If truth is a judgement by the mind then it must be based on facts.
Been over this already, I have contributed all I care to on this subject, and you can review my previous posts where I have discussed the issues of contradiction in your diagram.
I will accept that my diagram does not depict what you view as accurate about the world and minds, but again I pointed out that my diagram does depict a logical conjunction and yours does not.
Quoting Terrapin Station
Ok.
I would say if you can't know there is no truth in world x, then you can't say for sure that truth depends exclusively on minds, it may well be that it also depends on worlds.
You just can't know.
Quoting Terrapin Station
Again if you can't know if there is or is not truth in world x, then you can't claim to know that truth is exclusively dependent upon minds, that claim is not true or false.
But no one was saying we can't know this (in world y)
As a consequence it is then neither true or false that truth is exclusively mind dependent.
If you can't know the truth about whether there are truths or not truths in some world (x,y, it doesn't matter), then you can't know the truth of your claim either.
Well that is not entirely true, as you can see the truth of your claim still depends on world x, witch means truth is world dependent as well as mind dependent.
But I will concede anyway and give the benefit of the doubt that it just can't be known.
Quoting m-theory
In other words, there are no judgments in world x.
Quoting m-theory
So this would be saying that (in world x?) there are no judgments that judgments are exclusively mind-dependent. That's a fact of world x as a fortiori, there are no judgments in world x.
Quoting m-theory
But it does matter what world we're talking about making judgments from. We can make judgments from worlds where there are persons with minds that judge. We can't make judgments from worlds where there are not persons with minds that judge. So I'm not sure why you'd say the world we're talking about being located in doesn't matter. We're located in a world where we can make judgments and where we can know things, including making judgements about and knowing about worlds where there are no creatures to make judgments and to know things.
Quoting m-theory
Ah--here is yet another confusion to clear up. When. I say something about truth being x-dependent, I'm talking about where truth obtains ontologically, what it's an ontological phenomenon of. I'm not saying something like, "People do not make judgments about the non-mental world." I'm saying that truths are a mental phenomenon. Namely, it's a judgment.
That depends on world x.
So judgments depend on minds, and worlds.
Which contradicts the notion that judgement depend exclusively on minds.
Quoting Terrapin Station
Whether there are judgments in world x or not judgments in world x, depends on the facts about world x, not the judgments of world y.
Quoting Terrapin Station
That is fine, you can believe what you like.
I have no issue with you believing that truths are exclusively mind dependent, but we can demonstrate that the truth of claims are not exclusively mind dependent, so you don't get to claim that what you believe applies to any world.
Yes, of course, and we posited that in world x there are no minds. So are there judgments in world x?
Which means existence of minds, truths, and judgments depends on world x, and not on minds in world y.
If truth-value is a judgment, and there are no judgments in world x, then there is no truth-value in world x.
Truth value is not equal to a judgment and truth does not depend on judgment.
If it is true that there are no judgments on world x, then truth value is not equal to judgment and does not depend on judgment, but instead it depends on world x.
But this is just the point. In my view, truth-value is a judgment.
Of course, you believe that this is wrong. And of course, I believe you are wrong.
Well I tried to reason with you, but it is your right to believe what you choose.
What you don't get to do is claim that what you believe is a truth about any world.
It is simply a truth about what you believe in your own mind.
Yes but the truth, or lack thereof, of this depends on world x, meaning that truth depends on world x not minds in world y.
You're saying that that is the case if truth-value is a judgment?
If truth value is a judgment there is a contradiction.
It would be the case that there is a truth value in world x when there are no minds, which would mean either that judgments are not dependent on minds, or truth values are not equal to judgments.
Are there judgments in world x?
If there are then that means that judgments are not dependent upon minds.
If there are not then that means judgments are not equal to truth values.
I'm not asking you to state conditionals. I'm asking you a yes or no question.
If that answer is yes, your position is contradicted, if the answer is no, your position has been contradicted.
I pointed this out, and that was my only concern.
We can demonstrate that if the answer is no, this contradicts the claim that truth value is equal to judgments and that this truth value of yes is dependent on world x not minds.
If the answer is yes we can demonstrate that judgments depend also on world x, which contradicts the claim that judgments are exclusively mind dependent.
Is your user-name on this site "m-theory"?
?
Why?
I'm seeing if it's possible for us to tackle a simple yes or no question, or if we've gotten to a point where even such basic conversational interaction is no longer feasible.
So you want to derail the thread in hopes of making some point?
Why not just make the point and stay on topic?
We are not conversing about simple yes or no questions.
We were debating a very particular yes or no question that is not so simple as you would like it to be, as I pointed out to you.
If it's that you feel that you cannot answer yes or no for some reason, then simply explain why that is in your view--"I cannot answer yes or no because . . ."
I did explain.
It does not matter what answer I give, both answer contradict claims you have made.
I don't really care what the answer should be, I care about the logical consequences of each answer.
It was not as simple a question as you would have liked it would seem.
Again, it would have to start with, "The reason that I cannot answer yes or no is because . . . " for there to be a chance that I'd count it as an explanation why you feel that you can't answer yes or no.
The reason it does not matter if I answer yes or no is because your claims are contradicted either way.
Happy now?
No. Because I wasn't asking you why you thought it mattered or not. If you have a view on it where your answer is yes or no, you should answer yes or no--simply because I asked and we're supposedly having a conversation. Otherwise if you feel that you can't answer yes or no--not that "it doesn't matter," but that it's not possible for you to answer yes or no, then you should explain why it's not possible.
Is there some issue you have related to the topic?
We are derailing the thread at this point.
For one, I'd like to explain a point of view that you don't understand, but you'd need to be able to have a conversation where you can answer simple questions in a straightforward way where you don't assume that you're lecturing instead.
I would say that it is not that I don't understand the point view you have expressed here, it is more that I don't agree that it is logically valid.
I pointed out the reason why, namely your position leads to contradictions.
We are discussing a topic.
Simple questions like whether or not my screen name is m-theoryrules or not are not related to the thread topic and I regard them as irrelevant.
If I do not see your point in asking this simple question this is not my fault, you failed to do anything to illustrate that it was in fact related to the topic of the thread.
The other question you asked is not as simple as you would have liked it to be and I pointed that out.
If you insist that I can only explore the logical consequences of the answer in one of two ways, then that is an example of a false dichotomy.
There is in fact a third option, the one I choose, which is to explore the logical consequences of BOTH answers.
Well, there's an easy way to test that. Go ahead and relay a summary of the view as I would.
You claim that truth is exclusively mind dependent and you stated that in your view that truth value is logically equivalent to Judgments.
.
Is there something I am missing?
So far so good if "logically equivalent to" is "is identical to."
But yeah, you're missing something. Why isn't it contradictory on my view to say from world y (as defined earlier) that it's true that in world x (as defined earlier) there is no truth-value?
To be honest I am getting kind of tired of repeating myself here.
I was hoping you had something new to contribute?
Again I pointed out, that if there is no truth value in world x, then the claim "truth is mind dependent" is refuted because truth value still depends on world x and not a minds in world y..
Which means there is a truth value in world y, and that truth value is false.
But I also conceded this point, you can claim it cannot be known what is the truth value in world x, in which case the truth value of the claim "truth is mind dependent" cannot be known either.
