Isn't that a reflection of how much people love life? For those to whom life does not matter, then the end is of no consequence - wholly beneficial even, if it results in an improved world (no suffering).
On the other hand, for those who love life, who are interested in living it, the idea of suffering cannot be avoided - except in death - and is nothing but depressing. In their heart, they would know that what they love so much just means misery for others and themselves.
Would you be happy knowing that what you wanted (life) meant the necessary suffering of yourself and others? And that there was no way to have what you want without suffering?
The Great WhateverOctober 27, 2015 at 03:28#13500 likes
Reply to TheWillowOfDarkness Well, I certainly don't think life is of no consequence to anyone. It's really, really fucking bad, and extraordinarily and gratuitously painful; that's clearly a consequence, something that matters.
There may be a tension in realizing that what they love is violence and suffering and ultimately making other people and themselves suffer in perpetuity, and it's hard to overcome the cognitive dissonance and say, 'yes, I love violence, and I want everyone to suffer forever,' which is essentially what one is saying if you give the old 'seal of approval' to life. Yeah, I guess I buy that.
Reading about medical conditions is actually interesting in that regard -- how pointlessly painful it is just to exist, even bracketing any external threats. And if you listen to people day in and day out talk about life, it's mostly complaints -- day to day, there's just obvious suffering, but not much if any joy. It's only when you ask them whether they love life 'in the abstract,' where it means nothing, that suddenly they get misty-eted about it and so on.
TheWillowOfDarknessOctober 27, 2015 at 04:06#13630 likes
To my mind "love" is the problem there. It is always an after-the-moment abstraction used to assert that something is important. People don't "love" life per se. Meaning and enjoyment is found in friends, family, eating, laughing, pleasure, creating, joy, drawing a picture, colouring in a book, hearing music, eating raspberries, etc., etc., etc. To compare life with the immediate visceral experience of "suffering" is just unfair.
The tension is not so much in that people love violence (most people don't to a large extent), but rather in that they cannot have what they want without the presence of suffering and violence. I can't have my cricket team and spin bowling without life. To have the joy I do (even when we lose), myself and others need to live. Some suffering or violence will, in the end, result in these lives. No matter how much I don't want it to, or how good my life happens to be, what I want can't be given without suffering.
Here, the problem is not so much cognitive dissonance: one can easily own the idea that what they want results in the suffering of others. It isn't that hard. Even antinatalists do this frequently, in recognising that there is no way to end everyone without causing horrible suffering, such that we ought to put-up with some suffering in life, even though we have ways to eliminate it all quickly if we really tried (Nuke everything).
What is upsetting is, rather, the destruction of the idea that life can be without a horrible cost. It is depressing to find out that the idea you had, that life is wonderful, to a point that it is always a joyful experience worth seeking, is wrong. It is not prescribing suffering for others which is upsetting (no-one really does this in the context in which we are talking; I did not chose that you would live or that you wouldn't die, as of today), but rather coming into the knowledge that there is no life without suffering. With such knowledge, you know that the joy of life will never overcome its suffering, even if you happen to have it almost constantly. It is the mourning of a "perfect" world which someone believed in, but which never existed.
The Great WhateverOctober 27, 2015 at 04:16#13651 likes
What is upsetting is, rather, the destruction of the idea that life can be without a horrible cost. It is depressing to find out the idea you had, that life is wonderful, to a point that it is always a joyful experience worth seeking, is wrong.
I don't think any adult actually thinks that, though. Usually their nominal opinions are instead summed up with dumb aphorisms about how life is 'good and bad,' and you take both of them in stride, or about how suffering makes you appreciate the good, etc. Of course none of that is true, it's just what you say. You sort of revert to thinking in terms of Hallmark cards because that's all you've got -- you recapitulate whatever the culture's told you, there's no real filter through actual life experience there.
TheWillowOfDarknessOctober 27, 2015 at 04:38#13690 likes
We weren't talking about such a situation though. My point is why discovering the inevitability of suffering in life is upsetting for those who understand it to be joyful.
Moreover, those dumb aphorisms aren't a description of anyone's life, joyful or not. They constitute a normative demand for people to put-up with suffering and make the most of whatever joy they experience. As if either of those ideas make sense or are even possible. Someone experiencing joy isn't worried about ensuring they make the most of it. Joy is felt, not meticulously planned to be productive as possible. And suffering, well, it is constituted by feeling horrible such that people want to get away from it as soon as possible. People put-up with annoyances, not suffering.
These dumb aphorisms sometimes work as a distraction from suffering, but that's really all they are. On occasion someone might, for example, find "solace" in the idea of "suffering making you appreciate the good," but all that's doing is building a moment of respite in the present. It doesn't actually undo any suffering of the past or make any suffering in the future go away. But then that's all people want in many instance: anything to forget the despair of suffering for a moment. Often the need to feel better in the moment outweighs any concern for accurate description of suffering.
The Great WhateverOctober 27, 2015 at 04:53#13701 likes
We weren't talking about such a situation though. My point is why discovering the inevitability of suffering in life is upsetting for those who understand it to be joyful.
I don't think anyone takes seriously the idea that life is not full of suffering. What may be more disturbing to people is, having realized this, coming to understand that they approve of life in spite of this, and therefore approve of other people's suffering, as well as forcing that suffering on further generations, perhaps in perpetuity. In other words, their ideals are internally inconsistent, which causes a Socratic pain: they nominally 'don't want people to suffer,' but deep down there is a very real sense in which they do want that.
These dumb aphorisms sometimes work as a distraction from suffering, but that's really all they are.
Ha. I doubt they even work on that level. They're just dumb phrases. It's like Ba da ba ba ba, I'm lovin' it. Nobody 'loves' McDonalds. That's just something they say in the commercials. Likewise with the aphorisms about suffering.
Interesting that antinatalist philosophy made your guys depressed. I would think it would come as a sort of relief, or hope (no matter how false that hope might be), that there is a way to end suffering, that we don't have to live. That realization is liberating, even if ultimately unrealistic.
It's depressing because we're already born, and because it counters the natural optimism bias. What I can't be sure about is to what degree it's correct, because a lot of times, whether life feels worthwhile is a matter of attitude, to me. If I start feeling depressed, then the negative thoughts come. But what makes the negative thoughts more true than the positive ones? It's just a different interpretation of life.
I don't think any adult actually thinks that, though. Usually their nominal opinions are instead summed up with dumb aphorisms about how life is 'good and bad,' and you take both of them in stride, or about how suffering makes you appreciate the good, etc. Of course none of that is true, it's just what you say. You sort of revert to thinking in terms of Hallmark cards because that's all you've got -- you recapitulate whatever the culture's told you, there's no real filter through actual life experience there.
This feels like you're projecting your own pessimistic view of life on others. Maybe most of us find it worth living, most of the time. Or that's how it feels to us, not always, but enough of the time. Or at least that's the case for me. It's only when I'm depressed or facing something dispiriting that I wonder if life's worth it.
The Great WhateverOctober 27, 2015 at 12:05#14070 likes
This feels like you're projecting your own pessimistic view of life on others. Maybe most of us find it worth living, most of the time.
Alright? But what we don't have anything to do with tends not to bother us, and from my experience the way people react to antinatalism is not the way they react to conspiracy theories about lizards ruling the earth.
But what makes the negative thoughts more true than the positive ones? It's just a different interpretation of life.
It's always been interesting to me how when it's a matter of finding food or getting a plane to fly, one's 'interpretation' doesn't seem to matter much. But suddenly when it's a matter of much more importance, it becomes omnipotent. Why is that? It's a good thing we have our 'interpretations' to save us from life's misery, huh. We'd be in a real bind if that trick didn't work.
Why is that? It's a good thing we have our 'interpretations' to save us from life's misery, huh. We'd be in a real bind if that trick didn't work.
Isn't life being miserable a matter of how one feels about life? Person A feels that the various sufferings of life make it not worth living, but person B does not. What makes B wrong about their own life?
The antinatalist position seems to be saying that the B people are fooling themselves, and the A people see things as they are. But I don't see what makes the pessimistic view true, at least in so far as to how people experience their own lives.
The Great WhateverOctober 27, 2015 at 15:33#14280 likes
Reply to Marchesk And how do people experience their own lives? Or is that a matter of 'interpretation,' too? Certainly it would be helpful to me if I could 'reinterpret' all my problems, and if, unlike whether a plane flies, they weren't real!
It's not that problems aren't real, it's whether those problems make a person's life not worth living. I don't think that suffering and problems alone make life miserable, although it can depend on the nature of those problems and the degree of suffering. But if we're talking about your average life in the developed world, I'm not sure I buy that life is so terrible.
The Great WhateverOctober 27, 2015 at 15:52#14340 likes
Reply to Marchesk I don't understand the sense in which you think it's somehow 'up' to a person to decide whether certain problems make life worth living or not. What do they do, just snap their fingers and make things, even though they're bad...not bad? There seems to be this idea that on the one hand, there's how your life actually is, and then there's some impenetrable magic lens, and on the other side of that there's you, and you can swap out that magic lens to make things different. But that's just nonsense, if you think about it for any amount of time.
As for the 'developed world,' well, first of all I disagree (hedonic treadmill), and second, the developed world depends on the 'developing' world in unsavory ways, and there is an implicit approval of what happens 'way over there,' if you see what I mean.
I don't understand the sense in which you think it's somehow 'up' to a person to decide whether certain problems make life worth living or not. What do they do, just snap their fingers and make things, even though they're bad...not bad?
It's a question of whether a person feels that the bad outweighs whatever good they get out of being alive. You seem to be arguing that people can't actually feel that way, or honestly come to such a conclusion. That they're delusional and lying to themselves.
There seems to be this idea that on the one hand, there's how your life actually is, and then there's some impenetrable magic lens, and on the other side of that there's you, and you can swap out that magic lens to make things different
And how is life, actually? Antinatalists think it's shitty. Okay, but what about people who don't? My point is that a judgement is being made either way.
As for the 'developed world,' well, first of all I disagree (hedonic treadmill), and second, the developed world depends on the 'developing' world in unsavory ways, and there is an implicit approval of what happens 'way over there,' if you see what I mean.
Yes, there is that. It was more of a snarky remark that antinatalism seems to be coming from comfortable people living in the developed world than people who suffer more than having to wait at a traffic light, or being bored because nothing is on the tube worth watching.
The Great WhateverOctober 27, 2015 at 16:13#14390 likes
It's a question of whether a person feels that the bad outweighs whatever good they get out of being alive. You seem to be arguing that people can't actually feel that way, or honestly come to such a conclusion. That they're delusional and lying to themselves.
You have to be careful about what you mean by 'feel' here. By that do you mean, for example, offer a nominal opinion about their life when asked? If that is what you mean, then that's not a great diagnostic, given that people can and do say all sorts of things that have nothing to do with the facts of the matter. Again, much of it is aphoristic and comes form a pre-determined cultural stock about what one is supposed to say about one's life. Surely when I ask a stranger 'how are you?' on the street and they respond, 'fine,' I don't really think that means they're fine, for example. They could be in any mood whatsoever given that response.
If on the other hand, you mean 'feel' in a stricter sense, as in the pains and experience that they live through moment to moment (and clearly this is what we're interested in, not the former), then the question suddenly becomes more difficult for you, first because that's harder to determine, and second it's not clear at all that people tend to enjoy life in any reasonable capacity in this sense. Again, the day to day grind is basically suffering, and only when we abstract and think about life in some detached sense does it suddenly become worthy of approval.
And how is life, actually? Antinatalists think it's shitty. Okay, but what about people who don't? My point is that a judgement is being made either way.
But does that mean that one is not wrong? Of course not. You can make judgments, or have opinions, about whatever you please -- but they're just that, opinions. You seem to be implying something further, like the fact that people have different opinions on this subject somehow means that one is no better than the other, or that it is up to each person in each case to decide which is true for their own case. But how would that work? Does thinking life is good make it good? Again, that would be quite convenient for all of us, wouldn't it?
Yes, there is that. It was more of a snarky remark that antinatalism seems to be coming from comfortable people living in the developed world than people who suffer more than having to wait at a traffic light, or being bored because nothing is on the tube worth watching.
I do not think that being bored at a traffic light or having nothing to watch on television exhaust the problems people have in the developed world, and the received opinion that basically nothing happens to anyone in the developed world (that people living there have no 'genuine' problems, or perhaps even no 'genuine' life experiences) is troubling in its own right. That said, it's not surprising that anti-natalism comes from a position of development, since that's also where philosophy as a specialized practice comes from.
Does thinking life is good make it good? Again, that would be quite convenient for all of us, wouldn't it?
What else would make it good or bad, as far as living one's own life is concerned? Are you arguing that there is an objective criteria for judging how life is experienced, such that those who disagree with antinatalists, at least regarding their own lives, are wrong?
[quote=The Great Whatever]But does that mean that one is not wrong? Of course not. You can make judgments, or have opinions, about whatever you please -- but they're just that, opinions. You seem to be implying something further, like the fact that people have different opinions on this subject somehow means that one is no better than the other, or that it is up to each person in each case to decide which is true for their own case. But how would that work? Does thinking life is good make it good? Again, that would be quite convenient for all of us, wouldn't it?[/quote]
It's not that thinking life good makes it good but that some people find that life is good, just as it's not that thinking liquorice tasty makes it tasty but that some people find that liquorice is tasty. It's not somehow up for decision but at the same time it's not something for which there are objective truth conditions.
The Great WhateverOctober 27, 2015 at 19:39#14640 likes
What else would make it good or bad, as far as living one's own life is concerned? Are you arguing that there is an objective criteria for judging how life is experienced, such that those who disagree with antinatalists, at least regarding their own lives, are wrong?
I'll answer your question with another question. If there is no criterion as to how good or bad your life is, apart from your opinion on the matter, then why do people have any problems at all? Why don't they just not get bothered by anything, by thinking that they're doing alright, by changing their perspective? Is it that they can do this, but just don't (don't know how, maybe)? Whence problems?
It's not that thinking life good makes it good but that some people find that life is good, just as it's not that thinking liquorice tasty makes it tasty but that some people find that liquorice is tasty. It's not somehow up for decision but at the same time it's not something for which there are objective truth conditions.
And what is it that you are talking about when you say that people 'find that life is good?' With 'tasty,' it's not too hard to see what you're talking about: to find something tasty is to experience a pleasant gustatory sensation when exposed to it. What is the analogue for life? Surely, it's something like: being alive, or being exposed to life, is somehow similarly -- what, pleasant? But clearly that's not going to work well for you, since life is extremely unpleasant in the main. So what are you talking about?
I should also point out that even if you think there are no 'objective truth conditions' for such statements (which is a complicated issue), surely statements like 'X finds Y good/tasty/etc.' have objective truth conditions. So, what are they?
