Are our minds souls?
I am told repeatedly that my mind is my brain, but I see no evidence that this is the case. Far from it, all the evidence seems to be that my mind is an immaterial soul.
When I say that I think my mind is an immaterial soul, I am told - as if I didn't realise - that what goes on in the brain seems to determine what goes on in our minds. But how does that demonstrate that my mind is my brain? It demonstrates only that there is a causal relationship between what goes on in my mind and what goes on in my brain - but it doesn't establish that my mind 'is' my brain. That'd be like reasoning that because the tea in my mug is having its shape determined by the mug, the tea is therefore the mug. No, the tea is 'in' the mug, and so long as it remains in the mug something about the tea - its shape - will be determined by the mug's shape. But they're distinct stuffs.
Likewise, all neuroscience does - and all it can ever do, I think - is tell us in ever greater detail about the causal relations that exist between brain states and mental states. But at no point is this going to constitute a demonstration that the mind 'is' the brain.
So what evidence is there that the mind is the brain? Like I say, I don't think there is any.
By contrast, there seems to be loads that my mind is an immaterial soul.
For instance, returning to my mug of tea. I can see it. Given I can see it, it makes sense - my reason assures me - to wonder what it might taste or smell or feel like. It may not have any of those qualities, but it at least makes sense to wonder about them. But what about my mind? I am aware of its conscious states. But my reason assures me that it makes not a blind bit of sense to wonder what my mind looks like, or tastes like, or smells like, or sounds like or feels like. "What does my mind taste like" is, to my ears, like asking "what does 7 taste like" - it doesn't make sense.
Clearly, then, my reason represents my mind to be an object that lacks sensible properties. That is, it represents it to be something utterly different to my brain.
And my reason also represents those things that do have sensible properties to be lacking in mental ones. For instance, though it makes sense to wonder what the mug of tea tastes like or smells like, my reason assures me that it makes no sense at all to wonder what it might 'think' like.
And my reason also says that all extended objects - such as my brain - can be divided. Yet my reason says no less clearly that my mind cannot be divided. Well, if my brain is divisible but my mind not, then my reason is telling me that my mind is not my brain (or any other kind of extended thing).
When I say that I think my mind is an immaterial soul, I am told - as if I didn't realise - that what goes on in the brain seems to determine what goes on in our minds. But how does that demonstrate that my mind is my brain? It demonstrates only that there is a causal relationship between what goes on in my mind and what goes on in my brain - but it doesn't establish that my mind 'is' my brain. That'd be like reasoning that because the tea in my mug is having its shape determined by the mug, the tea is therefore the mug. No, the tea is 'in' the mug, and so long as it remains in the mug something about the tea - its shape - will be determined by the mug's shape. But they're distinct stuffs.
Likewise, all neuroscience does - and all it can ever do, I think - is tell us in ever greater detail about the causal relations that exist between brain states and mental states. But at no point is this going to constitute a demonstration that the mind 'is' the brain.
So what evidence is there that the mind is the brain? Like I say, I don't think there is any.
By contrast, there seems to be loads that my mind is an immaterial soul.
For instance, returning to my mug of tea. I can see it. Given I can see it, it makes sense - my reason assures me - to wonder what it might taste or smell or feel like. It may not have any of those qualities, but it at least makes sense to wonder about them. But what about my mind? I am aware of its conscious states. But my reason assures me that it makes not a blind bit of sense to wonder what my mind looks like, or tastes like, or smells like, or sounds like or feels like. "What does my mind taste like" is, to my ears, like asking "what does 7 taste like" - it doesn't make sense.
Clearly, then, my reason represents my mind to be an object that lacks sensible properties. That is, it represents it to be something utterly different to my brain.
And my reason also represents those things that do have sensible properties to be lacking in mental ones. For instance, though it makes sense to wonder what the mug of tea tastes like or smells like, my reason assures me that it makes no sense at all to wonder what it might 'think' like.
And my reason also says that all extended objects - such as my brain - can be divided. Yet my reason says no less clearly that my mind cannot be divided. Well, if my brain is divisible but my mind not, then my reason is telling me that my mind is not my brain (or any other kind of extended thing).
Comments (288)
You could start reading the philosophical literature on this and never finish.
To the extent that I've thought about it at all, I like panpsychism. That says that everything is conscious. The rocks, the atoms, everything. That makes more sense than the other theories. You don't have to figure out how a clump of brain tissue becomes self-aware. It is because everything is.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mind%E2%80%93body_problem
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panpsychism
As well as being something our reason tells us directly, it also tells us the same thing indirectly, as I pointed out.
For instance, it says that our minds are indivisible. Yet any extended object is divisible. So, our reason is telling us that our minds are not extended objects.
You ask 'where is it?' That's a confused question. Only extended objects have locations.
How is that self evident? I don't think it's self evident at all. Can you "see" minds? How then can you say that cup of tea has no mental properties
So it is - undeniably - self-evident that extended objects don't think. That doesn't prove they don't think, for appearances, including rational appearances, can be deceptive. But it means the burden of proof is one the person who says they can think.
So, where's the evidence my brain thinks?
Welcome.
I have half a mind to tell you… oh, never mind but as such all matters;…
Soul is theSpirit of Unconditional Love.
Best have that useless organ removed, for it uses most of the energy. I can see that your brain isn't doing anything.
Enjoy the forum, and best wishes.
In that sense, it is not self evident that extended objects don't have mental properties. If they did, there would be no inconsistency with anything
Quoting Bartricks
Do you understand what panpsychism is? According to panpsychism your mind would be the mental property attached to your body. However it also proposes everything has such mental properties. So a cup could have a mental life for all we know. There is no proof for or against that. Because having a mental life doesn't require or cause any behavior logically speaking. It is possible that a cup could have a mental life and it's possible it doesn't, the fact that it doesn't move doesn't favor either of those hypothesis if you believe a mental life is an epiphenomenon of a physical world.
But we don't need to get into one of those pointless discussions about how words are used. For I agree that it is indeed self evident that if all As are Bs and all Bs are Cs, then all As are Cs (for this is something our reason represents to be the case)
So, what I am saying is that it is self-evident - or clear to our rational intuitions, or represented to be the case by our reason - that objects that possess sensible properties do not also possess mental ones.
Why else do we consider someone insane who takes seriously that that their tea may be thinking something?
Why else do most reflective humans - now and throughout history - think that their minds are not sensible objects?
Why else do most contemporary philosophers working in this area acknowledge that it is challenging to figure out how a sensible thing could be conscious?
Yes, I understand what panpyschism is. But a label is not evidence. I have presented three arguments against such a view (you say there is no proof it is false - well, if my arguments can't be refuted, then there demonstrably is).
Here:
1. If the reason of most people represents something to be the case, that is good evidence that it is the case other things being equal.
2. the reason of most people represents their minds to be positively lacking sensible properties.
3. Therefore, there is good evidence that our minds lack sensible properties (that is, that they are not our brains).
Another:
1. If the reason of most people represents something to be the case, that is good evidence that it is the case, othe rthings being equal.
2. The reason of most people represents objects that have sensible properties to be positively lacking to be lacking in mental properties
3. therefore, we have good evidence that objects that possess sensible properties positively lack mental properties
And another;
1. If an object is material, then it is divisible
2. My mind is not divisible
3. Therefore my mind is not material
That said, mind-brain identity position is not as widely held as you make it sound: it is only one of a number of physicalist theories of mind and, at a guess, not the most popular. Moreover, a dualistic soul is not the corollary of denying mind-brain identity. Again, it is only one of a number of non-physicalists positions on the mind, and again at a guess, not the most popular, at least among philosophers.
Quoting Bartricks
Then you should also understand that it cannot be self-evidently false, otherwise it would not have as many proponents as it does.
As for panpyschism having lots of proponents - er, no it doesn't, it just has a fancy name and is associated with a philosopher who has long hair and thinks he's a rock star.
Numbers don't mean anything, it is evidence that counts. But if you're (misguidedly) interested in numbers, then my view wins hands-down. The thesis that your mind is an immaterial soul and not your brain or any other physical thing is far and away the prevailing view among reflective people, now and throughout history.
I am not a philosopher. I am not competent to defend anything I wrote in this thread. Consider it just an idle drive-by post, not to be taken as authoritative in any way.
Quoting Bartricks
I have a distinct recollection of being around six years old, outside playing with a ball. I had a strong sense of wondering what it was like to be the ball. The impression is with me decades later. I do have a personal gut sense of panpsychism. I find it very plausible. As I say I don't know the literature and can not converse substantively on the topic. My belief isn't very strong nor has my interest ever even risen to reading the Wiki page I linked. It's just an idle belief. I have many others.
What I am claiming is that these are self-evidently confused wonderings.
Go into a restaurant and ask about the colour of a dish on the menu, or ask about its flavour, or its smell, or its texture, or if it sizzles or not. All perfectly legitimate questions to which an answer will be provided. Then ask what the dish thinks like.
That's not a legitimate question. You may wonder what the dish thinks like, but your reason - or at least, the reason of most of us - declares loud and clear that such wonderings make as little sense as wondering how heavy Beethoven's fifth symphony is. That is, they reflect category errors.
