I think enotivism is just wrong as a matter of fact. Beyond the question whether a truth value for moral statements can be established, it seems obvious to me that people don't just express an emotion when they make moral statements.
If we look, for example, at deeply religious people, there is a clear distinction between what they personally feel and what they think the will of the divine is.
Reply to Wittgenstein With certain assumptions/rules yes. So if something like "Lying is wrong" is a starting assumtion then "Lying to your frined is wrong" is true. Is "Lying is wrong" true or false though? That depends on the person. You use some statements such as "lying is wrong" to prove the truth of falsity of other statements but whether or not you consider those starting assumtions to be true depends on the person. So if you're looking to assign a certain moral statement (or any statement for that matter) a truth value regardless of context or starting assumtions then I don't think you can do that.
WittgensteinAugust 11, 2019 at 08:42#3147740 likes
Reply to Echarmion
I would divide emotivism into two further categories.
1.Overt emotivism regards the utterance of moral statements as attitudes in a descriptive form.
Hence the statement "killing is bad" is a description of the statement "l hate killing". So according to overt emotivist we can replace these two statements. This theory is really week in my opinion.
2.Covert emotivism may be a little tricky since they tend to replace hate,despise, fear etc with bad , evil , immoral and so on in moral statements but they do not express attitudes as you have mentioned rightly.
, it seems obvious to me that people don't just express an emotion when they make moral statements.
Mind you, you can obviously disagree with the distinction but l think it's useful ( at least for me ) .
Do you think covert emotivism is really common among public especially when they tend to defend some moral statements with ridiculous arguments. If it is common with public, academic are only good at hiding it and justifying the use of truth values.
WittgensteinAugust 11, 2019 at 08:49#3147770 likes
With certain assumptions/rules yes. So if something like "Lying is wrong" is a starting assumtion then
1. Yes, if we allow assumptions we can get far but we may end up confused when facing moral dilemma. Would you lie to a murderer knocking at your door inquiring about your family members ? Most people will lie in those circumstances because they weren't taking
"lying is wrong " as a principal or a true statement but as an emotive statement which can neither be true or false.
2. Do you think we can assign truth values to basic moral assumptions ?
Would you lie to a murderer knocking at your door inquiring about your family members
If "Lying is wrong" is the only moral assumption I'm making then it would bo wrong to lie to a murderer. To make it ok in that scenario you'd need something more detailed like: "Taking a course of action that can be reasonably inferred to incur a lot more suffering than other available options is wrong" for example would permit lying to said murderer. Also there is no reason to limit yourself to ONE of these moral assumptions but we as humans like it when someone makes as few assumptions as possible.
Do you think we can assign truth values to basic moral assumptions ?
No. I don't think you can assign absolute truth values to anything. Moral assumptions (as well as other assumptions) are statements you proclaim to be true which allow for further reasoning but that leaves them open to someone coming along and saying "But actually I don't agree with the statement lying is wrong and I personally prefer the statement lying is right" and there is nothing you can do about that. There is no assumption you can assign a truth value to in such a way that makes it immune to someone coming along and disagreeing with it. It's just that as a society we tend to have many more shared assumptions than not, because people who don't share our assumptions end up dead or in jail
Terrapin StationAugust 11, 2019 at 13:26#3148060 likes
We can assign truth values to statements about metaethics, for example.
Including that this statement is true:
"Normative ethical/moral stances have no truth value."
Terrapin StationAugust 11, 2019 at 13:28#3148070 likes
If someone doesn't feel that x is morally right/permissible, etc., or that y is morally wrong/impermissible, etc., then I wouldn't say that "x is morally right..."/"y is morally wrong..." is a moral stance that they have.
Terrapin StationAugust 11, 2019 at 13:32#3148080 likes
With certain assumptions/rules yes. So if something like "Lying is wrong" is a starting assumtion then "Lying to your frined is wrong" is true.
If someone were to say both "Lying is wrong" and "Lying to your friend is okay," then they're probably just not expressing their view very clearly or in enough detail or with enough qualifications. They're probably not saying something they'd agree is false (re "Lying to your fiend is okay") relative to "Lying is wrong" (assuming the idea of that really makes much sense in the first place) if they say both of those things.
Magnus AndersonAugust 11, 2019 at 14:16#3148100 likes
A moral statement such as "It is wrong to kill" in the majority of cases means "If you want to maximize your chances to attain certain goal G then you must not kill other people". Such a claim can either be true or false. So the answer to your question is yes, moral statements do have a truth value.
In some cases, such a statement might simply mean "I don't want people to kill other people not because I want to attain some other goal but simply because I don't want that sort of stuff to happen". Such statements express a goal that is not subordinated to any other goal (an end in itself) as adopted by someone. Such statements, it is true, have no truth value.
But most moral statements aren't of that sort.
WittgensteinAugust 11, 2019 at 14:37#3148110 likes
Reply to Terrapin Station
That's really interesting and l agree with placing truth values on metaethic statements but I think that they belong to realm of logic and language . They are outside the domain of ethics in my opinion.
Terrapin StationAugust 11, 2019 at 15:01#3148130 likes
If "Lying is wrong" is the only moral assumption I'm making then it would bo wrong to lie to a murderer. To make it ok in that scenario you'd need something more detailed like: "Taking a course of action that can be reasonably inferred to incur a lot more suffering than other available options is wrong" for example would permit lying to said murderer.
I think that response is classical Utilitarianism. That maxim can also have problems in certain cases like the following one. Should a judge sentence an innocent person to death to avoid mass rioting that can cause 100s of death ? Most people would not justify that. There is also another problem with maximizing happiness and reducing suffering because the consequences may not be achieved and yet the deeds may still be noble and good. Consider a firefighter who tries to save a baby but fails in the end. He hasn't reduced any suffering in the end but the act was clearly moral and good.
No. I don't think you can assign absolute truth values to anything. Moral assumptions (as well as other assumptions) are statements you proclaim to be true which allow for further reasoning but that leaves them open to someone coming along and saying "But actually I don't agree with the statement lying is wrong and I personally prefer the statement lying is right" and there is nothing you can do about that. There is no assumption you can assign a truth value to in such a way that makes it immune to someone coming along and disagreeing with it.
I want to clarify my point on what turns a statement into a proposition. Non cognitivism asserts that moral statements are incapable of having truth values, and that means assigning truth values i.e true or false is meaningless. Non--cognitivism doesn't imply that all moral statements have to be accepted as either true or false and it also doesn't imply that people cannot disagree with each other. It is an issue of logic and language and not that of ethics .
People demonstrably can and do assign truth values to moral statements, just as we routinely assign truth values to claims ranging from "the cat is on the mat" to "water freezes at 0 degrees c" to "Jesus died for our sins."
If there's a philosophically interesting issue it resides in how we justify our truth value assignments--which amounts to revealing what the difference between the "true" and "false" hinges on and amounts to in someone's judgment of the issue. God-given commandment? Historically and culturally situated norms? Personal conviction or preference or emotional "knowing"? Moral imperatives hovering out there in Kantland or tucked away on a shelf in Plato's cave? Queer entities or qualities or relations of a very strange sort, utterly different from anything else in the universe? Instrumental or pragmatic requirement?
Magnus AndersonAugust 11, 2019 at 16:59#3148360 likes
There is also another problem with maximizing happiness and reducing suffering because the consequences may not be achieved and yet the deeds may still be noble and good. Consider a firefighter who tries to save a baby but fails in the end. He hasn't reduced any suffering in the end but the act was clearly moral and good.
It's moral and good because people think it's better to try and fail than to not try at all. In other words, they think that if you make 10 mediocre attempts that you will be successful at least once (you'll save at least one baby) whereas if you try to make sure that every single attempt of yours is a successful one you will never make an attempt which means you'll fail 0 times and succeed 0 times (i.e. you'll save zero babies.) Although not apparent, moral decisions of this sort are still guided by projected consequences.
If someone doesn't feel that x is morally right/permissible, etc., or that y is morally wrong/impermissible, etc., then I wouldn't say that "x is morally right..."/"y is morally wrong..." is a moral stance that they have.
For a given definition of "feel", this may be accurate. It's not like you can somehow decouple your cognition from your feelings. But I think it would be wrong to dismiss the different role the justification plays for moral stances as opposed to emotions.
An interesting parallel might be law. There is a school of thought which supposes that the application of legal rules is mostly governed by intuition, and the actual legal arguments are then formulated to support that intuition. But that doesn't make the legal arguments pointless, because knowing that you will need to support a stance, and what kind of support is considered adequate, will change your intuition.
Deleted UserAugust 11, 2019 at 17:30#3148430 likes
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If someone were to say both "Lying is wrong" and "Lying to your friend is okay," then they're probably just not expressing their view very clearly or in enough detail or with enough qualifications
No? 2+2=4? Triangles have three sides and squares four?
I meant anything non trivial. These statements are true by definition. This would be like saying "Lying is wrong therefore lying to your friend is wrong". Given the first assumptions "lying is wrong" the conclusion follows. In the case of math you need certain axioms such as (A=B and B=C => A=C) to prove many statements. One cannot "prove" that if A=B and B=C => A=C but every human ever has agreed with that statement so far so no one has had to
If M is true, and I think it is, then it is fair to ask what makes it true
The problem is, I think you can ask this "what makes it true" question forever.
Murder is wrong
Why
Because it harms someone else which is bad
Why
Because harming other people is not repsecting their free will which is bad
Why
etc etc
Eventually I believe you will have to try to find a statement the annoying why guy would agree with. I believe the best you can do when it comes to morality (or anything) is just find that axiom no one disagrees with.
that means assigning truth values i.e true or false is meaningless
I don’t think it’s meaningless, I just don’t think you can assign a truth value to any statement without certain assumptions that are not proven. Moral statements can be true or false relative to starting assumptions
Terrapin StationAugust 11, 2019 at 19:05#3148600 likes
Are you prepared to let everything be hostage to the infant who just says why?
No. But where that infant begins and where a serious skeptic ends is completely subjective. And even if I personally am not prepared others might be and I have no grounds on which to criticize them other than pragmatic ones. Quoting tim wood
Are you prepared to deny the possibility of such a system of thinking?
No. That doesn't mean others aren't.
Terrapin StationAugust 11, 2019 at 20:49#3148770 likes
Strong emotions, so strong that you can't imagine thinking otherwise, are not the same thing is reason. "Murder is wrong" isn't a result of reasoning. It's just a strong emotion.
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Terrapin StationAugust 12, 2019 at 10:36#3149730 likes
Maybe it's just a game to take a stance of anti-reason, to deny reason, but all that is, is a self-proclamation of being a fool.
Yup I agree. I'm saying there is no stopping the fool by calling him a fool. He doesn't think he is, he thinks we're the fools. I'm not taking that stance, I'm pointing out that taking the stance of reason cannot stop someone form taking a stance of anti reason
Oh! Wait! You can't call them bad people; you have no reason to!
I can and would, it just doesn't actually stop them unless they themselves believe murder is wrong (which they probably don't).
