Is there a logic that undermines "belief" in a god?
Hello logicians and rationalists - I do not have the technical ability for this kind of work, so I figured I would at least drop what I have in whatever way I can, and allow others to pick at it.
I am interested to discover whether or not there is a logic that can be constructed which renders the statement:
as true. I intuit it to be true, and intuit there is a logic that must exist which proves this to be true. If I am wrong, the pursuit of whatever is true is the most important thing. There are a few items I myself see that would have to be clarified and checked for problems.
Does not being in a state of confusion first require a false "belief"? That is - in order for one to be in a state of confusion, one must "believe" whatever is, actually is not, and whatever is not, actually is; to confuse things and/or become confused. If so, I see the following:
If satan requires "belief" in order to confuse people into "believing" that:
i. "belief" is a virtue, and
ii. evil is actually good; good is actually evil (equivalent: satan is actually god)
then it necessarily follows that "belief" is not a virtue.
Would this not be true given there being the alternative of "knowing" who/what/where/why/when/how (which are all taken as products of the conscience following use of its inquiry) *not* to "believe"? It seems to me knowing what not to "believe" is superior to "belief" given "belief" to be the agency required to confuse in the first place.
So:
a. Not all "believers" are confused, but
b. All who are confused are necessarily "believers"
therefor because "belief" (ultimately in something that is not true) is required for confusion in the first place, "belief" is not a virtue and "belief" in any proposed god is actually inviting the very agency (ie. "belief") required by the mythical satan to confuse good and evil (ie. satan and god).
Ultimately I find it reduces down into the two 'states' "I believe..." and "I know..." which seem to me to be like the two Edenic trees. One begets the possibility of "believing" something that is not true (which causes suffering/death) and the other begets the inverse of the former: one does not become "bound" to "believe" anything that is not true, and is thus not "bound" by anything at all. This should agree with 0=1 or nothing and infinity are the same.
If there is any logic that can be constructed from this or what needs to be clarified first, I am very curious to see how rationalists would try to address the problem of "belief".
I am interested to discover whether or not there is a logic that can be constructed which renders the statement:
"belief" is not a virtue
as true. I intuit it to be true, and intuit there is a logic that must exist which proves this to be true. If I am wrong, the pursuit of whatever is true is the most important thing. There are a few items I myself see that would have to be clarified and checked for problems.
Does not being in a state of confusion first require a false "belief"? That is - in order for one to be in a state of confusion, one must "believe" whatever is, actually is not, and whatever is not, actually is; to confuse things and/or become confused. If so, I see the following:
If satan requires "belief" in order to confuse people into "believing" that:
i. "belief" is a virtue, and
ii. evil is actually good; good is actually evil (equivalent: satan is actually god)
then it necessarily follows that "belief" is not a virtue.
Would this not be true given there being the alternative of "knowing" who/what/where/why/when/how (which are all taken as products of the conscience following use of its inquiry) *not* to "believe"? It seems to me knowing what not to "believe" is superior to "belief" given "belief" to be the agency required to confuse in the first place.
So:
a. Not all "believers" are confused, but
b. All who are confused are necessarily "believers"
therefor because "belief" (ultimately in something that is not true) is required for confusion in the first place, "belief" is not a virtue and "belief" in any proposed god is actually inviting the very agency (ie. "belief") required by the mythical satan to confuse good and evil (ie. satan and god).
Ultimately I find it reduces down into the two 'states' "I believe..." and "I know..." which seem to me to be like the two Edenic trees. One begets the possibility of "believing" something that is not true (which causes suffering/death) and the other begets the inverse of the former: one does not become "bound" to "believe" anything that is not true, and is thus not "bound" by anything at all. This should agree with 0=1 or nothing and infinity are the same.
If there is any logic that can be constructed from this or what needs to be clarified first, I am very curious to see how rationalists would try to address the problem of "belief".
Comments (95)
No.
Confusion occurs when someone isn't sure what's the case and especially when there seem to be dissonances in the information at hand.
Aside from that, what you're looking for has nothing to do with logic, really. Logic is about "what follows from what" given certain assumptions, definitions, rules, etc.
In the context of Religion, you could say belief would be 'less of a virtue' when making a priori statements about a Deity.
For example, the Ontological argument for the existence of God is based upon a priori deductive reasoning. In essence, it becomes a play on words.
Inductive reasoning on the other hand, in that context, is considered more persuasive because of its empirical nature (otherwise known as a posteriori), which is knowledge based upon observations and experiences, then resulting probabilities.
I hope that helps...
I don't understand anything you are saying there, unless it's just rhetoric. "Belief is not a virtue" does not necessarily render belief "bad". It should just mean that: it is not a virtue. Anyways, if "belief" is not a virtue is the point, where is the "get us to believe" point coming in?
Could one not confuse good for evil and evil for good based on a "belief" that one is the other, and the other is the one?
Well this was the general idea of:
If: satan requires "belief" to confuse people into "believing" satan (evil) is god (good)
then: "belief" is not a virtue over knowing what not to "believe".
To tie this into:
In this case, god would be associated with the ability to "know" everything *not* to "believe". One can argue here "belief" is a necessity, which can be granted barring it is neither a virtue, nor something bad or evil, just neutral. But that it is not a virtue is the point, because only satan would try to make "belief" a virtue by virtue of requiring it to have people "believe" satan is god.
So treating "belief" as an object (x) and stating satan "requires" (x), therefor (x) is not a virtue. The alternative is knowing (conscience: who/what/where/why/when and how) not to "believe" which renders "belief" absolutely impotent. It should follow from here that any "potent" god would need not rely on "belief" at all, therefor "belief" in a god is unsound.
I'm having difficulties following you. The only thing I can gather from your statement is the concept of logical necessity relating to Cosmology and causation; I guess you could say it is 'neutral' in some sense.
But this business about satan/virtue, etc. etc. I'm losing you.
???
There's a difference between the phenomenon of confusion--of someone saying, "I'm confused," and saying that someone else is confused. The latter doesn't amount to the person in question feeling confused.
When we say that someone else is confused, what we usually have in mind is (a) the idea that they should be conforming to some extent to conventional concepts, and (b) per those conventional concepts, they're getting things wrong in some way, mixing them up, not making distinctions, etc. And sure, we could have in mind that they're misidentifying something.
But "one being in a state of confusion" is someone saying "I'm confused." Not someone else thinking that the person has something wrong.
I was working from this...
which leads, it seems, later in the post to the conclusion that it is better not to believe. It seemed, not to believe in general.
Now, yes, 'belief is not a virtue' does not entail that belief is bad. But working within the context of what I just quoted above and then you're referring to as
Quoting A Gnostic Agnostich
that ratinonalists might address, it seemed like belief might better avoided in general.
I did find the post a bit hard to understand, but it seemed the problem with belief might be exacerbated if people rationally or otherwise tried to get people to belief things, as here you were asking the rationalists to come and do.
Quoting A Gnostic Agnostic
In any case this seemed like a call to come and argue something in relation to belief. If they are rationalists, it seemed to me they might mount an argument, this being something leading to people being persuaded, which would, it seems, in this case, persuaded to have a belief about belief.
Should it not follow that if satan *requires* "belief" to confuse "believers" into "believing" that "belief" is a virtue, thereby allowing one to become confused and "bound to believe" that satan is god? Is one not better off avoiding "belief" in the first place? Is "knowing" (rather than "believing") the who/what/where/why/when and how *not* to "believe" necessarily superior to "belief"?
Would an omnipotent god know this? Why would an omnipotent god require and/or rely on "belief" at all if this is what satan requires in order that "believers" "believe" satan is god?
That is a good point - but I feel this is a part of the intended deception. For example, if a religious institution relies on 'idol worship' to bind adherents to a "belief"-based 'state', it must first "confuse" people into "believing" that 'idol worship' is something they are themselves *not* doing, when in reality they are worshiping an idol. I understand this begs a definition/understanding of 'idol worship', but this can come later. What is important for now is that the "believer" does not actually know/understand they are themselves confused.
