Plato's argument for the soul (in Alcibiades)
I was reading over a book titled, "Philosophy demystified" and it presented this argument found in one of Plato's writings:
P1. Look around you: nothing moves by itself.
P2. Anything you see always needs another thing to move it.
P3. Natural things are no different from human-made things in that they need to be moved by something else.
P4. Just like anything else, the bodies of living things can’t move by themselves.
Therefore, there has to be something else, other than the body, that moves a body, and this we can call a soul (or psyche in Greek).
The author of the book then critiques this argument with this reply:
"This argument can be critiqued by pointing out that, while it may be true that nothing moves by itself, we need not jump to the conclusion that there must be something wholly other than a part of the body (or something material in the bodily realm), like some soul, that is responsible for moving the body. Bodies can be broken down into parts, and when seen in this way, we can imagine one part of the body moving another part (or parts) of the body. Plato and many of the Greek philosophers did not seem to consider this as a viable option."
What I am having difficulty understanding is how does the fact that the body is composed of parts (and may be moved by these parts) defeat the argument given by Plato?
Wouldn't plato then reply by stating that premise 4 should be read as "the parts of living things can't move by themselves?" I don't mean to suggest that I believe Plato's argument is successful, but I just find it hard to see how introducing parts, or stating that a whole is composed of parts and that parts may be what moves the whole, defeats Plato's argument.
If I were to rewrite Plato's argument to accommodate the relation between parts and wholes and the possibility that the parts move the whole, then this is what I think Plato would argue:
Nothing can move by itself.
If nothing can move by itself, then parts that compose wholes cannot move by itself.
if parts that compose wholes cannot move by itself, then something else must be responsible for the movement of parts.
All things that are moved, because of something else, are causally impotent.
All things that are their own source of movemnent are causally potent.
If that something else is moved by another something else, then the source of movement of such a sequence of movers is found in something that is its own source of movement.
The body is not its own source of movement.
Therefore, the body is moved by something that is its own source of movement.
This is the soul.
I am not a logician at all, and I figure that I presented this argument's logical structure poorly, but if any of you can try to interpret this argument, then I think that you can see that Plato would argue that parts aren't exempt from premise 1.
However, the reason I think that Plato's argument fails (as it was presented in Philosphy demystified) is because premise 1 seems to contradict the conclusion. If nothing moves itself, then a soul can't move itself. So the soul's movement must be the product of some other thing and so on. Even if it is accepted that whatever is moved, because of something else, is itself causally impotent and whatever is its own source of movement is causally potent, we are left wondering if premise 1 is compatible with the notion that some things are their own source of motion. If somethings are their own source of motion, then it seems that some things can move by itself and premise 1 is false.
Another issue with the argument is how it looks at causal relations. Why suppose that causal occurances are assymetrical relationships between a causally inert thing and a casually potent thing? Perhaps, causal occurances are between things of equal causal potency? Think of how paper and a comb are attracted to each other with static electricity or how magnets attrack each other or how the mass of two things affect each other as examples of how, in nature, there doesn't seem parts of reality that are causally inert and other parts that are causally potent.
Or perhaps movement occurs as the result of the way that thing X affects thing Y and how thing Y affects thing X? So we can agree that no single thing can move itself, but it does not follow that because no single thing can move itself, that the collection of individual things must be moved by something that is not contained within the set of individual things. In this case, movement occurs because individual things move each other simultaneously and we are still able to agree that nothing moves itself.
Again, I don't want to argue that the alternatives I give of how movement occurs is correct, but it seem to me that there are other reasons for why one would be skeptical of Plato's argument that go beyond the way that parts and wholes affect each other.
I welcome any one that can help me understand why the parts/wholes reply would defeat the argument and for any help with understand if premise 1 is compatible with the soul being responsible for the movement of the body without itself being moved by something else.
P1. Look around you: nothing moves by itself.
P2. Anything you see always needs another thing to move it.