[quote=The Great Whatever]And what is it that you are talking about when you say that people 'find that life is good?' With 'tasty,' it's not too hard to see what you're talking about: to find something tasty is to experience a pleasant gustatory sensation when exposed to it. What is the analogue for life? Surely, it's something like: being alive, or being exposed to life, is somehow similarly -- what, pleasant? But clearly that's not going to work well for you, since life is extremely unpleasant in the main. So what are yo talking about?[/quote]
What I'm talking about is that I enjoy life, in the same way that some people enjoy reading or playing sport or listening to music, and so on. It's an emotional disposition that people find themselves in. Not everybody is chronically depressed, like you. The problem is that you're treating your emotional disposition as reflective of the objective worth of other people's lives. It just doesn't work that way.
I should also point out that even if you think there are no 'objective truth conditions' for such statements (which is a complicated issue), surely statements like 'X finds Y good/tasty/etc.' have objective truth conditions. So, what are they?
I don't know. Is it relevant? There may be objective truth conditions for "X finds life worth living" and "Y finds life not worth living". How does that help your case?
Here is a quick rundown of what I think about this issue:
According to tradition, during his trial in Athens, Socrates muttered: The unexamined life is not worth living.
I completely agree. To be a person who just runs through life without analyzing it lives a mediocre life.
But a person who spends too much time ruminating about life and not living life ends up ruining their life.
The trick is to figure out how to deal with pain. I said it before and I'll say it again: For the most part, pain is inevitable, but suffering is theoretically optional.
Additionally, there is no mutual exclusivity between suffering and happiness.
The existentialists felt that the truly free man makes a conscious choice to not commit suicide every day he wakes up. And if a man is not making a conscious choice, then he is not authentic, but of bad faith. I honestly do believe that most people on Earth do not really understand why they keep living, they just mindlessly go through the actions, rocking back and forth between suffering and boredom without even realizing it. This is why Socrates was correct. To analyze one's life and to continue to live regardless has the chance of procuring a truly meaningful existence. To be extremely familiar with the sense of one's mortality is authentic and pure.
The Great WhateverOctober 27, 2015 at 22:38#14931 likes
What I'm talking about is that I enjoy life, in the same way that some people enjoy reading or playing sport or listening to music, and so on. It's an emotional disposition that people find themselves in. Not everybody is chronically depressed, like you. The problem is that you're treating your emotional disposition as reflective of the objective worth of other people's lives. It just doesn't work that way.
While there's nothing I can say to you here to disprove this claim, it's rather empty. Of course if you said something like this about say, being beaten up, it would sound stupid. What I am saying is that this sounds just about as stupid to me (I'm exaggerating a little, but you see the point I'm making). Watching how people actually behave, instead of listening to what they say, is illuminating here.
I don't know. Is it relevant? There may be objective truth conditions for "X finds life worth living" and "Y finds life not worth living". How does that help your case?
If this were what we were talking about, you would need to spell out what those conditions are in order to know whether they hold, and so for your claim to be worthwhile.
The Great WhateverOctober 27, 2015 at 22:44#14941 likes
The trick is to figure out how to deal with pain. I said it before and I'll say it again: For the most part, pain is inevitable, but suffering is theoretically optional.
Theoretically optional? As opposed to actually optional, I suppose...
The existentialists felt that the truly free man makes a conscious choice to not commit suicide every day he wakes up. And if a man is not making a conscious choice, then he is not authentic, but of bad faith. I honestly do believe that most people on Earth do not really understand why they keep living, they just mindlessly go through the actions, rocking back and forth between suffering and boredom without even realizing it. This is why Socrates was correct. To analyze one's life and to continue to live regardless has the chance of procuring a truly meaningful existence. To be extremely familiar with the sense of one's mortality is authentic and pure.
Existentialism is a holdover from Christian ideas of the will. Those aren't tenable in the face of everyday life, imo.
Theoretically optional? As opposed to actually optional, I suppose...
What I meant by theoretical was that it is not guaranteed to eliminate all suffering, otherwise that would be the nirvana fallacy. It is perfectly conceivable, however, to minimize the amount of suffering one experiences.
What I meant by theoretical was that it is not guaranteed to eliminate all suffering, otherwise that would be the nirvana fallacy. It is perfectly conceivable, however, to minimize the amount of suffering one experiences.
I'm not sure what that would mean, unless it means being dead. I don't know what being alive entails, if not suffering in the broad sense (feeling pleasure and pain), and I don't know I can imagine a life that is somehow only pleasant. To experience seems to bring with it the possibility of disappointment and suffering.
In the Sartrean sense, anyway -- there's even a direct lineage from Sartre's notion of the will back to Descartes' in the Meditations, who in turn relates this explicitly to the will of God. The idea that the will is free from external influence and acts as a sort of force doesn't make much sense out of the context of that tradition.
I'm not sure what that would mean, unless it means being dead. I don't know what being alive entails, if not suffering in the broad sense (feeling pleasure and pain), and I don't know I can imagine a life that is somehow only pleasant. To experience seems to bring with it the possibility of disappointment and suffering.
I reject the idea that pleasure is synonymous with happiness. Happiness, for me, is synonymous with contentedness and eudaimonia, and although pleasure often does accompany happiness, it is itself a completely separate feeling that cannot cause happiness by itself. Empty pleasure is suffering in itself, merely a distraction from the discontent.
If you can learn to prepare for the worst, hope for the best, and expect the mediocre, then you can live your life in such a way that minimizes disappointments and suffering, and even take some enjoyment out of life.
In the Sartrean sense, anyway -- there's even a direct lineage from Sartre's notion of the will back to Descartes' in the Meditations, who in turn relates this explicitly to the will of God. The idea that the will is free from external influence and acts as a sort of force doesn't make much sense out of the context of that tradition.
Why does it not make sense? Is this related to determinism/fatalism?
The Great WhateverOctober 27, 2015 at 23:20#15000 likes
I reject the idea that pleasure is synonymous with happiness. Happiness, for me, is synonymous with contentedness and eudaimonia, and although pleasure often does accompany happiness, it is itself completely a completely separate feeling that cannot cause happiness by itself. Empty pleasure is suffering in itself, merely a distraction from the discontent.
If you can learn to prepare for the worst, hope for the best, and expect the mediocre, then you can live your life in such a way that minimizes disappointments and suffering, and even take some enjoyment out of life.
Maybe we can't get into this here, but I don't see a reason for the distinction. It seems to me that pain and pleasure are bad and good on their own terms, whether you think so or not, and that nothing else fulfills these criteria. So insofar as there's a notion of eudaimonia, joy, happiness, or contentment that is not about pleasure, it either doesn't make sense or isn't worth pursuing if it does.
Why does it not make sense? Is this related to determinism/fatalism?
It is certainly related to the hypostatization of the mind as a substance with an active faculty of willing, as in Descartes' philosophy, which is probably related to the Christian notion of the soul. It's a historical question. The more important thing is just that I don't think this notion of an existentialist heroic free will is at all true to life. That's all.
Yup, no one is truly happy, and everyone that claims to be is full of shit, or tucking their doubts, longings, fears, and sadness into that big gaping empty hole in their soul. So what? Big whoop. The problem isn't that no one is happy, the problem is that so many people think that they're supposed to be.
We're playing a game, a game that involves strategy, and to play the game ethically is to not cheat, steal, use underhanded tactics, and make low quality moves.
Not playing the game at all doesn't make one ethical, and certainly burning the game to the ground so that no one can play doesn't make them like fucking Jesus, the most ethical of all! Ethics and morality only apply within the context of the game.
Maybe we can't get into this here, but I don't see a reason for the distinction. It seems to me that pain and pleasure are bad and good on their own terms, whether you think so or not, and that nothing else fulfills these criteria. So insofar as there's a notion of eudaimonia, joy, happiness, or contentment that is not about pleasure, it either doesn't make sense or isn't worth pursuing if it does.
Pleasure and pain are indicators of general well-being. The value placed upon these feelings, and others, such as meaning, eudaimonia, happiness, etc, is up to the person themselves to determine. For example, I think there are different types of pleasures, one that simply stimulates the nerve endings, and one that is actually meaningful. The former leaves the person in a state of emptiness after it goes away, while the latter is something that simply complements the feeling of happiness. But perhaps you are right in that this belongs in a different thread.
It is certainly related to the hypostatization of the mind as a substance with an active faculty of willing, as in Descartes' philosophy, which is probably related to the Christian notion of the soul. It's a historical question. The more important thing is just that I don't think this notion of an existentialist heroic free will is at all true to life. That's all.
Pre-Socratic philosophy explored the ideas of free will long before Christianity. In fact (correct me if I am wrong here), Christianity's "free will" ideas came from the influence of the Mediterranean region.
I don't buy into classical libertarian free will either. But the fact of the matter is, we are, at the bare minimum, trapped within an illusion of having free will. There's no escaping it. Every action we do feels like we have actively had a role in it. This kind of fictionalism, in my opinion, is compatible with the existential heroism you speak of.
Pleasure and pain are indicators of general well-being. The value placed upon these feelings, and others, such as meaning, eudaimonia, happiness, etc, is up to the person themselves to determine. For example, I think there are different types of pleasures, one that simply stimulates the nerve endings, and one that is actually meaningful. The former leaves the person in a state of emptiness after it goes away, while the latter is something that simply complements the feeling of happiness. But perhaps you are right in that this belongs in a different thread.
But it's not up to me to determine. Pain feels bad no matter what my opinion is. That's why it's pain. If it were up to me, pain would never bother me because I'd just choose not to let it bother me. But I obviously can do no such thing, which is why pain is something dangerous at all in the first place.
Pre-Socratic philosophy explored the ideas of free will long before Christianity. In fact (correct me if I am wrong here), Christianity's "free will" ideas came from the influence of the Mediterranean region.
You may be right, but I don't know what pre-Socratic philosophy you would be talking about here.
But the fact of the matter is, we are, at the bare minimum, trapped within an illusion of having free will. There's no escaping it. Every action we do feels like we have actively had a role in it. This kind of fictionalism, in my opinion, is compatible with the existential heroism you speak of.
Existentialists do not talk about delusions of freedom as liberating. Certainly Sartre would not, anyway.
But it's not up to me to determine. Pain feels bad no matter what my opinion is. That's why it's pain. If it were up to me, pain would never bother me because I'd just choose not to let it bother me. But I obviously can do no such thing, which is why pain is something dangerous at all in the first place.
But like I said above, the existence of pain and happiness are not mutually exclusive. I agree that pain is inevitable. But there is a certain amount of control someone has over the amount they receive and how much the pain affects them.
But like I said above, the existence of pain and happiness are not mutually exclusive. I agree that pain is inevitable. But there is a certain amount of control someone has over the amount they receive and how much the pain affects them.
What control do you have over how much pain affects you? You mean, you can will it to be less painful? If you mean something else, then what?
What is happiness, if not pleasure? And if it is something distinct from pleasure, what makes it worthwhile? Pleasure is intrinsically worthwhile, i.e. good by its own standards.
Someone can obviously not just turn off nociceptors, or just "stop" feeling anxiety or any other kind of mental disturbance.
What you can do is to accept the pain that is present, limit your desires and strivings, and focus on fulfilling lasting goals and achievements.
As I said earlier: I reject the idea that pleasure is synonymous with happiness. Happiness, for me, is synonymous with contentedness and eudaimonia, and although pleasure often does accompany happiness, it is itself a completely separate feeling that cannot cause happiness by itself. Empty pleasure is suffering in itself, merely a distraction from the discontent.
If you experience happiness, you know why it is worthwhile.
But it's not up to me to determine. Pain feels bad no matter what my opinion is. That's why it's pain. If it were up to me, pain would never bother me because I'd just choose not to let it bother me. But I obviously can do no such thing, which is why pain is something dangerous at all in the first place.
But then why do people choose to do painful things such as running or climbing tall mountains? It seems like the suffering accompanied with such endeavors is worth it to them. Why would anyone climb Everest or run ultramarathons if suffering was the only thing that mattered? Clearly, it isn't.
The Great WhateverOctober 28, 2015 at 16:28#15660 likes
Reply to Marchesk I can't psychologize everyone as to why they do everything. Presumably if they're sane there's some pleasure of accomplishment attending it. But I don't see any contradiction with my position to say either that (1) the efficient causes of pleasure may themselves be painful, or that (2) one may take a separate kind of pleasure in a certain kind of pain (as a masochist might). That doesn't change what's at stake.
If there's no pleasure to doing such things at all, then I would agree there's nothing "good" about doing them. That doesn't mean people won't do them, of course -- it's not like people gravitate toward living great lives or anything. For the most part they're miserable, and some of that misery is generally self-inflicted.
@The Great Whatever You've made 15 posts on this thread in the space of a day or so. This is clearly an issue you care about? Why?
The Great WhateverOctober 28, 2015 at 18:28#15730 likes
Reply to Baden I think it's important. Generally my interests have drifted away from epistemology and toward ethics, especially pessimism. Other philosophical issues seem not that important by comparison.
TheWillowOfDarknessOctober 29, 2015 at 03:55#16580 likes
Great Whatever:I don't think anyone takes seriously the idea that life is not full of suffering. What may be more disturbing to people is, having realized this, coming to understand that they approve of life in spite of this, and therefore approve of other people's suffering, as well as forcing that suffering on further generations, perhaps in perpetuity. In other words, their ideals are internally inconsistent, which causes a Socratic pain: they nominally 'don't want people to suffer,' but deep down there is a very real sense in which they do want that.
I don't think it is a question of thinking as life absent suffering. What strikes me about many people is not that they actively proclaim nobody suffers with any seriousness, but rather that their minds are frequently filled with other thighs and feelings. It's more a question of not recognising the presence of suffering because you are too busy doing something else. The distress at noting the inevitability of suffering seems to a morning for a time when someone was so caught-up with other ideas they didn't notice. In their heart, they wish the world was just made-up of joy, like they perceived for am moment in the past.
Great Whatever:Ha. I doubt they even work on that level. They're just dumb phrases. It's like Ba da ba ba ba, I'm lovin' it. Nobody 'loves' McDonalds. That's just something they say in the commercials. Likewise with the aphorisms about suffering.
That certainly worked on me. Reading "Ba da ba ba ba, I'm lovin' it. " was nice. The saying consumed my mind for couple of seconds and I thought of nothing else. Suffering become invisible for a moment.
Nobody loves McDonalds. But then that's not what is at stake. What matters here is not a representational point (what does "loving McDonalds (or life)"even mean? It is an all together meaningless statement). Rather it is the act of "Ba da ba ba, I'm lovin'it" itself: the making of or hearing of the statement, which pushes aside all other thoughts, including those about suffering, to give a brief moment without any anxiety about anything. Moment where suffering becomes invisible, where anyone can take a break from the pain of worrying about it. That's is something just about everyone loves.
The Great WhateverOctober 29, 2015 at 04:21#16630 likes
What you can do is to accept the pain that is present, limit your desires and strivings, and focus on fulfilling lasting goals and achievements.