This is exactly the predicament 'idol worshipers' are in: they do not understand they are worshiping an idol because they are confused regarding idol worship itself. This also applies to "belief": a "believer" might "believe" that their "belief" is a solution to a problem, rather than the problem itself.
I am looking for a logic that designates "belief" as an inferior state as compared to, say, "knowing":
"I know..." (who/what/where/why/when and how) *not* to "believe"
is superior to
"I believe..."
which may not be true.
It seems a frame of reference problem: one who is confused need not necessarily know/understand or feel they are confused. I think a part of confusion is in the being unaware one is themselves confused. However, one who is not confused can see others who are themselves in a state of confusion, but not knowing of this.
I do not want anyone to "believe" anything - I just invited people to use their knowledge and understanding relating to logic as I assume it is superior to mine, and try to frame the problem I am after in terms of logic. Part of the reason for this is to avoid emotions as the religious "believers" seem to place their emotions before just trying to work out what is true and/or untrue. I do not ask anyone "believe" anything: whether it be from me or anyone else. I am looking for logic that undermines belief entirely.
I think we are going too far: I am only interested in a logic that undermines "belief" as a viable state which pays no special attention to emotions as there are just too many barriers.
No. There is no 'logic' which undermines belief in 'God' unless that belief gives 'God' essential properties which can be empirically tested or observed and that test 'fails'. That is because 'logic' must assume 'truth' of chosen axioms and cannot evaluate that truth. (Godel's incompleteness theorem, although mathematical in intent, has been extrapolated to most general systems, such that the 'truth' of at least one axiom cannot be deduced from the system itself)
1. God is omnibenevolent
2. Satan is evil
3. If God is omnibenevolent then belief is unnecessary for goodness
4. If Satan is evil then belief is necessary to cause suffering
5. If belief is unnecessary for goodness and necessary to cause suffering then belief is not a virtue
Therefore
6. Belief is not a virtue
God is omnibenevolent = D
Satan is evil = E
G = belief is necessary for goodness
S = belief is necessary to cause suffering
V = belief is a virtue
1. D........premise
2. E.........premise
3. D > ~G....premise
4. E > S.....premise
5. (~G & S) > ~V.....premise
7. ~G.......1,3 MP
8. S.........2,4 MP
9. ~G & S...7,8 Conj
10. ~V......5,9 MP
Never mind belief and the virtue of it or not, but rather let us get to a logic that undermines a belief in 'God'. Not a proof, mind you, but an undermining via probability, reason, and logic:
Probability for no ‘God’
0. Note: It is not a factor herein that the Biblical and thus necessarily fundamentalist ‘God’ has been demolished by evolutionary science and self-contradiction, for it still remains to size up what’s left.
1. All that we see goes from the simplest to the composite to the complex to the more complex, where we exist, which will continue into the future, where we can expect being higher than ourselves to become. The unlikely polar opposite of this is an ultra complex system of mind of a Designer 'God' being First as Fundamental, but systems have parts, this totally going against the fundamental arts.
2. (1) gets worse, given that there can be no input for any specific direction going into the Fundamental Eterne—the basis of all, this bedrock having to be causeless, having random effects, like those shown in quantum mechanics.
3. So, (2) indicates that there is no ultimate meaning, not that a built-in meaning would be great, for it would be restrictive, but at least, as ‘liberating’, there’s anything and everything possible that could become from the basic eternal state of not anything in particular—our present Earthly life path being one that is being lived now after 13.57 billion years, much of which can be accounted for.
4. On top of the preceding unlikelihoods, and given that obviously that no Designer made everything instantly, it is unlikely that all eventualities could have been foreseen by a Deity in starting a universe suitable for life. It more seems like we were fine-tuned to the Earth.
5. It’s more OK if the ‘God’ Deity is like a scientist who throws a bunch of stuff together that is balanced and energetically reactive enough but not too much so that it races along too fast, etc., but, again, really, what is a fully formed person-like being doing sitting around beforehand, this also being all the more of a quandary that enlarges the question rather than answering it. If life has to come from a Larger Life, then a regress ensues, making this not to be a good template. As for a Deity trying to put workable stuff together, this is much like the idea of a multiverse.
6. Even worse, existence has no alternative, given that nonexistence has no being as a source and that there is indeed something, and so existence is mandatory, there not being any choice to it. It's a given.
7. We see that the One of Totality continually transitions/transmutes, never being able to remain as anything particular, which matches its nature supposed due to no information being able to come into the Eternal in the first place that never was, for the One Fundamental Eterne has to be ungenerated and deathless.
8. Aside from the trivial definition of free will being that without coercion, that the will is free to operate, and the useless definition of the harmful random will equaling ‘freedom’, the deeper notion of ‘free’ as being original and free of the brain will is of a currency never being able to be stated and cashed in on, leaving ‘determined’ to continue to be the opposite of ‘undetermined’.
While eternalism can’t yet be told apart from presentism, the message from both is of a transient ‘now’, whether pre-determined or determined as it goes along. All hope is crushed, both for us and the Great Wheel having any potency. This is the great humility; all hubris is gone.
It is enough, then, that we have the benefit of experiencing and living life well, sometimes, more so given this modern age, although still with sweat, tears, and aversive substrates of emotions that those of the future might consider to be barbaric.
It doesn’t seem like a smart God’s world, and so fundamentalist literalist Biblical ‘reasons’ cannot apply here, for those went away already. The pride of being special and deserving of reward and avoiding punishment is a nice wish, though, for us electro-chemical-bio organisms who appear be be as organic as anything else that grows in nature.
9. God’s operations, curiously restricted to be the same as nature’s has us not being able to tell them apart from nature's, but which is more likely, the natural or the supernatural? Earth is where it ought to be, in the Goldilocks zone, not impossibly out near Neptune. And why must there be a distinct transcendent, immaterial, intangible, super realm when it would still have to give and take energy in the physical material language, talking its talk and walking its walk?
10. So, sit on a fence and go to church half the time or estimate the probability either way; there can be no blame for not knowing what can’t be shown for sure.
Let us have wine, lovers, song, and laughter—
Water, chastity, prayer the day after.
Such we’ll alternate the rest of our days—
Thus, on the average, we’ll make Hereafter!
When it comes to "essential properties" I find that "belief" is an essential property for one to "believe" that 'Satan' is 'God' (equivalent: evil is good). If there is a property (ie. "belief") that evil requires in order to sustain itself, but truth does not, I find it to be "belief". Else: knowing who/what/where/why/when and how not to "believe" which I intuit there must be a logic that exists which spells this out.
1. Belief is unnecessary for goodness
2. Belief is necessary for evil
3. If belief is unnecessary for goodness and necessary for evil then belief isn't a virtue
So,
4. Belief isn't a virtue
Logical argument:
G = belief is necessary for goodness
E = belief is necessary for evil
B = belief is a virtue
1. ~G premise
2. E premise
3. (~G & E) > ~B premise
4. ~G & E from 1, 2 conj
5. ~B from 3, 4 MP
I ask others: does it hold?
"Would an omnipotent god know this? Why would an omnipotent god require and/or rely on "belief" at all if this is what Satan requires in order that "believers" "believe" Satan is god?"
GA, I'm a Christian Existentialist (some people refer to it as being 'Spiritual' if you like). Ethically/morally, when someone uses the term 'evil', that's a euphemism for 'lack of perfection' to me. I don't 'believe' in a sentient Being called Satan.
I think of our temporal nature and finitude, as all part of the tree of life extended metaphor. Meaning, it removes the ethical/moral notion of an external belief system (Satan) and associated paradigm's. I don't try to make sense of that. So in your context of struggling with that 'belief system', when say a far-right Fundy talks about Satan and his attributes and/or his nature it begs the questions of : who/what/where/why/how does he know this... .
Our temporal nature and lack of perfection obscures our judgement ( in all domains personally/professionally/vocation-wise etc. etc.). And morally/ethically, we take on our own responsibility for our own actions and recognize that intrinsic value; we don't say 'the devil made me do it'.
