Quod gr?t?s asseritur, gr?t?s neg?tur
The title of the discussion is the older version of what is now known as Hitchen's Razor.
The English version is: What is asserted without evidence can be dismissed without evidence and is attributed to the famous atheist late Christopher Eric Hitchens (13 April 1949 – 15 December 2011).
I would like an analysis of this purportedly rational stance on, possibly, all matters under the sun.
Personally, I think it has a flaw because it doesn't allow, in fact stifles, rational inquiry.
Why?
In science and math there's a completely acceptable mode of inquiry and that is the conjecture which is, as far as I know, statements that are, in non-technical terminology, pulled out of thin air. These conjectures probably have some basis, however flimsy, but the point is they're asserted without evidence. To dismiss the many conjectures that exist in math and science solely because they haven't been proved isn't the common practice it should be if Hitchen's Razor is a rational method of inquiry.
Comments...
The English version is: What is asserted without evidence can be dismissed without evidence and is attributed to the famous atheist late Christopher Eric Hitchens (13 April 1949 – 15 December 2011).
I would like an analysis of this purportedly rational stance on, possibly, all matters under the sun.
Personally, I think it has a flaw because it doesn't allow, in fact stifles, rational inquiry.
Why?
In science and math there's a completely acceptable mode of inquiry and that is the conjecture which is, as far as I know, statements that are, in non-technical terminology, pulled out of thin air. These conjectures probably have some basis, however flimsy, but the point is they're asserted without evidence. To dismiss the many conjectures that exist in math and science solely because they haven't been proved isn't the common practice it should be if Hitchen's Razor is a rational method of inquiry.
Comments...
Comments (60)
In that case, axioms are not legitimate. If axioms are not legitimate, then mathematics is not legitimate, because mathematics is exclusively axiomatic. If mathematics is not legitimate, we must remove the entire bureaucracy of formalisms that maintains consistency in science and engineering. In that case, science and engineering will mostly go out of the window.
In the meanwhile, we are already back in the stone age.
Informal mathematics means any informal mathematical practices, as used in everyday life, or by aboriginal or ancient peoples, without historical or geographical limitation. Modern mathematics, exceptionally from that point of view, emphasizes formal and strict proofs of all statements from given axioms. This can usefully be called therefore formal mathematics. Informal practices are usually understood intuitively and justified with examples—there are no axioms. This is of direct interest in anthropology and psychology: it casts light on the perceptions and agreements of other cultures. It is also of interest in developmental psychology as it reflects a naïve understanding of the relationships between numbers and things.
In other words, Hitchen's razor is something suitable for aboriginal tribes in the one or the other virgin rainforest only.
Axioms are by definition asserted without evidence.
A conjecture in science is the same way. It can be dismissed without evidence, that doesn’t mean it is automatically false or insignificant. Notice the quote says CAN be dismissed without evidence not MUST be dismissed due to lack of evidence
That is a wrong definition outdated now for almost a century. The following is the long story of the role of axioms in mathematics and what they mean:
[i]A philosophical defeat in the quest for "truth" in the choice of axioms
Hilbert's axiomatic system – his formalism – is different. At the outset it declares its axioms.[15] But he doesn't require the selection of these axioms to be based upon either "common sense", a priori knowledge (intuitively derived understanding or awareness, innate knowledge seen as "truth without requiring any proof from experience"[16] ), or observational experience (empirical data). Rather, the mathematician in the same manner as the theoretical physicist[17][18] is free to adopt any (arbitrary, abstract) collection of axioms that they so choose. Indeed, Weyl asserts that Hilbert had "formaliz[ed] it [classical mathematics], thus transforming it in principle from a system of intuitive results into a game with formulas that proceeds according to fixed rules".[19] So, Weyl asks, what might guide the choice of these rules? "What impels us to take as a basis precisely the particular axiom system developed by Hilbert?".[19] Weyl offers up "consistency is indeed a necessary but not sufficient condition" but he cannot answer more completely except to note that Hilbert's "construction" is "arbitrary and bold".[19] Finally he notes, in italics, that the philosophical result of Hilbert's "construction" will be the following: "If Hilbert's view prevails over intuitionism, as appears to be the case, then I see in this a decisive defeat of the philosophical attitude of pure phenomenology, which thus proves to be insufficient for the understanding of creative science even in the area of cognition that is most primal and most readily open to evidence – mathematics."[19] In other words: the role of innate feelings and tendencies (intuition) and observational experience (empiricism) in the choice of axioms will be removed except in the global sense – the "construction" had better work when put to the test: "only the theoretical system as a whole ... can be confronted with experience".[/i]
In other words, axioms have fundamentally been arbitrary rules since the first half of the 20th century. They are certainly not correspondence-theory "true" in any way.