P3. Natural things are no different from human-made things in that they need to be moved by something else.
P4. Just like anything else, the bodies of living things can’t move by themselves.
Therefore, there has to be something else, other than the body, that moves a body, and this we can call a soul (or psyche in Greek).
The author of the book then critiques this argument with this reply:
"This argument can be critiqued by pointing out that, while it may be true that nothing moves by itself, we need not jump to the conclusion that there must be something wholly other than a part of the body (or something material in the bodily realm), like some soul, that is responsible for moving the body. Bodies can be broken down into parts, and when seen in this way, we can imagine one part of the body moving another part (or parts) of the body. Plato and many of the Greek philosophers did not seem to consider this as a viable option."
What I am having difficulty understanding is how does the fact that the body is composed of parts (and may be moved by these parts) defeat the argument given by Plato?
Wouldn't plato then reply by stating that premise 4 should be read as "the parts of living things can't move by themselves?" I don't mean to suggest that I believe Plato's argument is successful, but I just find it hard to see how introducing parts, or stating that a whole is composed of parts and that parts may be what moves the whole, defeats Plato's argument.
If I were to rewrite Plato's argument to accommodate the relation between parts and wholes and the possibility that the parts move the whole, then this is what I think Plato would argue:
Nothing can move by itself.
If nothing can move by itself, then parts that compose wholes cannot move by itself.
if parts that compose wholes cannot move by itself, then something else must be responsible for the movement of parts.
All things that are moved, because of something else, are causally impotent.
All things that are their own source of movemnent are causally potent.
If that something else is moved by another something else, then the source of movement of such a sequence of movers is found in something that is its own source of movement.
The body is not its own source of movement.
Therefore, the body is moved by something that is its own source of movement.
This is the soul.
I am not a logician at all, and I figure that I presented this argument's logical structure poorly, but if any of you can try to interpret this argument, then I think that you can see that Plato would argue that parts aren't exempt from premise 1.
However, the reason I think that Plato's argument fails (as it was presented in Philosphy demystified) is because premise 1 seems to contradict the conclusion. If nothing moves itself, then a soul can't move itself. So the soul's movement must be the product of some other thing and so on. Even if it is accepted that whatever is moved, because of something else, is itself causally impotent and whatever is its own source of movement is causally potent, we are left wondering if premise 1 is compatible with the notion that some things are their own source of motion. If somethings are their own source of motion, then it seems that some things can move by itself and premise 1 is false.
Another issue with the argument is how it looks at causal relations. Why suppose that causal occurances are assymetrical relationships between a causally inert thing and a casually potent thing? Perhaps, causal occurances are between things of equal causal potency? Think of how paper and a comb are attracted to each other with static electricity or how magnets attrack each other or how the mass of two things affect each other as examples of how, in nature, there doesn't seem parts of reality that are causally inert and other parts that are causally potent.
Or perhaps movement occurs as the result of the way that thing X affects thing Y and how thing Y affects thing X? So we can agree that no single thing can move itself, but it does not follow that because no single thing can move itself, that the collection of individual things must be moved by something that is not contained within the set of individual things. In this case, movement occurs because individual things move each other simultaneously and we are still able to agree that nothing moves itself.
Again, I don't want to argue that the alternatives I give of how movement occurs is correct, but it seem to me that there are other reasons for why one would be skeptical of Plato's argument that go beyond the way that parts and wholes affect each other.
I welcome any one that can help me understand why the parts/wholes reply would defeat the argument and for any help with understand if premise 1 is compatible with the soul being responsible for the movement of the body without itself being moved by something else.
Comments (81)
what moves the soul?
human body is moved by sense data triggering mind which triggers stored energy
It really doesn't matter since nothing moves itself (according to premise 1).