The only point I'm making is that reason is society bound which is why using it against those who don't want to use it will never work. Calling a fool a fool doesn't do anything. And there were times when the most intelligent people were called fools for the longest time. I, personally, am a fan of reason but if someone isn't there is nothing I can do to convince him. Calling him a fool won't work (if he truely is anti reason) but I still WILL. That's all I'm saying
ChatteringMonkeyAugust 12, 2019 at 12:55#3150010 likes
Ethics or morality is neither subjective nor objective, but collective or intersubjective if you will. And as such they are a real feature of groups that has consequences. Eventhough you cannot verify them empirically like facts, you can test what the moral standards are in a certain group by gaging into the attitudes of people... Punching babies in the face on Times Square will get you into trouble.
So yes you can assign truthvalues to statements in ethics, with the caveat that those statements are necessarily limited to a specific social context.
Terrapin StationAugust 12, 2019 at 13:21#3150070 likes
It's a type of convention, which originate in dialogue and agreement between people roughly speaking. You can find it in the brains of people, but not in one particular person individually, which is why the label 'subjective' doesn't really apply. Like paper money, which doesn't have any inherent value (for people), it has tangible consequences because people agreed on it and believe in it.
Terrapin StationAugust 12, 2019 at 13:51#3150150 likes
It's a type of convention, which originate in dialogue and agreement between people roughly speaking. You can find it in the brains of people, but not in one particular person individually, which is why the label 'subjective' doesn't really apply.
"Subjective" refers to something being located in brains, by the way. Re agreement, that's just sounds that people make. The meaning part occurs in brains. So value only occurs in brains. It's fine noting that we can agree on things, but that's not where the valuing part occurs.
For "intersubjective, not subjective or objective" to amount to anything substantial, you'd need to be locating the valuing part somewhere other than just persons' brains or in the world outside of their brains. (Whatever would be left.)
ChatteringMonkeyAugust 12, 2019 at 13:59#3150200 likes
For "intersubjective, not subjective or objective" to amount to anything substantial, you'd need to be locating the valuing part somewhere other than just persons' brains or in the world outside of their brains. (Whatever would be left.)
My goal, and I would say the goal of philosophy is not to amount to anything "substantial" whatever that means, but to make sense of the world. I don't see why 'intersubjective', though i prefer collective, doesn't do exactly what I want it to do, and that is to make relevant distinctions that help me make sense of the world.
Reply to Wittgenstein I believe that moral statements can be emotive or cognitive, and it's all about speaker meaning. Some people say moral statements purely on emotions, others rely on moral principles.
ChatteringMonkeyAugust 12, 2019 at 14:19#3150230 likes
Reply to Terrapin Station To elaborate a bit more, if you say morality is subjective because the valuing happens in the brain, you need some additional explanation to say that eventhough it is 'merely' subjective there are other mechanisms that make it a bad idea to act only one your individual subjective idea of what is moral. And unlike say preference in taste, there are definitely consequences to acting on you own subjective morals only... so it seems to me the distinction between things that are individual and collective is a usefull one here.
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Terrapin StationAugust 12, 2019 at 17:36#3150930 likes
Yes, I was. You asked my moral stance on it. Moral stances are dispositions--preferences or feelings, basically, that individuals have about interpersonal behavior that they consider to be more significant than etiquette.
You might think that moral stances are something other than that. You'd be factually incorrect about that.
Terrapin StationAugust 12, 2019 at 17:42#3150950 likes
To elaborate a bit more, if you say morality is subjective because the valuing happens in the brain, you need some additional explanation to say that eventhough it is 'merely' subjective there are other mechanisms that make it a bad idea to act only one your individual subjective idea of what is moral. And unlike say preference in taste, there are definitely consequences to acting on you own subjective morals only... so it seems to me the distinction between things that are individual and collective is a usefull one here.
Subjective shouldn't have a "merely" first off, as if it's simpler or inferior or whatever.
Whether something is a bad idea is also subjective, of course.
Morality is dispositions about interpersonal behavior. So that means that by definition, it's not just about one's own behavior. And by definition, it's dispositions that people feel strong enough about that they'd take forcible action to prevent,and sometimes to obligate, some behavior (otherwise it would just be etiquette). So of course there's a social aspect to it, but moral stances, moral valuations themselves are individual and subjective.
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Terrapin StationAugust 12, 2019 at 18:00#3151020 likes
I did. You don't agree that I did. So I'm trying to explain that to you. Of course, either you're trolling or you're incredibly dense, so it might be difficult, but in either case, I'm willing to try to explain it to you.
Hence why I asked if you didn't agree that "Murder is wrong" is a moral stance.
ChatteringMonkeyAugust 12, 2019 at 18:21#3151250 likes
Whether something is a bad idea is also subjective, of course.
It's a bad idea, if you hold the value that you don't want whatever the negative consequences are of disregarding morality. The value is subjective, not the 'fact' that to obtain that value you'd better don't disregard some intersubjective morality.
Morality is dispositions about interpersonal behavior. So that means that by definition, it's not just about one's own behavior.
Sure, but morality being about interpersonal behaviour doesn't make the disposition itself interpersonal. If it's only an individual disposition, then you are missing something.
And by definition, it's dispositions that people feel strong enough about that they'd take forcible action to prevent,and sometimes to obligate, some behavior (otherwise it would just be etiquette). So of course there's a social aspect to it, but moral stances, moral valuations themselves are individual and subjective.
You are missing something. The social aspect is the vital part. For a women in a radical muslim country it doesn't matter if her moral view is that everyone should be able to wear what they want, she will still have to act according to the dominant mores... unless she can find enough likeminded people to change those societal mores. If you're the only one holding a certain view, then you merely have a view on morality, but that does not constitute an actual morality that is enforced socially.
Terrapin StationAugust 12, 2019 at 18:30#3151290 likes
"Bad"/"good" are ALWAYS subjective assessments, and there's never a guarantee that any two people will come to the same assessment about the same thing.
If he does wrong, do we say, "Oh, that's all right, for after all he's just a fool; let him go to do it again"?
No we usually jail him. Again, I never said you have to tolerate foolishness even if the foolish see us as being fools for that. You just can't stop them because you have no argument to convince them by. Same if the fool tries to convince you to become one. He can't convince you and you can't convince him so then it's just survival of the fittest. Note this entire paragraph could have been stated by said fool looking at a person employing reason. That's what I mean by survival of the fittest. Neither the fool nor the reasoable person has a claim over which method is "better", it's just that most of the fools died
My point is that there are moral rights and wrongs. And there must be.
Depends on how you define them. We seem to have a pretty clear cut difference here at least when it comes to morality.
Me: Morality is intersubjective, but you don't need an objective rule to foist your moral codes onto someone else, that just depends on who can do it more effectively
You (at least how I'm reading it): Morality is objective, because you need objective rules before foisting your moral codes onto someone else
If Terrapin murders someone because he feels like it, do the rest of us put him in prison because we feel like it?
Yes, at least to me. The main point of jail is so he doesn't do it again. Why do we think he shouldn't do it again? Because none of us wants to die. So ultimately it is because we don't feel like letting him kill any more of us.
And if Terrapin doesn't feel like going to prison, what then?
We throw him in anyway. I don't think you need an objective morality to foist your values onto someone else. Nothing is stopping you except how much you CAN foist said values
ChatteringMonkeyAugust 12, 2019 at 18:53#3151350 likes
Terrapin Station:morality being about interpersonal behaviour doesn't make the disposition itself interpersonal.
— ChatteringMonkey
I don't know if that's what you meant to type, but I couldn't agree more.
It is what i meant to type... but you may be interpreting it not as I intended. But i don't think it matters, I agree, dispositions are not interpersonal. Though I'd say that the dispositions are not the same as a morality.
If she wants particular consequences, etc., sure. But that in itself isn't actually morality. Morality is value assessments of interpersonal behavior.
Your are using a different definition then, I suppose. As I said, a value assessment of interpersonal behaviour is 'merely' a view on morality, not an an actual morality.
But you can't make any sense out of the mores without adding in meaning, value judgments, etc.
I don't see why that is a problem, that's part of it sure. Money also doesn't make sense without humans giving it meaning and valuing it, though there's an aspect to it that's more then that... more than an individual valuation that is.
But I think it would be wrong to dismiss the different role the justification plays for moral stances as opposed to emotions.
— Echarmion
I'm not sure what this is saying.
I am saying that your justification for a certain brain-state is a useful distinction for different "classes" of brain-states.
"Simple" emotions are not connected - mentally - to a requirement of a specific kind of justification. Moral stances are. So they can be differentiated from said emotions on that basis. This also means we can evaluate different moral stances, including our own, in a way we cannot do with "simple" emotions. This might not qualify as a truth value to you, but it nevertheless makes the claim that moral stances are just like emotions inaccurate.
Terrapin StationAugust 12, 2019 at 19:49#3151500 likes
I don't see why that is a problem, that's part of it sure. Money also doesn't make sense without humans giving it meaning and valuing it, though there's an aspect to it that's more then that... more than an individual valuation that is.
It's not a problem. Morality is just something different than the social enforcement of morality.
Terrapin StationAugust 12, 2019 at 19:53#3151530 likes
You were asked a question with a yes/no answer. That question you did not answer. And even now you do not address.
That's some location.
Ignoring that you completely ignored the question I asked, even though you supposedly have an issue with that, you're not saying that you couldn't understand "Sure, I feel that it is wrong" as me uttering a "Yes" opinion, are you?
Asking this of someone who has already stated that they believe moral right/wrong is a matter of subjective opinion and demanding a yes/no answer is like asking "Have you stopped beating your wife, yes or no?".
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Ah, okay. And what would you say is an example of this?
Let's say your moral stances is "lying is always wrong". Let's suppose, for the sake of argument, that this is merely an expression of what you feel.
Now you visit this forum and see a thread about the morality of lying. Being that you feel your moral stance strongly, you want to participate. But you cannot write "that's how I feel" because you know that's not how you justify a position in philosophy. So you have to figure out an argument for your position.
If other people make counterarguments, you will then have to either evaluate your position and address the arguments, or ignore them. If you do the former, your position is now no longer one of emotion, since you're applying reasoning to support it and implicitly accept that reasoning is how you support such positions. If you do the latter you end up with a cognitive dissonance where you at the one hand have claimed that your position is reasonable, but on the other failed to support it. This also means your position is now no longer one of merely emotion.
You could of course refrain from any argument altogether, insisting that you merely have a feeling. That is not, however, how people normally operate with respect to moral stances. If it were, there'd be no need to even have a term for "moral stance".
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Terrapin StationAugust 13, 2019 at 16:03#3153290 likes
But whether people believe/accept it or not, foundational moral stances ARE simply ways that they feel. There's no way to justify them on facts, since you can't derive an ought from an is. Again, this is the case whether people believe or act like it is or not.
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Terrapin StationAugust 13, 2019 at 16:11#3153320 likes
Already exhibited to you, I think more than once. See Mortimer Adler, for example.
