What advance in epistemological or metaphysical knowledge did David Hume bring us?
The question I'm asking is specifically relating to Book 1 of Hume's Treatise. I've read it very closely and can find absolutely nothing of value in it. His idea that our observations are just in our mind and that we cannot know if objects external to our mind exist or if they exist when we are not looking at them is completely irrational and leads to absurdities. Treatise 1 iv 7 is full of doubt because of these absurdities. I cannot grasp why anyone would think Hume a good philosopher or would claim that he has advanced knowledge. His goal was to establish doctrines that would lead to Pyrrhonism. Ultimately, Hume found that Pyrrhonism wasn't livable and so he "doubted his doubts" and became a "on-again, off-again" skeptic. Hume's philosophy is so ludicrous it is laughable.
One hopeful author turned a manuscript into an editor and got this reply, "Your work is both good and original. Unfortunately, what's good is not original and what's original is not good." Book 1 is partly original and partly borrowed from earlier skeptics. My question is, does it contain anything of value that is original?
One hopeful author turned a manuscript into an editor and got this reply, "Your work is both good and original. Unfortunately, what's good is not original and what's original is not good." Book 1 is partly original and partly borrowed from earlier skeptics. My question is, does it contain anything of value that is original?
Comments (100)
So, if you think it's absurd that our observations are just in our minds, where do you think they are?
That there is an observer in all our observations that we need to consider is the major epistemological advance that Hume's philosophy caused. He at least reintroduced the problem of induction.
Hume was not the first to bring up the problem of induction. Due to his view that the external world is not provable, Hume greatly overstates the problem of induction. Can you think of anything Hume wrote that is both original and valuable?
So it seems obvious, but at the same time eludes strict proof. It seems to me like Hume's scepticism is thereby validated.
Quoting Ron Cram
It's difficult to vouch for the originality of anything in philosophy. Hume's ideas were original enough to contemporaries to influence later philosophies. His scepticism is valuable to get people to rethink things that seem obvious, particularly people who are new to philosophy, since Hume is relatively easy to read. I also think his realization that certain basic concepts, like causality, can not be gleaned by observation is important.
Yes, the external world seems obvious to me and is also demonstrable. It is also clear that a great many philosophers have seen the external world as obvious but their "proofs" have failed to be persuasive. I don't see how it could be my fault that they did not present better proofs. Nor do I see their failure to do so as a validation of Hume's skepticism which was irrational from the start.
Quoting Echarmion
Yes, you are correct that Hume does make the claim that we cannot observe causation. Again, this is clearly false and I will write a future paper on this. Let me explain briefly. Hume was not a student of natural philosophy. While a student at University of Edinburgh, Hume never completed his degree. The fourth year of study required him to complete a course in natural philosophy, but Hume never did. There is no evidence, for example, that Hume ever read the works of Galileo on motion or Johannes Kepler on mathematical physics or Christiaan Huygens on pendulums. If Hume had read Galileo, Kepler and Huygens, he would have had a better foundation to understand Newton. There is evidence that Hume read Newton but he clearly did not understand him. Hume attacked Newton badly in the Treatise. If Hume had studied natural philosophy, he would never have made the claims he made regarding causation.
Hume's illustration of the billiard ball was particularly ill-advised as Hume knew that Locke had discussed this. Although Locke was not a natural philosopher, Locke understood from Newton that one billiard ball can transfer its force by "impulse." When you see one billiard ball roll up and strike another, you are observing a transfer of kinetic energy. There is no question about this. Hume's argument that we jump to this conclusion because of habit or constant conjunction is clearly false. Take a small child to see his first pool table and the child instantly understands that one pool ball has caused the second ball to move. The child understands it the very first time he sees it. Every pool shark with $20 riding on a game has said "Eight ball in the corner pocket." He knows causation is involved. Without causation such predictions would not be profitable. For better philosophy, Hume should have spent more time playing billiards and less time playing backgammon.
The only ground from which one could question causation in this context is if the person held it was not possible to know that an external world exists. To anyone operating on the view the external world is real, then observation of causation is perfectly straightforward in these simple examples. This is also true of Hume's illustration of the burning match. You can watch the flame consume the match. There is no reasonable doubt one is watching causation here.
Again, is there anyone who can think of anything Hume wrote in Treatise Book 1 that is both original and valuable?
This is true. Humans intuitively understand events in the world as being causal. But the fact that we intuitively understand the world to be this way doesn't mean that our understanding is correct. We can observe the pool balls striking each other and then moving as a succession of events. But we can't observe the reason why this happens. So it isn't obvious that the first pool ball caused the second to move, only that the second ball moved after the first one struck it. Personally, I do believe that the first ball caused the second to move, so I'm open to the idea that it could be proved logically. I just don't think it's obvious from a philosophical point of view.
"Humans intuitively understand events to be causal." This is at least partly true. Events are understood to be causal. This may be because of intuition and it may be due to the principle of sufficient reason which I take as a reliable axiom of philosophy.
"But we can't observe the reason why this happens." Yes, we can. When we see a billiard ball moving, we can understand that a moving billiard ball has kinetic energy. When the first ball strikes the second ball, the first ball has less kinetic energy (it may slow or stop) and the second ball begins to roll. The second ball now has the kinetic energy. You can watch the transfer of kinetic energy as it happens. There is no question about this. And it can be confirmed by mathematics.
Did you consider the burning match example?
What do you mean when you say we can observe kinetic energy being transferred? We can observe the first ball strike the second ball followed by the second ball moving. But you'd observe the same thing if you were watching an animation of pool balls. We can only observe phenomena, but not the reasons behind phenomena. Reasons are not available to our senses, only to our intellects. So I think proving that one pool ball causes the second to move would require a logical proof and not just an appeal to experience.
But we are not watching an animation. As long as you accept that the external world is real, there is no difficulty in understanding that a moving billiard ball has kinetic energy.
"Reasons are not available to our senses, only to our intellects." Our senses and our brains work alongside each other constantly. It is not possible to separate the actions of the two. The light flashing on our retinas sends signals to our brains which our brains must interpret. We easily interpret a moving billiard ball as having kinetic energy. This is so easy to do that a child will do it on the child's first exposure to colliding pool balls. Take a three year old to a pool table and ask them what happened when one ball causes another to move and they will tell you plainly that one ball caused the other to move.
I think it is not a master of being able to see energy but of being able to feel it bodily. We feel the resistance, the force and the impact of external objects. We feel the force of the wind. We experience the resistance of the wall; it stops us. We feel the impact of the tennis ball on the racquet, and all the more when it strikes us in the face.
We also feel the energy of our own bodies; our capacity to move things, break things and make things. So it may be true that we don't see causality, but it is false to say we don't experience causality.
Quoting Janus
Have either of you heard of Malebranche? He believed that the external world was real. However, he also believed that all events in the external world were caused by God. All events in our consciousness, such as feeling the impact of tennis balls, in his view, were also caused by God. God lines up the events in the external world and the events in human consciousness so that they correspond to one another. I think Liebniz believed something similar. How would you prove that they are wrong, that it's the first ball and not God which causes the second ball to move?
Because I don't believe God would deceive us. We can plainly see that one ball has kinetic energy. Kinetic energy is a well-understood, well-described force. For God to be the cause of the second ball moving, God would have to interrupt the action of the moving ball as cause and then insert his own more immediate cause in its place. To do so would be ludicrous, deceptive and unnecessary. Ockham's Razor would say that such an explanation is unnecessary speculation.
I disagree. We absolutely can see kinetic energy. Anytime you see a falling object, you are looking at kinetic energy. You may not think of that term, but you instinctively know that you do not want to be under a falling boulder because that boulder will hurt you by its kinetic energy.
Also, whenever we look at flame we can see its destructive power. It quickly consumes whatever it is using as fuel. There's no reasonable doubt the flame is causing the fuel to be consumed. You can literally watch it happen.
When you see an object moving, why do you think that you are not seeing kinetic energy?
Kinetic energy looks like an object moving, such as an object falling or a ball rolling down an incline plane. If you had read of Galileo's experiments or Huygens work on pendulums or the experiments by s'Gravesande, this would be obvious. But even without those experiments, don't you instinctively feel that a falling boulder is dangerous? If you saw a boulder rolling quickly down a hill, wouldn't you want to get out of the way? Of course you would! Ask yourself why! You know the boulder moving quickly has force and energy and would do you great damage.
This is, at least in part, why Galileo studied motion, Huygens studied pendulums and s'Gravesande studied kinetic energy. s'Gravesande would use objects of different weights and drop onto soft clay from different heights. Then he would measure the depth of the impression the object made in the clay as a way to measure the object's kinetic energy. Of course, he wasn't calling it that. The term "kinetic energy" wasn't coined until the 1800s, but that is what he was measuring.
Objects have different types of energy as well. There is potential energy, rest energy and inertial energy. When an object is moving, you are looking at kinetic energy. It is plainly visible and can be mathematically modeled. Kinetic energy can be of any size, any shape and any speed. Kinetic energy doesn't have color because color is a secondary quality.
Of course if I saw a boulder rolling down a hill I would get out of the way, but that is not on account of how it appears but of my bodily experience with the impact of heavy objects. The boulder I see rolling down the hill might be made of styrofoam in which case I would be mistaken to think I was in danger.
Quoting Ron Cram
And that's the problem with what you are claiming, Things we can see are always of some colour and tone (excluding monochromal objects which are tonal only, and transparent objects). But the latter always reflect their environment to some degree and so still look like they are coloured and tonal.
I am already aware enough of the different categories of energy, so no need to school me on that. If we can see kinetic energy then we ought to be able to see "potential energy, rest energy and inertial energy" (which are really all just potential energy as far as I remember) but we can't. When we see an object at rest we cannot see its potential energy which depends on its mass, which we cannot see. A moving object's kinetic energy also depends on its mass and we can't see that there either.
I suggest reading An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding.
Here's a passage on causation.
[quote=Hume]
54. The generality of mankind never find any difficulty in accounting for the more common and familiar operations of nature—such as the descent of heavy bodies, the growth of plants, the generation of animals, or the nourishment of bodies by food: But suppose that, in all these cases, they perceive the very force or energy of the cause, by which it is connected with its effect, and is for ever infallible in its operation. They acquire, by long habit, such a turn of mind, that, upon the appearance of the cause, they immediately expect with assurance its usual attendant, and hardly conceive it possible that any other event could result from it. It is only on the discovery of extraordinary phaenomena, such as earthquakes, pestilence, and prodigies of any kind, that they find themselves at a loss to assign a proper cause, and to explain the manner in which the effect is produced by it. It is usual for men, in such difficulties, to have recourse to some invisible intelligent principle as the immediate cause of that event which surprises them, and which, they think, cannot be accounted for from the common powers of nature. But philosophers, who carry their scrutiny a little farther, immediately perceive that, even in the most familiar events, the energy of the cause is as unintelligible as in the most unusual, and that we only learn by experience the frequent Conjunction of objects, without being ever able to comprehend anything like Connexion between them.
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Here's something on the external world.
[quote=Hume]
118. It seems evident, that men are carried, by a natural instinct or prepossession, to repose faith in their senses; and that, without any reasoning, or even almost before the use of reason, we always suppose an external universe, which depends not on our perception, but would exist, though we and every sensible creature were absent or annihilated. Even the animal creation are governed by a like opinion, and preserve this belief of external objects, in all their thoughts, designs, and actions.
It seems also evident, that, when men follow this blind and powerful instinct of nature, they always suppose the very images, presented by the senses, to be the external objects, and never entertain any suspicion, that the one are nothing but representations of the other. This very table, which we see white, and which we feel hard, is believed to exist, independent of our perception, and to be something external to our mind, which perceives it. Our presence bestows not being on it: our absence does not annihilate it. It preserves its existence uniform and entire, independent of the situation of intelligent beings, who perceive or contemplate it.
But this universal and primary opinion of all men is soon destroyed by the slightest philosophy, which teaches us, that nothing can ever be present to the mind but an image or perception, and that the senses are only the inlets, through which these images are conveyed, without being able to produce any immediate intercourse between the mind and the object. The table, which we see, seems to diminish, as we remove farther from it: but the real table, which exists independent of us, suffers no alteration: it was, therefore, nothing but its image, which was present to the mind. These are the obvious dictates of reason; and no man, who reflects, ever doubted, that the existences, which we consider, when we say, this house and that tree, are nothing but perceptions in the mind, and fleeting copies or representations of other existences, which remain uniform and independent.