You've heard the term 'existential angst' right?
If you are using belief as it is generally used in philosophy - that is anything one believes to be true, regardless of the justification (iow scientific conclusions and folk beliefs and religious beliefs are all under the category of beliefs, just there are differing degrees of rigor) - then that is where my confusion is coming in. If someone used logic to undermine belief, that process would include both relaying beliefs and drawing conclusions - that is, more beliefs.
If you mean belief in the pejorative sense - which is generally not the meaning in philosophy - that's a different story.
There are a lot of terms here I am either unfamiliar with or don't share an understanding with, so I will just clarify what my understanding of Satan is so there is less confusion.
I understand Satan as comprised of three parts:
shin - expression
tet - bind
nun (final) - ongoing state
I understand the Hebrew language is comprised of 22 letters which are derived from a single 'form' that, when rotated and viewed from 22 different angles produce the letters. Each of these letters imparts a basic meaning related to the hand position. As such I find 'Satan' to be any expression of being bound (to "believe", for example) in an ongoing (ie. unresolved) state. So this is not a sentient being, this is a state of being that is an expression of a bind(s) in an ongoing state.
As such a "belief" system which advances a "belief" that does not reflect the reality is necessarily satanic, because adherents become bound to believe something that is not true. This is how I see "believers": bound to believe.
I am not following the "lack of perfection" expression you are using. I observe a lack of conscience obscures judgement more so than anything else, as a lack of conscience is essentially what is required for a "belief" to have power. The alternative is knowing what not to "believe" which requires using the conscience to question/challenge "beliefs". Unfortunately this is what people are attached to: beliefs and how I find "belief" and 'idol worship' to be related, if not the same.
Can "belief" not be a 'state of being' rather than a 'state of mind'? Suppose the way one thinks is the way one feels, and the way one feels is the way one behaves, thus a "belief" that affects the way one thinks/feels/acts has bearing on ones 'state of being'? As in one who is in a 'state of belief' as opposed to a 'state of disbelief'?
I am having trouble with "belief" implying a state of mind rather than a state of being.
Is it possible to construct a scenario such that observational evidence is specified, fails and belief is logically undermined?
I am interested in:
In what way would the process include relaying beliefs and drawing conclusions?
Your last sentence is exactly what I have said regarding beliefs with observational correlates.
Well, if you are undermining someone's belief using a process that includes logic (or does not for that matter) you are trying to reach a conclusion and demonstrate that other people should draw the same conclusion. That conclusion is a belief. If I want to undermine your belief in God, say, or that water is two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen, I will present some premises and do some deduction to demonstrate something else is true, or I will try to demonstrate that one of your premises is incorrect. If I succeed you will now believe something else, including perhaps that your premise X is not true. You will also believe my argument makes sense. You would like also believe now or already that this or that type of deduction is correct.
I agree 'being' implies and necessarily indicates continuity.
I do not see 'belief' implying or necessarily indicating "segmentation".
Can one not be "bound to believe" in an ongoing/continuous state? What if one "believes" something that is not true, and they persist in this in an ongoing state?
I don't understand what part you take exception to.
If one "believes" something that is not true, this is due to ignorance which begets suffering. As such there is a correlation between ignorance and suffering ie. ignorance is suffered.
I find the problem of 'evil' is the blaming/scapegoating of ones own internal state of suffering as being caused by an outside agent, when in reality it is the one who is ignorant who suffers themselves. I find this to be ignorance: blaming someone else for ones own fault (in ignorance), which is what I find the original sin of Adam to be in the Abrahamic mythology which...
...all relates to the problem of "belief" and the superiority of "knowing" who/what/where/why/when and how *not* to "believe" which, rather than ignorance, is the opposite of it: knowledge. Thus one who is closer to the truth suffers less and less, until there is no more suffering as one is not bound by anyone or anything. There is a math equation in here somewhere probably: as ignorance is lifted, binds are lifted as they approach boundlessness. The opposite of boundlessness is bound, which is what one who is "bound to believe" is... bound.
I find therefor that knowledge of good and evil is the same thing as knowing who/what/where/why/when, how and if *not* to "believe" which is what protects one from becoming bound (to "believe").
...no, not someone's belief. Belief itself as an agency and/or 'state of being'.
See, the "belief" itself matters not - not a particular "belief", but the agency of "belief" entirely.
That "I know..." is superior to "I believe..." if granting "I know..." is actually known and is not mistaken via "I believe I know...".
If taking 'consciously' as knowing the who/what/where/why/when, how and if ...
is there a logic that could defend the following as true:
and/or is this statement already obvious enough to grant as self-evident?
Generally, in philosophy, it is idea that may have any degree of justification. On the street 'belief' tends to be contrasted with knowledge. In philosophy knowledge is a rigorously arrived at subset of beliefs. You'll find discussions justified true belief, for example.
I don't think it's coherent to say that someone can be in a state of confusion without knowing that they are.
But we must keep in mind we are dealing with the virtuosity of "belief".
If even granting knowledge is arrived at as a subset of "beliefs", this still does not make "belief" a virtue.
Can it not also be said "knowledge is arrived at as a subset of falsifying "beliefs" which renders one knowing of what not to "believe"?
For example can not knowing not to "believe" something and the reasons why not be a kind of knowledge?
I think at best it can be said it depends on from whose perspective one is looking. From your perspective I understand "that's a belief" but from my perspective it is not a "belief", it is a knowledge. I do not find coherence in the general notion that "knowledge" requires "belief" outside of knowing (of) a particular belief(s) to be false and the reasons why.
As a practical example: I know not to "believe" that either the Torah (implied: Bible as it begins with the Torah) or Qur'an are the perfect unaltered words of (a) god, contrary to the claims held by the respective 'states'.
The who/what/where/why/when and how I know this if this is obviously important, but not here. What is important here is this is in response to a "belief"-based claim asserted as true, but is actually in reality false:
which serves as the basis for "belief" in the institutions themselves. It is for this reason that I am interested in undermining "belief" itself (as a cohesive agency) because it is the agency required to confuse "believers" into "believing" something that really is, is really not and something that is really not, really is. If not for "belief" such a confusion can be avoided, and in its place a knowledge of who/what/where/why/when/how *not* to believe.
It's a good question: the relationship between "belief" and truth. I will borrow from Christian paradigm to keep the Christians entertained.
Take an equilateral triangle pointing upward and place "I am..." on the top, "I know..." and "I believe" as the two bottom as derivative of the more basic state "I am...".
When one is in a state of "belief" in say (x), they can either choose to retain the belief without subjecting it to conscience scrutiny (ie. attempting to prove it false or inferior to an alternative) or subject it to scrutiny based on 'knowns'. If what is 'known' is not sufficient to graduate the "belief" to either:
i. I know... (x) is true
ii. I know... NOT to "believe" (x)
one must go and 'know' whatever is necessary to graduate the "belief". If one chooses not to do this, well this is essentially denying the use of the conscience and I understand this the same as Jesus stating "those who deny me deny the father". If a person does not use their conscience to graduate "beliefs", they are not conscience and likely "believing" something instead, which requires no conscience.
I express it in universal terms because I think it is wrong to treat "belief" as a potential particular or object. "Belief" is treated as a universal agency in the statement "belief is not a virtue"... one can also say "belief is not a viable agency...". It is one thing to say "belief" is necessary, which I am willing to grant. But that something is "necessary" does not make it a virtue. In the case of the above, the conscience is what I find "beliefs" are to be subjected to in order to graduate them to a knowledge: of what is true/untrue, or who/what/where/why/when/how not to "believe". This is how I find truth and belief are related: one starts from a place of "belief" and graduates it to a place of knowing.
Really? Hmm... interesting. I understand deception as something that rather relies on the person not knowing they are confused. In fact I find that exploitation of people through "belief" systems rather relies on their confusion and unaware of being confused, in the same manner idolatrous religions employ use of idols while the adherents are confused about what is idol worship while worshiping idols.
