Being Good vs Being Happy
First time poster here.
Is there a logical difference between being happy and being good?
The meaning behind the term "good" seems to be fulfillment of something. For instance, I call a pen "good" if the pen does what a pen is supposed to, the more a pen an object is, the more it is a "good" pen. Likewise, something x is "good for" y, if and only if x fulfills or gives being to y.
"Happiness", on the other hand, also seems to mean fulfillment of something. For instance, one might say they are happy if they get everything they want, where want means something lacking, hence fulfillment. Obviously there can be false wants, as in getting something that your nature or being isn't actually lacking per its nature. Likewise, if one is satisfied, one is happy, but satisfaction seems to mean the same thing as fulfillment.
Is it the case, then, that being happy and being good are not actually distinct? Thoughts? Criticisms?
Is there a logical difference between being happy and being good?
The meaning behind the term "good" seems to be fulfillment of something. For instance, I call a pen "good" if the pen does what a pen is supposed to, the more a pen an object is, the more it is a "good" pen. Likewise, something x is "good for" y, if and only if x fulfills or gives being to y.
"Happiness", on the other hand, also seems to mean fulfillment of something. For instance, one might say they are happy if they get everything they want, where want means something lacking, hence fulfillment. Obviously there can be false wants, as in getting something that your nature or being isn't actually lacking per its nature. Likewise, if one is satisfied, one is happy, but satisfaction seems to mean the same thing as fulfillment.
Is it the case, then, that being happy and being good are not actually distinct? Thoughts? Criticisms?
Comments (37)
Your argument of a pen being "good" is subjective. To a poet a pen is extremely good, to a football player not so much. This type of good, if it can be called that is the good of utility. I think what you want to mean is the good in people, or virtue or justness as the Greeks called it.
Like, according to your definition of good, is a mountain good? I mean, some people might marvel at them but most people live their lives happily ignoring it, and it wouldn't really matter if you took the mountain away, wouldn't make any difference to them. Perhaps the habit of appreciating natural beauty is good, or penmanship, and not the mountain or the pen itself. Also, climbing mountain is hard work and a pen can be used to harm somebody by poking them with it. The intention of the person who made the pen expecting it to be used for some constructive purpose, and the beautiful verses written by the poet or the satisfaction of a businessman who just finished doing his accounts with the pen, is perhaps a better concept of good, rather than an object of utility itself.
Another example is an airplane. Is an airplane good? For some people it might be, but perhaps they are actually bad for the environment and to spirituality.
Let's take the example of the pen for instance. I think that we can agree on a pen being able to take the characteristics of being " a good pen". We can also agree on a pen being the able to fulfill something, such as "the pen is good for writing on the paper". It is both a good pen, being of favorable characteristics, and it is "good for" something which in this case is writing, so it fulfills a purpose.
Now, if we take this same pen which we have agreed is good and is good for something, and we pose the question to the user of the pen and ask him "Are you happy to receive this good pen? Does it satisfy you?" then things can take a dramatically different context.
First off, lets define happiness. You have stated that it is a fulfillment of something and I agree. Happiness is a fulfillment of joy. You are happy because something favorable has happened to you and that has led to joy, which is another way of saying that you are happy. As a matter of fact, the something favorable in question doesn't even need to happen to you, it just has to be what you consider favorable and it has to be something from which you hope to have joy from.
As I have already stated, this is what I see as the difference as I have tried to highlight in my somewhat rambling way. While happiness and good are both fulfillments' of something, happiness is more towards the fulfillment of a desire or feeling. Happiness is much more emotionally entwined. On the other side of things, being good is a fulfillment of a purpose, it is a fulfillment of an object(in this particular scenario with the pen) achieving what it was made to do. And from this we can surmise that being good is somewhat of a more logical train of thought.
When expressing something or someone as being happy we can assume that this is their emotional state. They have fulfilled their innermost desire(which can be, but is not limited to, fulfilling their purpose) and that has brought them to a favorable outcome in which they find joy. When expressing something or someone as being good, we can assume that they have favorable characteristics and that they have achieved their purpose successfully and in decent manner. While something or someone can both be happy and be good, the two are not mutually exclusive and not always able to be used together. And so I surmise that they are distinct and do differ in the various contexts and meanings that they are used in.