So whatever moves the body, soul or not, must itself be moved by something else.
its an eternal circle
existence is an eternal circle of cause and effect. a perpetual motion machine.
because there is nothing outside it to stop it or start it
everything within reality has a starting point, but reality itself cannot
its an illusion that i am a soul with free will inside, and controlling, a body
yet this is what most people believe
its the ignorant naive view of self
This is not correct. Read Plato's Parmenides and then read Aristotle's On the Soul. The recognition that different parts were listening to their own drummer is one of the driving forces of Greek thought.
That all these discordant elements would agree to be a part of something else is the issue.
What do you mean when you say that different parts were listening to their own drummer? I guess I don't understand what you mean by "their own drummer."
I agree that there is no such sequence as described:
Quoting Wayfarer
I think that what you are trying to imply here does not necessarily follow from the information given:
Quoting Wayfarer
If you were blindfolded, and someone scratched your nose, then you will the sensation of your nose being scratch and the sensation will inform you that your nose was scratched. While it seems correct that the nose does not transfer "its having been scratched" back to the mind by the finger, it seems possible that some other part of the body is responsible for this transfer of knowledge.
Quoting Wayfarer
So far you presented an argument regarding how we experience sensations and how we don't experience them and I guess you are drawing metaphysical conclusions from those experiences. I think that there are still ways that can also account for those experiences from a scientific world view. For example, I never feel a sequence, such as, commanding my heart to beat and then my heart beating, but it would be a mistake to conclude that my heart beats without any input from my brain. Thus, simply experiencing or not experiencing sensations does not help determine what is under the command of brain states or not. In the end, I don't want to argue that you are wrong simply because there are other possible explanations, but it seems that more arguments are needed before we can come to metaphysical conclusions about these things.
When you get to Aristotle's On the Soul, you will note that each kind of sensation that leads to perception is related to a particular exchange. Touch is felt as touch through whatever allows us to sense tangible things that way. Aristotle calls it the primary sense of mobile life forms.
Hearing is a process where sounds being made are heard by the individual as sounds being made.The ears are involved. But something other than the obvious instrument turns these feelings into information about what is happening.
Sight is something going on with the eyes. How that turns into perception of the visible is recognized as a process of its own.
Each of the senses has its own processes in addition to the world of convergence that allows the perceiver to recognize what is there before them in the moment of being alive with other things.
Quoting Valentinus
When a dog barks, there are waves that are produced that enter the ear canal and the respective parts that are part of whatever allows one to hear. So I think the first quote isn't controversial, but the second quote states that "something other than the obvious instrument turns these feelings into information." Even if it is the case that the ear is not responsible for the recognition that noise was produced, which I agree with you, why should it follow that there is something that is not of the body that is referred to as the perceiver that is responsible for the recognition that noise was made? It seems that sense data is compatible with physicalism and I am not sure why these facts would be brought up by Aristotle.
What is a body?
Not so much an argument, as a couple of observations.
The autonomic or parasympathetic nervous system is generally not under conscious control, although yogis have demonstrated extraordinary abilities to exert control over these faculties (i.e. by being entombed in coffins for long periods of time and emerging alive when by all expectations they should have died.)
However, the point about the subjective unity of consciousness is another matter altogether - and there really is no scientific account of it, as by its nature, it's a subjective matter. Please have a look at this post which provides a tentative explanation for how to conceive of the nature of the soul with reference to a current scientific paper.
There's another point which comes to mind as well. There was a very well-known Canadian neurosurgoen, name Wilder Penfield, who pioneered many modern forms of brain surgery in the 20th Century. He used to conduct brain operations on conscious patients, as the brain itself has no pain sensors. He found that by stimulating certain areas of the brain, all kinds of sensations and even memories could be elicited, which the subjects would experience very vividly. But he also found that the subjects were aware of when these were being elicited by the surgeon's operations, rather than by their own intentions. 'You're doing that', they would say. This led Penfield, a sober scientist, to ultimately arrive at a somewhat dualist philosophy of mind. (This case is often quoted in arguments against reductionism, and has been the subject of much commentary.)