I've explained to you in detail why Adler doesn't work. We can do the dance again if you like. Re fleeing, I respond if you respond to me. You simply ignore the responses or only reply in a trolling way.
I responded to Echarmion. He can respond if he wants.
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Because murder,in itself, does not allow of degrees, , and cannot be partly wrong and not wrong, then it must be right.
You don't seem to have grasped the fact that you're arguing with someone who believes that things are only morally right/wrong from an individual subjective perspective.
It's quite pointless insisting "if it is not wrong......it must be right." if the person you're talking to simply does not accept your starting premises.
Magnus AndersonAugust 13, 2019 at 17:37#3153420 likes
By refusing to say murder is wrong, Terrapin is in effect saying that it is not the case that murder is wrong.
If what you asked him is "Do you agree that murder is wrong?" then he did answer your question, his answer being "Yes, murder is wrong".
Even if he did not answer your question that wouldn't mean (as you seem to be claiming) that he does not think that murder is wrong.
No answer != negative answer.
Terapin is right in the sense that some of the moral statements are nothing more than expressions of one's personal preferences. In some cases, saying "Murder is wrong" means no more than "I don't want people to be murdered". But in many cases -- in fact, in most of the cases -- moral statements aren't mere expressions of one's wants, desires, goals, etc. Rather, they are expressions of what someone thinks is the best thing to do in order to maximize chances of attaining certain goal. In most cases, what "Murder is wrong" means is "If you want human species to survive for as long as possible, don't kill other people". Such statements DO have a truth value.
It's really as simple as that.
Terrapin StationAugust 13, 2019 at 18:33#3153510 likes
As I recall, you wanted to consider "ought to do X," disregarding the "if you want Y. Was that it?
No, that's not it.
What I pointed out is that "if you want Y" does NOT imply that you ought to do Y, or that you ought to do X, which achieves Y.
"You ought to (do what's necessary to) achieve what you want" is not a fact. That would have to be a fact in order for either "If you want x, then you should do x" OR "if you want x, and y is necessary for x, then you should do y" to be implied by wanting x.
But whether people believe/accept it or not, foundational moral stances ARE simply ways that they feel. There's no way to justify them on facts, since you can't derive an ought from an is. Again, this is the case whether people believe or act like it is or not.
I don't think the "simply" belongs here. Moral stances may originate as feelings. But they have another dimension when other subjects enter the picture, and start to communicate. That's why i think it's accurate to say that there is an interpersonal layer where things like "moral truths" reside. This does not make them facts, or justifiable from facts.
If we're going with the subjective / objective dichotomy, then morals are subjective. There is no way they could be objective, since what object would they refer to? But in the subjective there are different forms of thought. There are things that are not reason-able, like emotions or preferences ("blue is my favorite color"). But there are also things that are reason-able, like "murder is wrong", because these kinds of brain-states, whatever we want to call them, contain in them a connection to other subjects. Not some kind of mystical ether, but just the way we thing these kind of thoughts contains our relation to others.
Terrapin StationAugust 13, 2019 at 18:45#3153530 likes
I don't think the "simply" belongs here. Moral stances may originate as feelings. But they have another dimension when other subjects enter the picture, and start to communicate. That's why i think it's accurate to say that there is an interpersonal layer where things like "moral truths" reside. This does not make them facts, or justifiable from facts.
Truth is a subjective judgment about the relation of a proposition to something else. So "truth" isn't the right word here certainly.
But there are also things that are reason-able, like "murder is wrong", because these kinds of brain-states, whatever we want to call them, contain in them a connection to other subjects.
Are you defining "reason" as "a connection to other subjects"?
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Are you defining "reason" as "a connection to other subjects"?
No, not exactly. But I think it's a defining characteristic of reason that it is shared among humans. So it being accessible to other people is an aspect.
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Magnus AndersonAugust 13, 2019 at 20:16#3153660 likes
Given where we've been, your answer is deeply disingenuous. You're not asked for your opinion. To my ear, you've been asked the equivalent of, '"is two and two four?" And you've answered, "yes, in my opinion."
You did ask for his opinion. And his opinion is that murder is wrong. Maybe you wanted to ask him a different question, a question such as "Is murder objectively wrong?" But you did not. At least not clearly. And asking him such a question would lead you nowhere. What would you do when he responds with "No, murder is not objectively wrong"?
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Terrapin StationAugust 13, 2019 at 20:26#3153700 likes
Yes. Point to you. I get sometimes hung up on this being and attempting to be a philosophy site. Which I take to be a place to learn. Not everyone participates with either that understanding or that agenda.
You don't seem as if you're trying to learn anything. You seem as if you want to be a teacher and you're basically offended if you're not accepted as such.
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Terrapin StationAugust 13, 2019 at 20:35#3153720 likes
As to the question itself, "Is X wrong," I do not see therein any reference to opinion.
Whenever you ask someone a question such as "Is X Y?" you are asking for their opinion. If I were to ask you a question such as "Is Socrates a man?" I would be asking for your opinion (which could be right or wrong.)
Terrapin's opinion happens to have no truth value because it is a mere expression of his personal preferences. When he tells you that murder is wrong all he's saying is that he doesn't like people to kill each other. The only way you can disagree with him is by claiming that he's lying about his preferences .e.g. by saying "No, dear Terrapin, you are lying, you don't mind it when people kill each other!"
The real problem with emotivism is that it's making a claim that EVERY moral statement is merely an expression of one's personal preferences. That's simply not true.
Terrapin's moral statements might be nothing more than mere expressions of what he likes and dislikes but my moral statements are not.
Magnus AndersonAugust 13, 2019 at 21:11#3153870 likes
Here's a moral statement:
"The surest way to end up in heaven is by not lying to other people."
When we try to simplify it, we get something like:
"Don't lie!"
(Because you'll end up in hell if you do and you don't want to go to hell, don't you?)
It's a false statement but that's irrelevant. What's relevant is that it has a truth value. In reality, it is either the case that when you lie you go to hell and when you tell the truth you go to heaven -- or it is not.
The fact that people want to go to heaven is irrelevant.
Most moral statements are like that. I am not saying that every moral statement is like that, even less so that every statement -- moral or not -- is of that sort. I am simply saying that most moral statements are in fact statements about the way the world outside of the thinking subject works.
Terrapin StationAugust 13, 2019 at 21:21#3153900 likes
Terrapin's moral statements might be nothing more than mere expressions of what he likes and dislikes but my moral statements are not.
Although of course I simply think you have a mistaken belief that your moral statements are not expressions of personal dispositions, preferences, etc.
"The surest way to end up in heaven is by not lying to other people."
I wouldn't actually say that that is a moral statement because it doesn't express whether it's right or wrong to lie or end up in heaven, or whether one should or should not lie or end up in heaven.
Magnus AndersonAugust 13, 2019 at 21:34#3153930 likes
I wouldn't actually say that that is a moral statement because it doesn't express whether it's right or wrong to lie or end up in heaven, or whether one should or should not lie or end up in heaven.
That's true. The statement is not a moral one. A moral statement would be something like "Lying is wrong". The above statement tells you how the universe works (in the form of "The surest way to make Y happen is to do X") but it does not tell you whether lying is right or wrong. So I stand corrected.
However, I would still argue that most of our moral judgments are not based solely on our personal preferences (what we like and what we dislike) but also on how the universe works.
In most cases, we decide whether a given act, such as lying, is right or wrong by:
1) choosing a goal: do we want to go to heaven or hell?
2) understanding how the universe works so that we can do what is necessary to do in order to attain our goal (what happens when you lie? what happens when you tell the truth? what happens when you keep quiet?)
If lying is precisely that which is necessary to do in order to attain our goal, then we say that lying is right. If it is precisely that which we must not do in order to attain our goal, then we say that lying is wrong.
My beef with emotivism is that it claims that moral judgments are based solely on one's personal preferences.
That's not true.
Terrapin StationAugust 13, 2019 at 21:56#3154000 likes
I don't say that you can't reason once you've stated your preferences. I say that (effectively) foundational moral stances can't be reasoned (and oughts can't be reasoned period per what I explained above as comments about Adler's claim otherwise). I just don't write all of that out all the time because it's wordy, it's laborious to write it all out, and it seems to me like it should be obvious.
So, for example, if we know that John thinks it's immoral to not let people freely live anywhere in the world that they'd like to live (or we could look at this from John's perspective just as well), then we could very well reason that John is probably going to think it's immoral to call ICE to raid his favorite restaurant, where he know a number of illegals are working (or from John's perspective, he could easily conclude this). But none of this makes the moral part something other than personal preferences. (And John could conclude otherwise--but it would be very odd for him to, we'd probably want further qualifications, etc.)
Magnus AndersonAugust 13, 2019 at 22:08#3154030 likes
I don't say that you can't reason once you've stated your preferences.
The point I am trying to make, which you seem to disagree with, is that most moral statements aren't mere expressions of one's personal preferences.
For example, in most cases, when someone says "Lying is wrong" they are not merely stating that they do not like to lie. Rather, what they are saying is "If I lie I won't be able to attain my goals".
In most cases, "Lying is wrong" is equivalent to "If I lie I won't attain my goals". (This means that moral statements do have truth value.)
Terrapin StationAugust 13, 2019 at 22:26#3154070 likes
In most cases, "Lying is wrong" is equivalent to "If I lie I won't attain my goals". (This means that moral statements do have a truth value.)
I don't agree with that as an empirical matter (that most moral utterances are only going to amount to the conditions necessary for some goal--my side of the bet would be on most people really having reactions for or against certain behaviors on a gut level), but again, I wouldn't say that "If I do x, then y is/is not achievable" is a moral utterance in the first place. So you'd be saying that most apparently moral utterances aren't moral utterances at all.
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Terrapin StationAugust 13, 2019 at 22:52#3154140 likes
Congratulation! You have earned a spot on the mere-S troll list. You''re only the second enlistee. That means I hold that you have removed all doubt as to your being a troll, and you earn thereby the epithet all trolls deserve. Fuck off! I shall waste no more time on you, but I will, when and as seems appropriate to me, warn others of your troll-like qualities.
That certainly seems like you being here to learn.
Reply to Wittgenstein
I would tend to be inclined towards non-cognitivism/emotivism, but don't necessarily agree with the distinction. Ethical arguments are colored by emotional appeals, but the attempt to parcel out an ethic can be concerned with abstract truths. I would reject that such truths exist, but do not think that the parties who put forth such an argument are necessarily making an emotional appeal.
Ethics is an experiment in how to live well collectively. Whether or not an action can be considered to be right or wrong is particular to each and every given situation.
Terrapin StationAugust 14, 2019 at 00:02#3154280 likes
Really? Always? Is two plus two four? Are those nice folks over there your parents? Do you live on planet earth? Your answers to these and all other questions are just your expressions of your opinion? Is there anything that you know?