Morally speaking I would say the greater the moral problem the more it shifts away from ‘happiness’. Happiness isn’t the be all and end of moral action/choice because morality is tested properly only when we have to take on an ‘unhappy’ role to fulfill a moral stance - to kill a man and suffer the inner turmoil of committing murder even when we realise the death of said man was almost certainly the best moral choice at the time (if said man was about to rape and torture three million people until the slowly and painfully lost their minds whlist their friends and families looked on). Even taking the life of such a person would inevitably be tough as taking a life, no matter how abhorrent you believe the life to be, cannot to my mind be something that won’t leave some mental scar.
Essentially to understand something abhorrent is to realise you’re capable of such abhorrence. The ‘good’ cannot be perpetually ‘happy’ and must, if intent on securing the ‘good’, willingly force themselves to be ‘unhappy’ - to some degree.
It is probably the key difficulty of human life dealing with this impossible balance. Clinging to ‘happiness’ is for fools and children only. Once experience takes hold all sense of ‘happiness’ will evaporate if one is silly enough to exit the warmth of one’s home naked and smiling into a blizzard - simply put if we avoid pain we’ll never mature and come to understand what pain we can cause and what pain we can feel (such a life is hardly a life at all).
There seems to be some mixing up of applications of the terms ‘happy’ and ‘good’ in reference to the subject. The OP questions the difference between ‘being happy’ and ‘being good’, but other posters here have interchanged ‘being’ and ‘feeling’. There is little difference between feeling happy and feeling good, but being good is another thing entirely.
When I believe I am happy, my inner experience (interoception) expresses a positive affect, and I’m assuming or predicting the emotional concept ‘happy’ based on all available information.
When I believe I am good, I’m assuming or predicting a positive evaluation in others’ experience of me, based on my words and actions in relation to my evaluation of the thoughts and intentions behind them.
It is possible to be happy without being good, and to be good without necessarily being happy, so I don’t see how they can be logically the same.
I refer to a pen as ‘good’ when my expectations of the concept ‘pen’ are met. In that situation I would be happy, but I wouldn’t consider referring to the pen as ‘happy’.
So it makes more sense to me to say that I am happy when everything and everyone I interact with is ‘good’, and I am ‘good’ when everyone I interact with is happy.
You can be a good citizen and not be happy. You can be a good worker and not be happy.
Being good isn’t feeling good.
Being good is associated with good behaviour more often than feeling I would’ve thought.
For instance having sex usually feels good, yet often one doesn’t feel happy at the same time, so feeling good is not the same as feeling happy.
I don’t see what “being happy” would refer to besides “feeling happy”, so I will assume that “being happy” = “feeling happy”. Thus feeling good is not the same as being happy.
Now there remains to show the relationship between feeling good and being good. As you mentioned in your example with the pen, something being good can refer to it being useful in order to fulfill some purpose. But then that means that the same thing can be both good for someone and not good for someone else, depending on what is desired. A pen that works well won’t be much good to someone who desires to communicate with a blind person, for instance, while it will be good to someone who wants to write a letter. And even though the person writing the letter can see the pen as good, the person doesn’t necessarily feel good at the same time, that person could be quite sad for instance while writing the letter. And the pen can be good (for someone) without feeling anything itself. So being good and feeling good are decidedly not the same.
So by the above being good and being happy are not the same, they are quite distinct. You can be happy without being good, and you can be good without being happy.
Another way to see the difference between the two is that while being happy is related to the fulfillment of your own desires, being good is related to the fulfillment of desires that aren’t necessarily yours. Yet another difference is that you can fulfill your own desires without being happy, because you have more profound desires that you haven’t yet uncovered or that you have forgotten because you believed they cannot be fulfilled. Sometimes people say they have everything they need and yet they aren’t happy, they feel something is missing but they cannot quite put the finger on what that is. Whereas when a pen fulfills its purpose we say it’s a good pen, regardless of how we feel.
Quoting Possibility Correct.
Quoting Possibility
I am not so sure the pen is not 'happy', and it makes sense to use "happy" this way. E.g. the "happy warrior", when referring to the warrior who fulfills the ideals of warriorhood.