Well, your original OP challenged the reader with the idea that "Greek" thinkers (many of whom disagreed with each other strongly) did not understand that parts of living things had their own processes apart from whatever made whole organisms operate. So on that point. my point has been amply made. Many of the "Greeks" talked about it precisely upon this criteria.
As to what Aristotle concludes regarding the "soul" as a perceiver, the work starts as distinguishing dead stuff from alive stuff on the basis that living things have to relate to other beings whereas dead stuff doesn't care what is beyond themselves.
Right, the author made that claim, but I didn't ask if this statement on the Greek philosophers was correct. I was interested in knowing if his proposed critique of Plato's argument had any merit.
Quoting Valentinus
Yes, amply made, yet not on topic, but still interesting and I appreciate it anyway!
So, in that regard, it has little merit.
As a starting point to discuss what is missing from said thinkers, it offers possibilities. But starting with an incorrect perception kills my groove.
Or only that his blanket statement on the Greek philosophers was wrong?
Because the subjects could clearly tell when the memories and sensations arose as a consequence of the surgeon's activities. They would say 'you're doing that'.
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3538094/
bolds added.
That is a good question. My impression is that Plato was not invested in giving a clear answer. All the different discussions of perception and what different parts of souls were up to are unified in their purpose to make it a complex matter to consider but not to buttress a single theory of what it was all about. I think one is on firmer ground to identify what was being opposed by all the different observations.
There are centuries of Platonists arguing about this sort of thing. Jump in wherever you like.
You need not conclude that 1 is false. The argument takes the observation that movements of the body (or the parts of the body which originate the motions of the body as a whole, in your reformulation) are not caused by motions of other bodies. So a soul is posited as the source of motion of the body.
Let's suppose that to be consistent with 1, a soul cannot move itself. Plato assumes intelligible objects, which are not material bodies, and these may be responsible for the movements of the soul. So I'd say that the argument is meant to open one's mind to the reality of the fact that the immaterial realm is causally active, and not meant to show that the soul moves itself.
Premise 1, in the manner that it was presented by the author of "philosophy demystified," doesn't make the kind of qualification that you are making. It simply states that nothing moves itself and this is corroborated by our experiences; so Plato expects the listener to accept premise 1 as obviously true and self-evident- it is a metaphysical principle that Plato does not think needs to be argued for. The way you are presenting the argument seems to suggest that premise 1 should only ably to physical things.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I think this is a plausible interpretation. However, Plato would then have to explain the mechanics of the immaterial realm and how it solves whatever dilemma there was in regards to the material realm
No. I am saying that the soul might be moved by some other immaterial thing. You only approached an inconsistency with 1 by saying that the soul moves itself. If you allow that the soul moves the body, but the soul is itself moved by some other immaterial thing, you have no reason to reject 1.
We don't know how immaterial things act as causes, only that they do. So we can't make any such assumption.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
So then premise 1 is being interpreted to imply that it is true only for physical things while being silent on the behavior of immaterial things.
Yes, now that I think about it, the premise must only apply to material things. Premise one starts with "look around you". We cannot see immaterial things, so the premise is an inductive conclusion drawn from the observation of material things. Therefore it would not be applicable to immaterial things.
In any case, I find your alternative reading of the argument as evidence that the author should have been more clear with how he wanted to present Plato's argument.
The "nothing moves itself" premise is a common starting point for numerous arguments concerning the nature of the immaterial, dating back to Plato. I believe it is supposed to be an inductive conclusion drawn from our sense observations of the material world. But that is no different from how you describe it as "corroborated by everyday experience". The movement of immaterial things is outside our field of "experience".
Care to explain what you think is the difference between these two?
Quoting Walter B
I cannot perceive any immaterial things by looking around me. So looking around me doesn't serve to give me any evidence to create any principles concerning immaterial things.