[/quote]
In short, we see the table, but the table isn't in our so-called mind. Its image or representation is.
Here is Hume on skepticism.
[quote=Hume]
There is a species of scepticism, antecedent to all study and philosophy, which is much inculcated by Des Cartes and others, as a sovereign preservative against error and precipitate judgement. It recommends an universal doubt, not only of all our former opinions and principles, but also of our very faculties; of whose veracity, say they, we must assure ourselves, by a chain of reasoning, deduced from some original principle, which cannot possibly be fallacious or deceitful. But neither is there any such original principle, which has a prerogative above others, that are self-evident and convincing: or if there were, could we advance a step beyond it, but by the use of those very faculties, of which we are supposed to be already diffident. The Cartesian doubt, therefore, were it ever possible to be attained by any human creature (as it plainly is not) would be entirely incurable; and no reasoning could ever bring us to a state of assurance and conviction upon any subject.
It must, however, be confessed, that this species of scepticism, when more moderate, may be understood in a very reasonable sense, and is a necessary preparative to the study of philosophy, by preserving a proper impartiality in our judgements, and weaning our mind from all those prejudices, which we may have imbibed from education or rash opinion. To begin with clear and self-evident principles, to advance by timorous and sure steps, to review frequently our conclusions, and examine accurately all their consequences; though by these means we shall make both a slow and a short progress in our systems; are the only methods, by which we can ever hope to reach truth, and attain a proper stability and certainty in our determinations.
[/quote]
I think of Hume as a sensible, serious guy.
I agree that we would move out of the way. We would be afraid. Call it instinct. A big noisy thing coming at us scares us out of its path. But how does this apply to the Hume I know? I take it as a given that we act on perceived regularities in experience. We expect them to continue, without being able to justify it deductively. To me that's the fascinating part. 'Pure' reason is mostly impotent. Science has an 'irrational' (non-deductive) ground. This chair will continue to hold me, I think, because it has so far. If I look for the logic in that, it leaps away from me --though the temptation is a circular argument that assumes the very uniformity of nature that it wants to prove. 'The future will resemble the past, because in the past the future resembled the past. ' To see that there is no argument for this instinctual expectation is not to quench this expectation (which is impossible.) Instead it leaves a central faculty of the mind mysterious to that same mind.
Anyway, one more passage on Hume's sensible skepticism.
[quote=Hume]
But a Pyrrhonian cannot expect, that his philosophy will have any constant influence on the mind: or if it had, that its influence would be beneficial to society. On the contrary, he must acknowledge, if he will acknowledge anything, that all human life must perish, were his principles universally and steadily to prevail. All discourse, all action would immediately cease; and men remain in a total lethargy, till the necessities of nature, unsatisfied, put an end to their miserable existence. It is true; so fatal an event is very little to be dreaded. Nature is always too strong for principle. And though a Pyrrhonian may throw himself or others into a momentary amazement and confusion by his profound reasonings; the first and most trivial event in life will put to flight all his doubts and scruples, and leave him the same, in every point of action and speculation, with the philosophers of every other sect, or with those who never concerned themselves in any philosophical researches. When he awakes from his dream, he will be the first to join in the laugh against himself, and to confess, that all his objections are mere amusement, and can have no other tendency than to show the whimsical condition of mankind, who must act and reason and believe; though they are not able, by their most diligent enquiry, to satisfy themselves concerning the foundation of these operations, or to remove the objections, which may be raised against them.
...
There is, indeed, a more mitigated scepticism or academical philosophy, which may be both durable and useful, and which may, in part, be the result of this Pyrrhonism, or excessive scepticism, when its undistinguished doubts are, in some measure, corrected by common sense and reflection. The greater part of mankind are naturally apt to be affirmative and dogmatical in their opinions; and while they see objects only on one side, and have no idea of any counterpoising argument, they throw themselves precipitately into the principles, to which they are inclined; nor have they any indulgence for those who entertain opposite sentiments. To hesitate or balance perplexes their understanding, checks their passion, and suspends their action. They are, therefore, impatient till they escape from a state, which to them is so uneasy: and they think, that they could never remove themselves far enough from it, by the violence of their affirmations and obstinacy of their belief. But could such dogmatical reasoners become sensible of the strange infirmities of human understanding, even in its most perfect state, and when most accurate and cautious in its determinations; such a reflection would naturally inspire them with more modesty and reserve, and diminish their fond opinion of themselves, and their prejudice against antagonists. The illiterate may reflect on the disposition of the learned, who, amidst all the advantages of study and reflection, are commonly still diffident in their determinations: and if any of the learned be inclined, from their natural temper, to haughtiness and obstinacy, a small tincture of Pyrrhonism might abate their pride, by showing them, that the few advantages, which they may have attained over their fellows, are but inconsiderable, if compared with the universal perplexity and confusion, which is inherent in human nature. In general, there is a degree of doubt, and caution, and modesty, which, in all kinds of scrutiny and decision, ought for ever to accompany a just reasoner.
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But you can! Kinetic energy is motion. To measure or estimate the kinetic energy, you multiply mass times velocity. At the same speed, the larger the object the greater the kinetic energy. Also, at the same mass, the faster it's moving the greater the kinetic energy.
Let's take for example, a thrown baseball. You can see that a 45 mph pitch is not moving as fast as a 95 mph pitch. And you intuitively know that the 95 mph pitch has more kinetic energy and would hurt far more than a 45 mph pitch.
In the same way, if a car bumps into you at 0.5 mph, it won't hurt much. But if a car hits you at 35 mph it will probably kill you. You can literally see the kinetic energy is much greater and much more dangerous at 35 mph.
Now let's look at the kinetic energy in hurricane force winds. The air molecules (nitrogen, oxygen, argon, carbon dioxide, etc.) being blown about are so small you cannot see them. Because there are so many small molecules you calculate the kinetic energy differently and it's much more complicated. See https://planetcalc.com/4773/
We have to use instruments for some of the inputs for that calculation. However, you can see trees blowing about as an effect of the wind and you can estimate the speed of the wind from its effects. To your point, we can also feel the power of the wind. To my point, we can observe its effects and estimate its speed and we can use instruments to study the kinetic energy of wind more precisely.
Quoting Janus
No, potential energy, mass rest energy and inertial energy are not the same. And yes, we can see them all if we know what we are looking at. I won't bore with a full report, but let's look at rest mass energy for a moment. We learned from Einstein that matter is convertible into energy and energy into matter. That's what his famous equation E=mc^2 was all about. You can easily compare the rest mass energy of one small object to the rest mass energy of another small object. Rest mass energy also contains the kinetic energy, so if one of them is moving - that complicates things.
Hume admitted in the Treatise that he did not understand motion. When he discusses motion, he talks about "unknown causes." The causes are not unknown to the natural philosophers of his day, only to Hume because he didn't complete his degree.
I have read Hume's first Enquiry. Have you read his Treatise?
Hume says that his philosophy is the same in both books, I believe this to be mainly accurate although there are a few changes. In addition, the Treatise is much more specific about why he holds the views he does. The Treatise is also much more honest about the absurdities his philosophy creates. Hume goes into great deal about this in Treatise 1 iv 7. Have you read it?
Sometimes Hume struggles to maintain his idea that external objects do not have a real or continued existence when not being observed:
I am here seated in my chamber with my face to the fire; and all the objects, that strike my senses, are contained in a few yards around me. My memory, indeed, informs me of the existence of many objects; but then this information extends not beyond their past experience, nor do either my senses or memory give any testimony to the continuance of their being. When therefore I am thus seated, and revolve over these thoughts, I hear on a sudden a noise as of a door turning upon its hinges; and a little after see a porter, who advances toward me. This gives occasion to many new reflections in reasonings. First, I never have observed, that this noise could proceed from anything but the motion of a door; and therefore conclude, that the present phenomenon is a contradiction to all past experience, unless the door, which I remember on the other side of the chamber, be still in being. Again I have always found, that a human body was possessed of a quality, which I call gravity, and which hinders it from mounting in the air, as this porter must have done to arrive at my chamber, unless the stairs I remember be not annihilated by my absence. But this is not all. I receive a letter, which upon opening it I perceive by the handwriting and subscription to have come from a friend, who says he is two hundred leagues distant. It is evident I can never account for this phenomenon, conformable to my experience in other instances, without spreading out my mind the whole sea and continent between us, and supposing the effects and continued existence of posts and ferries, according to my memory and observation. To consider these phenomena of the porter and letter in a certain light, they are contradictions to common experience, and may be regarded and may be considered objections to these maxims, which we form concerning the connections of causes and effects. I am accustomed to hear such a sound, and see such an object in motion at the same time. I have not received in this particular instance both these perceptions. These observations are contrary, unless I suppose that the door still remains, and that it was opened without my perceiving it: And this supposition, which was at first entirely arbitrary and hypothetical, acquires a force and evidence by its being the only one, upon which I can reconcile these contradictions…. Here then I am naturally led to regard the world, as something real and durable, and as preserving its existence, even when it is no longer present to my perception. Location 2910, 32%, Treatise 1.4.2
For most people, Hume’s experience would be adequate to persuade then that a world of objects external to their mind really exists. But Hume has embraced this idea that sense data cannot convey the existence of objects external to the mind and so he’s in a quandary. For those among us who are convinced of the external existence of objects, it is easy to believe in their continued existence when not being sensed. Hume’s idea that the stairs should be annihilated by his absence seems absolutely bizarre to us, but follows, if uncomfortably, for those who are not convinced in the existence of external objects.
Hume continues his “reasonings”:
But whatever force we may ascribe to this principle, I am afraid it is too weak to support alone so vast an edifice, as is that of the continued existence of all external bodies; and that we must join the constancy of their appearance to the coherence, in order to give a satisfactory account of that opinion. As the explication of this will lead me into a considerable compass a very profound reasoning; I think it proper, in order to avoid confusion, to give a short sketch or abridgement of my system, and afterwards draw out all its parts in their full compass. This inference from the constancy of our perceptions, like the precedent from their coherence, gives rise to the opinion of the continued existence of body, which is prior to that of its distinct existence, and produces that latter principal. Location 2943, 32% Hume, Treatise, 1.4.2
And so despite the logical need for stairs to exist for the porter to climb, in spite of the logical need for his friend to continue to exist in order to write him a letter, in spite of his friend’s statement of being 200 leagues distant - even so, Hume cannot find a reason to believe in the continued existence of an external world. Hume loves sceptical thoughts too much to let them go.
In his Abstract, which Hume wrote to increase sales of his Treatise, Hume writes about himself and his philosophy in the third person. Paragraph 28 reads:
By all that has been said the reader will easily perceive that the philosophy contained in this book is very sceptical, and tends to give us a notion of the imperfections and narrow limits of human understanding. Almost all reasoning is there reduced to experience; and the belief, which attends experience, is explained to be nothing but a peculiar sentiment, or lively conception produced by habit. Nor is this all; when we believe anything of external existence, or suppose an object to exist a moment after it is no longer perceived, this belief is nothing but a sentiment of the same kind. Our author insists upon several other sceptical topics; and upon the whole concludes that we assent to our faculties, and employ our reason, only because we cannot help it. Philosophy would render us entirely Pyrrhonian, were not nature too strong for it. (Abstract, Para 28)
http://web.mnstate.edu/gracyk/courses/web%20publishing/hume'sabstract.htm
This is a telling paragraph. While Hume began with doctrines designed to support full Pyrrhonian scepticism, when he arrived at his destination he found it unlivable. Hume reports that “nature is too strong for it.” This is an interesting phrase. If an external world cannot be known, what is this 'nature' Hume refers to?
Later Hume will attempt that to make his philosophy livable one must adopt an unprincipled "on-again, off-again" scepticism. This is what you call "sensible scepticism." His attempt doesn’t really work, because it is inconsistent and Hume retains the doctrines that lead to full scepticism.
Changes in Hume’s philosophy between his A Treatise of Human Nature (THN) and An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (EHU) have been noted by others. One change was that Hume was unhappy with his reasonings on personal identity in THN and so he does not address the subject in EHU. The present point is that the beginning of EHU contains little hint that Hume doubts the existence of an external world. However in Section 119 of EHU, Hume shows that he still holds this view:
[i]119. By what argument can it be proved, that the perceptions of the mind must be caused by external objects, entirely different from them, though resembling them (if that be possible) and could not arise either from the energy of the mind itself, or from the suggestion of some invisible and unknown spirit, or from some other cause still more unknown to us? It is acknowledged, that, in fact, many of these perceptions arise not from anything external, as in dreams, madness, and other diseases. And nothing can be more inexplicable than the manner, in which body should so operate upon mind as ever to convey an image of itself to a substance, supposed of so different, and even contrary a nature.