Quoting Possibility
How would you define "feeling" and "happy" in this sentence. If "happiness" needs a modifier "feeling" to associate it with "feeling" then what does "happiness" itself mean disconnected from that qualifier "feeling"?
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II. @Leo
Quoting leo
What do you mean by "happy" here disconnected from the qualifiers "being" or "feeling"?
Quoting leo
Correct, which would be the difference between "being good (in itself)" and "being good for x". Both refer to "fulfilling some x". "Being good" fulfills its own nature and "being good for x" fulfills x.
Quoting leo
Yet if one is lacking good feelings, isn't there at least some quality of that person that is lacking goodness? Certainly feelings might not be as valuable as promoting other goodness in oneself, but its not nothing. Hence "feeling good" might not be "being good" even if its necessary condition for fully "being good."
What I meant to say is that being happy is the same as feeling happy, in case that was unclear, to me “being happy” refers to “feeling happy”. I don’t see happiness as something that can exist independently of the feeling of happiness.
Quoting Dranu
Would you say a pen can “be good” in itself, that it has its own nature that can be fulfilled? If someone uses a pen to write and someone else uses a pen to hurt and someone else uses a pen to point at something, what would be the nature of the pen?
A desire/purpose is what can be fulfilled, presumably a pen has neither in itself.
Quoting Dranu
It depends what you mean by goodness. When we say “that person is a good man”, we refer to that person’s actions, not necessarily to what he feels. Some person could feel good about killing many people, but we wouldn’t say that person has goodness. “Feeling good” usually refers to pleasure, whereas “good feelings” usually refers to moral good, so the two are distinct, one can feel good about spreading suffering which isn’t considered a moral good.
Being happy can be seen as fulfilling one’s own profound desires. If you define being good as fulfilling one’s own profound desires (fulfilling one’s own nature) then by definition you see “being happy” as the same as “being good”. However that does not imply that being happy is necessarily being a morally good person. When you’re happy you’re good for yourself, but you’re not necessarily good for others.
Quoting leo Yes.
Quoting leo To write. If they intend to use it to stab, they are not using it as a pen.
Quoting leo Certainly all things besides Being have their nature through another (call it desire or telos, whatever). I do not mean they get it from themselves, but they all have it. That of course would be another debate, but suffice it to say, I simply mean that we call something good in itself when it fulfills what it is, and it is good for x when it fulfills that external x.
Are there other meanings for good besides variations of this use?
Quoting leo So you are saying we normally equivocate on the term "good"? If so what are the two meanings if a person who does not have good feelings can indeed be said to be truly and completely good? Without equivocation on the meaning of "good", he obviously could not be, for to lack any goodness is to not be good in some way.
Happiness is a feeling, an internal experience that refers to patterns of information we conceptualise as ‘happy’. The concept ‘happy’ refers specifically to interoception, but the concept ‘good’ refers to an overall hierarchy of value, in this sense applied to interoception - ie. feeling.
‘I feel happy’ refers to an immediate recognition of positive affect in interoception; ‘I am happy’ relates that affect to one’s experience of their overall situation. The distinction is subtle, but the effect is to associate the positive affect with objectively verifiable elements of one’s experience. It’s an assumption, what Lisa Feldman Barrett refers to as ‘affective realism’. This is where confusion begins. When ‘being happy’ is associated more with our external, physical life than our inner, experiential life, it seems more ‘real’ because it’s objectively verifiable. I can believe that I am happy because the external situation with which I have associated that happiness hasn’t changed, even if I no longer feel happy - the negative affect can easily be attributed to feeling unwell, nervous, stressed about something else, etc.
Recognising that ‘happy’ cannot be disconnected from the positive affect in interoception prevents us from assuming that happiness lies in what material goods we possess or the way our current situation appears to others.
Reducing the fifth dimension, the value aspect of our reality, to four dimensional events or objects necessarily discards information about that aspect. Just as drawing a table (reducing a three dimensional object to two dimensions or even one) must be carefully done so that we continue to recognise it as an accurate portrayal of the three dimensional object, so reducing the five dimensional concepts ‘happy’ or ‘good’ to a description of objectively verifiable events (4D) or objects (3D) requires great care to retain accurate information regarding its fifth dimensional aspect - its relation to value structures and systems.