The underlined word "material" is the cornerstone of the refutation. All motion till date have been material in cause and effect. Why introduce such a thing as "soul" of which we have no observable data regarding it causing motion?
As for the part-whole paradigm it still needs to explain how the parts move. However this doesn't negatively impact the data - matter moves matter.
Is it an illusion? It seems to me that words like soul, consciousness, mind, will; whether they are monological or dialogical are all words in the toolbelt that are used to describe existing physical phenomenon we do not yet fully understand or comprehend.
The real illusion; is thinking we can know or understand what the illusion is. How can I know how big the iceberg is when I can only perceive what is on the surface? Which makes up just a small percentage of the true scale and depth of it all.
Or if you don't like the iceberg metaphor; There is the argument by dimensions; Imagine that the universe has 9 dimensions represented as a room with 9 sides. You inside the room only see a triangle shaped room with s tv screen showing you live footage of a small part of one of the other walls(Time wall) after another.
calling consciousness physical is blind and ignorant
I also agree that, as stated, the real problem with the argument is the apparent regress it would generate.
However, far from generating a regress the argument shows why positing something immaterial - a soul - appears to be the only way to stop one.
The argument talks about those things we can see - so, sensible objects - and says of them that they appear always to be moved by something other than themselves.
And indeed, the only kinds of thing that would appear capable of movement would be extended things - that is, things occupying some space (for it is only they that have somewhere to move to and from). And it is only extended things that are objects of sensible observation. So it is sensible things that move, and sensible things whose movements require external causal explanation.
So, what Plato says about sensible objects does not apply to insensible ones. Insensible objects, being unextended, do not move. For there is nowhere for them to move to or from. And insensible things, by their very nature, are not objects of sensible observation.
Bearing this in mind then, it seems reasonable to conclude that all things that move require something that moves them. But things that do not move, do not. So, sensible objects - objects extended in space - move and their movements require causal explanation.
Clearly, however, we would be off on a regress if we kept positing more and more moving things to explain the movement in one moving thing. My fingers are moving. They cannot move themselves, so there must be something else that moves them. We can posit tendons and such like, but eventually this has to come to an end. It cannot come to an end in another moving thing. It cannot be my brain. For my brain, being a sensible thing, is one of those things that moves and whose movements require external explanation. Therefore, it must terminate with an unmoved mover. And an unmoved mover is going to be an insensible thing - a soul.
illusion
The illusion as ive already said, is thinking you know anything about illusions.
Still not seeing an argument from you and one worded responses are boring to me.
an illusion is something that appears to the mind, to be different then it actually is in reality
i said the physical universe is an illusion
the belief in the mind that reality is separate physical objects is an illusion.
it appears to be that way to the mind but in reality is not
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bundle_theory
I don't even believe in a soul but I do believe in the existence of the mind being rooted in our very physical brains.
Sorry if my grasp of philosophy is too far ahead for you to even understand what I'm talking about. Maybe when you get your masters we can talk again. :)
1. If a physical thing exists, it will be infinitely divisible
2. No infinitely divisible things exist
3. Therefore, no physical things exist.
Er, where are you getting that from? Ah, I see what you've done - you've applied your reasoning skills to some other arguments I have made about the rank immorality of procreation and you've arrived at a conclusion that was in no way implied by them. Good stuff!
Quoting Mark Dennis
Then you have some demonstrably false beliefs - not surprising in the least.
Quoting Mark Dennis
Let me remember, that's an MA in business ethics, right? You know that any academic achievement with 'business' in the title is a joke?
The bigger joke is someone without a masters jealously knocking them because he cant hack it in school when the teacher easily makes him look like the fool that he is.