It is a question of fact, whether the perceptions of the senses be produced by external objects, resembling them: how shall this question be determined? By experience surely; as all other questions of a like nature. But here experience is, and must be entirely silent. The mind has never anything present to it but the perceptions, and cannot possibly reach any experience of their connexion with objects. The supposition of such a connexion is, therefore, without any foundation in reasoning.[/i]
Clearly, Hume denies the possibility of knowing if objects external to the mind actually exist or not. Interestingly, Hume does not discuss in EHU the difficulties such a view visits on daily life, as he did on THN.
Hume's "sensible scepticism" is really just an admission that his philosophy is irrational and unlivable.
One might be overlooking contexts. Hume’s Treatise was in many a way a reply to both Descartes and Berkeley. Understand the logic used by these two predecessors and one might, maybe, hold a more empathetic view of Hume’s logic, for it serves to counteract the effects of Cartesian skepticism and that of Berkeley’s subjective idealism. This by illustrating how all our knowledge is built out of habituated thoughts inductively put together – thereby impelling one to reappraise the logic used by both Descartes and Berkeley. But I get it; Hume’s not to your liking. To each their own. And no, I've no interest in composing a thesis to support the just mentioned perspective.
As to what is both original and good in Book 1 of the Treatise, good to whom? This possible trick question has some degree of importance to it.
Hume’s detailed musings on what would nowadays be most properly termed experientialism (and not empiricism) and of what he termed probabilistic reasoning (due to the possibility of error – which is nothing else but the pragmatist notion of fallibilism) are original in the details they present, but I take it you don’t deem them to be good. So be it.
On the other hand, bundle theory (which you’ve alluded to) was originated in the western world via book 1 of the Treatise – Hume’s noted dissatisfaction with it at the end of the treatise aside. This theory has persisted as an important ontological hypothesis since. So it is both original to at least western thought and good to a large number of individuals.
But again, by what standards do you demarcate the goodness of ideas?
This is a good and fair question. In general terms, the goodness of ideas is found in their truthfulness and their benefit. Truth is that which is in accord with reality. Reality, in the words of the great philosopher Dallas Willard, is "what you run into when you are wrong." Running into reality can be painful. By knowing more of the truth, then you will experience less pain - which we can all agree is a benefit.
More specifically, in terms of philosophy, I'm wondering what in Hume's Treatise Book 1 has shown itself to be true and beneficial? Hume's claim that we cannot know that external objects exist is irrational (and disproven in the paper I'm preparing). Hume's idea that causation cannot be observed is counter to our everyday experience and completely irrational. Hume's attack on induction is original but vastly overstated.
Perhaps you are wondering if any philosopher has ever lived up to the lofty standards I am expecting of Hume. Yes! For example, Aristotle's physics are terrible. He was wrong about many things. But he is also the author of deductive logic. It is not that Aristotle was the first to use deductive logic, but he was the first to write down the rules. Of course, the rules have been clarified and enlarged over the centuries and new forms of logic have arisen. But Aristotle's work here is both original and good. Aristotle has added to our store of philosophical knowledge. Hume has not.
Can you explain the difference between them?
I still don't think it is reasonable to say that we can see energy, nothing you have said convinces that it is, so we'll just have to agree to disagree about that.
Rather than get lost in details, I'll try to focus the issue. I don't think Hume doubted the existence of the external world. His 'ruling passion' was a love of literary fame. If you read his own brief description of his life (written as it was ending), you'll see that he was a man of the world.
https://davidhume.org/texts/mol/
[quote=Hume]
Philosophy would render us entirely Pyrrhonian, were not nature too strong for it.
[/quote]
I think one ought to read this line anti-metaphysically and even anti-philosophically if philosophy is understood in its abstruse and ridiculous aspect. Nature is indeed too strong for our merely theoretical doubts. When such doubts aren't just toys for the exhibition of cleverness and creativity, they are perhaps useful against positive metaphysical assertions (theological confusions, etc.)
The idea that one should bother with a proof of the external world strikes me as absurd. Only a person in the grip of madness doubts the external world, and they might as well doubt the legitimacy of a complicated 'proof' of this world as well. So I think we agree that doubting the external world is just ridiculous. But I think we disagree on what kind of chap Hume was.
Nature being to strong means Hume,in the terms you are using, thinks there are external objects.
We are affected by nature in certain ways. Things happen to us, all around us, within are experiences. The sceptic is destined to fall to what appears in our impressions. From beginning to end, someone can whine they don't have "proof" a billiard ball is about it hit them in the face, but then it does. Nature is too strong for our wish for "proof" to matter.
From here, we can actually extend scepticism to a proof of external objects. The motivation of the sceptic is entirely driven by the existence of external objects. What is the monster we fear so much as a sceptic? Making a mistake, taking an unjustified/untrue position, the world being other to what appears own our experiences.
To participate in any sceptical project is a tact acceptance of the externality of objects. If there were no external objects there couldn't be a mismatch between what appears to us and what was true. Scepticism would be incoherent. It needs a world which can be other to our experience.
A world other than our experiences also has implications for how a scepticism can conceivably function. It must turn not only on certain assertions of what is true (as they might be wrong), but also on any sceptical rejection of a claim (as a claim might also be true). The coherent sceptic must, like Hume, oscillate between scepticism of one claim and accepting it (i.e. scepticism of rejecting it).
Hume isn't laying out a rejection of external objects, knowledge or philosophy. He's analysing the relationship of our reason to knowledge, trying to break with a philosophy which holds our reason or concepts are how our knowledge obtains (as in poor surface readings of Descartes and Berkeley).
We might say Hume is trying to recognise the life of the external world, that it is the things outside us which determine their existence, rather than us having an experience or concept. In this metaphysical space, he is constantly sceptical because he recognises our concepts are distinct from how something is true/made true.
Yes. Potential energy is the energy an object holds relative to other objects. Think of a boulder perched on the side of a cliff above a highway. Someone or something, perhaps gravity, dislodges the boulder so that it begins rolling down the hillside. Once it begins rolling, you are looking at kinetic energy. Before it begins rolling, you are looking at potential energy. Another way to conceive of potential energy is the store of energy necessary to put the boulder back in its original position above the highway. To put the boulder back would require you to expend energy. The energy you expend in that effort is now the potential energy stored in the boulder once it is back in place.
Mass rest energy I explained last time. To repeat, Einstein came up with the equation E=mc^2. This equation explains conversion of energy to matter and matter to energy. Matter to energy is easy to explain by thinking of a fire in the firepit. The wood, coal or natural gas in the firepit is the matter. By burning it, you turn matter into heat energy. That's one example.
Inertial energy is the energy an object has at rest. This may seem confusing because it sounds similar to mass rest energy, because relates to objects at rest. But only the names are similar. Inertial energy doesn't have to do with conversion but to motion. The more massive the object, the greater its inertial energy. The shape of the object also contributes to its inertial energy. One billiard ball can easily move another billiard ball because the second billiard is round, it rolls easily and is the same size as the first billiard ball. But if you put a much bigger, flat boulder on the billiard table, the billiard ball would not be able to move it even when moving quickly. The boulder has a lot more inertial energy than the ball.
Newton described vis inertia in his Principia but this is one of the issues Hume never understood. Motion, power, energy, inertia were all mysteries to him. But lack of facts never stopped Hume from pontificating from his position of suspension of judgment.
If your only exposure to Hume is his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, I can see why you might think that. Hume does not even hint at his doubt of the external world in the early part of the book (but read section 119 closely). However, in his Treatise Book 1, Hume is highly skeptical and he is very upfront about it. He was much influenced by Pyrrhonism.
The goal of Pyrrhonism is the “suspension of judgement” resulting in a lack of knowledge or belief about everything, including what things absolutely and really exist. By suspending judgement, Pyrrhonists believe they will achieve a state of happiness marked by freedom from distress and worry. Pyrrhonism was distilled into the “ten modes of Aenesidemus” or the “five modes of Agrippa.” Hume has developed his own series of doctrines which have the same goal as Aenesidemus and Agrippa, suspension of judgement. Hume describes and attempts to support these doctrines in the first part of the Treatise Book 1.
Kant read Hume and was "awakened" from his "dogmatic slumbers." Kant said it was a scandal that philosophy had never offered a solid proof of an external world and he then described a proof that he claimed was the only possible proof. People found it wanting. Others have tried and their efforts have also been found wanting. You can read Moore's famous proof here. http://joelvelasco.net/teaching/4330/moore-onskepticism.pdf
You are correct that most people, even most philosophers accept the reality of objects external to their minds. But there is a significant minority of Hume followers who do not accept that it is proven, even though they may agree it is probable. Hume followers do not have much faith in probability.
If you want to know more about Hume and his view of the external world, you can read Hume in Treatise Book 1 or you can read the book by HH Price.
https://www.amazon.com/Humes-Theory-External-Habberley-1940-12-06/dp/B01HC14VU4/
I did not claim that Hume was rejecting external objects. I'm saying the Treatise Book 1 lays out Hume's argument as to why we do not have a proof of external objects and Hume's argument that it is irrational to believe in the continued existence of objects not seen.
I see that you have not read all of my comments. I can't say I blame you. It's a lot to read. But in my comments above I quote Hume bewildered by the fact the porter was able to reach his room on the second floor as he was under the belief the stairs would be annihilated if he was not looking at them. That seems ridiculous to us, right? But that is where Hume's doctrines lead him. His philosophy is irrational and unlivable. He attempts to make his philosophy livable by changing to a "mitigated scepticism." This mitigated scepticism is just an unprincipled "on-again, off-again" scepticism. He will be sceptical when philosophising but will not be sceptical when he gets hungry! Hume says a "true sceptic" doesn't deny himself these comforts.
Come on, admit it. That's dishonest on Hume's part!
Your inertial energy seems more akin, kind of an inverse, to the ordinary conception of potential energy. You seem to understand the inertial energy of an object as being the idea of how much energy would be required to move it.
If you're not convinced there's nothing of value in one's philosophy that claims our understanding based on our observation cannot be justified, then that's your opinion. But Hume had made a statement that's deceptively simple it freaked the heck out of the entire caboodle of philosophers.
Kinetic energy is implied in the the movement of the pool balls. We grasp its truth, but never the thing "kinetic". It's not separable from the other things in the room, like the balls. Yet you speak of it like you could literally hold it in your hand, with or without the balls.
Quoting Dusty of Sky
Correct.
We need to unpack this one a bit. Why does Hume makes this move? He's answering a question about a certain kind of "proof." Do we have experience of these unseen objects at the given time? We do not. Clearly, they do not meet a standard of observation. Beyond this, I don't know for sure (beyond all other possibilities) whether the stairs are present. All sorts of stuff could happen to the stairs, including the stairs ceasing to be.
Hume is really just sticking to a certain demand justification. A demand, which we might add, applies both ways.
If the letter reaches him without the stairs, he will have a world without stairs (whatever that might be) which brought him the letter. The stairs have just been replaced by something else. He will be confronted by the need for an unseen object in an absence of stairs too. Bewilderment in either case. We cannot make the accusation Hume believes their are no stairs.
For the same reason he cannot accept there are stairs, he cannot accept there aren't any. He cannot see the occurrence of either.
What's driving this juxtaposition is not the existence/non-existence of any particular object or not, but rather the distinction between one's own experience and everything else in the world. Whenever we encounter information or a proposal about something beyond are immediate experience, we are put in this situation.
In making this point, Hume isn't trying to pose some kind of universe without external objects or even without external objects which we know, but laying out what is demanded by a certain kind of justification. The true sceptic doesn't deny himself the comforts of knowledge because they understand this scepticism isn't strictly a measure of what is known. It's a measure of whether a claim has been justified to a certain standard.
Yes, it did freak out a bunch of philosophers and no one knew how to refute him. But Hume's idea was still completely irrational. He did not add to our philosophical knowledge because he was wrong and I can prove it.
Quoting Caldwell
I think you are trying to draw too fine a distinction here. When you see motion, you are looking at kinetic energy. That's all you really need to think about. When you see an object at rest, then you are looking at inertial energy.
Yes, this is the essence of Pyrrhonism - the suspension of judgment. But this suspension of judgment is entirely irrational.