The argument is valid but the some/all premises won't go down well for some folks.
I tried to be as faithful to your argument as I could.
I'm especially concerned about:
"Belief is unnecessary for goodness." because you would have to believe in some moral code to be good. We could say, going by the Bible, that the fruit that caused the fall of Adam & Eve was, in a narrow sense knowledge of good & evil and, in a broad sense all knowledge. Presumably these require belief. There's a thread on why the exile of Adam and Eve was unjust.
Another thing I want to mention is that even if goodness requires belief it is essential for evil. This, if not negating the virtue of belief, at least dilutes it to the point of being unpalatable.
Also, to deny your position, I'd like to say that if all of reality can be taken to be series of cause-effects then aren't you overshooting? I mean your attack on belief is like trying to kill Hitler's grandfather when in fact Hitler was a free agent, fully capable of making his own decisions and believing what he wants to believe. Looks like freewill is an integral part of your argument as the way you argued your point indicates the absence of freewill; we're at the mercy of our beliefs.
Richard Dawkins' memes seems relevant too. Do people possess beliefs or are we slaves to memes?
It's not good to have or state a belief when the object isn't known to be so, as it might ingrain itself, as well as that others might pick up on it as true, especially concerning invisible realms proposed.
Note also that in general what many believe can become their 'goods', in both of its meanings, prompting opposing beliefs to be labeled as 'bad' or 'evil'. That there even are opposing beliefs out there can seem to some to lessen the credibility of their own, and then might wish to wipe out the other believers, as nonsensical as that would be.
This seems very similar to your other thread, 'rant on belief'.
In any case, the answer to your question is 'no'. A belief might or might not be correct (and so in some sense 'virtuous') depending on its content. You can have true beliefs, which are beneficial, or you might believe something abhorent, or completely fallacious. But none of that means that belief is necessarily a bad thing, any more than 'speech' might be (as you can engage in either virtuous or vicious speech-acts.)
I think what you're trying to do in both threads is criticize religious belief in particular, for its perceived evils associated with enforcing 'group-think' and dogmatism. Those a fair criticisms, but it seems to me you have an anti-religious ax to grind. But to give you some benefit of the doubt, and as your screen name includes 'gnostic', what do you think 'gnosticism' amounts to? How is it different from 'mere belief'? Is it a form of valid knowledge, and if so, knowledge of what? Do you think gnostics have beliefs, or do they have knowledge?
An argument being suggested above is that 'belief' could be a whole modus vivendi equating to 'being', but that argument essentially rests on one modus claiming superiority (i.e 'correctness') over others which are demoted to mere 'belief systems'.
or degrees of justification, I would say, or at least, degrees of justification that can be shared and tested by many. I've always though JTB should be JB in philosophy. Quoting frescoI thought he was getting at the idea of being without belief as a modus vivendi which is better than having (a bunch of) beliefs. But yes, he seems to be claiming superiority for parsimony in beliefs. A belief that would need to be demonstrated to be true and this would be tricky.
I think the word wisdom would be better to use here. But still the contradiction will hold. It might be better to argue that parsimony in beliefs is wise, or the like.Quoting A Gnostic AgnosticWell, if one wants to draw a hard line between knowledge and beliefs, there are all sorts of problems unless you think you are infallible. And I think thinking you are infallible is a problem. A problematic belief. Quoting A Gnostic AgnosticI certainly think I am better off without certain beliefs. I don't believe that either about those books. And in fact I acknowledge the positive belief: I believe they are not the perfect....etc.
But we are all moving around with all sorts of heuristics, which are a subset of beliefs, and other kinds of beliefs. How to minimize risk at night on street, what friend X likes and doesn't like, what helps in a relationship, at work...I could go on and on. We are filled with and use an incredible range of beliefs to make choices. It is certainly good to see which are helping or not. And to evaluate beliefs we will have other beliefs and tools. This has given us great advantages over other animals. That we have beliefs and heuristics.
So, fine you lack a belief in the Abrahamic texts being perfect words of God. And that might be helpful to you. But your version of parsimony in belief might mess you up in other ways. That would all remain to be seen.
This is not coherent to me... where does it come from? Is this held as an axiom? If all knowing *is* belief, what does this say of ignorance? Is ignorance not required for a "belief" to even be possible? Can "knowing" not be the opposite of "belief" in that knowing what not to "believe"?
If ignorance is required for a "belief",
and "belief" is required by satan
in order that "believers" "believe"
that "belief" is a virtue, and
satan (evil) is god (good),
...does it now follow that
"belief" is not a virtue before
knowing who/what/where/why/when/how and if
*not* to "believe"?
Does this not juxtapose knowledge (knowing what not to "believe") and belief? Is this not what distinguishes knowledge from "belief"? How can all knowing be "belief" when knowledge of what not to "believe" exists?
I think that leads to all sorts of confusions. Knowing what not to belief would still require a belief. Which is why in philosophy, knowledge is considered those beliefs that are supported by strong justification. If you have strong justification for not believing X, then you believe and know that X is not false or not justified.
It would mean you have evaluated evidence and reached a conclusion. And the process you went through to do this is considered well justified.
On the street people often use 'belief' to mean things that are not supported by enough evidence, something like faith. But this leads to absurd things like one does not believe what one knows. One knows it. And since we re fallible what we know today may turn out to have actually been merely a belief. Evidence may come in to change our minds.
Trust' is a step up from 'faith', meaning that you have at least seen something happen, such as morning dawning. 'Faith' adds zero to what is wanted.
I jumped off of the Empire State Building one time, and lived to tell about it because, luckily, I was only on the first step when I jumped. Geronimo!
Yeah... this is not coherent to me. Not to say it is not: if even only to me and no else, it is just not coherent to me.
With no offense intended to philosophers, and based on my own experience (I was in a living relationship with a B.A. in philosophy) I find the institution of 'philosophy' as lacking in the department of creating safeguards such that prevents severing what is practical (ie. useful) and not practical. It is not practical to define all knowledge as "belief" insofar as pursuing a true understanding of what "knowledge" actually is, if anything meaningful.
I hope for the sake of humanity, philosophy as a common practice shifts its attention toward clearly defining what "knowledge" actually is - I find it has a self-imposed boundary condition that would not otherwise be there by virtue of its treatment of such stuff.
From a Western sciences perspective, philosophy's handling of "knowledge" might as well be a "theory" - supported by strong justification (ie. a bed of evidence). If considered the same, a "theory" can be necessarily false based on certain conditions, such as a central taken-to-be-true (regardless of the circumstances giving rise to it) as not actually being true in the reality. This is where I find philosophy falls: once detached from the reality, it loses its efficacy and ultimately will always fall short.
If you changed "evaluated evidence" to "used the conscience" this would be distinct from belief: it is possible to "believe" something never subjecting it to scrutiny (ie. conscience, evaluate evidence, test for validity etc.) it just sustains itself and can solidify and be made immovable (stubborn). Now if you take the "well justified" part, I find this to be the method used. Tried, tested and true - universal "well justified" methodology that acts as a model for any/all effective inquiry.
I find there can be "knowns" that need not "beliefs" supporting them - if philosophy as a school treats knowledge as necessarily requiring "belief", I'm afraid it may be just as severed from any meaningful attachment to the (un)reality as attention received by others regarding (matters pertaining to) it.
In some religious buildings, "belief" can also mean things that are not supported by ANY evidence, therefor things like "faith" (established upon "beliefs") serve in its place. Else: knowledge of the evidence that clearly undermines the "belief" - to which they would not be bound - had they known (of) the evidence available to them, accomplished by way of the conscience having the ability to inquire, investigate, learn, discern and eventually graduate a "belief" into either a known of that which is true, or a known of what (ie. claim, worldview, belief etc.) not to "believe" by virtue of it being known to be untrue.