How does one 'accept' pain? Clearly that must mean something else besides feeling it, because then there would be no distinction to make, since for there to be pain is simply to feel it already (you cannot 'fail to feel' pain; the extent to which it's not felt is simply the extent to which there is none).
In accepting pain, do I think, 'alright, I'm in pain?' But how does that help?
As I said earlier: I reject the idea that pleasure is synonymous with happiness. Happiness, for me, is synonymous with contentedness and eudaimonia, and although pleasure often does accompany happiness, it is itself completely a completely separate feeling that cannot cause happiness by itself. Empty pleasure is suffering in itself, merely a distraction from the discontent.
So one can be happy without feeling any pleasure whatsoever? What sort of feeling is happiness, then? If it is not a feeling, why is it worth pursuing, since it seems that feelings are all that can possibly matter to us? And since if a feeling is good in its own right, it seems just to be pleasure, in what sense can we say happiness is worthwhile insofar as it is not pleasant or identical with pleasure?
What is worthwhile is worthwhile in its own right, not for the sake of anything else (if it is for the sake of something else, then we simply say that other thing is worthwhile, with the former simply being an efficient cause of it). So if happiness is worthwhile, it must demonstrate its own worth in such a way that the idea of it being regarded as not worthwhile doesn't make sense. But I do not know of anything that does this, other than pleasure. In fact, that seems to be what 'pleasure' means, in a sense.
I don't think that feelings, positive or negative are worth pursuing. I know a religious person, they like to have big inspirational conversations with people, where they use lots of words and ideas that elevate them. I find this is be chasing feelings.
I think that things are worth pursing, regardless of how they feel. Justice for someone else, even when you're the one that wronged them, for instance. I think that it is worth while to admit to doing wrong, even when it feels awful, and it isn't worth while to simultaneously think that you must be great, and doing the right thing for doing all that.
Do you not think that knowing what the truth is, is a desirable thing, TGW, regardless of how it makes you feel?
OK, so it's important why? What's the goal? Catharsis? Intellectual distraction? Or are you engaging in a kind of dark evangelism? Saving our souls by informing us of how worthless they are. I'm genuinely curious as to what motivates you. The depressed people I know aren't too bothered about spreading the bad news. They're more concerned about just being able to function.
The Great WhateverOctober 29, 2015 at 11:54#16990 likes
Reply to Baden Is the question, why is ethics important?
The Great WhateverOctober 29, 2015 at 11:56#17000 likes
Do you not think that knowing what the truth is, is a desirable thing, TGW, regardless of how it makes you feel?
This is the opening question of the Philebus. Is what is good, knowing true propositions, as Socrates maintains? Well, suppose I know how many hairs are on my head. That's the truth, right? Is that truth desirable? On most days anyway, not really.
So your question must be at least, what sorts of truth are desirable?
I think TGW's goal is to convince people to stop procreating. Now I don't think the antinatalists have a snowballs chance in hell of stopping the entire human race from procreating, but they might convince some people. That brings up the question of what a practical antinatalist hopes to accomplish. If you can't convince everyone to stop giving birth, then how about plan B where you convince people to make a world that's less terrible to be born into?
The Great WhateverOctober 29, 2015 at 13:48#17120 likes
Reply to Baden I don't think properly speaking ethics can be important 'to someone,' as if it were a personal choice. Rather ethics already is important regardless of your opinion on the matter, since it concerns adjudication of things that matter by their own lights, again regardless of your opinion.
Reply to Marchesk I don't have any particular goal here except to discuss philosophy, which I assume is what everyone's goal here is. The only odd question is why I'm the only one that has to justify myself (worth thinking about why that is).
The Great WhateverOctober 29, 2015 at 13:59#17140 likes
Reply to Baden It's an interesting question. I would say that the only thing worthwhile in itself is pleasure. But insofar as one's goal is to live well, ethics always becomes a demand. Without ethics, there is a sense in which things continue to matter, of course, but it will cease to matter 'what you do,' because you'll just do whatever, indifferent to whether it's worthwhile or not. And if it doesn't matter what you do, well then, that's another sense in which 'nothing matters,' because if you have no capacity to do anything that will change anything in a worthwhile way, then all discussions about anything might as well not be had.
This is what I'm trying to get at. There seems to be a tension in your joint claims that the only thing worthwhile is pleasure and that ethics is objectively important. I don't think you've really resolved it with your last comment. But I'll have to think some more on the issue.
The Great WhateverOctober 29, 2015 at 15:57#17210 likes
Reply to Baden Something can be worthwhile extrinsically, as an efficient cause of a good. It's not hard to see why ethics would relate interestingly to pleasure in this way.
Of course, if you were a Kantian ethicist for example, I'd say there's a very real sense in what you do/theorize about is completely unimportant. Nothing hinges on it, except perhaps negatively insofar as your mistaken opinions cause you to harm people.
The only odd question is why I'm the only one that has to justify myself (worth thinking about why that is).
I think you suffer your views to be challenged. You answer questions. You are capable of communication in a way that others find hard.
I think Hume's idea that if you keep asking 'Well, what's good about that?' you eventually end up with pleasure = good and pain = evil is a very interesting and robust position. Despite it being very philosophically strong, for some reason many people don't like it or they don't think it true, so I guess people argue against it.
I don't think I agree with it either, by the way, but I am nevertheless very sympathetic to TGWs Humean position.
All truth is clearly desireable, males in particular love to know tons of useless facts, and can seem to never get enough of them. You already agree in suggesting a truth that you believe to be of no consequence, suggesting by exclusion the realm of truth that is of consequence.
Happiness is play, art, pretend, imagination, fun times with good friends, family, and even strangers -- but life is serious. and seriousness is more important than happiness.
I think TGW's goal is to convince people to stop procreating. Now I don't think the antinatalists have a snowballs chance in hell of stopping the entire human race from procreating, but they might convince some people. That brings up the question of what a practical antinatalist hopes to accomplish. If you can't convince everyone to stop giving birth, then how about plan B where you convince people to make a world that's less terrible to be born into?
All truth is clearly desireable, males in particular love to know tons of useless facts, and can seem to never get enough of them.
Isn't a truth's value relative to it's perceived usefulness? As TGW said, he could know the number of hairs on his head, but unless he's a scientist doing a study on hair follicle counts what is the value of that information?
I think the reason we say things like "all truth is desirable" and "I'm a seeker of the truth" is because understanding how the world is or works is and has been a useful survival tool. Learning a ton of useless facts might actually have more to do with a person wanting to be perceived as knowledgeable or smart rather than those facts being intrinsically valuable.
For instance, what if a loved one got lost in the woods and died. Would the truth about how much they suffered at the end be desirable? The only way one could answer yes to that is if they tell themselves the truth for the sake of knowing the truth is worth it. Cold comfort, I think.
No, its value is relative to its actual usefulness. We can be wrong about something's usefulness, which may make us value facts that are useless, but we value them mistakenly believing them to be useful.
As I pointed out to TGW, that there are useless facts is not relevant to my point, but contested none the less that people have no interest in facts regardless of their perceived usefulness.
I'm not interested in speculating as to why knowing any fact is desireable, but I suppose that facts are generally useful, and authoritative, and we cannot always see in advance whether or not a fact will be useful in the future or not.
The truth about what happened to your loved one is indeed desireable, in order to feel the appropriate emotional reaction, which I think at least honours their memory and what they went through. Would you like to have suffered a great trial, and have everyone think that it was a walk in the park?
This very point is often my visceral reaction to the idea that being in a constant state of happiness is desireable, because if loved ones suffered or died, it would be inappropriate, and distasteful to feel anything but misery, that's what empathy and sympathy is, to understand what someone has went through, and feel the appropriate emotional response to it. I'm not one to engage in such self-protection that I'd sever empathic ties in order to not feel too bad about anything.
TheWillowOfDarknessOctober 29, 2015 at 21:39#17480 likes
The Great Whatever:Something can be worthwhile extrinsically, as an efficient cause of a good. It's not hard to see why ethics would relate interestingly to pleasure in this way.
The problem is an effect is never given without its cause. In an instance of a pleasure causing action, there is no way to separate performing that action and obtaining the pleasure.
So to consider the action only "extrinsically" important is to miss a most critical aspect. There is no question of judgement to be made. You don't have any sort of choice whereby you get to measure whether it is valuable to take the pleasurable action or not. If this is instance of pleasure matters, so must the taking of the action. Both must matter for themselves. That is to say, it is important that each of the states exists. Good is not some justification, some excuse for doing something. It is a state of being. It is about existing, about acting, in some way.
In accepting pain, do I think, 'alright, I'm in pain?' But how does that help?
Yes. Realizing you are suffering is the first step to mindful living. The next step is to locate the source of suffering. I think you might be surprised at just how much suffering is self-caused and not out of our control.
So one can be happy without feeling any pleasure whatsoever? What sort of feeling is happiness, then? If it is not a feeling, why is it worth pursuing, since it seems that feelings are all that can possibly matter to us? And since if a feeling is good in its own right, it seems just to be pleasure, in what sense can we say happiness is worthwhile insofar as it is not pleasant or identical with pleasure?
What I meant by pleasure is any strictly sensual experiences. Like eating a cookie. A cookie will not bring you happiness, only temporary relief from the burden of desire.
Eudaimonia, or flourishing, is the "goodness" that is focused on in several philosophies, including Epicureanism, Buddhism, and Utilitarianism. You cannot achieve eudaimonia by eating a cookie. Eudaimonia, happiness, contentedness, these are separate from sensual pleasures, although most often they are accompanied by sensual pleasures. Without trying to be vague, eudaimonia is a different kind of pleasure. It is something that makes your life worth living instead of something that must be relieved. It is difficult to explain, but you will know when you experience it. Think about when something "clicks" and you just "get it", and suddenly love doing whatever you are doing. You finally learned to do a layup with ease. You can point out all the constellations in the sky and navigate around the night sky. You have found someone that appreciates you almost as much as you appreciate them. You are in a process, a journey, in which the result is simply a continuation of the journey, and you are perfectly okay with that.
This is what I feel is truly tragic about the human condition. It's not that we are suffering, but rather we are suffering when there are alternatives. We pursue excessive hedonism and build vast structures of ambition, only to see the hedonism disappointing and our structures crashing down.
The Great WhateverOctober 29, 2015 at 22:41#17641 likes
Reply to TheWillowOfDarkness In a way you are right, but reason that is misleading is that it might cause someone to think, say, because moderation leads to the pleasure that attends self-restraint and avoids the pain of overindulgence and hangovers, that therefore moderation itself is good, which leads to the confusion that moderation itself is somehow intrinsically worthwhile. Of course, it isn't; there are possible situations in which moderation is extrinsically bad, and leads to painful consequences.
If you stick to the very situation, some action may actually be not divorceable from the pleasure. But then I would just say in that one case, the two are identical; there is no pleasure apart from the pleasant thing or action. But that doesn't mean the action itself, as a species, is intrinsically worthwhile, whereas pleasure is.
This very point is often my visceral reaction to the idea that being in a constant state of happiness is desireable, because if loved ones suffered or died, it would be inappropriate, and distasteful to feel anything but misery, that's what empathy and sympathy is, to understand what someone has went through, and feel the appropriate emotional response to it. I'm not one to engage in such self-protection that I'd sever empathic ties in order to not feel too bad about anything.
The worry is that it is unappreciative of a person, or shows a lack of empathy for them, if one isn't pained by their death. That is understandable. However, I think it's wrong on that basis then to suggest that the only way one could show such qualities is by being miserable. Certainly a much better world would be one in which we empathized with, and showed appreciation for, our loved ones when they died by celebrating them and feeling happy for the life they lived, rather than miserable. In other words, you are confused; you think that because you feel miserable when someone dies, this is the only way you ever ought to feel, or else you re somehow betraying them. I should be much happier not only for others' death, but also for my own, if I knew it would be met with joy and celebration of the dead person's life (and the claim is, this is how it actually goes in some cultures -- what you think is a visceral, natural reaction may in fact be a cultural contingency).
Yes. Realizing you are suffering is the first step to mindful living. The next step is to locate the source of suffering. I think you might be surprised at just how much suffering is self-caused and not out of our control.
I think a lot of it is, but there's just so much suffering in life that even removing that leaves you with too much to be acceptable, and of course still vulnerable to contingencies of suffering beyond your control.
What I meant by pleasure is any strictly sensual experiences. Like eating a cookie. A cookie will not bring you happiness, only temporary relief from the burden of desire.
Certainly eating a cookie can make you happy -- true, only for a little bit, but why is a little bit not better than not at all?
Reply to The Great Whatever The question that was put to me was about a miserable death, and my response was within that context. Not all deaths are miserable, some are surely glorious.
All lose of loved ones, and even things bring about mourning, and grief, but this is the feeling of lose, lose for something one is attached to, and which was partly integrated into their very being. The feeling of lose isn't fun, but it isn't about empathy, or concern for the thing that was lost's feelings per se, it is the feeling of getting over a significant relationship that has become no more.
I don't have any particular goal here except to discuss philosophy, which I assume is what everyone's goal here is.
Over on the other site in the unmoderated section, you started a thread raising the question of how antinatalists can go about convincing the world to stop procreating. When I reply to posters I'm familiar with, I do so in context of what I recall them posting about previously. But perhaps I misunderstood your intention in those antinatalist threads.
The only odd question is why I'm the only one that has to justify myself (worth thinking about why that is)
Because you're defending two controversial positions here. One is that pleasure is the only true good. Most ethical systems disagree. But more controversially, you argue the pessimistic view that life isn't worth living, and anyone who claims otherwise is mistaken. Most people are going to disagree.
In addition, you claimed that the pessimistic view is liberating, while I find it debilitating, which I suspect a lot of others do too. Now maybe it's because I'm psychologically unable to handle the truth, or maybe because I don't stay depressed for long. However, that's what makes me think it's a matter of 'interpretation', or mood.
I think a lot of it is, but there's just so much suffering in life that even removing that leaves you with too much to be acceptable, and of course still vulnerable to contingencies of suffering beyond your control.
Of course there is suffering, that is part of the nature of conscious life. But I disagree that there is necessarily an overwhelming amount of suffering, though. It certainly is not worth it to take the chance and have a child, but if you are already here then you have the chance of having some really cool experiences. Yes, tomorrow I could get in a car accident and have a pole rammed through my abdomen, impaling me. But tomorrow is also supposed to be a clear night sky, at least where I live. And I rather like looking at the stars.
Suffering is going to happen. It is inevitable. How you deal with the suffering is a different question altogether.
Certainly eating a cookie can make you happy -- true, only for a little bit, but why is a little bit not better than not at all?
Consuming a cookie will give you a temporary relief from that specific tanha. This is not happiness. I would go as far as to say that eating this cookie is a form of learnt self-torture. Happiness occurs when tanha is extinguished, when you are perfectly okay with your current situation.