Mathematics does not make any claim as to usefulness or meaningfulness. That is so by design.
Hitchens' razor just expresses that he does not understand mathematics, science, engineering, nor the link between these domains. By design, it all starts from arbitrary rules with zero justification. Hitchens simply had no clue about the true nature of modern knowledge.
You see, the flagship of mathematics is, beyond any doubt, general abstract nonsense, i.e. category theory. It has absolutely arbitrary starting points (axioms), and, to the non-mathematician, leading to pretty much absurd conclusions.
These things are not something for people like Hitchens. That is why he produced that kind of low-knowledge "razor".
Well, yeah, probably. So?
Quoting tim wood
Well, a good part of the body of modern knowledge is actually quite counter-intuitive, when you think of it. That is undoubtedly why Hitchens, who is completely ignorant of its caveats, sounds so ignorant. Hitchens was someone who took great pleasure in depicting other people as idiots, but his own views were clearly even worse.
I believe this saying was used specifically to argue that assertions of the existence of God do not have to be taken seriously, although it certainly could be applied to other situations. I think he was talking about phenomena claimed to exist in the "real" world, i.e. outside our minds. I don't think it applies to logical or mathematical entities. If I'm wrong, please somebody set me straight.
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Exsurge Domine
Condemning the Errors of Al Contali
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We can scarcely express, from distress and grief of mind, what has reached our ears for some time by the report of reliable men and general rumor; alas, we have even seen with our eyes and read the many diverse errors. Al Contali's errors are either heretical, false, scandalous, or offensive to pious ears, as seductive of simple minds, originating with false exponents of the faith who in their proud curiosity yearn for the world’s glory. We can under no circumstances tolerate or overlook any longer the pernicious poison of the above errors without disgrace. No one of sound mind is ignorant how destructive, pernicious, scandalous, and seductive to pious and simple minds these various errors are. Therefore we, in this above enumeration, important as it is, wish to proceed with great care as is proper, and to cut off the advance of this plague and cancerous disease so it will not spread any further. With mature deliberation on each and every one of Al Contali's theses, we condemn, reprobate, and reject completely each of these theses or errors as either heretical, scandalous, false, offensive to pious ears or seductive of simple minds!
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One person's self-evident truth is to another person an assumption without evidence. Axioms are assumed to be true for sake of argument, for example. And you have axioms in geometry that are assumed, and interestingly some axioms in Euclidian geometry, if accepted as correct, might have stopped non-euclidean geometry, which has practical applications in physics.
That would be a very bad conclusion or rule. The evidence of the usefulness or accuracy of the axiom might come much later on, after the axiom is assumed for the sake of argument/investigation. Sure, having a hypothesis, in science say, that seems to have some evidence for it is a good starting point. But there is no reason oan a Tuesday, to decide that Tuesday, well that axiom or that assumption has no evidence, so let's throw it out.
Well, ever since the annexation and reappropriation of logic by mathematics, the remaining flagship sailing for the colours of philosophy is epistemology.
If knowledge is defined as a justified (true) belief, then knowledge has the shape of an arrow. Therefore, we do not reject a knowledge claim because we do not like its starting point. We also do not reject a knowledge claim because we do not like its conclusion. We only reject it because the conclusion does not necessarily follow from the starting point.
Therefore, Hitchens' approach in which he arbitrarily rejects starting points, is just a cheap slogan that he could use and abuse to reject pretty much any knowledge claim. The late, dead Hitchens was a rhetorical attack dog, with a strong emphasis on the word "dog". May his carcass rot in hell.