First, there's a sense of "opinion" that refers to one's view on a factual matter. This is the sense in which you receive opinions--including second opinions, from physicians. This is also the sense in which we write sentences such as "Einstein does not share the opinion held by most of us that there is overwhelming evidence for quantum mechanics."
This discussion began with a reference to an entry in the online Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entitled "Moral Cognitivism vs. Non-Cognitivism". The OP asked for opinions on this article.
I tried reading this and have to confess that I could not get through it - it was too dense and jargon laden for me. However, the summary at the top of the article is reasonably clear and I believe I get the gist of things.
Basically the article is a survey of contemporary philosophical schools of thought regarding statements about morality. The author groups these schools of thought into two large categories - Moral Cognitivism vs. Moral Non-Cognitivism. There are also many sub-categories.
Based on the opening summary, you seem to be on the side of Moral Cognitivism and in particular you seem to be a moral realist. Per the article, "... moral realists are cognitivists insofar as they think moral statements are apt for robust truth and falsity and that many of them are in fact true."
I.e., I believe you would assert that the statement "Murder is wrong" is a true statement. Please correct me if I am mis-representing you.
Terrapin, on the other hand, falls into the Non-cognitivist camp. Again, per the article, "non-cognitivists think that moral statements have no substantial truth conditions".
So asking the question "Is murder wrong, yes or no?" cannot possibly be a starting point for discussion since this statement assumes that Moral Cognitivism is correct. To continue this thought, even if a person were to answer this "No" - that too is a statement that only a Moral Cognitivist would make - albeit one that you would disagree with. I.e., by asserting that "Murder is OK" a person is asserting a truth value about a moral statement and (at the risk of repeating myself) non-cognitivists think that moral statements have no substantial truth conditions.
Putting it another way, the question "Is murder wrong, yes or no?" is *not* a simple question since there is a hidden assumption behind the question - namely that the question must be answered within the context of Moral Cognitivism.
So it is pointless to continue asking Terrapin the same question over and over since Terrapin is of the opinion that the question itself is wrong. Now could Terrapin find a way to answer you more clearly and respectfully? Perhaps - I wish both of you would be more respectful to each other; the name calling is distracting and does not contribute to the discussion. I do disagree with you that Terrapin is a troll, he may be arrogant, he may be totally wrong, but I am not seeing any trolling.
Oh - and I also disagree with Terrapin that you are a troll. :wink:
Perhaps you have already done so - in which case I apologize for the implication - but I respectfully suggest that you read the full article from the OP. I do not follow all the discussions, but there seem to be some interesting objections to Non-Cognitivism in sections 4 & 5. I could be wrong (it happens on a regular basis) but if you want to poke holes in Terrapin's Non-cognitivist position? That seems like a more fruitful approach.
WittgensteinAugust 14, 2019 at 03:49#3154700 likes
Reply to thewonder
I wrote this earlier on but l think it addresses your statement here ,
. I would reject that such truths exist, but do not think that the parties who put forth such an argument are necessarily making an emotional appeal.
I would divide emotivism into two further categories.
1.Overt emotivism regards the utterance of moral statements as attitudes in a descriptive form.
Hence the statement "killing is bad" is a description of the statement "l hate killing". So according to overt emotivist we can replace these two statements. This theory is really week in my opinion.
2.Covert emotivism may be a little tricky since they tend to replace hate,despise, fear etc with bad , evil , immoral and so on in moral statements but they do not express attitudes as you have mentioned rightly.
, it seems obvious to me that people don't just express an emotion when they make moral statements.
Mind you, you can obviously disagree with the distinction but l think it's useful ( at least for me ) .
Do you think covert emotivism is really common among public especially when they tend to defend some moral statements with ridiculous arguments. If it is common with public, academic are only good at hiding it and justifying the use of truth values.
I do think that it is possible for someone to level an Ethical argument concerning abstract truths without, wittingly or not, substituting that something is not Ethically valid with that it is socially disagreeable. I don't agree with such reasoning as I don't think that there are abstract Ethical truths, and I think that whether or not something is socially disagreeable can be relevant.
I also think that Emotivism partially assumes that an appeal to emotions invalidates an argument which I would also, to some degree, reject.
WittgensteinAugust 14, 2019 at 04:39#3154850 likes
Reply to EricH
Non Cognivitism has many other positions which haven't been discussed here yet. I hope we can discuss them one by one as the article states that
Since non-cognitivism is a species of irrealism about ethics, it should be unsurprising that many of its main motivations overlap with those for other versions of ethical irrealism
It is possible that most non cognitivists support a hybrid theory with various ethical irealist ideas overlapping.
Prescriptivists suggest that moral judgments are a species of prescriptive judgement and that moral sentences in the indicative mood are semantically more akin to imperatives than indicatives.
Universal prescriptivism suggests that moral statements like " stealing is wrong " act as "do no steal" since the main aim of moral statements is that they should be followed. What differs moral prescriptions from other imperatives statements like " you should not litter here " is the universal character of the imperative. They act as a command to the agent,the one at whom it is directed and all similar cases in society too. There is another problem with imperative statements, while most philosophers find it difficult to strictly indicate what falls under following but they generally state " having intentions to carry out order " falls under it. I may have missed the specifics but this is the gist of it.
Quasi Realism as the name suggests, is another branch of counter realism in ethics which seeks to explain why we treat ethical statements as being apt for truth values, especially in the society without basing their grounds on cognitivism. They reject that moral statements can have truth values attached to them on epistemic grounds. The positivist rejected moral language as being outside the domain of logic and scientific statements and hence meaningless as the article hints
Hence they fail tests for meaningful discourse proposed by logical positivists.
Expressivism is akin to emotivism as they have taken similar lines of reasoning however there is a fine distinction between them.
In recent years, however, the term ‘expressivist’ has come to be used in a narrower way, to refer to views which attempt to construct a systematic semantics for moral sentences by pairing them with the states of mind that the sentences are said to express. Such expressivists hold that the meanings of all sentences containing moral terms are determined by the mental states that they serve to express.
While the emotivist may fall under two broad different categories such as behaviourism or expressivism. It is also interesting to note that mental states are not always emotions. They can have imperatives, indicative moods and much more. This theory is different from the ones that l have mentioned above in the sense that it describes them all by placing mental states of the brain as a foundation to determine the meaning of ethical statements.
I will write about the hybrid theories of non-cognitivism before moving on to ethical realism.
My beef with emotivism is that it claims that moral judgments are based solely on one's personal preferences.
That's not true.
You're right but I'm not sure that the claim of emotivism is that moral judgements are solely based on personal preferences (that they're sufficient) - if they were, all personal preferences would be moral preferences and of course they're not.
My understanding of emotivism (and what I think is the case) is that it is the recognition that personal preferences are necessary components of all sincerely held moral stances. All (sincere) moral judgements are therefore, to some degree or other, expressions of emotional attitudes.
Terrapin StationAugust 14, 2019 at 11:26#3155280 likes
But there are also things that are reason-able, like "murder is wrong", because these kinds of brain-states, whatever we want to call them, contain in them a connection to other subjects.
If "Murder is wrong" isn't "reason-able" as you put it because of the connection to other subjects (in other words, you explained that that's not actually what you are referring to with the term "reason-able"), then what makes it reason-able?
If "Murder is wrong" isn't "reason-able" as you put it because of the connection to other subjects (in other words, you explained that that's not actually what you are referring to with the term "reason-able"), then what makes it reason-able?
It's reason-able because the statement is processed by a part of the brain that operates on a reason-ruleset, so to speak. A part that we use for things that concern interpersonal relations.
Terrapin StationAugust 14, 2019 at 12:56#3155470 likes
It's reason-able because the statement is processed by a part of the brain that operates on a reason-ruleset, so to speak. A part that we use for things that concern interpersonal relations.
So any phenomena in that part of the brain, and/or any phenomena focused on interpersonal relations is reason-able? (I don't know if it's also reasonable without the hyphen in your view.)
Since non-cognitivism is a species of irrealism about ethics, it should be unsurprising that many of its main motivations overlap with those for other versions of ethical irrealism
So non-cognitivism is a variation on a yet more generic framework? Dang, I missed that one - and that was the first sentence! :smile:
I did a quick search and ran into a different article in the same online Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entitled "Moral Anti-Realism". I tried plowing through this, but got bogged down in a ticket of jargon and terminologies. In fact, even the author (or authors) of this article humorously acknowledge the difficulty in defining/characterizing the different philosophical positions.
Anyway - I appreciate your efforts to explain the various beasts in this menagerie of philosophical positions. I will try to absorb some of this, but it will be very slow going.
My understanding of emotivism (and what I think is the case) is that it is the recognition that personal preferences are necessary components of all sincerely held moral stances. All (sincere) moral judgements are therefore, to some degree or other, expressions of emotional attitudes.
The question that comes to mind here is, if moral stances are expressions of emotional attitudes to some degree then what else are they?
So any phenomena in that part of the brain, and/or any phenomena focused on interpersonal relations is reason-able? (I don't know if it's also reasonable without the hyphen in your view.)
No, because that would include emotions and preferences. As for the hyphen, I use it to denote that I am using the two words reason and able literally, as in "accessible to reason".
Terrapin StationAugust 14, 2019 at 18:17#3156090 likes
The question that comes to mind here is, if moral stances are expressions of emotional attitudes to some degree then what else are they?
Whatever else the people making moral claims intend to convey. At the very least, moral judgements (in contrast to non-moral preferences) signify disapproval/approval for the actions of others.
It seems like you keep telling me info that's not what it is for "murder is wrong" to be reason-able then.
I'm wanting you to describe how it can be reason-able.
I am not certain it's possible to describe how reason works. There are arguments to be made about whether murder should be wrong. Those arguments must be logically valid and proceed from acceptable premises.
Whatever else the people making moral claims intend to convey. At the very least, moral judgements (in contrast to non-moral preferences) signify disapproval/approval for the actions of others.
And what if what people want to convey are certain "truths" about how interactions in a society should function? And moral stances are not just about the behaviour of others, you can evaluate (and change) your own actions based on your moral stance.
Terrapin StationAugust 14, 2019 at 19:58#3156290 likes
I am not certain it's possible to describe how reason works. There are arguments to be made about whether murder should be wrong. Those arguments must be logically valid and proceed from acceptable premises.
Would you say they could proceed from (or not include) premises that are not moral stances?
Terrapin StationAugust 14, 2019 at 20:01#3156300 likes
To say that murder is, in some sense, not in-itself wrong, especially based on "feeling" or "opinion" is like saying that murder is a liverwurst sandwich. Hey, just my opinion, and therefore and thereby I must be right! I have it written down right here in front of me!
Whether or not murder is wrong is contingent upon the circumstances in which the murder was committed. Because murder so emphatically denies the other by virtue of that it terminates them, it can generally be said that "murder is wrong" because is most cases this would prove to be 'true'. I'm sure that there is a hypothetical case where a person may question as to whether or not a murder was, in point of fact, "wrong". Also, are we speaking of murder in particular or just simply killing?