That's an inconvenient thing for our reason to say in an age in which it is widely assumed that the intellectually respectable view is that our minds are our brains.
But there it is: do you go with intellectual fashions, or reason?
I just told you, didn't I? Why not read something about this topic if it interests you? You might want to start not with the identity theory specifically but with an overview of theories of mind, which will put things in perspective.
Quoting Bartricks
You persist in misunderstanding this. "Self-evident" doesn't mean the most popular. Self-evident means that it is impossible to deny. This isn't just a quibble about words, by the way. You are too blithely dismissing positions without even trying to learn about them. That is not the attitude of a philosopher. At the very least, the fact that such positions are taken seriously by people who are not stupid or insane ought to give you a pause.
My answer to that question is from the ancient Hebrew word: naphesh, which is translated as "soul" in English.
The naphesh is the "will expressed" or the expression of the will. "Voice" is another way to say it, but the English word for voice is a bit misleading for that purpose. An artist speaks through paint, and a musician through music, that is their voice.
So the consciousness is intrinsically a principal in the soul (though not everything, because there is much that we say that does not come from our conscious reasoning). The brain, therefore is the central calculator whereupon the consciousness sits when it does it's work of "reasoning".
But is the consciousness limited to only the brain?
I remember my first experience with a herbal medic who used a technique of "strength testing" to diagnose the cause and treatment for my condition, (which essentially was adrenal fatigue and related unsettlement). She got me to clasp my ring finger and thumb together with all my strength and she pulled them apart with her two hands, to see how strong my hand muscles were. By doing that while instructing me to press pressure points on various parts of my body, she found that some pressure points produced a weakness in my grip that she could open easily - while in comparison, some pressure points gave me such strength like Samson, that she was literally too weak to pry my fingers apart. (It was amazing, I would never believe it if somebody had told me).
But the real interesting thing I have for you, is that when she began to analyse and identify the treatment for the pressure points that were revealing weakness, she put a shoulder bag over my shoulder so that the bag rested next to my gut, and into that bag she placed packets of herbs. One, two, three, four etc while she adjusted the measure to find the optimum dose for my treatment. As she placed them and repeated the test, my grip was strengthened. So that is the art of her medical practice - to analyse appropriate prescriptions based upon the body's response to herbal remedies.
The thing I found most interesting, is that the herbs were not ingested in order to have an impact. The mere proximity of the herbs to my gut was sufficient for the body to be impacted by them. This indicates to me that the mind, or consciousness, extends beyond the brain.
There are other indications too, like having butterflies in your stomach, or tightness of chest, or general feeling of uneasiness, or heavy heart - all of which can be stimulated by an environment, and even before the eyes or ears have detected a change to the environment (as for example someone walking into a room behind us, or that feeling you get when someone is looking at you).
Therefore, the soul (the I AM who comes into the world through our actions), is distinct from the mind (the I KNOW that resides within the body).
.. that's just how I think of the language we use though, which really is all it comes down to when we are discussing these things.
There is also spirit to consider, as another word describing an aspect of the nature of the living.
I am more concerned with exploring those views, starting with learning them even in the most basic outlines. But I can see that you are not interested in that at all.
But I would use the word 'mind' to denote the object, whatever it may be, that has conscious states.
And I would use the word 'soul' to denote a mind that is not material. That is, not extended in space.
So, if my mind is my brain, then it is not a soul, and if my mind is a soul then it is not my brain
Could you explain what a "conscious state" means?
I almost replied to say I would name the body as an object that has conscousness, but I then saw that I was misreading you.
But occurrent thoughts, desires and sensations would all be states of consciousness.
So 'the mind' is any object that can be in a state of thinking, or desiring, or sensing (not that those are exhaustive).
It is a matter of debate what kind of an object the mind is. And I am arguing that all the evidence is that the mind is not a material object (so, not something that is extended in space).
I also thought, while waiting for your answer, that a state of consciousness is a medical description of a brain's awareness of the environment and it's ability to motorise the body to interact with it. (Moreso the former).
Now you've mentioned states of desire as being a mind, that I hear as describing (as an example) a cigarette smoker who is craving and cannot shake the desire until his addictive appetite has been quenched. But a state of thinking appears to be a mood. A state of sensing is not an expression that I recognise. But it shows you have a basis of philosophy upon which you draw your comprehensions and the words rely upon that philosophical basis to some extent, and therein I do not have the same philosophical basis upon which to interpret the same meanings.
Nevertheless we are observing and discussing the same reality, and to that extent we can agree that words like "brain" are not merely philosophical concepts.
But in describing those words that represent real but not so tangible things, like mind, soul, consciousness, spirit, mood, etc, we can work toward if it is constructive.
So I see that the brain sleeps, and sometimes is made unconscious by trauma etc, wherein it does not recall having interpreted the data that the senses detected during that time, and in the case of sleep, it is only to an extent because the brain can be aroused to consciousness by sound, light or touch.
Therefore, I think what you are describing is a different thing than that.
You have named the mind as the seat of consciousness, wherein it's way of thinking then manifests through the body to impact the world. I would agree with that, while also saying that consciousness extends beyond the mind (as I described that the heart and gut have consciousness that is separate from the mind, while contributing toward our state of mind).
That is to say that our soul is the whole sense of self, that includes the mind, whereas the mind is what we think and it resides in the brain because that is the centre of operations for the body, and a powerful computer.
I do not see any evidence though, that our mind or soul extends beyond the body, therefore it is baseless to say that the mind or soul can experience the world or impact the world if it were not for the body. In my vocabulary, I would use the word "spirit" to describe the impact we may have on the world beyond the body, and therefore how the world succeeds in impacting our mind through it's actions.
Evidence includes that whenever one suffers brain injuries, brain impairment, etc., we see concomitant mental changes. There's no reason aside from wishful thinking, usually stemming from religious beliefs and/or a desire for oneself and one's loved ones to somehow survive past death, that mind is something different than a subset of brain activities.
That brain impairment has concomitant mental impairment isn't proof that mind and brain are identical, but empirical claims are not provable, so nothing is going to be proof that they're identical. It's rather evidence supporting a belief that they're identical. On the other hand, there is no evidence to support the wishful thinking that they're different.
I have presented three arguments - each one deductively valid and each one with premises that are far, far more reasonable than their negations - in support of the soul. Either challenge a premise or show that the arguments are invalid.
I am not guilty of any wishful thinking - it is you who is guilty of that, for you just wish my arguments were fallacious and think that's sufficient to establish that they are. And I don't have any religious beliefs, so that's got nothing to do with it either.
Note, conscious states are not minds (as you imply in some of what you say). They are 'states' of mind. It is a category error to confuse a state of a thing with the thing itself. My desk is brown - that's a state of my desk. but my desk and brownness are not the same. Likewise, my mind is conscious, but my mind and consciousness are not the same.
Anyway, I have presented three arguments in support of the soul - three pieces of evidence. I know of none in support of the thesis that the mind is the brain. I am still waiting for someone to present me with some or to show me what's wrong with my arguments.
Just found that. So one thing at a time:
"If the reason of most people represents something to be the case, that is good evidence that it is the case other things being equal."
I don't buy that premise (also, the ceteris paribus clause in it is rather vague). What do you take to be a support of it?
What things to call conscious is the problem.
I came here to be insulted, so feel free. :wink:
Quoting Bartricks
I disagree, I think they are analogous. 'Heavy' is of course applied to music only metaphorically, but that doesn't matter here. The point is that in both cases (dish and piece of music) we are trying to classify correctly. It's pretty clear that the dish is unconscious, while the music is (in this particular case) heavy.
Actually, my wishes would be that consciousness isn't material, that the notion of nonphysical things can make sense, that we continue after bodily death, that things like ghosts are real/that we could become ghosts, etc., but I can't believe any of that stuff even though I wish it were true.
It says "God will redeem my soul from the power of Sheol, for he receives me". So I'd like to explain what I see in this, because it shows that the soul is more than just a mind:
The Psalmist is not saying that God will redeem his soul from Sheol, but from the power of Sheol. So in understanding that key difference, we can see that he does not say he has descended to Sheol before God redeems his soul, but rather that his soul is in danger of being taken by the power of Sheol. So Sheol has some power that threatens his soul, and it is from that power that he says God will redeem his soul.
Without getting too much into the speculative topic of Sheol, because it is speculative and off-topic, I'm just looking at what makes a soul vulnerable to it's power. It is essentially remorse or regret, or bitterness over one's own failings. It is the inability to stand strong against attacks on our character in light of God's judgement. It is when we have fallen into such a state, that we begin fighting against the very law of God itself, in order to justify ourselves and by necessity, to condemn God. It happens because there is no justification in ourselves on account of the knowledge we have, that we have failed to do righteousness.
So the soul is vulnerable to the power of Sheol, not as a command from God to throw it into Sheol, but on account of what it thinks of itself - or rather, I should say that we are vulnerable to being consumed by the power of Sheol on account of what we think of ourselves, and because of that, we are unable to come to God with good conscience. It is that very insecurity that is the power of Sheol, because as I mentioned, we are forced to turn to devious ways to justify ourselves (to escape from being condemned by ourselves when we also feel powerless against it), and in that process, we become corrupted in thinking and when it grows, hypocrisy and denial of truth.