Quoting TheWillowOfDarkness
Yes, this is correct. Hume's irrational scepticism isn't trying to prove the non-existence of an external world; it is trying to establish suspension of judgment. In Book 1, Hume speaks in a very dogmatical way but his goal is not to establish knowledge but to establish suspension of judgment. This even applies to the continued existence of objects when they are not being observed such as the stairs. This leads to all kinds of absurdities and inability to reason properly in Treatise 1.4.7. Hume then goes for, and leads his followers to go for, a totally unprincipled "mitigated scepticism" which is "on-again, off-again." Hume was forced to give up his goal of living a life that was philosophically consistent. Why? Because he was unwilling to give up his irrational scepticism.
Once you read the proof of an external world, the suspension of judgment about an external world goes away. And so do all of the absurdities and inconsistencies. It is possible to live a life that is philosophically consistent. Hume failed to show the way.
Quoting Ron Cram
[quote=Hume]
By what argument can it be proved, that the perceptions of the mind must be caused by external objects, entirely different from them, though resembling them (if that be possible) and could not arise either from the energy of the mind itself, or from the suggestion of some invisible and unknown spirit, or from some other cause still more unknown to us? It is acknowledged, that, in fact, many of these perceptions arise not from anything external, as in dreams, madness, and other diseases. And nothing can be more inexplicable than the manner, in which body should so operate upon mind as ever to convey an image of itself to a substance, supposed of so different, and even contrary a nature.
It is a question of fact, whether the perceptions of the senses be produced by external objects, resembling them: how shall this question be determined? By experience surely; as all other questions of a like nature. But here experience is, and must be entirely silent. The mind has never anything present to it but the perceptions, and cannot possibly reach any experience of their connexion with objects. The supposition of such a connexion is, therefore, without any foundation in reasoning.
[/quote]
I agree with Hume that no argument can prove that there is an external world. I also agree that no argument can prove that the sun will rise tomorrow. For me the point is about the limits of deduction. We aren't essentially deductive creatures. Custom, habit, experience rule. If we think of rationality in terms of mathematical proofs, then we just aren't (primarily) rational creatures. Our most important knowledge has no deductive foundation. If B follows A with regularity, we like to say that A causes B. But we can't prove the necessity. And indeed we human beings are often fooled.
But even though Hume convinced himself and me of this, we both kept on believing 'irrationally' that the sun wasn't a dream and that yes indeed it would rise tomorrow. I say 'irrationally' and yet acting on patterns in our experience for our benefit is also rationality itself. The point is that we can't get by on pure reason. If we can't find proofs for external world or the uniformity of nature, that's OK. We don't need them. We can't help believing in such things. Its what we are.
That said, I'd still like to hear any proof you have that there is an external world. Since I never doubted that there was, I'm really interested in how you navigate around Hume's suspicion that there can be no such proof.
Circling back to the OP, I think the 'problem of induction' was the kind of advance you were asking about. And that's just one great idea. You mention Kant being inspired by Hume. Indeed. Assuming that you like Kant, that also evidence of Hume's significance.
Anyway, I'll stop here with one more great quote, one with which I completely agree.
[quote=Hume]
It is confessed, that the utmost effort of human reason is to reduce the principles, productive of natural phenomena, to a greater simplicity, and to resolve the many particular effects into a few general causes, by means of reasonings from analogy, experience, and observation. But as to the causes of these general causes, we should in vain attempt their discovery; nor shall we ever be able to satisfy ourselves, by any particular explication of them. These ultimate springs and principles are totally shut up from human curiosity and enquiry. Elasticity, gravity, cohesion of parts, communication of motion by impulse; these are probably the ultimate causes and principles which we shall ever discover in nature; and we may esteem ourselves sufficiently happy, if, by accurate enquiry and reasoning, we can trace up the particular phenomena to, or near to, these general principles. The most perfect philosophy of the natural kind only staves off our ignorance a little longer: as perhaps the most perfect philosophy of the moral or metaphysical kind serves only to discover larger portions of it. Thus the observation of human blindness and weakness is the result of all philosophy, and meets us at every turn, in spite of our endeavours to elude or avoid it.
[/quote]
This is a quote from an earlier comment you made. The Treatise Book 1 explains Hume's doubt of the external and his shock the porter was able to rise to the second floor if the stairs were annihilated by Hume's absence. If your only exposure to Hume is his first Enquiry, then you would not be aware of Hume's extreme and pernicious doubt.
Quoting joshua
A rational person would not request a proof. The request is irrational. I explain this in my forthcoming paper which I hope will be published next year.
You provide a quote from Hume:
I will give a few hints about my paper. Hume doesn't like sense data. He says sensations are only impressions in the mind and arise from "unknown causes." He says our senses are founded upon our imagination. And Hume tries to distort the meaning of these sensations. For example, Hume likes to pretend that we cannot see depth and distance. As a result, he makes some odd comments about space. Hume really dislikes the sense of touch because it gives a sense of reality. With sense of touch you can discern hardness and softness, heat and cold, pain and pleasure. Hume's dislike of sense data makes him the very opposite of an empiricist. He is the anti-empiricist.
But here is the real key. Hume seems to know absolutely nothing beyond the five senses commonly discussed during his lifetime. Now we know the human body has many other senses under the category interoceptive senses.
The interoceptive senses are those we use to sense the internal condition of our bodies. We can sense whether we are cold or hot. We can sense whether our heart is beating fast or slow. We can sense if we are hungry or full. We can sense if we are thirsty or well-hydrated. We can sense if we are getting enough oxygen or if the air is thin. We can sense if we are losing our balance or if we experience sudden muscle weakness and in some cases we can even sense if we are about to lose consciousness.
Proprioception is among the interoceptive senses. Our bodies have little sensors, called proprioceptors, under our skin and in very high density in our hands, feet and major joints. These sensors tell our brain where our body parts are in space. For example, if you put your hand behind you, you no longer see your hand but the proprioceptors tell you that your hand is behind you. Proprioceptors can tell you if your hand is low to the ground or high over your head. And they can tell you the orientation, whether your palm is facing forward or facing backward. Try it right now.
That is all the hint I'm going to give you regarding my upcoming paper. Perhaps you can figure out the proof of the external world from this.
Quoting joshua
I'm not a fan of Kant. Philosophy would have been much better off if Kant had provided a real refutation of Hume as I am about to do.
You provided another lengthy quote from Hume. I would like to comment on a portion of that quote:
This is absurd. The quote certainly hasn't aged well. If Hume was a decent student of natural philosophy, he would know how silly this is. Why is Hume not openly mocked in philosophy texts for saying "these are probably the ultimate causes and principles which we shall ever discover in nature?" He was certainly no futurist. He had no clue about the discoveries yet to be made relating to electromagnetic forces, radiation, strong and weak nuclear reactions, fluid dynamics, quantum mechanics, atmospheric science, geology, chemistry and biology. Hume was enamored with the skeptical philosophy, not with the advance of science.
Hume concludes:
Do you see what nonsense this is? There is currently strong tension between the disciplines of science and philosophy at the university. This tension, I believe, is largely the result of Hume's followers being irrationally skeptical and anti-science. Philosophy will never progress out of its current darkness until Hume is seen as entirely refuted.
I greatly like this statement. But I so far also don’t find anything in Hume that would at all contradict its stance. Hume was about prioritizing our experience, rather than our rationality. Yet, by establishing via non-deductive reasoning that all our reasoning is liable to some degree of error, his position to me seems to stand in firm agreement with the quoted statement. It is most often via our experiences that we discover “what we run into when we are wrong”. And even when it is via reasoning that this is discovered, to be so discovered, it will need to conform to our experiences.
Quoting Ron Cram
Causation is an abstract concept or reasoning and, as such, is not directly observable via the physiological senses. To Hume, we form understandings of causation as abstract concept via an accumulation of experiences that hold uniformity. Yet Hume never denied that we hold instincts (in the broader, non-genotypic sense) via which we interact causally:
Quoting SEP - David Hume - 5.3 Belief
Quoting Ron Cram
Am I correct in presuming that you dislike Hume's, here paraphrased, affirmation that all logically sound arguments are founded upon non-deductively obtained premises? Premises that thereby hold a possibility of error?
That there are no infallible premises and, thereby, infallible conclusions is not to me irrational - though it might offend many a rationalist, granted. Instead, this conclusion, to me seems to be what honest reasoning is about.
As just one implication of such reasoning, Hume is basically saying (without name calling): "Hey guys, think twice about Cartesian philosophy, for our reasoning cannot ever be infallible, as Descartes claims it can be; also, yes, Berkley said this and that, but Berkley's reasoning by no means establishes the absence of an external world and, in fact, we can't help but live with beliefs (instinctive or otherwise) that an external world exists - which makes the external world as solid as anything else, given that nothing is infallible."
I agree, using 'rational' in the ordinary way. We are radically embedded in a world that we share with others. Only philosophers in love with a strange game pretend otherwise, and yet they do so to impress one another. Perhaps most 'high-level' human behavior is other-directed. I want to impress people, get paid by people. I think in the language of my tribe. If my private journal is discovered, it is mostly intelligible by others in the tribe.
If we let ourselves see this embeddedness in the world (which is painful in the context of our fantasies of autonomy), then many 'problems' of philosophy just dissolve. They are like chess problems, but less pure and beautiful given the 'organic' nature of language.
Quoting Ron Cram
I agree that science has progressed, but I think you are missing the point. There's a tendency to explain things in terms of basic principles which themselves remain unexplained. Sometimes we find a more general theory or set of concepts that offer an explanation, but now this more general theory is true for no reason (or seems true enough for now for no reason.)
Quoting Ron Cram
I find it implausible that 'Hume's followers' are anti-science. Instead I see Hume as a scientist's philosopher. I read him as anti-religious and anti-dogmatic. Consider the part you left out:
To me this is the ghost of Socrates.
[quote=Socrates/Plato]
I dare say, Athenians, that someone among you will reply, "Why is this, Socrates, and what is the origin of these accusations of you: for there must have been something strange which you have been doing? All this great fame and talk about you would never have arisen if you had been like other men: tell us, then, why this is, as we should be sorry to judge hastily of you." Now I regard this as a fair challenge, and I will endeavor to explain to you the origin of this name of "wise," and of this evil fame. Please to attend then. And although some of you may think I am joking, I declare that I will tell you the entire truth. Men of Athens, this reputation of mine has come of a certain sort of wisdom which I possess. If you ask me what kind of wisdom, I reply, such wisdom as is attainable by man, for to that extent I am inclined to believe that I am wise; whereas the persons of whom I was speaking have a superhuman wisdom, which I may fail to describe, because I have it not myself; and he who says that I have, speaks falsely, and is taking away my character. And here, O men of Athens, I must beg you not to interrupt me, even if I seem to say something extravagant. For the word which I will speak is not mine. I will refer you to a witness who is worthy of credit, and will tell you about my wisdom - whether I have any, and of what sort - and that witness shall be the god of Delphi. You must have known Chaerephon; he was early a friend of mine, and also a friend of yours, for he shared in the exile of the people, and returned with you. Well, Chaerephon, as you know, was very impetuous in all his doings, and he went to Delphi and boldly asked the oracle to tell him whether - as I was saying, I must beg you not to interrupt - he asked the oracle to tell him whether there was anyone wiser than I was, and the Pythian prophetess answered that there was no man wiser. Chaerephon is dead himself, but his brother, who is in court, will confirm the truth of this story.
Why do I mention this? Because I am going to explain to you why I have such an evil name. When I heard the answer, I said to myself, What can the god mean? and what is the interpretation of this riddle? for I know that I have no wisdom, small or great. What can he mean when he says that I am the wisest of men? And yet he is a god and cannot lie; that would be against his nature. After a long consideration, I at last thought of a method of trying the question. I reflected that if I could only find a man wiser than myself, then I might go to the god with a refutation in my hand. I should say to him, "Here is a man who is wiser than I am; but you said that I was the wisest." Accordingly I went to one who had the reputation of wisdom, and observed to him - his name I need not mention; he was a politician whom I selected for examination - and the result was as follows: When I began to talk with him, I could not help thinking that he was not really wise, although he was thought wise by many, and wiser still by himself; and I went and tried to explain to him that he thought himself wise, but was not really wise; and the consequence was that he hated me, and his enmity was shared by several who were present and heard me. So I left him, saying to myself, as I went away: Well, although I do not suppose that either of us knows anything really beautiful and good, I am better off than he is - for he knows nothing, and thinks that he knows. I neither know nor think that I know. In this latter particular, then, I seem to have slightly the advantage of him. Then I went to another, who had still higher philosophical pretensions, and my conclusion was exactly the same. I made another enemy of him, and of many others besides him.