So "feeling happy" means awareness of "positive affect in introception." Is "positive affect" distinct from "good affect?" If so how?
If not, then would'nt it logically follow that since "feeling happy" means "feeling positive", and "feeling positive" means "feeling good", then good and happy mean the same thing even if we normally use happiness in context of a feeling qualifier?
For clarification sake, I definitely agree and understand that normally "happy" is used to refer to feeling, I am just thinking that when we analyze the meaning behind that word it, unqualified, actually means the same thing as "good."
I wouldn’t use ‘good’ in this context - it doesn’t make sense to me. Do you have an example of it being used in this way, or are you simply throwing words together?
Quoting Dranu
This is what I mean about reducing a fifth dimensional aspect of reality. ‘Feeling good’ and ‘feeling happy’ both refer to a positive affect, but not in the same way. Language is a bit like drawing - you’re combining concepts/line strokes to reduce meaning to words on a page.
‘Good’ is an overall value concept that attributes a positive affect to something - in this case, it is attributed to how one is ‘feeling’. So ‘good’ is the qualifier here.
The use of the qualifier ‘feeling’ in reference to ‘happy’ shouldn’t be necessary. It is used only because we misuse the concept ‘happy’ as a qualifier in itself, disconnecting it from the affect or feeling to which it refers.
In my view, ‘good’ is a misleading term that enables us to associate positive affect without qualification, and make value judgements on the world as if these judgements were objective. ‘Happy’ used as an adjective or adverb has a similar misleading effect, although it refers specifically to interoception, whereas ‘good’ refers to internal and/or external experiences.
All of this stems from the insecurity of referring to irreducible value aspects of reality.
Quoting Possibility Of course: "I have a good affect", meaning it is an affect which gives satisfaction or fulfillment to the end of interoception. Of course since you mean a positive affect is not identical to a good affect, I might be using the term positive different than yourself. I do not know.
Quoting Possibility Well, maybe they are. It certainly would seem to be a result of the words meaning the same thing if they do. Nevertheless fear of the consequences of the meanings being the same does not mean they do mean something different.
Quoting Possibility Certainly happy means something in itself without "feeling", otherwise it would be identical to "feeling", and thus the only type of feeling which I assume you agree is false. There must be a way to distinguish it from a "sad" feeling, etc. Likewise, all other types feelings can be used outside the context of feeling as well since they have independent meaning from the feeling qualifier, and by the fact of being types, something other than the genus they are qualified by is their meaning, as this is the case of all types/species.
Those who are good are deserving of happiness - that is, it is good if they are happy (and bad if they are not). But being deserving of happiness and being happy are not the same.
This is not to suggest that happiness is individually subjective. Happiness is no more individually subjective than goodness is. It is just that they are not the same quality.
Can you think of a definition of the two that are distinct and cannot be reduced to each other?
Quoting Dranu
‘Positive’ and ‘negative’ refer to opposing ends of a spectrum that are not necessarily good or bad. If I have an affect that is positive, that’s good for me, in itself. When I refer to an experience or object as ‘good’, I am correlating it with a positive affect, whether or not that affect is mine, necessarily.
If a serial rapist or murderer, for instance, has a positive affect, that may not necessarily be ‘good’, objectively or morally speaking, although they would find it subjectively ‘good’ for them. So when you claim to ‘have a good affect’, you’re making an assumption that what feels good for you is objectively good. By replacing ‘positive’ with ‘good’, you effectively conceal the subjectivity - not of the affect itself, but of the positive affect you attribute to your (self-reflective) experience of that affect.
‘Good’ claims a non-specific association with positive affect, and requires qualifiers for clarity. Whose positive affect is associated here? Objectivity is implied when ‘good’ is employed in a particular way - but is not intrinsic to the term, and conceals the introspective aspect of the claim.
‘Positive’ is often interchanged with ‘good’, but the term actually has nothing to do with affect in itself. ‘Affect’ is implied when ‘positive’ is employed in a particular way, but is not intrinsic to the term.
‘Happy’ is specifically associated with a subjective, internal experience of positive affect - predicting a specific emotional concept as a result of introspection (self) or observation (others). Introspection is intrinsic to the term.
But that is evidence that your analysis is going wrong. We don't need definitions. Prior to having any definition of goodness or happiness, it seems to us - that is, it is manifest to the reason of most of us - that happiness and goodness are not one and the same quality.