So the soul certainly is the self, but it is more than a mind alone - because in this case, we can see that our very name (reputation) contributes to the soul's strength and character. The soul is comprised of the name (reputation) of a person as well as his mind, because it is according to the person's own awareness of his name in the world, that Sheol takes liberties to accuse him.
The Psalmist writes that God will redeem his soul from the power of such destruction "because God receives him" - and in so saying, recognises that his having faith in God is the strength of character he needs in order to stay hopeful for the day in which his deliverance from the power of Sheol is brought to completion. He also says that it is God's work to do that.
So his soul has come under attack from Sheol on grounds that he believes are ultimately untrue, and he trusts that God will deliver his soul from that power by bringing about justice - clearing his name so that Sheol will be unable to bring any further claims against him. In that strength is salvation (and that is why baptism is at the core of Christian faith). In contrast, he says in the preceding verse that the "image" of the self-confident is destined to "decay in Sheol" when the light of day comes.
It could also just be that what I call mind, you call consciousness and what I call consciousness you call mind. I've said that consciousness includes mind, heart and gut, so if you could say that mind includes mind, heart and gut but that consciousness is seated in the brain - then that's what is happening.
Anyway, putting aside cases like that, if our reason represents something to be the case, then that is good evidence that it is the case.
Why is that true? Well, because you can't argue for anything without presupposing its truth. Try it. Try arguing against it without using an argument - that's obviously impossible. Yet that's what you would need to do in order to challenge it, for an 'argument' is an appeal to a representation of reason (how do we know that this kind of argument - if P, then Q; P; therefore Q - is valid? Well, because our reason represents it to be).
So although you can say that you don't buy it, you do - or you do if you reason about anything at all.
That's completely beside the point, though. For the point is that sensible objects cannot literally think anything, just as Beethoven's fifth cannot literally weigh anything. Thus my mind cannot literally be my brain (or any other sensible thing).
Suppose this is the case.
What does it have to do with the idea that "if most people represent something to be the case, that is good evidence that it's the case"?
Alright, here we go:
Quoting Bartricks
How do you envisage that it might be possible to divide your brain but not your mind?
Take for an example, that you can divide a tree and you will have two living trees. But we do not assume that trees have a mind (though, consciousness is pretty safe to assume).
So a central nervous system (ie: brain) is a basic requirement for a mind in the field of consciousness.
Yet, if your brain can be divided and you would have two functioning brains, how can it be that you will have only one mind? What if those two parts of the brain were located in different bodies and those bodies taken to other places? Would they be thinking the same?
(I also suspect maybe you have meant that your mind can exist in your brain even if some of your brain is taken away from it, in which case I don't think it really can be said that the brain has been divided).
Could you explain that a bit more?
If it has nothing to do with it then it's not at all what I'm asking for.
I'm telling you that I don't at all accept your premise.
I'm presuming that you accept it. Why?
Can't you just tell me why you accept that premise (the premise that you wrote as the start of your first two arguments)? It's a simple question. Why do you accept that premise?
So, here is the argument:
1. All extended things are divisible
2. My mind is not divisible.
3. therefore my mind is not an extended thing
I think you're trying to challenge premise 1, but it is not clear to me how you are doing so. You mention trees and you note that they are divisible. Well, trees are extended objects. So that's no challenge to premise 1. To challenge premise 1 you need to describe an object that is both obviously extended, yet equally obviously not divisible.
That seems impossible for a very simple reason: any extended thing occupies some space, and any region of space is infinitely divisible.
Oy vey not another one of these friggin nutballs.
You wrote this, which I already quoted: ""If the reason of most people represents something to be the case, that is good evidence that it is the case other things being equal."
I'm asking you why you accept that. Stop stalling and just say why you accept that. If you don't know why, that's fine--I'm not going to hold that against you (as opposed to playing games where we have to go through all of this crap to even talk about it). Just be honest and straightforward and we can move on from there.
Yes, you said I am testing your Premise 1.
How is it that you say a brain can be divided, in such a way that you also think it should create a dividing of the mind?
The one I wrote is true, the one you wrote is obviously false.
Why is my one true? Because you can't argue for anything - anything at all - without presupposing its truth.
Just to be clear, for I fully imagine you won't grasp this: all evidence, all arguments for anything, presuppose its truth. So it is as true as it is possible for anything - ANYTHING - to be.
Goddammit, man, I just asked you what "You can't argue for anything without presupposing its truth" has to do with ""If the reason of most people represents something to be the case, that is good evidence that it is the case other things being equal" and you said "Nothing."
If not "Nothing," can you tell me what the two are supposed to have to do with each other?
I don't think you understand the argument. Here it is again:
1. all extended objects can be divided
2. My mind cannot be divided
3. Therefore my mind is not an extended object.
It's logically valid - that is, its conclusion (3) is necessarily true if the premises (1 and 2) are.
So the only issue is whether they're true.
1 is true for the reason I just explained. If an object is extended then, by definition, it takes up some space. Any region of space can be divided. Thus all extended objects, by their very nature, are divisible.
But now you ask me why I think that the mind CAN be divided - but I clearly stated the precise opposite. My mind cannot be divided. That's premise 2!
If A can be divided but B cannot, then A is not B, yes?
You say that a brain can be divided by mere fact that if you cut a piece off it, then it has been divided. The physical brain that was once one piece, now exists as two pieces. But, only one of those pieces is still functioning as a living brain .. what has happened to the other piece?
That premise - the one you're having such difficulties even writing accurately, never mind understanding - says that if our reason represents something to be the case, then that is good evidence that it is the case.
Now, baby steps....so, someone who denies it will have to insist that if their reason represents something to be the case, that is not good evidence that is the case, yes? Now, how....will.....they......ARGUE....for that claim....without....appealing.....to......REASON?
Over to you. You tell me how to argue for something without using an argument. I'm all ears. Take me to school daddio.
What error are you showing me? Which premise are you challenging? 1 or 2?
Wait a minute, are you saying that "most people" in your premise isn't about people collectively, but that it's rather another way of saying, "For most arbitrary individuals, if their reason represents something to be the case, that is good evidence that it is the case other things being equal"?
I am challenging both premise 1 and 2 at this stage.
In other words, you're not saying "P is more likely to be true if most people reason that P," but rather, "If some individual, S, reasons that P, then most likely P" (ceteris paribus)?
The premise I am appealing to has a name. It is called the "principle of phenomenal conservatism". It says "if something appears to be the case, that is prima facie evidence that it is the case".
I know that someone people like labels and think they count for something, so now, perhaps, you'll start to take it seriously. For all I have done is take that principle - a principle presupposed by ALL rational inquiry - and apply it to the representations of our faculties of reason.
Are you an Aspie? I'm just trying to clarify that whether you were using "most people" to necessarily refer to a collective of people asserting the same thing, or whether we're talking about individuals asserting different things. I initially understood you to be referring to a collective.
Me: "I would like a cup of tea",
You: "so, you mean, an arbitrary person would like a cup of coffee?"
Me "er, no, I am saying that I would like a cup of tea".
You: "so you mean that if an arbitrary person would like a cup of coffee, then you'll have a cake?"
Me "er, no... don't worry about it"
We have a room of 100 people.
If I say, "Most people in the room like some band," we can read that two different ways:
(1) A majority of people in the room like the same particular band, the Beatles.
(2) A majority of the people in the room have some band they like, the Beatles for Joe, Led Zeppelin for Sue, Nirvana for Pete, etc., but they all like a different band.
I'm trying to clarify which way you were using "most people."
Why this is so difficult to understand I don't know.
You: "so you mean that if Mr Most People represents something to be the case, then it is the case?"
Me: "No, I said if the reason of most people represents something to be the case, then that is good evidence that it is the case"
You: "Oh, so you mean if Mr Most People's reason represents something to be the case, then you'll have a cup of coffee and a cake".
Do you understand that it wasn't clear to me, and it still isn't, how you were using "most people"? Yes or no
I don't know how you expect to have a discussion with anyone if you won't bother to clarify simple things they're asking about.
Quoting Bartricks
First off, we don’t, we consider them a panpsychist. We consider people insane if they report talking tea (if thinking something is treaded as synonymous with having an experience of some sort)
Quoting Bartricks
Is false. You should know this considering you’re an antinatalist.... What most people intuitively think presents no evidence something is the case. Evidence of something being the case is evidence of something being the case.
Quoting Bartricks
The conclusion isn’t inconsistent with panpsychism though. Panpsychism proposes consciousness as a property of matter. The fact that consciousness isn’t divisible when matter is doesn’t go against that at all, because consciousness is not identical to matter according to panpsychism.
Does that make it easier to understand? And do you see why it is not open to rational dispute?
At the moment I'm not trying to dispute anything. I'm trying to figure out just what the claim is. Are you saying that it has more weight if there's agreement? Yes or no.