Edit: If we are just speaking of murder, being the unlawful and unwarranted killing of an other, then, you could conclude that "murder is wrong" because it would be, by definition, unwarranted. This ethic, however, stems from that there is an other. It exists because of a social relationship. There is nothing intrinsicly wrong with murder, or, rather, there exists no Ethical law which states that "murder is wrong". That it is wrong is something that is deduced because of a social relationship.
Terrapin StationAugust 14, 2019 at 20:19#3156400 likes
Reply to tim wood To ascribe abstract laws to Ethics ignores the particulars of any given situation. Take Kieslowski's Dekalog 5, for example. A young drifter kills a taxi driver as sort of existential experiment. From that "murder is wrong" and that "all are equal before the law" one would conclude that Jacek should be given the death penalty. If we don't begin with an assessment of Ethical truths, then we can take into consideration that he is a misguided youth probably stuggling with Nihilism and that some form of rehabilitation is probably better suited to such a crime. The assumption that there are objective Ethical truths is, rather ironically, resultant in a number of the absurdities of Law.
A methodology that proceeds from that "murder is wrong" could be quite interesting. To what degree is what one is doing like murder? I would, perhaps, deduce that it is wrong to violate what an other existentially attests. I would, then, of course, have to qualify this. You could say that in so far that what an other existentially attests is in good faith and Ethically sound and valid that it is wrong to violate this. I could parcel out an entire ethic from there as you could as well. I don't think that I would start there, though.
As murder is the exception and not the rule, I'm not sure that it would be useful to create an ethic proceeding from that "murder is wrong". We can say that "murder is wrong", but that is all that we really know. It's just the one rule that checks out.
For instance, what about theft? Had you just come out of Bicycle Thieves, you might suggest that it is wrong to steal because you don't know what role that that object has to play in a person's life. Had you just finished reading Les Misérables, you might suggest that it is fine to steal if you need to do so in order to survive. From this, you could deduce that it is wrong to steal a bicycle, but not a loaf of bread, but doing so would be absurd. The percieved need to ascribe abstract truths to Ethics is due to a legal aporia which assumes that there ought to be an effective functioning of the State. A governing body has no idea as to how to deal with criminality without the disjointed logic of objective Ethics. To me, it is clear that Ethics are contingent upon the particulars of any given situation. Because we could never understand any given situation in its entirety, we can't make any objective claims as to what is Ethically valid aside from a few deductions such as that "murder is wrong".
Reply to tim wood
My point is that you have only identified an exception to the rule. Murder is an extraordinary case. What we can infer proceeding from that "murder is wrong" can not necessarily be applied throughout all of Ethics.
I'm suggesting that all of Ethics is "outside the bounds of ordinary consideration". Every event is a particularity.
Edit: That you can say that "murder is wrong" does not necessarily invalidate the Non-Cognitivist position. That it happens to be the case that when someone states that "murder is wrong" can be proven to be 'true' abstractly does not necessarily mean that when they make such a claim that they are not making a personal appeal.
I do, however, think that it is possible to simply state that "murder is wrong" abstractly. The distinctions are not how I would choose to wage a debate concerning Ethics.
Edit 2: To answer the original question posed by Wittgenstein, I do think that it is possible to assign truth values to Ethical statements, but don't think that it is useful to do so.
That murder is wrong is trivially assumed by everyone, I think - almost everyone. At issue here is whether the non-cognitivist view is nonsense. I think it is.
Given that "murder is wrong is trivially assumed by everyone", does it make any practical difference in the real world if the reasons for a person thinking that murder is wrong are based in a strong sense of personal morality - i.e. if they are non-cognitivists? I think not.
Deleted UserAugust 15, 2019 at 03:26#3157310 likes
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...wherein tim wood invokes the Holocaust and then decides that there will be no further discussion.
So, for everyone else, does Non-Cognitivism deny that Ethical value judgements can be made? I think that it might, and don't necessarily agree, but do agree with the general sentiment of the critique of that is being made.
Terrapin StationAugust 15, 2019 at 03:50#3157410 likes
Would you say they could proceed from (or not include) premises that are not moral stances?
I am not sure. The question is whether it's possible to avoid an is-ought-fallacy on the one side and an infinite regress of moral stances on the other.
My intuition is that they proceed from a sort of moral axiom, which would be some principle of reciprocity (similar to the golden rule).
If you feel you have nothing more to say, that's OK. But to request that no one replies? I don't think that is in the spirit of this forum. Just say "I give you the last word". I have done this.
I would not serve on a jury if there was any chance that the death penalty could be applied.
I would just never agree to vote "guilty" in that case.
There are many situations where I'd never agree that someone is guilty due to not agreeing with laws/sentencing/etc. I strongly believe in jury nullification. Of course, not everyone does, but at least in the U.S. the jury's verdict has to be unanimous.
Yes, we can assign truth-values to moral statements. Why not? The emotivist argument is simply a bad argument. No, I don't simply mean, "Boo!" or "Yay!", although yes, they are typically representative of the related sentiment.
Magnus AndersonAugust 15, 2019 at 20:56#3161140 likes
Yes. Anything else implies murder is not wrong. Any takers on that?
"Murder is wrong" is a statement that is either true or false only if you assume that it has truth value. If it does not then the statement is neither true nor false. So you're wrong.
It is this assumption that is the subject of this thread.
What have you done to prove its validity?
Magnus AndersonAugust 15, 2019 at 21:04#3161220 likes
Every statement that says that some portion of reality is such and such has truth value i.e. it is either true or false.
After all, truth is a belief that corresponds to reality.
Even statements that merely express one's personal preferences have truth value: either one has the stated preferences or one does not.
"I like cake" expresses a personal preference of mine that I either have (which would make it true) or that I don't (which would make it false.)
The real subject of this thread then is concerned with language i.e. what moral statements actually mean.
According to emotivists, moral statements express no more than one's personal preferences. According to me, in most cases that is not true.
When most people say "Killing people is wrong" they are not merely saying that they don't want people to be killed. Rather, they are saying that society cannot survive if people kill each other.
In most cases, "X is wrong" is equivalent to "X is something that would make it difficult or impossible for us to attain our goals".
I believe you would assert that the statement "Murder is wrong" is a true statement.
— EricH
Yes. Anything else implies murder is not wrong. Any takers on that? That is, that can make the case?
The case has been around for some time, it just isn't convincing enough. They definitely have a truth-value, whatever that may be. Anyone who thinks otherwise I would put down to a result of misinterpretation.
Comments (141)
If we look, for example, at deeply religious people, there is a clear distinction between what they personally feel and what they think the will of the divine is.
I would divide emotivism into two further categories.
1.Overt emotivism regards the utterance of moral statements as attitudes in a descriptive form.
Hence the statement "killing is bad" is a description of the statement "l hate killing". So according to overt emotivist we can replace these two statements. This theory is really week in my opinion.
2.Covert emotivism may be a little tricky since they tend to replace hate,despise, fear etc with bad , evil , immoral and so on in moral statements but they do not express attitudes as you have mentioned rightly.
Mind you, you can obviously disagree with the distinction but l think it's useful ( at least for me ) .
Do you think covert emotivism is really common among public especially when they tend to defend some moral statements with ridiculous arguments. If it is common with public, academic are only good at hiding it and justifying the use of truth values.
1. Yes, if we allow assumptions we can get far but we may end up confused when facing moral dilemma. Would you lie to a murderer knocking at your door inquiring about your family members ? Most people will lie in those circumstances because they weren't taking
"lying is wrong " as a principal or a true statement but as an emotive statement which can neither be true or false.
2. Do you think we can assign truth values to basic moral assumptions ?
If "Lying is wrong" is the only moral assumption I'm making then it would bo wrong to lie to a murderer. To make it ok in that scenario you'd need something more detailed like: "Taking a course of action that can be reasonably inferred to incur a lot more suffering than other available options is wrong" for example would permit lying to said murderer. Also there is no reason to limit yourself to ONE of these moral assumptions but we as humans like it when someone makes as few assumptions as possible.
Quoting Wittgenstein
No. I don't think you can assign absolute truth values to anything. Moral assumptions (as well as other assumptions) are statements you proclaim to be true which allow for further reasoning but that leaves them open to someone coming along and saying "But actually I don't agree with the statement lying is wrong and I personally prefer the statement lying is right" and there is nothing you can do about that. There is no assumption you can assign a truth value to in such a way that makes it immune to someone coming along and disagreeing with it. It's just that as a society we tend to have many more shared assumptions than not, because people who don't share our assumptions end up dead or in jail
Including that this statement is true:
"Normative ethical/moral stances have no truth value."
If someone doesn't feel that x is morally right/permissible, etc., or that y is morally wrong/impermissible, etc., then I wouldn't say that "x is morally right..."/"y is morally wrong..." is a moral stance that they have.
If someone were to say both "Lying is wrong" and "Lying to your friend is okay," then they're probably just not expressing their view very clearly or in enough detail or with enough qualifications. They're probably not saying something they'd agree is false (re "Lying to your fiend is okay") relative to "Lying is wrong" (assuming the idea of that really makes much sense in the first place) if they say both of those things.
In some cases, such a statement might simply mean "I don't want people to kill other people not because I want to attain some other goal but simply because I don't want that sort of stuff to happen". Such statements express a goal that is not subordinated to any other goal (an end in itself) as adopted by someone. Such statements, it is true, have no truth value.
But most moral statements aren't of that sort.
That's really interesting and l agree with placing truth values on metaethic statements but I think that they belong to realm of logic and language . They are outside the domain of ethics in my opinion.
I'd say the realm of ontology, because it's talking about what ethics is/what its nature is, as an existent, so to speak.
At any rate, I'm definitely an emotivist/noncognitivist--or subjectivist as I'd usually put it.
I think that response is classical Utilitarianism. That maxim can also have problems in certain cases like the following one. Should a judge sentence an innocent person to death to avoid mass rioting that can cause 100s of death ? Most people would not justify that. There is also another problem with maximizing happiness and reducing suffering because the consequences may not be achieved and yet the deeds may still be noble and good. Consider a firefighter who tries to save a baby but fails in the end. He hasn't reduced any suffering in the end but the act was clearly moral and good.
I want to clarify my point on what turns a statement into a proposition. Non cognitivism asserts that moral statements are incapable of having truth values, and that means assigning truth values i.e true or false is meaningless. Non--cognitivism doesn't imply that all moral statements have to be accepted as either true or false and it also doesn't imply that people cannot disagree with each other. It is an issue of logic and language and not that of ethics .
If there's a philosophically interesting issue it resides in how we justify our truth value assignments--which amounts to revealing what the difference between the "true" and "false" hinges on and amounts to in someone's judgment of the issue. God-given commandment? Historically and culturally situated norms? Personal conviction or preference or emotional "knowing"? Moral imperatives hovering out there in Kantland or tucked away on a shelf in Plato's cave? Queer entities or qualities or relations of a very strange sort, utterly different from anything else in the universe? Instrumental or pragmatic requirement?