If, upon trying to define happiness and goodness respectively, you find that your definitions collapse them into one, then you have not discovered that they are one - that would be to give your own attempts at definition control over reality - but that your definitions are faulty.
You know what happiness is without having to have a definition of it. For example, if I said "happiness is a piece of cheese", you know that my attempted definition is mistaken even though you have none of your own to offer.
As it is manifest to reason that happiness and goodness are not the same - for someone can be good and not happy, and not good and happy - then we know in advance that any definition that collapses them is a faulty definition.
That is a point about approach - that we must respect Reason, not defer to our definitions in defiance of what Reason says.
But what kind of definition might be endorsed by Reason? Well, what about this: happiness is that which it is in your interests to acquire. By contrast, goodness is that which Reason wants you to acquire.
Well, the videos I posted suggests that happiness and goodness aren't the same thing. This, in my humble opinion, is what's been, is and will be humanity's greatest bane. Sometimes or maybe most of the time, depending on how cynical you are, we derive joy from the suffering of others; sadism is real isn't it?
There were philosophers like John Stuart Mill and Epicurus who thought of pleasure as the highest good. The philosopher's quest for euadaimonia too can be safely construed as happiness driven. Yet, it didn't take long for these very same people to realize that happiness to be good requires some modification; morality in whatever shape and form is humanity's all out effort to bring happiness and goodness into alignment. The past and the present state of affairs indicate that this process of bringing these two important aspects of living, happiness and goodness, into harmony is no easy task.
Quoting Possibility
If you have trouble answering this do you see my dilemma? A side note to you: don't hear what I'm not saying. I'm not saying feeling good or feeling happy (the same thing, no?) is the same as being good or being happy.
If it qualifies feeling (which I assume you would agree with), then how does feeling not qualify it?
For instance qualifications of feelings can be quite properly and meaningfully used independent of feelings without reference to any feelings. E.g. "A sad state of affairs."
‘Happy’ already IS feeling, it doesn’t need ‘feeling’ to qualify it. You’re confusing ‘happy’ as a feeling (which doesn’t require a qualifier) with ‘happy’ used as an adjective.
Quoting Possibility
‘A sad state of affairs’ attempts to make a value judgement on the state of affairs as if that judgement were objective. But ‘sad’, just like ‘happy’, refers to interoception - a subjective, internal experience of affect. This statement falsely implies that an internal negative affect in relation to this state of affairs is universal - making a negative value judgement about the state of affairs and passing it off as objective. It’s a misuse of language that conceals the subjectivity of the statement: a common strategy of modern rhetoric.
One person being (continuously) happy is the same thing as everything being good for them. (Momentary happiness may not be good for them if it comes at the expense of later happiness).
But that's not the same as that happy person being good for everyone else.
It seems the good you're concerned about doesn't have anything to do with morality. You describe the good as a fulfillment. Nevertheless, the moral good is the highest fulfillment one can imagine, right? There can't be anything better than being morally good.
However that's only half the story. Humans are also uniquely rational and so to be it is also the highest fulfillment one can imagine (for a human).
I think the Greeks called this eaudaimonia or flourishing: a state of being a virtuous, rational being. Thus the good you're interested is about eaudaimonia, the scope of which may be expanded to include everything from pens to gods.
You seem to think, erroneously???, that happiness isn't an emotion. Read below:
[quote=Wikipedia]Happiness in its broad sense is the label for a family of pleasant emotional states, such as joy, amusement, satisfaction, gratification, euphoria, and triumph.[/quote]
Happiness is an emotion; there's no denying that. If you don't accept what seems to be a basic fact concerning humans then you'll need to produce an argument for it.
That happiness is good in the sense that it's part of the highest fulfillment for mankind is an open question. Epicureans and Utilitarians have made this claim but some philosophers have disagreed. If you ask me, then my reply is simple: there are more ways of being happy than there are ways of achieving eudaimonia (virtuous rational person) and so, inevitably, there are many occasions where happiness and euadaimonia conflict. For instance our happiness may lie in making love to someone else's wife but eudaimonia, a state of virtuous wisdom, would oppose the fulfillment of that desire. It's this frequent incompatibility between happiness and goodness that is the cause of many of our problems.