Panpsychist is normally reserved for academic philosophers (many of whom are insane, incidentally) who've arrived at their conclusion via careful - though in my view, very bad - reasoning, rather than because it seems to them that their tea is thinking. If it seems to you that your tea is thinking, then I assure you that you're insane. There's what we might call 'rational' panpsychism and then there's 'phenomenal panpsychism'. The former is a philosophical position that some perfectly sane, but not especially rational philosophers hold. The latter is symptomatic of serious mental disorder.
Premise 1 has an 'other things being equal' clause. It isn't met in the case of the morality of procreative acts. It is met in this case, however. Premise 1 can't reasonably be denied. For if you've got an argument for its falsity, then you just confirm it.
One thing is 'evidence' for the truth of a proposition only insofar as it appears to be providing us with some epistemic reason to believe that other thing, which is something only our reason can tell us about. Hence why the principle is true. If you deny it, you'll find you don't have any evidence for anything.
Your last point commits a category error. I am talking about the mind - the object, whatever it may be, that is bearing our conscious states. You're conflating conscious states with the object they're the states of.
Haha, yes but I meant I agree that the dish is literally unconscious (non-conscious if you prefer), while the music is metaphorically heavy.
Anyway, human animals (brains, at the cost of distorting the situation) are among the things we can rightly describe as literally conscious. 'Mind' is best dropped in careful discourse, or glossed as 'conscious object' (e.g. person).
Quoting Bartricks
What about human animals i.e. persons? Are they not sensible objects? I can't gloss 'sensible objects' as 'things'?
I'm not a zombie-denier, by the way. I'm not calling any dishes (or even e.g. insects) conscious.
I'm just inviting you to refrain from turning a property (or class of objects) into a thing. I.e. turning consciousness into a thing, or things.
No, you're not challenging either premise. You're just singularly failing to grasp basic logic.
here's my argument:
1. A is divisible
2. B is not divisible
3. therefore, A is not B.
You: so, I am going to challenge A. Imagine an A, if you will. It is divisible, is it not. Now, why do you think that B divides when A divides.
Me: that's not what I think and that doesn't challenge A. That confirms A. And I said that B is indivisible, not divisible.
You: but help me here, why do you think that B can be divided by dividing A.
Me: er, I don't think that - I think the exact opposite. Which premise are you disputing?
You: I am trying to show you the way, trying to give you my some flavour of my immense wisdom, for I am impressed at scholars who knew next to nothing and so made us stuff that would only impress a five year old, but who do need to be read in the right spirit to be appreciated - that is, a spirit of total and utter ignorance.
Me: what are you on about?
Now that you know that I'm not reifying consciousness, which premise do you dispute and why?
Then why do you refer to your mind as though it were an entity?
The mind is, by definition, that object - whatever it may be - that is bearing conscious states.
When it comes to animal bodies we do not attribute conscious states to the bodies, rather we attribute minds to the bodies. Hence why we wonder what might happen to our minds after our bodies crumble to dust. And hence why we can coherently wonder the same about animal minds.
The issue is exactly what a mind is. This isn't a matter that can be settled by stipulation or by empirical investigation. We have to consult our reason.
I have presented three arguments that imply the mind is an immaterial thing, a soul. So I have shown how, in three separate ways, our reason represents our minds to be immaterial objects.
To challenge this evidence you need either to challenge a premise or show that the arguments are not valid.
Why not just say which premise you are disputing - and just focus on one at a time.
Do you agree that minds cannot be divided? If the answer is 'yes' then you agree with me.
Conscious states are NOT objects.
Minds ARE objects.
Conscious states are states.
Minds are objects.
Conscious states are states of an object called a....wait for it....MIND.
This one:
Quoting Serving Zion
.. if you just answer that question, it will lead to the next, and so on. I will lead you to see the problem.
I said that the brain - you know, the meaty thing in your head - can be divided. I said that all extended things can be divided. This is not deniable.
I then said that the mind - the thing you think with - cannot be divided.
I then concluded - validly - that the mind is therefore not an extended object.
Now why are you asking me where bits of brain might be. I don't know - the last place you put it, probably.
Why? Well, because if an object is a cube, then it is not also a sphere. Thus, if A is a cube and B is a sphere, we know that A is not B.
If an object is divisible, then it is not also indivisible.
So, if my BRAIN is divisible - and it obviously is - and my MIND is not divisible, then.....my MIND is not my BRAIN.
Plus, when dealing with such hypotheticals, it is naturally difficult.
So give a real example. Which part of the brain can be removed while the brain that is left continues to function so that the person can have a mind? .. and more to the point, so that the mind can function as it did before so that nobody can say they have lost a part of their mind?
Anyway, if you're denying both, then you're denying premise 1. So, you deny that extended objects are divisible.
Okay, er, explain that to me then. An extended object occupies some space, yes? It has to. Denying that is like denying that bachelors have to lack wives.
Any region of space is infinitely divisible, yes? If you don't believe me, start dividing some space and tell me when you've finished.
So, any extended object is going to be divisible.
Thus premise 1 is true and anyone who denies it is just plain confused.
I don’t get why it wouldn’t be but then again, I didn’t think that clause had any significance whatsoever and I still don’t get what significance it might have. Could you explain that? What “things” are “equal”. Oftentimes when I hear “other things being equal” it is just there to add words to an essay.
Quoting Bartricks
How so? If most people thought the sun revolves around the earth would that be evidence for the hypothesis? No it wouldn’t be, that doesn’t make the hypothesis true or false, I’m just saying that people’s rational beliefs do not constitute evidence for anything. Empirical observation does.
Quoting Bartricks
Agreed so far
Quoting Bartricks
Disagree. The fact that evidence is as you described (something that gives us reason to believe a hypothesis is true with some epistemic reason) does not mean that MOST PEOPLE’S rational intuitions constitute evidence. I can deny the proposition that having a majority with the same rational conclusion about something constitutes evidence and instead say something like: Only my own rational conclusions constitute evidence, the number of people who share them has nothing to do with it. That’s what I think, I don’t think the number of people who rationally believe in any proposition is evidence for that proposition. I only care about what I see, not the number of people who see the same thing
Quoting Bartricks
I haven’t mentioned “conscious states” though. Panpsychism proposes that the object called “mind” actually exists in everything everywhere. That is not inconsistent with physical objects being indivisible but it poses the “combination problem”, (I’m not sure if this is the actual name) which is asking how exactly these “minds” of all the different constituents of a larger thing (say a human or animal) “come together” to form a unified consciousness.
So back to your argument, according to panpsychism, conscious you IS divisible in a sense, it just wouldn’t be you anymore. Think of consciousness in panpsychism as a jigsaw piece. Sometimes the pieces come together to form a Bartricks but if the pieces break apart Bartricks will cease to exist, although the individual pieces, in themselves conscious will continue to.
Also have to sleep now bye
Your next claim - that the mind relies upon the brain - is false, but it is not something I argued for or against, so it is irrelevant in this context.
To a dualist, of course. Don't expect a physicalist to agree with this premise. They can be quite happy pointing "conscious" directly at people, just as they point "wet" directly at tea.
When you are using the word "divided" in Premise two, to say that one mind becomes two minds, you also need to apply the same meaning to the word "divided" in premise one, to say that one brain becomes two brains.
Else, you might use the word "divided" as you do in premise one, to say that you are cutting pieces off the brain (and the question implies that to only the primary piece of the brain the mind belongs), then you also need to apply the same meaning to Premise two, to say that you can't cut away pieces of the mind.
If you opt for the second, then we have an additional difficulty - such as, we only see evidence of a mind by it's manifestation through a brain, so when you cut away some of a mind, then it doesn't belong to a brain, so how can it be demonstrated to exist?
Quoting Bartricks
Yes, immaterial will do. I will use that in future.
Quoting Bartricks
That's an interesting idea. What makes you so sure of that?
So you think wetness can just exist? Wetness is a property of liquids.
Imagine I go into a shop and I ask for a wet blanket. They say they don't have any blankets. I say "oh, well I'll just take the wet then". I'd be asked to leave, yes? Because I'm clearly mad.
You can't just have 'wet'. You can have a wet this or a wet that. But you can't just have wet.
Likewise, you can't just have conscious states. They are states - the clue is in the name - of a thing. What thing? Why a MIND of course.
Did you not notice that I was arguing for precisely that thesis? So why are you telling me I'm wrong, when you think I'm right - it makes no sense!!
My arguments imply that the mind is an immaterial thing. Not a material thing. An immaterial thing.
What do you mean?
Quoting Bartricks
Exactly.
Quoting Bartricks
Exactly.
Quoting Bartricks
Why, a person, of course.
You've just said that the brain can be divided and that the brain can't be divided in the same sentence.
How many times - the BRAIN can be divided. It is the MIND that can't be divided.
And what kind of object is the mind? Why it is an immaterial object, not a material one as my arguments demonstrate.
"So" in the current idiom, or as an inference? From what?
Not if “soul” is the transcendental object necessary for the source and expression of feelings, but “mind” is the transcendental object necessary for the source and expression of cognitions.
Otherwise....sure, why not?
