Reasoning badly about free will and moral responsibility
Here's how some people reason:
1. If I am morally responsible, then I have free will (if P, then Q)
2. I do not have free will (not Q)
3. Therefore, I am not morally responsible (therefore, not P)
That argument is bad because although its first premise is well supported by our rational intuitions, its second one is not. It expresses beliefs rather than describing a representation of reason.
Here is a much better argument:
1. If I am morally responsible, then I have free will (if P, then Q)
2. I am morally responsible (P)
3. Therefore I have free will (therefore Q)
That's better becasue both its first and second premises are well supported by our rational intuiitons. So only an irrational person would endorse the first argument over the second, other things being equal.
It would seem, then, that the evidence is that we have free will rather than that we do not. Nevertheless, some are going to resist this on the basis of further bad arguments, such as this one:
1. If I have free will, then not everything I think, desire and do has been determined by prior external causes (if P, then Q)
2. Everything I think, desire and do has been determined by prior external causes (not Q)
3. Therefore I do not have free will (therefore not P)
But that's a bad argument because although its first premise has powerful support from our rational intuitions, its second premise has none. It is just another expression of conviction, not a description of a rational representation. And the argument's conclusion contradicts widespread representations of reason. So a reasonable person will conclude that premise 2 is false, not that 3 is true. That is, this is a better argument:
1. If I have free will, then not everything I think, desire and do has been determined by prior external causes (if P, then Q)
2. I have free will (P)
3. Therefore, not everything I think, desire and do has been determined by prior external causes (therefore Q)
Once more, only an irratonal person would endorse the former over the latter.
It seems to me, then, that the only way to arrive at the conclusion that we lack free will and are not morally responsible is irrationally. That is, by preferring arguments with weaker premises to those with stronger ones.
1. If I am morally responsible, then I have free will (if P, then Q)
2. I do not have free will (not Q)
3. Therefore, I am not morally responsible (therefore, not P)
That argument is bad because although its first premise is well supported by our rational intuitions, its second one is not. It expresses beliefs rather than describing a representation of reason.
Here is a much better argument:
1. If I am morally responsible, then I have free will (if P, then Q)
2. I am morally responsible (P)
3. Therefore I have free will (therefore Q)
That's better becasue both its first and second premises are well supported by our rational intuiitons. So only an irrational person would endorse the first argument over the second, other things being equal.
It would seem, then, that the evidence is that we have free will rather than that we do not. Nevertheless, some are going to resist this on the basis of further bad arguments, such as this one:
1. If I have free will, then not everything I think, desire and do has been determined by prior external causes (if P, then Q)
2. Everything I think, desire and do has been determined by prior external causes (not Q)
3. Therefore I do not have free will (therefore not P)
But that's a bad argument because although its first premise has powerful support from our rational intuitions, its second premise has none. It is just another expression of conviction, not a description of a rational representation. And the argument's conclusion contradicts widespread representations of reason. So a reasonable person will conclude that premise 2 is false, not that 3 is true. That is, this is a better argument:
1. If I have free will, then not everything I think, desire and do has been determined by prior external causes (if P, then Q)
2. I have free will (P)
3. Therefore, not everything I think, desire and do has been determined by prior external causes (therefore Q)
Once more, only an irratonal person would endorse the former over the latter.
It seems to me, then, that the only way to arrive at the conclusion that we lack free will and are not morally responsible is irrationally. That is, by preferring arguments with weaker premises to those with stronger ones.
Comments (23)
This is the heart of the matter for your approach, isn't it? I don't know what a "rational intuition" is, or at least I don't know what you mean when you say it. You've presented it as a black box without showing us its moving parts. Is it the same as self-evidence? I don't think it is self-evident that if I am morally responsible, then I have free will. That's an assumption, almost a definition. I don't think it is self-evident that I am morally responsible. That's a value judgment, one I share, but also one I recognize for what it is.
So, what is a rational intuition?
I came across this in another thread. I think it provides a pretty good explanation of what you mean by "rational intuition." I've never really liked the idea of self-evidence except as, maybe, a moral statement. "We hold these truths to be self-evident..." As far as I can tell, it just means "seems to me," which is fine, but not enough.
First, I think it would be very unusual for anyone to actually think this.
What people tend to think instead is, "If I don't have free will, then I'm not morally responsible for my actions."
It's the point where reasoning stops and table-pounding begins.
Isn’t that just the contrapositive though? I was surprised to notice that.
Yes, and it's what people are likely to think rather than what he said.
You've put the effect before the cause.
Also rational intuitions, although I like them a lot, have on most occasions put me I trouble.
Moral responsibility to me rests on the foundation that ought implies can. If you can't choose freely then there's no ought and therefore no moral responsibility.
No. That something is equivalent logically doesn't at all mean that it's equivalent semantically, re the way that people think about something.
That's a common mistake that's behind a lot of dubious philosophy, including many of the Gettier cases, for example.
You brought it up.
I don't know if it's irrelevant. I'm skeptical that anyone would state "If I am morally responsible, then I have free will" without actually running into that person.
"I'm skeptical that anyone would state 'If I am morally responsible, then I have free will' without actually running into that person" isn't random on any conventional definition of random. But I guess you're using some unusual definition.
And if no one would state that, then arguing against it is arguing against a straw man of course.
Free will leads to real choice leads to moral responsibility. The causal chain flows ----> in that direction and not the reverse as you seem to be suggesting.
From that it logically follows, as in the OP, that we can conclude that someone has free will if we know that they are morally responsible. People with free will are definitionally the ones that we hold morally responsible: those who are able to change their behavior in response to moral judgement.
But "If I have free will, then not everything I think, desire and do has been determined by prior external causes" is only definitionally true on an incompatibilist view of free will. On any compatibilist conception, including modern ones, having free will is completely independent of nondeterminism, and may in fact be dependent on adequate determinism, in that any functional capacity relies on causation to operate reliably in order to function reliably.
So you can conclude"I am morally responsible therefore I have free will" for one sense of "free will", and you can conclude "I have free will therefore determinism is false" for another sense of "free will", but you can't string them together to get "I am morally responsible therefore determinism is false" without conflating two different senses of the term "free will".
Quoting Pfhorrest
No, that's not true. It would not matter if it was true, for a powerful argument does not require premises that are beyond all dispute, but premises that seem to have powerful support from reason - and that one does (hence why so many are persuaded that incompatibilism is true).
But it isn't true. Logically speaking one could be a compatibilist and accept that if everything we think, desire and do has been determined by prior external causes we lack free will. For one could maintain that so long as we exist with aseity - that is, so long as we have not been created but have instead existed eternally - then the condition can be satisfied consistent with causal determinism being true.
So, in fact that premise is neutral between compatibilism and incompatibilism. That is, it does not beg the question against compatibilsts.
Like I say, it would not matter if it did - for it is bad reasoning to start out with a position (be it compatiblism or incompatbilism) and then reject premises that seem unfriendly to it.
My point, then, is that people do tend to reason badly about free will and the form that bad reasoning takes is to form a theory first, and then filter what reason says through that filter.