Which is not a contradiction, it simply means we can't (for some unnamed reason) know what whether or not truth is mind dependent or not.
I conceded this point because I understand how you are trying to justify your views.
Your view is that if ever there is a mind we can simply say that truth depends on that mind regardless of what world that mind inhabits.
But we can imagine that there was some state such that there are no minds in any worlds.
In such a state is it true that there are no mind?
If it is true then truth does not depend on minds.
You might argue that it is not true or false in that example.
So that is why I conceded your point.
But again you don't get to claim that you know it is true that truth depends on minds.
Your position is basically if there are no minds then there are no truths.
I pointed out this leads to a contradiction because we can imagine the case where there are no minds, and then point out if it is true that there are no truths, then there is at least one truth, which contradicts that there are no truths.
You rebut saying, yes but right now literally there are minds that is why we have truths.
But it isn't so that this proves truth is dependent upon the mind, it proves rather that there are minds at this time.
These two are not one in the same thing.
However let's assume, by some feat of mental gymnastics, you have decided that because there are minds this proves that truth is mind dependent
Well then the problem now becomes that you are left with a circular argument.
A circular argument is not valid reasoning.
Note this point because it is critical.
You still don't get to claim that if there were no minds there would be no truths, that still leads to contradiction or amounts to circular argumentation.
Well I suppose you can claim that if you like, but that claim has no logical force that compels me to accept it as valid.
What you could claim instead is that if there were no minds we could not know if there were truths or not.
That is not a contradictory or circular position and I will not challenge that claim.
That super-cliched move at this point does not count as understanding my view. So do you not know why it isn't contradictory on my view to say from world y (as defined earlier) that it's true that in world x (as defined earlier) there is no truth-value? (And why we do know that it's true (from world y) that in world x there is no truth value?)
It's fine if you don't know. It doesn't mean that you're inferior or anything. It also wouldn't imply that you agree with me if you're able to relay my view so that I'd agree with it. You can still be superior and eventually play the role of teacher where you assume I'm only fit to be your student. But how about slowing down and trying to understand a view you're not familiar with? That's what I'd be interested in us doing. I can explain my view so that you'd understand it, but you'd have to play along and answer questions when I ask them and so on--I'd be going slow, one step at a time. It wouldn't work if you just keep impatiently going back to why you're right and I'm wrong. You need to understand my view in the first place to be able to say why I'm wrong.
What I know, so far, is that you have not put forth a view that does not lead to contradiction.
From what you describe here, you don't need me at all, you need someone to follow along and take cues from you and answer how you want when you want.
You can do that for yourself.
Also I never said you were wrong or that I was right, I said that there are logical issues with your claims.
Sure, that's your opinion.
But re MY view, explain in a way that I'd agree with why it's not a contradiction. That would show that you understand my view, which is important for critiquing it.
Ok.
I believe you.
In your mind your view is not contradictory.
lol
I just reread this.
You are basically saying that unless I agree with you, I don't understand and can't critique your view.
lol
That is not very reasonable.
How old are you?
No, I'm not saying anything about you agreeing with me.
I'm saying something about whether you even understand the view you're critiquing. If you understand it, you should be able to state it so that the person whose view it is would agree with the paraphrase.
In other words, this is no different than, say, a teacher asking on an exam, "Give a summary, primarily in your own words, of Descartes' argument in the Second Meditation, Part 1." They're checking to make sure that you understand Descartes' argument. You can think that his argument sucks, that Descartes is wrong, etc., but that's different than knowing what his argument is in the first place, understanding it, and being able to paraphrase it in a way that Descartes would agree with.
I am glad you understand that it is not reasonable to insist that some one must agree with you first, before what you claim can be understood.
However...
It is not my duty to paraphrase you such that your arguments are not claiming something which is contradictory.
That is your duty.
I understand, from what you have posted so far, that your claims have logical issues and I have pointed those issues out already.
Either address the issues I have raised and/or provide further information to clarify your position.
If you fail to do this in the next post I will consider our discussion to be stagnant and will pursue it no further.
I don't care anything about "duty" pro or con here. So I don't care whether anything is or isn't anyone's duty in anyone's opinion.
You had said:
Quoting m-theory
I'm challenging that. I believe that you don't at all understand my point of view on this (well, at least not beyond the rudimentary start you made above). But you have an opportunity to show that I'm wrong and that you weren't just talking shit there, that you do in fact understand it.
The importance of this is that you can't "understand my claims to have logical issues" if you don't even understand just what my claims are in the first place.
Please identify at least one specific view put forth in this thread by @Terrapin Station that leads to contradiction. Even if you believe that you have already done so, this might help clarify where things stand at this point. Do not explain (yet) why you think it leads to contradiction, just restate what you perceive to be his position.
Terrapin's view is that truth is entirely and exclusively dependent upon minds such that if there were no minds there would be no truths.
This leads to a contradiction.
If there were no minds then it could not be true that there were no truths.
Notice that I use the word if here.
Terrapin does not see this as an issue because there are minds now, so the condition in which there would be a contradiction is not met.
However in logic we do not have to meet the condition of the argument to see that it is contradictory.
I also pointed out another possible issue with Terrapin's views.
Terrapin might hope to argue that we can be sure that truth is entirely and exclusively dependent upon minds, because minds exist now and thus the truth of what is said about anything depends entirely and exclusively upon them and there is no issue because as of now those minds do exist.
This would be circular argumentation.
That minds exist now proves only that there are minds now, it does not prove that truth is entirely and exclusively dependent upon those minds and these are not logically equivalent things.
Would I say that in world x, where there are no minds, it's true in world x that there are no truths?
You said there were no truths in world x, which does not deal with the issue, it is still a contradiction that it cannot be true that there are no truths.
Quoting Terrapin Station
That's a yes or no question. Either I would say that or I wouldn't (and I'll give you a 50/50 chance--either yes or no is correct here). At the moment, I'm only interested in your answer to this yes or no question. You should be able to answer this easily, because I explained it all in detail earlier in the thread, in responses to you that you responded back to.
This again?
I'm interested in the conversation getting somewhere (in my assessment). This is how it would get somewhere.
It seems to me that the disagreement here is over the very definition of truth, which is tied to the nature of propositions. On your (mind-independent) view, there are truths in a world without minds, including the proposition that there are no minds. On @Terrapin Station's (mind-dependent) view, there are no truths in a world without minds, because (I gather) there are no propositions (true or false) in such a world. The latter is only a contradiction given your definition of truth; it is not a contradiction given @Terrapin Station's definition. In other words, you cannot simply refute his definition by presupposing yours.
Answering his yes-or-no question will reveal whether you fully understand his position, so I encourage you to do so. Admitting that his view is not self-contradictory does not entail that it is correct; you can still reasonably disagree with it (as I do), but on other grounds.
Here's an illustrative aid that makes it a bit easier to think about the question:
So--would I say that inside of possible world x the proposition in quotation marks "There are no truths in possible world x" is true?
Yes I pointed out a contradiction with Terrapins view that truths were logically equivalent to judgments.
We imagined a world x where there were no minds.
The dilemma then becomes is it true in world x that there are no judgments?
If it is true then truths do not depend on minds and judgments are not equal to truths.
If it is not true then judgments do not depend on minds and judgments are not equal to truths..