And panpsychism is saying that every material object has such an immaterial object attached to it. It then becomes a problem how these immaterial objects combine or split up but that doesn’t falsify the whole position.
https://www.dictionary.com/browse/immaterial?s=t
3. not material; incorporeal; spiritual.
Quoting Bartricks
.. no, all this time I thought you were discussing the difference between mind and soul.
Quoting Bartricks
Can you show me that? I think you probably have misread me, and I would like to clarify my wording.
2. Mind is divisible. Indeed, it is divided in millions of connection between neurons. Destroy one connection and you are destroying one part of mind.
No argument can support such a conclusion. There's no such thing as an immaterial soul, except in religious fiction.
Nevertheless, we could only discover that we had good reason to think we had taken such a drug (and thus discover that we had good reason to discount the relevant intuitions) on the basis of other rational intuitions. And so it is only if the principle is true that we even have the means to discover when the other things being equal clause is not met.
Yes, I agree that someone could say that about the version of the principle expressed in the argument - that is, they could deny it without affirming it. The problem, however, is that the principle they do have to affirm still has to give rational intuitions probative force and the fact they have decided only to give their own any probative force is clearly arbitrary and prejudiced. So, yes, someone could deny 1, but they could not deny 1 reasonably. That is, someone who denied 1 on the grounds that they think this principle - if and only if something appears to be the case to me is there any good evidence that it is the case - is true, is simply not a reasonable person, for they have given their own rational intuitions privileged status on an arbitrary basis. I have no problem acknowledging that wholly unreasonable people can reject a premise - they can and will reject any premise. But a reasonable person who acknowledges that their appearances have probative force is going to accept that, other things being equal, so do the appearances of others. Thus, I don't think there is any reasonable way to deny 1.
I do not understand your point about divisibility. Our reason represents our minds to be indivisible. That there are some theories about what the mind is that would, if they were true, allow the mind to be divisible, is neither here nor there. Here's such a theory - the theory that our minds are pieces of cheese. That theory - and it is good to have fancy terms for ridiculous theories, so let's call it Mental-fromagism - would allow that the mind is divisible, for cheese is clearly divisible. But so what? How's that evidence that the mind is divisible? What appearances can you appeal to that even challenge, never mind overturn, those appearances that speak in favour of premise 2?
So, again, Are you saying that it has more weight if there's agreement? Yes or no.
If that's what you're saying, then what does "you can't argue for anything without presupposing its truth" have to do with it? How would that support that something has more weight if there's agreement?
Okay. So what's the support for something having more weight if there's agreement?
Yes. That's what I said from the start. I don't accept the premise.
So, on what basis do you reject it?
It's the argumentum ad populum fallacy, and that's considered a fallacy for good reason.
Are you ever going to explain what your support of the premise is? (with respect to agreement having more weight)
1. If P, then Q
2. P
3. Therefore, Q
Look, put down your book of fallacy titles and get real. Present a deductively valid argument that has the negation of my premise as a conclusion and that has premises that are more plausible than any of mine.
If you can't do that - and you won't be able to - I'll accept that there is a reasonable doubt about its truth.
So your support is basically, "Either you accept this without question or you suck."
Great argument.
If you're not religious you should be. You have their argumentation skills.
Oh, of course, first you need to scurry around the internet looking up what those words mean....
Get back to me when you hit puberty.
Your style is basically asshole with a lot of attitude. It's kind of pointless to pretend that I'd have a fruitful discussion about philosophy with that stereotypical personality. It sucks that the Internet is full of that, but there it is.
I did make an argument. I don't accept your premise. It's fallacious. You have no support of it except for the brashness of "It's self-evident if you're not a moron/not insane." We'll get nowhere like that.
If ten people report that the criminal was wearing a red hat, that's good evidence the criminal was wearing a red hat.
Not to you though. No, someone who reasons like that has committed a fallacy according to you - which means it must be true that they have.
You don't have any arguing skills, Terrapin. Present an actual argument and stop thinking that if you deny or don't accept something, that constitutes good evidence that the proposition in question is false.
Express everything in the form of a deductively valid argument or say nothing.
If all you have in support of your premises is arguing that they're self-evident, then you're basically always going to be preaching to the choir. (Assuming that you're getting simple stuff like modus ponens right after you state your premises.)
You can do that, of course, but I don't know if there's much of value in it. (Unless it simply makes you feel better about yourself or something and that's really the point.)
Otherwise, you need to find more nuanced, creative, fruitful ways to deal with the fact that your premises might be rejected. Simply insulting the rejectors, framing things as if the people rejecting premises are morons who are vastly inferior to your "philosophical expertise," etc., won't do it if your goal is to persuade anyone who doesn't already agree with you.
Or don't take the advice. It doesn't matter to me. I just thought you might have a goal of wanting to persuade people who don't already agree with you. But I guess not.
If you can do that, and if the premises of the argument are sufficiently self-evident (or themselves derived from sufficiently self-evident truths) then you will have provided rational inquirers with some reason to believe that minds are divisible, and thus some reason to doubt whether the rational intuitions that represent our minds to be indivisible are accurate. But until or unless you do that, you're just begging the question by dogmatically assuming that you already know what the mind is, regardless of the evidence.
What's hard is learning that arguments aren't just simple instantiations of modus ponens, or even necessarily deductive.
Maybe try cranking down the attitude a bit until you get to a point where you don't figure that everyone needs to look up simple terms of art?
The argument needs some improvement:
1. If an object is material, then it is divisible into quanta; however, the Planck size is the absolute small size limit beneath which the quantum is no longer divisible. All has been quantized so far except space-time gravity, this effort being just barely underway by loop quantum gravity hoping to achieve space-time quanta. There is no continuum in nature, as Einstein thought, but his theory still holds at large numbers of grains. Also, even the smallest quantum has extension—the Plank size. See for time—the Plank time. One could still argue that the ultimate basis of the covariant quantum fields are continuous waves, but above that quanta come into play. As an aside, the waves are good for a TOE, in that the ultimate basis cannot have parts.
Field quanta are the key to the once mysterious 2-slit experiment: even sending one particle at a time builds up an interference pattern, thus, the particle is a field of waves of energy. Mass is equivalent to mass which approximates energy being equivalent to matter.
2. My mind is not divisible. The objects of consciousness, as what is currently on/in the mind are indeed unified, these called qualia, and are also smoothly stitched onto previous qualia. These qualia match external and internal inputs, mostly, with the proviso that a more useful face has been painted on them. This representation takes time, as so did the figuring of the thought, action, or scene produced. So, then, the inputs to the mind are divisible, at least. Note that systems always have parts. 'More' is always different: one neuron alone can't do anything but when there are more then connections become. The brain doesn't have two hundred neuron connections for nothing—these to be ignored because the mind is proposed to have a separate apparatus and separate information.
Consciousness/mind is therefore too late in the process to be able to do any figuring on its own; it always shows the past, but this does not crush the ability of qualia to be useful, since evolution doesn't spend great expense for nothing, especially that which had so much time and energy invested over millions of years. One proposed usage is that to know and record what went on is best and most quickly done through this self-developed symbolic language of qualia. As such, other figuring areas can then check in immediately or later, expanding on it, if need be, as rumination, deliberation, and such.
3. Therefore my mind is not material. This isn't known, even by itself, and also it doesn't necessarily follow here from (1) and (2). Whatever is proposed as immaterial, intangible, transcendent, and the like as distinct, would still have to exchange material energy with the physical/material realm and speak its language, making it not really distinct. Research continues, but so far the physical does it all. It has to be said, though, that conscious qualia would seem to be of a fantastic process. Unfortunately, it is difficult if not impossible to get at the private internal first person experience from the public external third person.
You're confusing the smallest things scientists need to posit with 'indivisible' things. A common mistake. Take the smallest thing that is extended in space. Now divide it. It has nothing to do with size. It has to do with the fact that extended things occupy some space and any - any - region of space is divisible.
So, you haven't challenged premise 1. What you've done is this: 'sciency, sciency, sciency, science - therefore premise 1 is false". This is metaphysics, not science.
For instance, have you ever attributed half a mind to a person? What would that even mean?
Premise 2 is supported by our rational intuitions and so you need countervailing evidence that it is false. What you must not do is just assume that the mind is the brain and then tell me all about how divisible the brain is. You need an argument that has "the mind is a material object" as a conclusion and premises that are more plausible than mine. Then you'll have provided rational inquirers with a reason to think there's a reasonable doubt to be had about the intuitions in support of premise 2. Unless you do that you're just assuming the mind is the brain - or some other extended thing - not showing it to be.
I am helping premise 1. Nature has been shown to be discrete, by Quantum Mechanics, as in the smallest entities that can't be divided any more. Infinite divisibility is out.
I supported that the objects of consciousness, as qualia, are indeed unified.
You need to challenge a premise of my argument. I'm talking about THE MIND
To relieve severe epilepsy, the corpus callous is severed, effectively producing two consciousness, although there is still the brain stem area common to the two minds. While it is a good relief, sometimes the two minds work against each other in a bad way.
Yes, so it appears, but not all that happens gets into consciousness.
