Non-reality
So according to Cantor a segment has an uncountable infinity of points instead of a countable amount. So you could have always from eternity divided a segment and never in forever get to the end. This can make us feel large against the background of the massive universe. But the world, I've been told, doesn't exist as a single extended reality, but has levels of reality. How can we conceptualize how substance is different in the quantum realm?
Comments (17)
As you may be suggesting, there has to be an end, lest there be no potency, and, for now, it would be at the Planck size.
Quoting Gregory
Until the massive universe makes us feel small. It turns out that the mid-point is about the size of a piece of dust.
Quoting Gregory
Yes and no, for there are fields behind the field quanta that we call particles. There would also be levels of actions/reality emergent for such as atoms, molecules, cells at their levels.
Quoting Gregory
The field quanta form when there is an interaction, bound by a discrete energy spectrum. The base 'substance' would be covariant quantum fields, whatever they consist of, as themselves.
More is different.
Quoting Gregory
"Potential Infinity" only works in math. The specific energy levels, say, as for electrons only being able to jump to certain orbits are due, we suppose, to that the waves still have to connect and can't just get chopped off to fit at any orbit.
The definition of 'infinite', largest or smallest, is not that it is an amount, but that it can never complete, and thus it cannot be.
Loop Quantum Gravity is trying to derive quanta of space-time so that General Relativity can be gotten to from quantum principles as an approximation of a finely grained continuum that still operates well at large numbers. It's not easy, but all else has been quantized so far.
And I tell you that in the "bar" on the left-hand side, there's 5 billion dollars credited to your bank account.
Do you feel rich, or do you think it's just some nonsense I'm making up?
Probably, there are many 'smalls' that can lead to the same classical large.
Of course, the sense organs take in what's out there, but ignore a lot, because, I guess, so that we have greater contrast, plus, the brain paints a more useful face on the jumble of waves or whatnot out there.
We only ever 'see' the brain's model, which model also reflects what we already know in forms made by the brain, as proved by dreams, in which not anything comes in through the senses from outside.
Reductionism is popular, but there is something to be said for emergence, such as many connected neurons can do more than just one neuron by itself could do (more is different). We presume that what goes on in Totality is completely relative to the inside of Totality, given that there is no outside to provide any absolutes. Even that as tiny as particles would really be more like that they are hubs of relations, leaving not much to be intrinsic, although Lee Smolin thinks that energy and momentum have to be.
Seems that at each new level, associated patterns become that operate at that level, and so on.
Your views are very constructivist. They seek to claim a definite connection between the abstract, Platonic world of infinite set cardinalities and the real, physical world.
From a Platonic view, there may be an elusive connection between mathematical abstractions and the real, physical world, but firm claims about this connection are absolutely not supported. From a formalist point of view, the symbol manipulations in Cantor's theory on transfinite numbers are perfectly consistent and therefore completely accepted. From a structural point of view, infinitary arithmetic extensions leave number-theoretic algebraic structures perfectly undamaged.
Aside from that, mathematics refuses to make definite claims about the real, physical world and limits itself to enforcing consistency in language expressions by governing the permissibility of symbol manipulations using an elaborate bureaucracy of formalisms. Constructivism is a mistake, because the only goal of mathematics is to consistently manipulate fundamentally meaningless and useless symbols. Nothing more.
Philosophy is hard
I don't know Cantor, but isn't this just a matter of abstract reasoning, or not?
In the abstract, of course any segment is infinitely divisible. Why wouldn't it be? Outside the abstract, Poetic Universe's mention of Planck scale basically shows Cantor can not be right in that instance (assuming our understanding of Planck scale is accurate and complete).
Quoting Gregory
I hear that. Even my 'abstract' answer above is more of a dodge, if I am understanding what you are trying to get at.
Yes, agreed.
If you want to deal with knowledge claims that apply to the real, physical world, then it is preferable to pick them from downstream users of mathematics ("applied"), such as science or engineering, which have real-world semantics and actively seek to develop usefulness. Mathematics itself stays clear of that, if only, not to compete with or needlessly disturb the semantics investigated by its downstream users.