Causality - what is it?
Let's consider the world of classical physics: the universe is represented by a point that evolves in the phase space, all the past and future evolution is already contained in the information about present state and the evolution law.
We can consider interactions between sub-systems of the universe, for example a ball hitting another ball and we can say that the impact "caused" the second ball to move. What is the meaning of such a statement?
Here is a possible answer:
(1) We could say that there is a set of (many) physical dynamics that we would call "impacts" and a set of physical dynamics that we would call "second ball starting to move"
(2) we can observe (and even prove in our mathematical model) that for every evolution that passes through a "impact" we always have a "second ball starting to move" dynamic
(3) we call every situation where a dynamics inside the set A is always followed (wrt time) by a dynamics in the set B as "A causing B"
This way of defining causality is quite similar to the definition of "logical implication" with the additional condition that the events must have a specific temporal order.
Can we consider this definition to be complete and satisfying? Are there counter-example that show this definition to be inappropriate?
What happens if two events are actually simultaneous? Can there be a "causal" relation between the two? Can this relation be asymmetric? Are there examples?
We can consider interactions between sub-systems of the universe, for example a ball hitting another ball and we can say that the impact "caused" the second ball to move. What is the meaning of such a statement?
Here is a possible answer:
(1) We could say that there is a set of (many) physical dynamics that we would call "impacts" and a set of physical dynamics that we would call "second ball starting to move"
(2) we can observe (and even prove in our mathematical model) that for every evolution that passes through a "impact" we always have a "second ball starting to move" dynamic
(3) we call every situation where a dynamics inside the set A is always followed (wrt time) by a dynamics in the set B as "A causing B"
This way of defining causality is quite similar to the definition of "logical implication" with the additional condition that the events must have a specific temporal order.
Can we consider this definition to be complete and satisfying? Are there counter-example that show this definition to be inappropriate?
What happens if two events are actually simultaneous? Can there be a "causal" relation between the two? Can this relation be asymmetric? Are there examples?
Comments (14)
Causality obtains simply when:
(a) one event, x, precedes another, y,
(b) x and y are contiguous (in terms of tactility),
(c) with respect to (a) and (b), x exerts forces that produce y, and
(d) y would not have occurred without (a), (b) and (c) being the case.
In your model universe and by your definition, everything causes everything that follows. That is, any given set of events cause any given events that follow (assuming that your universe is also non-relativistic, so that "follow" is objectively given). A butterfly flapping its wings in China causes a hurricane in the Caribbean, as long as one precedes the other.
"x produces y" is a paraphrase of "x causes y". Your definition is even worse than circular: it appeals to a narrower notion of causation (one that specifically relies on forces) to explain causation simipliciter.
My entire definition is a synonym, only much wordier, of course, of the word "causality."
If you propose a definition that is not a synonym of causality, then it's no definition of causality. Your definition in that case would either (a) not capture some necessary feature of causality, or (b) propose additional features that are beyond what causality is.
So your criticism actually would underscore that you don't understand how definitions work in the first place. Definitions are necessarily circular in the sense that you're using that term, or they're no definitions.
Re "a narrower notion", that would be (a) in your opinion. However, in my opinion, anything broader than that is (b)--it's proposing additional features that are beyond what causality is.
x causes y just in case A, B, C, ..., x causes y, D, E, ...
Again, definitions are synonyms, or they're not definitions. The synonym can be one word or many. It's not as if something isn't a definition just because it's a one-word synonym rather than being many words.
In my model causality is defined between two sets of states, not between two states. It wouldn't make sense to say that the state A causes the future state B. When we say (according to my definition) that the impact causes the crash we mean that "impacts" are always followed by "crashes" (which is in fact not completely true).
What does it mean that an event "exert forces"? We know that electromagnetic forces always exist between charges: they are not "triggered", does it mean that there is no causation when electromagnetic forces are the only one involved?
Basically, matter comes into contact with other matter and influences it.
Quoting Babbeus
I wouldn't say that forces exist between charges if matter is not coming into contact with other matter and influencing it.
Electrostatic forces for examples are described by Coulomb's law which doesn't require any contact and predict a non-zero force for any finite distance.
We'd be getting into whether I agree with taking particular interpretations of instrumental utilities to be correct ontologically (and the answer is that I don't with respect to quite a few normal interpretations with respect to the sciences) . Do you want to move the conversation in that direction? I wouldn't say that moving the conversation in that direction will have anything to do with causality in a general sense if that's what you want to discuss.
Without realizing that they had corroborated this, a group of mathematicians examining all of classical mathematics and physics concluded that any number of simple metaphors can describe physical causality equally well. If you want, you can take your pick from among countless explanations to describe everything as merely consisting of black holes, balls of string, bouncing springs, clockwork, or lotions in motion on vibrating rubber sheets for all I know! Along these same lines, a similar mathematical study established that only two dimensions are required as if, in reality, life were a cartoon. Like Donald Hoffman before them, the mathematicians have rigorously confirmed is that academia has traditionally relied upon what I like to call "Cartoon Logic" which is the logic of small children who will adopt whatever rationalization happens to appeal to them more at the time or conflicts less with reality as they know it.
We are using nature to study nature, while the void laughs back in our faces without the slightest compassion for all of our hard work, sacrifices, good intentions, deeply held beliefs, and thousands of years of progress and tradition.
I am not sure why you are dwelling on this. If I accept a definition, then I henceforth take the definiendum to be synonymous with that definition. But I cannot accept your definition because it is defective, for the obvious reason that I have pointed out. I don't know what else to say.
Quoting Babbeus
On second thought, I am less clear about what you are trying to say. I guess you are trying for what's called type-causation (typical, lawful, repeatable effects result in like causes), but I am not sure. If you are interested, I suggest you read about some already existing attempts to make sense of (or even to dismiss) causality, e.g. here. Perhaps you'll find something similar to your idea.
Because your criticism, which persisted after I explained the problem with it, evidenced that you don't understand how definitions work.