OK, about the brain: we can poke at the brain and then the experience appears in the mind, then repeat it, and then the same.
Let's imagine that Ralph has severe epilepsy. I've lent Ralph $1000. But now Ralph needs his brain to be cut in half. So they cut it in half and, because they're hungry, they take one half out and eat it, leaving him with a functioning half.
Ok, so what - does this half-Ralph now owe me $500? No, obviously not. He owes me $1000. Because Ralph hasn't been divided, only his brain has.
Or perhaps the division extinguished Ralph altogether, in which case the resulting person owes me nothing.
Those are obviously the options though, aren't they - the post-surgery person either owes me nothing, or $1000. They don't owe me $500, because they're not - and can't possibly be - a 'half-Ralph'.
I'd say he put the cart before the horse.
That's an agreed on name for the contents of the mind.
Tell me, do you think Descartes was a) one of the greatest thinkers of all time, or b) a twit?
He owes a lot more than that if he has no insurance.
At first, another Ralph with one hemisphere of the brain taken out, has a disabled mind and body, but, eventually, we hope, as usual, that the remaining hemisphere takes over the missing functions.
He did great by what was known at the time.
No, full price, if that memory is still intact, otherwise…
My good friend and interesting discusser and fast typer, you got it wrong, but you had to, so you are forgiven. No hard feelings.
I'm helping your argument by expanding on it so maybe it can get into better form but still remain true to itself. The jury is still out, not just me, on non-physical notions. In a more final court, the judge may respond, "Immaterial!"
The post surgery person either owes you $1000 or nothing, yes? Because either it is Ralph, or it is a totally new person. It isn't 'half-Ralph'. We may not know for sure whether it is Ralph or not-Ralph, but we know that it isn't 'half-Ralph'. We know that it is absurd to think he owes you $500. We know that it is absurd to reduce your debts by having bits lopped off your brain.
Why do those things sound absurd? Because our reason represents our minds to be indivisible, that's why.
Sorry, wrong again; I could even read his latin. I won't hold it against you.
Res extensa and res cogitans as his way of saying it.
Generally, I'm helping. although in that attempt some reasonable doubt came in.
Now which premise in his oh so dated argument are you disputing?
It's just that systems of any kind require parts, and that those parts came beforehand.
The same as he always get disputed about, that distinct realm can't interpenetrate, plus the energy transfer not conserving energy, plus the way I plainly put it earlier. I should have written it in French, I guess.
I have assisted your arguments concerning the indivisibility of the elementals and the unity of consciousness.
I assume that in your latest reply you're trying to raise the problem of interaction. But again, I don't yet see which premise you're challenging with it, or what the problem is.
You should have read Horace before Descartes, but that's not their order in the encyclopedia.
I'm going to eat dinner, because my mind came up with it all by itself with no help from neurology or my central nervous system or the older neurons in my gut. Then I can pull the cart better.
I can smell the pork cooking, that I set out to have for dinner from the decision and its inputs that only my mind came up with by conscious figuring from a mind that is all one with no parts.
Oh, no, I see that yet another Ralph had his entire brain and brain stem removed. I rushed over. I thought he might say, "I've lost my mind!" but he was quiet.
As for your wonderings about helping, it's all there in my initial statement, which I'm leaving as is. Maybe some other responders can turn it into better form or condense it to a simpler 1-2-3.
Ok. I get what you're saying. Now what are those conditions in the case of natalism vs antinatalism? There is no "drug" that pushes people to have the reasonable belief (though at this point I think the word reasonable is redundant) that having children is ethical. Some parents become antinatalists later although rarely. So, given that there are no "things" being "unequal" in the case of natalism, the number of natalists would constitute evidence for their beliefs being right no?
Quoting Bartricks
Is it? I really don't think it is. I've never cared about the number of people that believed in a certain belief, I only cared about what I thought of it. Does that make me prejudiced? So be it, I don't care. I don't think it makes me prejudiced.
Quoting Bartricks
And you'd be giving shared rational intuitions privileged status on just an arbitrary a basis
Quoting Bartricks
I am claiming minds are divisible, basically.
Re thinking that only your own rational intuitions have any probative force - no, here we simply disagree. I think it is arbitrary to think that your rational intuitions count for something and those of other people do not.
I am not denying that sometimes one may be perfectly justified in believing something on the basis of one's own intuitions, even when they are contradicted by others. And I don't deny that we're often justified in giving our own intuitions some default clout that we don't have to give to others (but in all these cases I would support my case by pointing out that this is what other people's intuitions say too). But to think that, systematically, one's own count for more just in virtue of being one's own is, I think, prejudiced. I can see no reason to think it would be true - you'd have to think that you alone are hooked up to rational reality, that you have some special insight that others lack or something. And those just seem like prejudices. I don't deny they exist - far from it, we have abundant evidence of their existence here on these threads.
I don't think that I would be giving other people's intuitions clout on an arbitrary basis, for it would be the same basis upon which I give my own clout. How's that arbitrary?
Yes, but a claim is not evidence. Our reason represents minds to be indivisible. That's why it makes no sense to attribute half a mind to someone. That's why I can't reduce my debts by lopping bits off myself. And so on. So, my premise has support from our rational representations. By contrast, when you deny it all you offer as 'evidence' is that certain theories would permit it. Well yes, but that's not evidence. Far from it - it means you're rejecting my premise not on the basis of reason, but because it conflicts with your favourite theory. Your theory is now unfalsifiable.
You need first to show that your theory is described by the conclusion of an argument that has stronger - that is, more self-evidently true - premises than the ones that entail my theory. Once you've done that, then I think you'd have some grounds for citing my premise's incompatibility with your theory as some kind of evidence that the premise is false. But not otherwise.
1. If everything I think, desire and do is the causal product of prior causes and/or indeterministic chance, then I am not morally responsible for anything I think, desire and do.
2. I am morally responsible for some of what I think, desire and do.
3. Therefore (from 1 and 2), not everything I think, desire and do is the causal product of prior causes and/or indeterministic chance.
4. If I am a material object, then everything I think, desire and do is the causal product of prior causes and/or indeterministic chance
5. Therefore (from 3 and 4), I am not a material object
If I am not a material object, then I must be an immaterial one, for that's the only alternative.
[i]1. If everything I think, desire and do is the causal product of prior causes and/or indeterministic chance, then I am not morally responsible for anything I think, desire and do.[/I]
True, and then, further, you were never responsible at any time for what you became, this being regardless of any religious, moral, court rules deeming you as responsible.
2. I am morally responsible for some of what I think, desire and do.
Not shown; you would have to undo (1) to the complete satisfaction to all.
[i]3. Therefore (from 1 and 2), not everything I think, desire and do is the causal product of prior causes and/or indeterministic chance.[/I]
No more 'therefore'. Again, the means need to be provided, not just that it is felt.
[i]4. If I am a material object, then everything I think, desire and do is the causal product of prior causes and/or indeterministic chance[/I]
True..
[i]5. Therefore (from 3 and 4), I am not a material object[/I]
'Therefore' didn't follow.
[i]If I am not a material object, then I must be an immaterial one, for that's the only alternative.[/I]
True, as kind of a ghost, soul mind in a realm distinct from the material that still talks the talk and walks the walk of the immaterial at every instant to communicate with it.
Should the mind be immaterial, what are the implications, if any?
You have acknowledged that 1 is true. So you need to deny 2 if you're going to block the conclusion.
Now on what basis do you deny 2?
Don't say '1'. Premise 1 does not entail that 2 is false. You need to add another premise to 1 in order to get the negation of premise 2. You need to add this:
Premise 2* Everything I think, desire and do is the product of prior causes and/or indeterministic chance.
What evidence do you have that premise 2* is true?
Yes, but to apply as a real life exercise it as true you need to show it. I could violate that too and just assert that (2) is false using the same liberty as you asserting it's true.
All I have to do is assert it in the same question begging way that you do, to match your style, but ungrounded assertions will be challenged.
Should the mind be immaterial, what are the implications, if any? A spirit of life evolved? Does that make some difference?
By contrast, 2 + 3 = 6 is not self-evidently true. virtually no-one gets that rational intuition (and those that do are technically referred to as 'stupid' - meaning, they're not very well hooked-up to reason).
Stop thinking you can make stuff up and thereby make it true. You can't. Be honest: it is self-evident to you that 2 + 3 = 5. It is not self-evident to you that 2 + 3 = 6.
It is self-evident to virtually everyone that premise 1 of my argument is true. It is self-evident to virtually everyone that premise 2 is true. It is self-evident to virtually everyone who has the power of reason and reflection that this argument is valid:
1. If P, then Q
2. not Q
3. Therefore not P
My argument had that form. join the dots.
And no, if the argument I have just presented is sound (and it is) then we did not evolve, but always existed. Likewise if the argument from divisibility is sound (and it is).
Then you should put that in since it is surely true.
Quoting Bartricks
No, it is more that you will be held morally responsible because you're the one who did it.
I give neither blame nor credit for the will doing what it means to do.
The point is that you can't make someone morally responsible by holding them morally responsible. We hold people morally responsible because they appear to us to be morally responsible. That's why we try hard not to punish innocent people.