Here:
1. Anything that exists has either been caused to exist by something external to it, or it exists by its very nature
2. If any physical things exist, they do not exist by their very nature
3. Therefore, if any physical things exist, they have been caused to exist by something external.
4. If physical things have been caused to exist by other physical things, then if there are any physical things there will be an infinity of causes
5. There cannot be an infinity of causes (or anything else for that matter).
6. Therefore if there are any physical things, they have not been caused to exist by physical things
7. A non-physical thing is something that lacks extension - that is, something that does not occupy any space.
8. Therefore, if there are any physical things, then they have been caused to exist by things that lack extension
9. There can be no causal interaction between an extended thing and an unextended thing
10. Therefore, there are no physical things.
I think your conclusion does not follow necessarily from your premises.
One problem is how you go from arguing that immaterial reality has no causal relation with physical reality to therefore no physical things exist. Perhaps immaterial reality does not interact with material reality in one specific causal manner, as in the way that a potter crafts a pot to exist, but that does not seem to preclude the possibility that material reality is metaphysically contingent upon immaterial reality- which may be metaphysically necessary- the point here is that is possible to say that the existence of x causes the existence of y to exist (if x's existence is logically prior to y's existence) and still have no "causal interaction" with y.
Your first premise reminds me of the principle of sufficient reason that Leibniz uses in his argument for God so I thought of this example after reading your argument.
An example of how a thing can have been caused by another and yet still have no interaction with that other can be seen in a God who is argued to be non-physical, changeless, and as such is timeless, and possesses whatever mental state that it is in.
The existence of such a God is logically prior to the existence of its thought so that if there was no such God, then there is no such thought; indeed, the thought's existence is caused to exist (in this example "caused" refers to logical dependency or metaphysical dependency) by something that is not identical to the thought and is thus external to it, since this example assumes that whatever God is that he is not his own thought, thereby satisfying premise one of your argument, but there is also no "causal interaction" between the existence of God's thought and the existence of God, as there can be no causal interaction between the existence of the thing that is logically dependent upon the existence of some necessary thing. So while God may have the power to cause whatever thought he wants, the actions of God's mind does not cause that the existence of God's thoughts are logically posterior upon the existence of God's existence; in this respect, God's mind and the logical dependency that the existence of God's thoughts have on God's existence have no causal interaction.
So we can agree, for sake of argument, that there is no causal interaction between immaterial and material things, but hold that it is still possiblely the case that these two things are metaphysically linked.
In this case, the material reality could have always existed in time and was nonetheless caused to exist, perhaps by the necessary existence of immaterial reality preserving the non-necessary existence of material reality; premise 1-4 suggest to me that you think immaterial reality is unlike material reality in not needing to be caused by something external to it, but correct me if I am mistaken.
There is no contradiction in it being the case that the existence of material reality is caused by the existence of immaterial reality and that there is no causal interaction between immaterial reality's activity the existence of physical reality. Here we see that what a thing is and what a thing does are not the same, so while it can be stated that immaterial reality's activities can do nothing to "causally interact" with material reality existence, the existence of immaterial reality may be the reason for why material reality exists.
The point is not to say your conclusion is wrong, mind you, but that you need to defend a version of premise 9 that argues that if there is no "causal interaction" between two things that that must also entail that there is no metaphysical and logical dependency between those things.
I agree that the weakest premise in the argument is the one that asserts that extended things can only causally interact with other extended things.
But without necessarily endorsing it, it does have a great deal of prima facie credibility. I think it is fair to say that the reason of many people - including, it would seem, the bulk of contemporary philosophers - endorses it, for it is the principle basis upon which (ironically) belief in the soul is rejected as false. For it is at the heart of the so-called 'problem of interaction'. The (supposed) problem being that if our minds are immaterial things - souls - then they would be incapable of causally interacting with our extended bodies; yet as our minds clearly do causally interact with our extended bodies, our minds must themselves be extended things (and thus not souls).
So, because that problem is currently considered a very big one, and because it depends crucially upon the premise that extended things and unextended things cannot possibly causally interact, I think we can safely conclude that the reason of many represents causal interaction to be impossible between objects of different kinds.