Which is why this razor wouldn’t affect it
Yes, of course. People like Hitchens are obviously no credible threat to the field of mathematics, if only, because they wouldn't survive for thirty seconds if they had to steer their own ship through uncharted waters on the high seas. It is just that I do not like people like Hitchens, whose only goal in life is to discredit and otherwise viciously attack other people. Hitchens was a cherished accomplice of Satan. Richard Stallman said about Steve Jobs: "I am not glad that he is dead but I am glad that he is gone." About Hitchens, I rather abbreviate all of that to "dead and gone", and we wouldn't want it any other way.
A lot of discussion that goes on here is based on assertions without evidence. This is an entirely normal state of affairs, because we understand that we all have opinions about all manner of things that are not supported with evidence. If we had to present evidence for all our opinions, we would become terminally constipated and would eventually explode.
A knowledge claim is an arrow between a starting point and a conclusion. In the empirical realm -- life on other planets is clearly a claim about the physical world -- it is an arrow between observations and a conclusion that follows from these observations.
In an axiomatic domain, a knowledge claim is an arrow between a starting-point rule and a consequential rule. The starting point simply does not consist of observations but of a rule. For example, if there is a countable infinite number of natural numbers, ?, then the number of real numbers is 2^?.
Hitchens was using his so-called razor, not to argue that the consequential rule does not necessarily follow from the starting-point rule, but to attack the starting-point rule itself. In the example above: There is absolutely no reason to believe that there is an infinite number of natural numbers, i.e. ?. This is obviously true, but that is not what it is about.
Attacking the knowledge claim "if cardinalityOf(N) is ? then cardinalityOf(R) is 2^?" cannot be achieved merely by rejecting "cardinalityOf(N) is ?", and also not by rejecting "cardinalityOf(R) is 2^?". You have to conclusively show that "cardinalityOf(R) is 2^?" does not follow from "cardinalityOf(N) is ?".
So, if Hitchens' so-called razor makes sense, you can use it to successfully attack the axiom of infinity, or any axiom in ZFC, because none of ZFC's axioms, i.e. the foundations of axiomatic set theory, can be justified with any evidence.
Of course, Hitchens did not dare to attack mathematics on those grounds. He pointed his arrows to a seemingly easier target: religion, but it is obviously the same attack. Hitchens' views are epistemically unsound, and clearly invalid, but obviously still popular with other atheists, who will defend them, because they like his conclusions. As I already pointed out, Hitchens was a cherished accomplice of Satan.
Look up “assertion” in regards to logic. It makes perfect sense then.
:up:
In partial agreement with you but there's one area of philosophical argumentation that Hitchen's Razor is extremely useful viz. the issue with burden of proof. I'm familiar with it from the God debate (theism/atheism). In some cases a debate ends in theists demanding proof that god doesn't exist. As you will notice this task is the contrary of but equally difficult to proving that god exists. I don't know if @tim wood agrees but this is probably a rhetorical device, shifting the burden of proof. As you may have already noticed Hitchen's Razor can be very effective in countering such a move because you can simply dismiss a motion on the basis that it has no evidence to back it up.
:rofl: :rofl: :up:
There is at least one missing assumption here.
First, just to be anally clear. I think you mean I should not make this claim without evidence. Since one clearly can. Further I think it is implicit that you also mean, one should not make this claim and expect that anyone has a good reason to take you seriously or believe you.
Here's why I think you are wrong. The processes through which we come to knowledge include all sorts of thought experiments. The specificity of the claim you are using as an example is problematic, but let's say you assert, as part of some research team:
There is intelligent life on many planets in the galaxy.
You want the group to take this on as a workign assumption. This can be useful. You assume this, then ask questions, for example. Why don't we see their tv shows or other things that indicate they are there. Then we can come up with proposed solutions that still fit the assumption.
Scientists and other experts and regular people make assumptions all the time, because it can lead to fruitful lines of thinking. Einstein did this and it was decades before some of his conclusions were confirmed empirically.
There is no reason to dismiss claims that do not have evidence.
However it would be silly for people to assume you should believe their claims if there is no evidence.
That I get. Someone tells you they know God exists or they know that there is life on other planets, well, they can't expect you to be convinced. There is no need to dismiss them however.