It's moral and good because people think it's better to try and fail than to not try at all. In other words, they think that if you make 10 mediocre attempts that you will be successful at least once (you'll save at least one baby) whereas if you try to make sure that every single attempt of yours is a successful one you will never make an attempt which means you'll fail 0 times and succeed 0 times (i.e. you'll save zero babies.) Although not apparent, moral decisions of this sort are still guided by projected consequences.
For a given definition of "feel", this may be accurate. It's not like you can somehow decouple your cognition from your feelings. But I think it would be wrong to dismiss the different role the justification plays for moral stances as opposed to emotions.
An interesting parallel might be law. There is a school of thought which supposes that the application of legal rules is mostly governed by intuition, and the actual legal arguments are then formulated to support that intuition. But that doesn't make the legal arguments pointless, because knowing that you will need to support a stance, and what kind of support is considered adequate, will change your intuition.
agreed
I meant anything non trivial. These statements are true by definition. This would be like saying "Lying is wrong therefore lying to your friend is wrong". Given the first assumptions "lying is wrong" the conclusion follows. In the case of math you need certain axioms such as (A=B and B=C => A=C) to prove many statements. One cannot "prove" that if A=B and B=C => A=C but every human ever has agreed with that statement so far so no one has had to
Quoting tim wood
The problem is, I think you can ask this "what makes it true" question forever.
Murder is wrong
Why
Because it harms someone else which is bad
Why
Because harming other people is not repsecting their free will which is bad
Why
etc etc
Eventually I believe you will have to try to find a statement the annoying why guy would agree with. I believe the best you can do when it comes to morality (or anything) is just find that axiom no one disagrees with.
Close but it’s closer to negative utilitarianism, I was just giving it as an example though. I know there are problems with it
Quoting Wittgenstein
I don’t think it’s meaningless, I just don’t think you can assign a truth value to any statement without certain assumptions that are not proven. Moral statements can be true or false relative to starting assumptions
But that's all we emotivists are referring to.
Quoting Echarmion
I'm not sure what this is saying.
No. But where that infant begins and where a serious skeptic ends is completely subjective. And even if I personally am not prepared others might be and I have no grounds on which to criticize them other than pragmatic ones.
Quoting tim wood
No. That doesn't mean others aren't.
Strong emotions, so strong that you can't imagine thinking otherwise, are not the same thing is reason. "Murder is wrong" isn't a result of reasoning. It's just a strong emotion.
Sure, I feel that it is wrong. That's not a result of reasoning. It's an emotional disposition that I have.
yea, typo
Quoting tim wood
I can, others may disagree with me.
Quoting tim wood
Yup I agree. I'm saying there is no stopping the fool by calling him a fool. He doesn't think he is, he thinks we're the fools. I'm not taking that stance, I'm pointing out that taking the stance of reason cannot stop someone form taking a stance of anti reason
Quoting tim wood
I don't get this. What's "reasoned pragmatic grounds" and "unreasoned pragmatic grounds"
Quoting tim wood
I can and would, it just doesn't actually stop them unless they themselves believe murder is wrong (which they probably don't).
The only point I'm making is that reason is society bound which is why using it against those who don't want to use it will never work. Calling a fool a fool doesn't do anything. And there were times when the most intelligent people were called fools for the longest time. I, personally, am a fan of reason but if someone isn't there is nothing I can do to convince him. Calling him a fool won't work (if he truely is anti reason) but I still WILL. That's all I'm saying
So yes you can assign truthvalues to statements in ethics, with the caveat that those statements are necessarily limited to a specific social context.
How would an intersubjective value obtain?
Don't quite understand what you mean, sorry. Care to elaborate?
In other words, how would it come to be as an existent? What's it supposed to be a property of? Where would we find it? How would it arise? etc.
It's a type of convention, which originate in dialogue and agreement between people roughly speaking. You can find it in the brains of people, but not in one particular person individually, which is why the label 'subjective' doesn't really apply. Like paper money, which doesn't have any inherent value (for people), it has tangible consequences because people agreed on it and believe in it.
"Subjective" refers to something being located in brains, by the way. Re agreement, that's just sounds that people make. The meaning part occurs in brains. So value only occurs in brains. It's fine noting that we can agree on things, but that's not where the valuing part occurs.
For "intersubjective, not subjective or objective" to amount to anything substantial, you'd need to be locating the valuing part somewhere other than just persons' brains or in the world outside of their brains. (Whatever would be left.)
My goal, and I would say the goal of philosophy is not to amount to anything "substantial" whatever that means, but to make sense of the world. I don't see why 'intersubjective', though i prefer collective, doesn't do exactly what I want it to do, and that is to make relevant distinctions that help me make sense of the world.
Yes, I was. You asked my moral stance on it. Moral stances are dispositions--preferences or feelings, basically, that individuals have about interpersonal behavior that they consider to be more significant than etiquette.
You might think that moral stances are something other than that. You'd be factually incorrect about that.
Subjective shouldn't have a "merely" first off, as if it's simpler or inferior or whatever.
Whether something is a bad idea is also subjective, of course.
Morality is dispositions about interpersonal behavior. So that means that by definition, it's not just about one's own behavior. And by definition, it's dispositions that people feel strong enough about that they'd take forcible action to prevent,and sometimes to obligate, some behavior (otherwise it would just be etiquette). So of course there's a social aspect to it, but moral stances, moral valuations themselves are individual and subjective.
"Murder is wrong" is a moral stance.
You don't agree with that?
Funny that you're trolling but characterizing it as me trolling.
Well, if "funny" means "typical."
I did. You don't agree that I did. So I'm trying to explain that to you. Of course, either you're trolling or you're incredibly dense, so it might be difficult, but in either case, I'm willing to try to explain it to you.
Hence why I asked if you didn't agree that "Murder is wrong" is a moral stance.
Merely in quotes... It is less people, particular only to an individual.
Quoting Terrapin Station
It's a bad idea, if you hold the value that you don't want whatever the negative consequences are of disregarding morality. The value is subjective, not the 'fact' that to obtain that value you'd better don't disregard some intersubjective morality.
Quoting Terrapin Station
Sure, but morality being about interpersonal behaviour doesn't make the disposition itself interpersonal. If it's only an individual disposition, then you are missing something.
Quoting Terrapin Station
You are missing something. The social aspect is the vital part. For a women in a radical muslim country it doesn't matter if her moral view is that everyone should be able to wear what they want, she will still have to act according to the dominant mores... unless she can find enough likeminded people to change those societal mores. If you're the only one holding a certain view, then you merely have a view on morality, but that does not constitute an actual morality that is enforced socially.
"Bad"/"good" are ALWAYS subjective assessments, and there's never a guarantee that any two people will come to the same assessment about the same thing.
Quoting ChatteringMonkey
I don't know if that's what you meant to type, but I couldn't agree more.
Quoting ChatteringMonkey
What would you be missing?
Quoting ChatteringMonkey
If she wants particular consequences, etc., sure. But that in itself isn't actually morality. Morality is value assessments of interpersonal behavior.
Quoting ChatteringMonkey
Sure, there's no law or no mores etc. backing up your personal view. That's often the case, isn't it?
No we usually jail him. Again, I never said you have to tolerate foolishness even if the foolish see us as being fools for that. You just can't stop them because you have no argument to convince them by. Same if the fool tries to convince you to become one. He can't convince you and you can't convince him so then it's just survival of the fittest. Note this entire paragraph could have been stated by said fool looking at a person employing reason. That's what I mean by survival of the fittest. Neither the fool nor the reasoable person has a claim over which method is "better", it's just that most of the fools died
Quoting tim wood
True. What I meant was the choice to use reason is society bound
Quoting tim wood
Depends on how you define them. We seem to have a pretty clear cut difference here at least when it comes to morality.
Me: Morality is intersubjective, but you don't need an objective rule to foist your moral codes onto someone else, that just depends on who can do it more effectively
You (at least how I'm reading it): Morality is objective, because you need objective rules before foisting your moral codes onto someone else
Quoting tim wood
Yes, at least to me. The main point of jail is so he doesn't do it again. Why do we think he shouldn't do it again? Because none of us wants to die. So ultimately it is because we don't feel like letting him kill any more of us.
Quoting tim wood
We throw him in anyway. I don't think you need an objective morality to foist your values onto someone else. Nothing is stopping you except how much you CAN foist said values
It is what i meant to type... but you may be interpreting it not as I intended. But i don't think it matters, I agree, dispositions are not interpersonal. Though I'd say that the dispositions are not the same as a morality.
Quoting Terrapin Station
Your are using a different definition then, I suppose. As I said, a value assessment of interpersonal behaviour is 'merely' a view on morality, not an an actual morality.
Quoting Terrapin Station
The mores are the morality.
But you can't make any sense out of the mores without adding in meaning, value judgments, etc.
I don't see why that is a problem, that's part of it sure. Money also doesn't make sense without humans giving it meaning and valuing it, though there's an aspect to it that's more then that... more than an individual valuation that is.
I am saying that your justification for a certain brain-state is a useful distinction for different "classes" of brain-states.
"Simple" emotions are not connected - mentally - to a requirement of a specific kind of justification. Moral stances are. So they can be differentiated from said emotions on that basis. This also means we can evaluate different moral stances, including our own, in a way we cannot do with "simple" emotions. This might not qualify as a truth value to you, but it nevertheless makes the claim that moral stances are just like emotions inaccurate.
It's not a problem. Morality is just something different than the social enforcement of morality.
Ah, okay. And what would you say is an example of this?
I didn't mean to say that It's just one aspect. It's the entire thing, including that, but not only that.
Yes, in those cases, too, if those terms are used as assessments.
Where would that fact obtain?
That's some location.
Ignoring that you completely ignored the question I asked, even though you supposedly have an issue with that, you're not saying that you couldn't understand "Sure, I feel that it is wrong" as me uttering a "Yes" opinion, are you?
Quoting tim wood
Badness isn't a property that things have. It's a value or preference judgment about things.
Asking this of someone who has already stated that they believe moral right/wrong is a matter of subjective opinion and demanding a yes/no answer is like asking "Have you stopped beating your wife, yes or no?".
Let's say your moral stances is "lying is always wrong". Let's suppose, for the sake of argument, that this is merely an expression of what you feel.
Now you visit this forum and see a thread about the morality of lying. Being that you feel your moral stance strongly, you want to participate. But you cannot write "that's how I feel" because you know that's not how you justify a position in philosophy. So you have to figure out an argument for your position.
If other people make counterarguments, you will then have to either evaluate your position and address the arguments, or ignore them. If you do the former, your position is now no longer one of emotion, since you're applying reasoning to support it and implicitly accept that reasoning is how you support such positions. If you do the latter you end up with a cognitive dissonance where you at the one hand have claimed that your position is reasonable, but on the other failed to support it. This also means your position is now no longer one of merely emotion.
You could of course refrain from any argument altogether, insisting that you merely have a feeling. That is not, however, how people normally operate with respect to moral stances. If it were, there'd be no need to even have a term for "moral stance".