If that's right, then it is reasonable to think that the relevant premise is true. But I agree that its truth is not beyond a reasonable doubt.
Let's imagine it is false, then. Well, we still need to stop the regress. The only way to do this, so far as I can see, is to attribute a power of so-called 'substance causation' to extended things. That is, although extended things can cause events by undergoing changes themselves, they can also cause events directly - that is, without themselves undergoing any change.
But here Plato's point, I think, is that we simply do not see this kind of causation among extended things. What we observe, where extended things are concerned, is event causation, not substance causation. That is, we notice that every movement in a thing, is caused by some other movement elsewhere. There may be no necessity to this, but it is what observation suggests. Therefore, it is reasonable to suppose that the movements of extended things are ultimately caused not by substance causation by extended things, but substance causation by immaterial things.
I will respond to the rest shortly
Hmm, I would say that the credibility of the claim that no extended thing can causally interact with an unextended thing is about the same as the claim that no extended thing can causally depend on an unextended thing.
Take a ball on a cushion and let's assume that they have both existed in that arrangement for eternity. It seems true to say that the ball is causing the indentation in the cushion, even though there is no event of the ball having caused the deny. So this, I think, would be an example of one thing - the dent in the cushion - causally depending on another thing - the ball, without there being any interaction between the two.
However, could something about an extended thing depend, in that kind of way, on the presence of an unextended thing? No, or at least it seems as hard to conceive of this as it is to conceive of interaction between an unextended thing and an extended thing.
So I think premise 9 is as plausible when it is about causal dependency as it is when it is about causal interaction (which is to say, very plausible though - I accept - not true beyond all reasonable doubt).
Let say that a cause and an effect are temporarily simultaneous to each other, as in your example; by definition an effect depends on its cause for its existence, so if X is the cause of Y- even when X and Y are contemporaneous- then there is still an asymmetrical relation between X and Y; the presence of Y guarantees the presence of X, but not the other way around; therefore, the particular physical thing that refers to Y is causally dependent upon the physical thing X, but the part of physical reality that constitutes Y is not logically dependent upon the part of physical reality that constitutes X.
An effect, by definition, implies the existence of a cause, but the physical reality that constitutes X does not make it so that effects imply the existence of a cause. There is a distinction to be made between causal and logical, and metaphysical dependency
If it is the case that things owe their existence either to themselves or to something else, then "caused to exist" in premise 8, and again in "causal interaction" in premise 9, will have to be defined to include causal, logical, and metaphysical dependency.
So you must be ready to argue that if X has no causal interaction with Y, that this information alone suffices you to conclude that no metaphysical or logical dependency is possible.
I got stuff to do so I will try to keep this conversation going in the future. I appreciate your thoughts though!
Perhaps I should say that I do not think anything exists with necessity, including God - I am a sceptic about necessity. But I take it that others would say that if a thing exists by its very nature, then that's what it is for something to exist with metaphysical necessity (I would not say this, but I accept that some things exist by their very nature).
But if a thing does not exist by its very nature, then the kind of explanation its existence requires is a causal one. That is, something external to it needs to be causally responsible for its having come into being.
If that's right, then the fact that extended things do not exist by their very nature, combined with the fact there are no infinite regresses of causes and fact that extended things cannot causally interact with unextended things, would suffice to establish their non-existence.
And this, combined with the fact my mind exists with certainty, would then entail that my mind is not an extended thing (something that, I think, is implied in multiple other ways).
Re your God example - I did not quite follow it. I accept that no thought can exist absent a mind to have it. But I would say that God substance-causes his own thoughts. God's first thought would not have been caused by any prior thinking on God's part, but it would still be caused by the thing that is God. Perhaps I am missing something here though.
Every one of your premises 1 to 9 is false, hence your conclusion (10) is unproven.