There is a difference between experiencing pain, and experiencing misery. That's why I brought up the sports analogy. Some people voluntarily choose to endure pain, when they don't have to. It could be quite a bit as well, but I don't think it makes them miserable. Rather, it's a challenge for them, one that's rewarding.
I've certainly experienced pain and obstacles without being miserable about them. And of course I've experienced misery at other times, sometimes just because that was my mood or focus, and not because of anything external or a physical ailment.
The Great WhateverOctober 30, 2015 at 03:58#17960 likes
Over on the other site in the unmoderated section, you started a thread raising the question of how antinatalists can go about convincing the world to stop procreating. When I reply to posters I'm familiar with, I do so in context of what I recall them posting about previously. But perhaps I misunderstood your intention in those antinatalist threads.
I saw it as more of a, 'what would an antinatalist even do?' I share the opinion that there is no reasonable expectation that antinatalism will ever be successful.
Because you're defending two controversial positions here. One is that pleasure is the only true good. Most ethical systems disagree. But more controversially, you argue the pessimistic view that life isn't worth living, and anyone who claims otherwise is mistaken. Most people are going to disagree.
Hedonism is one of the oldest, most persistent, and best-founded ethical positions that I'm aware of. I certainly don't think it's any more controversial than any other major option. Of course, it has the virtue of being right, but that is not always the deciding factor in adopting moral/ethical opinions.
As for pessimism, I don't know. I think if you get people alone and drunk, a lot more admit to it. Of course you can't say it in the daylight, just like you can't say plenty of things.
Of course there is suffering, that is part of the nature of conscious life. But I disagree that there is necessarily an overwhelming amount of suffering, though. It certainly is not worth it to take the chance and have a child, but if you are already here then you have the chance of having some really cool experiences. Yes, tomorrow I could get in a car accident and have a pole rammed through my abdomen, impaling me. But tomorrow is also supposed to be a clear night sky, at least where I live. And I rather like looking at the stars.
I like how your example of a positive thing is pathetic compared to how utterly terrible the negative one is. Even in your own constructed examples, you can't win. Who in their right mind would be thrilled by those chances? Oh, boy, looking at the stars!
Consuming a cookie will give you a temporary relief from that specific tanha. This is not happiness. I would go as far as to say that eating this cookie is a form of learnt self-torture. Happiness occurs when tanha is extinguished, when you are perfectly okay with your current situation.
It seems to me that any philosophical position that must claim that eating a cookie is torture has gone wrong somewhere.
No, its value is relative to its actual usefulness. We can be wrong about something's usefulness, which may make us value facts that are useless, but we value them mistakenly believing them to be useful.
Value, much like truth, is not "out there" to be found(IMO). Something could be potentially useful but unknown, and therefore not valued. It would only attain a value by us or some other being deciding so.
The truth about what happened to your loved one is indeed desireable, in order to feel the appropriate emotional reaction, which I think at least honours their memory and what they went through. Would you like to have suffered a great trial, and have everyone think that it was a walk in the park?
Firstly, I would be dead and therefore I imagine I wouldn't be able to care.
Secondly, how much truth or how many truths about the loved one's demise is sufficient enough to honor their memory and amount "the appropriate emotional response"? Do you need to know every detail of their suffering, lest you not understand the significance of the ordeal?
You value truth in all cases because you think truth is desirable in all cases. I think that truth is undesirable in some cases, and therefore has no use for the living or the dead(in those cases*).
I feel the philosophical position one takes in a discussion like this hinges on their psychological state.
How can you quantify suffering or pleasure? Even if you could it wouldn't mean they're equivalent to each other. Humans trade suffering for pleasure all the time, so I'm inclined to think pleasure has a better exchange rate.
The long-term outlook is bleak though..
I like how your example of a positive thing is pathetic compared to how utterly terrible the negative one is. Even in your own constructed examples, you can't win. Who in their right mind would be thrilled by those chances? Oh, boy, looking at the stars!
What you fail to realize is the probability of these happening. The probability of me getting impaled in a car crash? So negligible that it's not worth worrying about. The probability of me being able to enjoy a clear night sky? High enough that I should expect to have a good time.
Should I climb a mountain during a thunderstorm? Of course not, even if the view is spectacular. The probability of me getting struck by lightning is non-negligible. I would rather not be killed or permanently maimed by a thunderbolt.
It seems to me that any philosophical position that must claim that eating a cookie is torture has gone wrong somewhere.
Not the actual act of eating a cookie, but rather the continuation of tanha. Too much sensual pleasure leads to an addiction. Unfortunately, the vast majority of people seem to have an addiction to sensual pleasures, pleasures that are almost always disappointing and merely prolong the addiction.
Value, much like truth, is not "out there" to be found(IMO). Something could be potentially useful but unknown, and therefore not valued. It would only attain a value by us or some other being deciding so.
You misunderstand. If someone values something based on its usefulness, but is wrong about its usefulness, then their placing value in it was a mistake by their own standards and intentions. The very notion of a neutral objective "usefulness" is of course absurd.
Secondly, how much truth or how many truths about the loved one's demise is sufficient enough to honor their memory and amount "the appropriate emotional response"? Do you need to know every detail of their suffering, lest you not understand the significance of the ordeal?
Between not knowing anything at all, and knowing every conceivable detail? Since I cared about them deeply, probably as much as I could find out in order to get a sense of what happened to them, like most anyone else, I figure. Try asking these questions to the family of a missing person. Advocate just forgetting about it, and not worrying about what happened to them, and sing the virtues of just feeling good all the time, regardless of what happens to you or those around you.
You value truth in all cases because you think truth is desirable in all cases. I think that truth is undesirable in some cases, and therefore has no use for the living or the dead(in those cases*).
Kind of undercuts your credibility, if, as you suggest, truth is not undesirable for being useless, or irrelevant, but because it might make you feel bad?
Advocate just forgetting about it, and not worrying about what happened to them, and sing the virtues of just feeling good all the time, regardless of what happens to you or those around you.
Kind of undercuts your credibility, if, as you suggest, truth is not undesirable for being useless, or irrelevant, but because it might make you feel bad?
My argument wasn't that feeling bad is always useless or that ignorance should be our bliss, but that sometimes the truth only serves to cause suffering and nothing else, making it undesirable. What good does it do a mother or father of someone who died in a car accident to tell them their loved one not only died, but was trapped and awake in the vehicle and slowly burned to death in front of desperate onlookers?
I don't see suffering as an end in itself. It's certainly inevitable that at times it will be, but it doesn't have to be desirable.
The evil falsehoods do in both cases, is firstly by big brothering people, and deciding what kind of information they can and cannot handle, or should and shouldn't be privy to, which makes you an unreliable, patronizing person. The evil it does in the second case, is that anyone that would rather believe pleasant falsehoods than terrible truths is also not trustworthy, or credible, and weak of heart and mind.
In the first case, I wouldn't be so patronizing to decide what people should and shouldn't know, though I would respect anyone's decision not to know, and of course wouldn't force any information down anyone's throat that they preferred not to know, but if they preferred not to know (and not like terrible irrelevant facts, about people that I have no ties with, in circumstances I have no control over, involvement with, and cannot learn from -- then of course I wouldn't care to know a string of terrible details for no reason at all, I'm not a masochist), then I would respect and trust them less as a result.
ProbablyTrueNovember 01, 2015 at 09:10#19440 likes
The evil falsehoods do in both cases, is firstly by big brothering people, and deciding what kind of information they can and cannot handle, or should and shouldn't be privy to, which makes you an unreliable, patronizing person. The evil it does in the second case, is that anyone that would rather believe pleasant falsehoods than terrible truths is also not trustworthy, or credible, and weak of heart and mind
No this is not the case. I'm not talking about a fools paradise and I'm not talking about withholding all relevant facts that would cause someone suffering. I'm saying there is a level of detail about certain things, such as the gruesome demise of someone's loved one, that giving said detail unsolicited under the pretense that "all truth is desirable" is ridiculous. If it's solicited that's a different story.
I personally would want to know details; that's how I am. However, I can see why other people might not.
It's not a matter of yes or no, but how much.
Certainly eating a cookie can make you happy -- true, only for a little bit, but why is a little bit not better than not at all?
Being satisfied or content with, or accepting of, your life is a state that relates not merely to the moment but to your overall passions and commitments. You have said that pleasure is the only intrinsic good; but I would contest this. Using you cookie example: sure, eating a cookie may give you momentary pleasure and on the basis of your belief in the intrinsic goodness of that experience you may be led to repeat it very often, which may lead to obesity and the various attendant sufferings that far outweigh the intrinsic goodness of the .momentary pleasure.
Is it really intrinsically good to abide in a disposition such that your satisfaction or dissatisfaction with life is dependent on momentary pleasures?
The Great WhateverNovember 02, 2015 at 00:04#19640 likes
Being satisfied or content with, or accepting of, your life is a state that relates not merely to the moment but to your overall passions and commitments. You have said that pleasure is the only intrinsic good; but I would contest this. Using you cookie example: sure, eating a cookie may give you momentary pleasure and on the basis of your belief in the intrinsic goodness of that experience you may be led to repeat it very often, which may lead to obesity and the various attendant sufferings that far outweigh the intrinsic goodness of the .momentary pleasure.
That only shows that pleasure can be an extrinsic bad, or the efficient cause of a bad. It is nonetheless intrinsically good, i.e. worthwhile for its own sake, even if it might lead to something bad (i.e. pain).
Is it really intrinsically good to abide in a disposition such that your satisfaction or dissatisfaction with life is dependent on momentary pleasures?
That only shows that pleasure can be an extrinsic bad, or the efficient cause of a bad. It is nonetheless intrinsically good, i.e. worthwhile for its own sake, even if it might lead to something bad (i.e. pain).
How do you justify the claim that something that may lead to an "extrinsic bad" should nonetheless be considered to be intrinsically good?
Would you not agree that a disposition that reliably leads to satisfaction, happiness and flourishing should be considered intrinsically better than a disposition that consistently leads to dissatisfaction, unhappiness and stultification?
The Great WhateverNovember 02, 2015 at 00:55#19670 likes
How do you justify the claim that something that may lead to an "extrinsic bad" should nonetheless be considered to be intrinsically good?
It does not lead to an extrinsic bad, but rather is one. An extrinsic bad is something that is bad, not for its own sake, but because it leads to something intrinsically bad. Or, if you like, it is simply the efficient cause of something bad (not bad in of itself).
Would you not agree that a disposition that reliably leads to satisfaction, happiness and flourishing should be considered intrinsically better than a disposition that consistently leads to dissatisfaction, unhappiness and stultification?
It can be extrinsically better, in that it might happen to lead to something good; but it is not intrinsically better, because no disposition is intrinsically better than any other (since there would also be situations in which those very dispositions lead to bad things, rather than good -- that is, they are not good in of themselves at all, but only insofar as they lead to good things).
It does not lead to an extrinsic bad, but rather is one. An extrinsic bad is something that is bad, not for its own sake, but because it leads to something intrinsically bad. Or, if you like, it is simply the efficient cause of something bad (not bad in of itself).
It can be extrinsically better, in that it might happen to lead to something good; but it is not intrinsically better, because no disposition is intrinsically better than any other (since there would also be situations in which those very dispositions lead to bad things, rather than good -- that is, they are not good in of themselves at all, but only insofar as they lead to good things).
So, you seem to be saying that only suffering is intrinsically bad and only pleasure is intrinsically good?
If so, then why would should we not say that something that inevitably leads to suffering is, at least in that dimension, intrinsically bad, or that something that inevitably leads to pleasure is, at least in that dimension, intrinsically good.
Personally I think the intrinsic/extrinsic talk smacks of 'essentialism', and is misleading and unnecessary anyway.
If it were possible for example to be hooked up to a machine that stimulated your brain giving you an indescribable and unprecedented level of pure pleasure that you never tired of, while still allowing you to live a normal lifespan (by feeding you with nutrients and even stimulating your nerves and muscles to substitute for exercise) would you say that would be a desirable way to spend your life?
Or again, if you were given a choice between losing the ability for your remaining life to enjoy some favorite indulgence that gives you great pleasure, or losing the intellectual capacity to pursue philosophy; which would you choose and why?
The Great WhateverNovember 02, 2015 at 01:43#19720 likes
If so, then why would should we not say that something that inevitably leads to suffering is, at least in that dimension, intrinsically bad, or that something that inevitably leads to pleasure is, at least in that dimension, intrinsically good.
Because in that case, it would not be good or bad for its own sake, but only insofar as it led to something else.
ProbablyTrueNovember 02, 2015 at 08:15#20240 likes
Because details beyond what is necessary to establish the case, are not useful, and thus their relevant factor in their undesirability would be their lack of importance, or usefulness, and not how terrible they are. You need to make the case based on how terrible they are, not based on how irrelevant, or useless. I long long long suggested (even back on another thread before this one) that inconsequential facts don't matter, and who cares if you know them or not? You suggested, however, that it would be their awfulness that would render them undesirable to know, so you have to make the point on this basis, and not some other basis while attempting to sneak in that they're also awful through the back door.
Well you didn't answer the more pertinent questions, but I will go with what you have responded to anyway,
If pleasure is intrinsically good and pain is intrinsically bad, and if there is, as the song would have it, and, I think experience confirms, "A fine line between pleasure and pain" then it would seem to follow that there is a fine line between good and bad. The problem is that the claim that something could be intrinsically good or bad seems to rely on a position of the purity of goodness and badness.
So, can you provide an argument for why we should think that there is anything at all that is intrinsically good or bad?
The Great WhateverNovember 03, 2015 at 00:34#20810 likes
So, can you provide an argument for why we should think that there is anything at all that is intrinsically good or bad?
To be intrinsically good or bad, something has to be good or bad by the very standards that it sets up, in such a way that it couldn't possibly not be good or bad. Pleasure and pain meet this requirement, since by their own standards they are good or bad, and not because of anything further. The very standards they set up, in being felt, are such that they feel good and feel bad, and since feeling is all that is at stake with them (since they are just feelings), this is the same as being good/bad by the very standards they set up (the only ones that matter).
That is an amoral view, however, and not conventional. Normally there is more to it than just pleasure, as it matters what one takes pleasure in. Taking pleasure in causing misery and suffering is seen as evil, and not good. Pleasure derived from an evil compounds the evil, makes it all the move evil. One causing suffering because they're coerced, or feeling remorse for it reduces how evil the act is perceived, doing it for the pleasure of it makes the act all the more evil.
You can of course maintain that pleasure is always good in all cases, regardless of how it is derived, but this would be a quite controversial opinion, in my view.
The Great WhateverNovember 03, 2015 at 00:55#20850 likes
You can of course maintain that pleasure is always good in all causes, regardless of how it is derived, but this would be a quite controversial opinion, in my view.