Our disagreement about what truth ought to mean does not resolve the logical issues associated with Terrapins position I am afraid.
Quoting aletheist
I conceded this point, but it has a consequence, if there is no truth value in a world without minds, then we cannot know the truth value of the claim that truth value is exclusively and entirely dependent upon minds.
The proposition that truth depends on minds cannot be validated even if it avoids invalidation from contradiction.
Quoting aletheist
No, I will not have him dictate to me how I can post to the forum.
I can answer his questions how I choose.
That I fail to follow his desires in my answering does not prove that I don't understand his position.
That does not follow.
Would I say that inside of possible world x, that is, limiting it to what's inside of that circle above marked as "Possible World X," it's true or false that there are no judgments?
Again as I have pointed out already.
Claiming that there is no truth value will mean, as a consequence that the claim that truth is equal to judgments has no truth value either.
As stated, that's not at all a consequence. You'd have to spell out the implication, because as it stands it's a non-sequitur. You're simply claiming that it's a consequence of it.
If you're talking about immediately above where you wrote:
Quoting m-theory
The last part of that makes no sense. There is truth value in a world without minds by virtue of what?
If there is no truth value in a world without minds, then it does not obtain that it is false that truth value is world dependent.
Similarly with your claim that truth and judgment are logically equivalent.
If it does not obtain because there is no truth value in a world without minds, it does not obtain that it is true that judgments are logically equivalent to truth.
Ah--you're saying inside of world x? Yeah, inside of world x, nothing has any truth value. That has no implication on whether truths are judgments though.
For one, I want to be clear that you're not conflating truth value and facts. You're not doing that are you?
I am saying logic.
I can't really make sense out of that last post: "I'm saying (that via?) logic your claims do not (possess?) truth value because they are claims that (depend?) upon things (what things?) without truth value"??
But there is nothing more I can do.
I have explained it as clearly as I can.
I am pointing out the contrapositive consequence of your claims about the absence of truth value.
???
What conditional are we referring to, first off?--"If there are no judgments, there is no truth-value"? The contrapositive of that is, "If there is truth-value, then there are judgments."
If there is no judgments = P (Which has no truth value because truth value is equal to judgement)
then there are no truth values (which cannot be considered true or false)
Q(there is no truth value to negate) therefor P (again no truth value to negate)
Are you talking about the contrapositive of some claim in world x, that is, inside that circle?
You think that truth is mind-independent. Therefore, you think that there is truth in a world without minds. @Terrapin Station thinks that truth is mind-dependent. Therefore, he thinks that there is no truth in a world without minds. You think that this is a contradiction, because it would have to be a truth in a world without minds that there is no truth in that world. But that is not what @Terrapin Station is claiming; he is merely saying that in the actual world, where there are minds, it is a (mind-dependent) truth that there would be no truth in a world without minds.
I am talking contrapositives where there is no truth value.
Right, that's what I've been trying to make clear to him via clearing up what seems to be confusion about context with respect to possible worlds. (And hence my illustration above.)
I can't tell at all if he understands any of that stuff or if he's even paying any attention to it.
Yes I know I pointed out the issues with that already.
In post 484
It is possible to talk about the contrapositive, they simply have no truth value.
Issues with what? With which part of my last post do you disagree, and why?
It is a circular argument.
No, it's not. There are a couple possible reasons for this, depending on just what we have in mind contextually re the possible worlds in question:
Rather than drawing, because that's time consuming, I'll just do headings:
Either
(1)
IN POSSIBLE WORLD X
"I'm talking about . . ."
which isn't possible because there is no one in possible world x to talk about anything.
Or
(2)
IN POSSIBLE WORLD Y
"I'm talking about:"
IN POSSIBLE WORLD X
contrapositives (in world x)
But that's not possible, because there are no contrapositives in world x, because there is no logic in world x (aside from something like a book in world x that might have "logic" written on the cover etc.)
Of course, you could mean something like:
(3)
IN POSSIBLE WORLD Y
"I'm talking about contrapositives that I'm imagining would be in world X, or I'm referring to something in world X that we'd call a 'contrapositive' and assign truth values to in this world (world y) etc." but that's really talking about world y, things you're imagining about x from world y, etc.
How could it be true that there is no logic in world x if there is no logic in world x?
Which I'm challenging you to make explicit then. What specifically is a conclusion that's being mentioned in the premises of an argument?
Here is what you said in your post #484.
Quoting m-theory
What does this have to do with my summary? We are having this discussion in the actual world, where there are minds. Obviously we could not be having it in a world without minds - it would be impossible.
It's true in possible world y that there's no logic in world x.
In possible world x, nothing is true or false. It's simply a fact that there is no logic in possible world x. AGAIN, I want to make sure that you're not conflating facts and truth values. You're not doing that, are you?
In other words:
IN POSSIBLE WORLD Y
"There is no logic in possible world x" -- and then I assign "T" to that propostiion.
IN POSSIBLE WORLD X
"There is no logic in possible world x" --maybe that's text in a book that still exists in possible world x or something, but it's not true or false in this world.
Yes but it is not true in world x that there is no logic.
Right
IN POSSIBLE WORLD X
It is not true or false that there is no logic.
However, it is a fact that there is no logic.
It is not a fact that is true in world x
Correct. It's rather a fact that it's not true or false.
I think that is where we disagree most when it comes to truth.
You believe that where you lack any doubt then there is truth.
That is not my view of truth.
If truth is mind-dependent, and there are no minds in world x, then:
Seriously, what the fuck? I'm not saying anything about doubt or certainty. PERIOD.
Right. You understand my view.
Yes, the conditions of a conditional statement that leads to contradiction do not have to be met in actuality.
The argument is still a contradiction, even if the conditions of the argument are not met.
Then it is neither true or false that there is no logic in world x
(1)
IN POSSIBLE WORLD X
"There is no logic in world x"
(2)
IN POSSIBLE WORLD Y
"There is no logic in world x"
That's true (in my view) in (2), and neither true nor false in (1), correct.
Yes but we are talking about world x not world y
Sure, it's neither true nor false in (1). We agree on that.
If there is no truth value to obtain in world x then there is no truth value to obtain in world y.
That's certainly not my view. What would the argument be for that?
The reason there is no truth value to obtain is because of logic, the logic in world y would not permit you to simply obtain a truth value where there is none.
I disagree with the premise that logic is what "permits" or "doesn't permit" truth values. (A fortiori because I'd say that logic isn't in the permissions business.)
There is no contradiction whatsoever in my last post.
Quoting m-theory
We are talking about world x within world y (our actual world), where there are minds, truths, logic, etc. Obviously no one would be talking about world x within world x, where there are no minds.
Yes I realize that.
You are comfortable with your beliefs and that is fine.
But I am merely pointing out why I do not accept your beliefs as logically valid.
This cannot be true in logic without contradiction.
The only place where logical validity enters the picture is that if one accepts the premises that truth values are identical to judgments about propositions, and one accepts that judgments only obtain when there are creatures with minds, then inside of world x, it validly follows that there are no truth values.
That would simply be (semi-)formalized like this:
a is identical to b
b only occurs when there are Fs.
In domain x, there are no Fs.
Therefore, in domain x, a doesn't occur.
What the heck does "true in logic" even refer to in this context?