And here we get into the meaning of CAN and then the human use of this razor. I think it's a poor razor because it can often be good to explore what might be entailed by an axiom. If you had a research team and one proposed an axiom: there is much intelligent life on other planets in the galaxy. And wanted to use this as a starting point for, let's say, we dont' see evidence, yet, of that. To work with that axiom and then have a discussion. Then one of the other scientists says. I CAN dismiss that assumption without evidence and I am and won't participate, they are blocking something. Might be a dead, might not be, but that person is using a contextless heuristic just justify behavior that can be counterproductive. The DISMISS is also so often taken to mean, decide is false. That perfhaps in not the fault of the razor, but I've seen it used that way enough to think this razor is a blunt and problematic heuristic at least as worded.
Now we could say that dismissive scientist in my above example is using the razor poorly. Or perhaps we could find an example where we would agree it is a poor use, but still think that since it says CAN it's fine. One can. But the problem for me is that I think the razor reinforces a tendency to think that there are two options, agree or disagree, accept or dismiss, rather than includling be agnostic (here I mean this broadly or metaphorically as not deciding (yet)) or take on for the sake of argument or thought experiment or 'see where this is going'.
It seems to me it gets used in a lot of situations where one actually means something like 'I have no reason to be convinced'. As if a final treatise had been handed in and found wanting, rather than that an unfolding discussion was taking place. This may be a failing of humans rather than the razor, but then it seems to me the razor's meant to be used by humans and I am not sure it is helping. Perhaps it would work pefectly well with the sapient lizard species on Kepler 452b, but I am not sure it is helping us here with we terrestrial primates.
In terms of epistemology, i.e. when defining knowledge as a justified (true) belief, the appropriate procedure is a bit less trivial than just asking for "burden of proof". If we define an epistemic domain as the collection of knowledge claims that can be investigated using a particular knowledge-justification method, then the procedure goes as follows:
[1] What epistemic domain does the question actually belong to, the main epistemic domains being axiomatic, scientific-falsificationist, and historical ?
[2] Is the question within reach of its knowledge-justification method?
[3] Ok, if yes, only now try to solve the question by using the knowledge-justification method that applies to it.
With [1] the biggest problem is that most people, obviously including Hitchens, are simply not aware of the existence of different non-overlapping epistemic domains. They seem to assume that there is only one epistemic domain, namely, science.
Scientism is an ideology that promotes science as the only objective means by which society should determine normative and epistemological values. The term scientism is generally used critically, pointing to the cosmetic application of science in unwarranted situations not amenable to application of the scientific method or similar scientific standards.
People like Hitchens, who clearly suffer from scientism, think that they are smart, while they are incredibly stupid. That is the result of the Dunning-Kruger effect:
In the field of psychology, the Dunning–Kruger effect is a cognitive bias in which people mistakenly assess their cognitive ability as greater than it is. It is related to the cognitive bias of illusory superiority and comes from the inability of people to recognize their lack of ability. Without the self-awareness of metacognition, people cannot objectively evaluate their competence or incompetence.
Of course, people like Hitchens would not dare to misplace the axiom of infinity in the scientifc-falsificationist domain, and insist on a simplistic "burden of proof" for it, but they are definitely bold enough to do that with religion.
Step [2] is whether the question is actually decidable by its knowledge-justification method. In the 1930ies, enormous progress was made in the realm of decidability, simply because David Hilbert asked the entire field of mathematics to work on his Entscheidungsproblem, i.e. the Decidability Problem. It is the combination of Kurt Gödel's, Alan Turing's, and Alonzo Church's work that yields the Church-Turing thesis. As you can imagine, most questions are actually not decidable. So, nowadays we have that enormous field of computability (=decidability) the existence of which people like Hitchens are not even aware.
Hitchens regularly said things that already in the 19th century were considered to be stupid. He was so ignorant.
Concerning [3], even if the question is decidable, it could still take 350 years to finally solve Fermat's Last Theorem. Hitchens, on the other hand, always had an answer ready within ten seconds. In his mind, difficult questions did not exist, because he was always sure that he knew the answer, even when he didn't.
Do you think this is because people are dumb? Or is it because science has proven itself to be, in Matrix terminology, The One?
Yet it could be said that we're under a magical spell, completely mesmerized by science and unable to think beyond it.
I guess you're putting science on trial here so let me put in a few kind words in its favor.
Science is empirical, observable, verifiable and rational. As you can see it fulfills two basic criteria of what could be called intelligence standards:
1. Observable therefore verifiable
2. Rational
I don't know of any other field that is so structured.