If it is controversial, I think it is because of confusion. If, for example, one gets pleasure out of causing others pain, then this is not a bad thing on behalf of the pleasure one receives, which is still intrinsically good; it is precisely bad because of the pain, which is intrinsically bad (notice if you take away the pain, resulting in a 'victimless crime,' the intuition that the act is bad goes away, even if the pleasure remains -- hence, it is not the pleasure that is bad).
Of course it is perfectly possible for an intrinsic good to be an extrinsic bad (or in my preferred way of speaking, an efficient cause of a bad). But notice that it is then an extrinsic bad only in virtue of causing pain.
No, that isn't the case. If it were just the pain that is caused, then whether or not pleasure was derived from the pain wouldn't effect how evil the action is perceived, but this isn't the case, as I pointed out, pleasure being derived from the action compounds the evil. This indicates that pleasure isn't absolutely good, in itself, but the circumstances by which it is derived are relevant to its determination as good or bad, and where most cases in which pleasure are derived are neutral or good, not subtracting from the pleasure as a good, it is also possible for pleasure to be seen as an evil, depending on how it is derived.
But, since the ideas of the intrinsic goodness and badness of pleasure and pain, respectively, are dependent on the (arguably) erroneous ideas of the absolute purity of pleasure and pain, I am still not satisfied that you have answered the question as to why we should think that pain and pleasure are really, as opposed to merely ideally (or by mere definition), intrinsically bad and good respectively.
To support an ethic of hedonism would be to say that pain and pleasure really are 'the good' and 'the bad' respectively, and that this fact trumps any other ethical considerations. The kinds of objections Wosret makes regarding the sources of pleasure also tell strongly against the justifiably of any ethic of hedonism.
The Great WhateverNovember 03, 2015 at 04:13#21080 likes
No, that isn't the case. If it were just the pain that is caused, then whether or not pleasure was derived from the pain wouldn't effect how evil the action is perceived, but this isn't the case, as I pointed out, pleasure being derived from the action compounds the evil. This indicates that pleasure isn't absolutely good, in itself, but the circumstances by which it is derived are relevant to its determination as good or bad, and where most cases in which pleasure are derived are neutral or good, not subtracting from the pleasure as a good, it is also possible for pleasure to be seen as an evil, depending on how it is derived.
I don't see why that 'compounds the evil.' If someone's getting hurt, then the bad thing about that is that they're getting hurt.
But, since the ideas of the intrinsic goodness and badness of pleasure and pain, respectively, are dependent on the (arguably) erroneous ideas of the absolute purity of pleasure and pain, I am still not satisfied that you have answered the question as to why we should think that pain and pleasure are really, as opposed to merely ideally (or by mere definition), intrinsically bad and good respectively.
I don't know what you mean by absolute purity, or by the distinction between ideal and actual pleasure and pain, but so far as I can tell nothing hinges on it or makes reference to it.
To support an ethic of hedonism would be to say that pain and pleasure really are 'the good' and 'the bad' respectively, and that this fact trumps any other ethical considerations.
I don't know what you mean by absolute purity, or by the distinction between ideal and actual pleasure and pain, but so far as I can tell nothing hinges on it or makes reference to it.
First, if pleasure and pain are never pure then they cannot be intrinsically good or bad, unless you want to say that something could be intrinsically good or bad, but only to a certain extent. But, to say this would be contradictory, because you would be saying 'X is intrinsically good to some degree, but it also intrinsically bad to an inversely proportionate degree'. The upshot of this would be that X cannot be intrinsically either good or bad, but only extrinsically good and bad to varying degrees.
The point is, to put it simply, that pleasure and pain, are only good or bad in principle. This means that it is only absolute pain (without the slightest degree of pleasure) or absolute pleasure ( without the slightest degree of pain) that can be intrinsically good or bad. But absolute pleasure or pain never obtains and so there can be nothing that is intrinsically good or bad.
The Great WhateverNovember 03, 2015 at 04:37#21100 likes
Reply to John I don't understand what you mean by 'pure' or 'absolute' pleasure and pain.
I don't see why that 'compounds the evil.' If someone's getting hurt, then the bad thing about that is that they're getting hurt.
The point is that the pleasure you might take in hurting others, even if it were 100% pleasure ( which it could never be) cannot in any case be ethically understood in isolation from the entire context in which it is gained.
So the relative badness involved in their getting hurt must be weighed against the relative goodness of the pleasure you derived from it.
Looked at another way, the relative goodness of the pleasure you gain from someone else's suffering must be weighed against the relative badness inherent in being someone who enjoys, to any degree, watching others suffer.
The only way you can avoid the badness inherent in watching someone suffer, in other words to be utterly untroubled by the kind of pain that would be attendant upon considerations about the kind of person you are in doing that, would be to be utterly sociopathic. But this would mean that you are not fit for human society, and for a social creature, surely that would have to be understood to be a bad thing.
I thought I had already explained that pure pleasure would be pleasure not accompanied by any pain, and of course, vice versa.
For example, even the apparently simple pure pleasure of eating a chocolate is accompanied by the pain involved in the inevitable ending of the experience and the fact that it cannot be endlessly repeated without increasing the attendant pain.
I don't see why that 'compounds the evil.' If someone's getting hurt, then the bad thing about that is that they're getting hurt.
I don't think that I'm suggesting anything controversial at all, but quite universal, and ubiquitous. Causing someone harm and deriving pleasure from it is what villains do (it's what psychopaths do, which is the evilest psychological profile you can give someone) , feeling remorse and reforming their ways is what anti-heroes do, and heroes don't even derive pleasure from the suffering of their enemies when they deserve it (though anti-heroes may, because they're still a little bad, but it's forgivable, because we want the villain to suffer too, because even we aren't as pure hearted and good as the hero, even though we recognize their not deriving pleasure from the suffering of the villain as a higher good)..
I don't feel the need to speculate why this is the case, I think that it is sufficient to point out that it is the case.
The Great WhateverNovember 03, 2015 at 05:32#21170 likes
Reply to Wosret Causing people harm is what villains do. What does it matter whether they take pleasure form it? The harm is the same.
That clearly isn't the case, and I don't know how you can reasonable maintain that. If that were the case, then it wouldn't matter if you cause the harm by accident, from coercion, under distress, for money, out of passionate anger, or whatever reason, when clearly the reason does matter to everyone -- and there is no eviler reason than for the sheer pleasure of it. You know this is true, and you cannot reasonably maintain the contrary.
The Great WhateverNovember 03, 2015 at 13:13#21390 likes
Reply to Wosret Are you saying that if someone beat you, it would make you feel better to know they feel guilty about it, or something? You're getting beaten either way.
Are you saying that if someone beat you, it would make you feel better to know they feel guilty about it, or something? You're getting beaten either way.
I would say if I was being beaten purely for pleasure, I would feel more animosity towards the person inflicting the beating than if they were doing it out of, say, revenge for a beating I had inflicted on them i.e. they had some reason other than the pure pleasure of it. It seems it would also be more humiliating to be abused in that way. And plausible that this emotional response could be considered additive to the purely physical pain inflicted.
I don't think that I'm suggesting anything controversial at all, but quite universal, and ubiquitous. Causing someone harm and deriving pleasure from it is what villains do (it's what psychopaths do, which is the evilest psychological profile you can give someone) , feeling remorse and reforming their ways is what anti-heroes do, and heroes don't even derive pleasure from the suffering of their enemies when they deserve it (though anti-heroes may, because they're still a little bad, but it's forgivable, because we want the villain to suffer too, because even we aren't as pure hearted and good as the hero, even though we recognize their not deriving pleasure from the suffering of the villain as a higher good)..
I don't feel the need to speculate why this is the case, I think that it is sufficient to point out that it is the case.
This doesn't harm the hedonist's position, though. If deriving pleasure from causing harm is more evil than simply causing the harm, it's because the knowledge that someone is deriving pleasure makes us (and perhaps the victim) feel extra shitty, and that's why it's extra bad. It's still pain = evil and pleasure = good.
The Great WhateverNovember 03, 2015 at 17:57#21610 likes
Reply to Baden Well, I can think of situations where getting beaten by someone who wasn't doing it for the pleasure of it would be worse. For example, suppose you're a child and your parent is beating you from a position of authority, believing it to be for your own good, and doing so unimpeachably in the eyes and moral standards of the community. That's a hell of a lot worse situation, because you still take the beating, only the beater is blameless and liable to do it again without reproach. Such is the way of all 'torturing angels...'
No, hedonists can think what they like (though I highly doubt that they'd actually practice that opinion, and would rather viscerally feel this to be the case in the relevant circumstances, if it were happening to them). It clearly doesn't compound the suffering, most cases in which suffering is caused because of suffering, or in ambiguous circumstances where it is difficult to blame the perpetrator, because of brain tumors, terrible upbringings, brain washing, and such makes us feel bad for everyone. We don't feel extra back because the perpetrator is evil, we rather feel vengeful, angry, and seek to feel pleasure from their misfortune.
I actually do think that all that is relevant for sympathy is the pain of whomever is hurt, and the bad feeling we get from that ought not be effected by the cause -- nor even character of the one in pain -- which is why (as I mentioned before), the hero even feels sympathy for the evil villain, because this is a higher good than deriving pleasure from even their misery.
Notice that, on its face, pleasure derived from misery is evil, whereas feeling empathetic, sympathetic misery for the suffering is good. These are cases in which the supposed absolute value of either are turned on their head. Clearly neither are intrinsically good, but only substantial at all because of a wider context of evaluation.
"com·pas·sion
k?m?paSH?n/
noun
sympathetic pity and concern for the sufferings or misfortunes of others." - dictionary.
In any case, quoting authorities aren't arguments, and I've not been making a prescriptive argument in any case, only a descriptive one. Merely pointing out how people tend to perceive and react to these things. Nietzsche by his own accord only reproaches the irreproachable, and counters what is most commonly, and widely believed. Bringing him up is just a point in my favor.
I wasn't citing authority necessarily, just adding to the conversation. I felt it was important to bring to the discussion the difference between pity and compassion in the Nietzschean sense.
Also, a dictionary is not necessarily the best source for definitions in philosophy, since philosophers tend to have slightly different opinions of what a specific word means.
Tell me what the difference is then, you figure? What distinction does he draw? My own view is that Nietzsche shouldn't be taken as endorsing a lack of compassion, or sympathy anyway, this is a gross mischaracterization in my view. It isn't really relevant, but I like Nietzsche a lot, so I'll indulge in the tangent. I believe that Nietzsche is rather saying that the strongest and most healthy human beings are naturally highly compassionate beings, that will be heroic, and self-sacrificing by nature, when they should take more care of themselves. It isn't a critique of compassion at all, in my view, but a call for the strongest and most healthy human beings to also take care of themselves, and to allow themselves selfish pursuits, and maintenance. There is no risk that they should fall into evil, or anti-social, behavior in the first place, compassion overflows from them, and his critique of it has to be taken within this perspective, in my view.
The distinction between pity and compassion is that pity leaves two people in misery, while compassion leaves no people in misery. Both stem from empathy, but pity is simply defeatist while compassion is motivating. The strong should take care of themselves, and help others out of the muck to get them to pursue their Ubermensch.
Reply to Wosret
[i]In discussing what can be translated into English alternately as “pity,”
“sympathy,” or “compassion,” Nietzsche almost always uses variations on
the German term Mitleid—literally, “suffering-with”—and only rarely
uses alternative German terms such as Mitempfinden, Mitgefu¨hl (both
“feeling-with”) or Sympathie. [/i]
-The Compassion of Zarathustra, p. 60
[i]A true compassion of
strength would not be the distinctive symptom of the imminent demise of
the once strong, but an expression of life and power successfully at work
in the very moment of compassion.[/i]
Hmm, didn't remember him making that point, which is unfortunate. I've heard it made a lot, about how feeling with someone is inferior to being motivated to make a difference, or take action and solve the problem and all of that -- but I disagree. I think that a huge misunderstanding of people, and what they need when they're suffering is for someone to swoop in and solve their problems. They just need someone to feel with them, and I didn't see him as missing this point.
We have enough social justice warriors as it is, we need more sympathy. You don't have to do anything, just feel. Also consider the absurdity of attempting to solve someone's problems, or make the world a better place for them, when you haven't even taken the time to feel what they feel about their situation. Wouldn't want to be dragged down, or made depressed.
Anyway, I think I'm done with the tangent. Thanks for producing that, I asked you because I didn't think that you could, but I stand corrected.
Anyway, I think I'm done with the tangent. Thanks for producing that, I asked you because I didn't think that you could, but I stand corrected.
I haven't actually read anything specifically by Nietzsche, only commentaries and criticisms like the one produced above. I am by no means an expert on Nietzsche; I'm only parroting what I have read elsewhere. Which actually goes against the Nietzschean idea of making up your own mind... ;)
Pffft, the only ones that live more dangerously than I do are my enemies.
ArguingWAristotleTiffNovember 04, 2015 at 12:33#22570 likes
Reply to Wosret A portion of your reply (the first on this thread, 8 days ago) has been posted on The Philosophy Forum Facebook page. Congratulations and Thank you for your contribution!
Comments (117)
Isn't that a reflection of how much people love life? For those to whom life does not matter, then the end is of no consequence - wholly beneficial even, if it results in an improved world (no suffering).
On the other hand, for those who love life, who are interested in living it, the idea of suffering cannot be avoided - except in death - and is nothing but depressing. In their heart, they would know that what they love so much just means misery for others and themselves.
Would you be happy knowing that what you wanted (life) meant the necessary suffering of yourself and others? And that there was no way to have what you want without suffering?
There may be a tension in realizing that what they love is violence and suffering and ultimately making other people and themselves suffer in perpetuity, and it's hard to overcome the cognitive dissonance and say, 'yes, I love violence, and I want everyone to suffer forever,' which is essentially what one is saying if you give the old 'seal of approval' to life. Yeah, I guess I buy that.
Reading about medical conditions is actually interesting in that regard -- how pointlessly painful it is just to exist, even bracketing any external threats. And if you listen to people day in and day out talk about life, it's mostly complaints -- day to day, there's just obvious suffering, but not much if any joy. It's only when you ask them whether they love life 'in the abstract,' where it means nothing, that suddenly they get misty-eted about it and so on.
To my mind "love" is the problem there. It is always an after-the-moment abstraction used to assert that something is important. People don't "love" life per se. Meaning and enjoyment is found in friends, family, eating, laughing, pleasure, creating, joy, drawing a picture, colouring in a book, hearing music, eating raspberries, etc., etc., etc. To compare life with the immediate visceral experience of "suffering" is just unfair.
The tension is not so much in that people love violence (most people don't to a large extent), but rather in that they cannot have what they want without the presence of suffering and violence. I can't have my cricket team and spin bowling without life. To have the joy I do (even when we lose), myself and others need to live. Some suffering or violence will, in the end, result in these lives. No matter how much I don't want it to, or how good my life happens to be, what I want can't be given without suffering.