It means an argument with a valid or sound form.
There is no logic in world x. There is logic in our actual world, and thus we can assert in our actual world that nothing is true in world x. The only way to contradict this is to assert in our actual world that something is true in world x. @Terrapin Station is not asserting this, so his view is not self-contradictory - which, again, is not to say that it is correct.
In fact, you are the only one asserting that something is true in world x, because you believe that truth is mind-independent; i.e., there are truths in all possible worlds. That is why you see a contradiction - you are (perhaps unconsciously) imposing your own view as a hidden premiss, rather than sticking to what @Terrapin Station is actually advocating.
There are no contradictions in world x.
But in world y to say that there is no truths in world x still leads to a contradiction in world y because the contradiction is being caused by the logic in world y.
So in world y it can't true about world x that in world x there are no truths, that would be a contradiction about world x.
Also I never claimed truth is mind-idependent.
I claimed it is reasonable to say truth is mind dependent and world dependent.
So far nothing I have encountered in this thread has caused me to doubt this view..
I also agreed that it maybe that we can't know if there is or is not truth in a world without minds because it may be the case that there are no truth values in a world without minds.
The only thing I am advocating, my only hiden premise, is that perhaps you guys should consider the possibility that you cannot prove the things that you believe with logic. At least so far you have not done so without issues.
There is no shame in that I don't think.
Well, then "x can not be true in logic without contradiction" is just nonsense, unless we're talking about some weird paraconsistent logic with necessary contradictions.
Empirical claims are not provable period. I'm not at all talking about proofs, I'm not at all claiming that anything empirical I believe is proved or has anything to do with proofs, etc.
Also, even with proofs, they're only relative to particular systems of logic.
You said that something can't be "true in logic without contradiction."
By the way, in your view, the following isn't a valid argument?
a is identical to b
b only occurs when there are Fs.
In domain x, there are no Fs.
Therefore, in domain x, a doesn't occur.
I also pointed out that if a is identical to b and a has no truth value then neither does b.
That would mean that b only occurs in F's has no truth value
in domain x there are no F's is fine
Therefor in domain x a does not occur has no true value
Why would that be a contradiction?
P = In world x there are no truths.
not-P = In world x there are some truths.
@Terrapin Station is asserting P. He is not asserting not-P. Therefore, there is no contradiction. To get one, you have to add another premiss; for example, "If there are no truths within world x, then there are no truths (in any possible world) about world x."
Quoting m-theory
My beliefs have nothing to do with anything being discussed here. I am only evaluating the formal logic, not the propositions themselves.
Two problems with this comment:
(1) You have no idea what a and b are. They're variables. I'm not asking you to plug anything into the variables. That's why they're presented as variables.
(2) I'm asking whether you think the argument, as presented, with variables, is a valid argument or not. Whether premises are false has nothing to do with whether it's a valid argument.
In world y there is logic, hence there is a contradiction when you claim that it is true that there are no truths.
Only if I claim that it is true in world y that there are no truths. There is no contradiction when I claim (within world y) that it is true in world x that there are no truths.
The fact that a proposition has no truth value in world x does not entail that it also has no truth value in all other possible worlds. Likewise, the fact that a proposition is true in world y does not entail that it is true in all other possible worlds. The whole point of positing possible worlds at all is that the truth values for the same proposition can be different in different worlds.
Then a = b is redundant
Quoting Terrapin Station
To be honest I can't tell, you are not using a notation convention, and I don't want to transcribe it.
No if you claim it is true about world world x that there are no truths that is a contradiction because it is the case about world x that there are no truths.
Well, they're identical. So what goes for one goes for the other. Setting forth an identity certainly isn't an "illegal" move in logic.
Quoting m-theory
Aren't you able to assess validity for "informal" logic, syllogisms, syllogisms with variables, etc.?
That is why it is a redundant step.
If they are identical you can just one symbol and it will represent the same thing.
Here, you're conflating about world x and in(side of) world x.
We're in world y, of course. Any claims we make about world x are made from within world y. Those claims can be about world x. But you're getting confused about the difference between that and what's IN world x.
It is you two that want to use world x and world y.
I simplified the gist in a much earlier post.
We can simply examine the claim that if there are no minds there are no truths in this world.
But I suspect you want to keep world y around so you can keep doing this circular reasoning thing.
Which, in other words, is possible world x Possible world x is different than actual world y.
And stop mentioning circularity if you don't know what it refers to.
It is true that at one point in this world there were no minds, so world x is just a reference to that point in time in this world.
I do not understand this sentence. Let P = "there are no truths in world x." What you seem to be saying is, "If you claim it is true that P, that is a contradiction because it is the case that P." This looks like exactly the opposite of a contradiction to me.
And according to @Terrapin Station, at that point in time in this world, there were no truths. But he is asserting that now, when there are minds and truths. Obviously no one asserted it back then.
Sure, we could talk about Time T1 versus T2. I pointed out the confusions you were making with that earlier.
In that context, the problem wout be this:
"Here, you're conflating about T1 and at T1."
"We're at time T2, of course. Any claims we make about T1 are made at T2. Those claims can be about T1. But you're getting confused about the difference between that (claims made at T2 about T1) and what's at T1. "
You are saying there is set such that the set is empty and such that the set does not contain itself which we will call x.
You then proceed to say that set y contains the set x that is empty but that set x contains itself.
That is a contradiction..
Which Quoting aletheist
Yes this is circular, truth depends on minds, because there are minds now therefor truth depends upon them..
.
If only we couldn't make your confusions "old ground."
Or your stubbornness.
I'm not saying anything about sets containing themselves.
You are saying that world y contains world x.
Same difference.
What in the world? No. I'm not saying anything like that. Again, maybe try understanding what I'm saying rather than being so obsessed with "disproving" it. You're disproving things that are not at all what I'm saying, because you're not that interested in what I'm actually saying.
No one is saying this. You are now claiming that any propositions about world x can only be asserted in a world that contains world x. This is not how possible worlds work.
Maybe we should try formulating a straightforward counterfactual claim, rather than talking about possible worlds. This is what I understand @Terrapin Station to be advocating:
If there were no minds in our actual world, then there would be no truths in our actual world.
The only way that an if-then statement can be self-contradictory is if the antecedent is P and the consequent is not-P. That is not the case here, so there is no self-contradiction.
As far as I can tell there is no possible world argument such that it is necessarily true that truth depends upon minds and only minds.
I can't even make out a modal argument that this is the possible case.
If there are no minds = P
Then there are no truths =Q (self refuting)
I'm not saying anything about it being necessarily true, though.
Given what I think truth is, after all, the whole idea of something being necessarily true is wonky.
It's fine for a game-like construction a la modal logic, though.
Quoting m-theory
???
NO ONE IS CLAIMING THIS!
Quoting m-theory
That is irrelevant. Do you agree that the following statement is NOT self-contradictory?
Quoting aletheist
Note that I am NOT asking you whether you agree that this statement is true; it can still be false even if it is not self-contradictory.
And I offered to concede the point that it may be true and that we can't know.
What statement?
Knowing something doesn't have anything to do with certainty or with it being necessarily true.
Perhaps that is a different topic you could post.
Seriously? This statement:
If there were no minds in our actual world, then there would be no truths in our actual world.
NOT self-contradictory, right?