[/quote]
Anyway, Hume goes with science like ketchup with hamburgers. Yet he also sees that science has no deductive justification, which is fascinating. We are 'irrationally rational' Pavlovian dogs. Skepticism is not our problem. Instead human beings are eager to sit at the feet of this or that guru with a few big words in his mouth --because those words tickle their bellies right.
A line like this helps me understand why you dislike Hume so much. I get the impression that you think philosophy is...still important. Yet I think you agree that nobody needs an OCD proof of the external world. To be sure our modern isolated personalities will look for gurus from Deepak Chopra to Dr. Phil to Jordan Peterson to Zizek. More creative (and arrogant?) personalities will present themselves as new and improved gurus, offering some homebrew of traditional religion and philosophy proper and quantum woo and psychoanalysis and pop culture and the left-wing, right-wing, broken-wing buzzwords of the twitter-verse.
Philosophy forums are both fun and sad that way. The modern atomized personality with its minimal shared culture wanders in a smoky maze with ten thousand prophets for profit who don't agree.
[quote=Eliot]
You had such a vision of the street
As the street hardly understands
[/quote]
This vision or my own morose perspective is one more option that can be packaged and sold as tomorrow's post-spiritual-but-spiritual bestseller. I suspect that there are lots of people out there who don't make much noise (what's the point?) and yet take science for a useful best guess and philosophy as a bag of tricks that might be good for this or that situation. And as an amusing zoo of vivid personalities who think they've finally got it right.
Quoting javra
Yes, I very much like Dallas Willard. I even had the pleasure of meeting him once. To find where Hume runs into reality, read Hume's Treatise, especially the sections 1.4.2 and 1.4.7. No one can read those passages without seeing the absurdities that Hume has run into and the doubts about his philosophy this causes him. Instead of mending his philosophy, he decides on what he calls "mitigated skepticism" a kind of on-again, off-again skepticism.
Quoting javra
Not true. We can and do observe causation. We observe the transfer of kinetic energy when one pool ball strikes another. We observe causation when we observe the flame consume the match. We observe causation when we observe a brick shatter a window. There is nearly an endless supply of these simple examples.
You are absolutely correct that we sometimes find a more general or deeper theory that fits the data better. One example of this was Einstein's theory of gravitation known as his general theory of relativity. Newton's had noticed what he called the universal law of gravitation, which is mathematically an inverse square law. Newton used g as his symbol gravitation. Einstein continued using the symbol g. He continued to recognize the inverse square law. The difference in the theory was the Newton could not explain what caused gravitation and Einstein's theory says it results from the warping of the spacetime continuum. Why do massive objects cause the spacetime continuum to warp? We don't know and so there is room for a deeper theory than Einstein's. But I think you are missing Hume's attitude in this passage. Because he is a skeptic, he is saying "Guys, we really haven't learned that much. There are still lots of things we don't know and we will never find out." Hume was clearly wrong. His skepticism is irrational, unwarranted. I'm thankful that scientists did not listen to him. If they had, I would not be able to book international airline tickets from my smart phone while riding in the back of an Uber.
Quoting joshua
My scientist friends consider Hume anti-science. I don't see how the portion I left out helps make the case that he would applaud the advance of science. His Treatise Book 1 was a frontal attack on Isaac Newton, observation, Newton's law of cause and effect, mathematics (especially geometry which Newton used in the Principia), etc. I know that for a long time the Hume followers taught that Hume was a follower of Newton, but this demonstrably untrue. Hume praised Newton with faint praise but attacked everything he accomplished. See https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hume-newton/
I agree with you that your Socrates quote is real Socrates and not Plato. But Socrates had reason to be skeptical that Hume did not have. Hume lived after Grosseteste, Galileo, Kepler, Bacon, Boyle, Huygens, Hooke, s'Gravesande and Newton. Hume lived after the great burst of the Scientific Revolution and then attempted to deny and fight against the advances these great men made.
Quoting joshua
Science doesn't need deductive justification. Let that sink in.
I would say that nobody needed a proof before Hume asked for one. Once people were stumped, the proof became necessary which is why I'm publishing one next year.
Quoting joshua
Science is much more than a "useful best guess" because it results in useful products and medicines that improve and lengthen our lives and also gives us new facts about which we can philosophize. Philosophy is important for a vast number of reasons, but so much bad philosophy has been published that is weighing people down and holding them back. Philosophy can be a terrific store of epistemological and logical tools and metaphysical facts. Philosophy can provide a platform from which new researches are conducted and new sciences are developed. Right now, philosophy is in a dark place. I think the best service I can provide philosophy is to remove the hindrances to good philosophy by refuting some of the worst philosophers. I'm starting with Hume.
Refute what? That induction is unjustified? They all joined him on this!
The question [that you should address to Hume yourself] is "So what?". So what if induction is not justified understanding. Can we live with this? Yes! I'm not at all bothered by this.
Quoting Ron Cram
Irrational in what way? And why would a philosopher add to our knowledge all the time instead of just invalidating what we're accustomed to already? Skeptics do this and we take it for granted! And yes they are philosophers, just so you know.
No you're not. But your teachers must have told you so.
What you see is movement of objects that may or may not have the property of kinetic energy. Talk to magicians or illusionists.
I love science, just to be clear. We agree on 'useful.' I say 'best guess' because I trust the products of science, without experiencing these products as final or beyond revision.
Quoting Ron Cram
I'd say that philosophy was important. I mean certain classic texts in the genre had real impact. I don't think philosophy proper continues to be all that important to the culture as a whole. Of course people are hot and bothered about politics (understandably), and philosophy appears within those heated discussions in a cruder form. But careful thought at the level of the good philosophy texts doesn't move the masses.
Offer the average person a proof that the world exists and they might think you are crazy. While I think philosophy at its best is about as good as it gets, bad philosophy is sub-normal. Thanks to the internet, I've seen how often the manic street preacher wears the robes of the philosopher. There's usually no way to put some magic world-saving system of philosophical words to the test. If there were, that'd pretty much be science. So philosophy attracts self-important Thinkers who don't need funding for equipment and can't be pinned down enough to be refuted (in their own eyes.) Personally I think we all do this to some degree when it comes to 'spiritual' issues. It's occasionally depressing to be 'realistic,' and I sometimes envy those with a mission and a message. ' The problem is X, and the solution is Y.'
For me the problems are X,Y, and Z, and no grand solution is apparent. I can offer trivialities like eat healthy food, don't waste your money on stupid sh*t, try not to need so much, seek employment that's fulfilling, blah blah blah. I think this is good advice for those who generally want to survive, but I see no master plan that makes that comfortable survival important to strangers. And I see no grand purpose for the species. And the problems I see in the world are (to me) manifestations of the opposed forces in my own 'soul', while for a different type of personality the world's problems are the result of a conspiracy of the bads, who of course are other-than the diagnostician.
I confess, that was quite a digression. But I think it gets to the issue behind the issue --the evangelist versus the morose (critical) philosopher -- who is also the laughing philosopher when the brain chemistry is right.
Is 'need' the right word here? Such a proof would be the clever solution of a chess problem. Except chess problems are more beautiful, since they are posed in a exact language. Philosophical 'proofs' can't be the 'math' they hope to emulate. Language is a slimy, smoking beast. The 'solution' to all such philosophical chess problems is perhaps to face this ugly beast and suffer the resulting paradigm change. Because language is a slimy, smoking beast, I can't pseudo-mathematically prove to you that it's like that. I can hint at an 'experience of language,' but that is misleadingly mystical sounding.
As long as someone is locked into 'the game' on a gut-level, they're dead to the examples (which other famous philosophers have already provided.) So I won't go into it. What I'm talking about isn't science, but it's the kind of realization that increases a persons respect for engineering at least.
I agree. And then after we have that deeper theory there will still be room for a yet deeper theory. I think we agree that the most general patterns we have must therefore be true for no reason. The alternative seems to be 'because God,' which only draws a smiley face on the issue.
Quoting Ron Cram
You are preaching to the choir. And isn't it you who are concerned with a proof of the external world? A deductive enterprise which you claim is somehow needed? What convinces human beings is the power that gives them what they want. I think we are fundamentally empirical beings. Deduction is an elite taste. I like mathematical proofs personally, but I don't think the proofs are what convince most people. Show them lots of examples and they will generalize (often ignoring counterexamples.)
But this is why I suggest that Hume is (counter-intuitively perhaps) pro-science. If the knowledge we use all of the time in the real world has no deductive foundation, that's a demotion of deduction and not an impossible demotion of our wordly knowledge. The bookish philosopher is shown in a new, unflattering light when we realize that deduction is secondary tool. We have to go outside and try things to see how the world works. And all of our theories are works-so-far conjectures.
Quoting Ron Cram
I think you are missing something important here. It is conceivable that the brick will bounce off the window. Of course we don't expect that to happen, but we can't prove that because bricks usually smash through windows that they will always do so. Yet we can't help expecting them to do so. So the question is whether and how causality is anything more than such expectations.
Or we can think of the half-life of some radioactive element. We fit curves to data points and calculate parameters again and again until we decide that the element has a 'nature' that we can count on in the future. But the silent assumption is that nature is uniform, that the past determines the future. I know of no non-circular and therefore genuine proof of this. Yet I can't help expecting the future to be like the past, all other things being equal. I'm just that kind of monkey, it seems. (Which is again applying the principle, which is implicit perhaps in the concepts of human nature and nature itself.)
No, philosophers were unable to refute Hume's claim that the external world cannot be demonstrated. Thomas Reid tried a "common sense" approach. Kant tried. GE Moore tried. A great number of philosophers tried. My paper next year will provide an unassailable proof that an external world exists.
I agree. The goal of publishing my proof is not to stir the masses to get a job or change their life. My goal is to change the way philosophers think and to change the way philosophers teach philosophy. The greatest philosophers, in my opinion, are not the skeptics. Skepticism is important in both philosophy and in science. Skepticism is the motivation for testing your conclusions and gaining a greater confidence in them when they pass the test. But irrational skepticism, the kind of skepticism that Hume had, is unwarranted and slows progress. The greatest philosophers are those who put the irrational skeptics aside, totally ignore them, and go about their work.
Quoting joshua
This is not a bad digression at all. Philosophy, at least originally, was about life. It was about gaining wisdom to live a better life, accomplish the right things, and be a good citizen. My philosophical interests are very much in this direction. In addition to being interested in philosophy of life, I'm also interested in epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of science and philosophy of religion. I believe all of these areas of study can help me build a better philosophy of life.
What I do NOT want, as I am developing my philosophy of life, is for some follower of Hume to pop his head up and say "But you can't even prove an external world exists!" That's what Hume was preemptively doing in Section 119 of his first Enquiry. It's annoying. His only purpose is to distract someone from making philosophical progress. That's why it's essential I publish my paper. Once it is done, we can put that bit of irrational skepticism behind us and move on. I consider that real progress.
My demonstration of an external world is not deductive.
Quoting joshua
You are correct that bricks will not always break windows. In some cases, the window may be made of bullet proof glass. But that doesn't change the fact that when we see a brick go through a window, we are observing the glass break the window. We are observing causation. A sold object cannot pass through a solid object without breaking it. In the case of the bullet proof glass, the brick doesn't go through the window. It simply bounces off.
Quoting joshua
This is a very interesting topic. If you are interested, I will provide you with some book titles.
1. Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science by Burtt
https://www.amazon.com/Metaphysical-Foundations-Modern-Science/dp/0486425517/
2. The Foundations of Scientific Inference by Salmon
https://www.amazon.com/Foundations-Scientific-Inference-50th-Anniversary/dp/0822964562/
3. Natural Laws in Scientific Practice by Lange
https://www.amazon.com/Natural-Laws-Scientific-Practice-Lange/dp/0195131487/
I don't agree with everything the authors have written but there are a great many helpful insights in each book. Of course, if you are not interested, then the suggestions.
I wouldn't even say that about those philosophers I really can't stand. This is surely a personal problem for you, rather than a problem generally speaking.
That isn't an answer. Can you think of anything at all in the Treatise Book 1 that advanced our philosophical knowledge, being original, true and beneficial? So far, no one else has either.
It is however conceivable that a normal brick would just pass through a normal window without damaging it. Afterwards, we would no longer consider the brick and the window normal, and we would scramble for some kind of explanation. But the point is that we can't 'rationalistically' deduce that the brick will damage the window. Pure reason is helpless here.