But whether people believe/accept it or not, foundational moral stances ARE simply ways that they feel. There's no way to justify them on facts, since you can't derive an ought from an is. Again, this is the case whether people believe or act like it is or not.
I've explained to you in detail why Adler doesn't work. We can do the dance again if you like. Re fleeing, I respond if you respond to me. You simply ignore the responses or only reply in a trolling way.
I responded to Echarmion. He can respond if he wants.
No, he answered you in the only way he could given his beliefs about moral attitudes.
Quoting tim woodYou don't seem to have grasped the fact that you're arguing with someone who believes that things are only morally right/wrong from an individual subjective perspective.
It's quite pointless insisting "if it is not wrong......it must be right." if the person you're talking to simply does not accept your starting premises.
If what you asked him is "Do you agree that murder is wrong?" then he did answer your question, his answer being "Yes, murder is wrong".
Even if he did not answer your question that wouldn't mean (as you seem to be claiming) that he does not think that murder is wrong.
No answer != negative answer.
Terapin is right in the sense that some of the moral statements are nothing more than expressions of one's personal preferences. In some cases, saying "Murder is wrong" means no more than "I don't want people to be murdered". But in many cases -- in fact, in most of the cases -- moral statements aren't mere expressions of one's wants, desires, goals, etc. Rather, they are expressions of what someone thinks is the best thing to do in order to maximize chances of attaining certain goal. In most cases, what "Murder is wrong" means is "If you want human species to survive for as long as possible, don't kill other people". Such statements DO have a truth value.
It's really as simple as that.
No, that's not it.
What I pointed out is that "if you want Y" does NOT imply that you ought to do Y, or that you ought to do X, which achieves Y.
"You ought to (do what's necessary to) achieve what you want" is not a fact. That would have to be a fact in order for either "If you want x, then you should do x" OR "if you want x, and y is necessary for x, then you should do y" to be implied by wanting x.
Quoting tim wood
I answered this already. YES, in my opinion it's wrong.
I don't think the "simply" belongs here. Moral stances may originate as feelings. But they have another dimension when other subjects enter the picture, and start to communicate. That's why i think it's accurate to say that there is an interpersonal layer where things like "moral truths" reside. This does not make them facts, or justifiable from facts.
If we're going with the subjective / objective dichotomy, then morals are subjective. There is no way they could be objective, since what object would they refer to? But in the subjective there are different forms of thought. There are things that are not reason-able, like emotions or preferences ("blue is my favorite color"). But there are also things that are reason-able, like "murder is wrong", because these kinds of brain-states, whatever we want to call them, contain in them a connection to other subjects. Not some kind of mystical ether, but just the way we thing these kind of thoughts contains our relation to others.
Truth is a subjective judgment about the relation of a proposition to something else. So "truth" isn't the right word here certainly.
Quoting Echarmion
Are you defining "reason" as "a connection to other subjects"?
That's fair enough. It's perhaps closer to validity. Or we could just call it justification.
Quoting Terrapin Station
No, not exactly. But I think it's a defining characteristic of reason that it is shared among humans. So it being accessible to other people is an aspect.
You did ask for his opinion. And his opinion is that murder is wrong. Maybe you wanted to ask him a different question, a question such as "Is murder objectively wrong?" But you did not. At least not clearly. And asking him such a question would lead you nowhere. What would you do when he responds with "No, murder is not objectively wrong"?
You don't seem as if you're trying to learn anything. You seem as if you want to be a teacher and you're basically offended if you're not accepted as such.
Shared in what sense? The show and tell sense? Do you mean literally having the same reason somehow?
Are you trying to learn there? Or is this you wanting to be a teacher and being offended that you're not accepted as such?
Whose opinion am I supposed to be giving?
Whenever you ask someone a question such as "Is X Y?" you are asking for their opinion. If I were to ask you a question such as "Is Socrates a man?" I would be asking for your opinion (which could be right or wrong.)
Terrapin's opinion happens to have no truth value because it is a mere expression of his personal preferences. When he tells you that murder is wrong all he's saying is that he doesn't like people to kill each other. The only way you can disagree with him is by claiming that he's lying about his preferences .e.g. by saying "No, dear Terrapin, you are lying, you don't mind it when people kill each other!"
The real problem with emotivism is that it's making a claim that EVERY moral statement is merely an expression of one's personal preferences. That's simply not true.
Terrapin's moral statements might be nothing more than mere expressions of what he likes and dislikes but my moral statements are not.
"The surest way to end up in heaven is by not lying to other people."
When we try to simplify it, we get something like:
"Don't lie!"
(Because you'll end up in hell if you do and you don't want to go to hell, don't you?)
It's a false statement but that's irrelevant. What's relevant is that it has a truth value. In reality, it is either the case that when you lie you go to hell and when you tell the truth you go to heaven -- or it is not.
The fact that people want to go to heaven is irrelevant.
Most moral statements are like that. I am not saying that every moral statement is like that, even less so that every statement -- moral or not -- is of that sort. I am simply saying that most moral statements are in fact statements about the way the world outside of the thinking subject works.
Although of course I simply think you have a mistaken belief that your moral statements are not expressions of personal dispositions, preferences, etc.
Quoting Magnus Anderson
I wouldn't actually say that that is a moral statement because it doesn't express whether it's right or wrong to lie or end up in heaven, or whether one should or should not lie or end up in heaven.
That's true. The statement is not a moral one. A moral statement would be something like "Lying is wrong". The above statement tells you how the universe works (in the form of "The surest way to make Y happen is to do X") but it does not tell you whether lying is right or wrong. So I stand corrected.
However, I would still argue that most of our moral judgments are not based solely on our personal preferences (what we like and what we dislike) but also on how the universe works.
In most cases, we decide whether a given act, such as lying, is right or wrong by:
1) choosing a goal: do we want to go to heaven or hell?
2) understanding how the universe works so that we can do what is necessary to do in order to attain our goal (what happens when you lie? what happens when you tell the truth? what happens when you keep quiet?)
If lying is precisely that which is necessary to do in order to attain our goal, then we say that lying is right. If it is precisely that which we must not do in order to attain our goal, then we say that lying is wrong.
My beef with emotivism is that it claims that moral judgments are based solely on one's personal preferences.
That's not true.
I don't say that you can't reason once you've stated your preferences. I say that (effectively) foundational moral stances can't be reasoned (and oughts can't be reasoned period per what I explained above as comments about Adler's claim otherwise). I just don't write all of that out all the time because it's wordy, it's laborious to write it all out, and it seems to me like it should be obvious.
So, for example, if we know that John thinks it's immoral to not let people freely live anywhere in the world that they'd like to live (or we could look at this from John's perspective just as well), then we could very well reason that John is probably going to think it's immoral to call ICE to raid his favorite restaurant, where he know a number of illegals are working (or from John's perspective, he could easily conclude this). But none of this makes the moral part something other than personal preferences. (And John could conclude otherwise--but it would be very odd for him to, we'd probably want further qualifications, etc.)
The point I am trying to make, which you seem to disagree with, is that most moral statements aren't mere expressions of one's personal preferences.
For example, in most cases, when someone says "Lying is wrong" they are not merely stating that they do not like to lie. Rather, what they are saying is "If I lie I won't be able to attain my goals".
In most cases, "Lying is wrong" is equivalent to "If I lie I won't attain my goals". (This means that moral statements do have truth value.)
I don't agree with that as an empirical matter (that most moral utterances are only going to amount to the conditions necessary for some goal--my side of the bet would be on most people really having reactions for or against certain behaviors on a gut level), but again, I wouldn't say that "If I do x, then y is/is not achievable" is a moral utterance in the first place. So you'd be saying that most apparently moral utterances aren't moral utterances at all.
That certainly seems like you being here to learn.
I would tend to be inclined towards non-cognitivism/emotivism, but don't necessarily agree with the distinction. Ethical arguments are colored by emotional appeals, but the attempt to parcel out an ethic can be concerned with abstract truths. I would reject that such truths exist, but do not think that the parties who put forth such an argument are necessarily making an emotional appeal.
Ethics is an experiment in how to live well collectively. Whether or not an action can be considered to be right or wrong is particular to each and every given situation.
First, there's a sense of "opinion" that refers to one's view on a factual matter. This is the sense in which you receive opinions--including second opinions, from physicians. This is also the sense in which we write sentences such as "Einstein does not share the opinion held by most of us that there is overwhelming evidence for quantum mechanics."
Long post coming up, bear with me . . .
This discussion began with a reference to an entry in the online Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entitled "Moral Cognitivism vs. Non-Cognitivism". The OP asked for opinions on this article.
I tried reading this and have to confess that I could not get through it - it was too dense and jargon laden for me. However, the summary at the top of the article is reasonably clear and I believe I get the gist of things.
Basically the article is a survey of contemporary philosophical schools of thought regarding statements about morality. The author groups these schools of thought into two large categories - Moral Cognitivism vs. Moral Non-Cognitivism. There are also many sub-categories.
Based on the opening summary, you seem to be on the side of Moral Cognitivism and in particular you seem to be a moral realist. Per the article, "... moral realists are cognitivists insofar as they think moral statements are apt for robust truth and falsity and that many of them are in fact true."
I.e., I believe you would assert that the statement "Murder is wrong" is a true statement. Please correct me if I am mis-representing you.
Terrapin, on the other hand, falls into the Non-cognitivist camp. Again, per the article, "non-cognitivists think that moral statements have no substantial truth conditions".
So asking the question "Is murder wrong, yes or no?" cannot possibly be a starting point for discussion since this statement assumes that Moral Cognitivism is correct. To continue this thought, even if a person were to answer this "No" - that too is a statement that only a Moral Cognitivist would make - albeit one that you would disagree with. I.e., by asserting that "Murder is OK" a person is asserting a truth value about a moral statement and (at the risk of repeating myself) non-cognitivists think that moral statements have no substantial truth conditions.
Putting it another way, the question "Is murder wrong, yes or no?" is *not* a simple question since there is a hidden assumption behind the question - namely that the question must be answered within the context of Moral Cognitivism.
So it is pointless to continue asking Terrapin the same question over and over since Terrapin is of the opinion that the question itself is wrong. Now could Terrapin find a way to answer you more clearly and respectfully? Perhaps - I wish both of you would be more respectful to each other; the name calling is distracting and does not contribute to the discussion. I do disagree with you that Terrapin is a troll, he may be arrogant, he may be totally wrong, but I am not seeing any trolling.
Oh - and I also disagree with Terrapin that you are a troll. :wink:
Perhaps you have already done so - in which case I apologize for the implication - but I respectfully suggest that you read the full article from the OP. I do not follow all the discussions, but there seem to be some interesting objections to Non-Cognitivism in sections 4 & 5. I could be wrong (it happens on a regular basis) but if you want to poke holes in Terrapin's Non-cognitivist position? That seems like a more fruitful approach.
I wrote this earlier on but l think it addresses your statement here ,
I would divide emotivism into two further categories.