They're rules (of thumb) on par with the asserted.
If assertions are intended to persuade, then you'd want relevant justifications, yes?
I'll venture to guess that most occasionally go by the razors, whether intuitively, implicitly or explicitly.
Formal axiomatic systems go by provisional axioms.
It just so happens that some such systems have been rather useful/successful, otherwise we wouldn't have kept them around.
Quoting alcontali
Quoting alcontali
What nonsense. :roll:
If your "poor victims" didn't preach indoctrinate proselytize mutually inconsistent superstitions day in and day out, then there wouldn't be a whole lot of Hitchens'ses around to disabuse those postulates.
And without those (initial) postulates there wouldn't be much to discuss in the first place (they carry the onus probandi).
Hitchens is like someone who goes through life claiming that he does not like to play or watch tennis. Fine, I should say: then play or watch cricket, or whatever. But no, that is not what Hitchens wants, because he declares himself to be a believer in non-tennis. So, what are tennis aficionados supposed to say to Mr. "non-tennis" Hitchens, besides: "Why don't you get a life?"
And this stercus is your response, @alcontali? :) Won't do.
Hey, let's have another Hitchens challenging them all.
Generally, I am very tolerant of unproven, evidence-free statements--Not because I believe everything I hear, but as you said, "because it can lead to fruitful lines of thinking".
Claims or conjectures? A claim without evidence seems eminently rejectable. A conjecture without evidence, maybe...but a conjecture without context? (A context will consist in some observations that have been used to construct it surely?).
Quoting Coben
I would not see that as an axiom, but as a conjecture or a possibility to be explored. Say planets have been discovered and observed. Perhaps they fit certain criteria of similarity to our own. Our own planet has life, so that fact coupled with observed similarities to our own might provide reason to conjecture about, or consider that there is a possibility of, life on that planet. Axiom? No!
And it is not fundamentally useful or meaningful. The mathematics that are, are the ones that start with axioms supported by evidence.
It is not the business of religions to make factual claims at all, as far as I can see. They may make claims concerning value, but these should not be claims about value simpliciter, they should be claims about what we ought to value grounded in further claims of traditional workability and benefit. In other words a religion can only justify its ethical principles, if at all, in terms of its actual fruits.
The further point is that religions do not need to justify themselves at all; people who believe in religions are not looking for justification, but something else. This is what the idiot, Hitchens, completely failed to understand. But there are plenty of religious fundamentalist idiots on the opposite side who also fail to understand.
Yes, a "category error" is an "epistemic error".
You know, there is an entire field in mathematics, called category theory. Just like epistemology, which is about "knowledge arrows", i.e. the justifying links between a statement and the statement from which it can be justified, category theory is also about arrows.
Now, these arrows are also called morphisms, which are incredibly powerful tools.
However, unlike in epistemology, these category-theory morphisms/arrows are not necessarily used to justify one statement from another. On the contrary, they usually just happen to be there. No need to painstakingly "discover" them. On the contrary, they will often (but not always) just be rubbed into your face, without even asking for that.
So, while epistemology is exclusively about knowledge-justification arrows, category theory is about any kind of arrow, on the condition that the situation can somehow be axiomatized. Epistemology, on the other hand, does not try to shoehorn itself into an axiomatic system. It just seeks to discover interesting methodological patterns in the existing world of knowledge.
Quoting Janus
Yes, agreed. Hitchens was making money out of annoying other people, because doing so, pleases a particular crowd that likes to upset them. Hitchens was just an arsehole.
He's quite eloquent and does well in debates. I don't recall him having to run from the law except the possibility of the Ayatollah issuing a fatwa.
His challenge to the religious establishment is genuine and well-reasoned. He doesn't discriminate between faiths like the faithful themselves are guilty of.
Anyway, so you do think that Hitchens' Razor isn't justified in ALL circumstances. Ok
It is rather the Papacy who would send out an Exsurge Domine, but in Hitchens' case, what he said was clearly not considered interesting enough to even make time to react.
You see, you have to really know what you are talking about before you can make people angry. You would have to say things like this:
It is a heretical opinion, but a common one, that the sacraments of the New Law give pardoning grace to those who do not set up an obstacle.