Yes, much 'appears to us' in our second story as formed from the non-apparent neurological boiler room on the first storey, but luckily science and its instruments have long since informed us.
Assumptions either way are out, as not being for sure, we thus having to remain agnostic to the free or not of the will.
Probabilities and self-contradictions can still be applied if they are good ones, for estimation.
If there is a lot of good evidence that James did the crime, and none that he didn't, then you're not reasonably if you continue to assume that it is just as likely that someone else did it as he did.
You're dogmatically committed, it would seem, to the view that we do not know what the mind is. So committed that no matter how much evidence someone provides you that the mind is an immaterial thing, you're going to reject it because it conflicts with your thesis - a thesis for which you can provide no evidence whatever -that we don't know the mind is.
Someone who, unable to raise an objection to those arguments beyond simply noting that they have conclusions they do not believe in, still persists in believing that the mind is the brain - or that we do not know what the mind is - is a dogmatist, plain and simple.
Following reason means something - it means drawing the conclusions she bids you draw.
No, not analogous.
evidence = it appears to us that…
Four independent witnesses come forward and say "James did it".
You can't raise a reasonable doubt about any of the arguments, and you can't raise a reasonable doubt about the probative force of those witnesses' statements - yet you persist in thinking that it is as likely someone else did it as James did it. That makes you an appalling detective. And it makes you a bad philosopher.
Analogous would be that we don't have any other evidence than somehow the notion only appears to us, and that's it, no blood, no fingerprints, no camera, not anything.
That's right, no clues, no detective work, but only a mind appearance notion.
OK, you assert that the mind instantly manages every thought and decision in real time, replete with memories looked up and all such figuring of relation between. So now you can show it for sure, due to appearances.
I'm going to sleep soon; be well and enjoy. You are a good responder.
Or not. This would need support. It is a good argument for cornering determinists who don't want to grant this as false.
If they do grant both then, yes, three follow.
that seems true but there needs to be more put in. I don't think there is any clear definition of material or physical anymore. So we would need a definition of material. If one is arguing with most determinists, they will merely grant this, of course.
Or you are a mixed object, it would seem, unless you are arguing that humans are not material in any way. Now you may have meant 'I' is mind or soul, in this last sentence. But still if we go back to 3 it is 'not everthing is determined' which seems to indicate a potential mix of being partially determined or determined on occasion. Like when the doctor taps your reflex points, say. Unless that isn't you moving your leg in response. And then we need to wonder about the interactin between this immaterial self and the body. If bodies are material, which they seem to be. Two also needs to show what morally responsible means, unless it is granted by the opposition. If i choose to do X, not caused by love, empathy, hatred or rationality. Not caused by anything, I am not sure that is moral behavior. I don't know what it is. It seems to me moral behavior would either come from feelings or have certain goals, so these become causal.
It is implicit in the argument that moral choosing exists. I don't know what that would be if it is not caused by wanting to do good or by values that create motivations, the motivations to live up to values being again causes and determining choices.
It seems to me there is a lot to unravel, though ti might be an effective argument in relation to people who want to just accept two and one, and find themselves in a bind to avoid the rest.
Some people like Sperry believe a divided brain creates two individual minds each with consciousness. Like the split brain experiments, what do you say about that?
Any region of space is divisible per what? That's not the conventional wisdom in the sciences.
I could then say that most humans will get the intuition that their tea isn’t conscious due to environmental programming. Threatening to call someone mad is environmental programming no? Not really a logical argument. So I can then use your first premise to refute your second premise using the “all things considered” clause.
Quoting Bartricks
And to think that others’ intuitions count more is just as prejudiced and arbitrary.
Quoting Bartricks
There is no logical reason to assume shared intuitions are to constitute evidence for any hypothesis. Everyone thought the earth was flat for the longest time so was that “evidence”? Absolutely not
Quoting Bartricks
Does it? One could easily claim that minds are divisible but don’t retain memory once divided for example. That’s perfectly reasonable. In fact there is nothing “reasonable” or “logical” in claiming minds are indivisible, reason is only concerned with you to treat premises not with which premises to select
Quoting Bartricks
No I’m not. I’m saying it is just as unsupported as an alternative premise that would lead to very different conclusions. Also, I don’t really have “my theory” when it comes to this yet. I’m just using panpsychism as an example
Quoting Bartricks
I’m saying the first premise to your first 2 arguments isn’t unsupported and the second one to your third is debatable.
Well, they did, and so the bubble is bursting.
In short, for starters, some like you have suggested that consciousness itself is causal, due to common sense impressions, but consciousness is not a thing, as either a material or immaterial entity. It is rather that consciousness accompanies particular brain events—it is a process that is entailed by these material brain events. Only matter/energy can be causal, and so those events are part of the physical world, and that world is thus causally closed.
We need not conclude that consciousness/qualia is useless, for its states are informational, as indicated earlier, even if not causal, as they are the discriminations entailed by causal transactions among neural activity states in a fine and useful symbol language.
Because qualia states and neural activity states are coherent, in certain contexts it is still useful to talk of qualia as standing for neural activity , and at higher levels of description, it is all the more convenient to talk as if consciousness/qualia is causal as long as no confusion results about the true causes that arise in the neural system.
Re what you say about premise 2 - it has considerable support. Like I say, the reason of virtually everyone represents it to be true. If that isn't support I don't know what is.
That does not mean that premise 2 is true beyond all doubt, but the burden of proof is squarely on those who would deny it to provide countervailing evidence.
Some are, though. A good case exists for thinking that rational intuitions that represent procreation to be ethical are wholly a product of environmental programming. I don't think a similar case exists for thinking that any of the intuitions I am appealing to above are wholly a product of environmental programming. But anyway, while the burden of proof would be on me to discredit the widespread rational intuitions that procreation is ethical (a burden I think can be discharged), if you want to argue that the any of the rational intuitions I am appealing to here lack credibility due to being a product of environment programming, then the burden of proof is squarely on you. And you don't discharge it by saying "I can say that they are the product of environmental programming' - for, yes, of course you can 'say' it, but you need to 'show' it. Brute possibilities are not evidence.
To stop this post getting too long, I will respond to the rest of what you said in another one.
I think someone who insists that their rational intuitions count and nobody else's do is wholly unreasonable and prejudiced. They really must think that they, and they alone, are hooked up to rational reality, and they can - by their own lights - have no better reason to think this than that they think it.
I am interested in what's true - so I am interested in what my mind actually is - not in persuading prejudiced people who have no interest in objectively weighing the evidence of something. The fact an argument fails to persuade a person like that is never going to be to the discredit of the argument.
Like I say, you need to provide an independent argument for the thesis that my mind is not a soul, and that argument needs to have premises that are more self-evidently true than mine. Then you would have a rational basis for rejecting one of my premises, but ortherwise all you're doing is saying one of my premises is false because it is inconsistent with your theory.
My premise is inconsistent with a billion theories. A trillion. That's not evidence it is false until or unless there's better evidence that the theory in question is true than there is that my premise is true.
Plus, the 'problem' is not explaining how meat can be conscious. The problem is that we have rational intuitions that represent all material things to be lacking in mental properties. And it's not a problem, unless you've started out assuming that we're material things.
Quoting BartricksIt's support in the sense that it may make the argument interpersonally effective, but other than that this is an ad populum argument, so far.Quoting BartricksYou haven't provided any evidence, you have said that people believe it, or think that way. IOW if this was strong evidence than it means theism is the default and even is evidence though less, that Kim Khardishan has important things to say.Quoting BartricksMy tack is to argue that the term material object, or the adjectives material and physical, no longer have any meaning. They used to mean things, like stones and chairs, but now the refer to massless particles, fields, things that have more than one in the same place, particles in superposition, neutrinos passing as we speak in their trillions right through the earth and so on. Whatever scientists consider real, they will call physical or material, regardless of the qualities. It is a set that is expanding not just in what it contains but in the types of things it contains, regardless of qualities or the lack thereof. So to me the whole debate about material/immaterial has a problematic ground since one of the two categories's criteria are expanding and are not fixed and has become synonymous with real. I think medieval theologians on hearing the characteristics of neurtrinos, let alone even less physicallike 'things' now considered physical, might very well have said 'oh, well with your use of the term, perhaps angels are physical, it's just they can fly right through the earth also.'
No, it isn't. All cases for anything appeal to rational appearances - to rational intuitions. Not beliefs, note. it is fallacious to think that you can make something true by getting enough people to believe it. But my claim is that the reason - a faculty - of most people represents it to be true. Which is stunningly good evidence - the best you're ever going to have for anything, for all appeals to evidence are appeals to reason - for anything.
Otherwise we just have default truths and the sense of the onus changing like fashion.
And one can still want to live as if there is moral responsibility or that it is part of determinsm, as a felt process. Even if I think I am determined, I could still want to regret certain acts, improve my social relations, do things that I consider good to my fellow humans. All those feelings can still continue.
Most people have not reasoned their way to moral responsibility, they have assumed it.
There are a lot of folk beliefs, like folk beliefs in psychology that are not the case, despite their popularity.