We will of course expect it. We'll have 'laws' of physics that assure us of it. But these 'laws' are themselves the same kind of expectation codified in an exacter quantitative language. In short, there seems to be no 'pure' reason that we should even expect the glass to be damaged. Our expectation is 'irrational' in this specific sense. From what you've written so far, I have the sense that you aren't seeing the strange problem of induction as I do. Yet this is one of the reasons Hume is great.
Quoting Ron Cram
Thanks for the links, but I'd prefer to hear your thoughts on topic, or paraphrases from those sources. After all, I think Hume destroyed the metaphysical foundations of science. Or showed that science never had one. Which revealed that science never needed one, though it's natural for philosophers to step in and try to invent one.
What Hume did or rather simply revealed was radical. Our sanity itself is without a metaphysical foundation. Pure reason on its own can tell me nothing about the world. Not even that its bad to step off of cliffs. Nor that all men are mortal. It's true that deduction can help us use a more general pattern in a concrete case, but our trust that that general pattern will persist is 'blind' human prejudice --and yet sanity itself.
I like Popper, but is Popper really any help here?
[quote=Popper]
The best we can say of a hypothesis is that up to now it has been able to show its worth, and that it has been more successful than other hypotheses although, in principle, it can never be justified, verified, or even shown to be probable.
[/quote]
What matter that a hypothesis has shown its worth up to now? How do we infer that it is therefore more likely to show its worth in the future? Why shouldn't a falsified hypothesis become valuable again?
To be clear, I believe in my heart like we all must that nature is uniform. And the falsifiability as a criterion has a value independent of this one issue. My point is that I haven't seen the problem of induction solved metaphysically. And I can't imagine a solution. Obviously the problem of induction is not a practical problem in the sense that we actually need a solution. Though I can imagine a rationalistic souls being tormented by it. The rest of us can be delighted and shocked by it. And do as we have done, after all.
I very much relate and agree.
For better or worse, though, I do think that existence as a whole is absurd. I think the times we live in are part of that. I imagine the philosophers from centuries who expected technology and the ideology of freedom to transform the world into a paradise.
That's harder to imagine now. It's pretty clear that personal freedom, plenty of food, and working toilets isn't enough to make us wise- at least as a species. Individually we can get better at life (or go completely to hell). I don't claim to be wise myself, though I feel less unwise than I was at 25 (which isn't saying much). I look at the problems of the world and see my own contradictions writ large. I think that seeings one's own greed-fear-vanity-sloth-lust-superstition helps with something like realism. But it's an expensive point of honor. It's more fun to melt into a group of righteous fixers and blamers. To oversimplify the problem so that it's just one political issue. And so on.
I think ancient philosophers could see the world as a immortal system of wheels. They could take pleasure in feeling outside of time and its disasters. Different types of government would come and go, but the earth and humanity would abide forever.
These days we feel the finitude and fragility of the world itself. Our pop culture is suffused with disaster and surreal conspiracies. We live in our screens, a society of the spectacle indeed. Many of our careers are absurd. We make things we don't believe in, if we make anything at all. We go into debt to buy things we can't afford to live up to impossible images of glamour. We can sort-of squint at find a system of wheels, but this is just human nature. And human nature is so dymamic and technological that it's hard to believe we've grasped eternal human nature.
Indeed, we can now mess with our own genetic code. I don't know if their are serious, radical efforts in this direction. Such efforts could lead to disaster and misery. But it's pretty much the only thing I can imagine that would really change the game. We could make ourselves semi-immortal, change our character, etc., which would change the world. I doubt it will happen in my lifetime. It will likely enough never happen.
Anyway, that leaves me with some blend of stoicism, epicureanism, cynicism, existenialism, humanism, etc., etc. Eat well, exercise, maybe buy some land and build a tiny house, work at something I believe in. Die well at a good moment if possible. Tho more likely by being run over by an Amazon Prime truck.
No, that isn't conceivable. We know that solid objects cannot pass through solid objects without breaking them. In the old days, people looked to philosophy to discover the nature of material things. The speculations of philosophers, included Hume, have been disproven. Now we look to condensed matter physics. Our advances in knowledge in this area and others have led to our technologically advanced society. There is no way society is going to accept a retreat from the knowledge gained since Hume. Instead, we have to bring philosophy into the modern age. The only way to do that is to accept that everything Hume said about material objects, epistemology and metaphysics was wrong.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Condensed_matter_physics
Quoting joshua
Many philosophers had written about the problem of induction prior to Hume, but none of these had doubted the existence of an external world. Hume was the first to attack induction from the viewpoint that we cannot prove the existence of external objects. Once my paper is published and the external world is proven, the problem of induction will remain but it will be the original problem of induction as before Hume. I have two more papers in development contra Hume. One of these deals with Hume's failed attack on Isaac Newton and his law of cause and effect and the other deals with the problem of induction after Hume is refuted. The second paper will, of course, deal with laws of nature.
Quoting joshua
No, science did have metaphysical foundations prior to Hume. Or, at least Burtt would claim so. His book is fascinating from a history of philosophy of science perspective. He explained the difference between primary and secondary qualities (in the writings of Galileo, Kepler and Newton) in a way that was clear and concise. Then when I read Hume, it was clear that Hume had never read Galileo and Kepler and so Hume was ill-prepared to understand Newton. Hume never grasped this important distinction and Hume admitted that he never understood motion, force, power and energy. Indeed, these things cannot be understood until you understand the difference between primary and secondary qualities. The problem persists among the followers of Hume. None of them seem the slightest bit interested in understanding Hume's failures.
I cannot agree that existence is absurd. I believe the empirical evidence clearly shows that life has purpose and meaning. I can't go into the reasons for this yet. I must finish my contra Hume papers first.
Quoting joshua
You are an amusing conversationalist. I certainly hope the Amazon truck that runs you over is not delivering another load of books to my house.
Fair enough. The forum would be no fun if we all agreed.
Quoting Ron Cram
Thanks. And I also love my 'primed' books waiting on the porch.
You may be right about Hume on this issue. I don't know. But in general I'm personally less interested in a philosopher's failures than in his or her successes.
Of course I do like Hume. We do seem to have gut-level feelings about various thinkers. In the end, though, I'm more interested in the ideas than in their sources.
As far as the physics concepts go, I'm familiar, especially with the Newtonian stuff. I like differential equations and numerical analysis. I like simulations. But I don't see how it gets around Hume. A differential equation is just something we project on recorded experience, expecting it to apply to future experiences. Newton's 'law' of cooling, for instance, is just a general description of what we are used to and therefore 'irrationally' expect. I don't see how we can purely logically exclude the coffee that never cools in the freezer or the snowball that never melts in the equatorial sun.
I might be wrong, but I have the sense that you aren't grasping the problem of induction, which means you are missing out on a real mindbender.
Normally, I am as well. I've been struck by the complete failure of the Treatise Book 1 to add anything to our store of philosophical knowledge. Hume's epistemology and metaphysics are wrong at every point. I once told a friend that I could go through Book 1 and put each of Hume's propositional statements in one or more of five categories:
1. Patently absurd
2. Demonstrably false
3. Self-contradictory
4. Intentionally obscure
5. Trivially true
I don't blame Hume for some of his passages that are intentionally obscure. He held views that would not be welcomed in an age when excommunication was a thing to be feared.
Quoting joshua
The mindbender only exists if one doubts the existence of an external world. If our perceptions arise in our minds from unknown causes, as Hume argues, then a snowball that never melts on the equator would be possible. But if an external world actually exists, then it cannot. Because an external world exists, we actually know what happens to H2O when it is frozen or heated. We know how temperature changes impact the chemical bonds and how molecules change shape at different temperatures. And we understand the second law of thermodynamics. It is a real natural law and it is never violated on cosmic scales and rarely on much smaller scales.
At the risk of being redundant, and assuming in good faith that this is to be interpreted as written, into which of these categories would you put Hume's bundle theory of the self from Book 1 of the Treatise? I guess I'd also like to know why.
No gripes with personal tastes, it's just that his bundle theory stands out to me as something both significant and worthwhile.
I have already claimed here the ability to prove the existence of an external world. If true, then Hume's bundle theory is demonstrably false. It is demonstrably false because objects actually exist and are "made of" something. The properties inhere due to the objects composition. Said another way, the properties the objects display are a result of the matter the object is made of. In the terms of a physicist, matter is made of molecules consisting in atoms which are composed of quanta. Depending on the composition of the matter, objects will display different density or heaviness, different tensile strength, different temperature characteristics and different rates of decay. All of this has been known for a long time. If we didn't know it, we wouldn't be able to engineer bridges and skyscrapers and jet planes. It is a bit of scandal that Hume is still being read in universities. He isn't right about anything.
Oops. I'm sorry. I read your question incorrectly. I missed the words "of the self."
To answer the question specifically regarding "of the self," I think it would be important to quote Hume himself:
I had entertained some hopes, that however deficient our theory of the intellectual world might be, it would be free from those contradictions, and absurdities, which seem to attend every explication, that human reason can give of the material world. But upon a more strict review of the section concerning personal identity, I find myself involved in such a labyrinth, that, I must confess, I neither know how to correct my former opinions, nor how to render them consistent. If this be not a good general reason for skepticism, it is at least a sufficient one (if I were not already abundantly supplied) for me to entertain a diffidence and modesty in all my decisions. --Hume
That quote appears in Hume's Appendix to the Treatise. Hume himself recognized that his view on personal identity led to contradictions and absurdities.
Quoting Ron Cram
I didn't initially reply to this aspect of the previous post mainly because in my own view Hume is very much on board with this quoted perspective. I find that he is in the sum of his works. His critique of miracles - in which he argues that all supposed miracles have as of yet unknown natural causes - comes to mind, but other potentially better examples abound.
Now, I'm not one to treat Hume as infallible, but to me, at least, in Book 1 he was addressing the logic how we justify our beliefs. His observation (I forget where it was made) that we know that tomorrow not all the leaves of all trees in the world will be on the ground - despite our not having any deductive means of evidencing this - was an epistemological observation. I don't personally find that this observation has any barrings on ontology - other than by illustrating how we know of an external world (and that tomorrow will be much like today) via non-genotypic instinct, or habits, and via induction. But not via logically sound deductions. This aspect of epistemology is to Hume universal, and so it can't be used to justify that there is no external world - not that he ever does.
As a reminder, Hume was not an adherent of Berkeley's philosophy, which devoid of Berkeley's all-perceiving god arguably does amount to the absence of an external world.
All the same, you ask in this thread of what original and good philosophical idea(s) exist in Book 1 of the Treatise.
I'm simply curious to find out how you think that Hume's bundle theory fails.
Hey, my bad. I guess I should slow down a bit. You do understand that Hume's bundle theory of the self basically states that there is no such thing as a permanent, or immutable, self? I presumed you do on account that you've read Book 1 of the Treatise.
But again, going at a slower pace, do you then presume that the something which objects are made of have a permanent, or immutable, core?
edit: Just in case, as quick references:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Personal_identity#Bundle_theory_of_the_self
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bundle_theory
Where else would our perceptions reside? Presumably, you don't intend to equate the outside world with any single set of perceptions, so we still need perceptions to be separate from that which generates them.
Quoting Ron Cram
The problem is that unless and until there is at least an outline of this proof, your criticism of Hume sounds rather hollow.
The subjective idealist isn't denying the conclusions of causality, for he isn't denying the intelligibility or epistemological significance of counterfactuals. He is merely insisting that abstract objects and causality are intelligible and even undeniable precisely because they are semantically reducible to actual experiments and to thought experiments whose sense in both cases hinge upon mental and sensory experience, even if definitions of physical concepts in terms of particular sensations are impossible to give.
The idea that a thought experiment or actual experiment can disprove subjective idealism, is therefore an oxymoron as far as the subjective idealist is concerned.
I thought I explained it clearly enough. I must have assumed you had some background information that I shouldn't have assumed. Let me back up and take another run at it.
Hume's bundle theory states that an objects consists of its properties and nothing more. That view would make sense if it were rational to doubt the existence of an external world. Once the external world is proven, then the bundle theory falls apart because the objects exist and have an actual substance. The properties of the object arise from the substance. Physicists and chemists are able to describe the material substance very precisely. We know matter is made up of molecules, atoms of different sizes and that the atoms themselves are made up of quanta (quarks, electrons and photons). We have a chart of elements that tell us about the different types of atoms. Materials made from these elements can be tested to measure their density, tensile strength, temperature characteristics, etc. Knowing the properties of the different materials allows us to engineer vast bridges and amazing skyscrapers. Without this knowledge, engineering like this would not be possible.