~P = if there were not minds in our actual world
then
~Q = there would not be truths in our actual world
Is the inverse of
P = If there are minds in the actual world
then
Q = there are truths in the actual world
But this part in particular is self refuting in my view
"There are no truths".
I can make no sense of the notion that it can be true that there are no truths.
I can make sense of this as false.
Because you're ignoring context.
From world y, it's true that there are no truths in world x.
At time T2, it's true that there are no truths at time T1.
You're ignoring context.
I am done with worlds.
I will simply have to take your word for it.
Well, I definitely agree that "In world x, it's true that there is no truth in world x" is contradictory. But that's not what's being said.
As I suggested long ago, substitute the word "judgment" for truth, and this should be far less confusing to you.
"In my judgment in 2016, there were no judgments made on Earth 4.3 billion years ago."
That doesn't seem contradictory to you, does it?
That would indeed be self-refuting ... but it is not what I said. My statement did not assert anything about what actually is the case, but rather about what would be the case under a certain condition - IF there were no minds, THEN there would be no truths. There is simply no way to construe this as self-contradictory.
No I don't agree with that view.
The argument is the combination of both statements
~P--->~Q
And not Q is still self refuting
Why should we have to substitute these terms if they are equivalent?
For purposes of understanding on your part. The word "truth" is confusing you.
And you're not answering the question:
"In my judgment in 2016, there were no judgments made on Earth 4.3 billion years ago."
That doesn't seem contradictory to you, does it?
You changed the statement. We agree that "there are no truths" is self-refuting. The statement was, "If there were no minds, then there would be no truths." Here the consequent, "there would be no truths," is NOT self-refuting. Consider this statement:
If there were no truths, then there would be no truths.
This is necessarily true - if P, then P - and thus obviously not self-contradictory.
Sure that seems reasonable, if it were that judgments and truths were the same thing.
I still see that as self refuting because would not be true that there were no truths
Okay, but understanding that on my view, truth values are simply judgments, when we put the word "truth" back into the statement, I'm saying the exact same thing. So that's why it's not contradictory on my view.
No the argument is not if P then P
The argument is if ~P then ~Q
where p if there is there are minds
and q then there are truths
Yes except it is contradictory to say it would be true that there would be no truths for example.
In logic at least that is contradictory in the sense that it is self refuting.
That is certainly the case when the context isn't different between "it's true" and "there are no truths."
However, ALL that I'm saying is that it's my judgment that there are no judgments in some particular context--some other time, some possible world, etc.
I have clearly been wasting my time. Cheers.
That is fine.
I just don't agree with the logical form of the argument you used to get there.
To my understanding circular arguments are not regarded as valid justification of claims.
i don't think that you're disagreeing with logical form. I think you're disagreeing, at least intuitively, with what "truth" denotes. You don't buy that truth is just a judgment that particular individuals make, and you're having trouble reading "truth" so that it would denote that and only that. You're intuitively thinking that there are going to be things true or false in worlds where no persons are around to make judgments.
Well actually that is why I was discussing the argument with aletheist in symbolic form.
But we can't even agree what the argument being made is.
If you wanted to discuss the argument in logical form I would be happy to do that.
Would there be any actuality; that is, would anything at all be the case in a world that contained no percipients?
Obviously I'm not any sort of ontological idealist.
Thats not an answer to the question.
In other words, why would I believe that the only means of there being something in a world is via there being creatures to have perceptions?
Now you are countering a question with a question. Why don't you just give an honest answer to the question instead of bullshitting around?
I gave an honest answer in the first place. If you want a particular (kind of) answer, either specify your limitations better or just have a conversation with yourself (since you'd be supplying the answer anyway).
It was a straightforward question that could be answered 'yes' or 'no' and you did not answer it. And I suspect I know very well why you didn't answer it
Actually, your comment above made me realize I misread your question (because at first I was like "It was a yes or no question? Wha??) I read your question as Quoting John
Re the simple yes/no question you actually asked, my answer is "Yes." The reason why I think that is that obviously I'm not an idealist. I'm a realist. I don't believe that the existence of anything but a very unusual possible world would depend on the existence of persons.
OK, no problem. So what then, according to you, is the difference in a mind-empty world between it being the case that X, and it being true that X?
"It is the case that" denotes a fact. Facts are states of affairs. "Ways the world is" in other words.
Truth-value is a judgment about the relationship of a proposition to something else--the something else being dependent on just what truth theory someone subscribes to. It could be correspondence (so that truth-value is a judgment about the relationship of a proposition to facts), it could be coherence (so that truth-value is a judgment about the relationship of a proposition to the rest of the propositions the person assigns "T" to), it could be consensus (so that truth-value is a judgment about the relationship of a proposition to propositions that are assigned "T" by consensus of relevant populations), and so on.
So then are you saying facts are propositions. Propositions that describe states of affairs. They are not, at least ostensively judgements, just statements of fact, so neither true nor false (I initially thought why not all true, since they can't be other than what they are, but I think ascription of truth to these statements gives them a valuation that they don't warrant, facts just are).
Facts exist separately from mind, they describe the world, current and in the past. Truths are made up of facts. So, if no mind then no truth, just facts.
I haven't the faintest idea how you'd get that from what I just wrote. I'm not saying anything like that. Facts and propositions are two different things.
Quoting CavacavaThose would be propositions. Facts are the states of affairs.
Quoting Cavacava
They=facts? propositions?
At any rate, neither facts nor propositions are judgments. Truth-value is a judgment.
Yes, although there are facts about minds, too.
Facts do not describe anything. They're not descriptions. They ARE the world.
Quoting Cavacava
The received view in analytic philosophy, at least, is that truth-value is a property of propositions. The view that truth-value is actually a judgment, or in other words, that the way the property of propositions in question obtains is via a judgment we make about propositions, is my own idiosyncratic view.
At any rate, clearly you've gone from asking for clarification on my view to giving your own, highly idiosyncratic view.
Quoting Cavacava
That I agree with (obviously--given everything I wrote about it above), but if on your view, truths are made up of facts, I have no idea how you'd get to "If no mind then no truth, just facts."
I don't understand that statement. Can you explain.
Well, what is it that you're describing when you utter a description? You're describing how the world is, right? That "how the world is" is what facts are. Facts aren't the descriptions. They're what you're describing.
Ok, then what you are saying is that the word "fact" has two senses,
a) as actuality, reality, the world
b) as a statement about what is comprised in "a"
"a" isn't beholding to us, except in so far as we fit into it
"b" assumes the ability to conceptualize what is sensed in "a" to give it a place in our construction of the world. Judgement takes facts, as we understand them and relates them to other facts & conclusions, which yield truths. Only humans do this cognitively, so if no mind, no truths, just facts, just the world.
No, facts are not statements. Facts are (a) only.
You seem to be conflating facts and propositions. They're two different things.
We're not separate from the world. Facts are everything with respect to the way the world is, including the way that humans are.
We connect to facts that are not us via our abilities to move, to manipulate things, etc., as well as via perception.
Can we say that facts are the objects of true propositions - i.e., that which they represent? I guess this gets tricky on the view that truth is a subjective judgment. What other word can we substitute for true? Correct? Accurate?