Like I say, I'm not in a position to defend panpsychism intellectually, since I haven't studied the literature. It's just a personal belief, and one not strongly held.
The claim is that if the reason of most people represents a proposition - p - to be true, then other things being equal that is good evidence that p is true.
What is a rational appearance? Well, just as there are visual and tactile appearances, so too there are rational ones. For instance, how do you know that there cannot exist any square circles? Because your reason and the reason of virtually everyone represents such things to be impossible.
All attempts to argue for anything - so all appeals to evidence - are ultimately appeals to rational appearances.
Anyone who rejects my premise on the grounds that rational appearances have no probative force will - by hypothesis - be rejecting it on no rational basis or being inconsistent.
Why do so many recognise that there is a problem explaining how extended things can be conscious? Well, because the reason of virtually everyone represents extended things to be positively lacking in mental states, and the reason of virtually everyone represents their own minds to be positively lacking in the kinds of properties characteristic of extended things.
Note, however, that to even think this is a 'problem' is to have assumed that our minds are extended things. I think it is perverse to think it is a problem. Why not just follow reason and conclude that our minds are not extended objects?
As to your claim that we reason our way to thinking we have free will - what is that reasoning process? And on what basis do you make this claim? It sounds like a conspiracy theory.
Did you just decide you have free will? Or does your reason represent you to have it?
Quoting BartricksOr is it an illusory byproduct?
What appears as going on 'now' to us is like a slightly tape-delayed broadcast. Who's going to notice that?
If that is correct, no premise of my argument is called into question by the fact that, at one time, a lot of people falsely believed that the earth is flat.
I did explain how I use the term belief. It is any conclusion about the world via whatever epistemological process: deduction, intuition, popularity, science, religion, common sense. It is neither a negative nor a postive term, just a category. If someone thinks we should treat idea A as true, they believe A is true.Quoting BartricksI see most people sending out mixed messages about their free will. Sometimes they talk about themselves as free, sometimes as being forced by their emotions, their situation. Yes, when people sum up, they often do sum up in favor of free will, but there is tremendous evidence that the idea of not having free will is unpleasant. IOW that it is not a reasoned conclusion, but a preferred for
emotional reasons conclusion. So when thinking of the whole category, that's who they think, but embedded in life they indicate both beliefs. And then we have tremendous evidence that all events are caused. And people also, themselves, refer to causes. I wanted to do that because and they refer to antecedent events and feelings and urges and needs in themselves that led to choice A.
Quoting BartricksThen there are differences between rational appearances OR we must always agree with the majority and there is no difference between belief that is knowledge and belief that is not. I cannot see in practical terms how your rational appearances differs from popular ideas.
Other things bring equal to what?
I don't think what you are calling rational is rational, or perhaps better put, some of what you are categorizing as rational intutions is rational some is not. And I see this when people talk about what they believe. For example, they often say they believe X, but act like they do not or even believe the opposite. I also see people saying that X is true for all sorts of reasons, sometimes having nothing to do at all with rational or intuition - for example, cultural habits. They grew up in the assumption, for example. Others can come from language, where paradigmatic ideas are built in, in dead metaphors for example.
In a way we are having the empicist vs rationalist argument, but I am not a pure empiricist. i am also a rationalist. I just don't see people using the same faculty in their various rationalist or habitual conclusions. And I don't believe their official stories about themselves and the world just because they say that is what they believe.
You can't argue for anything without making an appeal to reason. The validity of any argument you employ is itself something that can only be seen with our reason.
You still haven't answered my question - do you deny that rational intuitions have probative force?
This is nonsense. We don't "appeal to reason", we use reason to argue consistently for premises which are assumed, but cannot themselves be defended other than by empirical observation, coherence with an overall body of accepted knowledge or the claim that they are a priori true or analytically self-evident.
And when reason says nothing...? Just interested to see what you make of such things. :chin:
The conventional beliefs of the current age, regardless of how they have been arrived at, perhaps?
it is undeniable that we have rational intuitions and undeniable that they have probative force.
For instance, which of these arguments is valid:
A:
Premise 1: If P, then Q
Premise 2: P
Conclusion: therefore Q
B:
Premise 1: if P, then Q
Premise 2: Not P
Conclusion: Therefore not Q
The first is, the second isn't - and that's something we (most of us) recognise by rational intuition. You can't see it with your eyes, or smell it, or taste it, or touch it. It is a truth of reason and we find out about those via rational intuitions.
Now we 'appear' - rationally - to have free will. Our reason - that is the reason of the bulk of humanity - represents us to have free will. If that isn't stunningly good default evidence that we do, then I don't know what you mean by evidence.
1. If an event harms a person, that person must exist at the time of the harm
2. The total destruction of our material bodies are events that will harm us if or when they occur, other things being equal
3. Therefore, we will exist at the same time as the total destruction of our bodies, if or when such events occur, and other things being equal.
4. If we are our material bodies, then it is not possible for us to exist at the same time as the total destruction of our material bodies under any circumstances.
5. Therefore, we are not our material bodies
I'm not sure, but don't we have to learn such things? I wonder if intuition (rational or otherwise) alone is enough to result in that realisation? Is logic intuitive? :chin:
My quarks are really annoyed at this! They have a rich inner life, you know. At the very least, by virtue of being the constituents of the atoms that are the constituents of the organic molecules that are the constituents of the basic processes of life; and that make up the organs and the body and the nervous system and the brain, which somehow has managed to achieve self-awareness and consciousness.
Why should not the phenomenon of consciousness be experienced at every level of its existence?
After all, our network of neurons is a grid for transmitting electrochemical signals. And at the bottom of reality, at the level of the particle physicists, it's quarks and electrons. Tiny bits of electricity.
There's electricity at the bottom of creation. And it's electricity that implements consciousness, or could we say at the very least, hosts it, as a computer hosts its software.
So yeah, you know, I was going to say that I don't have enough interest to defend my belief rationally. But it turns out I do have a bit of a plausible story. What do you think?
Now we could go an have a discussion about that, but since you cannot be bothered to even respond to what I write, and now for the second time in a row, and simply repeat your posiition,
I will not read what you write and will, therefore, also not respond anymore to any of your posts.
I know you are sure you are right. I knew that already. And I know that in general this 'being sure' is so much easier when one repeats one's assertions and ignores what other people say. It's just, I'm not interested in being a part of that.
Take care.
Are you some kind of scientific literalist? Your arithmetic example is true by definition, if we first accept a raft of axioms and number-related mathematical theorems. If we don't, then "2 + 3 = 5" is a collection of meaningless symbols. You present your example as though it is indisputable, apparently unaware of its origins and meaning. You aren't helping your case.... :chin:
You have speculated but not proved.
It's a product of the brain and nervous system, and in order for your mind to even "consider that it might be separate from the brain.." in the first place, requires the brain and nervous system.
Also, how do you figure the mind is a soul? And immaterial at that, if it's a part of your brain..? I'm not really getting the leaps, none of your previous reasoning follows or adequately leads to these conclusions, so I'm not sure where they are coming from. If anything, your reasoning would lead to more questions..
You answered this, just a few words previously:
Quoting Swan
A running program is quite distinct from the hardware on which it runs. Although brain/mind-computer analogies aren't great, it will do in this case, I think. The mind is not part of the brain, it's an emergent property of the brain. Not the same thing at all.
Consciousness/mind is a brain process, then, a product, with the objects in the mind also a product/result, making the mind to be a reflection of what's already been figured out a split-second ago, all this not allowing for the mind to figure anything on its own, and thus not a soul.
Okay, maybe I used the incorrect words. This just seems like a lot of word play of technically this means that, and technically, that means this.
What I meant was mind is brain - doing things and not mind is brain. And by 'generate' I don't mean the brain is creating 'immaterial' minds, but instead generating the illusion that it is doing just that.
I think the OP took some leaps and I'm not sure how he concluded something indistinguishable from an illusion to be a soul and I'd be curious to ask him where his confidence comes from in distinguishing the two?
Yeah, I'm not sure how OP is getting immaterial soul out of a brain process. Maybe he will answer?
Mathematics is immaterial, but I would have said it's also a thing? :chin:
So, someone who believes that conscious states are being borne by some kind of extended thing - such as our brain - is someone who believes that the mind is a material object.
I am arguing that the mind is an immaterial thing. By an 'immaterial thing' I mean an object that lacks material properties, such as extension.
I have presented several arguments for this thesis, each one deductively valid and with extremely plausible premises.
For example;
1. Any material object is divisible
2. My mind is not divisible.
3. therefore, my mind is not a material object.
So, here is one:
1. No object that has sensible properties has mental properties.
2. All material objects have sensible properties
3. Therefore, no material object has mental properties
4. My mind has mental properties
5. Therefore, my mind is not a material object
Anyway, good luck starting your cult.
The mind is the thing - whatever it may be - that is, or can be, in a state of consciousness.
The reason I am the same person - the same mind, that is - both before and after a period of unconsciousness is precisely because I am my mind not my consciousness. I am conscious, but I am not consciousness.
I don't think that's how it works.