In the Treatise, Hume is predominantly a skeptical idealist. From the very beginning, Hume talks about how sensations "arise from unknown causes," exist only in our minds, and cannot be used to prove the existence of an external world. Hume also throws in a few comments that indicate he is a skeptical materialist, that is, that even if we could prove an external world - then we still could not know much of anything about the nature of these objects. The problem is that Hume's irrational skepticism in the Treatise leads him into doubt and despair in 1.4.2 and 1.4.7. There he decides it is better to take on a mitigated skepticism, a kind of on-again, off-again skepticism. This means he will talk more about his skeptical materialism and less about his skeptical idealism. This is the position he takes in his first Enquiry.
In the first Enquiry, Hume begins the book as a skeptical materialist. He lists out a number of things that he believes we cannot possibly know (even though knowledge of many of these had already been demonstrated by natural philosophers before he wrote). Then in Section 119, Hume throws in his "tincture of scepticism" and says that we cannot even know that an external world exists. Most philosophers believe that skeptical idealism and skeptical materialism are mutually exclusive. Hume doesn't take that view.
The fact Hume thinks that it is possible to maintain his bundle theory while being a skeptical materialist just shows how ignorant Hume is regarding natural philosophy. As I've mentioned before, motion, force, energy, etc are all concepts that are very well defined in Galileo, Kepler, Newton and others. Hume never studied natural philosophy. He read Newton but didn't understand him because he never read Galileo or Kepler or Huygens which would have given him the background to understand Newton.
Regarding Hume's bundle theory on personal identity, Hume himself admits that the theory leads to absurdities and contradictions. And he goes on to say that he has no idea how to mend this theory to avoid these contradictions. Anytime a theory leads to absurdities and contradictions, it is recognized as demonstrably false. Hume thinks his theory may be rescued by some minor adjustment. He has no reason to think so.
If I still have not answered your question adequately, please try to ask a specific question based on what I've said here.
Yes. When I first read the question my eye skipped over the words "of the self" and so I answered based purely on Hume's bundle theory of objects. When I realized my mistake, I provided Hume's quote saying that he understands that his theory of personal identity is not correct and that he cannot find a way to rescue it. Anything that leads to absurdities and contradictions is considered demonstrably false. Hume was optimistic that someone would be able to find a minor adjustment to his theory that would avoid these contradictions and absurdities, but I am not optimistic. It has been 250 years and it hasn't happened yet.
Quoting javra
No, all material objects are mutable. The substance objects are made of are well characterized. Take any object to a condensed matter physicist and they can tell you all about the substance and its properties.
Perhaps I used the wrong phrase here. I should have said that "if perceptions arise in our minds from unknown causes."
Quoting Echarmion
Yes, I understand there are people such as yourself who want to see this proof. I've given some hints and I will be publishing it next year. In the meantime, you can consider if what I say makes sense of the external world can be proven.
This is the argument Hume makes, but he's wrong. Stay tuned.
Yes, I recall that statement. What makes his bundle theory of the self imperfect is the presence of what some might term a unified first person point of view. Still, I can well argue that this imperfection does not in any way invalidate the claim that there is no permanent, immutable, aspect of the self.
Quoting Ron Cram
OK, I haven't read him in a very long time. Still, I don't recall him saying that "objects consist of its properties and nothing more". All I recall is his argument for the bundle theory of the self, in which he states that the self is a commonwealth of elements that constantly change.
Can you point out where in his own works Hume claims a bundle theory of objects?
Quoting Ron Cram
As to modern bundle theory, it does not deny substance, but presents the view, roughly speaking, that substance is composed of an aggregate of properties (such that properties can includes relations, which include causal relations.) The link I previously gave can serve as reference to this.
Also, we are addressing substance within contexts of philosophy, not those of science. It makes for a world of difference. If properties do not inhere into the immutable substance of "apple", for one example, I still fail to see how the modern notions of bundle theory are erroneous? (note, I presume an external world throughout) But I gather this issue addressing bundle theory isn't central to the thread.
Yes, the unified first person is inescapably contradictory to the bundle theory. Hume saw the contradiction. I'm wondering why you don't? I don't think Hume ever claimed that individuals were immutable. I'm not sure where that is coming from.
Quoting javra
I don't have a quote at my fingertips but the Wikipedia article on Bundle Theory, the one you linked above, has this quote:
"Thus, the theory asserts that the apple is no more than the collection of its properties. In particular, there is no substance in which the properties are inherent."
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bundle_theory
Wikipedia has it correctly.
Quoting javra
No, the link you provided supports my claim.
Quoting javra
I reject the idea that science and philosophy are investigating different subjects when investigating the substance of material objects.
No, Hume's bundle theory of the self claims that there is no immutable self - which is what I've previously stated.
What I asked is where Hume specifies a bundle theory of objects.
Quoting Ron Cram
Its not a long article, form the same article:
"The bundle theory of substance explains compresence. Specifically, it maintains that properties' compresence itself engenders a substance. Thus, it determines substancehood empirically by the togetherness of properties rather than by a bare particular or by any other non-empirical underlying strata. The bundle theory of substance thus rejects the substance theories of Aristotle, Descartes, and more recently, J. P. Moreland, Jia Hou, Joseph Bridgman, Quentin Smith, and others."
I don't think Hume said anything about immutability in his theory of self.
Quoting javra
This is not Hume's theory of substance. Notice that Hume's name does NOT appear in that list. Here's the quote I provided in context. It occurs right at the beginning of the article. You will see that Hume is named.
"Bundle theory, originated by the 18th century Scottish philosopher David Hume, is the ontological theory about objecthood in which an object consists only of a collection (bundle) of properties, relations or tropes.
"According to bundle theory, an object consists of its properties and nothing more: thus neither can there be an object without properties nor can one even conceive of such an object; for example, bundle theory claims that thinking of an apple compels one also to think of its color, its shape, the fact that it is a kind of fruit, its cells, its taste, or at least one other of its properties. Thus, the theory asserts that the apple is no more than the collection of its properties. In particular, there is no substance in which the properties are inherent."
Again, notice the words "consists only" in the first paragraph. Notice the second paragraph says "an object consists of its properties and nothing more." This is Hume's Bundle Theory.
You asked for a quote directly from the Treatise. Here's a quote from 1.1.6:
"I would fain ask those philosophers, who found so much of their reasonings on the distinction of substance and accident, and imagine we have clear ideas of each, whether the idea of substance be derived from the impressions of sensations or of reflection? If it be conveyed to us by our senses, I ask, which of them; and after what manner? If it be perceived by the eyes, it must be a colour; if by the ears, a sound; if by the palate, a taste; and so of the other senses. But I perceive none will assert, that substance is a colour, or sound, or a taste. The idea, of substance must therefore be derived from an impression of reflection, if it really exist. But the impressions of reflection resolve themselves into our passions and emotions: none of which can possibly represent a substance. We have therefore no idea of substance, distinct from that of a collection of particular qualities, nor have we any other meaning when we either talk or reason concerning it."
If Hume was a student of the natural philosophers, he would have learned that natural philosophers had a very good conception of substance and very clear reasons why color and taste are secondary qualities. It is obvious that Hume is trying to preserve his Pyrrhonism and trying to continue his doubt about the existence of an external world. Remember that Hume teaches that sensations of color, taste, etc arise in the mind "from unknown causes."
Why not? Because it's not the sort of thing that has happened so far?
And what do we know about [math]H_2 O[/math] that isn't based on our past experience? Our entire theory of molecules, atoms, and sub-atomic particles is a codification of the patterns we have found to hold so far (or since we've been checking.) [If someone did observe a violation, we probably wouldn't believe, them, though.] So saying that the snowball must melt because the electron must do X etc. only shifts the issue to electrons. Why should electrons continue to behave as they have?
Why would Hume appear in a list of individuals whose theories of substance the bundle theory of substance rejects?
Quoting Ron Cram
Greatly appreciative of that. I'm now content, and actually happy to see that he did write something regarding a bundle theory of substance - and not just of self. So I acknowledge being wrong in remembering him to only address the bundle theory of the self. But we obviously interpret his comments in considerably different ways.
" here it is important to remember that, in addition to cause and effect, the mind naturally associates ideas via resemblance and contiguity. Hume does not hold that, having never seen a game of billiards before, we cannot know what the effect of the collision will be. Rather, we can use resemblance, for instance, to infer an analogous case from our past experiences of transferred momentum, deflection, and so forth. We are still relying on previous impressions to predict the effect and therefore do not violate the Copy Principle. We simply use resemblance to form an analogous prediction. And we can charitably make such resemblances as broad as we want. Thus, objections like: Under a Humean account, the toddler who burned his hand would not fear the flame after only one such occurrence because he has not experienced a constant conjunction, are unfair to Hume, as the toddler would have had thousands of experiences of the principle that like causes like, and could thus employ resemblance to reach the conclusion to fear the flame. "
https://www.iep.utm.edu/hume-cau/
I am not a Hume expert, i'm just a googler. But doesn't this defence of Hume miss the point, or at least fail to stress the epistemological target of Hume's argument?
Assuming Hume was a rational and non-superficial thinker, he would have granted the possibility that we can "infer" causal relationships even without appeal to resemblance. For example, when a baby is first born, it might initially behave instinctively to avoid fire, implying that it already has a concept of causation.
Surely, any behaviour, especially avoidance behaviour, can be interpreted as embodying a causal understanding of the world, even when the behaviour is without precedent and there are no earlier resemblances to draw upon.
The dispute I'm raising here, concerns conflicting interpretations of 'having' knowledge. On a behavioural interpretation of knowledge, the fire-avoiding baby might be said to "already know" that fire hurts. Yet on a mentalistic, verbal or otherwise representational interpretation of knowledge, the fire-avoiding baby is completely ignorant of fire hurting, even when it instinctively acts to avoid fire.
So assuming Hume was a good philosopher, his concepts of resemblance and constant-conjunction must have been mental concepts referring to the mentalistic interpretation of knowledge, where they make sense. For instance, in our modern world of virtual reality it might be the case that we instinctively avoid virtual fire as we might also instinctively avoid virtual spiders and virtual snakes, even though we consciously appreciate, via resemblence and constant-conjunction, that these virtual entities are likely to be harmless.
Because of physical necessity. We understand the temperature characteristics of snow and of snowballs. We understand that the temperature at the equator is above 32 degrees. We understand snow begins to melt above 32 degrees. We understand why snow melts above 32 degrees because we understand the physical necessity of it.
Quoting joshua
Because of cause and effect due to physical necessity. Each step in the process is well understood. It is like the physical necessity of one billiard ball forcing another billiard ball to move. It can be clearly observed.
The defense of Hume in IEP is accurate to a point. However, it fails to consider the fact of physical necessity shown by natural philosophers Galileo, Kepler and others that Hume never read. If Hume had read them, then he would have had the foundation to understand Newton's law of cause and effect. Hume's doubt of an external world is his stumbling block. If the doubt is removed, then Hume would be free to investigate physical necessity.
Quoting sime
Hume was not a good philosopher. He was writing as a skeptical idealist and so you are correct that Hume's concepts are mental concepts. Hume could not consider physical necessity as long as he doubted the existence of the external world.
Your welcome.
Noticed in this thread that you nitpick what to reply to in relation to my posts. Leaves me to believe that you might not address other's writings, such as Hume's, with a fair sense of impartiality. Can you provide any reference to Hume being a "skeptical idealist"? Or else one that critiques Hume as "doubting the existence of an external world"? Fallible though I am, these complaints seem idiosyncratic.
I will be happy to give you some things to read. First, Hume is difficult to interpret which makes him difficult to categorize. This is due in part to Hume's self-contradictory statements, called antinomies, in the philosophy literature.
Hume's Antinomies by Manfred Kuehn
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/389183/pdf
In an Introduction to Hume's writings, Selby-Bigge writes:
“Hume’s philosophic writings are to be read with great caution. His pages, especially those in the Treatise, are so full of matter, he says so many different things in so many different ways and different connexions, and with so much indifference to what he said before, that it is very hard to say positively that he taught, or did not teach, this or that particular doctrine…. This makes it easy to find all philosophies in Hume, or, by setting up one statement against another, none at all.” - L. A. Selby-Bigge, Introduction to the Enquiries, p. viii. (2nd ed., 1902).