Here, the problem is not so much cognitive dissonance: one can easily own the idea that what they want results in the suffering of others. It isn't that hard. Even antinatalists do this frequently, in recognising that there is no way to end everyone without causing horrible suffering, such that we ought to put-up with some suffering in life, even though we have ways to eliminate it all quickly if we really tried (Nuke everything).
What is upsetting is, rather, the destruction of the idea that life can be without a horrible cost. It is depressing to find out that the idea you had, that life is wonderful, to a point that it is always a joyful experience worth seeking, is wrong. It is not prescribing suffering for others which is upsetting (no-one really does this in the context in which we are talking; I did not chose that you would live or that you wouldn't die, as of today), but rather coming into the knowledge that there is no life without suffering. With such knowledge, you know that the joy of life will never overcome its suffering, even if you happen to have it almost constantly. It is the mourning of a "perfect" world which someone believed in, but which never existed.
I don't think any adult actually thinks that, though. Usually their nominal opinions are instead summed up with dumb aphorisms about how life is 'good and bad,' and you take both of them in stride, or about how suffering makes you appreciate the good, etc. Of course none of that is true, it's just what you say. You sort of revert to thinking in terms of Hallmark cards because that's all you've got -- you recapitulate whatever the culture's told you, there's no real filter through actual life experience there.
Moreover, those dumb aphorisms aren't a description of anyone's life, joyful or not. They constitute a normative demand for people to put-up with suffering and make the most of whatever joy they experience. As if either of those ideas make sense or are even possible. Someone experiencing joy isn't worried about ensuring they make the most of it. Joy is felt, not meticulously planned to be productive as possible. And suffering, well, it is constituted by feeling horrible such that people want to get away from it as soon as possible. People put-up with annoyances, not suffering.
These dumb aphorisms sometimes work as a distraction from suffering, but that's really all they are. On occasion someone might, for example, find "solace" in the idea of "suffering making you appreciate the good," but all that's doing is building a moment of respite in the present. It doesn't actually undo any suffering of the past or make any suffering in the future go away. But then that's all people want in many instance: anything to forget the despair of suffering for a moment. Often the need to feel better in the moment outweighs any concern for accurate description of suffering.
I don't think anyone takes seriously the idea that life is not full of suffering. What may be more disturbing to people is, having realized this, coming to understand that they approve of life in spite of this, and therefore approve of other people's suffering, as well as forcing that suffering on further generations, perhaps in perpetuity. In other words, their ideals are internally inconsistent, which causes a Socratic pain: they nominally 'don't want people to suffer,' but deep down there is a very real sense in which they do want that.
Quoting TheWillowOfDarkness
Ha. I doubt they even work on that level. They're just dumb phrases. It's like Ba da ba ba ba, I'm lovin' it. Nobody 'loves' McDonalds. That's just something they say in the commercials. Likewise with the aphorisms about suffering.
Why do you continue existing? And could you define if there's anything you 'like'? I'd hesitate using the word 'love'.
It's depressing because we're already born, and because it counters the natural optimism bias. What I can't be sure about is to what degree it's correct, because a lot of times, whether life feels worthwhile is a matter of attitude, to me. If I start feeling depressed, then the negative thoughts come. But what makes the negative thoughts more true than the positive ones? It's just a different interpretation of life.
This feels like you're projecting your own pessimistic view of life on others. Maybe most of us find it worth living, most of the time. Or that's how it feels to us, not always, but enough of the time. Or at least that's the case for me. It's only when I'm depressed or facing something dispiriting that I wonder if life's worth it.
Alright? But what we don't have anything to do with tends not to bother us, and from my experience the way people react to antinatalism is not the way they react to conspiracy theories about lizards ruling the earth.
Quoting Marchesk
It's always been interesting to me how when it's a matter of finding food or getting a plane to fly, one's 'interpretation' doesn't seem to matter much. But suddenly when it's a matter of much more importance, it becomes omnipotent. Why is that? It's a good thing we have our 'interpretations' to save us from life's misery, huh. We'd be in a real bind if that trick didn't work.
Isn't life being miserable a matter of how one feels about life? Person A feels that the various sufferings of life make it not worth living, but person B does not. What makes B wrong about their own life?
The antinatalist position seems to be saying that the B people are fooling themselves, and the A people see things as they are. But I don't see what makes the pessimistic view true, at least in so far as to how people experience their own lives.
As for the 'developed world,' well, first of all I disagree (hedonic treadmill), and second, the developed world depends on the 'developing' world in unsavory ways, and there is an implicit approval of what happens 'way over there,' if you see what I mean.
It's a question of whether a person feels that the bad outweighs whatever good they get out of being alive. You seem to be arguing that people can't actually feel that way, or honestly come to such a conclusion. That they're delusional and lying to themselves.
'Quoting The Great Whatever
And how is life, actually? Antinatalists think it's shitty. Okay, but what about people who don't? My point is that a judgement is being made either way.
Yes, there is that. It was more of a snarky remark that antinatalism seems to be coming from comfortable people living in the developed world than people who suffer more than having to wait at a traffic light, or being bored because nothing is on the tube worth watching.
You have to be careful about what you mean by 'feel' here. By that do you mean, for example, offer a nominal opinion about their life when asked? If that is what you mean, then that's not a great diagnostic, given that people can and do say all sorts of things that have nothing to do with the facts of the matter. Again, much of it is aphoristic and comes form a pre-determined cultural stock about what one is supposed to say about one's life. Surely when I ask a stranger 'how are you?' on the street and they respond, 'fine,' I don't really think that means they're fine, for example. They could be in any mood whatsoever given that response.
If on the other hand, you mean 'feel' in a stricter sense, as in the pains and experience that they live through moment to moment (and clearly this is what we're interested in, not the former), then the question suddenly becomes more difficult for you, first because that's harder to determine, and second it's not clear at all that people tend to enjoy life in any reasonable capacity in this sense. Again, the day to day grind is basically suffering, and only when we abstract and think about life in some detached sense does it suddenly become worthy of approval.
Quoting Marchesk
But does that mean that one is not wrong? Of course not. You can make judgments, or have opinions, about whatever you please -- but they're just that, opinions. You seem to be implying something further, like the fact that people have different opinions on this subject somehow means that one is no better than the other, or that it is up to each person in each case to decide which is true for their own case. But how would that work? Does thinking life is good make it good? Again, that would be quite convenient for all of us, wouldn't it?
Quoting Marchesk
I do not think that being bored at a traffic light or having nothing to watch on television exhaust the problems people have in the developed world, and the received opinion that basically nothing happens to anyone in the developed world (that people living there have no 'genuine' problems, or perhaps even no 'genuine' life experiences) is troubling in its own right. That said, it's not surprising that anti-natalism comes from a position of development, since that's also where philosophy as a specialized practice comes from.
What else would make it good or bad, as far as living one's own life is concerned? Are you arguing that there is an objective criteria for judging how life is experienced, such that those who disagree with antinatalists, at least regarding their own lives, are wrong?
It's not that thinking life good makes it good but that some people find that life is good, just as it's not that thinking liquorice tasty makes it tasty but that some people find that liquorice is tasty. It's not somehow up for decision but at the same time it's not something for which there are objective truth conditions.
I'll answer your question with another question. If there is no criterion as to how good or bad your life is, apart from your opinion on the matter, then why do people have any problems at all? Why don't they just not get bothered by anything, by thinking that they're doing alright, by changing their perspective? Is it that they can do this, but just don't (don't know how, maybe)? Whence problems?
Quoting Michael
And what is it that you are talking about when you say that people 'find that life is good?' With 'tasty,' it's not too hard to see what you're talking about: to find something tasty is to experience a pleasant gustatory sensation when exposed to it. What is the analogue for life? Surely, it's something like: being alive, or being exposed to life, is somehow similarly -- what, pleasant? But clearly that's not going to work well for you, since life is extremely unpleasant in the main. So what are you talking about?
I should also point out that even if you think there are no 'objective truth conditions' for such statements (which is a complicated issue), surely statements like 'X finds Y good/tasty/etc.' have objective truth conditions. So, what are they?
What I'm talking about is that I enjoy life, in the same way that some people enjoy reading or playing sport or listening to music, and so on. It's an emotional disposition that people find themselves in. Not everybody is chronically depressed, like you. The problem is that you're treating your emotional disposition as reflective of the objective worth of other people's lives. It just doesn't work that way.
I don't know. Is it relevant? There may be objective truth conditions for "X finds life worth living" and "Y finds life not worth living". How does that help your case?
According to tradition, during his trial in Athens, Socrates muttered: The unexamined life is not worth living.
I completely agree. To be a person who just runs through life without analyzing it lives a mediocre life.
But a person who spends too much time ruminating about life and not living life ends up ruining their life.
The trick is to figure out how to deal with pain. I said it before and I'll say it again: For the most part, pain is inevitable, but suffering is theoretically optional.
Additionally, there is no mutual exclusivity between suffering and happiness.
The existentialists felt that the truly free man makes a conscious choice to not commit suicide every day he wakes up. And if a man is not making a conscious choice, then he is not authentic, but of bad faith. I honestly do believe that most people on Earth do not really understand why they keep living, they just mindlessly go through the actions, rocking back and forth between suffering and boredom without even realizing it. This is why Socrates was correct. To analyze one's life and to continue to live regardless has the chance of procuring a truly meaningful existence. To be extremely familiar with the sense of one's mortality is authentic and pure.
While there's nothing I can say to you here to disprove this claim, it's rather empty. Of course if you said something like this about say, being beaten up, it would sound stupid. What I am saying is that this sounds just about as stupid to me (I'm exaggerating a little, but you see the point I'm making). Watching how people actually behave, instead of listening to what they say, is illuminating here.
Quoting Michael
If this were what we were talking about, you would need to spell out what those conditions are in order to know whether they hold, and so for your claim to be worthwhile.
Theoretically optional? As opposed to actually optional, I suppose...
Quoting darthbarracuda
Existentialism is a holdover from Christian ideas of the will. Those aren't tenable in the face of everyday life, imo.
What I meant by theoretical was that it is not guaranteed to eliminate all suffering, otherwise that would be the nirvana fallacy. It is perfectly conceivable, however, to minimize the amount of suffering one experiences.
Quoting The Great Whatever
I would like some clarification on this.
I'm not sure what that would mean, unless it means being dead. I don't know what being alive entails, if not suffering in the broad sense (feeling pleasure and pain), and I don't know I can imagine a life that is somehow only pleasant. To experience seems to bring with it the possibility of disappointment and suffering.
Quoting darthbarracuda
In the Sartrean sense, anyway -- there's even a direct lineage from Sartre's notion of the will back to Descartes' in the Meditations, who in turn relates this explicitly to the will of God. The idea that the will is free from external influence and acts as a sort of force doesn't make much sense out of the context of that tradition.
I reject the idea that pleasure is synonymous with happiness. Happiness, for me, is synonymous with contentedness and eudaimonia, and although pleasure often does accompany happiness, it is itself a completely separate feeling that cannot cause happiness by itself. Empty pleasure is suffering in itself, merely a distraction from the discontent.
If you can learn to prepare for the worst, hope for the best, and expect the mediocre, then you can live your life in such a way that minimizes disappointments and suffering, and even take some enjoyment out of life.
Quoting The Great Whatever
Why does it not make sense? Is this related to determinism/fatalism?
Maybe we can't get into this here, but I don't see a reason for the distinction. It seems to me that pain and pleasure are bad and good on their own terms, whether you think so or not, and that nothing else fulfills these criteria. So insofar as there's a notion of eudaimonia, joy, happiness, or contentment that is not about pleasure, it either doesn't make sense or isn't worth pursuing if it does.
Quoting darthbarracuda
It is certainly related to the hypostatization of the mind as a substance with an active faculty of willing, as in Descartes' philosophy, which is probably related to the Christian notion of the soul. It's a historical question. The more important thing is just that I don't think this notion of an existentialist heroic free will is at all true to life. That's all.
We're playing a game, a game that involves strategy, and to play the game ethically is to not cheat, steal, use underhanded tactics, and make low quality moves.
Not playing the game at all doesn't make one ethical, and certainly burning the game to the ground so that no one can play doesn't make them like fucking Jesus, the most ethical of all! Ethics and morality only apply within the context of the game.
Pleasure and pain are indicators of general well-being. The value placed upon these feelings, and others, such as meaning, eudaimonia, happiness, etc, is up to the person themselves to determine. For example, I think there are different types of pleasures, one that simply stimulates the nerve endings, and one that is actually meaningful. The former leaves the person in a state of emptiness after it goes away, while the latter is something that simply complements the feeling of happiness. But perhaps you are right in that this belongs in a different thread.
Quoting The Great Whatever
Pre-Socratic philosophy explored the ideas of free will long before Christianity. In fact (correct me if I am wrong here), Christianity's "free will" ideas came from the influence of the Mediterranean region.
I don't buy into classical libertarian free will either. But the fact of the matter is, we are, at the bare minimum, trapped within an illusion of having free will. There's no escaping it. Every action we do feels like we have actively had a role in it. This kind of fictionalism, in my opinion, is compatible with the existential heroism you speak of.
This is such a great insight, Wosret. I wish I had said it myself ;)
But it's not up to me to determine. Pain feels bad no matter what my opinion is. That's why it's pain. If it were up to me, pain would never bother me because I'd just choose not to let it bother me. But I obviously can do no such thing, which is why pain is something dangerous at all in the first place.
Quoting darthbarracuda
You may be right, but I don't know what pre-Socratic philosophy you would be talking about here.
Quoting darthbarracuda
Existentialists do not talk about delusions of freedom as liberating. Certainly Sartre would not, anyway.
But like I said above, the existence of pain and happiness are not mutually exclusive. I agree that pain is inevitable. But there is a certain amount of control someone has over the amount they receive and how much the pain affects them.
Quoting The Great Whatever
Neither do I, I just remember reading that somewhere. :P
Quoting The Great Whatever
Camus at the very least talks about rebelling against life regardless of reality.
What control do you have over how much pain affects you? You mean, you can will it to be less painful? If you mean something else, then what?
What is happiness, if not pleasure? And if it is something distinct from pleasure, what makes it worthwhile? Pleasure is intrinsically worthwhile, i.e. good by its own standards.
Someone can obviously not just turn off nociceptors, or just "stop" feeling anxiety or any other kind of mental disturbance.
What you can do is to accept the pain that is present, limit your desires and strivings, and focus on fulfilling lasting goals and achievements.
As I said earlier: I reject the idea that pleasure is synonymous with happiness. Happiness, for me, is synonymous with contentedness and eudaimonia, and although pleasure often does accompany happiness, it is itself a completely separate feeling that cannot cause happiness by itself. Empty pleasure is suffering in itself, merely a distraction from the discontent.
If you experience happiness, you know why it is worthwhile.