And this is where I think philosophy is dead: mishandling of what knowledge is. I am not unsympathetic - I understand how difficult the problem of "knowledge" is, as even theism denotes the problem of "knowledge" (of good and evil) as central to human conflict. The idea there is that there are fundamentally only two forces present ever-exchanging: good for evil, and evil for good. There is something to this, but it is not as it seems to many I find. I have contemplated this problem for approx. 4 years now, and just recently discovered how good and evil can be reconciled such that only good (being) remains. This solution I will make a new thread for... it is good that I visited the philosophy forums and am bouncing between religion and philosophy - reconciling them will be easier now that I understand how they are both trying to point at the same "thing". Both have problems, but both are a part of the solution - it will be a matter of how mature people can be regarding the topic.
There's a lot of work on epistemology in philosophy.Quoting A Gnostic Agnostic
It is not that beliefs support them. I am not saying the knowledge is supported (or not) by beliefs, just that knowledge is a set of certain kinds of beliefs. Ones arrived at rigorously.
Unless you are saying you are infallible when deciding 'known A' is true, then it may turn out to have been a belief that was not true.Quoting A Gnostic AgnosticOf course.Quoting A Gnostic AgnosticThis whole section shows that you have not read much epistemology. Nothing you say here about the problems of belief, faith, the difference between beliefs that are not knowledge and knowledge is even slightly controversial in philosophy.
You're tilting at windmills.
Now of course you don't have to take on philosophy's use of the terms. But 1) this will cause confusions in philosophy discussions, here for example in a philosophy forum and 2) your final separation of belief and knowledge entails an implicit claim of infallibility.
But I'll leave you to it. It seems to me you are basing your beliefs not on the evidence.
It does not *only* apply to me, it applies to anyone. But yes - implicit is the assumption "I know..." is not being mistaken as "I believe I know..." (or equivalent) rendering "I know...(x)" and (x) actually is false. In such a case the "I know..." was wrong. But this is precisely what I am equating to the Abrahamic good and evil dilemma: if one eats from the tree of knowledge of good and evil, they will surely die. Please bear with me - I will be starting a new thread on this soon so will address it there.
Oh, well, please send my apologies to "philosophy" for not treating it as an authority on any real matter whatsoever. It may be pleased to "know"... whatever that means.
It is not meaningful to me.
I do not take on "philosophy"'s use of terms - I define my own pertaining to my use only if not commonly understood. I'm still waiting for it to "know" what those terms are, because I "know" the global crisis is related to a language(s) problem(s) - that is, people not having respect for language, words and their use.
Like, you know, "believers" who call "unbelievers" racists for being critical of a "belief"-based religion which divides humanity between "believers" and "unbelievers" wherein the former are persecuted by the latter MEANWHILE vast numbers of "believers" "believe" the OPPOSITE is true, and "unbelievers" are persecuting "believers"? How is this possible?
If satan requires "belief" in order that "believers" "believe" that:
"belief" is a virtue, and
that satan is god (equiv.: evil is good)
...who calls themselves "believers"? And this is the problem philosophy faces - no distinction between one who is in a state of "knowing" (ie. what not to believe) and "believing". Is it unaware that "knowing" and "believing" can be in regards to yes/no questions? Such as:
Is the Torah the perfect word of god?
You can go many places from here, but will find that the Torah is a body of four independent source materials (as in: J, E, P and D) which were later redacted with a fifth. This finding rules out the "belief" that it was... delivered to a man on a mountain? And because the Torah is the beginning of the Bible, we now have a biiiiig problem with the West and Judeo-Christianity: it was built on false claims. Of course it stands to reason it will fall: but by the hands of who?
Is the Qur'an the perfect word of god?
Here we go again - more "perfect" books. What is this idol worship nonsense? The Qur'an is evolved from Syriac Christian strophic hymns which were:
i. not "Arabic" they were Syriac, and
ii. not "Islamic" they were Christian"
that grew into an attempted compendium of the Bible, but oddly incorporating a lot of non-Biblical content esp. from Judaism.
How many people "believe" the Torah/Bible/Qur'an are divinely inspired? What is the weight of the gravity of their "belief" being "dead wrong" (as the early Genesis account might have it) being they are themselves waging the war, instead of making peace? What if it is actually true that the ones who call themselves purveyors of "peace" (never-mind the internal wars... genocide of hundreds of millions) while essentially claiming a book and a man are not to be surpassed in any way?
Ummm, hello? Who is worshiping idols now? These people reading books and imaging idols are doing just that: worshiping books and idols.
It's inversion: "believers" are liable to "believe" the opposite of what is true. Only being in a state of "knowing" who/what/where/why/when/how *not* to "believe" guards from becoming bound to "believe" something that is not true. This I find "knowing" which is actually an absence of "belief" that might otherwise be acting on the being if not otherwise knowing of what not to "believe".
Okay... it seems to me the "belief"-based religions are doing what you think I am doing, which is basing "beliefs" not on the evidence? Why is the House of Islam still teaching Muslims Islam was formed in Mecca when all of the Mosques built up until 730 CE had a Qibla facing an entirely different city in South Jordan? Where did the pilgrimage used to happen and when did it actually change? Where did the Qur'an actually come from? Where did Muhammad come into the picture historically? What time did his life biographies become available (before being redacted)?
These, and many more, all have gravity. Muhammad is now probably a more powerful male central figure idol that male idol worshipers imitate and use to justify their own behavior. In reality, that blood is spilled over criticisms of him should be enough to any half-conscious being that they worship this man.
Couldn't I say that I don't know anything other than this fact (that I don't know anything (else))? Everything else that we know is based on some assumptions that we believe in. We could go run a bunch of scientific experiments that tell us all sorts of interesting things, but all of that is based on some assumptions.
The line between belief and established irrefutable facts is blurry. I could believe that there is a god that is a purple stegosaurus swimming through the universe, but I think very few people would agree with me and I don't have much evidence to convince them. I could believe gravity pulls things down, and we could spend days or years dropping thousands upon thousands of rocks on the ground until we decide the evidence is strong enough to consider it an irrefutable fact that gravity pulls things down. But, still, those rock dropping observations are based on beliefs. The difference is that the claim of gravity pulls things down is a lot more convincing than that of the purple stegosaurus god.
I believe I am a man. -- what's the virtue in this?
I believe you are a woman. -- there is no virtue in this belief
I believe there is a god. -- no virtue to be found. It's nice if you are a fellow believer or if you are the particular god concerned, but virtue? In the action? I see no virtue. It's no more viruous than tying your shoe or taking out the trash.
I believe there is a proof that renders the statement "belief is not a virtue" true. The proof is finding even just one example when belief is not a virtue. That does not make all beliefs unvirtuous, but shows that some beliefs are not virtuous, while others may be.
It is not intentionally misleading, it is due to a mishandling of 'knowledge'. It's the treatment of what knowledge actually is (or is not) that is itself problematic, rendering the enterprise of 'philosophy' fundamentally limited to/by that. That is not to say it is not useful: philosophy can be useful. But it is also limited. I understand this limitation, thus treat it with such limitation in mind.
Philosophy should not feel bad at all in this regard: religious approaches suffer the same. According to an Abrahamic model for creation, there are fundamentally only two trees at the head of it (speaking of "epistemology"): a tree of the living, and a tree of the knowledge of good and evil which "surely" causes death. It too fails to indicate exactly what this tree of knowledge is, but perhaps that is the point (ie. how does one truly 'know' anything? What is there to 'know'? How does one 'know' one knows, rather than "believing" to know? What is the agency of a true discernment? How best to discern?) - to use the conscience itself.
But to bring up again your reference to "epistemology" I am interested to understand your own understanding of what this is, or implies. I will keep my understanding simple:
And so my handling of the problem of good and evil starts with just that: it begins with good and evil, and all things are made possible by them, thus is relevant to any/all "philosophical" discussion that must at least grant there are people on the planet who understand creation as being headed by two inter-locked forces of good and evil. On the outside, they apparently consume each other. On the inside... what does one "believe" to know about good and evil? This brings up the 'GOD' problem, and I will be making a new thread that offers a solution such that solves for good and evil (that also takes care of the problems of "belief" and 'GOD') and it requires an understanding of 'knowledge' which is not exactly in line with how 'philosophy' handles it.