So by sensation, we become aware of what is apparent, what is sensed, which we attempt to fit into our conception of what is in the world. The straight stick looks bent in the jar of water only apparently, conceptually we understand the optics, we understand that in order for something to seem the way it is there must be something behind it, something which may not be as it seems.
Hi, no I don't think so, but I'll think about it. TS probable has a ready answer.
I'd say that it's what they're taken to represent, and add "just in case someone is using correspondence theory." What they're taken to represent is an important distinction in my view, because a major aspect of my view is that I'm rejecting the idea that propositions represent anything "on their own" so to speak. And a fortiori, I'd reject the idea that anything represents anything else non-mentally. Representation is a way of thinking about things. Representation is not a feature of non-mental existents.
Quoting Cavacava
I don't want to get into a philosophy of perception debate yet again, at least not just yet. We did it in what seemed to be tens of different threads within the past few months. Anyway, I'm a naive/direct realist. I think that representationalism is incoherent.
Fair enough, given your views.
Quoting Terrapin Station
It depends on exactly what we mean by "representation"; but again, I understand that this is your view.
Ok we have run into an impasse regarding both what and how reality is constituted, yet we both agree that without mind there is no truth, even though we disagree on what constitutes that judgement. I think we also agree that what is, is...even if we differ about what reality entails for us and how it can be known (we are not idealists).
If a mind-independent world can consist in "states of affairs", and in facts about those states of affairs, then why would there not be truths about those states of affairs?
For example, say that after humanity has become extinct, the Sun is now twenty times its 2016 size, and the average temperature of Earth is much hotter, wouldn't you say that it will then be fact that the Sun is twenty times its 2016 size and the temperature is thus much hotter on Earth, and that there will be an enormous number of other attendant facts besides? And wouldn't you say that it will then be true that the Sun is twenty times its 2016 size and the temperature is thus much hotter on Earth and that there will be an enormous number of other attendant truths?
Otherwise explain what is the difference between the facts that will then obtain that the Sun is twenty times its present diameter and the temperature is much hotter, and it being true at that time that the Sun is twenty times its present? To me it seems to be perfectly in accordance with ordinary usage to say that they are the same.
You say truth-value is a judgement about the relation between a proposition and "something else". If truth-value is conceptual and it relates to the "something else", does that mean that the relationship between truth and the "something else" is also conceptual? Wouldn't that entail that the "something else" is also conceptual, at least in part? If not then how could there be a relation between a conceptual thing (the proposition), a relation which is itself conceptual (the truth-relation can't be physical so what else could it be but conceptual?) and something entirely non-conceptual; the presumably purely physical 'something else'?
Quoting John
Are you wondering why truths wouldn't be the same thing as facts?
That's really a side issue. There are at least two senses of 'fact'. There are ostensive facts and there are semantic facts. The former are more like actualities or states of affairs and the latter are more like truths.
"It is a fact that the Sun is a certain distance from the Earth" expresses the semantic sense of 'fact', and is conceptually no different than saying "it is true that the Sun is a certain distance from the Earth".
"The distance form the Sun to the Earth is a fact" expresses the ostensive sense of 'fact'.
I am not claiming there is a truly coherent demarcation between ostensive and semantic senses of 'fact', either, and if there is not such a clear demarcation it is even more problematic for your position.
In any case, ostensive facts cannot be brutely physical entities, because if you claim they are then the difficulty of how there could be a truth relation to them arises. In fact the difficulty of how there could be any semantic relation to them at all would need to be explained if you want assert that facts in the ostensive sense are utterly non-semantic; which you would need to assent to if you want to claim that facts can be in the total absence of percipients that employ conceptualizing language.
Alright, then I'll take that as a "no" to the question I asked.
So to answer your questions:
Quoting John
Because truths, as I noted above, are judgments about the relation of propositions to other things (again, just what other things depends on the truth theory someone employs). There are no minds to make judgments in a mind-independent world.
Quoting John
Yes, I'd say that.
Quoting John
No, I wouldn't say that, since truth is a judgment about the relation of propositions. There would be no one to make such judgments.
Quoting John
Well, it's judgmental, but judgments have to involve concepts, sure.
Quoting John
Yes. The relationship hinges on the way the person assigns meanings to words, phrases, sentences, etc.
Quoting John
That depends on the truth theory in question. If we're talking about a relationship to facts--so if we're talking about correspondence theory, no. If we're talking about coherence theory, then yes.
Quoting John
Everything is physical. So I obviously don't agree with "the truth-relation can't be physical." Concepts are physical. Beyond that, I can't say I understand you being perplexed by how there can be a relation between propositions and other things. The way that obtains in this case is via an individual assigning meanings and, for example (if we're talking about correspondence), observing facts.
Quoting John
As you predicted, I don't buy that distinction.
Quoting John
If you're talking about the part in quotation marks as a statement, that's a proposition, not a fact (well, besides the fact that it's that proposition for example). I agree that people call true propositions "facts," but that's based on a misunderstanding of the terms. It's a bit similar to how folks conflate, say, speed and velocity. That's not to suggest that my analysis of truth is the received view, but that there's a difference between facts and propositions, and that truth-value is a property of propositions, is certainly the received view in analytic philosophy.
Quoting John
Again, the relation is a matter of how meanings (which are subjective, assigned by individuals, and not literally shareable) correlate to facts, or one's other propositions that have been assigned "T," etc.--that's one what is making a judgment about with truth-value.
Are there any mind-independent worlds to speak of?
We were talking about possible worlds, or you could just say we were talking about counterfactuals.
HIstorically, of course, we had a mind-independent world, and we might have one again in the future. I wouldn't say there are any actual mind-independent worlds at present though. Of course, I'd say there's just one actual world at present.
Again, you're picturing 'a world in which there are no mind' - the early earth, drifting silently through the empty void. But that is still a concept, an idea, ordered according to the intuitions of space and time. The point about realism - whether scientific or naive - is that it supplies that human perspective, situates the concept in a temporal and spatial matrix - and then doesn't realise it is doing so. Whatever we say about 'reality' assumes a perspective, but then forgets that it is actually supplying the perspective. It is analogous to wearing a pair of spectacles, without which nothing can be seen, and then looking through them, and demanding 'show me where in this picture there are spectacles'.
Here's a passage in Magee's book on Schopenhauer which explains this exact point:
Bryan Magee Schopenhauer's Philosophy, Pp 106-107
Firstly, by 'truth' you seem to understand only "truth value". Which would be very much like limiting facts to semantic kinds.
There are certainly cases in which people use 'truth' in a sense similar to that of ostensive facts. 'Climate change is true" would be an example.
Quoting Terrapin Station
But you say you don't buy the distinction. So that means that you must think people are speaking nonsense when they say "It is a fact that X".
But the real weakness of your position is that you seem to be unable to offer any explanation at all as to:
Yeah, my picturing it is a concept, etc. but the facts in question aren't a concept.
Quoting Wayfarer
Realism is an ontological stance. I'm not sure what the heck "it supplies that human perspective" is saying exactly, however. And you're saying the ontological stance "situates the concept in a temporal and spatial 'matrix'"?? What the heck does that amount to? "And then doesn't realize it is doing so"--as if an ontological stance is itself conscious or something?
Quoting Wayfarer
Over and over again, you conflate concepts and what they're concepts of, what we say and what we're talking about, etc.