Or this, because it is thinly veiled criticism on burning Jan Hus at the stake:
It seems to have been decided that the Church in common Council established that the laity should communicate under both species; the Bohemians who communicate under both species are not heretics, but schismatics.
This must have really made the Papacy mad like hell:
Christians must be taught to cherish excommunications rather than to fear them.
In the following "error", our beloved Augustinian heretic, Martin Luther, even (accidentally?) insinuates that a particular verse in the Bible must be a forgery. Over time, it had become obvious that it was James the Just, Jesus' brother, who had been appointed as successor to lead the congregration of the poor, and not Peter:
The Roman Pontiff, the successor of Peter, is not the vicar of Christ over all the churches of the entire world, instituted by Christ Himself in blessed Peter.
Furthermore, the Holy Sees of Alexandria, Jerusalem, and Constantinople had never recognized the Roman Pontiff as "vicar of Christ over all the churches". The views of the Papacy were even contrary to the resolutions of the first council of Nicaea. Of course, you are not supposed to say that kind of things about your boss, if you are in paid employ as a staff member of his organization.
Quoting TheMadFool
No, the religious establishment would never give a flying fart about what someone like Hitchens says. If you want to discredit them, you really have to know what you are talking about, which Hitchens clearly didn't. It is the same in Islam. They'd just brush Hitchens off as irrelevant babble. Seriously, there is nothing heretical about what Hitchens said, simply, because he was just not capable of doing that.
Also, when was the when was the last time you heard a priest/imam/puja (or even parent) conclude a sermon with "Oh, by the way, we don't know"? (That might actually be considered blasphemy.) :)
Out in real life, the preached-indoctrinated-proselytized is typically presented (implicitly or explicitly) as the be-all-end-all truth of it all. In general, with elaborate, mutually inconsistent messages, allegedly of the utmost importance for all man-kind (all genders).
This sort of thing goes further still.
[quote=https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Barry_Goldwater]Mark my word, if and when these preachers get control of the [Republican] party, and they're sure trying to do so, it's going to be a terrible damn problem. Frankly, these people frighten me. Politics and governing demand compromise. But these Christians believe they are acting in the name of God, so they can't and won't compromise. I know, I've tried to deal with them.[/quote]
Not just fundamentalists.
Suggest you good folk take Gouldean magisteria — and that evidence is irrelevant — to the streets and the apologists. Until then let's have some more Hitchens'ses around (that you can ad hominem at here on The Philosophy Forum). (y)
Never heard of rhetoric, eh?
What I meant was that there should be a context which renders conjectures to be sensible, not merely arbitrary or logical possibilities. And as you say I agree that "intelligible statements/ conjectures would usually be in some existing domain of knowledge, which includes observations. I also agree that none of those observation need indicate that the conjecture is true; in fact if they did it would not be, or would no longer be, a conjecture. But I don';t see that the conjecture making sense within a domain of knowledge would be evidence for the truth of the conjecture, if that is what you meant.
How about a compromise:
Hitchens' razor is applicable in those cases where a conjecture is claimed to be true. If a particular claim is considered only as a conjecture Hitchens' razor doesn't apply. The moment such "guesses" are said to be true we can use Hithcens' razor.
I don't think that there are any epistemic knowledge-justification methods that claim that anything is correspondence-theory "true".
Mathematics merely decides if a claim is provable from the construction logic of an abstract, Platonic world. Science merely decides that a claim is testable awaiting its ultimate falsification. History merely decides that it is possible to corroborate witness depositions for a particular alleged fact.
In my impression, there is no knowledge-justification method that allows you to decide if a claim is correspondence-theory "true" or not. They are merely provable, testable, or "corroborable".
In fact, it is not possible to prove anything about the real, physical world.
Scientific Proof Is A Myth. Science can do a whole lot of things, but proving a scientific theory is still an impossibility.
There's No Such Thing As Proof In The Scientific World - There's Only Evidence. “Proof” implies that there is no room for error — that you can be 100% sure that what you have written down on the piece of paper is 100% representative of what you are talking about.. And quite simply, that doesn’t exist in the real world. You cannot prove anything.
Furthermore, a belief does not need to be epistemically justified in order to be correspondence-theory "true". Most beliefs actually aren't (formally) justified. Knowledge is just a relatively small subset of what we believe, and rationality is merely one of the several mental faculties that people use.