But then why do people choose to do painful things such as running or climbing tall mountains? It seems like the suffering accompanied with such endeavors is worth it to them. Why would anyone climb Everest or run ultramarathons if suffering was the only thing that mattered? Clearly, it isn't.
If there's no pleasure to doing such things at all, then I would agree there's nothing "good" about doing them. That doesn't mean people won't do them, of course -- it's not like people gravitate toward living great lives or anything. For the most part they're miserable, and some of that misery is generally self-inflicted.
I don't think it is a question of thinking as life absent suffering. What strikes me about many people is not that they actively proclaim nobody suffers with any seriousness, but rather that their minds are frequently filled with other thighs and feelings. It's more a question of not recognising the presence of suffering because you are too busy doing something else. The distress at noting the inevitability of suffering seems to a morning for a time when someone was so caught-up with other ideas they didn't notice. In their heart, they wish the world was just made-up of joy, like they perceived for am moment in the past.
That certainly worked on me. Reading "Ba da ba ba ba, I'm lovin' it. " was nice. The saying consumed my mind for couple of seconds and I thought of nothing else. Suffering become invisible for a moment.
Nobody loves McDonalds. But then that's not what is at stake. What matters here is not a representational point (what does "loving McDonalds (or life)"even mean? It is an all together meaningless statement). Rather it is the act of "Ba da ba ba, I'm lovin'it" itself: the making of or hearing of the statement, which pushes aside all other thoughts, including those about suffering, to give a brief moment without any anxiety about anything. Moment where suffering becomes invisible, where anyone can take a break from the pain of worrying about it. That's is something just about everyone loves.
How does one 'accept' pain? Clearly that must mean something else besides feeling it, because then there would be no distinction to make, since for there to be pain is simply to feel it already (you cannot 'fail to feel' pain; the extent to which it's not felt is simply the extent to which there is none).
In accepting pain, do I think, 'alright, I'm in pain?' But how does that help?
Quoting darthbarracuda
So one can be happy without feeling any pleasure whatsoever? What sort of feeling is happiness, then? If it is not a feeling, why is it worth pursuing, since it seems that feelings are all that can possibly matter to us? And since if a feeling is good in its own right, it seems just to be pleasure, in what sense can we say happiness is worthwhile insofar as it is not pleasant or identical with pleasure?
What is worthwhile is worthwhile in its own right, not for the sake of anything else (if it is for the sake of something else, then we simply say that other thing is worthwhile, with the former simply being an efficient cause of it). So if happiness is worthwhile, it must demonstrate its own worth in such a way that the idea of it being regarded as not worthwhile doesn't make sense. But I do not know of anything that does this, other than pleasure. In fact, that seems to be what 'pleasure' means, in a sense.
I think that things are worth pursing, regardless of how they feel. Justice for someone else, even when you're the one that wronged them, for instance. I think that it is worth while to admit to doing wrong, even when it feels awful, and it isn't worth while to simultaneously think that you must be great, and doing the right thing for doing all that.
Do you not think that knowing what the truth is, is a desirable thing, TGW, regardless of how it makes you feel?
OK, so it's important why? What's the goal? Catharsis? Intellectual distraction? Or are you engaging in a kind of dark evangelism? Saving our souls by informing us of how worthless they are. I'm genuinely curious as to what motivates you. The depressed people I know aren't too bothered about spreading the bad news. They're more concerned about just being able to function.
This is the opening question of the Philebus. Is what is good, knowing true propositions, as Socrates maintains? Well, suppose I know how many hairs are on my head. That's the truth, right? Is that truth desirable? On most days anyway, not really.
So your question must be at least, what sorts of truth are desirable?
Let's do that one too: Why is ethics important to you? The original question was: Why is talking about your philosophical worldview important to you?
I don't have any particular goal here except to discuss philosophy, which I assume is what everyone's goal here is. The only odd question is why I'm the only one that has to justify myself (worth thinking about why that is).
Of course, if you were a Kantian ethicist for example, I'd say there's a very real sense in what you do/theorize about is completely unimportant. Nothing hinges on it, except perhaps negatively insofar as your mistaken opinions cause you to harm people.
I think you suffer your views to be challenged. You answer questions. You are capable of communication in a way that others find hard.
I think Hume's idea that if you keep asking 'Well, what's good about that?' you eventually end up with pleasure = good and pain = evil is a very interesting and robust position. Despite it being very philosophically strong, for some reason many people don't like it or they don't think it true, so I guess people argue against it.
I don't think I agree with it either, by the way, but I am nevertheless very sympathetic to TGWs Humean position.
All truth is clearly desireable, males in particular love to know tons of useless facts, and can seem to never get enough of them. You already agree in suggesting a truth that you believe to be of no consequence, suggesting by exclusion the realm of truth that is of consequence.
Happiness is play, art, pretend, imagination, fun times with good friends, family, and even strangers -- but life is serious. and seriousness is more important than happiness.
I don't currently consider life generally to be all sunshine lollipops and rainbows,
Why not try for plan A and B at the same time?
Quoting Wosret
Isn't a truth's value relative to it's perceived usefulness? As TGW said, he could know the number of hairs on his head, but unless he's a scientist doing a study on hair follicle counts what is the value of that information?
I think the reason we say things like "all truth is desirable" and "I'm a seeker of the truth" is because understanding how the world is or works is and has been a useful survival tool. Learning a ton of useless facts might actually have more to do with a person wanting to be perceived as knowledgeable or smart rather than those facts being intrinsically valuable.
For instance, what if a loved one got lost in the woods and died. Would the truth about how much they suffered at the end be desirable? The only way one could answer yes to that is if they tell themselves the truth for the sake of knowing the truth is worth it. Cold comfort, I think.
No, its value is relative to its actual usefulness. We can be wrong about something's usefulness, which may make us value facts that are useless, but we value them mistakenly believing them to be useful.
As I pointed out to TGW, that there are useless facts is not relevant to my point, but contested none the less that people have no interest in facts regardless of their perceived usefulness.
I'm not interested in speculating as to why knowing any fact is desireable, but I suppose that facts are generally useful, and authoritative, and we cannot always see in advance whether or not a fact will be useful in the future or not.
The truth about what happened to your loved one is indeed desireable, in order to feel the appropriate emotional reaction, which I think at least honours their memory and what they went through. Would you like to have suffered a great trial, and have everyone think that it was a walk in the park?
This very point is often my visceral reaction to the idea that being in a constant state of happiness is desireable, because if loved ones suffered or died, it would be inappropriate, and distasteful to feel anything but misery, that's what empathy and sympathy is, to understand what someone has went through, and feel the appropriate emotional response to it. I'm not one to engage in such self-protection that I'd sever empathic ties in order to not feel too bad about anything.
The problem is an effect is never given without its cause. In an instance of a pleasure causing action, there is no way to separate performing that action and obtaining the pleasure.
So to consider the action only "extrinsically" important is to miss a most critical aspect. There is no question of judgement to be made. You don't have any sort of choice whereby you get to measure whether it is valuable to take the pleasurable action or not. If this is instance of pleasure matters, so must the taking of the action. Both must matter for themselves. That is to say, it is important that each of the states exists. Good is not some justification, some excuse for doing something. It is a state of being. It is about existing, about acting, in some way.
Yes. Realizing you are suffering is the first step to mindful living. The next step is to locate the source of suffering. I think you might be surprised at just how much suffering is self-caused and not out of our control.
Quoting The Great Whatever
What I meant by pleasure is any strictly sensual experiences. Like eating a cookie. A cookie will not bring you happiness, only temporary relief from the burden of desire.
Eudaimonia, or flourishing, is the "goodness" that is focused on in several philosophies, including Epicureanism, Buddhism, and Utilitarianism. You cannot achieve eudaimonia by eating a cookie. Eudaimonia, happiness, contentedness, these are separate from sensual pleasures, although most often they are accompanied by sensual pleasures. Without trying to be vague, eudaimonia is a different kind of pleasure. It is something that makes your life worth living instead of something that must be relieved. It is difficult to explain, but you will know when you experience it. Think about when something "clicks" and you just "get it", and suddenly love doing whatever you are doing. You finally learned to do a layup with ease. You can point out all the constellations in the sky and navigate around the night sky. You have found someone that appreciates you almost as much as you appreciate them. You are in a process, a journey, in which the result is simply a continuation of the journey, and you are perfectly okay with that.
This is what I feel is truly tragic about the human condition. It's not that we are suffering, but rather we are suffering when there are alternatives. We pursue excessive hedonism and build vast structures of ambition, only to see the hedonism disappointing and our structures crashing down.
If you stick to the very situation, some action may actually be not divorceable from the pleasure. But then I would just say in that one case, the two are identical; there is no pleasure apart from the pleasant thing or action. But that doesn't mean the action itself, as a species, is intrinsically worthwhile, whereas pleasure is.
Quoting Wosret
The worry is that it is unappreciative of a person, or shows a lack of empathy for them, if one isn't pained by their death. That is understandable. However, I think it's wrong on that basis then to suggest that the only way one could show such qualities is by being miserable. Certainly a much better world would be one in which we empathized with, and showed appreciation for, our loved ones when they died by celebrating them and feeling happy for the life they lived, rather than miserable. In other words, you are confused; you think that because you feel miserable when someone dies, this is the only way you ever ought to feel, or else you re somehow betraying them. I should be much happier not only for others' death, but also for my own, if I knew it would be met with joy and celebration of the dead person's life (and the claim is, this is how it actually goes in some cultures -- what you think is a visceral, natural reaction may in fact be a cultural contingency).
Quoting darthbarracuda
I think a lot of it is, but there's just so much suffering in life that even removing that leaves you with too much to be acceptable, and of course still vulnerable to contingencies of suffering beyond your control.
Quoting darthbarracuda
Certainly eating a cookie can make you happy -- true, only for a little bit, but why is a little bit not better than not at all?
Quoting darthbarracuda
So, it is pleasure, then?
All lose of loved ones, and even things bring about mourning, and grief, but this is the feeling of lose, lose for something one is attached to, and which was partly integrated into their very being. The feeling of lose isn't fun, but it isn't about empathy, or concern for the thing that was lost's feelings per se, it is the feeling of getting over a significant relationship that has become no more.
Over on the other site in the unmoderated section, you started a thread raising the question of how antinatalists can go about convincing the world to stop procreating. When I reply to posters I'm familiar with, I do so in context of what I recall them posting about previously. But perhaps I misunderstood your intention in those antinatalist threads.
Quoting The Great Whatever
Because you're defending two controversial positions here. One is that pleasure is the only true good. Most ethical systems disagree. But more controversially, you argue the pessimistic view that life isn't worth living, and anyone who claims otherwise is mistaken. Most people are going to disagree.
In addition, you claimed that the pessimistic view is liberating, while I find it debilitating, which I suspect a lot of others do too. Now maybe it's because I'm psychologically unable to handle the truth, or maybe because I don't stay depressed for long. However, that's what makes me think it's a matter of 'interpretation', or mood.
Of course there is suffering, that is part of the nature of conscious life. But I disagree that there is necessarily an overwhelming amount of suffering, though. It certainly is not worth it to take the chance and have a child, but if you are already here then you have the chance of having some really cool experiences. Yes, tomorrow I could get in a car accident and have a pole rammed through my abdomen, impaling me. But tomorrow is also supposed to be a clear night sky, at least where I live. And I rather like looking at the stars.
Suffering is going to happen. It is inevitable. How you deal with the suffering is a different question altogether.
Quoting The Great Whatever
Consuming a cookie will give you a temporary relief from that specific tanha. This is not happiness. I would go as far as to say that eating this cookie is a form of learnt self-torture. Happiness occurs when tanha is extinguished, when you are perfectly okay with your current situation.
I've certainly experienced pain and obstacles without being miserable about them. And of course I've experienced misery at other times, sometimes just because that was my mood or focus, and not because of anything external or a physical ailment.
I saw it as more of a, 'what would an antinatalist even do?' I share the opinion that there is no reasonable expectation that antinatalism will ever be successful.
Quoting Marchesk
Hedonism is one of the oldest, most persistent, and best-founded ethical positions that I'm aware of. I certainly don't think it's any more controversial than any other major option. Of course, it has the virtue of being right, but that is not always the deciding factor in adopting moral/ethical opinions.
As for pessimism, I don't know. I think if you get people alone and drunk, a lot more admit to it. Of course you can't say it in the daylight, just like you can't say plenty of things.
Quoting darthbarracuda
I like how your example of a positive thing is pathetic compared to how utterly terrible the negative one is. Even in your own constructed examples, you can't win. Who in their right mind would be thrilled by those chances? Oh, boy, looking at the stars!
Quoting darthbarracuda
It seems to me that any philosophical position that must claim that eating a cookie is torture has gone wrong somewhere.
Value, much like truth, is not "out there" to be found(IMO). Something could be potentially useful but unknown, and therefore not valued. It would only attain a value by us or some other being deciding so.
Quoting Wosret
Firstly, I would be dead and therefore I imagine I wouldn't be able to care.
Secondly, how much truth or how many truths about the loved one's demise is sufficient enough to honor their memory and amount "the appropriate emotional response"? Do you need to know every detail of their suffering, lest you not understand the significance of the ordeal?
You value truth in all cases because you think truth is desirable in all cases. I think that truth is undesirable in some cases, and therefore has no use for the living or the dead(in those cases*).
How can you quantify suffering or pleasure? Even if you could it wouldn't mean they're equivalent to each other. Humans trade suffering for pleasure all the time, so I'm inclined to think pleasure has a better exchange rate.
The long-term outlook is bleak though..
What you fail to realize is the probability of these happening. The probability of me getting impaled in a car crash? So negligible that it's not worth worrying about. The probability of me being able to enjoy a clear night sky? High enough that I should expect to have a good time.
Should I climb a mountain during a thunderstorm? Of course not, even if the view is spectacular. The probability of me getting struck by lightning is non-negligible. I would rather not be killed or permanently maimed by a thunderbolt.
Quoting The Great Whatever
Not the actual act of eating a cookie, but rather the continuation of tanha. Too much sensual pleasure leads to an addiction. Unfortunately, the vast majority of people seem to have an addiction to sensual pleasures, pleasures that are almost always disappointing and merely prolong the addiction.
You misunderstand. If someone values something based on its usefulness, but is wrong about its usefulness, then their placing value in it was a mistake by their own standards and intentions. The very notion of a neutral objective "usefulness" is of course absurd.
Quoting ProbablyTrue
Obviously, but I would be able to, and would rather feel emotions appropriately than just the ones I like regardless of context, or appropriateness.
Quoting ProbablyTrue
Between not knowing anything at all, and knowing every conceivable detail? Since I cared about them deeply, probably as much as I could find out in order to get a sense of what happened to them, like most anyone else, I figure. Try asking these questions to the family of a missing person. Advocate just forgetting about it, and not worrying about what happened to them, and sing the virtues of just feeling good all the time, regardless of what happens to you or those around you.