But yeah, we have a perspective in saying something. A perspective is a type of reference point. And reference points can't be "gotten free of," whether we're talking about sentient beings or not.
Anyway, I don't really know what you're on about overall, but apparently per the Magee passage, you're arguing for idealism somehow. That's just what we need, because we haven't done that over and over enough in tons of different threads.
Not at all. When someone says "It is a fact that x," they are claiming that states of affairs are such and such. Why would that be nonsense?
Quoting John
My analysis of truth in no way hinges on some meta analysis of what it is ontologically in terms of physical versus nonphysical. You brought up that issue, so I commented on it.
You seem to be wanting to argue about physicalism rather than understanding the analysis of truth versus facts, etc.
It's not 'conflating' anything. It is the observation that you can't ultimately separate facts and concepts, reality and perception.
Quoting Terrapin Station
Problems of Philosophy 101.
Quoting Terrapin Station
Good! Please parcel me one up, and ship it. But first, weigh it and measure it.
Quoting Terrapin Station
Kant's is an ontological argument. Read that passage I quoted again. This is the exact point it's making. You're simply assuming 'the reality of the world'. What that passage is doing, calling it into question, and you respond with 'what the heck'.
I don't know why you refer to "post #2000", nor why you think that what is a really just common sense critical objection to Terrapin's hopelessly incoherent position is a "rehash of Hegel". If you know your German Idealism you should be well aware that Kant made the point before Hegel.
This is obviously not true, since it was you that claimed that truth is "physical" as a way of wriggling out of the conceptual difficulties involved in your position. If that is not an ontological claim then what kind of claim is it? All I am asking for is an explanation as to how truth can be understood to be physical; and if you can't offer one then your assertion is as empty as can be.
By physical do you think he means external instead? Physical substance isn't really physical afaik and doesn't exist how we think it does, so how could anyone say it has truth if all it is is a misunderstood system in/of existence?
Yes it is.
Quoting Wayfarer
There are facts about concepts of course, but in general, it's not an "observation," it's simply a conflation. You always talk about ideas like picturing something as if picturing is identical to what we're picturing. That's a simple conflation, as confused as if you were to say that a painting of a building is identical to the building. You could say, "It's an observation that you can't separate the painting and the building," but that wouldn't make it not a conflation where you simply do not understand that the painting and what it's a painting of are not the same thing.
Quoting Wayfarer
Which makes it curious that you haven't managed to tackle it yet.
Quoting Wayfarer
Is that from Idiotic Arguments 101?
Yeah, I'll place it in a box made of neutrinos for you. Oh wait--you couldn't receive a neutrino in a box, so they must not be physical per that script from your Stupid Arguments 101 course.
Quoting Wayfarer
Alert the press.Quoting Wayfarer
It's arguing that ontological stances have cognition as if they're sentient entities? Nice.
Quoting Wayfarer
I like how you assume that your inability to write clearly is identical to a much more well-written passage from the likes of Magee.
I don't know if everyone has the same amount of posts per page, but I'm set up so that I see 26 pages of posts at the moment in this thread. If you go back to page 20, say, and search for occurrences of the word "physical," the first occurrence is on page 25, when you said this:
Quoting John
So once again, I only mentioned the word "physical" because you brought it up in your post. I was responding to what you typed. My truth analysis has NOTHING to do with whether truth, facts, etc. are physical or not.
Quoting John
Jesus Christ, dude--learn how to read if you're going to attempt to have a big boy discussion. I wrote this: "in no way hinges on some meta analysis of what it is ontologically in terms of physical versus nonphysical.." You can't just bail on the sentence after you read the word "ontologically." There are six other words there that qualify the term "ontologically." (Not to mention that "meta analysis" qualifies it, too.)
Quoting John
Okay, but that's changing the topic. What does it have to do with whether truth is mind-dependent? I'd rather we didn't keep steering everything to talk about folks' pet topics. Let's try to have some discussions about something different every once in awhile.
This thread is about that very point, and nothing you have written in it demonstrates that you understand it. I notice also your non-response to the 'very well written passage' from Magee.
I wouldn't say that anything you write demonstrates that you can understand or communicate anything. In fact, every single thing you write seems to demonstrate that you have zero understanding of everything you read. You did that repeatedly in your post to me above, too, which is why I responded with sarcasm about it a number of times.
You certainly write a lot--you do here as well. That in no way implies that you understand anything you read or that you can write coherently, of course. Re whether you have an educational background in philosophy, those of us who do can tell if you do independently of what you say about yourself.
We haven't had enough threads already focused on a general realism vs idealism debate?
Why not focus on whether truth is mind-dependent separately from that? Unless one is an ontological idealist, in which case one likely thinks that truth isn't mind-independent a fortiori because nothing is, we could make this topic a lot more interesting than yet another realism vs. idealism debate on the most general level.
Apparently not. The point never seems to be understood.
Quoting Terrapin Station
I presume you're familiar with A J Ayer's Language Truth and Logic, which was based around the
principle of verification, very similar in import to this point you're making here? Do you recall what about 'the principle of verification', as described by Ayer in that book, eventually caused it to fall from favour?
Yet another example of you not being able to comprehend anything you read. I'm not saying anything about verification in what you're quoting from me. You should concentrate on trying to tackle basic reading comprehension instead of concentrating on quoting and name-dropping. I don't think the latter fools anyone into believing that you're an expert on anything, especially when you continually do it so that it doesn't really have anything to do with what anyone was saying. Try understanding what you're reading, try to write coherently rather than "impressively" (advice that would go for a few others around here, too), try directly answering questions and objections about your comments instead, and try treating others with a bit more respect and maybe you'll receive some in turn.
Well, I think you are. I think at many points in this thread, you claim that there are the facts, X, and here our concept of them, as if facts and our concepts of them are clearly separable. But the whole point of arguments about 'mind-independence' is to analyse this very supposition. So to simply assume that separability of facts and concepts is to beg the question - to assume what it is that requires proof.
And these types of statements:
Quoting Terrapin Station
These are very similar to the ideas Ayer explores in 'Language Truth and Logic' - this is not not 'name dropping' but referring to the literature of the subject so as to situate the debate in terms of philosophy.
Yeah, no shit. Because your reading comprehension sucks.
Quoting Wayfarer
Even if the two comments were related, as if what you describe above had something to do with verification(ism).
Quoting Wayfarer
Again, even if so, that (definition of "fact") has nothing to do with verification(ism). You're just digging a bigger hole for yourself. It's almost as if you can't simply read something and comprehend it for what it is.
No kidding! I would hate that. That would be terrible. Anyway, thanks for the chat.
Quoting Terrapin Station
I actually said this ; "If not then how could there be a relation between a conceptual thing (the proposition), a relation which is itself conceptual (the truth-relation can't be physical so what else could it be but conceptual?) and something entirely non-conceptual; the presumably purely physical 'something else'?"
Note how you left you the part where I said the "presumably physical something else", since you have long on these forums claimed to be a physicalist, and you also earlier said, as quoted: Quoting Terrapin Station
Apparently your "big boy" truth analysis has nothing to do with anything at all since it seems you are unable to give any account of it, other than to make vacuous assertions about what you will and won't "buy" as if anyone could be care less about that if it does not come with any accompanying explanation.