The two videos I posted quite vividly demonstrate the difficulty we face. We have agent Smith, a person who is morally corrupt and thus diametrically opposite to moral goodness which we've seen is an essential component of fulfillment and yet he's ecstatic. Then there's Jesus, morally good and thus an instance of fulfillment of one arm of eudaimonia and yet he suffers.
Quoting Dranu
I hear you loud and clear.
I disagree with your claim that if hedonism is true, morality is meaningless.
Let's begin with religions; humanity's earliest experiment with morality. Invariably all religions are hedonistic systems promising happiness and threatening suffering depending on the moral choices we make. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the concepts of heaven and hell that is, to my knowledge, ubiquitous in religion. Somewhere in our collective history we realized that happiness by itself is incomplete or even dangerous to social existence; we can't have people doing everything that makes them happy, right?
Along came morality a set of rules, dos and don'ts, that would temper the happiness-seeking nature that is inherent in every person. Morality doesn't contradict happiness directly for it would be immediately opposed by our nature which is primarily motivated by happiness. Ergo, morality does what it must: it imposes an hierarchy on happiness which very roughly can be spoken of in terms of higher and lower forms of happiness; the higher forms of happiness being those that contribute to harmonious coexistence among peoples while the lower forms of happiness being those which if unchecked would tear society apart. This stratification of happiness into higher and lower forms achieves, or is at least aimed at achieving, peaceful coexistence without going against our natural instincts.
Therefore, while it may be true that morality forces us to examine the nature of happiness more closely it can't outright reject happiness; what it does instead is akin to what a chemist does with mixtures: separating happiness into higher, more valuable forms and lower, less valuable forms and lays down rules that channel the populace away from the latter and towards the former. Morality is hedonism refined.
But here's the thing: you divide this all into higher and lower forms of happiness, but there is a clear reduction in happiness inherent in any morality. It wouldn't be a morality otherwise. A morality is
precisely saying that you must do X or you must avoid doing Y
because it is bad - generally to others, or upsetting to God,
not because it reduces your happiness.
You will notice that moral teaching very, very rarely tries to demonstrate that doing X is moral because it will make you happier or even produce a better happiness.
The whole point is that your happiness is less important that something else: other people, traditions, God,
To be moral is precisely to set aside one's happiness or one would not need a morality, one would just need a good explanation for why doing X makes you less happy.
It would be no different from 'don't cross the street when you are facing red' Why not? becauase you may die or be injured and that will make you unhappy or dead.
It would be a practical heuristic, not a morality. Moralities put your ego and your happiness off the board. They are precisely giving up what you want for others or God.
This is absolutely clearly true of deontological systems. They are not practical sets of advice. They are not saying you will be happier if you do not covet your neighbor's wife. They don't care about your enjoyment. They are saying it is wrong to covet. There is no attempt to convince you that you will enjoy life more if you stop coveting. In fact every religion knows that the morals 1) reduce the pleasure of their followers and 2) are not for the purpose of increasing happiness (making it 'higher' as you say) but about valuing something other than your pleasure.
That is why morality is nearly always contrasted with selfishness. If you are moral you are not being selfish, nto taking care of your own needs at a loss for others.
I mean, my God, all the judgments of sex in moralities. Did we make some huge mistake when we stopped thinking that all non-procreative sex was immoral? That dancing was immoral per se?
Now I don't believe in objective morals. And further I recognize that many moral systems as a whole reduce pleasure and joy, for no good reason. I also have other values than pleasure or reduction of pain. I am not saying we should reduce happiness, but it is clear that morals are not about maintaining, heightening or increasing happiness or pleasure. In fact they are quite happy to reduce happiness and absolutely pleasure, which in and of itself can be seen as immoral.
And many religious and even secular morals have judgments of pleasure, and not just pleasures 'of the pleasure'. Some even put suffering up as a value. Look at the flagellants.
Why would we create moralities based on the idea that we are bad and need to be punished? That women need to give birth in pain? That we should not masturbate. That we should not dance or play. It is so clear that not only are moralities precisely NOT about happiness and pleasure
which
you
keep
conflating
but in fact some moralities actually want to reduce happiness and pleasure
(because of original sin, because they are unseemly or frivolous per se (the actual state or experiencing these things, not just specific prohibilitions like alcohol or sex)
We are not all hedonists, and the ways we are not all hedonists varies. Values other than pleasure increase and pain reduction are held in all sorts of different ways by differnt cultures, subcultures and individuals.