As far as I am concerned, the default status of a hypothesis is not that it is false until proven otherwise, or something like that. No, I start by accepting the claim, and then I interrogate it, until I finally discover the reason why it is inconsistent. As long as this reason cannot be found, I consider the hypothesis to be legitimate.
That is exactly what the police does when they interrogate a suspect. Everything the suspect says, is considered true, until the suspect starts saying the opposite of what he previously has said. The trick consists in making the suspect reveal an increasingly large number of nitty-gritty details in what he says, because that makes it exponentially harder for him to keep any lies afloat. If ultimately, after lengthy interrogations, no inconsistency can be discovered, then the police will choose to believe what the suspect has said.
Hitchen's razor, however, would obviously not work. The police would get absolutely nowhere with their investigations, if they used it.
How unlike a good learning heuristic that is.
Of course there are moments for such a reaction. But, again, how unlike a good learning heuristic it is.
By "sensible" I just meant something relevant to the context; i.e. the domain of inquiry and the observations and tests that have already been done, and so on.
I think that's the scientific/logical/mathematical method right there.
What I find relevant in your post is that you don't accept that a conjecture is true. You only assume it is. It's just a weaker version of Hitchens' razor isn't it?
Well, it is not a version of Hitchens' razor, because unlike him, I do not reject the hypothetical statement. In order to reject it, I first need a "witness" testifying to its inconsistency.
Mathematical witness. For example, a theory T of arithmetic is said to be inconsistent if there exists a proof in T of the formula "0 = 1". The formula I(T), which says that T is inconsistent, is thus an existential formula. A witness for the inconsistency of T is a particular proof of "0 = 1" in T.
What Hitchens does, is pretty much the opposite.
He wants witness(es) to the wholesale consistency of the hypothetical statement, because he somehow believes such witnesses would somehow prove its consistency. That view is obviously misguided. Unlike witnesses testifying to inconsistency, witnesses testifying to consistency do not prove anything.
The false belief in the existence of proof about the real, physical world is a very common error. It is even a fixture in the widespread "burden of proof" nonsense. If knowledge statements about the real, physical world required proof, then we would have no knowledge at all about the real, physical world.
Well, you do suspend belief until the conjecture is proven. If you don't do that then you'd be believing anything and everything which I hope is not what you want.
If you agree with me so far then all Hithchens' razor does is reject the truth of a conjecture on the grounds that it's unproven. If there is proof then Hitchens' razor would be inapplicable.
How long can an arbitrary stream of language expressions continue before it contradicts itself? In my experience, not very long. That is why I will not easily say, "I do not believe you". My knee-jerk reaction is rather: "Please, go on."
So, no, it is not suspension of belief. I will certainly be in doubt, but not in disbelief. Doubt is rather some kind of indecisiveness. Doubt and disbelief are quite different from each other.
People get pissed off if you disbelieve them for no good reason at all, and they are actually right, because there is not even a need for that.
Quoting TheMadFool
Both reality and Platonic worlds have an incredible amount of often even unexpected structure. Fitting a lie into these elaborate structures, is really, really hard. I just wait until it goes wrong.
Other models, such as the one I think implicit in the Hitchen's razor, are very precipitous. Notice the assertion. Demand evidence. Upon judging this lacking dismiss. Notice also that any evidence would seem to be verbal or immediately experiential. A link to a paper, the paper itself, some kind of immediate pointing. Not a process that might take some longer period of time. Nothing with a large experiential component. No longer discussion that might lead to experiences or attitudes that might lead to experiences. Meet, assertion, produce or not, decide. A kind of assembly line of rapid decisions.
Of course anyone should be free to do this. Maybe there's a newborn in the family or they don't like the person asserting, or they are tired or their gut feeling is they'd rather have some other conjecture to mull over. Fine.
But it's, then, a razor that really one need not have. That's all self-care and self-guidance. If one needs that razor to back up such choice in situ there's a deeper problem.
Hitchens' razor: Prove it and say it.
You: Say it but prove it
I guess there's a very important aspect of rationality I'm not understanding.
I don't know. I think Hitchens' razor is for people like me who don't think before they speak and now you seem to be a very nice guy. :joke: