The Problem with Escapism
Recently in philosophy of religion, Andrei Buckareff and Allen Plug have come up with an alternative view of hell that denies its eternal nature. They claim that God’s character and policies warrant that he would enforce an open-door policy when it comes to hell allowing escape from eternal damnation, hence the title “escapism”. Their argument for escapism can be summarized as follows
1. None of God’s actions toward persons is unjust or unloving.
2. If God does not provide opportunities for salvation to people in hell, then His actions toward those in hell are unjust and unloving.
3. Therefore, God provides opportunities for salvation to people in hell.
This argument seems plausible, and, upon first reading it, I thought it provided a positive alternative to the eternal view of hell that we currently hold. Additionally, in proposing this argument, Buckareff and Plug adopt an issuant view of hell which contrasts with the retributive version Christians traditionally hold in that hell issues from the same godly love that heaven was issued from and is not a place of punishment. Rather, hell is where God sends those who have chosen not to accept communion with him and is simply a very unpleasant alternative to heaven. In my eyes, this issuant version with hell coupled with unlimited opportunities for salvation seemed like a great alternative to the fiery, retributive, eternal hell.
However, upon further examination, I realize that this argument is unsound. The premise I would like to contest is the second one. Under this issuant view of hell that Buckareff and Plug have adopted, it seems incorrect to claim that God not providing opportunities for salvation is unjust. Rather, through their actions on Earth, those who end up in hell have chosen to reject communion with God and it doesn’t seem unjust for God to respect their free will by allowing them to remain in hell. This applies especially because the issuant view of hell is not the retributive, meaning that those in this version of hell are not being punished. They are simply living in a highly unpleasant state that stems from love. Since the issuant view of hell also asserts that hell issues from His godly love, it doesn’t seem unloving either for God to allow residents to remain without the opportunity of salvation.
1. None of God’s actions toward persons is unjust or unloving.
2. If God does not provide opportunities for salvation to people in hell, then His actions toward those in hell are unjust and unloving.
3. Therefore, God provides opportunities for salvation to people in hell.
This argument seems plausible, and, upon first reading it, I thought it provided a positive alternative to the eternal view of hell that we currently hold. Additionally, in proposing this argument, Buckareff and Plug adopt an issuant view of hell which contrasts with the retributive version Christians traditionally hold in that hell issues from the same godly love that heaven was issued from and is not a place of punishment. Rather, hell is where God sends those who have chosen not to accept communion with him and is simply a very unpleasant alternative to heaven. In my eyes, this issuant version with hell coupled with unlimited opportunities for salvation seemed like a great alternative to the fiery, retributive, eternal hell.
However, upon further examination, I realize that this argument is unsound. The premise I would like to contest is the second one. Under this issuant view of hell that Buckareff and Plug have adopted, it seems incorrect to claim that God not providing opportunities for salvation is unjust. Rather, through their actions on Earth, those who end up in hell have chosen to reject communion with God and it doesn’t seem unjust for God to respect their free will by allowing them to remain in hell. This applies especially because the issuant view of hell is not the retributive, meaning that those in this version of hell are not being punished. They are simply living in a highly unpleasant state that stems from love. Since the issuant view of hell also asserts that hell issues from His godly love, it doesn’t seem unloving either for God to allow residents to remain without the opportunity of salvation.
Comments (10)
Your argument seems to take the following form:
1. If God is all-loving, then it's right for God to respect the free will of sinners by allowing them to remain in hell.
2.God is all loving.
3. Therefore, it's right for God to respect the free will of sinners by allowing them to remain in hell.
I would like to take objection to your first premise, as I believe it is unsound. I think, as you lay out in your post, that this isn't an adequate-enough response to the initial argument. It is not love for God to let people perish miserably in hell when he has the power to save them. Even if he's respecting their free will, I think we'd still argue that a grander demonstration of love would be to save a person from eternal flames. Let's think of a real world example where this is the case: a mother and a son. The son has grown up to be accused of murder-- and is on trial for the death penalty -- but he has an alibi. Unfortunately, the alibi would make him look very bad in front of the entire world, so he doesn't want to share the alibi with the public. In one scenario, the mother respects the son's free will not to use the alibi, and lets him get put to death. In another scenario, the mother takes action and convinces her son to share the alibi with the world and ultimately save his life. When left to a vote between these two scenarios, it seems as is the mother that saves her son is more loving, no?
Looking forward to your thoughts.
Free will is not lack of determinism, so God could build people who functioned in ways that would not lead them into hell without violating any freedom of will in any way that matters morally. He could, for example, make people really skilled from birth at figuring out what is right and wrong, so the right thing to do is just obvious to everyone, and made them strong of will so that when they decide that something is the right thing to do, they will follow through on that if it is at all possible to do so, instead of failing to do so out of weakness that they would later regret.
Even if hell were just separation from God, if God is all-powerful then he can reach out to everywhere and ensure that nothing is ever separated from him. This dovetails closely to the common theistic view that God is the source of morality, and that knowing God is how to know what is right or wrong. An all-powerful all-loving God could and would just "shine his light into the heart of everyone" so that the way to him was obvious and obviously desirable and everyone was naturally drawn to him for their own good. They would be able to turn away if they wanted to, but why would anybody ever want to?
According to Christian doctrine, beings are free to accept or reject God. If they reject God of their own free will, then 'hell' is the result. Whereas if you were forced or obliged to 'love god' and had no choice in the matter, then it wouldn't amount to anything - you would be a robot or automaton and it would mean nothing to you. That is the meaning of being born free.
It's like you didn't read past that first sentence.
As a "created" being myself, I want the ability to easily figure out what I should do instead of screwing up out of ignorance or inconsideration, and the resolve to end up doing what I think I should instead of something else I'll regret later. Difficulty figuring out what to do and difficulty making myself do it feels less free, and worse for me, and worse for the world. If my behavior is predictable as a consequence of me being more likely to always do the right thing (so if you know what the right thing is, you know what I'll do), that doesn't feel less free or worse in any other way.
After reading Buckareff and Plugs thoughts on escapism, I believe that there is an important distinction to be made regarding the nature of hell that has not been addressed yet here. Buckareff and Plug specify that they have no intention of defining the state of hell, or how bad it may or may not be. They only state that hell is less good than heaven, therefore, hell’s inhabitants may not “perish miserably” or be forced to exist in, “eternal flames”. If hell is simply not as good as heaven, would your response change? For all we know hell could be similar to life, not fully bad but certainly not perfect. While heaven’s perfection does seem to be preferential, I don’t know that people should be deprived of their free will solely on the basis that an option is less good than the other. Secondly, an issue I hold with your example regarding the mother/son is that the mother being human is motivated by her own desires to keep her son alive, thus putting herself first over her son. If the son would rather die than face public ridicule then it would be more loving for her to put aside her selfish desires in regards to her own fears for her son and to prioritize his needs, allowing him to die.
Too much pleasure is a pain.
Why would this be true? God says what "unjust" and "unloving" means not us. So if he decides that you deserve eternal damnation for being evil for 70-80 years then that means that is just and loving.
If you take ordinary human suffering that has 'natural' causes, like a painful childhood death from cancer, or the deaths from a tsunami or earthquake - many people will regard such events as somehow 'unjust or unloving', if some sort of super-person was their cause.
You also have what for me is a perennial problem in making analytic quasi-logical arguments about 'God': there seem to be many premises behind the visible ones, which Christians like yourself take for granted. Here's one: in what sense is 'God' a kind of super-person who can allow or inflict verdicts and their consequences? Can the idea be given meaning for a person who doesn't use 'God' in their vocabulary of philosophical accounts?