So Hume is harder to categorize than most philosophers. What I have said in this thread is that Hume is primarily a skeptical idealist in the Treatise, although he also wrote some comments that qualify as skeptical materialist in the same book. I have characterized Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding as primarily skeptical materialist although Section 119 is clearly skeptical idealism.
I use the term "skeptical idealism" because I think it fits. The link below is by G.J. Mattey, a philosopher from UC Davis. He clearly views to Hume as skeptical idealist. He writes:
[i]The various forms of idealism and realism are based on two other sets of opposing high-level concepts:
* dogmatic/skeptical/critical
* transcendental/empirical
Kant thought that all earlier varieties of idealism were either dogmatic or skeptical. This distinction is one of philosophical methodology. The dogmatic procedure attempts to establish the truth of principles a priori, based on the analysis of philosophical concepts. Dogmatism itself is the attempt to do so without a previous critique of the powers of human reason. Criticism, then, is the "necessary preparation for a thoroughly grounded metaphysics" which itself is subject to the dogmatic procedure (Bxxxv). Skepticism, on the other hand, is a response to the failure of dogmatism, and it denies the possibility of a priori metaphysical principles. Wolff is held up as a paradigmatic practitioner of dogmatism, Hume of skepticism, and Kant himself of criticism.[/i]
Kant sought to refute Hume. Although he did a poor job, he certainly viewed Hume as a skeptical idealist.
See http://hume.ucdavis.edu/mattey/kant/IDEALISM.HTM
The term skeptical idealism also has a certain symmetry with Hume's later predominant position of skeptical materialism. Stephen Buckle has written of Hume's skeptical materialism.
Hume's Sceptical Materialism by Stephen Buckle
https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/20185271.pdf?casa_token=cbmMsRzTA5sAAAAA:UbkipmAgRxfwVyFkHUYzY9VZc77g8Kubv4BaGR0SqVJ6Ou81naiR2jwZKSH4M71n8tRg8Dx5chEVoEzxHkXPmYHeUzNH3_sTSz8IgdrksUQ0Sawl_8c
From my perspective, you are missing the point entirely.
That we all 'project' necessary connection or physical necessity is not in dispute. Our minds seem built to do just that. The point is that this is so automatic that even understanding the problem of induction is difficult. It's not only conceptually difficult (but it's too 'close' to us), but it's also difficult in terms of motivation. First it offends our metaphysical urge toward a reliable theory of existence. Second, there is no practical payoff. Since we are going to keep on projecting necessity automatically even after realizing its metaphysical baselessness, why should anyone bother to suffer a perception of this baselessness? In my guts I believe in the 'laws' of nature, even though I can see that such 'laws' are merely 'irrational' expectations. And I see that we simultaneously define not only rationality but sanity itself in terms of sharing these expectations. The problem of induction reveals the 'animality ' of our thinking. When the bell rings, we salivate. But we are more elaborate than dogs, so we express that salivation in differential equations.
I'm not missing the point at all. My second paper contra Hume will discuss in detail the fact we can observe cause and effect and that we can know causation is from physical necessity. But I will not be the first person to write such a paper. See
Ducasse, Curt J. "On the nature and the observability of the causal relation." The Journal of Philosophy 23.3 (1926): 57-68.
https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2014377.pdf?casa_token=ggnTBa3vcIIAAAAA:_IfujdK5d1dYpLjVfdeywH3iR_YU1zbOojcAT1JfUhOHiW_wG4MT2A1RUGGrWBVL03l28UlejQOVPjSEmfXNBkmWlcS3LM3ph4LbVbpq71j1teiXlw
Quoting joshua
No, they are not irrational. Not believing in the laws of nature is irrational. Consider for example the law of floatation. The law of floatation explains why a big metal battleship floats and a needle sinks. Because we understand the law, we can engineer battleships. If the law was not real, and was only a matter of our imagination as Hume says, then we could not reliably engineer battleships to float.
See https://www.reference.com/science/law-flotation-863f4c00172608f
But the problem is this move from 'battleships have floated' to 'battleships will float.' I do not deny that we just can't take this problem seriously. I emphasize that, yes, it is intellectual candy. But that's just what's fascinating. We have complete gut-level trust in the uniformity of nature, despite not having any 'metaphysical' support for this trust. The mighty edifice of science is built on a faith that runs in our blood. I say this as a lover and student of science who also likes philosophy.
[quote= paper]
The uniformity of nature is the principle that the course of nature continues uniformly
the same, e.g. if X is the cause Y, then Y will necessarily exist whenever X exists. In particular,
the uniformities observed in the past will hold for the present and future as well. Hume’s query
in Inquiry IV/ii is whether our belief in this principle is founded on reason or not.
After rejecting the notion that its certainty derives from demonstrative reason (because
there is no contradiction in the thought that nature does not continue uniformly the same), Hume asks whether it can be supposed to rest on probable (i.e. empirical) reason. He argues that this assumption leads us into a vicious circle, and therefore must be false...
[/quote]
https://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/courses/modern05/Hume_on_empirical_reasoning.pdf
Also, thanks for the links. But please just quote or paraphrase the points you'd like to make. I need to know how you interpret whatever you link me to. I could be wrong, but I'm still not convinced that you are even seeing the problem. Perhaps you could paraphrase the problem as you see it. That might help me locate the disconnect.
No. It isn't that "battleships will float" as if battleships suddenly appear out of the blue, but we know how to make battleships float because we discovered the law of floatation. Why pretend that we don't know the things we know with certainty? What makes you think there is any value to humanity in that?
The paper you quoted is describing Hume's thought, but it isn't defending Hume's thought. At least the portion quoted is not defending Hume. Hume thinks it is not possible to demonstrate the uniformity of nature "because there is no contradiction in the thought that nature does not continue uniformly the same." But just because there is no contradiction doesn't mean that it cannot be demonstrated in another way. I'm explaining to you how the uniformity of nature can be demonstrated and it relates to what we call "the laws of nature." We understand the physical necessity of these laws, such as the law of floatation. Once you understand the physical necessity behind the laws, then you understand why it is necessary and why it can be called a law of nature and why it isn't one way one time and a different way the next. Hume never understood the physical necessity because he never studied the natural philosophers like Galileo, Kepler, Boyle and Huygens. If he had, and if he wasn't committed to his skeptical idealism, then he might have understood Newton.
The problem as I see it is that Hume is a bad philosopher. None of his original thoughts are true or beneficial. The problem is that philosophy has followed Hume into this dark place where it is at odds with science. I believe in the unity of reality. That is, science and philosophy are both inquiring into the nature of reality, the same reality. Philosophy has a role to play just as science has a role to play. But philosophy has badly misplayed its role. Now there is tension between science and philosophy. This is the fault of philosophy, not science. Philosophy should be helping science think clearly about the standards of science, about the meaning of scientific discoveries, about new things science can investigate, about how to make life better for the greatest number of people. Philosophy has a very important role but it has become more of a hindrance to science than a help right now. Philosophy will not progress out of its current state of darkness until Hume is seen as entirely refuted.
The assumption is unscientific. If we apply the stipulation battleship will necessarily float, we place our own concepts about the battleship over how any given battleship behaves.
We have an idea of how battleship must behave which will lead us astray if we encounter instances of battleships which behave differently. Instead of allowing the state we observe to set what it does, we come in with out prejudice any battleship must float, simply because that's what other ones have done.
The issue here isn't that I'm claiming that every battleship will always float, but that we know how to make battleships float. Unerringly. We know. If a particular battleship doesn't float, we can investigate what went wrong and then we will know that too. There is no guesswork here. This is engineering based on science, not science fiction or imagination. Why pretend we don't know things with certainty when we obviously do?
But that's the assumption: that all battleships will work like this, such that any which don't float have some kind of problem explicable in these rules. Hume's point is we might encounter a battleship which fails to behave as stated in our laws. For example, a battleship which appears with all the features of one which out laws expect will float, but then behaves differently.
The point is that when we ascribe that battleships necessarily behave as per these laws, we start to engage in guesswork. We guess that all instances of a battleship must behave this way, rather than respecting a given battleship defines it.
It's not that we do not know, even with a certainty, that some battleships behave a certain way.
Rather, it is our concept of necessary behaviour is being stated in the wrong terms. We can know, with certainty, but only when we grasp how a given individual state behaviour. We cannot substitute out the existence of a state with our concepts and laws.
I know that is what Hume thinks. That's why he is a bad philosopher. It is impossible for a battleship to behave contrary to the law of floatation. How do I know this? Because we understand the concept of physical necessity. Hume did not understand this because he did not read the natural philosophers.
Quoting TheWillowOfDarkness
I don't understand what you are trying to say here. It is the last sentence that baffles me. What do you mean exactly? Why would you think that?
That's why he's one of the best metaphysicians and scientists.
He doe not allow our concepts to override the question of what they world is doing.
We cannot have a concept which delivers all information about future states. Hume is rejecting these natural philosophers because they put our ideas above how the world behaves.
Hume rejects physical necessity because it requires ignoring the difference between our concepts and what constitutes an existing state. It must suppose existing states to be given by our concepts, rather than recognising they are they own beings who may or may not behave a we expect.
Hume is not rejecting the natural philosophers, he is ignorant of them. He only read Newton and he doesn't understand him.
Hume is outright rejecting the claim you ascribe to these natural philosophers, physical necessity.
It's not a question of ignorance of concept in the sense of never having come across it. Hume is actively taking a metaphysical position that physical necessity is impossible on the grounds the world is distinct from our concepts, that states are their own author, rather than being determined by what we think they must be.
Can you provide a quote where Hume says that?
Since Hume was a skeptical materialist (when he wasn't being a skeptical idealist) I very much doubt that Hume would be so dogmatic as to say either that physical necessity is impossible or that the world is distinct from our concepts.
OK. So he is difficult to categorize. Yet this directly contradicts your stance throughout this thread that the proper way to categorize Hume is obvious. I get the sense that this too will be ignored by you. But I find it very significant.
Quoting Ron Cram
Antinomies are not logical contradictions; they're two or more conclusions that are each equally well justified yet appear to contradict each other. To me, Hume's greatest antimony, so to speak, is his justification that free will and determinism not only coexist but require each other. But this doesn't make him contradictory to himself, i.e. self-contradictory, this makes him a compatibilist.
Likewise, he was neither an obvious idealist nor an obvious materialist. With both SEP and Wikipedia as references, Hume is commonly considered a neutral monist. This conclusion is not devoid of criticism, but it is what most subscribe to. In this light there are no contradictions in his philosophical works as regards idealism and materialism.
I can't grasp why it is that you're so certain of what was going on in Hume's head. Especially when you characterize him as someone who is difficult to categorize.
I say he is difficult to categorize, not in the sense that it is difficult for me, but in the sense that different philosophers put him in different categories. There is no agreement about the right category. Kant sees him as a skeptical idealist. Buckle sees him as a skeptical materialist. I see him as both even though most philosophers think the two categories are mutually exclusive. Many other people put him in entirely different categories. The most errant category of them all is British Empiricist. The great British Empiricists are Bacon, Boyle, Locke and Newton. Hume is nothing like them.
Quoting javra
Hume certainly is a compatibilist. But he is so about things when they truly are mutually exclusive.
Quoting javra
Neutral monism is not a view that Hume ever used for himself as the term was coined only after he died. Hume certainly did embrace skepticism.
Quoting javra
Hume says that his philosophy in the Treatise and in his first Enquiry are the same, that the manner is different but not the matter. Some people read the Treatise and try to interpret the Enquiry to fit the Treatise. Others read the Enquiry and try to interpret the Treatise fit the Enquiry. For me, the key is found in the Treatise 1.4.7. This is the passage in which Hume talks about his doubts about his own philosophy and then claims the answer is to "doubt your doubts" and "not think" about the contradictions and difficulties. That is the approach Hume takes in the Enquiry. He is following his own advice. He never discusses his doubts or how his philosophy is unlivable. As a result, the Enquiry appears to be less skeptical than the Treatise. And then Hume throws his "tincture of Pyrrhonism" in Section 119. It all fits. Now the Treatise and Enquiry can be said to have the same philosophy even though EHU reads like it is much less skeptical than THM. That's why I'm certain of how to interpret Hume. My interpretation fits both his words and what he wrote about his philosophy.
If you haven't read the Treatise Book 1, you will never understand Hume. You must pay special attention to 1.1.1., 1.1.2, 1.4.2 and 1.4.7.
Hume's claim that the external world cannot be demonstrated? Okay, let's indulge on this.
May I ask what this means to you, if Hume said this? What does it mean to demonstrate the external world.
Thanks in advance.