However if you were a "believing" Christian, for example, I would say to you that the solution for 'GOD' and/or good and evil requires an understanding of 'GOD' that is not exactly in line with Christianity - which a Christian might not like, because they are attached to their own institution. So again, this is not against 'philosophy' - it is *for* a different understanding of what 'knowledge' is and observing the entire 'context' with it.
It doesn't matter - it is to no end. I don't find 'knowledge' in reading or remembering things others wrote down. In fact I find that people who are most attached to something that they "believe" in such to the point it defines who they "believe" they are, they are more likely to fall into the trap of enmity which results in them "accusing" others of what they are themselves guilty of, such as...
...this. This is exactly what 'philosophy' is - based on an assumption that is false. This will be fleshed out in the new thread that deals with the resolution of good and evil. Besides, if all 'knowing' is based in 'belief', nobody actually 'knows' what they are talking about, so I enjoy being on the same page as everyone else. Maybe we can come to some sort of understanding on what real 'knowledge' is and why it is important that it be distinct from 'belief'.
Maybe you will find something in the responses that follow which highlights the problem of treating 'knowledge' as 'belief'. I find it to be rather the opposite.
I would say facts are facts that logic requires to make into 'knowledge'.
You can definitely start there: 'I know nothing'.
If you are at least willing to admit 'I don't know' this is the condition required to know something. If one "believes" to know something, they will not seek to know it. It is like a "believer" who "believes" they already have the truth, so they stop searching for it.
This is just one of the many reasons why I repeat: belief is not a virtue.
It is also intentionally blurred by "belief"-based 'states' that wish people to "believe" something is true, when in fact it is not true.
One can have a "belief", and one can have reason to "believe". I am more interested in the "reasoning" part - I want to understand how it is reasoned. If the reasons are sound, the "belief" may be too sound, and perhaps true, but that does not mean "belief" is a virtue. How one reasons something can be virtuous (ie. chess players who calculate moves in relation to an adversarial player 'know' the weaknesses of that player) and a choice made based on this reasoning can itself be virtuous (ie. checkmate) but this doesn't make playing chess particularly a virtue unless learning/understanding what moves *not* to make next time to produce a better result. I find 'knowing' a better move comes with looking for a better move.
It should be less about the "belief" itself and more about the reasoning. I find the extent to which one relies on (ie. attaches themselves to) a "belief" the less they rely on reasoning for themselves. I find people who are less 'conscience' reason less, and prefer to have things that (at least seem to) work just be given to them. The point I emphasize is not to "believe" anyone or anything on the grounds that a "belief" may not be true.
This is a problem of how conscience one is, but I find interestingly that what one refers to as 'conscience' is actually the condition necessary to access what is referred to as 'GOD' - that is, 'GOD' actually has nothing to do with "belief" at all, and rather "belief" is the agency required to CONFUSE good with evil. Because "belief" is required for this, 'knowing' who/what/where/why/when and how *not* to "believe" is necessarily superior to "belief" and has much more to do with 'GOD' than "belief" does.
Perhaps better stated: instead of trying to understand what 'GOD' *is*, rather using the process of elimination (via the conscience) to determine what 'GOD' *is not* yields a necessarily more accurate result because it actively avoids falling into the trap of not "believing" something that is not true. If the conscience is used properly, what one is left with is either *nothing* or *whatever 'GOD' is*.
This is the approach the new thread will take: start with good and evil, and eliminate what 'GOD' is by virtue of being able to 'KNOW' what 'GOD' is not.
The good thing about this is nobody has to "believe" me, or in me, or even like me. They can hate me and see it for themselves unless they are themselves a barrier (ie. trying to protect a "belief" they want to be true).
You highlighted something very important. It is already generally accepted that:
But the statement:
Some people attempt to undermine it by claiming some "beliefs" can be virtuous. The problem here is between 'belief' as an agency and "belief" as a particular. In the former, 'belief' is taken as an agency: the person does not know, therefor "believes". In the latter, "belief" is taken as an object: the person has a particular belief in/of (x).
The point of the argument is that the particular is actually unimportant - it is the agency of "belief" that is not a virtue, therefor there is actually no such thing as a virtuous "belief" - it is better to say there are virtuous people whose "beliefs" reflect their own virtuousness. I'm sure this is related to the body being a lamp and each person being a light unto the world, therefor discernment of what is good (ie. virtuous) and evil (ie. inverse of virtuous) is needed to never become subject to evil.
This may include "believing" evil is actually good - hence the problem of "belief", it is the agency required to confuse good with evil. There is an alternative, which is knowing what *not* to "believe".
As far as my own epistemology, I notice that I use a number of different methodologies to arrive at what I consider knowledge. It seems to me other people do that also, though they seem to, generally, argue that route X is the only way to knowledge or knowledge is only Y, all the while acting like there are a number of ways to get to knowledge and a number of different kinds of knowledge. So I have no specific approach. I notice a more ad hoc approach in myself. And in general I am satisfied.
That is good - if there is attention paid to the handling of 'knowledge' such that there are takes and handles, perhaps the disciplines responsible for this attention to clarity will hold to serve while considering other possibilities.
As to the question - I am not aware of the various ideas about knowledge in philosophy: I only understand things in terms of what I call "first distinction" which is not from any philosopher or school. At best I can only offer a background as to how I arrived at it as a principle of governing all things.
I am bound to know the answer to the question 'from whence human suffering?' I am bound to know this, and in my own experience I tend to approach the understanding of things from an epistemological way (ie. top-down) on the basis of what gave rise to their existence in the first place, hence 'from whence human suffering'. In the past, this was an unconscious process - for example, one of my pass-times is playing the piano, and I would interpret pieces of music by reducing them into a single 'idea' that uses itself to express itself in as many ways as "humanly" possible that impart also the "feeling" behind the idea. For example, if you listen to the track 'Time' by Hans Zimmer (soundtrack: Inception) you will hear a two-syllable motif that repeats. I know the 'idea' behind the musical 'motif' is "wake up", and the "feeling" of the piece is to start subtly quiet and grow into a loud screaming horn. There is an element of 'design' such that it is obvious there is a conscious being responsible for its existence. How this relates to "first distinction" is my finding of the most principle distinctions being inside/outside (of ones self) and whatever is going on in the inside (as in writing a piece of music) shows up on the outside somehow.
I evaluate creation in the same way, and find there is certainly a 'design' element in creation, and myself am bound to know the designer because it is absolutely beautiful, elegant, awe-inspiring, beyond belief etc. I do not have the words to describe it, but do not mind endeavoring such that others can "see" it for themselves and stop suffering what they suffer, which happens to involve "belief".
How acute is your imagination? Can you imagine a boundless universe with the following laws:
i. There are only two forces which consume one another in perpetuity: evil and good, and
iii. The default 'state' is all-knowing; else: "belief"-based ignorance, and
iii. All suffering is self-generated and self-perpetuated (ie. suffered) as a product of ones own ignorance
And the rest is boundless: the default 'state' is naturally all-knowing, because that is what 'GOD' is often imagined as being. Anything short of this can be understood as "belief"-based ignorance.
"Belief" is the agency required to confuse good and evil. If philosophy can prove this true, it would probably overtake all other institutions on the planet in terms of correctly identifying the most prime source of human suffering: ignorance. The "belief"-based religions of the world will never get it, because they are 'bound to believe' whereas others are bound to know things.
I am also bound to know if world peace is possible - so far, the answer is 'no' based on how much "protection" humanity gives to each others' "beliefs" such that they should be respected. No "belief" that can be proven untrue should be "respected" - it should be the other way around.
But one thing is true: the top-down approach always wins. Philosophy has this in its bag, and it should apply it to the Abrahamic problem of good and evil such that it designates 'evil' as a product of "belief".