1.Overt emotivism regards the utterance of moral statements as attitudes in a descriptive form.
Hence the statement "killing is bad" is a description of the statement "l hate killing". So according to overt emotivist we can replace these two statements. This theory is really week in my opinion.
2.Covert emotivism may be a little tricky since they tend to replace hate,despise, fear etc with bad , evil , immoral and so on in moral statements but they do not express attitudes as you have mentioned rightly.
, it seems obvious to me that people don't just express an emotion when they make moral statements.
Mind you, you can obviously disagree with the distinction but l think it's useful ( at least for me ) .
Do you think covert emotivism is really common among public especially when they tend to defend some moral statements with ridiculous arguments. If it is common with public, academic are only good at hiding it and justifying the use of truth values.
I am somewhat confused by your distinction.
I do think that it is possible for someone to level an Ethical argument concerning abstract truths without, wittingly or not, substituting that something is not Ethically valid with that it is socially disagreeable. I don't agree with such reasoning as I don't think that there are abstract Ethical truths, and I think that whether or not something is socially disagreeable can be relevant.
I also think that Emotivism partially assumes that an appeal to emotions invalidates an argument which I would also, to some degree, reject.
Non Cognivitism has many other positions which haven't been discussed here yet. I hope we can discuss them one by one as the article states that
It is possible that most non cognitivists support a hybrid theory with various ethical irealist ideas overlapping.
Universal prescriptivism suggests that moral statements like " stealing is wrong " act as "do no steal" since the main aim of moral statements is that they should be followed. What differs moral prescriptions from other imperatives statements like " you should not litter here " is the universal character of the imperative. They act as a command to the agent,the one at whom it is directed and all similar cases in society too. There is another problem with imperative statements, while most philosophers find it difficult to strictly indicate what falls under following but they generally state " having intentions to carry out order " falls under it. I may have missed the specifics but this is the gist of it.
Quasi Realism as the name suggests, is another branch of counter realism in ethics which seeks to explain why we treat ethical statements as being apt for truth values, especially in the society without basing their grounds on cognitivism. They reject that moral statements can have truth values attached to them on epistemic grounds. The positivist rejected moral language as being outside the domain of logic and scientific statements and hence meaningless as the article hints
Expressivism is akin to emotivism as they have taken similar lines of reasoning however there is a fine distinction between them.
While the emotivist may fall under two broad different categories such as behaviourism or expressivism. It is also interesting to note that mental states are not always emotions. They can have imperatives, indicative moods and much more. This theory is different from the ones that l have mentioned above in the sense that it describes them all by placing mental states of the brain as a foundation to determine the meaning of ethical statements.
I will write about the hybrid theories of non-cognitivism before moving on to ethical realism.
I mean being able to re-create the relevant brain-states in their own mind with sufficient accuracy.
You're right but I'm not sure that the claim of emotivism is that moral judgements are solely based on personal preferences (that they're sufficient) - if they were, all personal preferences would be moral preferences and of course they're not.
My understanding of emotivism (and what I think is the case) is that it is the recognition that personal preferences are necessary components of all sincerely held moral stances. All (sincere) moral judgements are therefore, to some degree or other, expressions of emotional attitudes.
So something like a resemblance nominalism sense then.
Okay so we're back to this, then:
Quoting Echarmion
If "Murder is wrong" isn't "reason-able" as you put it because of the connection to other subjects (in other words, you explained that that's not actually what you are referring to with the term "reason-able"), then what makes it reason-able?
It's reason-able because the statement is processed by a part of the brain that operates on a reason-ruleset, so to speak. A part that we use for things that concern interpersonal relations.
So any phenomena in that part of the brain, and/or any phenomena focused on interpersonal relations is reason-able? (I don't know if it's also reasonable without the hyphen in your view.)
So non-cognitivism is a variation on a yet more generic framework? Dang, I missed that one - and that was the first sentence! :smile:
I did a quick search and ran into a different article in the same online Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entitled "Moral Anti-Realism". I tried plowing through this, but got bogged down in a ticket of jargon and terminologies. In fact, even the author (or authors) of this article humorously acknowledge the difficulty in defining/characterizing the different philosophical positions.
Anyway - I appreciate your efforts to explain the various beasts in this menagerie of philosophical positions. I will try to absorb some of this, but it will be very slow going.
The question that comes to mind here is, if moral stances are expressions of emotional attitudes to some degree then what else are they?
Quoting Terrapin Station
No, because that would include emotions and preferences. As for the hyphen, I use it to denote that I am using the two words reason and able literally, as in "accessible to reason".
It seems like you keep telling me info that's not what it is for "murder is wrong" to be reason-able then.
I'm wanting you to describe how it can be reason-able.
Whatever else the people making moral claims intend to convey. At the very least, moral judgements (in contrast to non-moral preferences) signify disapproval/approval for the actions of others.
I am not certain it's possible to describe how reason works. There are arguments to be made about whether murder should be wrong. Those arguments must be logically valid and proceed from acceptable premises.
Quoting ChrisH
And what if what people want to convey are certain "truths" about how interactions in a society should function? And moral stances are not just about the behaviour of others, you can evaluate (and change) your own actions based on your moral stance.
Would you say they could proceed from (or not include) premises that are not moral stances?
X is wrong if and only if "x is wrong" is a true statement.
That's what you're saying here, right?
Is that because you're reading "x is wrong" as necessarily being a claim about (or a statement of) a fact?
Whether or not murder is wrong is contingent upon the circumstances in which the murder was committed. Because murder so emphatically denies the other by virtue of that it terminates them, it can generally be said that "murder is wrong" because is most cases this would prove to be 'true'. I'm sure that there is a hypothetical case where a person may question as to whether or not a murder was, in point of fact, "wrong". Also, are we speaking of murder in particular or just simply killing?
Edit: If we are just speaking of murder, being the unlawful and unwarranted killing of an other, then, you could conclude that "murder is wrong" because it would be, by definition, unwarranted. This ethic, however, stems from that there is an other. It exists because of a social relationship. There is nothing intrinsicly wrong with murder, or, rather, there exists no Ethical law which states that "murder is wrong". That it is wrong is something that is deduced because of a social relationship.
If that's not what you're saying, you could just say "No," and then you could clarify.
A methodology that proceeds from that "murder is wrong" could be quite interesting. To what degree is what one is doing like murder? I would, perhaps, deduce that it is wrong to violate what an other existentially attests. I would, then, of course, have to qualify this. You could say that in so far that what an other existentially attests is in good faith and Ethically sound and valid that it is wrong to violate this. I could parcel out an entire ethic from there as you could as well. I don't think that I would start there, though.
As murder is the exception and not the rule, I'm not sure that it would be useful to create an ethic proceeding from that "murder is wrong". We can say that "murder is wrong", but that is all that we really know. It's just the one rule that checks out.
For instance, what about theft? Had you just come out of Bicycle Thieves, you might suggest that it is wrong to steal because you don't know what role that that object has to play in a person's life. Had you just finished reading Les Misérables, you might suggest that it is fine to steal if you need to do so in order to survive. From this, you could deduce that it is wrong to steal a bicycle, but not a loaf of bread, but doing so would be absurd. The percieved need to ascribe abstract truths to Ethics is due to a legal aporia which assumes that there ought to be an effective functioning of the State. A governing body has no idea as to how to deal with criminality without the disjointed logic of objective Ethics. To me, it is clear that Ethics are contingent upon the particulars of any given situation. Because we could never understand any given situation in its entirety, we can't make any objective claims as to what is Ethically valid aside from a few deductions such as that "murder is wrong".
I'm sure many people do want to convey their beliefs about moral "truths".
My point is that you have only identified an exception to the rule. Murder is an extraordinary case. What we can infer proceeding from that "murder is wrong" can not necessarily be applied throughout all of Ethics.
I'm suggesting that all of Ethics is "outside the bounds of ordinary consideration". Every event is a particularity.
Edit: That you can say that "murder is wrong" does not necessarily invalidate the Non-Cognitivist position. That it happens to be the case that when someone states that "murder is wrong" can be proven to be 'true' abstractly does not necessarily mean that when they make such a claim that they are not making a personal appeal.
I do, however, think that it is possible to simply state that "murder is wrong" abstractly. The distinctions are not how I would choose to wage a debate concerning Ethics.
Edit 2: To answer the original question posed by Wittgenstein, I do think that it is possible to assign truth values to Ethical statements, but don't think that it is useful to do so.
Good.
Noumena notwithstanding. Your argument stands on its own with no need for even the idea of them.
Carry on.
Given that "murder is wrong is trivially assumed by everyone", does it make any practical difference in the real world if the reasons for a person thinking that murder is wrong are based in a strong sense of personal morality - i.e. if they are non-cognitivists? I think not.
So, for everyone else, does Non-Cognitivism deny that Ethical value judgements can be made? I think that it might, and don't necessarily agree, but do agree with the general sentiment of the critique of that is being made.
No, not at all. It's simply that ethical judgments are not true or false under noncognitivism.
What the heck would that be referring to? Whatever "passes in me for a larger sense"??
You are correct. I was thinking of Emotivism.
tim wood has left the discussion Terrapin Station.
Emotivism is a species of noncognitivism.
I am aware of that. I just conflated the terms when I made that post.
I am not sure. The question is whether it's possible to avoid an is-ought-fallacy on the one side and an infinite regress of moral stances on the other.
My intuition is that they proceed from a sort of moral axiom, which would be some principle of reciprocity (similar to the golden rule).
If you feel you have nothing more to say, that's OK. But to request that no one replies? I don't think that is in the spirit of this forum. Just say "I give you the last word". I have done this.
Quoting tim wood
I would not serve on a jury if there was any chance that the death penalty could be applied.
I would just never agree to vote "guilty" in that case.
There are many situations where I'd never agree that someone is guilty due to not agreeing with laws/sentencing/etc. I strongly believe in jury nullification. Of course, not everyone does, but at least in the U.S. the jury's verdict has to be unanimous.
"Murder is wrong" is a statement that is either true or false only if you assume that it has truth value. If it does not then the statement is neither true nor false. So you're wrong.
It is this assumption that is the subject of this thread.
What have you done to prove its validity?
After all, truth is a belief that corresponds to reality.
Even statements that merely express one's personal preferences have truth value: either one has the stated preferences or one does not.
"I like cake" expresses a personal preference of mine that I either have (which would make it true) or that I don't (which would make it false.)
The real subject of this thread then is concerned with language i.e. what moral statements actually mean.
According to emotivists, moral statements express no more than one's personal preferences. According to me, in most cases that is not true.
When most people say "Killing people is wrong" they are not merely saying that they don't want people to be killed. Rather, they are saying that society cannot survive if people kill each other.
In most cases, "X is wrong" is equivalent to "X is something that would make it difficult or impossible for us to attain our goals".
The case has been around for some time, it just isn't convincing enough. They definitely have a truth-value, whatever that may be. Anyone who thinks otherwise I would put down to a result of misinterpretation.