Quoting ProbablyTrue
Kind of undercuts your credibility, if, as you suggest, truth is not undesirable for being useless, or irrelevant, but because it might make you feel bad?
Yes, I think I did.
Quoting Wosret
Quoting Wosret
My argument wasn't that feeling bad is always useless or that ignorance should be our bliss, but that sometimes the truth only serves to cause suffering and nothing else, making it undesirable. What good does it do a mother or father of someone who died in a car accident to tell them their loved one not only died, but was trapped and awake in the vehicle and slowly burned to death in front of desperate onlookers?
I don't see suffering as an end in itself. It's certainly inevitable that at times it will be, but it doesn't have to be desirable.
In the first case, I wouldn't be so patronizing to decide what people should and shouldn't know, though I would respect anyone's decision not to know, and of course wouldn't force any information down anyone's throat that they preferred not to know, but if they preferred not to know (and not like terrible irrelevant facts, about people that I have no ties with, in circumstances I have no control over, involvement with, and cannot learn from -- then of course I wouldn't care to know a string of terrible details for no reason at all, I'm not a masochist), then I would respect and trust them less as a result.
No this is not the case. I'm not talking about a fools paradise and I'm not talking about withholding all relevant facts that would cause someone suffering. I'm saying there is a level of detail about certain things, such as the gruesome demise of someone's loved one, that giving said detail unsolicited under the pretense that "all truth is desirable" is ridiculous. If it's solicited that's a different story.
I personally would want to know details; that's how I am. However, I can see why other people might not.
It's not a matter of yes or no, but how much.
I think you've just moved the goal post.
Being satisfied or content with, or accepting of, your life is a state that relates not merely to the moment but to your overall passions and commitments. You have said that pleasure is the only intrinsic good; but I would contest this. Using you cookie example: sure, eating a cookie may give you momentary pleasure and on the basis of your belief in the intrinsic goodness of that experience you may be led to repeat it very often, which may lead to obesity and the various attendant sufferings that far outweigh the intrinsic goodness of the .momentary pleasure.
Is it really intrinsically good to abide in a disposition such that your satisfaction or dissatisfaction with life is dependent on momentary pleasures?
That only shows that pleasure can be an extrinsic bad, or the efficient cause of a bad. It is nonetheless intrinsically good, i.e. worthwhile for its own sake, even if it might lead to something bad (i.e. pain).
Quoting John
No dispositions are intrinsically good or bad.
How do you justify the claim that something that may lead to an "extrinsic bad" should nonetheless be considered to be intrinsically good?
Quoting The Great Whatever
Would you not agree that a disposition that reliably leads to satisfaction, happiness and flourishing should be considered intrinsically better than a disposition that consistently leads to dissatisfaction, unhappiness and stultification?
It does not lead to an extrinsic bad, but rather is one. An extrinsic bad is something that is bad, not for its own sake, but because it leads to something intrinsically bad. Or, if you like, it is simply the efficient cause of something bad (not bad in of itself).
Quoting John
It can be extrinsically better, in that it might happen to lead to something good; but it is not intrinsically better, because no disposition is intrinsically better than any other (since there would also be situations in which those very dispositions lead to bad things, rather than good -- that is, they are not good in of themselves at all, but only insofar as they lead to good things).
So, you seem to be saying that only suffering is intrinsically bad and only pleasure is intrinsically good?
If so, then why would should we not say that something that inevitably leads to suffering is, at least in that dimension, intrinsically bad, or that something that inevitably leads to pleasure is, at least in that dimension, intrinsically good.
Personally I think the intrinsic/extrinsic talk smacks of 'essentialism', and is misleading and unnecessary anyway.
If it were possible for example to be hooked up to a machine that stimulated your brain giving you an indescribable and unprecedented level of pure pleasure that you never tired of, while still allowing you to live a normal lifespan (by feeding you with nutrients and even stimulating your nerves and muscles to substitute for exercise) would you say that would be a desirable way to spend your life?
Or again, if you were given a choice between losing the ability for your remaining life to enjoy some favorite indulgence that gives you great pleasure, or losing the intellectual capacity to pursue philosophy; which would you choose and why?
Yes.
Quoting John
Because in that case, it would not be good or bad for its own sake, but only insofar as it led to something else.
How so?
Well you didn't answer the more pertinent questions, but I will go with what you have responded to anyway,
If pleasure is intrinsically good and pain is intrinsically bad, and if there is, as the song would have it, and, I think experience confirms, "A fine line between pleasure and pain" then it would seem to follow that there is a fine line between good and bad. The problem is that the claim that something could be intrinsically good or bad seems to rely on a position of the purity of goodness and badness.
So, can you provide an argument for why we should think that there is anything at all that is intrinsically good or bad?
To be intrinsically good or bad, something has to be good or bad by the very standards that it sets up, in such a way that it couldn't possibly not be good or bad. Pleasure and pain meet this requirement, since by their own standards they are good or bad, and not because of anything further. The very standards they set up, in being felt, are such that they feel good and feel bad, and since feeling is all that is at stake with them (since they are just feelings), this is the same as being good/bad by the very standards they set up (the only ones that matter).
That is an amoral view, however, and not conventional. Normally there is more to it than just pleasure, as it matters what one takes pleasure in. Taking pleasure in causing misery and suffering is seen as evil, and not good. Pleasure derived from an evil compounds the evil, makes it all the move evil. One causing suffering because they're coerced, or feeling remorse for it reduces how evil the act is perceived, doing it for the pleasure of it makes the act all the more evil.
You can of course maintain that pleasure is always good in all cases, regardless of how it is derived, but this would be a quite controversial opinion, in my view.
If it is controversial, I think it is because of confusion. If, for example, one gets pleasure out of causing others pain, then this is not a bad thing on behalf of the pleasure one receives, which is still intrinsically good; it is precisely bad because of the pain, which is intrinsically bad (notice if you take away the pain, resulting in a 'victimless crime,' the intuition that the act is bad goes away, even if the pleasure remains -- hence, it is not the pleasure that is bad).
Of course it is perfectly possible for an intrinsic good to be an extrinsic bad (or in my preferred way of speaking, an efficient cause of a bad). But notice that it is then an extrinsic bad only in virtue of causing pain.
No, that isn't the case. If it were just the pain that is caused, then whether or not pleasure was derived from the pain wouldn't effect how evil the action is perceived, but this isn't the case, as I pointed out, pleasure being derived from the action compounds the evil. This indicates that pleasure isn't absolutely good, in itself, but the circumstances by which it is derived are relevant to its determination as good or bad, and where most cases in which pleasure are derived are neutral or good, not subtracting from the pleasure as a good, it is also possible for pleasure to be seen as an evil, depending on how it is derived.
But, since the ideas of the intrinsic goodness and badness of pleasure and pain, respectively, are dependent on the (arguably) erroneous ideas of the absolute purity of pleasure and pain, I am still not satisfied that you have answered the question as to why we should think that pain and pleasure are really, as opposed to merely ideally (or by mere definition), intrinsically bad and good respectively.
To support an ethic of hedonism would be to say that pain and pleasure really are 'the good' and 'the bad' respectively, and that this fact trumps any other ethical considerations. The kinds of objections Wosret makes regarding the sources of pleasure also tell strongly against the justifiably of any ethic of hedonism.
I don't see why that 'compounds the evil.' If someone's getting hurt, then the bad thing about that is that they're getting hurt.
Quoting John
I don't know what you mean by absolute purity, or by the distinction between ideal and actual pleasure and pain, but so far as I can tell nothing hinges on it or makes reference to it.
Quoting John
Yes, that is the idea.
First, if pleasure and pain are never pure then they cannot be intrinsically good or bad, unless you want to say that something could be intrinsically good or bad, but only to a certain extent. But, to say this would be contradictory, because you would be saying 'X is intrinsically good to some degree, but it also intrinsically bad to an inversely proportionate degree'. The upshot of this would be that X cannot be intrinsically either good or bad, but only extrinsically good and bad to varying degrees.
The point is, to put it simply, that pleasure and pain, are only good or bad in principle. This means that it is only absolute pain (without the slightest degree of pleasure) or absolute pleasure ( without the slightest degree of pain) that can be intrinsically good or bad. But absolute pleasure or pain never obtains and so there can be nothing that is intrinsically good or bad.
The point is that the pleasure you might take in hurting others, even if it were 100% pleasure ( which it could never be) cannot in any case be ethically understood in isolation from the entire context in which it is gained.
So the relative badness involved in their getting hurt must be weighed against the relative goodness of the pleasure you derived from it.
Looked at another way, the relative goodness of the pleasure you gain from someone else's suffering must be weighed against the relative badness inherent in being someone who enjoys, to any degree, watching others suffer.
The only way you can avoid the badness inherent in watching someone suffer, in other words to be utterly untroubled by the kind of pain that would be attendant upon considerations about the kind of person you are in doing that, would be to be utterly sociopathic. But this would mean that you are not fit for human society, and for a social creature, surely that would have to be understood to be a bad thing.
I thought I had already explained that pure pleasure would be pleasure not accompanied by any pain, and of course, vice versa.
For example, even the apparently simple pure pleasure of eating a chocolate is accompanied by the pain involved in the inevitable ending of the experience and the fact that it cannot be endlessly repeated without increasing the attendant pain.
I don't think that I'm suggesting anything controversial at all, but quite universal, and ubiquitous. Causing someone harm and deriving pleasure from it is what villains do (it's what psychopaths do, which is the evilest psychological profile you can give someone) , feeling remorse and reforming their ways is what anti-heroes do, and heroes don't even derive pleasure from the suffering of their enemies when they deserve it (though anti-heroes may, because they're still a little bad, but it's forgivable, because we want the villain to suffer too, because even we aren't as pure hearted and good as the hero, even though we recognize their not deriving pleasure from the suffering of the villain as a higher good)..
I don't feel the need to speculate why this is the case, I think that it is sufficient to point out that it is the case.
That clearly isn't the case, and I don't know how you can reasonable maintain that. If that were the case, then it wouldn't matter if you cause the harm by accident, from coercion, under distress, for money, out of passionate anger, or whatever reason, when clearly the reason does matter to everyone -- and there is no eviler reason than for the sheer pleasure of it. You know this is true, and you cannot reasonably maintain the contrary.
I don't see this point as seriously disputable.
I would say if I was being beaten purely for pleasure, I would feel more animosity towards the person inflicting the beating than if they were doing it out of, say, revenge for a beating I had inflicted on them i.e. they had some reason other than the pure pleasure of it. It seems it would also be more humiliating to be abused in that way. And plausible that this emotional response could be considered additive to the purely physical pain inflicted.
This doesn't harm the hedonist's position, though. If deriving pleasure from causing harm is more evil than simply causing the harm, it's because the knowledge that someone is deriving pleasure makes us (and perhaps the victim) feel extra shitty, and that's why it's extra bad. It's still pain = evil and pleasure = good.
No, hedonists can think what they like (though I highly doubt that they'd actually practice that opinion, and would rather viscerally feel this to be the case in the relevant circumstances, if it were happening to them). It clearly doesn't compound the suffering, most cases in which suffering is caused because of suffering, or in ambiguous circumstances where it is difficult to blame the perpetrator, because of brain tumors, terrible upbringings, brain washing, and such makes us feel bad for everyone. We don't feel extra back because the perpetrator is evil, we rather feel vengeful, angry, and seek to feel pleasure from their misfortune.
I actually do think that all that is relevant for sympathy is the pain of whomever is hurt, and the bad feeling we get from that ought not be effected by the cause -- nor even character of the one in pain -- which is why (as I mentioned before), the hero even feels sympathy for the evil villain, because this is a higher good than deriving pleasure from even their misery.
Nietzsche would vehemently disagree. Feeling pity for another person only breeds more suffering. Compassion, not pity, is the good.
"com·pas·sion
k?m?paSH?n/
noun
sympathetic pity and concern for the sufferings or misfortunes of others." - dictionary.
In any case, quoting authorities aren't arguments, and I've not been making a prescriptive argument in any case, only a descriptive one. Merely pointing out how people tend to perceive and react to these things. Nietzsche by his own accord only reproaches the irreproachable, and counters what is most commonly, and widely believed. Bringing him up is just a point in my favor.
I wasn't citing authority necessarily, just adding to the conversation. I felt it was important to bring to the discussion the difference between pity and compassion in the Nietzschean sense.
Also, a dictionary is not necessarily the best source for definitions in philosophy, since philosophers tend to have slightly different opinions of what a specific word means.
Tell me what the difference is then, you figure? What distinction does he draw? My own view is that Nietzsche shouldn't be taken as endorsing a lack of compassion, or sympathy anyway, this is a gross mischaracterization in my view. It isn't really relevant, but I like Nietzsche a lot, so I'll indulge in the tangent. I believe that Nietzsche is rather saying that the strongest and most healthy human beings are naturally highly compassionate beings, that will be heroic, and self-sacrificing by nature, when they should take more care of themselves. It isn't a critique of compassion at all, in my view, but a call for the strongest and most healthy human beings to also take care of themselves, and to allow themselves selfish pursuits, and maintenance. There is no risk that they should fall into evil, or anti-social, behavior in the first place, compassion overflows from them, and his critique of it has to be taken within this perspective, in my view.
The distinction between pity and compassion is that pity leaves two people in misery, while compassion leaves no people in misery. Both stem from empathy, but pity is simply defeatist while compassion is motivating. The strong should take care of themselves, and help others out of the muck to get them to pursue their Ubermensch.
Oh yeah? Where does he talk about this distinction?
[i]In discussing what can be translated into English alternately as “pity,”
“sympathy,” or “compassion,” Nietzsche almost always uses variations on
the German term Mitleid—literally, “suffering-with”—and only rarely
uses alternative German terms such as Mitempfinden, Mitgefu¨hl (both
“feeling-with”) or Sympathie. [/i]
-The Compassion of Zarathustra, p. 60
[i]A true compassion of
strength would not be the distinctive symptom of the imminent demise of
the once strong, but an expression of life and power successfully at work
in the very moment of compassion.[/i]
-The Compassion of Zarathustra, p. 66
We have enough social justice warriors as it is, we need more sympathy. You don't have to do anything, just feel. Also consider the absurdity of attempting to solve someone's problems, or make the world a better place for them, when you haven't even taken the time to feel what they feel about their situation. Wouldn't want to be dragged down, or made depressed.
Anyway, I think I'm done with the tangent. Thanks for producing that, I asked you because I didn't think that you could, but I stand corrected.
I haven't actually read anything specifically by Nietzsche, only commentaries and criticisms like the one produced above. I am by no means an expert on Nietzsche; I'm only parroting what I have read elsewhere. Which actually goes against the Nietzschean idea of making up your own mind... ;)
The secret of reaping the greatest fruitfulness and the greatest enjoyment from life is to live dangerously.
-Nietzsche
Because really, what do you have to lose?