Even if you replaced the words epistemology with 'conscience', it reads the same, and it is all the same true. People might believe *their* way is the only way - they are just confident because their way worked and produced the right result. As you point out, there are many ways to arrive at the right result, and this is so true it is ridiculous: like a point in otherwise boundlessness, another point has boundless ways to approach it from.
No, it never is. That's a category error.
No, it isn't. For anyone at all. Maturity and age are completely irrelevant. It's a category error to say that beliefs are chosen.
Quoting tim wood
All you've effectively done there is repeat your assertion that beliefs are chosen, along with some irrelevancies, like mentioning that they're considered. I never said anything about beliefs not being considered. They're just not chosen. And then you make a completely inappropriate analogy which I raised precisely because it works against you. When I go into a clothes shop, I can walk over to the t-shirt section, browse through the different colours and styles, pick one that I'd like to purchase, and then purchase it, so that I then have acquired it. I can choose from a range of options: the blue one, the red one, the black one, and so on. That's nothing like how I acquired any of my beliefs. I didn't choose to believe that I live on Earth, for example. I couldn't and can't believe that I live on Mars, or Mercury, or Venus, or Jupiter, or any other planet, even if I try my hardest. There's simply no choice in the matter. And that's obvious.
Sorry for the delay, I have been out and about recently.
I understand the optics might suggest so: perhaps I can clarify so as to highlight my real motive.
In my own attempt to solve the problem 'from whence human suffering?' I ran into the problem of religious "beliefs". I compiled a list of assertions that are taken to be 'true' by various religious entities and tried them for their validity.
I found that there is a particular religious "belief" surrounding a particular book and a particular male central figure "mercy upon mankind" idol that serves as the highest "example" for humanity to be... exceeding problematic. Problematic to the degree of being the leading source of human suffering on the planet. Fundamentally I know this to be true, and feel I could exhaustively advance an argumentation that renders this 'true'. The problem is such "believers" place authority over truth rather than truth over authority and, despite even altruistic efforts, such arguments are met with slander and accusations.
Unfortunately, I find this same "belief"-based religion to be the *real* source(s) of both fascism/Nazism and socialism. It is all coming from one place, but being manufactured behind proxies by making people "believe" these are coming from somewhere else, such as Jews. It is not true and deliberately designed to take all attention away from the real source which is... again, another reason why "belief" is not a virtue. It can be an extremely detrimental vice that "locks" people in a perpetual cycle of blaming whoever they "believe" is responsible. It is possible to "know" who is responsible.
And so, the "ax to grind" is not but for the fact I find it to be the leading source of human suffering on the planet, which is actually the only thing I care about.
The word 'gnosis' indicates 'knowing'. That is, as a stark contrast to "belief". It amounts to being able to "know" whether or not an assertion(s) is true or untrue, for example:
"Book Q is the perfect, inimitable, unaltered, inerrant word of god."
and/or
"Person M is the greatest example for all of humanity to emulate."
A belief can be anything, based on nothing. However a knowledge in/of something to be true/untrue demands the scrutiny of a specific assertion that can be falsified (ie. rendered certainly false). One can thus "know" if/when an assertion is true or untrue.
A gnostic will test such assertions (wherever possible) and evaluate what the implication(s) is (are) if a given "belief"-based claim is, in fact, certainly false. This is what I have done for the religion in question.
If over a billion people "believe" in a "belief"-based assertion(s) that are, in fact, certainly false, this overwhelmingly contributes to the problem(s) of 'from whence human suffering?' given their thoughts, feelings and actions are often guided and/or dictated by such "belief".
This includes waging wars against "unbelievers" for not "believing" in an assertion that is certainly false, while simultaneously claiming to be the ones being persecuted. It is an inversion - one that is not possible if not for "belief". Again, "belief" is the agency required to confuse good with evil, and vice versa. If not for "belief", if even granting Satan were a real "thing", people would not suffer "believing" assertions that are not true.
So, I find the problem to be "belief" itself, but also acknowledge that there is certainly a particular "belief" on the planet responsible for the deaths of hundreds of millions of people via genocide.
Knowledge of who, what, where, why, when, how and/or if *NOT* to "believe" in an assertion(s) on the basis of their being certainly false. This ensures one never becomes "bound to believe" something that is not true and allows for considerations of others who are themselves bound.
It really depends on the person and their discipline re: the use of the conscience. One can "know" the who/what/where/why/when/how and/or if *NOT* to "believe" a particular assertion(s) while having their own "beliefs" that are constantly being tried and subjected to scrutiny.
That is demonisation, which is just the kind of thing that those who you're accusing engage in.
I find your analysis unconvincing and shallow. There are good reasons for criticising the manipulation of belief, but you're not making a case; you're basically stating a single idea over and over again. You're not showing any understanding of the meaning of gnosticism, other than a platitude about gnosis being knowledge.
I could say more, but I sense you're here to talk rather than to listen, so I'll desist.
It is my experience that religious preachers and proselytizers are here to reinforce their own 'rationalities'. Its another aspect of the incestuous relationship between 'word magic' and 'religious belief' which inevitably involves repetition. Shallow 'questions' like this one are mere vehicles for those self reinforcement exercises.
If there is a "belief"-based state responsible for the genocide of hundreds of millions, that is an observation. Demonisation would be using it as a rationale for further war, as "those who you're accusing engage in" would do. I use it as a rationale for ending war by advancing rationale as to why it exists in the first place and what would be needed to end it, peacefully. There is quite the difference between these.
I expect you will follow up with reason...
...and, is the idea unsound? We all know repeating a point doesn't make it true, but does it somehow make it untrue? Would not any true point be true regardless of how often it is stated? I probably repeat it often because that is what it keeps reducing into.
We can disagree whether or not the point is true, which is fine, as long as you have an actual reason (still searching)...
...I don't understand what you mean by "showing any understanding of the meaning of gnosticism". Gnosticism doesn't have any special "meaning" associated with it insofar as I know. It's just a word, like other words. What one associates to/with it is kind of their own "thing".
"Beliefs" are like things - they should be (kept) private rather than forced by way of sword.
I wish you would have - I'm still looking for the reason.
Whatever is true, ultimately speaks for itself, but only if ones is attuned to listen. I find the notion "truth in plain sight" is indeed true: it is a matter of perception. "Belief" is what shapes perception such that good might be perceived to be evil, and vice versa. If even taking a yogic perspective, the entire point of yoga is to perceive the reality just the way it is less distortion(s). This requires the dismissal of any/all internal polarization prior to considerations of the reality.
The removal of polarization is ultimately what happens as one tends towards truth: there is no more enmity, as enmity comes from those who have an adversary as a result of the "us vs. them" dichotomy that "belief" brings forth.
What 'hundreds of millions'? What 'genocide'?
https://www.sikhnet.com/news/islamic-india-biggest-holocaust-world-history
and
https://www.politicalislam.com/tears-of-jihad/
excerpt from the latter:
Islam as an entity is responsible for more genocide than any other comparable 'state' on the planet. It is the leading source of genocide, not to mention the various other atrocities it commits while "religiously" blaming anyone/everyone for what they themselves are guilty of and/or attempting to shift attention away from itself onto others.
But what is in the past is over: I am not interested in playing the "blame" game as I now understand the "original sin" as just that: blaming others. I am interested in a solution that addresses the problem 'from whence human suffering?' and understanding its source is the first step in this. That "belief" is the agency required to "believe" evil is good and vice versa is the problem that this humanity must overcome lest the genocides continue.
The first victim of Islam is the "believing" Muslim by virtue of the facts that follow.
Contrary to what the House of Islam holds as 'true':
i. The Qur'an is *not* the perfect, inimitable, unaltered, inerrant word of a (the) god. It is evolved from Syriac Christian strophic hymns which had Arabic imposed over it, rendering some words/phrases unintelligible unless reverted back to Syriac,
ii. Muhammad is *not* the perfect model for all of humanity. The 'model' of Muhammad was constructed circa 685-690 as a fixed "pattern of conduct" for Muslims to follow. It is based on the historical conqueror "Muhammad" who waged war against "unbelievers" for not "believing" he was the final messenger of a/the Abrahamic god, and
iii. Mecca did not exist in the time of Muhammad - all mosques built up until 730 CE were constructed facing Petra located in South Jordan. As such, Mecca could not have been the birthplace of Islam.