This is a version of the cosmological argument, is it not? I suppose another way of putting 1 is that 'anything that exists has come into existence'. In my lexicon, the way I put it is that 'existing things' are necessarily compound and impermanent, that being the 'mark' of 'anything existent'. So this distinguishes what is 'compound and contingent' from what is 'simple and self-existent', which is the mark of 'real being'. So, as no physical things are 'simple and self-existent', therefore (according to the argument) their existence is contingent, so they are unreal (which is not exactly the same as simply non-existent). That's another way of stating (10) but one which 'preserves the appearances', so to speak, as it allows them a kind or degree of reality, namely, existence.
In any case, in the classical cosmological arguments, the necessary being is the Aristotelian first mover, usually identified with God. Is that the point towards which your argument is aimed?
Please indicate something that exists that has not been caused to exist.
It has some premises in common, certainly. But the cosmological argument has 'Therefore, God exists" as its conclusion, whereas I am arguing that no physical - that is, extended - objects exist.
my argument is much stronger than a cosmological argument because it seeks to do less.
My argument does not seek to establish the existence of a very specific, single person - God - but only the existence of a certain kind of thing or things, namely unextended things, and consequently the non-existence of extended things (physical things).
Quoting Wayfarer
That's not how I would use those terms. An existing thing is just anything that exists. Simple things are things that lack parts.
I think any object that has parts requires explanation. Confronted with something that appears to have parts, our reason tells us that it is legitimate to wonder how those parts came to be united in that way.
By contrast, simple things - that is, things lacking parts - do not require explanation as anyone who grasps the concept of such things can recognise. For a simple thing, lacking parts, is not made of anything more basic than itself. To ask how it came to together, then, is to have failed to grasp that one is dealing with a simple thing. Simple things cannot be made, for there is nothing from which one can make one.
Likewise, simple things cannot be destroyed, for there is nothing into which one can deconstruct one.
Thus, by simply applying our reason to the idea of a simple thing, we can see that any simple thing that exists, exists by its very nature and thus does not require explanation (or, perhaps better, its existence is explained by its nature).
This is not so with complex things.
The problem with extended things - with physical things - is that they are by their nature complex, for they are infinitely divisible and thus have infinite parts.
This is by itself sufficient to establish their non-existence. But additionally, it means that they always require explanation, and that explanation is going to have to reside in something non-physical (which combined with the fact that nothing non-physical can cause something physical, establishes once more their non-existence).
I should add, some would go further and say that simple things - or at least one simple thing - exists of necessity.
I don't. I think that existing by one's nature and existing of necessity are not quite the same concept. After all, the idea of a simple thing that does not exist seems entirely conceivable, which is not what one would expect of a necessarily existing thing.
So, I think that all things that exist, exist contingently.
But some things that exist, exist by their very nature.
You haven't followed the argument (or you have dismissed it as a 'rhetorical device').
The argument establishes the existence of simple things. If anything exists, some simple things (or thing) exist - that's what it establishes.
And yes, you have an example in yourself. You are a simple thing. Can you be divided? No. So you have no parts. You - a mind - are an instance of a simple thing.
And how do you differentiate physical things, like actual objects, from representations of physical things, like drawing or icons? Surely a real chair is physical, and a representation is not.
Causality is a construct based upon a subjective judgement, or if an experiment is repeated it is statistical. There may well be a temporal association of events - one event can precede another, but the assertion that one causes the other can never be proven.
I used your mind as an example of something simple - something unextended. But I am not thereby saying that you caused all else to exist, only that something, or things, like you has.
Also, of course, the argument establishes that physical things do not exist. So, nothing created them - they have no reality.
As for the sensations of colour, texture, smell, and so forth - well, we know from our own case that we, minds, mint such things. For we do so when imagine things.
There is the sensible world - the world of sensation - and it exists. But the physical world does not. There is no illusion, however, just a mistaken belief that the sensible world exists extra-mentally.
This whole paragraph might easily be found in the writings of Berkeley. Which is not to say that it's mistaken, on that account, as I believe Berkeley expresses a profound truth.