Moralities are one specific way we produce and maintain values that are not hedonistic.
Your claim is that, really, underneath, they increase happiness/pleasure (again, not the same, though your claim is false in either case), despite people's own assertions about their moralities' intent and their own, often obviously, reduced pleasure in life (in many systems with strict moralities.) Really, deep down they are happier than they would be.
I think this requires a tremendous amount of evidence, since things point in the opposite direction. That stricter moralities for example, lead to less joy, happiness, pleasure and any other words that slide in to replace 'pleasure' when it is convenient.
Correct, Eaudaimonia means the same thing as "happy" as far as I can tell, and Eaudaimonia clearly means the same as "good."
The meaning commonly referred to in our language as "happy," seems to be Eaudaimonia (though language is arbitrary and you could easily use the word to describe only a feeling, rejecting its etymology from the idea of 'fortune.' Its the meaning I am interested in, however). Nevertheless you would have to throw out the following as meaningless if that were how you used the term:
I do not deny that we can depart from a word's original etymology, as language is relatively arbitrary. However there seem to be some issues if happy is defined as A feeling of positivity, rather than simply positivity. After all, feelings plainly have objects (or they would not be differentiated). It would be, under that definition, improper to say one "feels happy," as happy is not an object distinct from the feeling. Instead, one ought to say something like one "feels good", and that is "happiness".
This seems to me an uncommon choice of language, but its not language I am trying to understand, but the meaning behind it. If that's what you mean when you use that word, then I agree with you, under your definition happy is not the same as good, as it is good qualified to a feeling only. Would you agree with that assessment?
Reduction but not elimination, to a non-zero value. Exactly what I meant.
Incorrect because if it did mean that the world would be much better than it is and it isn't. You do the math...
I'm sorry I do not think I understand what you mean. Are you saying that if Happiness is Eaudaimonia, everyone would be doing it fully? If so, I can think of many reasons they would not (the chief being ignorance, malice, and idolatry (being caught up in lesser fulfillment).)
Please ignore my last post. I misspoke. Sorry for the trouble.
Yes, but it isn’t improper (language being relatively arbitrary), only unnecessary and confusing to qualify ‘happy’, defined as a feeling, with the term ‘feeling’.
Having said that, however, the notion of ‘being happy’ has two meanings - and this is what leads to the more common use of ‘feeling’ as a qualifier of ‘happy’. My father always used to ask me, whenever I visited, “Are you happy?” I found it a strange question, and wanted to qualify it by asking “Do you mean about being here, or generally?”
So when people say ‘I feel happy’, they’re referring to a positive affect that is not necessarily connected to them ‘being happy’, generally speaking. The implication with ‘feeling happy’ is that the positive affect IS the experience. It’s often used this way when one is under the influence of drugs, or otherwise unaccustomed or unwilling to attribute this positive affect to themselves in general.
It is the more general notion of ‘being happy’ that is being discussed here at length, particularly in relation to morality. A lasting ‘happiness’ in this sense isn’t about maintaining a pleasurable life (which is impossible) or about avoiding or eliminating experiences of suffering, or even necessarily about ‘being good’. It’s about maintaining a positive internal experience of self. I can say that ‘I am happy’ when self-reflection generates a positive affect in me.
Many of our experiences of self come from external sources: what we do or say, how others respond to us, what they say about us, what we see in the mirror, as well as our online profiles, friends, family, occupation or material extensions such as clothes, car, house, bank balance, etc. But an internal experience of self is an awareness of our own thoughts, memories, imagination, feelings, knowledge, beliefs, fears, values, motivations and conceptual relations.
If this internal experience of self doesn’t generate for us a positive affect, then we won’t really ‘be happy’, no matter how ‘good’ our external experience of self might become. And if we don’t recognise our own capacity to improve on this internal experience, then we may occasionally ‘be happy’ as a fleeting feeling, but we won’t achieve ‘happiness’ in general: this eudaimonia that refers to interoception of a positive affect in relation to self.