Your "position" is an absolute joke, dude if you not only cannot provide any argument for it, but cannot even give a cogent account of it. :-} :-d
This is in response to my earlier question:
Quoting John
You did claim that concepts and by extension truth are physical; it doesn't matter who mentioned the word "physical' first; that is just another of your red herrings. When you are asked for an account of how that works, you respond defensively as above, which indicates to me that it is likely there is no substance to your position.
Quoting Terrapin Station
Again this is a laughably lame evasion. It has nothing to do with pet topics and everything to do with whether truth is mind-dependent.The logic of the operation of minds is semantic, logical not physical. The very reason you can claim there is no truth absent minds is that the truth relation is understandable only as a semantic relation. You are left with two options. First: collapse the semantic into the physical; but if you are going to do that you should be able to give a better account of the truth relation than the semantic one. Or second, explain how there can be a relation between the semantic and the non-semantic. f you want to merely claim that concepts and by extension truth are really physical in order to merely feign explaining how the truth relation works in physicalist terms then I doubt anyone will take you seriously.
I agree with you that we have no really coherent notion of "physical' other than something like 'what can be sensed, measured and so on'. I don't know if Terrapin means "external'. I doubt it because he claims that everything is physical; that nothing is real except the physical. That is what it means to be a physicalist. It is a deeply incoherent, self-refuting position in my view, but people like Terrapin continue to assert it without being able to provide any cogent argument for why they hold to it. I think it really is a case of 'head-retracted turtles all the way down'.
Because the whole point was who brought up "physical" first in our discussion in this thread. I wasn't talking about that in this thread. My view on truth, facts, etc. and whether they're mind-dependent do not have anything to do with my physicalism. I don't want to talk about the same things in every thread so that we can't even tell what the heck the topic of the thread started out as. This board has a tendency to do that, it has a tendency for people to keep getting into the same discussions over and over and over regardless of what the thread was ostensibly about.
Quoting John
So then how about we don't bring up the same discussions we've already done 50 times in other threads?
Quoting John
Again with that stupid criticism. I might care about it if anyone were providing any arguments for anything here, where "argument" would amount to something I'm not doing; that is, if I were doing something significantly different than other folks rhetorically. But apparently, either (a) people believe that I believe that I'm providing arguments for things in some narrower sense, and so they're figuring that saying that I'm not providing an argument for something will sting as a comment, where they're also assuming that I consider their opinions as critics to hold water (which is probably not safe to assume), or (b) people believe that they're providing arguments for things in some narrower sense, and they believe that I'm doing something significantly different than they are in that regard. I don't know which option there is more amusing. But be sure to bring this up 50 more times in 50 different threads in the future.
Quoting John
Yes, it does. The reason that matters is that my truth analysis has nothing to do with my physicalism. You were claiming that the two were importantly related, and you used the fact that I was making comments about physicalism as evidence for that. Well, the only reason I made any sort of comment about physicalism was because I was responding to you bringing up physicalism in your discussion with me.
Quoting John
An account of how what works? The relation between propositions and facts that we judge as truth-value? I explained that--we assign meanings to words, phrases, propositions and assess how those meanings correlate with facts (if correspondence theory), other propositions we've assigned "T" to (if coherence theory), what's commonly assigned "T" by relevant populations (if consensus theory), etc. If you still see something mysterious there, you'd need to better explain why you see it as mysterious.
And I said all of the above already.
If you were talking about something else instead (re an account of how "that" works--I'm not entirely sure what "that" is referring to), then please specify what "that" is.
Quoting John
Again, MY truth analysis, MY view on whether it's mind-dependent has nothing to do with my physicalism. Assume mind is nonphysical. Well, that doesn't at all change my truth analysis or my view on whether truth is mind dependent. That would be the case whether we assume that mind is nonphysical, whether we assume that the world is nonphysical, too, whether we assume that the world is nonphysical and the mind is physical--whatever we assume in that regard. It just has nothing to do with my truth analysis.
Quoting John
I don't agree with that. I don't agree that that's the only reason that someone could claim that there is no truth if there are no minds, but in any event, as I explained above, yes, the relation is a semantic one on my view.
Quoting John
Not that I agree that those are the only two options, but the first option is irrelevant on my view, as I'm not saying anything that hinges on whether anything is physical or not, and re the second option, I did that already.
Although note in the first place that it's not necessarily the case that the relation is between the semantic and the nonsemantic. That's not the case with coherence theory for example. The relation there is purely in terms of the relation between the proposition in question and the other propositions the person assigns "T" to. It's also not the case with consensus theory, because again, the relation is purely to other propositions to which "T" is assigned. And I'd say it's not the case with pragmatism, either, as the relation is between the proposition in question and what the person considers useful, practically valuable, etc.
It's an issue with correspondence (and for some odd reason, by the way, folks on this board seem to assume that correspondence is the only available truth theory), but as I said, with correspondence, I explained this already. You're simply assessing the proposition in relation to facts of the world as you experience them. It doesn't matter for this what exactly is going on ontologically re that experience--whether physicalism is true, whether direct realism is true, whether solipsism is true, or anything in between--whatever is the case. It doesn't matter. In all of those cases, the answer is the same. You're assessing propositions with facts of the world as you experience them.
[Of course, for the question posed in this thread, we don't have to bother too much with (at least ontological) idealism, because an (ontological) idealist is going to think that the answer to the topic question is obviously "Yes," since a fortiori everything is mind-dependent in their view]
And for it not mattering, it would be a crappy functional analysis of truth if it were to only work on an assumption that physicalism is true. To be a worthwhile analysis of truth it needs to work for not only whatever general ontological assumptions someone makes, but whatever truth relation they employ--hence why it's not just a correspondence theory. It works just as well with the other truth theories. That's not to say that it's simply a reporting of how people think about truth, their beliefs about it, etc. It's a functional analysis of what they're doing in their truth (talk) behavior.
By the way, the relation isn't mysterious to you because you're thinking that all of the properties have to match or something to be a relation, are you? That is, you're not thinking something like "There can't be a relation between something with property p and something without property p. In order for there to be a relation, both things have to have the same properties", are you?
Quoting John
For the umpteenth time, I only mentioned that I believe that concepts, truth, etc. are physical because you brought up that issue and I didn't want to ignore things that you'd said in my response to you. I definitely believe that concepts, truth--EVERYTHING--is physical, and I'm a direct realist and yada yada yada. None of that has anything to do with my truth analysis however.
Quoting John
You're obviously under a mistaken impression of my assessment of fellow posters who might not "take me seriously."
For example, maybe you're under a mistaken impression that I consider you a qualified judge of anything?
Fine, have it your own way as always, but I won't bother to respond to a giant load of evasive, non-committal bullshit. What a joke! :-}
We agree on one thing:
:-}
I'm hardly the first or the last to do it, but I think we have to question the question. If we take the question seriously, it seems to throw us into the ancient mud of stating our linguistic preferences as if we were doing something like science. I'm just one voice, of course, but I'd say that pursuing this question in all of its ambiguity and possible uselessness is a waste of time better spent on more relevant issues. I don't want to come off here as anti-philosophical. Philosophy is at times the best genre. At other times it looks like the place where thinking goes to die alone, growling along the way of course at the "idiots" who refuse to agree with trivial preferences.