These truths, among others, render the shahada certainly a false testimony contrary to the ten commandments which, if one is to be truthful in their claim to be following the Abrahamic god, must be taken as Potent. This renders any/all bearers of the shahada testimony as certainly heretical to the Abrahamic god, should it exist.
Further, Muhammad (if his historical account is to be taken as accurate) violated every single one of the ten commandments (in some cases ad absudum) such that if one were willing to "believe" that his character is a testament to a living god (himself being dead) they find death in "believing" in him. One can not testify to the character of a man if the man is dead. The testimony is certainly necessarily false, and this axiom of not bearing witness to that which has not been witnessed is potent regardless of whether or not there is an Abrahamic god.
This is why "belief" is not a virtue so much as knowing who, what, where, why, when, how and/or if *not* to "believe" is, as "belief" is the agency required to confuse evil with good.
EDIT - and so perhaps my appeal to the logic experts regarding a logic that undermines a "belief" in god has some context and meaningful incentive to find.
You believe that because you believe you are not free.
I like this response very much.
Perhaps freedom is the default state, and bondage only comes by way of "belief". One can "believe" they are not free in lieu of knowing they are.
People do not suffer their bondage, they suffer their freedom.
Gnostic Agnostic
Interesting, I didn't know there were any sad gurus. :joke: Seriously, though, he seems to be following in Osho's footsteps, and I did have respect for Osho.
That's an interesting guess, but it's wrong. I believe that, like I said, because beliefs simply aren't the kind of thing that can be chosen, even if other things can. I can choose what flavour crisps to buy in the shops later on for my lunch, but I can't choose to believe what year I was born. It's the same for you. It's the same for everyone. Why don't you try choosing to believe that you were born last week? You'll find that you can't.
Organized religion has historically been a rationale for tribalism, and ensuing genocide. But more pernicious are pompous tin pot orators like you, ( the self styled 'Greatest I Am'), who lay claim to 'the truth', whether that 'truth' be given the label 'religious', 'political' or 'national'.
If I believe you used this red herring in error, does that prove your argument right? Or, if I believe you used the argument nefariously, does that prove me wrong in thinking you to be wrong?
Janus said it better than me, as usual. I still stand by my annoying bullshit, though.
Thanks. I'm just the joker in the back of the room, though. Any accidental logical cohesion on my part is exactly that. :rofl:
I don't care, but if you care about your false accusation of a red herring, you should attempt to back it up.
Beliefs, by definition, are what you're convinced of. There aren't any exceptions. That's not the definition of knowledge, although of course you'd be convinced in the case of knowledge, too. Knowledge requires belief.
And it depends what you mean by "revise". If you mean something more than reconsidering the matter, then no, that's false, and obviously so. My belief always accords with what I'm convinced of at the time. So I can reconsider, which is a mental act I can perform, and if I end up convinced otherwise, then I can revise my claim accordingly. But no, I can't choose to change my belief: that's a nonsense category error. It's out of my control.
Uh oh.
Great - thank you for admitting to this reality.
You are describing Muhammad here. In fact, the expression "Allahu akbar!" means "Allah is greater" who lays claim to 'the truth' which, apparently, is that the greatest example for all of humanity is a polygamous pedophile infidel man waging war against "unbelievers" for not "believing" he was the greatest prophet to have ever existed.
I understand that at any given time one is equally surrounded by "evil" and/or "good" such that the only factor which disturbs this is ones own internal polarization. This is how I understand not to see myself:
i. above anyone else
ii. below anyone else
and everything is on eye level for me. And even in this I say: "belief" is not a virtue, and neither am I to be "believed" but the truth is powerful enough to speak for itself. I can only point to it, and watch the worshipers of lies become filled with hatred and accuse of me spreading hatred. If it is inside of you, and I stir it, the problem is not that I stir, but that you hate.
I too care not.
Probably positive atheism.
I don't see why the rest of the stuff is needed?
Quoting A Gnostic Agnostic
Why does it a require a "proof that it is true"? A logical refutation that undermines "a belief in god" would be a disproof simply from positive atheism - of course formulated in some kind of sound argument opposing, but most are too lazy for that, so let's just say "strong" atheism.
Quoting A Gnostic Agnostic
So... atheism?
Quoting A Gnostic Agnostic
Maybe I'm just being tired, but this question fucks me up.
[i]Are you asking does coherent thinking require false beliefs...?
Or are you saying, "is it true or not that being a state of confusion first requires a false belief?"[/i]
If the former, no, if the latter still no.
The latter is essentially most religious people. They are running off emotion to inform their belief system heavily, but they are not all confused, it's just their emotions triumphs rationality more often than not.
Logic does not allow for discovering correspondence-theory truth. Only observation can attempt to do that.
Logic does something completely different. You start by assuming that particular statements are true. From there, you can use logic to derive that other connected statements are also true.
Therefore, you can always logically conclude that "belief is not a virtue" simply by assuming it.
Quoting A Gnostic Agnostic
There is a syntactical problem with that statement. Imagine that S1 is true. Then S2=[math]\neg[/math]S1 is false. So, by pursuing the falsehood of S2 you attain exactly the same goals as by pursuing the truth of S1. In logic, "true" and "false" do not correspond to morally "good" and "evil". There is no such mapping.
There is a big warning in the wikipedia page on boolean algebra against assuming that "true" and "false" mean anything more than arbitrary symbols in their algebraic structure:
[i]There is nothing magical about the choice of symbols for the values of Boolean algebra. We could rename 0 and 1 to say ? and ?, and as long as we did so consistently throughout it would still be Boolean algebra, albeit with some obvious cosmetic differences.
But suppose we rename 0 and 1 to 1 and 0 respectively. Then it would still be Boolean algebra, and moreover operating on the same values. However it would not be identical to our original Boolean algebra because now we find ? behaving the way ? used to do and vice versa.[/i]
Is this intentional?
No, merely syntactically:
S1=true [math]\wedge[/math] S2=[math]\neg[/math]S1 [math]\Rightarrow[/math] S2=false
Because:
S2=[math]\neg[/math]S1 [math]\Rightarrow[/math] S2=[math]\neg[/math]true [math]\Rightarrow[/math] S2=false
S2 syntactically resolves to "false" by virtue of a succession of permissible find & replace operations. No need for using additional propositional rewrite rules.
If you mean to ask if it is intensional logic (or some kind of modal logic):
Intensional logic is an approach to predicate logic that extends first-order logic, which has quantifiers that range over the individuals of a universe (extensions), by additional quantifiers that range over terms that may have such individuals as their value (intensions). The distinction between intensional and extensional entities is parallel to the distinction between sense and reference.
No, because the expression does not make use of special-purpose quantifiers.
Okay. You should look up what a red herring is, though. Because giving an example of why I believe what I do alongside my explanation of why I believe what I do, in response to Janus's false claim about why I believe what I do, is [I]very clearly not a red herring[/I], so you're both [I]very clearly wrong[/I] to accuse me of having commited that fallacy.
:sad: I'm sorry to have elucidated these harsh feelings in you.
You mean elicited, not elucidated.
:sad: Correct. I'm sorry to have elicited these harsh feelings in you.
Well don't be. You're a big boy now. Just learn from your mistake and move on.
Ok you win! Damn, I'm such an idiot!
Actually I take it all back. You're always right; I'm always wrong. Teach me your ways. I'm sorry that I've been so foolish.
And I hope that's not sarcasm I detect.
See me after class!
No teacher, no sarcasm! I really do think you're full of shit and insecure as fuck!
Well how noble of you. Whatever my shortcomings may be, I at least can correctly identify a red herring.